

Electoral Violence in Bangladesh: A Comparative Analysis of 2001 and 2008 Parliamentary Elections

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DEDICATION
TO MY BELOVED PARENTS

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CERTIFICATION

The thesis on ‘*Electoral Violence in Bangladesh: A Comparative Analysis of 2001 and 2008 Parliamentary elections*’ has been written by Noorana. She has conducted the research under my supervision. I find it satisfactory for submission to the Department of Political Science under the Faculty of Social Sciences, University of Dhaka for the award of the Degree of Master of Philosophy.

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DECLARATION

I submit the thesis on ‘*Electoral Violence in Bangladesh: A Comparative Analysis of 2001 and 2008 Parliamentary Elections*’ to the Department of Political Science under the Faculty of Social Sciences, University of Dhaka for the award of the Degree of Master of Philosophy. I hereby declare that it has not been submitted for any other degree.

Noorana

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GLOSARY

Campaign	A series of political actions (like advertisements, public appearances, and debates) that are used to help a political party get supported by the masses to their activities and ideologies.
Caretaker Government	One of the provisions of Bangladesh Constitution is that once an election is called, the government goes into 'caretaker' mode. The caretaker period continues after polling day until it is clear who will form the new government.
Candidate	A person who is running or contesting in election for an office.
Constituency	The geographical unit which elects a single MP. There will be 300 in the Bangladesh after the election.
Code of Conduct	A set of general rules of behavior, for example for members and/or staff of an EMB, or for political parties, with respect to participation in an electoral process.
Democracy	A form of government in which people hold the power, either by voting for measures directly or by voting for representatives who vote for them.
Election	A process in which people vote to choose a leader or to decide an issue.
Electoral Management	Electoral management is a process. This process is managed by a body or bodies with specific electoral management responsibilities. Thus electoral management means bringing together the knowledge and expertise relating to electoral activities of EMB, their roles and functions, their organization, financing and management of election administration. It also focuses on the

	institutional structure of EMB, their administrative infrastructure and their external environment.
Electoral Campaign	The period of weeks immediately before an election when politicians try to persuade people to vote for them. In this sense, electoral campaign means such political activity, which includes meetings, rallies, speeches, parades, broadcasts, debates and other media events designed to inform the voters.
Electoral System	Bangladesh uses a <i>first past the post</i> system. In this system, the candidate who gets more votes than any other candidate in the constituency wins.
Election Commission	A non-partisan body which determines election procedures and oversees the conduct of elections. The Constitution of Bangladesh (Article 118) gives the provision for setting up an Election Commission (EC) for the superintendence, direction and control of the preparation of electoral rolls for election.
Electoral Fraud	Electoral fraud is illegal interference on the process of an election. Acts of fraud affect vote counts to bring about an election result, whether by increasing the vote share of the favored candidate, depressing the vote share of the rival candidates or both. It is also called voter fraud; the mechanisms included illegal voter registration, intimidation at polls and improper vote counting. Electoral fraud varies from country to country.
General election	Election at which all seats in the parliament are contested. General elections must take place in Bangladesh at least every five years.
Landslide	The name given to an election that one party wins by a very large margin. The Awami League won landslide victory in the election 2008.

Manifesto	A public declaration of a party's ideas and policies usually printed during the campaign. Once in power, a government is often judged by how many of its manifesto promises it manages to deliver.
Opposition	The largest party not in government is known as the official opposition.
Presiding Officer	The person responsible for ensuring the conduct of the ballot in polling stations. They have to ensure that ballot boxes are kept secure and are responsible for transferring them safely to the count.
Political Party	An organized group of people with common values and goals, who try to get their candidates elected to office. The Awami League (AL) and the Bangladesh Nationalist Party (BNP) are the two major political parties in Bangladesh today.
Representative Democracy	A government in which the adult citizens of the country vote to elect the country's leaders. These elected leaders make the governmental decisions.
Returning Officer	The official in charge of elections in each of the constituencies.
Vote	A way to show your preference and choose elected leaders or decide on initiatives. People can vote by marking a piece of paper, raising their hand, or filling out a form on a computer.

ABBREVIATIONS

AL	Awami League
BNP	Bangladesh Nationalist Party
BD	Basic Democracy
BEMB	Bangladesh Election Management Body
BNP	Bangladesh Nationalist Party
BEC	Bangladesh Election Commission
CEC	Chief Election Commissioner
CMLA	Chief Martial Law Administrator
CML	Council Muslim League
CTG	Caretaker Government
SOE	State of Emergency
RPO	Representation of the People Order
EC	Election Commission
RPO	Representation of the People Order

ABSTRACT

This research deals with electoral violence in Bangladesh particularly its causes, nature and effects which is detrimental to the process of democratization of the country. Electoral violence attenuates participation in the process of democratization. In addition, electoral violence causes human insecurity, deepen confrontational politics. Since 1973, parliamentary elections have suffered from electoral violence of varying degrees. This study has specifically focused on comparisons of electoral violence between 2001 and 2008 elections. The data, for this purpose, have been collected from primary and secondary sources. Primary data were collected from a total of 50 interviewees. Secondary data have been collected from newspapers. Content analysis has been done to analyse secondary data. Thus the finds of the study suggest that, although electoral violence fall place due to the reason of winning in the election, but certain grey areas remain in the process of occurring electoral violence. The difference in the scale of violence between 2001 and 2008 elections lies in the overall performance of the election management bodies. The better management in 2008 elections led to the low scale of violence. However, the findings of Bangladesh case may be evident in other contexts of transitional democracies.

Chapter - 1

Introduction

Introduction

Elections are theoretically assumed to ensure peaceful transfer of power through voting. Electoral violence in democracy, therefore, undermines the legitimacy of the process of making the government. In the last 43 years Bangladesh has experienced violence in elections not only under authoritarian or semi-authoritarian regimes but also under parliamentary governments, calling the free and fair elections into question. In Bangladesh, since 1973, nine parliamentary elections have so far held until 2008. All these elections have witnessed several rounds of violence. In recent history, the electoral violence rose to an alarming height in the eight national parliamentary elections (2001) in which minority voters were attacked, their properties destroyed including their daughters raped. In comparison with 8th parliamentary elections, violence in the 9th parliamentary elections (2008) was less visible. Violence in elections however has impacted on the smooth democratic transition in Bangladesh. Generally, the opposition has denied legitimacy of elections, for that matter the defeated party, resulting in the boycott of parliament session. Not only have that but also life, liberty and property of a section of the voters been threatened to the extinction due to electoral violence.

1. Background of the study:

Bangladesh has become acquainted with electoral democracy since the British colonial period with 1935 India Independent Act. Under this Act, the elections of 1937 and 1947 were held in the then Bengal province (Noorana, 2016). After 1954 elections, the first parliamentary elections under federal structure were held in 1970, in which Awami League got the absolute majority in the central and provincial legislature. The rejection of electoral mandate by the (West) Pakistani elite regarding transfer of power to the AL led to the War of Liberation. As a result, Bangladesh became an independent sovereign state through a violent armed struggle. After independence, the parliamentary election was held in 1973, under the provision of 1972 Bangladesh Constitution. The 1973 Parliamentary elections

were marred by widespread violence. From then onwards, no parliamentary elections in Bangladesh was entirely free from some sort of violence.

With the break-up of British India in 1947, Pakistan became an independent state wherein the then Bengal province became an integral part. During the Pakistani rule (1947-1970) Bengali people of East Bengal (former Bengal province) had the taste of two important landmark elections. One held in 1954 through which United Front (UF) government assumed the state power in East Bengal. But their government did not complete the term. However, the military takeover in 1958 by General Iskander Mirza followed by Ayub Khan in the same year buried the possibility of competitive democratic elections until 1970. The 1970 National Parliamentary Elections in the United Pakistan was the only national elections in which Awami League won the majority in both the national and the provincial legislatures. The verdict of this election scaled off the sustainability of the United Pakistan as the Pakistani ruling elites failed to transfer power to Bangabandhu Sheikh Mujibur Rahman. As a result, the Pakistani ruling elite launched a military crackdown in East Bengal, thus initiating post 1970 electoral violence. This violence eventually led to the War of Liberation. After eight -month long War the then East Bengal (later Bangladesh) became an independent state on 16 December 1971. After independence, the 1972 constitution upheld democracy as the long cherished form of government by the Bengali people. As per the constitution the responsibility of holding of elections was entrusted with the Election Commission. The Commission since 1973 has so far organized ten parliamentary elections in the country along with other elections. In all these elections, the incumbent party has been accused of rigging elections. The winning party has pursued 'winner takes all' policy while being in power. The policy of 'one man, one vote' has been persistently followed in the elections to form the majority. In the context of widespread violence featuring 2001 and 2008 general elections, a particular section of the civil society has been advocating to replace the above policy by adopting proportional system. More or less every parliamentary election in Bangladesh was faced electoral violence. After 1991 election, electoral violence was chronologically increasing. Electoral violence in the Eighth Parliamentary Elections (2001 election) was more than the seventh elections (1996 election). In the eighth parliamentary election, pre-electoral violence became so rampant that many observers suspected whether holding election in a

peaceful and congenial atmosphere could at all be possible. Clashes and conflicts particularly between the activists of AL and those of BNP made the situation grave (Mannan, 2005, p.171). It was reported that 124 persons were killed and 6,000 injured within 35 days of the declaration of election schedule (*Ajker Kagoj*, 25 September 2001). Incidents of killing, attacks on the election rally and procession, attacks on the candidates including some former Ministers, and destruction of election camps were common. Activists of a particular religious party attacked members of the minority community in many places of the country (Mannan, 2005, p. 172). Since electoral violence spoils the congenial atmosphere to hold free and fair election, when the impacts of violence remain long time, it became difficult to hold next election. In this context 2006 election could not be held in due time. After two years with an unelected caretaker government had been governing under a state of emergency, the Bangladeshi people chose a democratically elected government on 29 December 2008. The ninth parliamentary elections (2008 election) set a new, higher standard for future elections in Bangladesh (Noorana, 2016). However, the 2008 elections will be remembered for reasons beyond these results: the campaign was violence-free, candidates of all parties by and large adhered to strict electoral rules, participation of the voter was higher than ever before, the Election Day atmosphere was festive, and the elections were free, fair and credible(Riaz, 2013, p.140). Now I would like to explain the contextual factors that have contributed to the spread of electoral violence during pre, election-day, and post electoral violence followed 2001 and 2008 parliamentary elections.

1.1. The background of 2001 and 2008 parliamentary elections

Electoral histories of Bangladesh especially parliamentary elections, most of the cases were non-participative and noncompetitive rather government-sponsored and designed programs to legitimize their own regimes. Not only the military governments, but also the civilian governments of Bangladesh followed almost the same path. AL assumed power through the June 1996 Parliamentary elections sweeping 146 seats in the Jatiya Sangsad, BNP got the second position securing 116 seats, but it claimed that the election was not free and fair, and so, it was reluctant to accept the election results. After anticipating loss of their popularity, BNP eventually accepted the results and joined the parliament.

However, soon it started boycotting the Parliament on various issues and attempted to organize mass movement against AL government. On January 6, 1999, BNP along with Jamaat-i-Islami Jatio Party and Islami Okkaya Jote formed a four-party alliance which demanded resignation of the government and holding a fresh Parliamentary elections under caretaker government. AL, completing its full tenure of five years handed over the power as per the constitutional provision to a caretaker government (Mannan, 2005, p.164). As Bangladesh began the run up to parliamentary elections, citizen's activism to promote free and fair elections clashed with efforts by political adversaries to assert their rival claims to power. Canvassing for popular has often been accompanied by attempts to silence voters of rival candidates or to engage in physical combat. As political parties used young gangs, some armed, to bolster their campaigns, violence became inevitable. Election reports by Fair Election Monitoring Alliance (FEMA) and others identified the use of pre-election threats to intimidate members of minority communities. This built into unprecedented attacks on such communities in many districts, immediately after the elections, which were not reined in either by the party whose supporters were alleged to have carried out these attacks, or the caretaker Government itself. The latter deployed the military to assist in maintaining peace during elections, but casualties in 422 clashes between the two leading parties stood at 103 killed and 1180 injured in 73 days under the Caretaker Government(FEMA,2002). The Caretaker Government's steps to hold peaceful, fair elections included arrests of party cadres in possession of illegal arms, cancellation of fire-arms issued indiscriminately by the previous government, deployment of armed forces before elections. The influence of the bureaucracy on influencing the course of the elections is manifest in the mode of transfers prior to elections. Two months before the Awami League handed over power; it transferred 31 District Commissioners, 170 Upazilla Nirbahi Officers, and 150 Assistant District Commissioners and over 262 Police Officials. The Chief Advisor to the caretaker Government, within a day of taking office, changed thirteen senior secretaries in the administration. He also ordered a large scale transfer of senior and junior government personnel, apparently to reverse the transfers made by its predecessor government. On both occasions these steps raised concerns for the course of free and fair elections (The Sangbad, 16 July, 2001). Finally the eight national parliamentary elections held on October 1, 2001.

According to eight parliamentary elections in 2001, the tenure of BNP led government ended in 2006. After nearly two years of the state of emergency (SOE) under a military backed caretaker government (CTG) in 2008, during most of which several fundamental rights were suspended and in which political activity banned, the emergency was lifted on 17 December. Much anticipated and twice-postponed parliamentary elections finally took place on 29 December 2008 in a peaceful atmosphere, with a large turnout of voters. The SoE was lifted from midnight on 16 December, less than two weeks before the elections, was among other things, deeply symbolic. Whether the much awaited transfer of power to elective political institutions would lead to qualitative as well as symbolic changes remained a matter of concern on the eve of the elections. There was some electoral reform took place during this time like-A. A reformed and effective Election Commission which was able to put in a place a new electronic voter roll, including many previously excluded categories of persons, which minimized chances of fraud and rigging. B. A revised Representation of the People Order (RPO), 2008 which laid down among other things, guidelines for political reforms such as party registration, procedures for democratization of the nomination process, amendment of party constitutions to sever ties with student wings, ensure nomination of 33% women. The RPO required party constitutions to be consistent with the constitution of the state and provided that any party which could not be shown to be engaged in any communal activity could not be so registered. Although objections to the registration of the Jamat-i-Islam failed, this party finally formally acknowledged the liberation War and extended membership to non-Muslim. C. The inclusion of a 'No—vote' option in the ballot appeared to reflect a sense of weariness among the electorate about existing political choices (ASK, 2009, PP. 1-6).

1.2. Socio-economic factors

Socio-economic structure is an important factor in the determination of electoral violence. Bangladesh is still lagging behind industrialization. Political participation, here, seems ineffective due to widespread poverty and illiteracy. Poverty is one of the indicators to influence the general people to violent activities. The people, who live under poverty line, easily motivate do violent activities instead of money to fulfill their basic needs. In Bangladesh, according to the latest available national statistics on poverty, based on head

count rate and using upper poverty line, the incidence of poverty decreased to 31.5 percent in 2010 at the national level with an annual average rate of decrease at 1.32 percent from 1991-92 (Titumir and Rahman, 2011, p.10-16). The incidence of poverty has dropped from 56.6 percent in 1991-92 to 31.5 percent in 2010. However, decline in the aggregate poverty in the subsequent period was associated with decline in urban poverty (Zohir, 2011, p.30). People's decisions are shaped by various factors like family background, social status, education, occupation, religious beliefs and economic status. Family and social environment builds up the views of a person. It decides how much time the person will spend to be informed about any issue (Chakraborty. G and Alam R, 1999, p.148). The majority of the people in Bangladesh live in the villages (approximate 80%), they take more interests in local issues and election than the national politics. Their voting behavior is also determined by their personal gains or interest (Bhuyan, 1991). These types of people can easily motivate to violent activities.

1.3. Political culture

Every political system, Writes Almond "is embedded in a particular pattern of orientations to political actions" (Almond, 1956, p. 396). Almond & Verba have constructed three ideal types of political culture, such as the parochial, the subject and the participant. In empirical reality, every political culture is a mixed political culture which Almond & Verba calls "civic culture" where some are active in politics and some are inactive or passive(Bhuyan, 1991,p.69). The most common political culture in Bangladesh is intolerance or lack of political trust. The active section of people cannot tolerate the other party's people. This intolerance culture pursues to conflict or violence.

One of the crucial aspects of electoral culture in Bangladesh is that the defeated party had always rejected the result. This culture came from 1973 parliamentary elections (Rashid, Feb. 2001, p.277). This trend has come to such a pass that the opposition gives up believing in holding credible elections under the ruling party. The introduction of caretaker government attested to this reality. Holding elections in Bangladesh is not a socially and politically isolated phenomenon in Bangladesh. Patronage based politics prevalent in political parties has largely contributed to damage the credibility of elections. Candidates with a view to confirming win in elections have employed guns, goons and gold, resulting

in the reign of electoral violence. In controlling such a reality, the Election Commission has poor track record as the commission- barring exceptions- have rendered its loyalty to appeasing the ruling party. Therefore, violence looms large in pre Election Day and post election period. Politics of patronage and corruption is another feature of Bangladeshi political culture. The leaders like Mujib, Zia and Ershad restored to various means of patronage and politics of corruptions to distribute favors among their followers in the formation of their respective political parties, and also in conducting elections (Haque, 1988). This culture also followed by the followers of the major political parties in Bangladesh (Bangladesh Nationalist Party, Awami League, Jatio Party). People are extensively being influenced by parties. There are many people who follow the party decision blindly. In any issue whatever positions the party takes, without judging whether the position is correct or not, this person supports the party position (Chakraborty. G and Alam R, 1999, p.148). All the above mentioned political cultures induce to violent activities in election time.

2. Statement of the research problem

In Bangladesh no one parliamentary elections are completely free from violence either more or less. In 2001 parliamentary elections have been infamous for high intensity violence. Elections to the national parliament were announced for 1 October, 2001. Under the 13th amendment to the Constitution of Bangladesh, a caretaker government took oath of office on 13 July with a mandate to complete the elections within 90 days. The election commission announced the election schedule on 19 August. In the run up to the election, the campaign between the two major parties was marred by a rising scale of violence between supporters and workers of the two major parties. According to newspaper accounts approximately 270 persons were killed in the violence leading up to the election. The army was called in support of the civilian administration to assist with the conduct of the elections, particularly in high risk centers. Since September leading national newspapers reported incidents of violence or threats against Hindu community in different parts of Bangladesh. During September, the pre-election period, fifteen days following Election Day and last fifteen days of October 80 incidents were reported during the fifteen days before the elections, the highest number of incidents occurring in Dhaka and Khulna

and these incidents occurred in the last fifteen days of October. Immediately after the elections on 1 October, newspapers gave almost daily reports of physical assaults, torture, damage to temples and personal property, demolition of deities and plunder. A few bomb explosions were also reported and the gangs were accused by the victims of extortion. Armed gangs, allegedly supporters of the BNP, which had won a large majority in the elections, were alleged to have perpetrated the violence. The forms of violence ranged from threats, assaults, plunder, arson, extortion, bomb blasts and physical torture. More serious crimes included murder, rape, kidnapping, sometimes for ransom. Between 15 September and 31 October, 17 cases of murder, 61 of rape and 64 of sexual assaults were reported. During this period 701 persons were reported to have been injured (ASK, December 2001). In the contrary, the parliamentary elections in 2008 were held after two-years of democratic hiatus, during which time the country was ruled by a military-backed technocratic caretaker regime under the state of emergency. The technocratic government was installed on 11 January 2007 after months of political stalemate, street agitation and violence between the 4-party alliance government led by the Bangladesh Nationalist Party (BNP) and the opposition Grand Alliance led by the Awami League (AL). The political crisis in 2006 lay bare that the country has failed to institutionalize democracy despite four elections and uninterrupted civilian rule since 1991. It is in this background that the caretaker government (CTG) promised and attempted to reform the political establishments and bring substantive changes in the political culture. In this context, ninth parliamentary election was held on 29 December, 2008. These elections constituted a milestone in the history of the nation. This election registered a high turnout of voters. The Awami League secured a landslide victory, the BNP recorded its worst ever electoral defeat, the Jatiya Party (JP) headed by General H M Ershad regained its position as a key player in Bangladeshi politics and the Islamist, particularly the Bangladesh Jamat-i-Islami, experienced a setback. However, the 2008 elections was remarkable because: the campaign was violence free, candidates of all parties by and large adhered to strict electoral rules, participation of the voters was higher than ever before, the election-day atmosphere was festive, and the elections were free, fair and credible. Incidents of violence had been a common feature of previous elections in Bangladesh, but in 2008 elections no major incidents took place before the election. Violation of electoral rules and regulations were

not widespread (Riaz, 2013). Against this backdrop, the central question of this research is: Why does violence occur in election time? In addition, some supplementary questions have been flagged up to support the answer of the central question. How did violence affect the electoral process? Why electoral violence was much higher in 2001 than that of 2008 elections? Is violence inversely related to democracy?

3. Aims and Objectives of the study

The aim of this study is to make an in depth causal analysis of electoral violence in Bangladesh through a comparative analysis of 2001 and 2008 parliamentary elections. For this purpose, the following objectives have been set forth:

- To explain the nature of electoral violence;
- To compare violence of 2001 and 2008 parliamentary elections;
- To explain the impacts of violence.

4. Justifications of the study

Electoral violence largely affects political participation, thereby destroy 'free and fair', election as the basis of minimal democracy. It is, therefore, imperative to identify the causal sets of violence. If causes could be generally identified, it would help the policy makers to take correct measures to stop violence. Moreover, this research would make people conscious about the determining impacts of electoral violence. Finally, this research has been conducted to fill up in literature gap on electoral violence.

5. Hypotheses

This study has dealt with a couple of hypotheses. These are:

- To win the election by any means constitute the end of electoral Violence
- Violence as means may not be necessarily related with the win in election.
- Electoral violence adversely affects the human security of the voters.
- The management of holding election by the EC has largely determined the intensity, causes and forms of violence in both the elections.

6. Methodology

This paper follows mixed methodology to combining qualitative with the support of quantitative methods. In this research, two sources of data collection shall be used to test the afore-mentioned hypotheses. Primary data collected through interviews and content analysis. The secondary data sources include election related rules, already published research conducted by others, books, journals and reports. Primary data collections have been done through interviews first one is content analysis and another is interview. In case of content analysis, three newspapers have been chosen such as the Prothom Alo, the Daily Ittefaq and the Daily Observer. Only three newspapers are chosen due to lack of time and research funding. In selecting these newspapers the circulation has been taken into account. In the calculating process, average is followed where the total number of occurrence are not mentioned. To avoid duplicity is the main reason to calculate in average process. In some cases the same occurrence are obvious in two or three newspaper where the total number is increased but remain duplicity. On the other hand, to select the timing for content analysis one month is select for pre and post electoral violence from Election Day. The reason is that, generally the election scheduled is declared one month ago after then the candidates become very active in the election field, and violence activities also begin. In the post election time to maintain continuity one month is selected. In the Election Day only three days are selected because the newspaper normally cover the Election Day violence within three days after the Election Day than post electoral violence came forward. In 2001 election, the election held in 1 October 2001 and in 2008 election held 29 December 2008. From the following figure (Figure-1.1, 1. 2,) the timing of calculation in 2001 and 2008 parliamentary elections are shown. Since the timing of this calculation is limited, so the event which goes beyond this timing has been avoided.

Timing of violence	Date of data collection
Pre-electoral violence	1 September 2001-30 September 2001
Election day violence	1 October 2001-3 October 2001
Post election violence	4 October 2001-30 October 2001

Figure 1.1: Timing of data collection in 2001 parliamentary elections

Timing of violence	Date of data collection
Pre-electoral violence	1 December 2008-28 December 2008
Election day violence	29 December 2008-1 January 2009
Post election violence	2 January 2009-30 January 2009

Figure 1.2: Timing of data collection in 2008 parliamentary elections

Primary data collection has been conducted through interviews. The questionnaire for interview is open ended in some cases close questions also included where the respondents had free access to express their opinion. Two districts are selected for data collection due to lack of time. These districts are Narayanganj and Bagerhat. Because existing report and the newspaper indicate these two districts include high intensity areas of violence in 2001 parliamentary election. In 2008 parliamentary elections this area also mention as violent area. Another cause to select these two districts is one is close from capital city another is remote from capital city along with maintain continuity. In the data collection process all areas have not been covered only Narayanganj Sadar and Bagerhat Sadar with Chacua Thana have been covered. The time schedule of data collection was from 15 February, 2016 to 25 February, 2016. When the same issue came in several times from different respondents, this type of issue was calculated in percentage. Total sample size of data collection was 50 in number where from every district have 25 respondents in different categories (Figure-1.3). All respondents been voters but in different categories. In the sample size different type of respondents are selected by which the total picture can seen through different eyes. As seen the ratio of different respondents from figure (Figure-1.3).

Type of Respondents	Number of respondent
Teacher	6
Banker	6
Businessman	6
Party supporter(AL)	6
Party supporter(BNP)	6
Housewife	6

Lawyer ,Journalist	5
Others	9
Total	50

Figure 1.3: Sample size

Among all the parliamentary elections in Bangladesh, only 2001 and 2008 elections are selected for comparative analysis. The basis of selection is John Stuart Mill,s theory of ‘the method of Agreement’ and ‘the method of difference’ . According to ‘the method of Agreement’ both elections were Parliamentary elections and both elections were held under Caretaker Government. In the ‘the Method of Difference’ 2001 parliamentary election was more violent than the previous democratic elections and in the same time 2008 election was comparatively less violent(Jonathan, H. 2002). In the comparative analysis, there are some indicators used to compare violence like-killing, injuring, rape and attack on minority community. Two dimensions are used in comparison which are inter comparison and intra comparison. In the inter comparison, the analysis show comparison of nature, causes and impacts of electoral violence in 2001 and 2008 elections. From this comparison the election which is more violent draws the attention. In the intra comparison the analysis focuses on the pre electoral, Election Day and post electoral violence. In the analysis a relationship is shown among this three timing of violence with special attention to the reason of more violence in 2001 and less violence in 2008.

7. Literature review

There are two tracks of literature among those scholars Mannan(2005), Riaz(2013), Akter(1991), Karim(2004), are mentionable. In their research electoral violence came as a peripheral issue not as central ones. They have simply presented some data on electoral violence without focusing on the violence of giving causes a depth analysis.

Another group of Scholars thinks that the victims of religious minority resulting from electoral violence depends some factors like-size of population, political culture and social control mechanism. They want to show that in 1996 election was less violent than 2001 due to these factors contribute to electoral violence in varying degrees. They want to identify some reasons of violence on the religious minority like- vote bank theory, motive

of ethnic cleansing, violence for violence, Breakdown of Social control Mechanism. Muslim are main actors on Hindu people where Biharies are not included in this violence. They also focused on electoral violence resulting from the failure of Election Commission. In the same way revenge is the main cause of post electoral violence. There are some effects of electoral violence like it suppress voter turnout, affect voter registration, prevent candidate from running for office, acerbate division in society, and even postpone an election. Among these scholars Rafi(2005), Rahman(2012) Centre For Research and Information (2003), are mentionable. This track of literature is closely relevant in my research because they want to show a clear picture about the causes of minority violence in election time especially in 2001 elections, and factors which encourage violent activities. Their research work deal mainly on minority violence not in depth analysis of electoral violence. From the above two tract of literature, it can be said that electoral violence comes as a peripheral issue. It is also notable that the existing literature deals mainly with the nature of electoral violence neither its cause nor effect. That is why this research paper focuses on cause and effects of electoral violence. The study will be based on a comparative analysis of electoral violence occurred in 2001 and 2008 elections.

8. Limitations of the Study:

The main limitations of this research paper were the timing and funding. Due to lack of time the field work can not cover the important places in Narayanganj and Bagerhat. Another factor was funding, because data collection required large amount of money and also research assistant. Since this work was self finance so wider range of work was quite impossible. The last factor was that the issues of human security, the respondents were reluctant to give information about electoral violence because they thought that if they give information and it is published then the party activist attack them.

Conclusion:

This study is organized through the following chapters. Chapter one presents a detailed background of the study. To understand the subject matter relevant concepts are explained and published books and reports are reviewed in this chapter. This chapter also draws a conceptual framework. The second chapter deals with conceptual framework of research,

the third chapter deals about the pre electoral violence in Bangladesh, the fourth chapter are designed about the Election Day violence in Bangladesh, the fifth chapter deals with post electoral violence in Bangladesh. The six chapters give attention to the comparative analysis by conclusion. Overall conclusion and major findings are presented in this chapter.

Chapter-2

Electoral violence: Nature, Causes and Impacts

Introduction

Electoral Violence refers to any physical attack or threats that are aimed at disrupting any part of the electoral or political process during the election period. Election violence generally involves political parties, their supporters, and journalists, agents of the government, election administrations and the general population. The form of violence includes threats, assault, murder, destruction of property, and physical or psychological harm (Odhikar and IFES (2006)). This chapter develops a theoretical framework where the theory clarifies the different concepts like election, electoral violence and political violence. The operational part will discuss the causes of electoral violence with two variables where violence is dependent variables and causes are independent variables with some exception. This section also deals forms, timing and impacts of electoral violence. In order to develop a theoretical framework on electoral violence, a couple of related concepts will be explained in the section of this chapter.

Election

Election is the democratic rights of people. It is a way to elect the peoples representative who will work in favor of people and enact law. According to Rose,(1978) and Dye, (2001), “ Election is a major instrument for the recruitment of political leadership in democratic societies; the key to participation in a democracy; and the way of giving consent to government ;and allowing the governed to choose and pass judgment on officers who theoretically the governed.

Political violence

Political violence are sum total of violence that are associated with the political process. It could come from within or outside the country, and manifests in various forms. Political violence is the use or threat of physical act or a considerable destructive use of force carried out by an individual or group of individuals within a political system against another individual or group of individuals and/or property, and whose objective chose of

targets or victims, surrounding circumstances implementation and effects have political significance, that is intended to modify the behavior of others in the existing arrangements of a power structure; or directed to a change in the politics, systems, territory of governments and hence also directed to changes in the lives of individuals within societies (Honderich, 1989; Anifowose, 1982; Edigin and Obakhedo, 2010)

Electoral Violence

Electoral violence is a common issue which demands no exceptional definition. This is because of the contentious issue of ‘violence begets violence’ developed by Frantz Fanon in the era of anti-colonial struggles. The fanonian argument is predicted on the fact that ‘violence provokes violence’. So those who retaliate to the first violence of political opponents do not agree that they are perpetrating violence. They argue that they are countering violence. Operationally, electoral violence connotes all forms of violence (physical, psychological, administrative, legal and structural) at different stages engaged in by participants, their supporters, and sympathizers (including security and election management body staff) in the electoral process (Balogun, 2003). These forms of violence take place before elections, during elections and after or post-election, and could also be intra-or inter-party (Obakhedo, 2011: 101-102).

Electoral violence is a part of political violence. As s theoretical background, the theory of political violence is followed. There are three dimensions to analyze the electoral violence like-Criminalized politics, economic view of violence, democratic view of violence. As a student of political science this paper only gives attention to the political view of electoral violence. Electoral violence differs from electoral corruption. Generally electoral corruption includes non violent activities and electoral violence includes violent activities. Although electoral corruption can be the causes of electoral violence like-snatching ballot box, vote buying, vote rigging are not included in electoral violence.

Timing and nature of Electoral Violence

Previous scholarly works have classified electoral violence basing on the two criteria; (1) the timing of violence and (2) the needs of organization. In terms of timing, electoral violence takes three forms: pre electoral violence, election time violence and post electoral

violence. Before elections, intimidations and assassinations are effective to decreasing the turnout and attracting neutral voters. Pre-electoral violence includes acts or threats against the candidates, intimidating voters during registration time or attacking election campaigns.

Election Day violence includes the snatching of ballot papers or boxes, assaults the opposition's agents, and harassment or intimidation by security agents. In the aftermath of an election, electoral violence may take the form of violent protests against electoral rigging, whether real or imagined, and of the state's deploying its apparatus of force in response to the protest, thereby further fuelling violence (Toyoda, Shin, 2012, p. 7). On the other hand, post-electoral violence is more likely to escalate to the large scale violent conflicts because the defeated candidate challenges the electoral results (Straus, Scott and Taylor, Charlie Taylor, 2009).

Further literatures reveal that electoral violence requires an organization. Electoral violence cannot take place unless office-seeking politicians can recruit sufficient number of followers who will be engaged in the production of violence, if necessary, to win elections. When electoral violence occurs; there are always required some armed organizations, militia or thugs; it is these forces who have involved in the production of electoral violence during electoral campaign to intimidate and assassinate political enemies (Noorana, 2016).

Physical violence	Assassination, looting, shooting, kidnapping and hostage taking, forcing disruption of campaign rallies, snatching ballot box, dacoits/robbery, rape, murder
Psychological violence	Frightening the people maybe the product of physical violence
Structural violence	Attacks on party office or dormitory, burning the house, cutting trees.

Figure 2.1: Multi-dimensional forms of electoral violence

According to the figure 2.1, in the multi dimensional forms of electoral violence physical attacks includes assassination, looting, shooting, kidnapping and hostage taking, forcing disruption of campaign rallies, snatching ballot box, dacoits/robbery, rape and murder. It is common and most widely forms of electoral violence which occurs regularly in election time. Psychological violence is such kind of violence which creates mental pressure. It may be the product of physical violence. In the last form of electoral violence is structural violence which includes attacks on party office or dormitory, burning the house, cutting trees.

Causes of Electoral Violence

In the causal analysis, the causes of electoral violence can be analyzed into two tracks one is- ends centric violence, another is procedural centric violence. In the end centric violence, winning in the election is the main cause of electoral violence but in the procedural centric violence, violence is not directly related to win in the election but it creates due to other factors of electoral process like-revenge or personal revenge, power competition, poverty or political socialization. The causes of electoral violence can be analyzed in another two ways like- distant causes and immediate causes of violence. In the distant causes personal revenge and poverty are categories where electoral violence becomes an uncertain issue; sometimes distant causes seem as independent variable where violence is dependent, sometimes distant causes work as concealed feature. On the other hand, immediate causes of violence always work as active independent variables like-ends centric violence.

Ends centric violence

The ultimate aim of election is to transfer power in government level. For this transformation the candidates have strong desire to win in the election. Winning in the election is the most important and common reason of electoral violence. Every political party aims to win the election by which it can capture the state power so as to establish its political ideology. Parties thus try to win the elections by any means, most of the time engaging in electoral violence (Noorana, 2016). The candidates want to motivate the administration in favor of them. In these cases the administration in some cases keeps

silence where violent activities raised. So the level of electoral violence depends on the ends of election.

Procedural centric violence

Winning in the election is the ultimate aim of all candidates and political parties take short or long term measure to win in the election. On the other side the electoral body or administration also take measure to conduct a free and fair election. The abnormal activities of both sides create disorder situation in the election resulting electoral violence. Procedural centric violence covers revenge, power competition, poverty, political culture and so on. The level of violence depends on procedural centric violence.

Revenge

In the election time, there are two types of revenge one is political revenge and another is personal revenge. In the political revenge, there are two types of revenge in election time one is inter election revenge and intra election revenge. In the inter election revenge if one party defeat in election, in the following election if they win then it creates violence as revenge upon the opposition parties. In the pre election time if one party creates violence on the others party, then in the post election time if the violent parties defect then the winning party supporter and activist create violence on the loser party. After election, leaders of defeated parties express anger through violent speeches and undemocratic activities. None can accept defeat with smile and congratulate the winner with open arms (Nahar, September 2012, p.28).being defeated in parliamentary elections of 1991, the then chief opposition leader Sheikh Hasina said to the ruling party. "I won't let (you) live in peace a single day.' Being defeated in parliamentary elections of 1996, the then Chief opposition leader Begum Khaleda Zia said to a ruling party leader in parliament, 'Shut up, stupid (beyadab, chup)!' (Kaiyum, 1999). In 2008 parliamentary elections, election held after two years rule by military government, as a result the people forget the immediate revenge so the level of violence was less than the previous time. In the personal revenge conflict between two families as the case of property people use election time to false revenge. Generally dominant party creates violent activities in inter and intra electoral violence but if the dominant party defeats in the election they face less violent activities.

Power competition

Politics is the power game, electoral politics as a part of politics also play a ground where two or more candidates play actively, want to win in the game. They also show their power or want to establish dominant position in the society. Power competition among the candidates of the election because every candidate wants to show that his/her muscle power is more than the other candidates so that (s) he can make people understand that his/her winning will make peoples' lives happier (Noorana, 2016). Since all players want to show power, so clash, conflict or violent activities happened among the candidates. The level of violence depends on the level of power competition.

Economical factors

The people who are economically dominant they easily establish dominance in political sector. Generally economically dominant people (mainly party activist) are the actors of violent activities and the economically insolvent people are the target or instrument of violence. The poor can easily be trapped in vote buying, or be used by the political leaders in violent activities. Although not all poor people are trapped by electoral violence, personal moralities of some voters can convince not to motivate violent activities instead of money. It is a distant cause of violence.

Political socialization

Lack of internalization of values and norms against violence among the members in the society breeds violence. Intolerance in political culture induces electoral violence. The party activists engage in violent activities because in the election time they try to win by any means, without considering the legal framework. In a democratic society peoples willing opinion considered legal way to hold the power, but threat, create pressure to give vote not the fair way to hold power. The level of violence depends on political socialization, the society which is politically more socialized about violent culture have less risk of electoral violence.

Electoral culture

In the electoral culture of Bangladesh the loser party is reluctant to accept the result. They imagine that the buying voter does not cast their vote. For this reason they create violence with the winner party, sometimes with administration due to their positive role on winner party. The people's interest is the cause of violence. Some people have political interest, others have personal interest like- in case of displacement the property when peoples are forced to leave their live and haven, and they use election time to fulfill their interest.

Law and order situation

The level of electoral violence depends on the level of law and order situation. Strong law and order situation reduces violence. Punishment is the most effective way to control the violent people. In election time, if law and order situation remains strong the party activities become afraid to do their violent activities.

Violence for Campaign

The campaign centric violence is the most important, serious and sensitive issue in election time. After getting the nomination the most important part of election is electoral campaign. The several candidates of political party want to attract the voters through electoral campaign. As a part of campaign the party declared party manifesto, build on party office or camp or gate, publicity through poster, procession, public meeting, in the present time campaign through mobile phone or local television channels are attract the attention. In this campaign process violence are common in every election, like-sometime in the procession, the supporter give incitement speech or the procession of different political parties came face to face or the activist of one party attack the camp or party office then the opposing also react this type of action. As a result attack and counter attack continue, wounding, killing, attack on house furniture, attack on livestock become more obvious nature of violence.

Vote related violence

Vote related violence is one of the most important factors of Election Day violence. Although vote rigging, fraud voting, control over voting centre are snatching ballot box is

not considered as form of electoral violence, these work as factors of violence. Basically these types of causes of violence occur after lunch hour without some exception. To control the voting centers the dominant party tries to control voting centre by which vote are cast in favor of them, in the same time the opposition try to obstruct them then create violence, sometimes post pond polling at the centre. If one party thinks the opposition will get more votes than they create panic or violence to obstruct them. To cast fraud voting the conflict continue between agents, polling officer or presiding officer. On the other hand, the voter are threatened not to come in voting centre or before or after they come they inform their vote already cast. This issue creates violence in Election Day.

Administrative set up

Election management body includes election commission and their supporting agencies. The level of violence depends on the strong role of administrative body. Administration runs the election so their work performance is most important for electoral violence. If the administration works neutrally then violence remains tolerable level. In some cases this administration remains silent after being informed the violent situation to favors one party. The perception of the general people is that administrations always work in favor of ruling party and the opposition parties are not safe by this administration. If the administration is fail to ensure level playing electoral violence raise tremendously. The candidate has the opportunities to break the electoral rules which encourage the violent activities.

The above mentioned causes of electoral violence can be exception in the three timing of election (Pre, day and post election time). The interesting matter is that ends centric violence only applies to in both pre and Election Day violence; it is not applicable in the post election time but the procedural centric violence is related in pre, day and post election time violence.

Actors and factors of violence of electoral violence

Actors mean the people who are directly or indirectly related to electoral violence. To know the causes of electoral violence is not enough, it is also important to figure out the actors involved in violence like-political party and their supporters, election commission with administrations and electoral management bodies, presiding and polling officers and

also the general people are included. These actors are directly or indirectly related to the electoral violence. Electoral violence involves organized efforts where the actors of violence are closely related to one another. Political party leaders conduct their violent activities by their party supporters. On the other hand, extremist or illicit armed groups act as violent actors due to the support of their own party (Noorana, 2016). Factor means the instrument or element which is used by actors for creating electoral violence like pistol, bamboo including dominant things in area like- fisheries, dairy farms, mounds of paddy, crops field. On the other hand, party office, electoral camp, home, shop, religious place or idol, motorcycle, mobile phone are also used as factors of electoral violence.

Variables of Electoral Violence

The violence rate is dependent variables and the other factors like- competitive place, power dominance, or religious minority dominated area work as independent variables. In the total constituency of Bangladesh, some constituencies are less violent places and some are more and some are non violent areas. This frequency generally depends on the independent variables. In a constituency if the candidates are more competitive, then it has high possibility of violence. Another fact is that, generally the ruling party supporter candidates have high dominance, but in the case if one constituency is dominated by opposition party then violence rate may be higher. The other fact is that, in case of Bangladesh the religious minority community living areas have high possibility of violence because this community considered as a vote bank and there displacement can give the opportunity to use their property.

Impacts of Electoral Violence

The impacts of electoral violence are multi-dimensional most commonly having physical, psychological and structural dimensions. This multi dimensional impact of electoral violence includes both short and long term effects. Electoral violence threatens human security where deaths, missing, long or short time sickness by severe physical attacks are common. When the poor people (especially day laborer) face such kind of violence their daily economic activities are hampered, sometimes this affected people are permanently or temporarily become handicap, consequently their families suffer. They could not recover it

in their whole life. Psychological impact includes official and unofficial actions that create fear in the people which may be a product of physical violence threatening to opposition forces by security agents or through phone calls and text message. This psychological impact leads to mental pressure of the victims. Displacement of the victims from home hampers their daily lives (Omotola, 2008). Violence resulted in the damage of the building or road, cutting trees or burning properties, this structural impacts mostly hamper economic and environmental damage of a country (Noorana, 2016). the ultimate impacts of electoral violence is that the voter becomes reluctant to cast their vote which badly impacts on democratic practice of the people.

Conclusion:

The causes of electoral violence can be analyzed from different angles with explaining ends and procedural centric violence. All the causes mentioned above may differ from one to the other or overlap in pre electoral violence, day violence or post electoral violence. In the electoral violence, total electoral management body, party activists and supporters are directly or indirectly related to violence. The impacts of electoral violence are short and long term including physical, psychological and structural dimensions. The explaining arguments of this chapter form the theoretical part in electoral violence, by which the chapters that followed will be analyzed.

Chapter - 3

Pre electoral violence in Bangladesh

Introduction

Free and fair election refers to the election which is held free from any kind of violence. Violence calls the legitimacy of election into question. Like many of the developing countries, the electoral culture in Bangladesh is characterized by widespread violence. In any election violence takes three forms; Pre, Election Day and Post electoral violence. Pre electoral violence start since the election schedule is declared and it's continued till the Election Day. This chapter discuss about pre electoral violence in parliamentary elections especially in 2001 and in 2008. It focuses on the causes, nature and impact of electoral violence in both elections already mentioned above. All the information used in this chapter is collected from the newspapers and open-ended interviews. For the convenience of the reader this chapter is divided into three sections. The first section deals with the nature of violence during pre election time. The second section looks into the causes of violence. The third analyses the impact of pre electoral violence followed by a conclusion.

1. Nature of Pre Electoral violence; Cases of 2001 and 2008 parliamentary elections

The nature of pre electoral violence can be defined as a combination of frequency, forms and spatial distribution of violence. The area-wise frequency of pre electoral violence varied in both elections in 2001 and 2008 elections. In 2001 parliamentary elections, the areas of high frequency of violence were; Bagerhat, Barisal, Noakhali, Bhola, and the middle frequency areas were Chadpur, Patuakhali, Comilla and low frequency areas were Kushtia, Gazipur, Tangail and others (Figure-3.1).

High frequency areas(4-5) ¹	Middle frequency areas(2-3)	Low frequency areas(1-less than)
Bagerhat,	Chandpur, Dhaka	Kushtia, Gazipur, Tangail, Khulna, Sirajgonj,

¹.The number indicates the average of violence events(1-5), by 1 I mean on average one incidents occurred in one constituency, by 2-3 it mean on average of violence events occurred 2-3 times and 4-5 it mean on average occurred 4-5times.

Noakhali Pabna, Feni Munshiganj Narayanganj Barisal and Bhola zilla.	Patuakhali, Comilla Moulvibazar, Chittagong, Sylhet, Rajshahi, Mymensingh, Jamalpur, Shariatpur, Laxmipur, Faridpur, Madaripur, Bogura, Netrokona zilla and Gournadi upazilla.	Narsingdi, Sunamgonj, Rajbari, Jessore, Meherpur, Jhenidah, Satkhira, Rangpur, Bhairab, Kurigram, Jalokhati, Magura, Sherpur, Dinajpur, Gaibanda, Naogaon, Tongi, Brahmanbaria, Narail, Nator, Rupgonj, Fatikchari, Habigonj, Borguna, Mirjagonj zilla and, Chauddagam upazilla including Aricha ghat.
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Figure 3.1: Frequency of pre electoral violence in 2001 parliamentary elections.

From the above table we get the impression that southern districts of Bangladesh were more inclined towards violence. It may be assumed that organizational strength of BNP, its win in 2001 elections along with the memory of electoral defeat in 1996 might have influenced BNP to perpetrate violence. On the contrary it is also evident that in the competitive constituencies, if the defeated party is stronger in terms of organizational strength, it faces the less possibility of violence.² In 2008 elections high and middle frequency of violence were absent, by contrast, low intensity areas of violence were Bagerhat, Pabna, Mymensingh, Madaripur district, Gournadi upazilla and others(3.2).

High frequency areas (4-5)	Middle frequency areas (2-3)	Low frequency areas (1-0)
Nil	Nil	Pabna, Bagerhat, Mymensingh, Madaripur, Rangamati, Brahmanbaria, Mirjagonj, and Gournadi upazilla.

Figure 3.2: The frequency of pre electoral violence in 2008 parliamentary elections.

Most of the places of low frequency areas in 2008 elections were same just as high frequency areas in 2001 such as Bagerhat, Pabna, Mymensingh or Gournadi Upazilla. This analysis indicates that some specific places have demonstrated high frequency of

² .Interview with respondents (Talukder Hasibur Rahman (46), BNP Workers, UP Chairman Candidates. Bagerhat) in 18 February 2016.

violence without some exceptions. This possible identification of places of violence gives the opportunity of policy makers or election commission to take necessary steps to reduce violence.

1.1. Forms of Pre Electoral Violence

The forms of violence differ from elections to elections and areas to areas. The constituency which is located to the border, the dominant forms of violence is the threat to displacement. The victim, as a result moves another safe place within the countries. Some of them even take shelter in India- the closest neighbor of Bangladesh.

In the river side areas (like Barisal Division) the actors of violence attack on launch, or the places where the fish farm³ is available (like Bagerhat) the actor of violence attack on this farm or in some places they attack on livestock or business places. Not only attack but also capture these places. The scenario of nature in pre electoral violence in 2001 all over Bangladesh is given below.

Name	Average
Killing	44
Physical injuries	1461
Be shoot at	32
Arson and vandalize election camp, party offices, houses, shops, car and idol	43
Abduction	1
looting (pistol, mobile phone, mounds of paddy)	1
Blockade road	1
Abruptly attack on procession	1
Arson on straw	1
Destroy photos of Sheikh Hasina, Sheikh Mujibur Rahman, Khaleda Zia)	less than 1
Bald heading	less than 1
Threats to minority(not to cast vote, displacement to India)	2

³ . In the Southern districts of Bangladesh, fishing is one of the prime modes of economic activities.

Attacks on minority home and worship place	1
Attacks on Mosque	less than 1

Figure 3.3: Nature of Pre electoral violence in 2001 parliamentary elections (1-30 September 2001).

The predominant form of pre electoral violence was physical injuries and the severe form was killing. In some places the activists of different parties used the weapons such as shotguns, rifles, revolvers, pistols and so on to shoot rivals. In 2001 parliamentary elections the number of shooting was 32 in average (Figure: 3.3). Apart from killing and physical injuries, other forms of violence included arson and vandalize election camps, party office, house, shops, cars and idol. In this case in 2001 parliamentary elections, the average incidence of violence was 43 (Figure: 3.3). In the pre electoral time destroy photos of different party leaders and candidates make unusual form of violence (Figure-3.3). As for example in Bagerhat, in the mid night some workers of AL with the support of seven police enter the electoral camp and destroy the photos of Khaleda Zia and parties candidate's photos(The Daily Ittefaq, 12 September 2001,p.1).

Particularly, in case of religious minority the forms of violence included arson and vandalize the worship places damaging Idols. The attack on religious minority community happened as the actors of violence were also motivated by the lure of properties of the minority people resulting from their displacement and taking shelter in India. Both major political parties Awami league and Bangladesh Nationalist Party perpetrate violence on religious minority people as they consider them their own vote bank. In 2001, this kind of violence was evident in Bagerhat, Barisal, Gopalganj, Pabna, Satkhira. As for example, in the pre election time, the religious minorities were threaten by different party supporters not to vote in AL. Even their houses were looting and firing. Some peoples leave their house. In Sujanagar in Pabna approximately forty thousand minority people live and twenty thousand voters live in different areas. The terrorist attacked in those areas and seventy person including men and women are injured and thirty houses were looting and firing. They created pressure not to cast vote, if they give vote, they will be punished after election (The Prothom Alo, 29 September 2001, p.4).However, and the matter of

displacement not only applies to religious minority community but also to the religious majority people.

If we want to see the nature of pre electoral violence in 2008 parliamentary elections, it was found that the nature of violence was less than the 2001 elections. But the types of violence were similar in both elections like killing, abduction, vandalize electoral camps or party office and so on (Figure: 3.4). Killing was severe form of violence in 2001 elections but it was absent in 2008 elections. like 2001 elections, several forms of violence were absent in 2008 elections such as destroying photos, bald heading, and threats to displacement, violence on minority people and attack on procession.

Nature	Average
Physical Injuries	54
Attack on electoral camps	less than 1
Abduction	1
Vandalize on Home, shop, motorcycle	4
Looting	less than 1

Figure 3.4: Nature of pre electoral violence in 2008 parliamentary elections (1-28 December 2008).

In the areas where religious minority people live (Bhola, Bagerhat, and Chittagong)) the administration took necessary steps to prevent pre electoral violence. They built police camp and continued after election. The reason was that in 2001 election this community faced violence and all the voters could not cast their vote. The village community also took necessary steps to prevent post electoral violence. For this reason in 2008 election violence were less than the 2001 elections (The Prothom Alo, 20 December 2008).

In order to analyze the nature of pre electoral violence the field data of Bagerhat and Naraynganj are given below-




Figure 3.5: Nature of pre electoral violence in Bagerhat and Narayanganj (15- 25 February, 2016)

From the in-depth interview with respondents, it is seen that in the pre electoral violence threat remain the highest percentage of violence which is 60 percent. the other form of violence is attack and counter attack because one party supporters attack the others party offices, rally, public meetings or in houses the victims or their party counter attack on them which value is 12 percent. Abduction is another form of pre electoral violence where the party leaders are mostly victims in some cases the activists are also victim. This type of violence is done to spread panic among the voters or in part which value is 10 percent.

Basically pre electoral violence starts from the submission of nomination paper till Election Day. From figure-3.5 it is seen that in the submission time of nomination paper, the competitive candidates fall in violence including physical attacks or abduction or killing due to resistance by the nearest candidates not to submit nomination papers.




Figure 3.6: Stages of Pre-electoral Violence

After completing nomination the second stage of pre election violence is the campaign violence-like attack on procession, tearing poster, direct attack between two parties procession, vandalize party office, cars, houses, furniture or livestock. In some cases one party file cases against the opposition side to give mental pressure. In the third or last stage or in the last night of election the more competitive party give money to buy vote or they give threats to the voters to cast their vote in favor of them or not to cast vote to the opposition candidate. Centering the issue of vote buying, contenting party supporters often engaged in violent conflicts.

1.2. Target Places of Pre-Electoral Violence

The places of occurrences differ from time to time although these have a similarity among three timing (pre, during and post electoral violence). But it is found from the field work violence tends to take place more in urban areas than the rural. The reason is that in urban areas the communication is better than rural areas. Due to communication gap, some rural areas remain free from electoral violence. Another common place of violence is party office in pre election time. Political party offices become the target of violence by the rivals. In addition, the bordering areas, the places where the religious minority people live, become the target place of violent occurrences because the minority particularly, the Hindus are viewed as a vote bank by the mainstream political parties like Bangladesh

Awami League. The displacement of the Hindus from their home and hearth had been the incentive for perpetrating violence on them, which gave the opportunity to use their left-over properties.




Figure 3.7: Target places of pre electoral violence

The most important places of violence are the constituencies which are more competitive (Figure: 3.7). In any constituency, the candidates who are more competitive and economically powerful they try to win the election by any means, this type of mentality creates ends centric violence. The end of violence is to win electoral constituency at any cost.

2. Causes of Pre Electoral Violence

Generally winning in the election assumes the top most cause of electoral violence. However, the main cause should not overshadow other causes that need to be worth mentioning. The data collected from the news papers on Narayanganj and Bagerhat indicate the total view of pre electoral violence in those areas (figure-3.9), although this does not represent the picture of the whole country.




Figure-3.8: Causes of pre electoral violence in Bagerhat and Narayanganj (15- 25 February, 2016)

The causes of pre electoral violence can be categorized into five points. These are as follows:

2.1. Violence for nomination

The first stage of pre electoral violence is violence for nomination submission. In a single constituency there remains several candidates from different parties, in most cases two or more candidates want to get the nomination from different parties. Since election is a power game competitive candidates want to get nomination by any means without thinking of morality. In these cases threats, abduction, physical attacks become the forms of violence. On the other hand, competitive inter party candidates create violence by threatening the opposition candidate to withdraw nomination with a view to reducing competition. In 2001 parliamentary elections the average of violence for nomination was 2 (Figure-3.10) and in 2008 parliamentary elections the average of violence was almost nil (Figure- 3.12). On the other hand data gathered from the interviews reveal that 12%

respondents opined that nomination (Figure-3.9) made the first cause for violence. Thus nomination centric violence became a dominant form of violence in pre election time.

Causes	Average
Clash over nomination submission	2
Revenge and counter attacks	2
Arguments on elections between two parties led violence	1
Establish hegemonic power on campaign stage	1
Win in the election	1
Intra- party conflict (Demanding one lakh taka)	less than 1
Attempt to kill AL candidate	1
To support hartal in Bagerhat in the previous clash	less than 1
Bombing	less than 1

Figure 3.9: Causes of Pre Electoral Violence in 2001 parliamentary elections

In one party several candidates opt for nomination, but finally one candidate gets the nomination. The rest of all candidates do not work in favor of the nominated candidate or sometimes they create violence or work in favor of the opposition party to defeat the nominated candidate. As result violence occurs⁴. From the above analysis it appears that, nomination centric violence not only occurs among different political parties but it is also an intra party phenomenon.

2.2. Violence for campaign

The second form of pre electoral violence is campaign centric violence. After getting the nomination the most important part of election is electoral campaign. The several candidates of political parties want to attract the voters through electoral campaign.

Causes	Average
Electoral Campaign	1

⁴. Interview with respondents in Bagerhat, 18 February.2016.

Poster related conflicts as (tearing, burning)	3
Incitement speech in electoral Campaign	2
Procession centered conflict(face to face procession)	6
Violence centers on public meeting	less than 1
Attacks on temporary party's election camp and campaign gates	less than 1
Total	14

Figure 3.10: Pre Electoral violence for campaign in 2001 parliamentary elections

As a part of campaign the party declares party manifesto, build temporary election camps or gates, make publicity through posters, processions, public meetings. In this campaign process violence occurs sometimes in the procession, the supporters give incitement speech or the procession of different political parties come face to face or the activists of one party attack the camp or party office then the opposing party also reacts to this type of action. As a result of continuous attacks and counter attacks, party workers, supporters along with innocent people get injured, killed. Attacks are also launched on house furniture; on livestock. Data collected from Narayanganj and Bagerhat (Figure-3.11) show that the number of violence in procession was 6. Data collected from newspapers show that in 2001 parliamentary elections the procession centric violence remained the highest of average 14 (Figure3. 11).

Causes	Average
Clash for nomination	less than 1
Procession-centric violence	1
To prevent Ershad from public meeting	less than 1

Figure 3.11: Causes of pre electoral violence in 2008 parliamentary elections

Although in 2008 elections violence was lighter than the 2001 election the figure 3.12 shows that out of the three categories of violence procession centric violence remained the highest position of average. In the electoral campaign public meeting was great issue of pre electoral violence. Sometimes boom blast in the public meeting to destroy or kill the candidates. As for example in Bagerhat at least seven persons were killed in a bomb blast at Mollahat of Bagerhat district this evening at around 6 p.m. More than 50 others were

injured in the blast which was allegedly targeted to kill AL candidate for Bagerhat-1 constituency Sheikh Helal Uddin (The Bangladesh Observer, 24 September 2001, p.1). In the campaign centric violence, tearing poster was another causes of pre electoral violence. In Narayanganj BNP and JP supporters and activists were in attack and counter attack where 5 persons were injured (The daily Ittefaq, 6 September 2001, p.1).

Violence for Dominance

Winning in the election remains pivotal, forming the highest percentage 24% (figure-3.9). During pre election time, the candidates try to woo the support of the voters pledging to give them better future. On the other hand, the desperate candidate wants to establish dominance on places of public meetings or they want to establish control on voting centers in the previous night of Election Day. Sometimes arguments amongst the party workers/ supporters in a tea stall or any other places caused violence.




Figure 3.12: Process of Electoral Violence from dominance of power

2.3. Violence for Revenge (political, personal)

In the pre election time revenge works in two ways: one is personal revenge another is political revenge. The first one is not related to electoral politics directly. In the case election time is used to express the revenge. These kinds of conflicts emanate from conflict

for property, traditional conflicts between two or more influential families and so on. In political revenge, there are two points of views. First view is that if someone attacks then as a part of revenge the victimized people mark time for counter attacks. Another point is that if the loser candidates of previous election become the next time candidate they use this time of election to attack because the loser party becomes the target for violence in post election time. It works as a vicious circle (Figure-3.13). In 2001 parliamentary elections revenge and counter attacks were the first categories of causes of violence (Figure-3.10), which average was 2. In the parliamentary elections of 2008 this type of causes was lightly absent.




Figure 3.13: Vicious circle of Electoral Violence

2.4. Economical causes of violence

Economical cause works as a prominent factor of electoral violence. The candidates who are economically well off have the possibility to win in the election. They can pursue electoral campaign in a passive way, can attract the attract voters easily. Economically insolvent voters are also used in violent activities with the spread of money. But if this candidate- who bought vote- failed in the election, then the poor voters become the target of post electoral violence. Thus when the powerful candidates want to show their economic dominance through buying votes, it leads to violence among those competitive candidates.


2.5. Partisan role of violence

Administration⁵ conducts the election so their performance is most important for electoral violence. From the field data it is seen that if the administration works neutrally then violence remains at the tolerable level. In some cases this administration remains silent after being informed about the violent incident with full knowledge to patronage one party. The general people's perception is that an administration always works in favor of the ruling party and the opposition party does not get support by this administration. If the administration fails to ensure level playing field, electoral violence raises tremendously.

3. Impacts of Pre Electoral Violence

The impacts of pre electoral violence are multi dimensional. The first point is that as a result of pre electoral violence is that the general people become averse to politics. They feel discomfort to exercise their democratic rights. In the same time they loss their confidence in politics. Consequently, voters get reluctant to cast their vote. Electoral violence creates panic among the general people. As a result of panic they become mentally weak. Another important matter is that some families (who are victim of rape, physical torture) loss their social status or respects. In some cases the raped women were suicides not tolerate the insult. In Sylhet Mili Rani (13) suicide after mass raped (The prothom Alo, 15 December 2008). Thus electoral violence hampers the human security. In the nature of pre electoral violence it is seen that (see chapter-3, p. 2.-4) killing is the predominant form of pre electoral violence, physical torture fall into the second category. Due to pre electoral violence the proper candidates lose interest in contesting the elections. As a result, people elect incompetent candidates.

⁵.Administration includes law enforcement agencies, Election Commission and legal officers of election like-presiding officer, polling officer.



3.14. The Impacts of Pre electoral Violence in Bagerhat and Narayanganj (15- 25 February, 2016)

As we stated before, violence made some people displaced to another safe place, in some cases even outside the country. As a result the stable or normal life of some people is hampered. The important impacts of electoral violence especially pre electoral violence is the incalculable economic losses. The daily worker, businessman loss their business, in some cases domestic animals are damaged due to violence activities. In order to establish hegemonic power the big businessmen receive threats to stop their business. In the figure- (Figure-3.15), it is seen that, the percentage of disliking politics and casting vote is 26%. On the other hand, the economic impact in electoral violence is 18%. And the percentage of psychological impact of electoral violence is 12%. According to the picture it is seen that the portion of 'others' is 44%. Others include human insecurity, displacement, democratic rights and so on. In the electoral violence killing, rape or physical injuries hampers the human security. It is seen that lacks of human security in the next election in 2008 people were fear in their normal life or to cast their vote.

3.1. Victims of Pre Electoral Violence

In the electoral violence the victims of violence are identified consciously or unconsciously by the actors of violence. The general people are the highest percentage of victim which

was 42 (figure-3.8). These highest groups fall victims consciously and sometimes unconsciously. All of them are less concerned about politics.




Figure 3.15: Target group of Pre Electoral Violence in Bagerhat and Narayanganj (15- 25 February, 2016)

The average value of victims of political party activists and their supporters is 32. This group is politically conscious and they are directly or indirectly connected to violence activities. Economical condition of a person has been a trigger factor of electoral violence. Economically insolvent people become the target group due to their direct and indirect participation in violent activities. They are used in violent activities due to their economic insolvency, their value is 10. This group of people can be targeted in pre or post or election time. Another target group is losing party activists; they become the target group especially in post election time. The most sensitive and important target group of violence is religious minority people and their number is 6. This issue is sensitive or important because they are used as a pre planned violence activities. In some places this religious minority people lived without violence. As for example in Bagerhat Sadar, the minority people who had been living in Bagerhat Sadar in 2001 election time, they were free from violence

(Interview with an anonymous Hindu female Banker, Age, 45, Bagerhat Sadar, 18 February 2016).

Conclusion

From the above discussion, we conclude that pre electoral violence starts with the declaration of electoral schedule. The main aim of pre electoral violence was to discourage voters not to cast vote or to cast vote in favor of a particular candidate. In the nature of pre electoral violence, killing is the pre dominant form and physical torture comes next, although there remain others form of violence such as threats, vandalize electoral camp, destroy photos, posing threats and so on. Although wining in the election is the main cause of pre electoral violence, however, violence as procedure contains some hidden reasons. In the process of violence over nomination submission or campaign, some personal factors, for example, personal revenge also triggered violence. Pre electoral violence adversely impact on the human security of the voters and non voters alike. The death of a voter is a big social and economic loss to his/her family. Same is true for a non-voter. When a woman faced rape in the 2001 pre electoral violence, her social existence in all manners was at stake. So pre electoral violence largely affected the sustainable security of the families, too.

Chapter -4

Election Day violence in Bangladesh

Introduction

Of three phases of electoral violence, the Election Day violence remains short but its severity is long lasting. Election Day violence includes threat, scuffle, killing, physical attack, ballot box snatching, bomb blasting near the polling centers. This type of violence mostly occurs after lunch in the polling centers and in its surroundings. Election Day violence seems to inherit the pre electoral violence but have a huge difference in its mechanism. The main aim of Election Day violence is to disrupt the election results, managing it in favor of the perpetrator or to impede the voters not to cast their vote. Like the previous one, this chapter is divided into three sections. The first section deals with the nature of violence during Election Day including 2001 and 2008 national parliamentary elections. In the nature places and victims of violence also included. The second section will discuss about the causes of Election Day violence. The third section will discuss about the effects of Election Day violence.

1. Nature of Election Day violence; Cases of 2001 and 2008 parliamentary elections

The nature of Election Day violence includes the frequency, forms and spatial distribution of violence occurring on Election Day. This nature of violence also includes the frequency, places and victims of violence.

The frequency of Election Day violence depends on the categories of voting centre. In single constituency some voting centers are prone to high risk of violence, some are middle risk of violence and some tend to low risk of violence. This frequency depends on the role of law-enforcing agencies, level of competition in elections and also the role of media coverage. The centers where the administration is more active and the law enforcing agencies can ensure security, this type of constituencies have less risk of violence. Another point is that competition; in some constituencies the candidates are more competitive. In

the same way, in some constituencies the candidates are competitive but not like strong competition. In this case, the more competitive candidates want to influence the electoral results, and create Election Day violence by their followers or other person. This type of case also can create pre electoral violence. Although it is not absolute truth because every candidate wants to win in the election, someone can follow violent way and someone can follow non violent way. The centre which is located in the far off place and media coverage is low this centre has high possibility of Election Day violence. Some constituencies which are located in rural areas and the national media are not so active; this type of constituencies has high possibility of violence. There have also exception, some constituencies without any cause have no possibility of violence or some have high possibility of violence. Generally party activists and supporters are the main actors of Election Day violence, but sometimes the administrations play a silent role to patronize this violence. The following subsections give an overall picture of Election Day violence.

High frequency areas(4-5)⁶	Middle frequency areas(2-3)	Low frequency areas (1-below)
Bhola, Barisal, Munshiganj, Comilla, Noakhali, Pabna		Chandpur, Chittagong, Bagerhat, Bakerganj Dhaka, Mymensingh, Coxbazar, Gazipur, Magura, Rajbari, Shahjadpur, Laxmipur, Bhairab, Sariatpur Feni, Sunamganj, Kurigram, Sherpur, Jamalpur, Bandarban, Jalokhati

Figure 4.1 : Frequency of Election Day violence in 2001 parliamentary elections (1-3 October 2001)

In 2001 parliamentary elections the middle range of frequency is absent but the high frequency of violence where evident in Bhola, Barisal, Munsiganj, Comilla, Noakhali and Pabna and the low intensity areas are Chadpur, Bagerhat, Chittagong, Dhaka and so

1. The number indicates the average of violence events(1-5), by 1 I mean on average one incidents occurred in one constituency, by 2-3 it mean on average of violence events occurred 2-3 times and 4-5 it mean on average occurred 4-5times.

on(Figure-4.1). Although in the pre electoral violence Bagerhat was on top (see chapter-3, p.2). The areas of low frequency of violence are Chandpur, Chittagong, Bagerhat, Dhaka, Mymensingh, Coxbazar zilla and Bakerganj upazilla and so on (Figure-4.1). This area was middle frequency area in pre electoral violence (see chapter-3, p.2).

High frequency (4-5)	Middle frequency(2-3)	Low frequency area(1-less than 1)
Nil	Nil	Pabna, Jessore, Pirojpur, Barisal, Bagerhat, Noakhali, Khulna, Feni, Kushtia, Bogra, Madaripur, Tangail, Jinaidah, Kishoreganj, Norshindi, Laxmipur zilla and Tekerhat upzilla.

Figure 4.2: Frequency of Election Day violence in 2008 parliamentary elections (29 December 2008-1 January 2009)

In the 2008 parliamentary elections the figure-4.2 gives clear picture of frequency of violence. In this election, high and middle frequency areas of violence are absent. Although low frequency areas are Pabna, Jessore, Pirojpur, Barisal, Bagerhat, Noakhali, Khulna, Feni, Khustia, Bogra, Madaripur, Tangile, Jhenaidah, Kisorganj, Norshindi, Laxmipur zilla and Tekerhat upzilla. From this picture it appears that in 2008 parliamentary elections was less violent.

It is an interesting matter that there are some common places where violence occurred in both the years in the pre and election day like- Bagerhat Noakhali, Barisal, Bhola, Munsiganj, Comilla, Pabna, Feni, Kushtia, Bogra, Madaripur, Narayanganj, Mymensingh and Madaripur (see chapter-3, p.2 and chapter-4, p.2.3).

1.1. Forms of Election Day violence

The forms of Election Day violence differ from pre electoral violence. Although in some issues their remains similarity not only forms but also places of occurrence and target groups of violence. Although vote rigging, snatching ballot box, control of voting centers indirectly result in violence. Rigging or snatching ballot box activities shape violence as a

means. However, vote rigging, control over voting centers remain the highest category of Election Day violence whose value is 44%. The most common nature in Election Day violence is threat and the number of value is 30% (Figure-4.3). Threat is given to the voter not to go in voting centers or not to cast vote or to cast vote in favor of a particular candidate. Generally agents are deployed in voting centers from different political parties. Violence among different agents is common inside or outside voting centre. Weak party agents are violated by the strong party agent, sometimes they scuffle outside voting centers and the value of this is 16% (Figure-4.3). Attack on voter is a common phenomenon in Election Day violence. Different agents and activists of different political parties attack on voters. The aim of this attack is not to vote or to vote for particular candidates. According to national investigator of election, in the Election Day violence, snatching ballot box or minority or women voters were being intimidated not to turn up at the polling station. Although this intimidation could not impede all voters not to cast vote (The Daily Ittefaq, 2 October 2001). Another cause of this attack is that when the agents or activists of one party can assume that a group of voters cast vote in disfavor of them then they attack on this voter as revenge. On the other hand, the other severe forms of Election Day violence include hijacking, looting, bombing and also killing. In aside voting centre activist and agent are bombing As a result conflict takes place in Election Day.




Figure 4.3: Nature of Election Day violence in 2008 parliamentary elections in Bagerhat and Narayanganj (15- 25 February, 2016)

In the same way bomb blasting, looting, Hijacking is common nature of Election Day violence. Bomb blasting occurs outside and inside voting centers to spread panic. As for example, in Gournodi eighteen persons were injured by bombing, shooting in the Saturday night (The Daily Ittefaq, 1 October 2001)..Another point is killing which are most severe forms of Election Day violence. This killing may include voters, agents, electoral management body like-presiding officers, polling officer, law enforcement agencies. In the Election Day, six persons were killed in the violence one person in Munshiganj two in Barisal and others in Bhola and Shariatpur (The Daily Ittefaq, 2 October 2001, p.1)

According to the data of newspaper in 2001 parliamentary elections physical injuries remain the highest position of average which is 189 (Figure-4.4). It can be seen from the figure 4.4, the average number of killing is 4.

Name	Average
Killing	4
Physical injuries	189
Attacks on houses	1
Threats to minority (not to cast vote, to displace)	less than 1
Blockade and vandalize DC Office	less than 1
Attacks on private cars	less than 1
Arson in voting centers	less than 1
Threats by winner party on NGO Activists, businessman, lawyer.	less than 1

Figure 4.4: Nature of Election Day violence in 2001 parliamentary elections (1-3 October 2001)

Attacks on home or blockade and vandalize in DC office, arson in voting centers are common in Election Day. On the other hand, after getting the results of election the winner party poses threats or attacks on NGO activists, businessman or lawyers (Figure-4.4). These type of people are directly or indirectly supporter of the loser party. Another form of electoral violence is threat to religious minority not to cast vote or to cast vote for a particular candidates, the number of value is less than 1. In 2001 elections BNP forms government and when they imagined that it was going to win then they perpetrated

violence on minority community and the AL activists and supporters. It is not the whole picture of Bangladesh, like in 2001 parliamentary elections in Bagerhat AL and BNP were both implicated in violence especially on minority community (15-25 January, 2016)). As a result of such kind violence polling centers were postponed. Polling in nine centers out of total 1546 in Chittagong were postponed due to wide spread violence. Law enforcing agencies arrested five Chhattra Shibir cadres with arms for illegally capturing a polling centre in Satkhira (The Observer, 2 October 2001, p.16).

Nature	Average
Killing	1
Physical Injuries	46
Attacks on party office	less than 1
Attacks on home	less than 1
Threat	less than 1

Figure 4.5: Nature of Election Day violence in 2008 parliamentary elections (29 December 2008-1 January 2009)

Comparing the Election Day violence in 2001 and 2008 elections (Figure: 4.4, 4.5) it is seen that in 2008 parliamentary elections violence was less violent. In the previous national elections in 2001 minority violence was rampant but in 2008 the majority people cast their vote in a festive mode. All over the country the minority people cast their vote without fear. Firing on Buddah temple before six day in election at Fatikchari in Chittagong was only the occurrence. In Barisal the law enforcing agencies were strong to prevent violence in minority living area. Although as the reason of post electoral violence in 2001, people were in panic in violence (The Daily Sonbad, 30 December 2008).

Although the forms like-killing, physical injuries, attacks on party office, attacks on home and threats were common in 2008 elections. Aside this type of violence rape was also in this election, although in few number. As for example, Sreepur in Gazipur two minority girls were raped by terrorist. In this event panic spread among thousands of family in minority group. When a case files against the terrorist, they threaten to kill those women (The Daily Ittefaq, 30 December 2008). In this election physical injuries were the highest in number of average which is 46. As the duration of Election Day violence is short, it is

difficult to calculate the data and to find out real picture in a tabular form. The form of Election Day violence is the continuation of pre electoral violence. The timing of pre electoral violence is longer than the Election Day violence. So the forms, causes, victims and places of occurrence in pre electoral violence cover broader areas than Election Day violence.

1.2. Timing and places of Election Day Violence

Election Day violence remains middle position of timing of violence, before it is pre violence and after it is post violence so the timing is more important to know violence in details. Generally after lunch hour, Election Day violence becomes severe because the candidates could presume earlier whether he or she is going to win or lose. In the political culture of Bangladesh the loser party cannot accept the results. Like- in 2001 elections, after the election result AL declared for large artifice they defect the election and they refused the result (The Daily Ittefaq, 3 October 2001) In the same way, after the results of 2008 elections the Khaleda Zia declared that the election was farce not acceptable (The Daily Janokantho, 31 December 2008). The candidate who is most likely to lose the election, he or she tries to snatching ballot box or create pressure on administration to declare the results in favor of them condemning the unfair elections. With the presumption of defeat, the losing side attacks on the rival supporters and candidates. Their attack remains not only to the physical level but also attack on party office, home of party activists and supporters. They also attack on voters due to cast their votes for opposition party. This timing differs from centre to centre but in some voting centers violence starts from first hour of the day. Election Day violence concentrated in voting centers and the surrounding places like-the gate of voting centre, inside the voting centre, in some cases party office.

2. Causes of Election Day Violence

The ultimate cause of electoral violence is to win the election without some exception. Although the causes of Election Day violence depend on the neutral role of law enforcing agencies, level of competition among the candidates and the administrative capability of the EC. In the Election Day, the weak performance of the administration in conducting

election free and fair induces violence. In the Election Day while several party activists are engaged in canvassing in favor of their own party, they get embroiled in conflict. Another point is that, generally ruling party does more violence in Election Day. Ruling party does more violence due to win in the election⁷.

Causes	Average
Snatching ballot box	1
False voting	less than 1
Claim partiality to AL Candidate from DC office, casting vote	less than 1
Winner party attack the loser party supporters, the activists of loser party also attack on electoral administrative body	less than 1

Figure 4.6: Causes of Election Day violence in 2001 parliamentary elections (1-3 October 2001)

In 2001 parliamentary elections, the dominant cause of Election Day violence was snatching ballot box. This issue of violence occurs after lunch hour. In the Election Day every party activist or agent remain active surroundings the voting centre. So if one party tries to give false vote the others try to impede or they try to give false vote. As a result conflict or scuffle surroundings the voting centre. According to the information in newspaper, in 2001 election the AL candidates claim partiality from DC office (The Prothom Alo, 3 October 2001:20). This partiality claimed to cast vote in favor of BNP. The winner party attacked on loser party activists and supporters also mentioned in this newspaper.

In 2008 parliamentary elections revenge remained the one and only categories of Election Day violence. The causes of Election Day violence can be categories into following points:

2.1.Winning in the election

As a part of politics, electoral politics is also a game where two or more players play in the field. These players want to win in the game by any means without considering the ethics.

⁷. Interview with Rownaq Rehana (47), Housewife, Narayanganj and 15 February 2016.

These unethical issues induced to violence. This winning in the election is one of the most important issues of Election Day violence.




Figure 4.7: Causes of Election Day violence in Bagerhat and Narayanganj (15- 25 February, 2016)

In Narayanganj and Bagerhat winning in the election is the predominant cause of Election Day violence, the value was 40% (Figure-4.8). The candidate wants to show absolute power to the other candidates or voters, that is why they led to violent activities. Generally the strong party or ruling party supporters do more violence in Election Day. The value in support of this statement is 8% (Figure-4.8). In 2001 parliamentary elections, in the Election Day violence it is seen that winner party attacks the loser party supporters, also the activists of loser party also attack on electoral administrative body (Figure-4.6). In 2008 elections only revenge was the main cause of Election Day violence.

2.2. Vote related violence

Vote related violence is one of the most important factors of Election Day violence. Although vote rigging, false voting, control over voting centre's and snatching ballot box was not considered as violence, sometimes it can work as a means of violence. Basically these types of cause of violence occur after lunch hour without some exception. To control

voting centre's the dominant party tries to control voting centers by which votes are casting in favor of them, in the same time the opposition tries to obstruct them then create violence, sometimes post pond voting centers. As for example, thirteen polling centers in Chadpur Election Day violence occurred where forty five persons were injured. The reason was snatching ballot box, false voting and thrown ballot papers in water. This centers were postponed before noon (The Prothom Alo, 2 October 2001) .If one party imagines the opposition will get more vote then they create panic or violence to obstruct them. To cast fraud voting the conflict continues between agents, polling officers or presiding officers. On the other hand, the voters are threatened not to come in voting centers or before or after they come they inform their votes already cast. This issue creates violence in Election Day. In 2001 parliamentary elections it is seen that snatching ballot box and vote rigging are most important causes of day violence (Figure-4.6).

2.3.Administrative⁸ factor

The existing laws are enough to control electoral violence, if applies strongly for every person. From field work this issue draws from major concerns (Figure-4.8). The violence level depends on the activities of election commission or interim government. In 2001 elections such kind of measures are absent but in 2008 parliamentary elections enough steps were taken to ensure free and fair election (BRAC, 2014).

Apart from the above mentioned issue there are some issues which are responsible for Election Day violence such as revenge, personal interest, to employ the agent, diving money or giving lunch and so on. For some people election is the source of income may be it to the low income people, or to the middle or high income people. These people may be voters, supporters, activists or leaders of the party. In some cases day violence occurs in this issue of money earning. In the Election Day the party candidate give lunch, violent activities occur in this issue of lunch.

⁸ .Administration includes law enforcement agencies, Election Commission and legal officers of election like-presiding officer, polling officer.

3. Effects of Election Day violence

The effects of Election Day violence mainly includes create panic among general people by which they adverse to politics. The voters remain in a confusion whether they will go or not to go in casting their votes. In some cases due to threat or panic they have to vote against their own preferable candidates. As a result incompetent candidates elect in the election. They have another panic that the loser party think that the voter did not cast their vote in favor of their party. The winner party thinks that the voter cast their vote in favor of loser party. In this case the voters have the risk of post electoral violence.

3.1. Victims of electoral violence

In the Election Day violence the voters or general people are main target of victims. As seen, the general people are highest percentage of victims (42). These targets are selected sometimes consciously sometimes unconsciously or they are less concerned about politics.




Figure 4.8: Target group of Election Day violence in Bagerhat and Narayanganj (15- 25 February 2016)

The second position of victim is political party activists and supporters their value is 32. This group is politically conscious and they directly or indirectly connected to violence activities. Economically insolvent people are made part of violent activities due to their

economic insolvency, their percentage is 10. The victims of religious minority people is 6 and among others women, children, young generation, student are included.

Conclusion

From the above analysis it is seen that Election-day violence remains for short time and the intensity of Election-day violence depends on level of competition, on law and order situation, media coverage and so on. The main goals of electoral violence on Election Day are to take control over the voting on Election- day in order to determine the outcome. In the Election Day physical injuries are remain highest ranking in forms although killing, raped, attack on home including other issues in election day violence. Winning the election is the most burning issue for day violence unlike pre election violence. Although in Election Day violence, snatching ballot box, capturing polling centers, false voting became the causes of violence. In the impacts of Election Day violence, if the victims of violence are winning the election they remain probably in safe john, in some cases as revenge the defeated party attack again on the winning party supporters. The effects of Election Day violence continued in the post electoral violence. One thing is common in both pre and day violence is that general people is the main victims of electoral violence.

Chapter 5

Post Electoral Violence in Bangladesh

Introduction

Violence after the election generally refers post electoral violence. This violence warrants serious concerns in most of the cases it takes severe forms than the pre or day electoral violence. Generally after getting the results of election the winner party attacks the loser party, in the same way the loser party also attack the winning rally or party activists or supporters of winner party. Both candidates attack on voters not cast their vote in favor of them. In 2001 parliamentary elections, post electoral violence was severe; the ruling party activists attacked loser party activists and supporters because of casting their vote in favor of opposition party. Religious minority people were the target in some constituencies. Not like that only the winner party but also the loser party perpetrates violence. Although on the minority people, violence was less in 2008 parliamentary elections, post election violence was more than the pre and day violence. It continues sometimes few weeks after the election results declared. This chapter is divided into three sections. The first section deals the nature of post electoral violence including frequency of violence and timing of post electoral violence. The second section deals with the causes of post electoral violence. The third section deals with the results of post electoral violence including victims of violence.

1. Nature of post electoral violence: Cases of 2001 and 2008 parliamentary elections

In 2001 parliamentary elections, the high frequency areas of violence were absent and the middle range of areas were: Barisal, Feni, Bagerhat, Khulna, Jessore, Pabna (Figure-5.1) and 2008 elections, the middle frequency level was only in Barisal (Figure-5.2). There are some factors which induce the level of frequency. Geographical locations have a great impact on the level of frequency of violence. The areas which are located nearby in bordering areas, those areas have high possibility of violence. The bordering areas of Satkhira, Feni, Khulna, Jessore also belong to this category (Figure-5.1). Majority of the people living in the areas are economically insolvent. In large numbers of them are

engaged in different illegal business. Therefore, they are susceptible to electoral manipulation. On the other hand, displacement is the result or nature of violence which is palpable in border areas. Another fact is that the places where religious minority communities live in, these places have high risk of electoral violence like: Bagerhat (Kachua, Rampal), Barisal (Gournadi, Agailjara). Other factors like high level competition in constituency in remote areas lead to electoral violence.

High frequency areas (4-5)⁹	Middle frequency areas (2-3)	Low frequency areas (1-below)
	Feni, Bagerhat, Khulna, Jessore, Pabna, Barguna, Barisal.	Narayanganj, Shariatpur, Chittagong, Gopalganj, Magura, Sirajganj, Norshindi, Noakhali, Tangail, Nator, Jhenaidah, Jamalpur, Bogra, Dhaka, Meherpur, Rangpur, Kurigram, Panchagarh, Netrokana, Rajshahi, Kushtia, Shahjadpur, Gazipur, Lalmonirhat, Munshiganj, Sunamganj, Norail, Kishoreganj, Patuakhali, Jalakhathi, ,Mirsari, Jhenaidah, Madaripur, Faridpur, Dinazpur, Moulvibazar, Coxbazar, Mymensingh, Meherpur, Kurigram, Rajbari, Sathkhira, Joypurhat.

Figure 5.1: Frequency of Post Electoral violence in 2001 parliamentary (4 October 2001-30 October 2001 elections)

⁹. The number indicates the average of violence events (1-5), by 1 I mean on average one incidents occurred in one constituency, by 2-3 it mean on average of violence events occurred 2-3 times and 4-5 it mean on average occurred 4-times.

High frequency (4-5)	Middle frequency(2-3)	Low frequency(1-less than 1)
Nil	Barisal(Gournadi , Agailjara)	Dhaka(Pollobi),Norshindi(Shibpur), Bogra,Comilla,Chapainababganj, Satkhira,Potuakhali,Chadpur,Lamxipur, Noakhali(Senbag),Jamalpur(Sorisabari), Rajshahi,Norail, Chittagong, Khulna, Kishoreganj,Sherpur,Coxbazar,Bhola, Narayanganj,Chuadanga,Jhenaidah,Savar, Chittagong,Bagerhat,Mirsorai, Sirajganj,Pabna,Rupganj, Moulvibazar.

Figure 5.2: Frequency of Post Electoral Violence in 2008 parliamentary elections (2 January 2009-30 January 2009)

When violence occurs after election, the violence tends to be at a higher level than in the pre-election period, and is more likely to involve the opposition as a primary perpetrator (Straus, S. and Taylor, C. T. 2009, p.38). Post electoral violence is more likely to escalate to the large scale violent conflicts because the defeated candidate challenges the electoral results. As a part of electoral culture in Bangladesh, the clash between the defeated and winner candidate induce electoral violence. The nature of post electoral violence varies from country to country, election to election. It was mostly post-electoral violence, attack on minority in minority infested areas. Identify them to be vote bank of a particular party. Reportedly the violence was intense, houses were burned, alleged rapes, and rioting took place mainly in the South Western and deltaic reason of Bangladesh, greater districts of Noakhali, Bhola, Khulna, Satkhira and part of Jessore¹⁰.

¹⁰ . Interview with Brig. Sakhawat Hussain, Ex- Election Commissioner (2007-2011), 06 November 2015.

The following pie chart shows the nature of post electoral violence resulting from especially in 2001 and 2008 elections. The nature of post electoral violence is closely related to one another like- structural or minority violence induce as physical violence, physical or structural violence induce psychological violence, violence on the minority included in physical, structural and psychological violence.




Figure 5.3: Nature of post electoral violence in Bagerhat and Narayanganj (15- 25 February, 2016)

Physical violence

Physical attack is the most common type of post electoral violence. The severe form of physical violence is killing. In the parliamentary elections in Bangladesh the percentage of killing is 14 (Figure-5.3). In 2001 elections the average of this type of violence was 23 (Figure-5.4) where in 2008 it was 2 (Figure-5.9). The another form of violence is injuries due to scuffle, shooting, rape or violence against women. In 2001 the average of injuries is 805 (figure-5.4) and in 2008 is 153 (Figure-5.9). In Bagerhat in 2001 elections 2100

thousand people were physically attacked¹¹. The average shooting using small arms on the Election Day was 32 in 2001 elections (Figure-5.4).

Name	Average
Killing	23
Physical Injuries	805
Be shoot at	32
Raped(including religious minority)	5
Violence against women	1
Uprooting eyes	1
Attack on presiding and polling officers	1
Attack on winning party rallies	1
Total	868

Figure 5.4.: Nature of Post electoral physical violence in 2001 parliamentary elections (4 October 2001-30 October 2001elections)

In the post election violence spread in different areas of Bagerhat district. Reports from Bagerhat said unruly people attacked, ransacked and set on fire Awami League offices, houses and shops of AL men and assaulted many of them physically in last 24 hours. Police is reported to have taken no action against this violence's (The Observer, 4 October 2001, p.15). Another nature of post electoral violence is displacement. In 2001 elections, amid continuing attacks on Awami leaguers by the activists of BNP led Four Party Alliance, about 10 thousand people, mostly minorities, of Gournodi and Agailjhara upazilas of Barisal have taken shelter in neighboring Gopalganj district (The Observer, 9 October 2001, p.1).

¹¹ Interview with respondents in Bagerhat, 17-19 Feb 2016.

Case Study¹²:

Montu who is the president of Smrik League. He is 48 years old. In 2001 elections he was general secretary of Smrik League. He was the victims of electoral violence. According to him, 7/8 persons were killed in public places. Among them the president of Smrik League was killed in open place. The servant of his home had to jail four times and faced tortured due to work in his house. He also was in jail for seventeen times and seven years he was disappeared. According to him, approximately 2100 people were physically injured because they walked using their leg and hand to cast vote in favor of AL. As a result of violence the perfect candidates are reluctant to come in politics. If politicians can avoid their personal interest then violence can reduce.

Structural Violence

In general structural violence including attack or destroy on the means of livelihood like- attack on home or working place, cutting tree .Structural violence is a term commonly ascribed to Johan Galtung, which he introduced in the article "Violence, Peace, and Peace Research" (1969). It refers to a form of violence wherein some social structure or social institution may harm people by preventing them from meeting their basic needs. Structural violence results in economic loss which seems difficult to measure in terms of money. After the election when one party holds the power they want to show hegemonic power taking revenge on the rivals. They attacked the defeated party workers houses, business places, vandalized the party leader's photos, agricultural and corn fields. In 2001 elections the average of structural violence was 38(figure-5.5).

Name	Average
Arson and vandalize election camps	6
Arson and vandalize party offices	1

¹². Rezaul Rahman Montu (48), Sramik league (president), Victims of Violence, Bagerhat.

Tearing posters	1
Arson and vandalize houses	27
Arson and vandalize shops	1
Destruction on photos(leaders of different parties)	1
Destruction of agricultural fields	1
Total	38

Figure 5.5: Structural violence in 2001 parliamentary elections (4 October 2001-30 October 2001 elections).

In 2008 elections it is known to all that it was less violent but the post electoral violence was obviously structural violence. As the type of violence differs from place to place, each area has separate source of livelihood to the common people like- fishing, business and woodcutting. For this reason which structure is being destroyed in the electoral violence depends on their source of livelihood. As seen, in 2008 elections 5000 eggs were destroyed, vandalized Coconut trees or killed domestic animals (Figure-5.6).

Name	Average
Arson and vandalize house and furniture	4
Plundering (65 thousand)	2
Vandalize on motorcycle and Rickshaw	1
Vandalize shops	1
Cutting on Coconut trees,	1
Attack on hostels	1
Vandalize Eggs (5000)	1
Vandalize on domestic animals	1
Vandalize on party offices	1
Total	13

Figure 5.6.: Post electoral structural violence in 2008 parliamentary elections (2 January 2009-30 January 2009)

In spite of this, the common structural violence is-vandalize electoral camp, party office, barricade road cutting tree and so on. The interesting matter is that not only the winner party but also the defeated party are involved in this structural violence.

Psychological Violence

Psychological violence becomes an instrument in electoral politics to weak the opposition party. It is the product of physical and structural violence (Figure-5.7). Psychological violence is such kind of violence which is nothing to express, nothing to see or nothing to measure actually an abstract form. If someone raped in a family, they loss their dignity to the society and the victim are in a complex situation to establish her future life. The percentage of raped in post electoral violence is 10 (Figure-5.3). In the same way, threat is another form of psychological violence where the victim becomes mentally weak. In the result of physical violence, the people have mental pressure with economic losses. Although this type of violence is seen mostly in pre election time but in the post time people also suffered from this type of violence. In the post time filing case, detention and arrest is common, mainly on loser party to weak them mentally this type of violence also the result of psychological violence. In 2001 and 2008 election such kind of violence draws the serious attention (Figure-5.8.5.9).




Figure 5.7: Process of psychological violence

Violence on Minority Community

In the electoral politics of Bangladesh religious minority people are considered as vote bank. The people perception is that the entire religious minority (especially Hindu community) are the voter of Awami league. If the other political party came in power, in the post time they are victim of violence activities (to vote in favor of opposition party), in the pre time of election they also are victim of violence (threat, not to go voting centre). As seen, the percentage of violence on minority is 10(Figure-5.3). In the 2001 parliamentary elections minority violence was more than the others electoral history of Bangladesh (Figure-5.8). The interesting matter is that the opposition party also involved in violence for their personal interests¹³. The actors of violence vandalize the living home, prayer house, idol etc.

Case Study¹⁴:

Manik who lives in Kochua upzila in Bagerhat district. He is 30 years old. He lives with his family in Hindu dominant area. In 2001 elections, in the post electoral violence he was victims along with his family. After the election, in one night 7/8 people came to their living area and shouted to recall Chandra (anonym). He was playing play cards aside but did not respond and went away. The group went to his house and physically tortured the male members of the family and also looted. The old person could not escape of violence. The only reason of this violence was to cast vote in favor of AL. This type of minority violence starts in the order of the candidates who elected in the constituencies. If he wished, he could stop such kind of violence, but he did not.

The serious form of post electoral violence in 2001 was displacement of 3335 people displace to Gopalganj from Gournadi and Agailjara(Figure-5.8). Some people have been forced to migrate into India.

¹³ . Interview with respondents in Bagerhat, 17-19 February 2016.

¹⁴ . Manik (30), live in Kochua, Bagerhat.

Nature	Average
Establish hegemonic power on different university and Hindu community home	1
Attack, threat to religious minority and destruction of home(not cast vote)	16
Displacement of minority from Agailjara and Gournadi to Gopalganj	3335
Attack and Destroy Idol	1
Attack, displacement and impede to go workplace of loser party activist and supporter,	24
Plundering	4
Impeding to fisherman from fishing	1
Threat to journalist	1

Figure 5.8.: Nature of post election Violence in 2001 parliamentary elections (4 October 2001-30 October 2001elections)

The post-polls violence has created panic among Awami Leaguers and members of Minority Community at almost all places in Khulna Division. At least four persons were killed and hundreds of people were injured in last 48 hours in attacks on opponents of BNP –led Four Party Alliance. Police and other law enforcing agencies including Army are playing very passive role in controlling these incidents. Minority members were beaten, their houses and business were ransacked, women were assaulted and violated, temples and idol were smashed and they were charged with heavy toll in different villages of Bagerhat, Khulna, Satkhira, Jessore, Magura, Kushtia, Jhenidah and Narail (The Observer, 6 October 2001,p.16).

In the post electoral time the wining party threat to the defeated party’s supporters not to cast their vote in favor of them .Some people are threatening not to go workplace. The shopkeepers or businessman have to stop their work in the post election time. Not only the winning party but also defeated parties were actors of violence. Normally the buying voters are threaten to violence because they think that the committed and supporters of their party did not cast their vote in favor of them.

Nature	Average
Killing	2
Injured	153
Arson and vandalize on Idol and worship place	1
Establish Hegemony	1
Threat(displacement)	1
Extortion	1

Figure 5.9: Nature of post election Violence in 2008 parliamentary elections (2 January 2009-30 January 2009)

In 2008 election, in the post electoral violence the issue of displacement, threats, arson and vandalize idols or worship place are common but not like in 2001 elections (Figure-5.9). 2008 election was a model election in Bangladesh. There was hardly any violence except one odd killing before declaration of schedule in an inner-party rift. Other than that election was peaceful in that election voter turnout was the highest in the history average 87% which suffice to say that election day atmosphere was conducive for such turnout. Women turnout was noteworthy as they felt safe to go to the polling station. There was after poll violence reported.¹⁵

Target group and places of Occurrences

The target group of post electoral violence is categorically the same but there are some differences among the timing of election. In the pre Election Day, voters and party activists are the target group of violence. On the Election Day voters and party activists and the post election violence opposition party activists and supporters are the target group of violence. When the violent activities run then the other factors are indirectly become target like-minority people property, women and children. Like the election day violence the identification of place is difficult in the post election time, although opposition party's party office, business places, home and their property holding places become the places of violence.

¹⁵ . Interview with Brig. Sakhawat Hussain, Ex- Election Commissioner (2007-2011), 06 November 2015.

2. Causes of Post Electoral Violence

The basic cause of post electoral violence is same like the pre and day violence like power competition, revenge, and administrative weaknesses and so on. The places of differences are given bellow-

Winning Rally

The first reason of post electoral violence is the victory rally taken out by the winning party. In the victory rally the loser party attacks and the winning party also counter attacks or sometimes in the winning rally the activist and supporter vandalize party office, home, and shops. In the rally the participants give recite incitement speech which induces violence (Figure-5.10). Monirampur in Jessore , in the winning rally of Four Party Alliance AL supported terrorist attacked on activists of BNP and Jamat- E-Islam. In this incident ten people were injured. They abducted Altaf Kari, Leadet of Jamat-E- Islam (The Daily Prothom Alo, 4 October 2001, p.4). Generally financially more solvent or influential party does more violence. If influential party fail in the election then the winner party cannot do violence , if possible winner party fail in the election then they create violence

Causes	Average number
Victory rally	1
Revenge	2
Incitement speech	1
Establish hegemonic power,	1
Displacement(minority, party supporters)	1
Manipulate voters in favor of AL	1
Winning in the election	1
Attack on minority as a vote bank of AL	1
Intra-party clashes	1

Figure 5.10.: Causes of post electoral violence 2001 parliamentary elections (4 October 2001-30 October 2001elections)

Revenge and Power Game

All the candidates in the election were remaining in competition to win in the election. After election one party or more party in case of coalition government forms government. The others remained the defeated party. So the ruling party wants to show hegemonic power. In the same time as revenge they create violent activities to the defeated party supporters (Figure-5.11). Revenge is one of the most important causes of post electoral violence.




Figure 5.11: Causes of post electoral violence in 2001 elections in Bagerhat and Narayanganj (15- 25February, 2016)

In 2001 elections, the post electoral violence was more severe in form where this revenge and hegemonic power was the causes of violence (Figure-5.11). As seen in 2008 election revenge is the causes of post violence (Figure-5.12).




Figure 5.12: Causes of post election violence in 2008 parliamentary elections

The fact is that the general people are victim of violence because they vote in favor of AL or B.N.P (both party involve in violent activities) (Figure-5.12). This issue is also common in 2001 election (Figure-5.10). Sporadic incidents of post- election violence left at least four persons killed and score of injuries all over the country. Two persons were killed in Bagerhat district. The victims were identified as Hemayetuddin Hawader(32) a BNP activist. Local Awami League claimed that a gang of BNP activists led by one Ripon stormed the house of Hemayet at village Khunirkhono of Morelhanj upzila last night and chopped him to death as he voted to the election symbol 'boat'. On the other hand, BNP claimed that AL leaders killed Aziz Tarafder at Charkat village of Kachua upzila (The Observer, 5 October 2001, p.01).

Electoral Culture

In Bangladesh, parliamentary elections are not free from violence. After its independence pre, post and election time violence are common where first (1973) and eighth (2001) parliamentary elections were mostly condemned by electoral violence and fifth (1991) and ninth (2008) parliamentary elections were less violent (Noorana, 2016). In the electoral culture of Bangladesh the defeated party challenge the electoral result. As a result they try to make a disorder situation in the post electoral time. They imagine that the buying voter does not cast their vote. They create violence with the winner party sometimes with administration due to their positive role on winner party.

Administrative Weakness

In the administrative weakness, the role of Election Commission, security forces election management bodies are included. The strong role of administration can reduce violence. In 2008 election due to administrative strong role the violence was less than the 2001 elections. The people's perception is that if election is free and fair then post electoral violence reduces. The political parties and general people have less debate about the electoral result. If the security forces work neutrally then violence remained at in tolerable level.

3. Impacts of Post Electoral Violence

Post electoral violence entails result of revenge. The winning party wants to take revenge in the pre electoral violence. The defeated party also does violence as a result of violence. The post electoral violence has long term impacts. The severe form of post electoral violence is killing. Consequently, their family member sufferings know no bounds. There is no way to recover this type of sufferings. In case of rape or physical injuries on women, some family's losses their social dignity. The sufferings women (raped women) face difficulties to continue her social life especially in education or in marriage life. In case of displacement the victim people loss their inherent property and social status. They conduct their life like refugee. Another point of impact comes from mental pressure. Due to threat the normal life style hampers. The structural violence like destroy home, party office, cutting trees, destroys fisheries lead weaker economical condition of the people.

Conclusion

When violence occurs it is not a result of an electoral process, it is the breakdown of an electoral process (Fisher, 2002, p. 3). In the post electoral violence revenge work as a central point of causes. The other factors like electoral culture, victory rally or administrative weakness also work as factors of post electoral violence. The impacts of post electoral violence include short time and long time effects of human beings. It threatens the human security especially in case of death, threat or physical injuries. To reduce post electoral violence, strong role of Electoral Management body is essential. As for example, in 2008 election post electoral violence was less than the 2001 election, where the strong role of Electoral management body work as most important factors.

Chapter- 6

Electoral violence in 2001 and 2008 elections: A Comparative analysis

Introduction

The analysis of nature, causes and effects of 2001 and 2008 elections demonstrate that there are some linkages among pre, Election Day and post electoral violence. The aim of pre electoral violence was to discourage voters not to cast vote for a particular candidates. On the contrary Election Day violence was deuced to affect the electoral result while revenge had been the dominant aim of post electoral violence. Politically induced violence in Bangladesh peaks in the election year. In spite of being the election year 2008 has few incidents of political violence, because enough steps were taken to ensure level playing field (BRAC 2014, P.45). According to ‘the method of Agreement’ both elections were Parliamentary elections and both elections are held under Caretaker Government. In the ‘the Method of Difference’ 2001 parliamentary election was more violent than the previous democratic elections and in the same time 2008 election was comparatively low violent(Jonathan, H. 2002 PP.249-267)). This level of violence depends on the management of Electoral management¹⁶ body. Their neutral and strong role can reduce violence in election time. The first section makes a comparative analysis of nature of the violence in 2001 and 2008 elections. The second deals with comparative analysis of the causes of 2001 and 2008 elections. The impacts of electoral violence in 2001 and 2008 elections have been compared in the third section. The forth section discusses the inter-relationship of pre, Election Day and post electoral violence. The fifth outlines the reasons of more electoral violence in 2001 and less violence in 2008 followed by a conclusion.

1. Forms of electoral violence: Comparison of 2001 and 2008 elections

To compare the electoral violence in 2001 and 2008 elections, it is necessary to find out the more or less violent elections. In the previous chapter the analysis of nature, causes and

¹⁶ Electoral management means bringing together the knowledge and expertise relating to electoral activities of EMB, their roles and functions, their organization, financing and management of election administration. It also focuses on the institutional structure of EMB, their administrative infrastructure and their external environment.

impacts give a possible direction that in 2001 electoral violence was more than in 2008 electoral violence. The following arguments also give support in favor of this statement. In the analysis of intensity area, it is seen that in 2001 parliamentary elections the high intensity of violence were in Bagerhat, Barisal, Noakhali, Bhola, and the middle intensity area were Chadpur, Patuakhali, Comilla and low intensified area were Kustia, Gazipur, Tangail and others. In 2008 the same calculation indicate that high and middle intensity were absence only low intensity of violent area were Bagerhat, Pabna, Mymensingh, Madaripur, Gournadi and others. From this analysis it is seen that in 2001 parliamentary elections violence was high than in 2008 elections. The low intensity areas in 2008 elections like Bagerhat, Barisal, Bhola were common as like as in 2001 elections. Some specific area can be identified as common place of violence.

In the analysis of forms of violence in 2001 and 2008 elections, there are some common and uncommon forms of violence which occur in both elections. The common forms are-killing, physical attack, abduction, attack on party office, looting, campaign related violence or violence on minority people. In this form killing is the most severe forms of violence and physical attack remain highest in number. The uncommon forms of violence are bald heading, arson on straw, blockade and vandalize DC Office, impeding to fisherman from fishing, cutting on coconut trees, vandalize domestic animal and egg (5000).

In 2001 parliamentary elections the total number of killing was 71 averages in number which was the severe form of violence. The total number of physical injuries of people was 2455 (Figure-6.1) which was in highest in number. Another common form of electoral violence in 2001 was arson and vandalizes electoral camps and party office of opposition party; vandalize house and furniture and shops.

Forms of violence	Total number in average
Killing	71
Physical injuries	2455
Arson and vandalize election camps, party offices, houses and shops	85

Violence on minority people	3361
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Figure 6.1. Forms of electoral violence in 2001 parliamentary elections (1 September-30 October 2001)

In the election time violence on minority was in severe form in the post electoral time in 2001 elections. Generally the minority people faced attacks and counter attacks, attack on idol or worship place, the women were raped. And the severe form of violence on minority community was displacement. In the figure 6.1 this kind of violence was obvious where displacement was 3335 in number in 2001 elections.

Forms of violence	Number in average
Killing	3
Physical Injuries	253
Arson and vandalize election camp, party office, house, shops,	7

Figure 6.2. Forms of electoral violence in 2008 parliamentary elections (1 December 2008- 30 January 2009)

From the figure 6.1, 6.2 it is seen that in 2008 parliamentary elections the forms of violence were less than the 2001 parliamentary elections. The number of killing was 3 (Figure-6.2) where in 2001 elections, it was 71 (Figure-6.1). The number of physical injuries in 2008 elections was 253 in number (Figure-6.2) where in 2001 elections the number was 2455 (Figure-6.1).the other major issue like violence on minority community was severe in 2001 election. The number of this violence was 3361 where threats to displacement were in highest form of violence. Another fact is that in post election time this minority violence was higher than the pre or Election Day violence (Figure-3.3, 4.4, 5.4, 5.8). The violence on minority community was merely absent in 2008 elections. In the post electoral violence in 2001 elections, within fifteen days three women were raped, 44 people were killed, 2500 people were physically injured and 60000 minority people would not cast their vote due to threats. (The Observer, 15 August 2001, p. 01). As unusual forms of electoral violence attacks were launched on domestic animals. In Norshindi the party supporters of BNP destroyed 5000 eggs in the post electoral violence in 2008 elections. In this day party supporters also attacked on home and destroy furnishers. They also set fire

on idols of Hindu god/gods due to work in favor of AL candidates (The Prothom Alo, 2 February 2009, p.01). The common forms of violence were same in both elections because all the places of violence killing, physical injuries can be easily done by violator. The unusual forms of violence generally occur when violence was in high range. For this reason in 2001 the unusual forms of violence were obvious like-bald heading, cutting tree, and arson on straw, blockade and vandalize DC Office etc where in 2008 this type of violence was absent. In 2001 elections the Election Commission could not play neutral and strong role to control violence. In the same time the Caretaker Government also played a passive role with EC. For this reason, in 2008 elections violence was in tolerable level than in 2001 elections.

2. Causes of Violence: Comparison of 2001 and 2008 elections

Generally the dominant cause of electoral violence is winning in the election in pre and Election Day time. In the post electoral violence revenge works as predominant factors of violence. But it cannot be generalized as a whole. In the previous chapter 3, 4 and 5 the causes of pre, day and post time are explained in details, where it is seen that administrative¹⁷ factors, nomination, campaign and winning rally works important causes of electoral violence. In the analysis of nature in the previous section we see that 2008 elections were less violent, so the causes were also a few. The causes like winning in the election, procession centric violence, winning rally were common like in 2001 elections. There are some unusual causes of violence. In 2001 elections, in Meherpur the AL supporters' post-up deviating poster against Khaleda Zia (Chairperson of BNP), when the supporter of BNP heard this news they attacked on the supporters of AL. In this clash one person was killed. They also destroyed the photos of Bangabandhu Sheikh Mujibur Rahman and Sheikh Hasia (The Prothom Alo, 7 September 2001, p.20). In the pre election time as a part of campaign, different political parties arranged procession.

To arrange this procession, supporters and activists of party built party office or gate. The opposition party obstructed and attacked on this procession or gate building process. As a

¹⁷ Administration includes law enforcement agencies, Election Commission and legal officers of election like-presiding officer, polling officer.

result violence spread out. In this case a total of 260 people were physically injured in a day (The Prothom Alo, 22 September 2001).

All the violent clashes of election time did not occur among opposition parties. In some cases intra party conflict led to electoral violence. In 2001 elections, intra BNP conflict on the issue of procession and extortion on the demand of one lack taka. In this violence two person were killed (Kushtia-1, Feni-1) (The Daily Ittefaq, The Bangladesh Observer, and 3 September 2001). In 2001 elections this intra party violence was dominant where in 2008 it was absent because party registration, electoral rules introduced in 2008 elections. As a result intra party democracy practiced, and due to democratic practice intra party clashes reduced. In 2001 elections, in campaign period face to face rally of different parties created violence, sometimes these clashes were taken place between police and the general people. In this type of violence nine people were killed and seventy people were physically injured (The Daily Ittefaq, 11 September 2001, p.01). In the post electoral time the people who are supporters and activists of the defeated party violated by winner party activists. In Coxbazar and Gopalganj the BNP and Shibir activists attacked on minority community and also young girls due to work in favor of AL (The Prothom Alo, 12 October 2001, p.5). In 2008 parliamentary elections the picture was different. Only one unusual issue in the pre electoral time was to prevent the public meeting of Hussain Mohammad Ershad (President of Jatio Party), it was intra party conflict between JP and JP supporter in Rangpur. In this clash thirty people were physically injured (The Daily Ittefaq, 28 December 2008, p.1.). Winning in the election is the regular cause of electoral Violence which is common in both elections. But there are some causes into the cause which is not obvious all the elections or in three timing of violence as for example violence based on post-up deviating poster or electoral violence for personal revenge. This type of causes is seen if the law enforcing agencies or electoral administration does not work strongly. In 2001 elections the unusual causes of violence was obvious for this reason.

3. Impacts of violence: 2001 and 2008 elections

The level of impacts of electoral violence depends on the level of violence. High level of violence induces high level of impacts. From the previous study, it is seen that in 2001 violence was high than in 2008 elections. So the level of impacts was high in 2001

parliamentary elections. The impacts of electoral violence can be categories into two types; short time and long time. In the short time impacts include economical destroy which can be cover by any means. In the long term impacts include physical and psychological and impacts where in some cases physical harmed can be reduced or not. But psychological impacts effects long time where culture can change. As for example in 2001 elections violence was high especially post electoral violence. In the next parliamentary elections people were reluctant to cast their vote or they remain in fear of violence. To reduced this psychological impacts the EC and CTG have to take strong role. Although this types of impacts cannot be changed only in 2008 elections. The impacts of electoral violence cannot be calculated as a whole. In 2001 elections, rape, physical injuries or attack on minority wee common where the sufferer families losses social dignity. In case of social dignity cannot be calculated. Some facts destruction of shops or homes or furniture can be calculated. Since in 2008 elections violence was less so the impacts also was short term. Another fact is that the daily news of newspaper mainly focuses on nature and places of violence not the effects of electoral violence. According to the newspaper data and also from people's perception it is clear that 2001 parliamentary elections was more violent than in 2008 elections. In 2001 elections people became reluctant to politics or casting vote but in 2008 elections this general people mainly young generation cast their vote with enthusiasm and festive environment.

4. Relationship of Pre, Election Day and post electoral violence

The pre, Election Day and post electoral violence are closely interrelated. This relationship can be analyzed in from of the issue of actors, factors and victims of violence.

Issues of relationships	Indicators of issue	Timing of Violence	Type of relationship
Actors ¹⁸ of violence	Political parties and their activists and supporters,	Pre Electoral Violence	Similarity

¹⁸.Actors means the people who are directly or indirectly related to electoral violence.

	Election Commission, Administrations, law enforcing agencies	Election Day Violence	
		Post Electoral Violence	
Factors ¹⁹ of Violence	Pistol, bamboo, fisheries, dairy farms, mounds of paddy, crops field. party office, electoral camp, home, shop, religious place or idol, motorcycle, mobile phone	Pre Electoral Violence	Similarity
		Election Day Violence	
		Post Electoral Violence	
Victims ²⁰ of Violence	General people, party activists and supporters, defeated party, religious minority	Pre Electoral Violence	Similarity
		Election Day Violence	
		Post Electoral Violence	

Figure 6.3: Similar relationships among pre, day and post electoral violence

In the three timing of violence the actors like political party and their supporters, election commission with administrations and electoral management bodies, presiding and polling officers and also the general people are included. Electoral violence involves organized efforts where the actors of violence are closely related to one another. Political party leaders conduct their violent activities by their party supporters. On the other hand, extremist or illicit armed groups act as violent actors due to the support of their own party (Noorana, 2016). Election commission and law enforcement agencies are indirectly related to electoral violence because lack of their strong role in the election

¹⁹ .Factor means the instrument or element which is used by actors for creating electoral violence like pistol, bamboo including dominant things in area like- fisheries, dairy farms, mounds of paddy, crops field. On the other hand, party office, electoral camp, home, shop, religious place or idol, motorcycle, mobile phone are also used as factors of electoral violence.

²⁰ .Victims of Violence means the people who are violated in the electoral clash like- general people, party activists and supporters, defeated party and religious minority people.

the political party and their supporters have the high possibility to do violent activities or if EC or law enforcing agency work in favor of specific party, there have high risk of violence in pre election day and post election time. In the electoral violence there are some factors or instruments of violence. Although these factors differs from place to place where the dominant things in areas like- fisheries, dairy firms, mounds of paddy, crops field. On the other hand, party office, electoral camps, home, shops, religious place or idol, motorcycle, mobile phone also used as a factors of electoral violence. In these violence small arms like pistol, shot guns, bamboo were used. Another issue of violence is the target group or victims of violence. In the three timing of violence general people, political parties' supporter and activist, economically poor and religious person were the victims of violence. These three issues are same in the pre, Election Day and post electoral violence (Figure 6.1).




Figure 6.4: Dissimilar relationship of pre, day and post electoral violence

Although area wise analysis shows that the ruling party does more violence in pre election time. In the Election Day time, both ruling and opposition party do violence, especially the candidates who are mostly dominant in one constituency does more violence. In the post election time, the wining party does more violence in general (Figure6..2) where defeated parties supporters and activists become the main target group. This analysis of relationships can be change in any election or in any time of violence. It is the dominant relationship among pre, Day and Post electoral violence.

5. The reason of high violence in 2001 and less violence in 2008

From the previous analysis there are some observations to high violence in 2001 parliamentary elections. Like-

- The EC is the guardian to conduct the election. However, EC is responsible for it. Therefore, electoral law and procedures are vested in the Constitution and Representation of People Order (*RPO*), 1972. Here should be mentioned that the rule making power now is vested in the EC by recent amendment (Akhter (2008), p. 4). As per the Constitution and *RPO*, 1972, the power, functions and duties of EC is described with the article 118(4) and 126 of the Constitution and in the article 4 of the *RPO*, 1972 in different nature. The *RPO*, 1972 is the basic law under which the election rules were made by the government. It also provides a logical and apparently complete basis for the conduct of parliamentary elections but has a few unusual features that have created difficulties with respect to public perception about the neutrality of the EC. Article 118 (4) of the Constitution provides that “the EC shall be independent in exercising of its functions and subject only to this constitution and any other law”. Article 126 of the Constitution and Articles 4 and 5 of the *RPO*, 1972 also provide that “it shall be the duty of all executive authorities to assist the EC in the discharge of its functions.” The EC has a power to require any persons or authority to perform such functions in the election. In the same vein, Article 58D (1) of the Constitution directs to the CTG to “give to the EC all possible aid and assistance that may be required for holding the general election of members of parliament peacefully, fairly and impartially.” In the interest of holding free and fair election, it would not appear that the CTG has the power to discharge and replace member of the EC, since EC members are appointed to five-year terms can only be removed through impeachment (Edgeworth, Linda and Finn, Daniel, 2000, p.9) It is the basic legal liabilities of EC and CTG to conduct election. Another matter is that EC have to build confidence among political party and general people to hold free and fair elections. It had been alleged that since the liberation of the country EBM in Bangladesh could not grow as a credible institution because of political manipulation, through 1972 constitution has

guaranteed the power, strength and independence of the EC under article 118 (Hussain, Sakhawat, 2012, p.16). In 2001 this confidence building role of EC and CTG are not ensured. As a result, the actors of violence had the opportunity to do more violence.

- Administration including law enforcement agencies can play vital role to control electoral violence. In 2001 elections, Police and law enforcing agencies including Army are playing very passive role to control violence (The Observer, 6 October 2001, p.16). Like- Post electoral violence is on spread in different areas of Bagerhat district. Reports from Bagerhat said unruly people attacked, ransacked and set on fire Awami League offices, houses and shops of AL men and assaulted many of them physically in last 24 hours. Police is reported to have taken no action against this violence (The Observer, 4 October 2001, p.01). In Barisal, the minority and AL supported activists were faced violence including looting, attack on house after the election. But the Administrations do not take necessary steps to stop this violence (The Prothom Alo, 9 October 2001, p- 20).
- In general ruling party does more violence in pre electoral time. In the same way in the post electoral time winning party does more violence. In this case the CTG steps to hold peaceful, fair elections included arrests of party cadres in possession of illegal arms, cancellation of fire-arms issued indiscriminately by the previous government, deployment of armed forces before elections. The influence of the bureaucracy on influencing the course of the elections is manifest in the mode of transfers prior to elections. Two month before the Awami League handed over power, it transferred 31 district Commissioners, 170 Upzilla Nirbahi Officers, 250 Assistant District Commissioners and over 262 Police officials. The chief advisor to the CTG, within a day of taking office, changed thirteen senior secretaries in the administration. He also ordered a large scale transfer of senior and junior government personnel, apparently to reverse the transfers made by its predecessor government. On both occasions these steps raised concerns for the course of free and fair elections (The Sanbad, 16 July 2001). On the other hand, the areas which are identified more violated, the police can take necessary steps but they play passive role in those area like Barisal, Bagerhat or Narayanganj.

- Since Election Commission and Caretaker Government have the responsibility to hold free and fair elections in case of 2001 and 2008 elections. In this case they should ensure punishment for the entire person who violates the rules of elections mentioned in PRO and the constitution of Bangladesh. In the fear of punishment the actors of violence does not engaged violence. In 2001 elections, such kind of punishment was not enforced.
- Lastly, people self consciousness are the most important way to control electoral violence. In a village or a community if a group of people are work as a safeguard to protect violence then it is possible to reduce violence. In 2001 it was absence.

In 2008, parliamentary elections were a model election in Bangladesh. There was hardly any violence except one odd killing before declaration of schedule in an inner-party rift. Other than that election was peaceful in that election voter turnout was the highest in the history average 87% which suffice to say that election day atmosphere was conducive for such turnout. Women turnout was noteworthy as they felt safe to go to the polling station. There was after poll violence reported²¹. The reason are-

- Previously mentioned Election Commission and Caretaker Government have join responsibility to hold free and fair elections especially national elections. The defining feature of the election held on 29 December were an error free voters list with pictures, the free and peaceful ambiance and the neutrality of the Election Commission(Riaz, Ali ,2013,p.140). The neutrality of EC was one of the most important cause of less violence. In 2008, there are some electoral reformed in this time like-**A.** A reformed and effective Election Commission which was able to put in a place a new electronic voter roll, including many previously excluded categories of persons, which minimized changes of fraud and rigging. **B.** A revised Representation of the People Order (RPO), 2008 which laid down among other things, guidelines for political reforms such as party registration, procedures for democratization of the nomination process, amendment of party constitutions to

²¹ Interview with Brig. Sakhawat Hussain, Ex- Election Commissioner (2007-2011), 06 November 2015.

serve ties with students wings, ensure nomination of 33% women. The RPO required party constitutions to be consistent with the constitution of the state and provided that any party which could not be shown to be engaged in any communal activity could not be so registered. Although objections to the registration of the Jamat-i-Islam failed, this party finally formally acknowledged the liberation War and extended membership to non-Muslim. C. The inclusion of a 'No—vote' option in the ballot appeared to reflect a sense of weariness among the electorate about existing political choices. (ASK, 2009, PP. 1-6). The reform brought salutary effect on the conduct of the campaign, conduct of elections and the counting system (Hussain, Sakhawat, 2012, p.146). According to the voter opinion (Krisna Ray), like other elections we are in fear, but the speech of government and EC we are hopeful. We do not expect such kind of good environment in voting centre (Jai Jai Din, 30 December 2008).

- The code of conduct had changed the campaign culture of elections in Bangladesh. It not only changed campaign culture of Parliamentary election but also it had similar effect on subsequent local elections. Violence, use of muscle power and excessive money has reduced to greater extent. For example till Chittagong City Corporation elections no pre-poll or post poll violence have been reported and no loss of life so far been reported during and after elections held to upa-zilla, City Corporation elections and few bye elections to national assembly seats conducted so far (Hussain, Sakhawat, 2012, p.147).
- In the previous chapter we see that in the electoral violence clashes were between not only inter party but also intra party. In the nomination process this intra party violence was obvious. In 2008 elections, party registration did start the process of inner party discipline and democratic system but most certainly it has initiated a long term effects on party politics particularly. These process reduce violence in inter and inner party electoral violence in 2008 elections.
- In the experience of 2001 elections, the religious minority voters were in threat. For this reason in 2008 elections the law enforcement agencies and administrations took necessary steps to prevent violence. To identify the violent area in the previous elections, they took necessary steps. In the areas where religious minority

people live (Bhola, Bagerhat, Chittagong) they built police camp and continued after election. The reason was that in 2001 election this community faced violence and all the voters could not cast their vote (The Prothom Alo, 20 December 2008). In 2001 elections the administrations and law enforcement agencies play passive role but in 2008 they play active role to prevent violence.

- Another fact is that after 2001 regular elections should be held in 2006, but the parliamentary elections were held after two-years of democratic hiatus, during which time the country was ruled by a military-backed technocratic caretaker regime under the state of emergency (Riaz, Ali, 2013, p.138). In the previous chapter we see that revenge is the most important cause of electoral violence. For these two years military backed CTG the political parties were far from immediate revenge of violence. Otherwise the rate of violence in 2001 elections should spread violence as revenge in 2008 elections.
- The self protection policy of village community was important steps to prevent violence in 2008 elections. The village community also took necessary steps to prevent post electoral violence. For this reason in 2008 election violence were less than the 2001 elections (The Prothom Alo, 20 December 2008). In Saidkathi Union of Banaripara upzila, village doctor Noren said, in our village we ambulated whole night gradually by which people of another village could not enter in our village. After 1973 they could not cast their vote but in this elections they cast their vote freely ((The Prothom Alo, 31 December 2008)

Most of the respondent thinks that in 2008 elections, the Election Commission play strong role to control electoral violence alongside the law enforcement agencies including police, RAB play strong and neutral role before and after election. After two years rule of Caretaker Government 2008 elections was held, as a result the immediate revenge of the previous election could not work as an immediate cause of violence. In this election AL came into power and minority violence were less in their regime. In 2001 elections the EC and law enforcement agency played weak role to conduct free and fair election. In the post election time minority people were severely attacked by the winning party alongside the defeated party due to considered as a vote bank.

Conclusion:

From the above analysis, it is seen that 2001 parliamentary elections electoral violence is more than the 2008 parliamentary elections. The dominant reason is the role of Election Commission including law enforcement agency. Their passive role induces more violence in 2001 elections and their active role induces less violence in 2008 elections. The role of electoral management body also can reduce the pre, Election Day and post electoral violence. There have a close linkage among this three timing of violence. The actors, factor and victims are similar considering more or less in number. The actors including violators of electoral violence are quite different in this three timing. In the pre electoral time generally ruling party does more violence and in the post electoral time winning party does more violence and in the Election Day mainly dominant party does violence. The places of occurrence especially constituency are quite common which are more violent in the elections. Although 2008 elections is less violent but the places where violence activities are occur have similarity with 2001 elections places of occurrence.

Chapter -7

Conclusion

The main aim of this paper is to analyze the cause's effects of electoral violence. To analyze this statement this paper also sets forth some supplementary issues like- the nature of electoral violence in the light of 2001 and 2008 parliamentary elections and to compare the violence of 2001 and 2008 parliamentary elections. This paper mainly follows mixed methodology to combining qualitative with the support of quantitative methods. In this research, two sources of data collection are used. Primary data collected through interviews and content analysis. The secondary data sources include election related rules, already published research conducted by others, books, journals and reports. There are two mode of the primary data collection process, first one is content analysis and another is interview. In case of content analysis, three newspapers are chosen like- the Prothom Alo, the Daily Ittefaq and the Daily Observer. To select the timing for content analysis one month is select for pre and post electoral violence from Election Day and for Election Day three days are selected after election including day. Another mode of primary data collection is interview. Two districts are selected for data collection these districts are Narayanganj and Bagerhat. Among all the parliamentary elections in Bangladesh, only 2001 and 2008 elections are selected for comparative analysis. The basis of selection is John Stuart Mill's theory of 'the method of Agreement' and 'the method of difference'. Following this methodology this study proves the hypothesis to win in the election by any means constitute the end of electoral violence. This hypothesis has been proved by conducting study on violence during pre, Day and post-election time. Although winning election is the natural tendency by any means creates violence in the election. Violence as means may not be necessarily related with the win in election. This hypothesis is shown in pre, day and post election time where candidates sometimes use elections times, revenge and vote bank works as causes of violence. Electoral violence adversely affects the human security of the voters where general people are killed and physically injured. Lastly the management of holding election by the EC has largely determined the intensity, causes and forms of violence in both the elections. In the analysis section of 2001 and 2008 parliamentary elections, it has been observed that the management of EC plays vital role in

the occurrence of low violence in 2008 parliamentary elections and high violence in 2001 parliamentary elections.

In the first chapter, the study shows the background of 2001 and 2008 parliamentary elections including the socio economic and political conditions which induce violence in the context of Bangladesh. Also explains the aims objectives, hypotheses, methodology, literature review including rationality and limitations of the study. **In the second chapter** a theoretical framework are shown including nature, causes and effects of electoral violence. In the nature of electoral violence includes physical, psychological and structural violence. In the causes of electoral violence ends centric and procedural centric violence are mentioned including immediate and distant causes of electoral violence. In the effects of violence short and long term are mentioned including three dimensions. This chapter has also shown the actors , factors, places of occurrence and also two variables of violence where competitive constituencies, power dominance, religious minority living areas were at work as independent variables and electoral violence as a dependent variables. **In the third chapter** a quantitative and qualitative analysis have been shown where the picture of nature, causes and effects of pre electoral violence were analyzed. In the analysis of 2001 and 2008 parliamentary elections were shown as case studies. In the causes of pre electoral violence ends and procedural centric violence are shown. In the ends centric violence winning in the elections was main issue which covers the dominant cause of pre electoral violence. In the procedural centric violence nomination campaign, revenge, economic factors and administrative capability work as factors of violence. This procedural centric violence plays a vital role in the pre electoral time. The long term impact of pre electoral violence was adverse to politics. The impacts also included short term effects of economic and psychological issues. In the nature of pre electoral violence some places are identified where violence occurred mostly like- Bagerhat, Barisal and Pabna. General people are mostly victims of pre electoral violence including political party activists and supporters, religious minority people. **In the fourth chapter**, Election Day violence is analysed with causes, effects and nature of violence especially in the light of 2001 and 2008 parliamentary elections. In the nature threat, physical injuries were highest forms of violence. Some areas were identified as common places of Election Day violence like- Barisal, Noakhali, Pabna. In the causes of day violence includes winning in the election,

vote related violence, and administrative weakness also mentioned possible winner and defeated candidates does more violence in Election Day. In the effects of Election Day violence, peoples were adverse to politics and they are remain in panic go or not to go in voting centre. **In the fifth chapter**, post electoral violence was analyzed with causes, effects and nature of violence. In the nature of post electoral violence killing, physical injuries, rape, violence on minority community were mentioned. The areas like Bagerhat, Khulna, Barisal, pabna and Narayanganj were identified as high rate of violence in post election time. The causes of post electoral violence were winning rally, revenge, political culture and administrative weakness which immediate and distant causes of violence. In the impacts of post electoral violence, people are adverse to politics where they were reluctant to cast their vote in the next election or in other elections. People losses their social dignity, they also faces economic losses. **In the sixth chapter**, a comparative analysis of 2001 and 2008 parliamentary elections was mentioned. In the comparison natures causes and impacts of 2001 and 2008 elections were analyzed. At first which elections were more violent was shown with arguments then why this more violence also analyzed. In another sections the relationships among pre, day and post electoral violence were shown. In this chapter the roles of administration in the election are related to electoral violence was the main argument.

From the total analysis, it is seen that, winning in the election is the dominant cause of electoral violence. Although the procedural centric violence like revenge, nomination vote related violence were not related always to win in the election. In the effects of electoral violence people remain in insecurity. They became adverse to politics and to cast their vote in the election by which peoples political participation is hampered. In this way violence retards democratization process.

Considering the above mentioned impacts of electoral violence the following recommendations are suggested to reduce violence during election time:

1. The appointment of the Commissioners including the Chief shall be made in consultation with all political parties. To reduce violence the EC must infuse confidence among political parties and general people. It will be difficult for EC to conduct election in a free and fair way or to establish electoral rules if the

government places their own nominees in the EC without any consultation of the political parties. In this respect, the Prime Minister in making the nomination to the EC must obtain the acceptance of the candidate by the leader of the opposition. This institution should be strong in such way that it can promulgate any rules or can ensure punishment if anyone violates the rules of EC.

2. Bureaucratic complexity should be reduced. If anyone applies to the EC alleging manipulation or violence then EC have to go a long way. It has no direct power to punish. Election Commission should give the power to punishment anyone in anytime if violence created or manipulated the rules of election. The EC also should be given the authority to file cases against the candidates, parties and employed personnel who violate electoral laws and code of conduct.
3. The educational qualifications should be increased for candidates. If educated and perfect candidates have to come through in elections then violence is likely to be reduced.
4. The law enforcing agencies should be appointed by EC in election time who will work neutrally. To supervise election independently, the EC should freely appoint all election officers i.e. Returning, Presiding or Polling Officers and deploy the law enforcing agencies for election duty and the government shall be obliged to make arrangement accordingly.
5. The administrative body plays important role in election time. So the people who are biased should be avoided by EC and EC should be empowered in this regard.
6. The areas which are vulnerable to violence, prevention should be taken by administration and EC to reduce violence.
7. Qualitative changes should be ensuring among the political parties. It means that political tolerance, Compromise and the culture to accept the results of election should be practiced by them. Everyone and professionals must be working within their respective areas and not beyond.
8. The general people should be conscious by which the candidates cannot motivate them easily to create violence. They should be ensured protection in their own village by which nobody can create violence. The administrations and media should make people conscious about it.

9. Rule of law should be ensured where nobody would remain above law. Then the actors of violence are unlikely to create violence.

These above mentioned recommendations must be implemented by political parties who are directly responsible for ensuring good governance in the country.

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Appendix-1

Questionnaire

Electoral Violence in Bangladesh: A comparative analysis between 2001 and 2008 parliamentary elections.

(All collected information to be used for academic purposes)

1. Information about respondent

Name of respondent:

Age:

Educational qualifications:

Profession:

Phone Number:

2. What is election according to your opinion?

3. Is there violence in election?

4. Why do you think violence in elections occurred?

5. What are the different types and nature of electoral violence in pre-election time?

6. What are the reasons of this violence?

7. What are the different types and nature of electoral violence during-election time?

8. What are the reasons of this violence?

9. What are the different types and nature of electoral violence in post-election time?

10. What are the reasons of this violence?

11. What are the effects of electoral violence?

12. What are the targets and/or who are the victims of election violence?

13. Why more violence in 2001 and less violence in 2008?

14. Give your suggestions to reduce this violence.

Appendix-2

Name of Respondents

1. Mst. Noorjahan (27), Teaching, Bagerhat.
2. Sharifa Khanam (50), Teaching, Chairman, Female Voter, Bagerhat.
3. Tamanna (27), Teaching, Female Voter, Bagerhat.
4. Animesh (52), Teaching, Chuchua, Bagerhat.
5. Muhammad Saidur Rahman (67), Teaching , Head Teacher, Morgan Girls High School, Narayanganj, 01716375444
6. Dr. Shafiqul Islam (45), Phd. Associate Professor (DU), Civil Society, Narayanganj.
7. Hahiuzzaman (30), Banker (Janata Bank), Bagerhat.
8. Devjani Das (58), Banker, Bagerhat.
9. Manik (30), Banker (Janata Bank), Kochuya, Bagerhat.
10. Khan Mizanur Rahman (56), Banker (Janata Bank), Professional, Bagerhat. 01714633043.
11. Khan Mizanur Rahman (56), Banker (Janata Bank), Professional, Bagerhat. 01714633043.
12. Md. Khorshed Alam (60), Banker, Narayanganj, 01817106512
13. Sheikh Muktedir Hossen (50), Shopkeeper, Bagerhat.
14. Md. Nazrul Islam (48), Pharmacist, Narayanganj, 01985771518
15. Rafiur Rabbi (57), Businessmen and Social Worker, 01966652949
16. Hazi Md. Abul Kashem (49), Businessmen, BNP activist, Narayanganj sadar.
17. Mansur Alam (26), Businessmen, Narayanganj, 01840071813
18. Gias Uddin Chaklader (60), Businessmen, Bagerhat.
19. Laila Rahman (46), Delta (Administrative officer), Al workers, Bagerhat.
20. Afsar Uddin Chaklader (70+), AL member/worker, Bagerhat.
21. Moniruzzaman Monir (50), AL Activist Voter, Narayanganj, 01819227504
22. Alhaj Anwar Hossain, , President of Mohanogor AL, Narayanganj, 01819247324
23. Minhazul Haque Nahid (25), AL Activist , Narayanganj, 01688067870
24. Maksudul Alam Khondoker Khorshed (42), Politician, Counselor (13 no. ward) Narayanganj. 01717178242.
25. Talukder Hasibur Rahman (46), BNP Workers, UP Chairman Candidates. Bagerhat. 01718209668

26. Rezaul Rahman Montu (48), Sramik league (president), Victims of Violence, Bagerhat.
01711355914
27. Md. Hasan Chakladar (40+), BNP Activist, Bagerhat.
28. Md. Mansur (26), BNP supporter, Narayanganj,
29. Shahnaz Beauty (42), BNP supporter, Bagerhat. 01717667060
30. Arif Hossen Nayan (26), BNP supporter, Narayanganj.
31. Tahmina Rashid (45), Housewife, Bagerhat.
32. Sopna Mustari (26), Housewife, Bagerhat.
33. Raonok Rehana (47), Housewife, Narayanganj, 01843825924
34. Afiya Akter (23), Housewife, Narayanganj, 01846833535
35. Najma Begum, (36), Housewife, Narayanganj.
36. Salma Akter (29), Housewife, Narayanganj,
37. Adv. Akram Hossain (65), Lawyer, Civil Society, BNP supporter, Bagerhat
38. Md. Monir Hossain (40), Lawyer, Narayanganj.
39. Md. Abul Hossain (65), Bachelor in Science, Journalist, Narayanganj.
40. Md. Shafiqul Islam Arju (40), B.S.S. journalist at Pakkhik Tottopotra(Head Editor),
Narayanganj, 01677116461
41. Mintu(reluctant to express name) (27), Journalist, , Bagerhat.
42. Sheikh Md. Abdus Salam (59), Male Voter, Bagerhat.
43. Md. Shahidul Islam (36), Male Voter, Bagerhat Sadar.
44. Popy Sarker (27), Student, Election Candidates, Female Voter, Narayanganj,
01684627618
45. Dr. Md. Jahangir Alam (50), Professional, Doctor, Male Voter, Narayanganj,
01716121428
46. Abdul Sattar (26), Student, Male Voter, Narayanganj, 01611040504
47. Anjan Das (34), Civil Society, Socialist, Narayanganj, 01672109473
48. Dr. Alhaz Md. Shah Neoyaz Chowdury (65), Professional, Doctor, Narayanganj Poly
Clinic, Narayanganj, 01711537496
49. Roushan Ara Begum (51), Teaching, Female Presiding Officer, Narayanganj,
01923841206
50. Brig. Sakhawat Hussain, Ex- Election Commissioner (2007-2011), 06 November 2015.

Appendix-3

2001 Parliamentary elections: Content analysis

Pre electoral violence

The Prothom Alo (September 1, 2001 to September 30, 2001)

Date	place	Actor	Target	Nature	Cause	Effect
1.09.2001 p. 10	Jessore-1	BNP candidate, and Sotontro party	injured(police man, UP chairman, party people)	Attack, burring the car,	Clash to nomination submit	
3.9.2001,p. 5	Laxmipur,Noak hali, Sarishabari in Jamalpur, Rajnagar in Moulvibazar,N arayanganj	AL AND BNP,BNP and BNP		31 injured,	electoral chopfallen, face to face rallies of different parties and attack each other	Three shop harmed through violence
7.9.01, p.20	Meherpur,Farid pur, Rajbari, Munshiganj	AL and BNP, BNP and BNP Supporter		Death-2, Injured-10, Destruction of party office, gun fire-7, attack on sheik mujibur Rahman and Sheikh Hasia photo	post up deviating photo of khaleda zia by AL supporter then create clash between AL AND BNP (meherpur, killed-1), Revenge and counter attack,	
10.09.01,P .20	Narayanganj, Jhenaidah, Laxmipur,	AL-BNP, Sromik league(		Injured-40 (Jinaidhah, 14 (Laxmipur),	Centered on procession, gate, fray of	

	Madaripur, Satkhira, Rajshahi, Sreepur (Gazipur), Mithapur (Rangpur), Moulvibazar, Munshiganj,Ch ittagonj.	laborer league)(condemned one another AL-BNP)		25(CTG), Physical attack- 6,	party poster, Attack on BNP leader then violence as a revenge (Gournodi), Incitement speech in electoral campaign,	
15.09.2001 ,p.20	Mymensingh(G afargaon,phulp ur), Laxmipur, Rajshahi, Pabna, Patuakhali (Baufal), Pabna (sathiya), Madaripur, Gournodi, Bhairab, Bogra	AL-BNP, AL-SHIBIR		Gun shouted- 11, Injured- more than 150, Destruction of houses, party office of AL, unnoticed attack on rally, looting, burring of shop and house of AL- BNP leader, bald heading, destruction on houses attack on party office looting,	rally, attack on part office create violence as a revenge,	
16.09.2001	Comilla (Chandina, Daudkandi), Mymensingh (Masakhali), Bagerhat,	AL-BNP,AL- Independent party,		Injured-128, death-4	revenge	

	Chaddogram, Gournadi, Shariatpur					
17.09.2001 ,p.5	Gournadi (Sadar, Ramnagar), Narayanganj (18), Pabna (Sujanagar) ,Gazipur, Kurigram (injured-20), Munshiganj.	Jatio party- AL, AL-BNP		Injured-75, Destruction electoral office and camp, Firing on camp	Revenge, Attack and Counter attack, fray on party poster	
18.09.2001 ,P.4	Rajshahi, Noakhali, Narayanganj, Jhalakathi, Shariatpur	AL-BNP		Injured-30(Shariatpur- 10,Rajshahi- 10,Jhalakathi- 10)	Incitement speech on poster hanging wallpaper.	
19.09.01,p. 4	Bagerhat, Jhenaidah, (Harinakundu), Jamalpur, Pabna (Chatmohar, Sujanagar), Bogra (Adamdighi), Jhalakathi (Nolchiti), Barisal (Gournadi) ,Noakhali, Patuakhali and Shariatpur	AL-BNP		Attack and destroy on party office and home, Gun shooted in Bagerhat-20, Injured-40(Jhenaidah)	Debate on election between two party then violence, violence on rally,	

20.09.01, p.4	Noakhali (sonaimuri) Potuakhali, Gournadi, Comilla, Munshiganj	AL-BNP, BNP- Independent party leader	party supporter, party leader	Injured-80 (Noakhali-40, Munshiganj-20, Comilla-10, Gournadi-4), Attack, firing and destruction on Home, camp, attack on procession, Destruction on shop.	Revenge in the pre election time to attack,	
21.09.01, p. 5	Kushtia Patuakhali, Magura, Gournadi, Laxmipur, Barguna,	AL-AL,AL- BNP,AL- POLICE-BNP	Party supporter, Police, Party leader	thronging brick,	Controlled on stage on pothosova,, rally or procession centered violence	
22.09.01	Noakhali, Sherpur, Feni, Faridpur (Nagarkanda), Potuakhali(Bauphal), Jamalpur (sarishabari), Barisal (Gournadi), Bagerhat (Morrelganj), Pabna (Ishurdi), Magura,	AL-BNP, AL- JP	Party Leader and supporter, Police	Injured-260 (Feni-8, Faridpur-30, Noakhali- 35,Sarishabari- 20,Gournadi-4, Bagerhat-4, Sherpur-11, Pabna-25), Prisioned-14, Gun shooted- 15, Sudden attack, Firing, destruction on Party office	Procession, Party office building, Gate building,	

	Dinajpur, Madaripur, Naraynganj (Rupganj)					
23.09.01,p. last page	Chittagong, Rajshahi, Gaibandha, Jamalpur (Sarishabari), Gournadi (Barisal), Naogaon , Sirajganj, Noakhali, Madaripur, Moulvibazar (Rajnagar), Raipur (Lakshmipur)	AL-BNP,AL- JP	Supporter of party	Injured-77 (Chittagong-20, Raj-10, Jamalpur (Sarishabari)- 10, Gournadi- 4,Naogaon-5), Gun shooted- 10, Broken electoral camp	Procession, Rally and Hanging poster	
24.09.01, p.4	Jamalpur (Sarishabari), Sherpur, Bogra (Santahar), Patuakhali (Patuakhali-2), Jessore, Magura, Netrakona, Tongi (Dhaka), Sirajganj, Comilla (Daudkandi), Gournadi (Barisal),	AL-BNP, Independent candidate from BNP attack on minority	Police, Supporter of political party, Women and minority group	Injured-250 (Jamalpur- 40,Sherpur-30, Bogra- 20,Patuakhali- 25,Jessore- 150,Naogaon- 12	Rally centered violence	

	Munshiganj, Noakhali, Lakshmipur (Raipur), Brahmanbaria					
25.09.01.p. 4		BNP-JP, AL- BNP,	Women, Party supporter,	Injured ((Natore-10,Jhalakhati-50,Gournadi-10,Bogra-20,Noakhali-50,Chittagong-23,Rajbari-10,Sarishabari-20),Death-1(comilla), Attack on home-35 , shop-3, Firing on straw-3, Attack on camp,	Poster hanging, electoral chopfallen, Rally centered violence	
26.09.01. p. 1	Bagerhat (Mollahat)	BNP- Independent candidate		Death-1 (AL leader Helal Uddin)	Bombing,	
28.09.01			Women, Police SI,	Injured-190(Noakhali-40,(Kushtia-30—women-1), Netrakona-10),(Sarishabar i-15,Gun shooted-5,)(Satkhira-50,	fray poster, Rally,	

				Women-3), (Shariatpur-10), Madaripur-20		
29.09.01, p. 4	Pabna, Faridpur (Cholon bil), Sherpur, Satkhira, Narail	BNP-Minority Group	Women, Minority group	Threat to minority, firing at home,	Threat to minority not cast vote to AL, otherwise after election they punished.	disturb the normal life, displace ment of minority
30.09.01. p. 4	Kushtia, Bagerhat, Patuakhali, Nalchity.	BNP-Minority people,		Threat, Fear and ruin and attack on minority, Ruin the women sculptor in the forthcoming worship		abstain from going to vote centre

The daily Ittefaq (1 set to 30 Sep 2001, Pre electoral Violence)

Date	Place	Actor	Factor	Nature	Cause	Effect
01.09.2001, P.16	Dhaka city (North goran, Siddirganj, Gulsan-Badda, Kawran Bazar)	Terrorist,	Women, BNP leader,	Injured-30		
02.09.2001, p.1	Chadpur, Pabna, Patuakhali, Laxmipur, Noakhali, Shariatpur, Faridpur,	AL-BNP	AL-BNP Party supporter	Death-4 (Pabna-3, Chadpur-1), Injured (Pabna-15, Chadpur-15, Patuakhali-4, Laxmipur-10, Shariatpur-	Clash for nomination, Tear poster, pervert	

				7, Faridpur-4) Clash, Blockade road	ed slogan,	
03.09.200 1.p.1	Kusthia, Faridpur, Noakhali, Bagerhat, Narayanganj, Pabna,	BNP-AL, BPN- Intra party conflict,	Police, B NP party supporte r, Chatro Dol and League,	Death-1(kusthia- 1. Jubo league), Injured- (Noakhali- 20, Bagerhat-9, Narayanganj-2, Pabna-16), Broken and looting shop- 7(AL),	Process ion centere d conflict ,	
04.09.200 1.p.1	Bhola,	AL-BNP,	Party supporte r	Injured-more than 100, Broken house and party office- 1, and 8,	Party clash	
06.09.200 1.p.1	Netrakona, Narayanganj, Bhola (Daulatkhan), Noakhali,	AL- Police, BNP-JP,		Broken shop-5/6	Tear poster,	
07.09.200 1.p.1	Meherpur, Faridpur , Narayanganj, Natore, Rupgonj, Netrakona, Laxmipur, Bhola (Daulatkhan), Brahmanbaria	AL-BNP,	Women, general people of bus, party supporte r	Death-2_ Meherpur- 1, Faridpur-1), Injured-(Meherpur- 10, Narayanganj-20 including 3 women, Natore-3, Rupgonj-8, Laxmipur-7), Attack on local bus, College	to establis h predom inance, incitem ent slogan against AL, Change the nomina tion in BNP IN	

					Narayanjanj	
08.09.2001, p. 1	Barisal(Agailjhara)	AL-BNP,		Injured-20, Barricade on road, attack on mosque		Disturb the normal life
11.09.2001 .p.1	Bhola, Feni, Munshigonj, Barisal, Dhaka	BNP Supporter -Police, AL-BNP	Police, General people,	Death-9(Bhola-3, Feni-1, Munshigonj-1 (BNP Leader)), Injured-70 (Bhola-more than 50 with OC).	Face to face rally of two party,	
12.09.2001,p.1	Feni, Fatikchori, Mymennsingh, Satkhira, Bagerhat	AL-JUBO League,B NP-Shibir supporter, Chhatra league-Jubo League		kidnapping-1 (Bhola), { Death-5 (Feni-3AL-JUBO league), Fatikchori-1 (Chhatra league), Mymensingh-1 (JA), Chittagong-1} Injured- (Feni-20, Chittagong-5, Mymensingh-20, Satkhira-10,Netrakona-15,Bagerhat-18), Tear poster of BNP leader	Tearing poster,	shop closed,
13.09.2001.p.1	Bhola, Khulna, Narsingdi, Noakhali, Luxmipur, Comilla, Barisal (Gournadi, Agailjhara)	AL-BNP	Party supporter	Death-5 (Bhola-3, Khulna-1,) Injured- (Comilla-18, Raigonj-11,	Recertion program of	

				Ramgoti-10,Bhola-10)	BNP leader in Bhola, tearing poster of Zia,	
14.09.2001,p.1	Chittagong, Narayangong, Habiganj, Mymensingh, Pabna, Shariatpur, Narsingdi,	JP-AL,BNP	party supporter	death-3(Chitagong-2,Sarishabari-1),Gun shoted-(Sarishabari-10, Injured-(Narayangonj-35, Habiganj-20, Mymensingh-10, Pabna-7, Shariatpur-5,)), Attack on party office,	Incitement slogan,	
15.09.2001,p.16	Mymensingh (Gafargaon), Jamalpur (Sarishabari), Bhola (doulatkhan), Barisal (gournadi), Rangpur, Feni, Madaripur, Munshingonj.	AL-BNP		Death-1 (Gafargaon) injured (Laxmipur-23, Rangpur-20, Pabna-18, Noakhali-18, Rupgonj-15), Looting, Attack on home. party office		
16.09.2001, p.1	Bagerhat, Gafargaon, Mymensingh, Narayangonj, Feni, Rajshahi, Bogra, Rupgonj, Satkhira, Laxmipur, Aricha,	AL-BNP, AL-JASAD		Death-5 {(Mymensingh (Gafargaon)-1, Bagerhat-1, Comilla		

	Noakhali, Gazipur, Chadpur.			(Daudkandi-1, Sylhet-1}, Injured- Narayanganj-15, Rajshahi-30, Bogra-15, Rupgonj-12, Noakhali-40, Chadpur-10, looting and destruction of home and shop(Mymensingh -10,15,Gazipur-10/12), firing shop, be shot at-45 (Shariatpur), Feni-8, Bogra-4		
20.09.2001.p1	Sirajganj, Pabna, Madaripur (Tekerhat), Faridpur, Rupgonj, Bagerhat, Netrakona, Borguna, Barisal, Mirzagonj, Noakhali (Choumuhoni), Chaittagonj, Feni,	AL-BNP, AL-JP,	party supporter	Death-1 (Sirajgonj), Injured-(Bagerhat-222, Sirajgonj-10,Madaripur (Tekerhat)-60, Faridpur-50, Rupgonj-8, Borguna-3, Barisal-8, Mirzagonj-5, Noakhali-50, Feni-10,	Incitement speech	
21.09.2001.p1	Jamalpur (Sarishabari)-, Rangpur, Shariatpur, Narail, Noakhali, Patuakhali, Pabna	AL-JP	party supporter, police,	Death-Jamalpur (Sarishabari)-1, Rangpur-5, Shariatpur-1	Procession centered	

			women	Injured-(Rangpur (Mithapukur)-200, Narail-28, Noakhali-11, Bagerhat-30, Patuakhali-10, Pabna-25	violence,	
24.09.2001, P.1	Bagerhat,			Death, injured, attack on camp, rally, Booming	Win in the election ,	less people participation in electoral chopfallen, people remain in tension
25.09.2001, p.1				Threat to minority not to cast their vote, Attack on their home, Firing and destruction of worship place, threat to displacement to India, Threat to not to go vote centre.		
29.09.2001, p.1	Dhaka (Tatibazar, Bangsal, North south road)	AL-BNP	Party supporter	Injured-20 (Dhaka), destruction on car-12	face to face rally	
30.09.2001, p.1	Bhola, Chittagong, Munshigonj, Sylhet,	AL-BNP, BNP-		Death-11(Bhola-4, Chittagong-2,		

	Moulvibazar, Feni, Police, Rajshahi, Netrakona, Bagerhat, Bogura,			Munshigonj-1, Sylhet-1, Moulvibazar-1, Feni-1, Rajshahi-1), Injured-(Bhola-50, Sylhet-10, Munshigonj-3, Netrakona-12, Laxmipur-40, Gopalganj-25, Bagerhat-40, Shariatpur-14, Bogura-50, Daudkandi-15		
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The Bangladesh Observer (September 2001, pre electoral violence)

Date	Place	Actor	Factor	Nature	Cause	Effect
02.09.2001, p.1	Pabna, Chadpur	AL-BNP Supporter	party supporter	Killed-3(Pabna-2, Chadpur-1), Injured-13(Chadpur)		
03.09.2001, p.15	Kusthia, Feni	BNP-BNP	Party supporter	Killed-2 (Kushtia-1, Feni-1), Injured-3 (Feni)	Intra-party conflict of BNP Demand ing one lakh taka.	
04.09.2001, p.1	Munshiganj, Narayanganj, Chandpur, Gazipur	AL-BNP Supporter, Chhatra	Party supporter, Police,	Injured-50 (Munshiganj 15, Chandpur-10,	separate processions of	

		League-Islami Chhatra shibir,		Gazipur-25), kidnapped-1 (Narayangonj), Death-1 (Narayangonj)	AL-BNP Supporter	
05.09.2001, p.1	Tangail, Dhaka, Sylhet	BNP-Unidentified assailants		Death-6 (Tangail-1, Dhaka-4, Sylhet-1)		
06.09.2001, p.6	Chandpur, Bagerhat, Patuakhali, Comilla, Moulvibazar,	AL-BNP Activists, BNP-BNP Activist, AL-JAMAT Activists		Injured-60 (Patuakhali-3, Bagerhat-18, Comilla-150, Moulvibazar-8, Gazipur-10), mounds of paddy looted, Shop damaged (Moulvi-3)	clash for nomination,	Cost proper ties worth over taka five crore
08.09.2001, p.1	Chittagong, Dakha	AL-BNP activists		Death-1(Chittagong), Shop looted(CTG), Attacked election camp,		
09.09.01, p.1	Chandpur, Rajshadi-5,	AL-BNP Activist, Four party alliance-BNP Candidate)		death-1 (Chandpur), Injured-20 (Chandpur-10, Rajshadi-10)	Tearing election poster,	
12.09.2001, p.1	Dhaka, Munshigang, Mymensingh,	AL-BNP Activist,	party supporter,	Death-12(Feni-3, Munshigong-	Election campaign	

	Feni, Barisal, Bhola.	police-BNP Supporter	police	3, Mymanshing-3, Bhola-2, Injured-more than 100(Feni-35, Mymanshing-20	n, pasting poster, protesting arrest	
15.09.2001, p.1	Mymanshing (Gaffargaon),	AL-BNP		Death-1, Injured-20		
16.09.2001, p.1	Comilla, Mymanshing, Khulna, Rajshahi, Narayanganj, Barisal, Sirajgang, Sylhet, Shariatpur, Feni	AL-BNP	women, supporter	Killed-6 (Comilla-2, Mymanshing-2, Khulna-1, sariat-1) Injured-400 (Comilla-25, Mymanshing (Gafforgong)-50, Khulna-20, Rajshahi-20, Narayn-15, Barisal-11, Sirajgong-31, Sariat-200), Damaged party office.	Procession, tearing poster	
21.09.2001, p.15	Jamalpur,	AL-BNP activist	party supporter	Killed-1		
23.09.2001	Chittagong	AL-BNP activist		injured-15, destroying election camp-12	procession	
24.09.2001, p.1	Bagerhat (Mollarhat), Bhola	AL- Unidentified	Party supporter	Death-10(moolarhat-	attempt to kill	

		terrorist, AL-BNP		8,Bhola-2), Injured-50 (mollarhat)	AL candidat e	
25.09.2001	Feni, Bagerhat	AL-BNP	Party supporter including UP Chairman	Death-1, injured-76(Feni- 6, Bagerhat-70), beaten, looted pistol and mobile phone	to support hortal in bagerhat in the previous clash	
26.09.2001, p.1	Bagerhat			sued		
27.09.2001, p.1	Narsingdi, Sunamgonj	AL-BNP Activist	general people including women	Death-4 (Sunamgonj), Injured-2 (Sunamgonj)	Attempt to kill AL leader	
28.09.2001, p.1	Jamalpur, Rajbari, Bhola	AL-BNP Activist		Death-1 (jamalpur), injured (Jamalpur-20, Rajbari-14, Bhola-10)	Electora l processi on face to face from two party	
30.09.2001, p.1	Munshigong, Chittagong, Sylhet, Moulvibazar, Comilla, Feni, Bhola,	AL- BNP,BNP- Jatio Party		Death-19 (Bhola-5, CTG- 9, Moulvibazar- 1, Sylhet-1, Feni-1), Injured-150 (CTG-45, Moulvibazar-10,	Processi on	

				Sylhet-8, Comilla-30		
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Election Day and Post electoral violence

The Daily Prothom Alo (01.10.2001-30.10.2001)

Date	Place	Actor	Factor	Nature	Cause	Effect
02.10.2001,p.08	Chandpur, (Bhola, Barisal, Comilla, Chittagong, Munshigonj, Bagerhat, Bakergonj, and Dhaka (Basabo,Sobujb ag, Motijheel)- Minority Violence)	AL- BNP	Party support er, women and minorit y	Snatching Ballot box, Fraud voting, stop voting, Threat to minority not to cast vote	Snatching ballot box ,fraud voting	apart from voting
03.10.2001, p.20	Sunamganj, Pabna, Kurigram, Sherpur-1, Munshiganj, Jamalpur, Noakhali, Bandarban, Jhalokati,	AL- BNP,A L-JP Activis t and support er	elector al admini strative body, Admini strative body of DC office,	Injured-72(Munshiganj- 30,Pabna-10,Kurigram-9) Blokade and Demolish DC office(Sherpur), Threat of Winner party Leader younger brother towards journalist, NGO activist, businessman, lawyer (Kurigram),attest, attack on private car	claim partiality to AL Candidate from DC office, casting vote, Winner party attack the loser party	

					supporter, The activist of loser party also attack on electoral administra tive body (Noakhali) ,	
04.10.2001,p.04	Jessore (Monirampur), Pabna (Ishwardi), Bagerhat	AL- BNP Activis t	party support er and leader home	attack on winning rally, attack on loser party leader home,	winning rally, winner party attack due to their power holding, loser party attack due to their jealous or angriness	
05.10.2001,pp.1, 4	Natore, Kushtia, Bogra, Sahjadpur, Gazipur, Jessore, Khulna, Feni, Bagerhat, Noakhali, Lalmonirha, Shariatpur,	AL- BNP Activis t	Al support er includi ng UP Chairm an, minorit y people,	Attack on AL Supporter(Mymensingh, Narayangonj, Bogra), Attack on minority people home and depart from their home (Gazipur-30, Norshindi, Narayngonj, Bogra, Patuakhali, Noakhali, Moulvibazar,Injured-	Revenge, winning rally, incitement speech,	

	Narayangonj, Norshindi, Munshigonj, Sunamgonj, Mymensingh,		women	217(Natore-15,Bogra-29 ,Shahjadpur-20,Noakhali- 20,Lalmonirhat- 41,Shariatpur- 45Sunamgonj-20, Rajshahi-30,Patuakhali- 15,Daudkandi-8 Moulvibazar- 40,Kishoreganj-37, Nobabgonj-4) Death- 9(Natore-1(AL)),Kushtia- 1(AL), Depart from home- 70(Bogra(AL),destruction on home,shop-Shariatpur- 25,Kishoreganj (Bhairab- 30), Looting, Threat on minority people		
6.10.2001,p.4	Kishoreganj (Katiadi), Bagerhat (Sarankhola), Patuakhali (Boufal), Jhalokati, Norial	BNP Activist	Al supporter, Woman, Minority	Looting, Threat Depart from home on minority people, Attack on AL Supporter (Kishoreganj (Katiadi), Jhalokhati, Displacement (Jhalokati, Manikganj, Patuakhali (Boufal), Attack on Idol.	Revenge	

07.10.2001,PP.1,4	Gazipur (Tongi), Mirsarai, Barisal (Hizla, Agailjara), Natore, Jhenaidah (Kaliganj), Narayanganj (Sonargaon), Madaripur, Jessore (Ovoynagar), Bogra, Barguna, Faridpur, Dinajpur, Patuakhali, Netrokona, Moulvibazar (Razanogor), Kustia	BNP Activist towards AL activist and minority people.	Minority and AL supporter	Death-10(Jhenaidah-1, Gazipur-1 Bhola-2,Natore-1,Sahjadpur-1) Mirsarai-1) Injured-(Gazipur-20,Jhenaidah-25), Threat on minority, Displacement, Destruction on home, shop, agricultural field, looting, Group attack on Hindu community	Establish supremacy, Revenge,	Displacement,
09.10.2001,p.20	Barisal (Ujirpur, Agailjara, Gournadi, Swarupkathi)	BNP activist or winning party	AL supporter, minority people	Destruction, looting, violence against women, threat on minority, Chadabaji,	Voting AL, Revenge	
12.10.2001,p.5	Cox's bazar, Meherpur, Faridpur (Chandpur), Khulna,	BNP AND SHIBIR Activist	AL supporter and minority	Attack on minority group and their home, destruction, looting, threat on minority, Injured-(cox's bazar - 40),	work and vote in favor of AL	

	Kurigram, Gopalganj, Rajbari, Munshiganj	t and AL activist	people	Physical attack on young girl (Gopalganj),		
13.10.2001,p.4	Patuakhali, Pabna, Magura, Kishoreganj, Netrakona	terroris t	Genera l people, AL support er and minorit y group	Destruction of home- (Patuakhali-50, shop, injured-(Pabna-4, Kishoreganj-10), attack on minority, impede to go al supporter to their workplace, cannot stay their home for fear, destruction of idol, impede to fisherman to fishery		Displac ement, disrupt normal life due to fear , not intereste d to go police administ ration to file their case
14.10.2001,p.5	Barguna, Satkhira, Sirajganj (Ullahpara)	BNP Cadre	AL Suppor ter and minorit y people	Attack on minority, threat for displacement and killed, injured, chandabaji,		
21.10.2001,p.12	Kushtia, Feni	BNP Activis t	AL support er or voter	Threat to killed a Journalist (Kushtia), killed- (Feni-1)		
22.10.2001,P.1	Dhaka (Mirpur),	BNP cadre and terroris t	AL Activis t,wome n and childre	attack on home and destruction property, snatching valuable things, Injured(Mirpur-10		

			n			
23.10.2001,p.5	Joypurhat	Terrorist	NGO	ghun shot and injured ,firing of office		
27.10.2001,p.5	Barguna (Pathargata), Sirajganj,	BNP – AL	AL supporter	injured-(Pathargata-10,Sirajganj-10,		
28.10.2001,p.5	Jessore (Monirampur)	rulling party	minority and women	attack on home and rape		

The Daily Ittefaq(01.10.2001-30.10.2001)

Date	Place	Actor	Factor	Nature	Cause	Effect
01.10.2001,p.1	Comilla, Mymensingh (Gaforgaon), Cox's bazar (Sondip), Gazipur (Kapasia), Barisal (Gournadi), Magura, Rajbari, Shahjadpur, Rajshahi, Munshiganj, Noakhali Laxmipur (Raipur), Pabna, Bhairab	AL-BNP Activist	Party supporter , women	Death-5 (Comilla-2, Gaforgaon-1, sondip-1, kapasia-1), Injured- (Gournadi-18, Magura-20, Rajbari-1, Shahjadpur-30, Rajshahi-1, Munshiganj-10, Mymensingh-10, Noakhali-23, Laxmipur-		

				20, Pabna-9, Bhairab-60), Destruction of home, Firing voting centre		
02.10.2001,p.1	Munshiganj, Barisal, Bhola, Shariatpur			Death- 6(Munshiganj -1, Bhola- 2,Shariatpur -1,Barisal- 2), Injured- (Munshiganj -4,0020		
04.10.2001,p.1	Feni (Dolia, Sonagaji, Chagolnaiia)	AL-BNP Activist	party supporter	Death-2 (feni), Injured-8 (Feni), Firing, attack, Plundering		
05.10.2001,p.1	Narshigdi, Noakhali, Tangail (Gopalpur)	BNP AND Terrorist	AL Supporte r, minority people	Death-8, Injured- 1500, Attack on minority people, looting, destruction on home		
06.10.2001,p.1		AL-BNP, Police	Party supporter	Threat on minority	win in the election	

			, general people, minority people	people not to cast vote, attack on presiding and polling officer, snacking ballot box, capture voting centre, attack on party leader		
07.10.2001,p.1	Sirajganj (Kalia khor), Natore, Jhenaidah, Pabna Bogra, Feni	AL-BNP Activis	party supporter , minority group	Death- (Pabna-1, Gazipur-1, Jhenaidah-1) Injured- Pabna-, Gazipur-10, Mymensingh-5, Narail-7), destruction of home, attack on minority- (Pabna, Jamalpur, Sherpur, Tangile, Rajshahi), Establishing dominance	Revenge, Attack on minority as a vote bank of AL,	

				in different university,		
08.10.2001,p.1	Chittagong (Fatickchari), Bagerhat Sarishabari, Feni,	terrorist, BNP activist, AL-AL	AL Supporter,	Death- (fatickchari-2,Bagerhat-2, Feni-1) Injured- (Feni-10,),Threat on minority group, and destruction their home (Jamalpur, Ruppur)	Intra-party clash	
12.10.2001,p.1	Dhaka (Mirpur)	BNP terrorist	AL leader	Death-1(Mirpur)		
14.10.2001,p.1	Meherpur	BNP-Police		Injured-3	arrest BNP leader	
17.10.2001,p.1	Meherpur, Barisal, Jamalpur, Pabna, Rongpur, Natore, Khurigramme, Noakhali, Panchagarh	AL-BNP, Chhatro league-Chhatro dol	Minority people, tample, idol	Attack on temple, destruction idol, plundering, injured, death, dominance on Hindu home, rape (Pathorgata (Barguna), Threat	supporter of AL AND JP	

18.10.2001,p1	Dhaka (Motijheel)	terrorist		Death-1 (Motijheel), Destruction of photo		
19.10.2001,p.1	Bogra (Durgapur), Natrakona, Bagerhat		Minority	Attack on minority lived village, Destruction idol, Rape (Bandarban)		
20.10.2001,p.1	Rajshahi (Godagari),	AL-BNP activist		Injured-20 (Rajshahi),p lundering		raise the price of daily necessary goods due to plundering
22.10.2001,p.1	Dhaka (Lalbag)	AL-BNP activist		Injured-6, uprooting eyes		
25.10.2001,p.1	Pabna (Atgoria)	AL-BNP activist		Injured-40 (Pabna), Destruction of home-20 (Pabna),		
27.10.2001,p.15	Borguna (pathargata)	AL-BNP activist		Injured-10 (Pathargata)		
29.10.2001,p.10	Pabna	Terrorist		Injured-65		

The Observer (01.10.2001-30.10.2001), Election Day and Post electoral violence

Date	Place	Actor	Factor	Nature	Cause	Result
02.10.2001,p .16	Comilla, Chandpur, Jamalpur, Kushtia, Barisal, Chittagong,	terroris t, Activis t of AL BNP AND JP	women,pa rty supporter	Death-2 (Comilla), injured-65 (Kushtia-20, Barisal-30) , attack on home, postponed polling centre due to violence		
03.10.2001,p. 06	Sirajgang, Narshingdi, Bagerhat, Cox's Bazar, Rangpur, Munsigong, Magura	BNP – AL Activis t		Rigging, clashes, Violence, snatching ballot papers, injured- (Rangpur- 200,Munsiganj- 5,Magura-24)	Snatching ballot box	
04.10.2001,p. 1	Feni, Narayanganj, Bagerhat,	AL- BNP Activis t	party supporter, minority	Injured-165(feni- 8,Narayanganj- 25,Magura- 20,Chapainawabg anj-10) Killed-2 (feni), Ransacked and set on fire Awami League offices, houses and shop (Bagerhat-25)		
05.10.2001,p 1	Khulna	Awam i league and		killed-6(Bagerhat- 2, kushtia-1, feni- 1), injured, houses looted,		

		Jamaat cadres				
06.10.2001,p. 1	Feni, Bagerhat, Khulna, Shariatpur,	AL- BNP Activis t	minority people and party supporter	killed-11 (Feni-1, Kushtia-1, Rajshahi-1, Bagerhat-1, Gazipur-1, Sariatpur-2), injured- (Sariatpur- 100),attack on minority (Khulna,Bagerhat, Magura, Kushtia, Jhenidah, Narail)	displaceme nt of minority	
08.10.2001,p. 1	Chittagong, Feni,Khulna	Shibir- Chhatr o league	party supporter	killed-(CTG- 5,Feni-7),Injured- ((CTG-23,Feni- 50), Threat to minority, Ransacked, set fire and looted houses (khulna)		
09.10.2001,p. 1	Gopalganj, Barisal(Gourn adi, Agailjhara)	BNP - minori ty	minority	displacement of minority from Agailjara and Gournadi to Gopalganj (10,000)	Displacem ent	
10.10.2001,p. 4	Magura	AL- BNP Activis t	minority	Injured-43 (Magura)		

13.10.2001,p. 1	Feni			killed-3 (feni)		
15.10.2001,p. 01	Barisal	Activist are mostly from BNP	Minority women (mostly victim AL Supporters and activist)	Raped-3(Barisal) (Total death 44 and injured 2500 and 60000 minority people not to cast their vote due to threat from 1.10.2001 – 15.10.2001)		
16.10.2001,p. 1				attack on minority		
21.10.2001,p. 16	Sirajganj	terrorist	Minority women and AL Supporter	raped minority women		
24.10.2001,p. 1	Jessore (Monirampur)	terrorist	women	Raped-9 (Jessore), attack on minority		looted two lakh taka property

Electoral violence in 2008 parliamentary elections

The Bangladesh Observer (December 1-31 December 2008, pre electoral violence)

Date	Place	Actor	Factor	Nature	Cause	Effect
28.12.2008, p.1	Pabna, Mymensingh	AL-BNP (4 party alliance) Supporter		Injured-80	procession	

The Daily Ittefaq (December 1-31 December 2008, pre electoral violence)

Date	Place	Actor	Target	Nature	Cause	Effect
12.12.2008, p.1	Madaripur (Shipchor)	AL-AL	Party supporter	Injured-11	Clash for nomination	
18.12.2008, p.5	Bagerhat	AL-BNP Activist		Injured-8, Attack on electoral camp-1	Rally	
20.12.2008, p.1	Chittagong	AL-BNP Activist and supporter				
21.12.2008, p.1	Rangamati, Brahmanbaria, Mirzaganj, Pabna, Gournodi			Injured-34, Kidnapped- 4, Attack on Home, Looting, Destruction Motorcycle, Attack on home, Attack on shop		
28.12.2008, p.1	Rangpur (Badarganj)	JP-JP		Injured-30	To prevent Ershad public meeting	
31.12.2008, p.1	Pabna, Jessore, Pirojpur, Barisal, Bagerhat, Noakhali,			Killing-2, Attack on home-1,		

	Khulna, Feni, Khustia			Injured-37, threat, physical attack.		
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Election Day and Post Electoral Violence

The prothom alo (1.1.2009-30.2.2009)

Date	place	Actor	target	Nature	Cause	effects
02.01.2009,p.1	Norshindi (Shibpur), Bogura, Comilla, Chapainaba bganj, Satkhira, Potuakhali, Chadpur, Barisal (Gournodi), Lamxipur, Noakhali (Senbag),	AL-BNP Supporter	BNP supporter, Al supporter, Religious minority,	Killing-2, Injured- 6,1,4,,3,5,5 Attack on home, Plundering, Destroy Egg(5000) (Norshindi) Attack on furnisher, Attack on home and furnisher, Attack on home and motorcycle, Attack and firing on home, Attack and firing on Idol.	Work in favor of AL	

03.01.2009,p.1	Dhaka (Pollobi)	Terrorist, AL Supporter		Attack on home and shop, Plundering(65 thousand),Extortion,		
4.1.09,pp.1,3,20	Chittagong Medical college and Politecnic institute,DU Johirul Haq Hall. Khulna, Jamalpur (Sorisabari), Rajshahi, Barisal, Norail	Chatro league		Injured-15 Establish Hegemony, Attack on Party Office (BNP)		
5.1.09,p.4	Kisorganj,	AL Activist	Religious Minority	Injured-3		
11.01.2009,p.1	Khulna medical college	Chatro league and Shibir		injured-10, Attack on hostel		
17.1.09,p.20	JU	Chatro league and Chatro league		Injured-30	Establish Hegemoni c power	

The Bangladesh Observer (December 1-31 January 2009, post electoral violence)

Date	Place	Actor	Factor	Nature	Cause	Effect
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10.01.2009, p.1	Rajshahi (RUET)	BCL- SHIBIR		Injured-7		
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The Daily Ittefaq (Election Day and Post –Electoral Violence) (1.1.2009-30.1.2009)

Date	Place	Actor	Target	Nature	Cause	Effect
1.1.2009,p.1	Pabna, Bogura, Barisal, Jessore, Feni, Tekerhat, Madaripur, Tangile, Jhenaidah, Kisorganj, Norshindi, Khulna, Lamxipur, Bagerhat	AL-BNP	BNP supporter and religious minority	Killing-1, Injured-100, Attack on party office-1	Revenge	
2.1.09,p.1	Bagura, Khulna, Barisal (Agailjara, Gournodi), Sherpur, Coxbazar, Comilla, Noakhali (Hatia), Narayanganj, Satkhira, Chuadanga, Potuakhali, Bhola, Jamalpur (Sorisabari), Jheinaidah, Norail	BNP-AL		killing-2, Injured-150, Attack on shop, Looting, Attack on Rikshaw, Extortion, Attack on home-4, Attack on Worship place, Attack on coconut tree, Plundering, Threat	Winning rally, revenge	

4.1.2009,p.1	Rajshahi, Jamalpur (Sorisabari), Barisal, Chittagong, Sherpur, Bagerhat, Norail, Mirsorai, Sirajganj, Pabna, potuakhali (Mirjagonj)	BNP-AL		Injured- 150, Looting, Attack on Party Office, Attack on hen cock, Ransacked, Threat to displaceme nt, attack on home,	work on BNP	
6.1.09,P.20	Rupgonj, Moulvibazar, Bagerhat, Barisal (Gournodi), Chumohoni			Looting, Killing-1		