Abstract:
In spite of having a long history of highly structured bureaucracy of Bangladesh inherited from
British-India, at present, the civil service of Bangladesh has lost its image for unscrupulous
decisions by the successive governments through over politicization. Over the years, mostly
intentionally, all governments have manipulated the civil service for their partisan political
interest and to rule the country surviving in power for long. In this regard, they have illegally
controlled the personnel administrative matters like recruitment, promotion, transfer, posting,
OSD, forced retirement and contractual appointment. Among them, wholesale contractual
appointments by the ruling parties have intensified the degree of politicization in
administration. Although, all democratic governments of Bangladesh have claimed that they
have resorted such practice to retain the smooth service of capable officers having proven
professional expertise to fill up vacuum in special circumstances in public interest, but the
increasing number of contractual appointments over the decades appears to have been based
more on political loyalty of the concerned officials to serve government's narrow political
interest. Contractual appointments may have many positive sides, but its negative impacts are
pervasive in Bangladesh civil service now. The study has analyzed only the three negative
effects of contractual appointments including “Foster Partisan Political Interest”, “Blockage of
Promotion” and “Low Level of Morale” which have been measured with several indicators.
To build an analytical framework, relevant literatures have been discussed. The study is unique
and the major objective of it is to assess the negative effect of contractual appointments in
Bangladesh Civil Service. The main research question was how contractual appointments
affect negatively in Bangladesh Civil Service. Primary and secondary data have been used for
the study. Primary data were collected through in-depth interview and semi-structured
questionnaire survey. A total of thirty (30) respondents, fourteen (14) from serving civil
servants and sixteen (16) from retired ones, were taken as sample respondents to conduct
interview and semi-structured questionnaire survey. And the secondary data were gathered
from several newspapers, journals, Bangladesh Gazettes, books, reports, websites, blogs and
posts etc. An extensive review of literatures, documents, newspapers and web pages pertained
to the contractual appointments, politicization and civil service, was conducted. As the research
goes mostly with the qualitative in nature, the collected data were organized and analyzed in a
systematic way and the data and findings were presented with detailed analysis and explanation
in order to address research questions and fulfill the objectives. From the analysis, it appears
that contractual appointments have increased over the years and fostered the partisan attitude
among the bureaucrats in administration as the ruling parties have desperately strived to get
undue advantages from them, to consolidate the power and to run the country over and over
again. To this end, successive governments have superseded one another through intensifying
the degree of nepotism & favouritism, political patronage, divisions among civil servants in
separate camps in administration. In addition, confrontational politics among political parties,
lack of consensus among them on national issues and vulnerable democratic institutions have
very close connection with contractual appointments. Such appointments at higher
administration have blocked the promotions of hundreds of careerist, efficient and professional
bureaucrats as the hierarchy of administration is pyramidal in structure and the tenure of service
age of the employees is limited. And thus the frequent blockage of promotions and partisan
politics in administration have sharply decreased the morale and productivity of the civil
servants. The variables -- the main three negative effects -- of the study are very closely
connected to one other, therefore, the measuring indicators to prove them are also intertwined.
So, the most striking feature of the variables and indicators is that they influence one another.
For example, the variables – ‘foster partisan political interest’ and ‘low level of morale’ -- can
be measured by the same indicators. Likewise, the variable – ‘low level of morale’ – may also
be measured by the other two variables – ‘blockage of promotion’ and ‘foster partisan political
interest’ together with some other indicators. For this reason, several statements and quotations
might also have been used in measuring the above variables. In fact, the result of this study
provides a snapshot picture of the negative effects of contractual appointments in Bangladesh
civil service which may assist a proper policy formulation and implementation to overcome
from the deep-rooted problems.