

THE CIVIL SERVICE OF BANGLADESH :
A CRITICAL STUDY OF CAREER MANAGEMENT


Ph. D. Thesis

by

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Department of Public Administration
University of Dhaka
Dhaka
September, 2004

**THE CIVIL SERVICE OF BANGLADESH :
A CRITICAL STUDY OF CAREER MANAGEMENT**

A thesis submitted to the
University of Dhaka
in conformity with the requirements
for the Degree of

Doctor of Philosophy

by

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under the supervision of

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Department of Public Administration
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Dhaka, Bangladesh
2004

Certification

Certified that the work incorporated in this thesis entitled **The Civil Service of Bangladesh: A Critical Study of Career Management**, submitted by Muhammad Abul Hossain, was carried out by the candidate under my supervision. Information culled from other sources has been duly acknowledged in the thesis.

401614




(Supervisor)

Acknowledgements

I have incurred many debts of gratitude in completing this thesis. My primary gratitude is to Dr Syed Giasuddin Ahmed, Professor of Public Administration, University of Dhaka, under whose supervision I carried out the research work as well as completed the write-up of this thesis. His enormous patience and scholarly guidance have had the effect of emboldening me throughout the period of my work on the thesis. He read through all of its chapters and offered valuable suggestions for improvement. I had moments of despair at times when my research work got bogged down amidst my preoccupations with more pressing tasks as a civil servant. But Professor Ahmed kept on offering me encouragement to complete the thesis. Indeed, without his help and persuasion the completion of this thesis would not have been possible.

I owe a special debt to Mr. Shamsul Haque Chisty (ex-CSP), formerly who held the o of Establishment Secretary to the Government of Bangladesh, for it was actually he who first suggested that I undertake a study on the career management problems in the Bangladesh Civil Service (BCS). I was a Deputy Secretary under him while a research proposal on the topic was submitted for approval to the Dhaka University authority. He was kind enough to provide all necessary support from the Ministry of Establishment (MOE) to carry out my planned fieldwork for this research. He also offered valuable suggestions and advice throughout the period of my research work. I am also indebted to Mr. G. D. King, a career management expert of the Institute of Manpower Studies in Sussex (UK), who taught me how to analyse career data of the four BCS cadres by CAMPLAN software (Cambridge Plan) and CAMEL, another software to study career progression. Members of staff of the Public Administration Computer Centre (PACC) at the MOE deserve my thanks for providing the necessary personnel data of the BCS officers.

I must thank Dr AKM Azizur Rahman, Professor of Psychology of Dhaka University, for his suggestions and guidance in preparing the questionnaires used while conducting the fieldwork of this study. I also thank Messrs Mohammad Showaib and Md. Shahid Ullah, teachers of the Institute of Statistical Research and Training at Dhaka University,

for their useful help in statistical analyses of the responses to questionnaires on career choice and career expectations. Due to limitation of space, I cannot mention the names of other teachers and students of different universities and many civil servants who helped in getting responses to my questionnaires. But I express my deep gratitude to all of them.

I benefited immensely from the MAT (Managing At the Top) Course conducted at the Bangladesh Public Administration Training Centre (BPATC), University of Birmingham and the Civil Service College (UK) in concretizing my ideas for a research work centering on the topic of this thesis. Hence I owe my gratitude to the BPATC, University of Birmingham and the Civil Service College.

I have been fortunate to have the views on the BCS and its career management from experts of an outstanding blend both at home and abroad. Especially, I offer thanks to Dr. Habib Mohammad Zaafrullah, ex-Professor of Dhaka University, Mr. Nasimuddin Ahmed, ex-CSP and Secretary, Mr. Khurshid Alam, ex-CSP and Secretary, Mr. Akamal Hossain, ex-CSP and Secretary, Mr. Mahfuzul Islam, ex-CSP and Secretary, Dr. Tawfiq-e-Elahi Choudhury, ex-CSP and Secretary, late Shafiul Alam, ex-CSP and Secretary, Mr. Mohammad Abdul Hannan, ex-Secretary, Mr. Idris Ali, ex-Secretary, late Afzalur Rahman, ex-Secretary, late Md. Abdul Jalil, ex-EPCS, Joint Secretary, Mr. Sharif Ullah, ex-Additional Secretary, Mr. Dalil Uddin Ahmed, Additional Secretary, Mr. Md. Abdul Hye, ex-Additional Secretary, Dr. Matiur Rahman of the BPATC, Dr. Donald Curtis, University of Birmingham, and Mr. John Peak, Director, Civil Service College (UK), for their helpful suggestions and advice.

I also thank Mr. Deloar Hossain, Publication Officer of the Asiatic Society of Bangladesh, for his meticulous typing several drafts of this thesis, including the correction of its references, tables and bibliography.

Finally, I owe a special feeling of gratitude to my wife Parveen Hossain Mina (*Luxmi*) and my children, Shifat Shimin Mou, Faria Madhumita and Simia Madhuchhanda, for their patience in sharing the strains and stresses that accompanied my work on this study. For they did not get their due share of time because of my preoccupation with my heavy office workload as a civil servant and then the research work preceding the completion of this thesis.

Abstract

The Bangladesh Civil Service (BCS), created since 1981, has been designed to be a 'unified career service' at the upper echelons of the civil bureaucracy, which comprises as of December 1997 about 35,000 members belonging to its constituent twenty-nine functional cadres. These functional cadres are meant to play important role both in administration and socio-economic development of Bangladesh. But indications have it that the inadequacies in the career management of the BCS has been affecting the performances of its members, resulting in factors that seem to have been thwarting the development activities of this country. Given the employment situation in Bangladesh, although a government position is still a very desirable job, indications also have it that high quality individuals are not attracted to the BCS. Inevitably, the situation as such does affect the efficiency and effectiveness of the Civil Service. This awareness in effect prompted this researcher to pursue an academic study centering on the topic of career management of the BCS. More specifically, this study has been initiated to achieve three main objectives. First, to probe the state of career management of the BCS offices. Second, to suggest reform measures based on information culled from the relevant literature as well as the lessons drawn from recent developments in the area of civil service management. Third, to explore the feasibility of introduction of inducements for better performers of the BCS similar to those introduced in the Civil Services of Malaysia, U.K., and the U.S. The main concern has been how to attract quality people to the Civil Service career in Bangladesh.

Accordingly, this thesis based on the completed study has been arranged towards the fulfillment of objectives that have been specified. Chapter I narrates in a nutshell the central issues, such as the important role that the Civil Service plays in a country's socio-economic developmental spheres, the importance of effective career management in the Civil Service, followed by a description of the study objectives in specific terms, then the reasoning of the significance of this study. This introductory chapter also indicates the methodology followed in conducting the study, including the surveys of opinions of both the prospective and the working civil servants. Chapter II includes

discussions on the concept of career management both in general and comparative terms. Chapter III deals with the structure of the Civil Service. Chapters IV and V examine the findings emanating from two separate surveys conducted by this researcher to ascertain the opinions of bright university students as well as the serving officials regarding their choice of career. While Chapter VI probes the existing system of recruitment of persons into the BCS, Chapter VII examines the flaws of the existing system of evaluating the performance of the BCS officers. The latter also examines the existing staff appraisal system of the Civil Services of Malaysia, Britain and the US to ascertain whether the introduction of that system in Bangladesh would attract quality individuals to the BCS. Chapter VIII deliberates upon the existing facilities for training the BCS officers. Chapter IX deals with career blockages of four cadres of the BCS and Chapter X critically examines the public service remuneration policy. Finally, Chapter XI concludes the study along with recapitulating some of the main structural-functional features of the BCS and its main career management aspects treated in all the previous chapters, including some observations pinpointing the interim reform needs.

Bangladesh Civil Service, one of the vital institutions of the country, seems to be affected by poor career management. Poor career management may be one of the causes of underperformance by the BCS. For enhancement of efficiency and effectiveness of the BCS, inadequacies in the career management system have to be remedied and modernised.

This thesis critically examines the career management and career related issues of the BCS, suggests reform measures to improve career management and studies the feasibility of giving inducement to better performer of the BCS like the Malaysian Civil Service, the US Civil Service and the British Civil Service to motivate brilliant students to join Civil Service. The study covers all developments in the BCS upto 1990.

Career management enables an organisation to meet its current and projected manpower requirement through proper selection, planned development of knowledge, skills, potentialities and provision of career mobility and reward for good performance with the aim of promoting organizational and individual effectiveness. Analyses of the history of the structural reforms show that the structure of the BCS impacts on the

career progression of the civil servants. The survey of opinion of the bright students of the university regarding the relative position of the BCS as a prospective employer show that most of the bright students are not willing to join the BCS. Another survey amongst BCS officials designed to establish their opinions on the BCS as an actual employer indicate that career expectations they perceived from BCS before joining the BCS remain unfulfilled to a great extent. In many cases, BCS cannot attract and recruit persons of right caliber due to inadequacies of system of recruitment. Design, operation and utilization of the Performance Appraisal fail to record performance and achieve the objectives set for the Performance Appraisal. Analyses of career data show that there is inequity in career progression in different cadres of the BCS. Poor remuneration policy of the Bangladesh Civil Service may not be able to induce bright students to pursue Civil Service career and motivate the serving civil servants to improve their performance.

To maintain equity in promotion prospect of all the cadres, BCS needs to be restructured-generalist cadres may be amalgamated to form only one cadre. Like open structure of the British Civil Service, and the Senior Executive Service (SES) of the USA, Australia and New Zealand, a separate SES may be introduced in the BCS. Method II system of recruitment of the British Civil Service has to be adapted in the BCS to recruit of the better calibre. System of training has to be modernised to enhance individual capability and organisational productivity. Design, operation and utilisation of the Performance Appraisal Report may have to be remodelled like the British Civil Service and Performance Related Pay may be introduced in the BCS. Fast streaming may be introduced in the BCS for high achievers in the BCS. To draw bright persons in the BCS, there should be good career prospect and adequate remuneration for the brilliant persons.

An in-depth study is needed to diagnose the inadequacies of the BCS and recommend corrective measures.

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Abbreviations/ Acronyms

ACR	:	Annual Confidential Report
Adnl Secy	:	Additional Secretary
ASRC	:	Administration and Services Reorganisation Committee
AT	:	Administrative Trainee
BCS	:	Bangladesh Civil Service
BMET	:	Bureau of Manpower Employment and Training
BOESL	:	Bangladesh Overseas Employment Services Limited
BPATC	:	Bangladesh Public Administration Training Centre
CSSB	:	Civil Service Selection Board
CSP	:	Civil Service of Pakistan
CSS	:	Central Secretariat Service
DAE	:	Department of Agriculture Extension
DG	:	Director General
DS	:	Deputy Secretary
ENGG	:	Engineering
EPCS	:	East Pakistan Civil Service
EPSS	:	East Pakistan Secretariat Service
FAO	:	Food and Agriculture Organisation
HEOD	:	Higher Executive Officer Development
ICS	:	Indian Civil Service
IDA	:	International Development Agency
ILO	:	International Labour Organisation
IMS	:	Institute of Manpower Studies
JS	:	Joint Secretary
MNS	:	Modified National Scale
NILG	:	National Institute of Local Government
NIPA	:	National Institute of Public Administration
NPC	:	National Pay Commission
NTC	:	National Training Council
ODA	:	Overseas Development Administration
PAR	:	Performance Appraisal Report
PRP	:	Performance Related Pay
PSC	:	Public Service Commission
SECTT	:	Secretariat
SECY	:	Secretary
SES	:	Senior Executive Service
SSP	:	Senior Services Pool
UNDP	:	United Nations' Development Programme

Chapter I

INTRODUCTION

Progress and well being of a country depend on effective functioning of the government. The government, irrespective of political creed or system, is run by the civil servants with the political direction of rulers, elected or otherwise. In the present-day world, the importance of the place occupied by the Civil Service needs no special emphasis. Robson, while paying high tribute to the Civil Service in England, rightly said: "Parliament may debate, resolve, enact and vote money; it cannot accomplish. The Cabinet may initiate and control; it cannot carry out. Execution of policy depends on the work of hundreds and thousands of anonymous public servants going daily to their offices."¹

Robson's above saying is equally applicable to Bangladesh. Notwithstanding that the Bangladesh Civil Service²(BCS) has been contributing much towards the development of this country, it also has become a target for widespread criticisms leveled by the alert public, the politicians and the donors for its alleged inefficiency and ineffectiveness. Some might say that the failure, if any, has to be attributed to all the macro-societal forces with varying degrees. Rightly or wrongly, the Civil Service has to bear the brunt of all attack because military or politicians come and go but the civil servants remain and run the administration.

The First Five-Year Plan (1973-1978) of Bangladesh could not be completed in stipulated time. A Two-Year Plan (1978-80) was again made to finish the incomplete or partially completed development projects. Many projects of the Third and the Fourth Five-Year Plans could not be completed in time. Bangladesh lacks trained manpower to attain the objectives for development³. The inefficiency of civil servants, according to the donors and

1 W. A. Robson, *The British System of Government*, Longman's, 1959, p. 30.

2 Unlike other countries, the Bangladesh Civil Service comprises of 30 cadres but excludes supervisory and support staff, non-cadre officers and managers and supporting staff of parastatals (state-owned enterprises). For more details on the system of Civil Service in Bangladesh, see Chapter III.

3 Syed Giasuddin Ahmed, *Public Personnel Administration in Bangladesh*, University of Dhaka, Dhaka, 1986, p. 5.

the alert public, may be one of the reasons for failure to complete the projects in scheduled time. Inefficiency of the BCS may also be suggested by the recent unprecedented upsurge of the Government contracting with Non-government Organizations (NGOs) and private Consultants for a wide variety of routine works, research, and development activities. Undoubtedly the reasons behind this growth are many and one prime reason appears to be the inability of the government to recruit and train the numbers and kinds of people needed to perform such services within the Government establishment. NGOs have been set up to perform essentially complementary functions for government as the Government establishment could not deliver the goods satisfactorily through its normal mechanism. All the Governments, past and present, set up as many as 18 Committees and Commissions to reform administration for increasing efficiency of the bureaucracy. These Commissions were critical about recruitment, training, promotion policy and system of rewards in the BCS.⁴

The truth is that Bangladesh depend heavily on the in-flow of foreign aid. But the most of the donor countries and agencies seem persistent in expressing serious concern about the poor utilisation of aids given by them for development of Bangladesh. The three international donors, i.e., International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD), United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), United States Agency for International Development (USAID) have invested considerable resources to bring about efficiency, productivity and accountability in the Civil Service System of Bangladesh. The 'Public Administration Efficiency Study' (PAES), undertaken at the request of Government of Bangladesh and funded by the USAID in 1989 identified five major constraints to efficiency- (1) Diluted accountability; (2) Over centralisation; (3) Complex operating procedures; (4) Weak support system; and (5) Inadequate human resources⁵. Apart from these five constraints, other factors like lack of training, low morale and bad decisions of the policy makers seem to be affecting the performances of the BCS officers as well. Poor quality of the BCS may not be the sole cause of poor performance; but it may be one of the main causes.

4 See Mohammad Mohabbat Khan, *Administrative Reform in Bangladesh*, University Press Limited, Dhaka, 1998, pp. 221-233.

5 See PAES (Public Administration Efficiency Study), *Report of the Public Administration Efficiency Study*, Vol. I, Washington, DC, USAID, 1989.

Public policy formulations, preparation and execution of development programmes, management of international relations, the wide range of research on commercial and other economic policies, the responsibilities for management of nationalised industries; and regulating and promoting private sector impose an onerous task on the civil servants of Bangladesh. The sheer size of the Government establishment, apart from any other consideration, means that a serious malfunction in any part of the Government is bound to have an impact on the country's overall development processes. The tasks of the Civil Service require talented people for their execution. There is presumptive evidence that the BCS is facing difficulties in attracting the numbers of able people it needs to carry out its crucial functions. Besides competing with overseas market for quality products of the universities, the Civil Service has to face stiff competition with the fast growing private sector of Bangladesh. To suggest that the BCS should always have priority claims on the best of the country's human resources would reflect a distorted view of the government's relationship to other institutions. Probably the various operating segments of the society can never reach agreement on what an ideally balanced distribution of skills and talents would or should be. Assumption of multitudinal functions by the BCS for some time has been changing the needs of the government relative to other institutions. Implementations of these functions of the government require people who are at least equal to the tasks of the Civil Service; if not the best brains of the educational institutions. Role of the civil servants in Bangladesh has to be viewed from the perspective of an undeveloped country where other institutions like political parties are comparatively weak in terms of education and skills.

Most Reform Commissions and the donors suggested the Government to recruit quality people into the Civil Service. There was a time when only the able and talented people could aspire to join the Civil Service. Professor Zillur Rahman Siddiqui, ex-Vice Chancellor of Jahangirnagar University and an ex-Advisor in-charge of the Ministry of Education of the Government of Bangladesh in 1990, stated that the bright students no longer interested in applying for positions in the Civil Service. According to him, most of the bright students were leaving the country⁶. The Annual Reports of the Public Service

6 Zillur Rahman Siddiqui, "Bureaucracy", *The Daily Sangbad* (A vernacular Daily), 15th August 1990.

Commission (PSC) in the early 1990s also indicated that most bright students were not attracted to the Civil Service. As the PSC conducts examinations for entry into the BCS, it may be considered the best judge about the quality of candidates. Comparison of educational qualifications of two groups of the BCS who are recruited after the liberation of Bangladesh in 1971 and those recruited before the liberation of Bangladesh in 1971 may be an indicator of variant qualities of the civil servants of two different eras⁷.

Although no comprehensive study on 'Career Management' of the BCS has so far been made, public administration experts and Administrative Reform Committees constituted by the Government commented on the subject criticizing different aspects of the existing Career Management, e.g., recruitment, training, evaluation of performance and reward system⁸. These issues will be separately elaborated in the subsequent chapters of this thesis.

Naturally, therefore, most interested observers might raise such questions as: Has the Civil Service in Bangladesh lost its career attractiveness? Are most of the brilliant students really not interested to join the Civil Service? If most of the brighter students are not willing to join the Civil Service, what actually discourage the meritorious students to choose the Civil Service as a career? What percentage of the civil servants has to be brilliant? These are the points to ponder. There are about 14 per cent policy-making posts in the 35,000 strong BCS⁹. It is assumed that at least 14 per cent of the civil servants have to be brilliant to occupy the policy-making posts in succession. Low pay, poor career prospect, quota system of recruitment, poor career management and availability of jobs outside the Government Service might be the causes of reluctance of the brighter students to join the Civil Service. Compared to the pay in the private sector as well as in the overseas employment sector, the pay package offered by the Bangladesh Civil Service may not be lucrative. But the Civil Service provides job security and lot of intangible benefits. Notwithstanding these two important aspects of career attractiveness, why the response

7 See Public Service Commission, *Annual Report 1990*, PSC, Dhaka, 1989.

8 See World Bank, *Government that Works*, Dhaka, 1996, pp. 121-122.

9 The top three grades of the seven managerial grades of the BCS are policy-making posts. There are 970 posts in top three grades in Bangladesh Civil Service, which are filled up from the members of the BCS. These posts comprise the top three grades of the BCS, posts of the Joint Secretary, Additional Secretary and Joint Secretary in the Ministries, some of the top posts of Parastatals and government departments. Nine hundred seventy posts each in grade vii, grade vi, grade v and grade iv have been assumed to be posts which would ultimately succeed the top three grades. Total number of the posts in the BCS is 35,000. Total posts requiring brilliant incumbents total 4850.

from most of the talented students to join the Civil Service has been found not very encouraging? Permanent Secretaries of the Government of Bangladesh expressed the view in the Senior Officials Strategy Conference held in Dhaka in April 1988 that good quality people were not attracted to the Civil Service due to poor career prospect¹⁰. Some public administration studies suggest that promotion is mainly based on seniority; promotion on merit had been rare¹¹. Many allege that the mediocre students have the scope to enter into the Civil Service through quota system bypassing the deserving meritorious candidates. The inefficiency of the Civil Service is attributed not only to the quality of the human resources; the way these resources are developed, nurtured, utilised, evaluated and rewarded also affect the efficiency of the Civil Service. Poor career management undoubtedly affects the efficiency and effectiveness of the Civil Service. Probably sufficient attention has not been paid to career management in the BCS. There is documentary proof that the BCS could not recruit the quality product of the universities¹². If the assumptions and evidence of poor career management in the BCS are true, then the inadequacies in its career management call for reform for improvement of its efficiency and effectiveness.

The objective of this study is to probe the career management of the BCS, and suggest reform measures to improve career management of the BCS. Possibility of giving inducement to better performers of the BCS - similar to what is in use in the Civil Services of Malaysia, England and the U.S. - is also to be explored to motivate brilliant students to pursue Civil Service career in Bangladesh. More specifically, the study is designed to achieve three main objectives: first, to examine in-dept the existing system of career management of the BCS, focusing such important career management aspects as recruitment, promotion, training, evaluation, and remuneration of the BCS officers; second, to ascertain the opinions of both the prospective and working civil servants as to attractiveness of the Civil Service careers; and third, to suggest appropriate reform measures in light of the lessons drawn from both conceptual and comparative perspectives.

10 Institute of Manpower Studies (IMS), *Report on the Human Resource Management Strategy in the Bangladesh Civil Service*, UK 1988, p. 33.

11 Syed Giasuddin Ahmed, *Public Personnel Administration in Bangladesh*, University of Dhaka, Dhaka, p. 397.

Besides the literature review centering on the research topic in the remainder of this thesis, the findings emanating from empirical research are analyzed in Chapters IV and V to test a hypothesis that 'poor career management of the BCS is likely to discourage most of the brilliant students to choose the Civil Service as a career'.

In trying to achieve development, Bangladesh has employed various tactics, in varying degrees and combinations. Strategies, ideas, reform movements - including suggestions as to what is to be done first, and how, abound in official reports. Yet poverty and other social ills persist. Perhaps Bangladesh has been emphasizing too much on the physical aspects of development. Due attention should have been given to the human resource factor, for no development programmes are self-executing. In the case of Bangladesh, all sorts of development activity - education, health, communications, agriculture, industry, commerce, and so on, are controlled, regulated or promoted by the civil servants. If the quality of its civil servants is not good, development of the country will be affected. It is hoped that the results of this study will help the policy-makers initiate measures to reform career management of the Civil Service; and that better career management will induce the bright students to join the Civil Service. No comprehensive study on the topic of this thesis seems to have so far been made in Bangladesh. Therefore, it is expected that the successful completion of this study will contribute significantly towards enriching the corpus of knowledge on the Bangladesh Civil Service.

The study is based on both primary and secondary data. Primary data include official documents, e.g., the Constitution, rules of business, allocation of functions, establishment manuals, financial codes, official gazettes, government orders, recruitment rules, reports of various reform committees and commissions, PSC annual reports, and so on. Fieldwork in the form of conducting surveys of opinions of both the prospective and working civil servants was carried out in the months of 1990 to supplement these official source materials. The questionnaires for survey of opinion of students regarding their career choice were distributed among the students of the University of Dhaka, Bangladesh University of Engineering and Technology (BUET), and Jahangir Nagar University, which are located within the capital and periphery of the capital. Due to geographical distance

12 See Public Service Commission, *Annual Report 1990*, PSC, Dhaka, 1989.

and communication problems questionnaires could not be distributed among students of the University of Rajshahi and the University of Chittagong, which are located about 200 to 300 km away from the capital.

In addition to the student opinion survey referred to in the preceding paragraph, it was also felt appropriate under this study to investigate empirically what influenced the serving civil servants to join the Civil Service, what they expected from the Civil Service career and how far their expectations were realized. Accordingly, the civil servants for a survey as such were selected from two generations with a gap of a decade. The civil servants of two generations in two separate samples were surveyed to see how much of their perceptions about the realities and attributes of the Civil Service had undergone change during a decade.

Moreover, career management issues of the BCS have also been examined in this thesis and career structures of only two specialist and two generalist BCS cadres, which seemed fairly representative of their respective categories (generalists or specialists), have been thoroughly studied by use of Cambridge Plan (CAMPLAN), a software for studying career structure. As the BCS cadres are based on functional basis and they vary widely in terms of career management and privileges, the CAMPLAN software may not equally be applicable to all of the BCS cadres. More specifically, the study in this respect covers all developments in the BCS up to 1990. Out of thirty cadres, only the career prospects in two Generalist cadres, i.e., the Admin Cadre and the Secretariat Cadre, and two Specialists Cadres, i.e., the Engineering (Public Works) and the Agriculture Cadre, were thoroughly investigated. Other cadres were deliberated upon in brief and as and when they were related to the thesis.

The field research of this study comprised the following components:

- a. A survey of opinion of the likely future inputs of the Civil Service on their career choice;
- b. Formal and informal discussions were held with senior Civil Service officials and trainers who are involved with career management in the BCS;
- c. Study of Annual Confidential Reports (ACRs) of the BCS officials;

- d. Discussions with the British Civil Servants of HM (Her Majesty's) Treasury, Ministry of Defense (MOD), Department of Statistics, about recruitment, placement, promotion, and performance appraisal;
- e. Discussions with Efficiency Unit of the British Civil Service regarding the increase of efficiency of the Civil Service.

Standard scholarly publications, daily and weekly newspapers, published accounts on government and politics, government handouts and press notes, and official bulletins have also been used to supplement the primary data and information obtained through interviews and discussions.

Research in any developing country is not an easy task. Data are unwieldy, scattered and not easily available. Fortunately, however, the author of this thesis faced lesser problems in getting official data as he was a mid-level civil servant when the fieldwork was in progress in 1990. He was serving at that time in the Ministry of Establishment (MOE), i.e., the Civil Service Ministry. Hence he was privileged to be a participant observer of the BCS's career management processes in the MOE. Yet, he remained always careful to see that his interpretations of the research findings get in no way biased because he was a working civil servant. However, he faced tremendous difficulties in conducting his planned opinion surveys of students in the selected universities as the universities were closed sine die several times in 1990; six university students were killed due to gun-battles in the campuses and students were agitating against the quasi-military Government throughout the year. Primary data collection thus cost him immensely in terms of time, money, effort and energy.

Understandably, the examiners of the thesis might wonder why the author has taken so much time in completing the final write-up of this thesis. Already stated that the author was holding a civil service post, i.e., Deputy Secretary, in the Ministry of Finance in 1990, when he was engaged in conducting fieldwork of the study. In fact, 1990 was an extraordinary year marked by a series of volatile political events, which saw the toppling of the government of President (Lt. Gen.) H.M. Ershad in December 1990. Early next year was held the general election, thereafter a new elected government was installed, which in effect paved the way for the restoration of parliamentary democracy effective from

September 1991. In the following years the author moved through the ranks from a Deputy Secretary in 1990 to a Joint secretary in 1996 (with antedated seniority from February, 92), then to an Additional Secretary since 2001. Along these elevations of ranks he had to hold many a responsible position outside the Secretariat as Head of organisations, e.g., Director of Archaeology, Project Director of the Primary School Development Project, Transport Commissioner of the Department of the Government Transport, and the Chairmanship of the Bangladesh Forest Development Corporation (BFIDC). Unfortunately, the discharge of the onerous tasks of these positions did interfere with author's thesis related work. Hence the completion of the write-up of this thesis has unusually been delayed. However, notwithstanding the long delay in completing the study, the author thinks that the research scope and purposes originally designed need no revision and its significance remains valid even in the present-day context. Because the structure of the Civil Service and the pattern of its career management in today's Bangladesh has remained much the same as in 1990, except that the members of the Secretariat Cadre have been absorbed in the Administration cadre after 1990, thus bringing the total number of cadres from 30 to 29.

It seems appropriate that some of the terms, i.e., 'Bangladesh Civil Service', 'Brilliant Students', 'Civil Service Reform', used repeatedly in the thesis are clarified in this introductory chapter. The term 'Bangladesh Civil Service' includes only the 30 cadres of the Civil Service in Bangladesh and exclude all other officers/staff belonging to departments, statutory bodies, parastatals (state-owned enterprises), and other supervisory and supporting staff working directly under the officers of the 30 cadres. Total number of members of the cadres is around 35,000. On the other hand, the students who obtained minimum one first division in previous secondary/higher secondary exam or exam of universities are considered as 'brilliant students' in discussions included in this thesis. The BCS officers who are having minimum one first division in their academic career are eligible for higher studies abroad on foreign scholarship. That is why the criterion of attainment of at least one first division in academic career has been chosen to define a brilliant student. For Bangladesh, administrative reform is different from 'Civil Service Reform'. While administrative reform covers entire gamut of administration, Civil Service reform means any change in the structure of the Civil Service, attitudes of the civil servants and changes or reforms in any other aspects of the Civil Service of Bangladesh.

The thesis consists of eleven chapters in all. In Chapter I, i.e., this 'Introduction', the purpose and scope of the study and the methodology adopted for research have been presented. The theoretical framework for analysis of the research problem has been described in Chapter II. Chapter III discusses the genesis of the structure of the Bangladesh Civil Service, including analyses on the past efforts for structural reform, persistent structural defects and their impact on career prospect of the incumbents. Chapter IV deals with a survey of opinion of students regarding their choice of career and attempts to find out the causes of their reluctance to join the Civil Service. To complement the opinion survey of the bright university students, another survey of opinions of two groups of the serving officials having a generation gap of ten years has been covered in Chapter V. The policy and system of recruitment in the BCS and its shortcomings have been investigated in Chapter VI. Chapter VII studies the flaws of the Annual Confidential Reports (Performance Appraisal Report) of the BCS, makes comparison with the Malaysian, British and the US Appraisal Reports. Chapter VIII focuses on the state of Civil Service training in Bangladesh and analyses its shortcomings. Chapter IX studies the problems of career blockages of the BCS with special focus on four cadres that are representative of their respective categories. The evolution of remuneration policy in the BCS, its inadequacies and effect of low pay in the BCS has been probed and discussed in Chapter X. Chapter XI concludes the study along with pinpointing interim reform needs.

Chapter II

CAREER MANAGEMENT

Introduction

This chapter probes the issues related to career, career management and reforms of career management of the civil servants. Concepts of career and issues related to career are discussed in detail here. The framework creates a means through which the existing literature in the field can be surveyed and systematized. It amplifies the theoretical setting of the rest of the thesis. After analysis of the issues relating to career management and its reforms, a model schema for better career management will be presented. This model schema will serve as the normative standard against which subsequent assessment of career management issues will be made.

To begin with, however, the term "career" needs to be clarified. For many years the public services in the UK and some European countries have sought to embrace within their personnel systems the concept of career. Consciousness of its importance in the United States was accelerated at the time of the report of the Commission of Inquiry on Public Service Personnel in 1935. This Commission fostered, particularly for the U.S. Federal Civil Service, the idea that a merit system for selection was not enough. This body urged the creation of conditions that would provide true careers for those who entered the service, with careful selection of young graduates from educational institutions and with real opportunities for satisfying advancement and for retaining them in the service for a lifetime. This philosophy has continued to influence the planning of public personnel systems since that time. Paralleling the efforts of private industry and the military services, emphasis has been placed on the "holding power" of the employer. Early recruitment, generous retirement systems, competitive pay, and other personnel aspects have over time become its distinctive features¹.

1 O. Glenn Stahl, *Public Personnel Administration*, Harper & Row, 1971, p. 45

To have a clear idea the term "career" has to be defined first. Various disciplines of social science define career from their respective viewpoints² as can be seen as follows:

Psychology

Career as a vocation: a viewpoint accepting the traditional psychological position on stability of personality in adulthood; associated theory as intended to help guide individuals and fill job openings in a mutually satisfactory way (Holland, 1985).

Career as a vehicle for self-realization: a humanistic viewpoint focusing on the opportunities a career can provide for further individual growth and how that growth can in turn benefit organizations and society (Shepard, 1984).

Career as a component of the individual life structure: from this viewpoint transition throughout the career are predictable and are accommodated in the work arrangements made (Levinson, 1984)

Social Psychology

Career as an individually mediated response to outside role message: a viewpoint that studies particular occupational circumstances, such as those of priests (Schneider and Hall, 1972) or scientists and engineers (Bailyn, 1980), for their psychological effects.

Sociology

Career as the unfolding of social roles: this viewpoint overlaps with social psychology but places greater emphasis on the individual's reciprocal contribution to the social order (Hughes, 1958, Van Maanen and Barely, 1984).

Career as social mobility: seeing a person's title as an indicator of social position (e.g. Blau and Duncan, 1967; Featherman and Hauser, 1978; Warner and Abegglen, 1955).

Anthropology

Career as status packages: a viewpoint overlapping with functional sociology or culture over time (Glaser and Straus, 1971).

Economics

Career as a response to market forces: a viewpoint emphasising the near-term distribution of employment opportunities and the long-term accumulation of human capital (Becker, 1975; Doerniger and Piore, 1971).

2 Michael B. Arthur, Douglas T. Hall and Barbara S. Lawrence, *Handbook of Career Theory*, Cambridge University Press, 1989, p. 10.

Political Science

Career as the enactment of self-interest: this views individual needs such as power, wealth, prestige, or autonomy as prominent objects of self-interested behaviour in the context of institutional political realities (Kaufman, 1960).

History

Career as a correlate of historical outcomes: looking at the reciprocal influence of prominent people and period events on each other (Schlesinger, 1965).

Geography

Career as a response to geographical circumstances: focussing on variables such as availability of raw materials, a natural harbor, or a population ready for work or trade as they affect the way working lives unfold (Vaananen, 1982).

More specifically, in public personnel management the term 'career' covers expressions such as advancement, fulfillment, enlargement, evolution, upgradation, growth, efflorescence, elevation, prosperity, progression, promotion and entire working life of an individual in any organisation. Schein says that career has two perspectives--- (i) external perspective, i.e., the observable series of steps through which the individual moves, and (ii) internal perspective, i.e., individual's personal experience of his career and reflects his hopes and aspirations³. Sofer and Hughes draw a similar distinction between objective and subjective views of a career⁴. The sequence of a person's work-related activities and associated attitudes, values and aspirations over the span of one's life may be regarded as career, which combines both internal and external perspective of career⁵. The external career refers to the objective categories used by society and organizations to describe the progression of steps through a given occupation. The idea of stages or steps in a progression towards culturally defined higher rewards is the essence of the definition of career. In order to answer the question of how to improve the career development from the organisation's point of view, the subjective counterpart of the external career, i.e. the internal career, needs also to be looked into. The internal career refers to the set or steps or stages that make up the individual's own perception

3 E. H. Schein, "Career Development: Theoretical and Practical Issues for Organizations", in *Career Planning and Development*, Geneva: International Labor Office, 1976, p. 17.

4 E. Sofer, *Men in Mid-career*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1970; E. C. Hughes, *Men and their Work*, Glencoe, III: Free Press, 1958, p. 23.

of his or her progression within an occupation. Such an internal ideation may not be very clear in terms of general aspirations to get ahead but it may sometimes be specific in terms of a person saying to himself or herself, for example, that he/she wants to achieve a certain rank and salary by the time he reaches certain age. To what extent the external career, as enunciated and operationalised by the organisation, matches the internal career, as visualised and aspired by the individual employees, represents the reality and validity of development programmes aiming to achieve the mutuality of shared interests. Such programmes would obviously include the assessment of human resources of different categories; evolution of appropriate policies and procedures for recruiting personnel of the right type and calibre, working out suitable career paths, training and placement of personnel in a manner best suited to their fuller development and utilisation of skills in meeting the organisational needs⁶.

Categories of Career Systems

Depending on the point of view, career systems may be classified roughly according to their scope, their limitations on entrance, or their orientation for reward and rank. The first two methods of classification may be disposed of relatively briefly. The matter of orientation of the system will require more extended treatment. These approaches to different kinds of career systems are not mutually exclusive; any one career system may be subject to classification by each approach separately⁷.

Programme Careers and Organization Careers

A career system may be built on the idea that persons are going to stay in a certain programme - construction of industrial plants for a longer duration, dam or highway construction, scientific research - or they may be geared to permit or encourage the movement of personnel among various programmes throughout a large, diversified department or among various agencies in a government jurisdiction. The scope of a career system may even be designed to permit and encourage movement among jurisdictions themselves⁸.

5 Ibid., p. 1.

6 K. Dey Bata, "Career Management," *Indian Journal of Public Administration (IJPA)*, Vol. XXXIII, 1987, pp. 50-51.

7 O. Glenn Stahl, op. cit., p. 47.

8 Ibid., p. 47.

Closed and Open Careers

Through the device of low maximum age limits for entrance and the filling of upper-level positions almost entirely from within, some career service have what is referred to as a closed system. There are numerous instances of it in the various nations of the world, especially in association with a rank-in-corps system. But the scheme is also well known in the United States, although not generally characteristic of its civilian public services.

The open type of career system, as the term implies, permits entrance at any or all grade levels (by rank or position). Entrance is governed by specified qualification requirements for each category and through competition. Persons serving in the recruiting organisation always have a natural advantage (intimate knowledge of the programme, performance already known to selecting officials, ready access to the selection process, etc.), so that it would be erroneous to claim that outsiders have equal access to all job openings or that insiders lack adequate assurance of advancement opportunity. The important feature of the open system is that infusion of new blood at middle and upper levels is not precluded and lateral entry is a part of this system.

Specific bureaus and professions may, by their very specialized nature, operate as if they are closed even under an avowed open system. There are many instances of this type of bureau in the United States. Nevertheless, Glenn O. Stahl⁹ preferred open system career of the U.S. to the closed, self-contained personnel schemes found in so many civil services in Europe, in South America, and in three countries still reflecting a British or Napoleonic colonial legacy such as India, Pakistan and Bangladesh, and some of the African nations. Glenn argues that since open systems of the indigenous American variety are clearly more flexible, they make greater allowance for entry of new personalities and ideas at levels where they are likely to count and permit almost as much opportunity for advancement of permanent staff in actual practice¹⁰.

Job-Oriented Careers and Rank-in-Corps

The third major classification of career systems is by their orientation as to rank and status. In the job-oriented career, the focus of the plan is on the assignment - the job to be performed - and the fitting of an individual into the job. Careers of individuals

9 Ibid., p. 50.

10 O. Glenn Stahl, *op. cit.*, p. 50.

derive from a succession of such assignments, more or less unplanned. Such careers may cut across departments, programs, and even occupations - so long as the careerist, under specified and varied modes of competition, meets the demands of each post passed. Hence the designation rank-in-job, or the job-oriented system¹¹. The Civil Services of the U.S. Canada, Iran and the Philippines are examples of job-oriented career.

In the rank-in-corps type, usually in conjunction with a more or less closed entry policy, the focus is on the person. Assignment, training, utilization, rank, and recognition are veered in terms of the individual and the corps to which he "belongs", rather than in terms of a hierarchy of positions. Rank has more to do with the length of service, relationship to others in the same group, and the general aptitude demonstrated than to the level of job occupied or to performance on a particular job. This explains the naming of rank-in-corps. The cadre structure of the Civil Service is an example of the rank-in-corps Civil Service. The Civil Services of the U.K. and most of its ex-colonies are examples of rank-in-corps Civil Service.

There is continued debate about the superiority of rank-in-job to rank-in-corps and vice versa. The theoretical differences between the two concepts, as it appears, make them totally incompatible. The application of each approach with features of others in the US and many other countries has been so modified with features of others that conceptual compromise does seem to be possible if not always practicable.

Mobility and Classification of Careers

Career can be classified into following groups from the viewpoint of mobility:

- Monolithic career identified with one institution or departmental jurisdiction. In this category of career, there is no mobility outside the department to which an individual is recruited.
- Cadre career, identified with a cluster or conglomeration of posts arranged vertically (i.e., hierarchically) and to higher, with different levels of responsibility, and with the facility of deployment of a member belonging to that cadre to any of the posts within the cadre jurisdiction, commensurate with the seniority, pay, experience, qualification, etc. The Civil Services of India, Pakistan and Bangladesh are examples of this type.

11 Ibid., p. 51.

- Inter-governmental careers identified with more than a single governmental jurisdiction. Apart from the Indian system of the All India Services, a good example of this kind of career pattern is found in the U.S. Municipal Services. In the United States people can move from small municipality to larger municipality. This trend of mobility of personnel from one non-specialised department to another similar department signals the end of monolithic career identified with one institution or government.
- There can be career system referred to as in and out system where a careerist finds part of his career in public service and part in other sectors of occupation even private. The movement of persons, particularly those in professional research and managerial employment had no doubt been a distinct American phenomenon that has lately caught on elsewhere. Instead of blighting career opportunities in any one place, this trend¹⁶ would enlarge the scope of such opportunities to mutual benefit to public and private sectors of society. To an extent, this also is part of the practice in French system.

Career Planning, Career Development and Career Management

Career management is interchangeably used with career planning and career development, and so on, though these are different in meaning and scope. With a view to understanding the nature, scope and dimensions of career management, the term career planning, and career development need thorough analysis. In this context, definitions of these terms are presented below.

Career Planning: According to Stahl, career planning refers to planned and systematic progression of events and development in the field of work or vocation of an individual during the employable periods of his life¹². Schien says that philosophy of career planning is to foster harmony between the individual's aspirations and goal of the organisation¹³. An individual has to prepare himself for a career in any organisation and organisation has to help the individual to develop his career to achieve organisational objectives. Career planning has more than one definition: According to Richard Williams, 'career planning is a deliberate process for (i) becoming aware of self,

12 O. Glenn Stahl, op. cit., p. 45.

13 H. Schein Edgar, *Career Dynamics: Matching Individuals and Organisational Needs*, London, Addison-Wesley, 1978, p. 19.

opportunities, choices, and consequences, and for (ii) identifying career-related goals, and for (iii) programming of work, education, and related developmental experiences to provide the direction, timing, and sequence of steps to attain a specific career goal¹⁴.

Richard Williams says that there are three stages of career planning¹⁵:

First stage: "broad conclusions about one's own capabilities, interests, aspirations, objectives".

Second stage: development planning where the focus is on "targets for future job assignments, developmental activities to make that progress happen, and plans for other future career decisions".

A third level of career planning is performance planning which involves "specific goals and plans, work priorities, and reward expectations on the current job assignment."

Career Development: Career planning and development are concepts which encompass the events either happening to or initiated by individuals which affect his progression or promotion, his widening and/ or changing employment possibilities and his acquiring a different, and normally higher status, better conditions or increased satisfaction with the job¹⁶. Career development denotes the lifelong sequence and pattern of an individual's work related behaviour, including all work-relevant experiences before and after entry into a formal occupation. Career development is a continuous process of working out a synthesis or compromise between the self and the reality, opportunities and limitations of the world¹⁷. Career development practices include personnel policy, i.e., posting, promotion, identification of potentials and grooming of the brilliant ones for future senior jobs and training. Training is the major means to develop career. Training has to be planned process of continuing development over a number of years, integrated into the career plans of individuals. It is difficult to discuss these separately without masking the interrelationships and interdependence that exist between career development and career planning. Assessment of performance and potential for placement and promotion, and training are very important part of career planning.

14 Richard Williams, *Career Management and Career Planning: A Study of North American Practice*, HMSO, *Civil Service Department*, p. 91.

15 *Ibid.*, p. 150.

16 ILO, *Career Planning and Development*, 1976, p. 59.

17 Gintzberg et al, 1951.

While career development conveys the notion of improvement, qualitative growth, career planning denotes 'thinking for future'.

Career Management: Career management is the process which enables an organisation to meet its current and projected manpower requirement through provisions of career opportunities for its employees. It aims at optimizing the effectiveness of human resources of the organization, through planned development and their knowledge, skills and potentialities¹⁸. Career management practices can be regarded collectively as a subsystem of a much larger human resource planning and development system of which the broad aim is to promote organizational and individual effectiveness. Wendy Hirsh of the IMS, Sussex (UK), has defined career and career management with simpler but meaningful words:

'By 'careers' we mean the series of jobs an individual may perform within an organisation. By 'management' we mean the process by which an organisation utilises individuals through their careers. In this sense career management concerns itself with most aspects of what has traditionally been called the supply side of 'manpower' management: where to get the people from that the organisation needs. In particular, it is concerned with both the acquisition and subsequent development of human resources inside the organisation.'¹⁹

In short, career management covers recruitment, training, performance appraisal and rewards. The above definitions of career planning, career management, and career development, though interrelated, reflect three different angles of vision and emanate from differential assumptions, follow separate routes and end up in emphasizing varying approaches and conclusions. Carefully analysed they seem to represent individual, organisational and bi-party concerns. Definitions of 'career development' revolves round events or occurrences that visit an individual during his or her working period, which take him or her through the hierarchic ladder, expand his or her areas of duties and responsibilities, bring about pay-rise and top up his or her status. Definitions of career management place greater emphasis on the organisations and its mission which are accomplished through developing the careers of individuals employed by it. The career management, from this angle, is seen to primarily subserve the needs of the employing enterprises for whose success the policy and programmes pertaining to career planning are necessarily to be designed, installed and implemented. In this view of the matter, individuals are treated as entities existing for organisations which, for its

18 U. C. Agarwal, "Career Management in Government", *IJPA*, Vol. XXXIII, 1987, p. 47.

19 Wendy Hirsh, *Career Management in the Organisation*, Institute of Manpower Studies, Sussex, UK, p. 17.

own sake, plans and directs and enriches the career of its employees. The central concern of employee-career, under this definition, is the responsibility, and the individual seems to be a by-product. Definitions of 'career planning' seek to balance the two dimensions, and de-emphasise both, one-sided objective of the organisation and bind individual ambitions of getting to the top. 'Career', it cannot be forgotten, is intensely particularistic in its basics, it must relate to an individual without who it loses its semblance of relevance. Yet, at the same time organisations must have an abiding interest in minding, even master-minding, the individual career, through fulfilling their own interdependent and interactive missions. This mutuality of concern makes it a bi-party issue.

Whatever may be the aspects and areas of emphasis, career management is essentially an integral part of a holistic human resource management of the organisation. While organisation must concern itself with the growth of individuals for attainment of its objectives through its employees, individuals should seek their total fulfillment in the organisation. Each must, therefore, contribute to the other's dream-actualisation and mission-control, in self-interest, which is mutual. This mutuality, thus, represents a commonality of concern in the management of career.

Inadequacies in different aspects of career management like recruitment, training, evaluation of performance and reward adversely affects the performance of the organisation. If such people are recruited who are not equal to the tasks they will be assigned with, organisation is bound to suffer. First step towards better Career Management will be to recruit able people, then to train them, evaluate their performance and reward and remunerate them to retain them. To get talented people, career of the organisation has to be attractive. Career attractiveness connotes good reward, scope for career development and promotion, job security and retirement benefits. This issue will be thoroughly deliberated upon in relevant chapter. For organisational effectiveness, reforms have to be undertaken to remedy the shortcomings of the career management. Career management reform may be structural or behavioural. Nature of reform required for inadequate career management is being discussed in the following sections.

Career Management Reforms

While structural reform deals with the structural aspect of organisation, behavioural reform is concerned with human element of the organisation. Structure of organisation denotes the hierarchy and number of posts at different levels of hierarchy. Hierarchy and number of positions in different positions of hierarchy decide the career prospect of the employees and as such structure of the organisation has direct bearing on the career prospect of the employees. Behavioural reform deals with attitudinal aspects, and training etc. From the above prima facie it seems that reform in career management involves both structural and behavioral reform. But there is controversy what type of reform is more suitable for organisational change- structural or organisational change. These two strategies need to be analysed before deciding which one would be better for reforming inadequacies of career management.

According to Lawrence and Lorsch methods of organisational change should include 'a variety of structural and procedural changes, such as changes in the formal communication and control procedures, changes in goal setting procedures, changes in authority structures and division of labour, changes in selection criteria'. In addition to this need for structural elements in re-organisations in general and the structural requirements typical of the machinery of government, the considerable emphasis on structural aspects in administrative reform is related to the scope of such induced change, which involves large parts or the entirety of the machinery of government²⁰. Lawrence and Lorsch say that there is mostly no question of a choice between a structural or behavioral strategy. In their opinion, it should rather be a matter of a preferable mix. But the need, desirability and utility of a greater dose of structural or behavioral devices will depend on the particular reform object or situation, e.g., the type of bureaucracy or the urgency of the reform²¹.

Behavioral changes are increasingly used to remedy the weaknesses of structural strategies. Modern organisation theory, according to many experts, emphasises the behavioural aspects of organisational change: structural change is accorded low priority. It is claimed that unless the behaviour of members of the organisation is changed, effective change in the operations of the organisation will not be possible.

20 Arne F. Leemans, *The Management of Change in Government*, Institute of Social Studies, Martinus Nijhoff, The Hague, 1976, p. 51.

21 Ibid, p. 76.

Cohen shares same views, although he also recognises the need for structural change under some specific conditions²². There may be valid arguments in favour of the behavioral approach; but it cannot be accepted that each and every situation demands behavioural approach. Reform for behavioral change has definite limitations; it tends to focus on the individual and the small group rather than on the organisation as a whole. It is essentially a micro approach and as such large-scale change cannot be made through behavioural change. It is also a time-consuming process, and in many cases governments cannot or do not wish to delay the reform in question²³. On these and other grounds, Braibanti concludes that 'institutional change appears to be increasingly more effective than attitudinal manipulation even as an internal means'²⁴.

In many developing countries the administrative reform failed as the reform was structure oriented. Administrative reform in the Philippines failed because of its emphasis on reorganisation at the expense of attitudinal reform of the civil servants themselves. The Philippines' experience in administrative reform amply demonstrates the futility of reorganising the Civil Service if such reorganisation is not accompanied by a corresponding change in the attitudes and change in the values of the civil servants²⁵.

Malaysia and Singapore have been more successful in administrative reform as their reform efforts are characterised by: (1) focus on both institutional and attitudinal reform; (2) explicit statement of the goals; (3) reliance on both comprehensive and incremental approaches to reform; (4) the absence of obstacle to reform; and (5) the presence of political support and sponsorship²⁶. The PMSC (Personnel Management Steering Committee) headed by the PSC Chairman was formed to implement the employee-centered personnel management philosophy in the Singapore Civil Service.

22 Johnson and Cohen, "Urgency of Reform" quoted in F. Leemans Arne, *The Management of Change in Government*, Institute of Social Studies, Martinus Nijhoff, The Hague, 1976, p. 51.

23 C. I. Mosher, "Governmental Reorganisation", quoted in Arne F. Leemans, *The Management of Change in Government*, Institute of Social Studies, Martinus Nijhoff, The Hague, 1976, p. 52.

24 Ralph Braibanti, "External Inducement of Political-Administrative Development: An Institutional Strategy", in Ralph Braibanti at al, ed., *Political and Administrative Development*, N. C. Durham, Duke University Press, 1969.

25 Guzman, Pacho, and Legada, *Administrative Reform in Asia and Pacific Region Nations*, p. 31.

26 Jon S.T. Quah, "Bureaucracy and Administrative Reform in the ASEAN Countries: A Comparative Analysis", in Raul P. De Guzman, Arturo Pacho, and Ric Tan Legada, eds., *Administrative Reform in Asia and Pacific Region Nations*, op. cit., p. 1011.

The PMSC focused its attention on recruitment, training, career development, succession planning, and matching the right person with right job²⁷.

Charles.H.Kennedy studied the structural reform in Pakistan and concluded that restructured Pakistan Civil Service failed to attain its major objectives. The Civil Service of Pakistan has been restructured in such a manner that it cannot attract talented students to the Civil Service as evidenced from the following:

"However, the wider and more important goals of Bhutto's administrative reform to create a classless bureaucracy which is comprised of one service; to make the bureaucracy more efficient; and to make the bureaucracy more technically proficient are as far away from realisation in 1996 as they were in 1973... Finally and perhaps most importantly, the administrative reforms have further eroded the perception that choosing a career in administration is a valid career choice. This depletion of the gene pool of public servants in Pakistan is likely to have a long-term negative effects on all aspects of administration in Pakistan"²⁸.

Before embarking on any reform, Pakistan's experience of structural reform has to be borne in mind that attractiveness of the civil service as a career depends a lot on its structure.

In Britain, structural changes had been undertaken in the hope and belief that it would solve some of the major problems confronting those agencies and improve their performance, although bringing about structural changes would be a long, difficult process²⁹. British politicians and public administrators, as well as many businessmen and academics, cling to a belief that the performance of an organisation can be improved by changing its internal structure. British Government went for an orgy of reorganisation between 1965 and 1975. Apparent failure to secure improvement in performance has often provoked further reorganisations in response. The alternative response has been to reject organisational change as ineffective or counterproductive³⁰. In the British Civil Service, recent change began with the introduction of the Ryner's Scrutinies to reduce the size of the Civil Service and waste, establishment of Efficiency Unit, development of the Management Information System for Ministers (MINIS) by Michael Haseltine. The system was extended to the whole of Whitehall after 1982 as the Financial Management Initiative (FMI). A much more radical initiative based on

27 Ibid, p. 1004.

28 Charles H. Kennedy, *Bureaucracy in Pakistan*, Oxford University Press, 1987, p. 224.

29 Howard Elcock (1991), *Change and Decay: Public Administration in the 1990s*, Harlow: Evans G. Longman (1993), p. 45.

30 Frank A. Stacey, *British Government 1966 To 1975: Years Of Reform*, Oxford University Press, 1975, p. 19.

principles of accountable management contained in the FMI was launched in February, 1988, with the publication of reports by the Prime Minister's Efficiency Unit entitled somewhat innocuously, "Improving Management in Government: The Next Steps"³¹. In the case of Britain, structural changes are therefore expensive, disruptive, addictive and its effectiveness is uncertain. Nonetheless there are valid reasons for restructuring³², as demonstrated below:

- a. When restructuring is clearly the appropriate response to major anomalies, or 'policy stress' in the existing structure;
- b. Where clear, realisable improvements in performance will be achieved or persistent problems solved by reorganisation;
- c. When clearly defined goals have to be achieved, such as better coordination or more coherent resource allocation.

Structural changes may also increase efficiency if the changes are well planned and implemented properly. Introduction of Senior Executive Service in the US Civil Service and the Australian Civil Service are the best examples.

Congruence Model of Organisational Change

According to Lawler, organisations are systems and composed of multiple interdependent subsystems. Changes in one element of the system result in changes in other parts. In addition, the property of equilibrium of the organisation will generate energy to move toward a state of balance in which the different parts of the system are congruent with each other. If the functions of the Civil Service are enlarged, capability of them has to be enhanced through better recruitment, training and reward for organisational effectiveness. Lawler says:

"A number of congruence models build upon this view of the organization as an open system. (See, for example, Galbraith, 1973; Nadler and Tushman, 1977). In these frameworks, the organization is made up of systems such as tasks, formal structures, informal cultures, individuals, and various subsystems. Many of the critical questions concern the congruence among the internal components of an organization. Are the demands of the organizational task consistent with the skills of the individuals? Are the rewards well suited to the needs and desires of the individuals and calculated to motivate the kind of behaviour that is needed for organizational effectiveness? The basic hypothesis of these models is that organizations will be most effective when the major components are congruent".³³

31 HMSO; Efficiency Unit, 1988; IBBS Report, p. 35.

32 Ibid., p. 64.

33 E. Lawler Edward III, ' Strategic Choices for Changing Organizations', in Jeffrey Pfeffer, ed., *Organizations and Organization Theory*, Pitman Publishing Inc., 1982, pp. 256-257.

If Lawler's congruence model of organisational change is believed to be valid, then it has to be accepted that any incremental change in organisation will necessitate changes in other subsystems of the organisations. One change will lead to series of changes in the organisations. In this line of thought, it is probably better to go for comprehensive change.

Model Schema of Career Management

In the preceding sections, concepts of career, career related issues and career management reforms have been discussed in detail. The present section provides a model career management system to attract talented people to the Civil Service. Following assumptions are made to develop the model schema.

- a. Most of the brilliant students may not be willing to join the Civil Service due to poor career management.
- b. A modern structure of the Civil Service that ensures equitable promotion prospects, adequate reward system, recognition of merit and performance, irrespective of professional/occupational groupings, may attract the brilliant students to the Civil Service.

The above assumptions (taking these assumptions to be true) make it mandatory to reform the inadequate career management of the Civil Service for improvement of its efficiency and effectiveness. Developing countries may adapt the reform strategy of Singapore to bring about behavioral and structural change of their Civil Services. Though it is argued that there can be no universal strategy for administrative modernisation (reform) and there will be separate strategy for each country or each particular situation³⁴, developing countries may not be able to experiment with a new system. The latter have to adapt the reform measures and strategies of other countries after necessary modifications and alterations as the situation demands.

To prove the above assumptions, the structure of the Civil Service needs to be studied to see how the structure affects the promotion of the civil servants and remedial measures have to be recommended. Survey of opinions of the brilliant students who are on the verge of leaving the universities, newly recruited officers and those affected by

34 N. K. Mukharjee, "Formulation of Administrative Strategies", in *International Seminar on Major Administrative Reforms in Developing Countries* (1971), Vol. II: Technical papers, New York, United Nations, 1973, p. 46.

career blockage have to be conducted to suggest measures to increase the attractiveness of the Civil Service as a career. This survey of opinions of the brilliant students would help find out what repels or attracts them towards the Civil Service career. The survey amongst the newly recruited officers and officers thought to be affected by career blockage would help find out their career expectations and how far their career expectations have been realized. Recruitment system has to be analysed to diagnose its problems and prescribe measures for drawing better quality candidates towards the Civil Service. System of training has to be investigated to find out its shortcomings and suggest improvement to induce talented people to the Civil Service. Needless to say here that training enhances the ability of the officers and this indicates to the civil servants that the management is taking due care and interest in their development.

Performance is a function of ability, effort and situation. Even if able people are recruited and they are equipped with the necessary skills through training, they are not likely to put up their best effort if they are not rightly rewarded for their performance. As such evaluation of performance has to be made in an objective manner and arrangement for rewarding the good performers has to be ensured. Remuneration policy has to be reexamined and reformed so that better quality recruits can be drawn to the Civil Service. Career structures of a sample of civil servants may be studied to identify the problems of career progression of different professional/occupational groups with view to solving the problems of career development that seem to have been persisting in most of the newly independent countries.

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Chapter III

THE CIVIL SERVICE IN BANGLADESH: GENESIS AND DEVELOPMENT

Introduction

The fact remains that the system of Civil Service in Bangladesh developed as an integral part of Pakistan's bureaucracy during the twenty-four years of its united existence until 1971. But its actual genesis can be traced to what the British in India innovated to maintain law and order, collect land revenue, and establish local institutions, which seemed to have preserved their colonial interests in the subcontinent. The focus of this chapter is on the civil service structure in place in today's Bangladesh, with special reference to its genesis and development in united Pakistan (1947-1971), the structural reforms implemented after the liberation of Bangladesh in 1971, including a critique on the existing civil service structure. The structural changes introduced after liberation need to be examined in that such changes would have an impact on the career prospect of the civil servants. To begin with, however, the remainder of this introductory section probes the system of civil service that was developed by the British colonial rulers in India before 1947.

During the rule of the East India Company (1757-1858) its employees had to sign agreements or covenants describing agreed-upon terms and conditions of service with the Company. Another group of employees also served under the East India Company who did not sign any such covenants. Those who signed covenants were known as covenanted servants and those who did not came to be known as uncovenanted servants. The Act of 1793 established the principle of exclusively filling 'covenanted offices' with covenanted officers. From then onward the two groups were formally divided between the covenanted and the uncovenanted servants. These groupings subsequently became known as cadres. During the first hundred years of British rule in India (1760-1857), the civil servants used to be nominated by the East India Company's central authorities in London. On the basis of a report called "Report on the Indian Civil Service", prepared by a Committee under the chairmanship of Lord Macaulay in

1854, this patronage system of selection was replaced by open competition. The term 'Civil Service' was formally introduced after the Macaulay Report. Moreover, the covenanted civil service gradually became known as an All-India Civil Service, or the India Civil Service (ICS)¹.

After the assumption of control of India in 1858 from the East India Company by the British Crown, changes of substantive nature were introduced in the existing civil service system. The Aitchison Commission (1886-1887) recommended the formation of two distinct categories of civil service, namely the Imperial Civil Service (ICS)² and the Provincial Civil Service. According to the recommendations of this Commission, the ICS was at the apex of the Civil Service. The members of the covenanted civil service were encadred in the Imperial Civil Service. The uncovenanted civil servants were divided into two groups - the Provincial Civil Service and the 'Subordinate Civil Service'. Members of the 'Subordinate Civil Service' used to be promoted to the Provincial Civil Service on the basis of merit. While the Imperial Civil Servants would serve all over India, either in the provinces or in the central government departments, the members of the Provincial Services were mainly deployed in the provinces. Subsequent to the adoption of the recommendations of the Aitchison Commission (1886-1887) by the government, the basic pattern of the cadre system of organisation was established.

As a matter of fact, the system of civil service developed by the British in India was the product of a series of pragmatic responses to the political and administrative needs of their colonial administration. Intermittent executive and legislative actions and the recommendations of such enquiry committees as the Islington Commission (1912-1915)³ and Lee Commission⁴(1924) had brought about changes in the Civil Service in India. The Indian Civil Service was a generalist service par excellence. Its members could be appointed to any administrative jobs, from the administration of districts to policy formulation in the Secretariat. Members of the ICS were the counterparts of the administrative class in Britain. The difference was that a highly developed network of local bodies performed the field activities in Britain and the administrative class staffed

1 For further details about the growth and development of the civil service system in British India, see B. B. Misra, *The Bureaucracy in India*, Oxford University Press, New Delhi, 1977.

2 Muzaffar Ahmed Chowdhary, *The Civil Service in Pakistan*, NIPA, Dacca, 1969, p. 12.

3 Ibid., pp. 24-30.

4 Ibid., pp. 34-37.

the Whitehall - the nerve centre of the central government administration. In British India, only the ablest and intellectually gifted young candidates could cherish the ambition of becoming an ICS. Later this ICS cadre was to develop, with only minor modifications, into the Civil Service of Pakistan or the CSP cadre in Pakistan and the Indian Administrative Service (IAS) in India. Similarly, the establishment of the Provincial Civil Service presaged the development of equivalent services in the provinces of Pakistan and India⁵.

The Civil Service in Pakistan (1947-1971)

In 1947, Pakistan and India achieved independence and inherited much of the civil service systems developed by the British in the years before partition. In the midst of frequent changes of government, political instability and the absence of democratic rule with short breaks of military rule, Pakistan's bureaucracy constituted the only element of continuity in that country. This reinforced the popular belief in the strength of bureaucracy. The civil servants of Pakistan were more educated and experienced in the art of government than most of the Ministers. Naturally, the two founding leaders of Pakistan, governor-general Mohammad Ali Jinnah and prime minister Liaquat Ali Khan, relied heavily on the civil servants⁶.

In Pakistan, the Civil Service was divided into spatial divisions - All Pakistan, Central, and Provincial. Members of the All-Pakistan Service (i.e., the CSP) used to be deployed in both the provinces of Pakistan, Central Secretariat, Parastatals; Central Services like the Accounts and Secretariat were mainly deployed in the Central Secretariat and jobs earmarked for the Central Government; and the members of the Provincial Services were mainly deployed in the respective provinces.

The services were further divided into the following three broad categories according to the type of work they performed:

- a. Generalist-administrative service, e.g., the CSP;
- b. Functional services, e.g., Audit and Accounts, Income Tax;
- c. Specialist service, e.g., Central Engineering Services, etc.

5 Charles H. Kennedy, *Bureaucracy in Pakistan*, Oxford University Press, Karachi, 1987, p. 22.

6 Syed Giasuddin Ahmed, *Public Personnel Management in Bangladesh*, Dhaka University, Dhaka, 1985, p. 255.

The CSP officers moved from one department to another - land administration, maintenance of law and order, collection of land revenue, judiciary, manning of key posts of attached departments and parastatals, and formulating policies in the national and provincial secretariats. People belonging to the functional services remained deployed in respective functional areas and they could hold few posts in the Central Secretariat. The officers of the specialist services remained confined within their respective domain.

These divisions into broad functional lines have been described as characteristic of "vertical classification" of services in that the services were cut across by vertical lines according to type of work performed⁷. Vertical classification of the All-Pakistan and Central Services is illustrated in Chart 3.1:

Chart 3.1

Vertical Classification of Services

Generalist-Administrative	Functionalist	Specialist
CSP	Foreign Service	Central Engineering
PSP (Police Service)	Audit & Accounts	Telegraph Engineering
CSS (Central Secretariat Service)	Military Accounts	Telegraph Traffic
	Taxation	
	Railway Accounts	Geological Survey
	Customs & Excise	
	Postal	
	Information	
	Trade	
	Military Land & Cantonment	

The generalist and functional services used to be recruited through one and same competitive examination, i.e., the yearly Central Superior Services examinations conducted by the Central Public Service Commission, whereas the members of the specialist services used to be recruited on the basis of their special professional qualifications and training.

There were 24 regularly constituted services in the two provinces of Pakistan-East Pakistan, and West Pakistan and they also had above vertical classification like the All Pakistan and Central Services. The Central and Provincial Services had almost identical structures. However, the terms and conditions and pay of the Central Services were

better compared to that of Provincial Services. While the cadres of Central Services belonged to only class I, the Provincial Services were divided into class I and II, higher or junior, upper or lower. Except for the Provincial Administrative Service, members of most Provincial Services remained throughout their careers in their respective functional areas. Very few of the Provincial Service candidates could reach the level of Deputy Secretary (present pay grades IV and V).

The Administrative Elite: CSP

After the independence of Pakistan, the human and the material resources of the country were too meagre to permit a violent shake-up of the service structure and building of a new one. The Civil Service of Pakistan (CSP) was thus created "as the pivotal service around which the entire administration - Central and Provincial - was organised"⁸. It is pertinent to mention here that the British colonial rulers allowed lateral entry up to 20 per cent from the Provincial Services into the ICS from 1924 as recommended by the Lee Commission. Lateral entry into the CSP was closed in spite of the sensible and logical step taken in India after independence in 1947 to absorb promoted Provincial Civil Service officers in the Indian Administrative Service (IAS). The old ICS belligerency was voiced with the argument that the standard of the 'steel frame' would be diluted if promoted officers were also absorbed in the cadre of the CSP⁹. Closure of entry of members of the Provincial Services to the CSP further accentuated the bitterness against the CSP. The CSPs were the self-proclaimed 'Brahmins' (the high caste) and the other services were treated as the low caste, if not untouchable, in respect of pay, privileges, and status and promotion prospect. The reservation of the bulk of the policy level Secretariat posts for the CSP helped to create a distinct privileged 'class' within the Civil Service with higher emoluments, extra privileges, power and prestige. This gave rise to hatred against the CSPs amongst the members of other services. In Pakistan, five Reform Commissions (Egger, 1953; Gladieux, 1955; Cornelius, 1962 and 1970; and Power, 1969) critically examined the existing administrative system. The recommendations of these five reform bodies ranged from the abolition of all-Pakistan Services and their replacement with a Single

7 Muzaffar Ahmed Choudhary, *Civil Service in Pakistan*, NIPA, Dacca, 1969. p. 2.

8 Muzaffar Ahmed Choudhary, *Civil Service in Pakistan*, NIPA, Dacca, 1963, pp. 86-87.

9 Pay and Services Commission (hereinafter referred as the Rashid Commission after the name of the Commission's chairman, Mr. A. Rashid), Report, Part I - *The Services*, Vol. 1, Government of Bangladesh, 1977, p. 40.

However, immediately after liberation, the government of Bangladesh reorganised the provincial set-up it inherited into that of a national government. At the same time, a committee called Administrative and Services Reorganisation Committee (ASRC) was also appointed in March 1972, with Professor Muzaffar Ahmed Choudhary (vice chancellor of Dhaka University) as its Chairman, to suggest measures to reorganise the Civil Service inherited at liberation. The next year the ASRC did submit its report to the government. Specifically, it recommended constituting a unified civil service structure comprising in all ten service grades¹¹. Unfortunately, the ASRC report was never made public.

In Pakistan, two-third posts of the Deputy Secretary and 60 per cent posts of the Joint Secretary and above were reserved for the members of the Civil Service of Pakistan. Interestingly, however, the erstwhile CSP officers in liberated Bangladesh were found to have occupied more than 75 per cent posts of Joint Secretary and above, despite the protests raised by the specialists and functionalists. Thus the generalists succeeded in retaining their domination in the administration as they had in the Pakistan days.

A new reform commission designated as 'The Pay and Services Commission' (hereinafter referred to as the Rashid Commission after the name of its Chairman, Mr. A. Rashid) was set up in February 1976 to suggest reforms and reorganisation of the Civil Service as well as the salary structures. The Rashid Commission submitted its report in May 1977. It recommended the constitution of 29 organised cadres at the top two tiers (administrative and executive) in major functional areas, with broad homogeneity in functions for all positions. It also recommended distinct hierarchy with well-defined functions for each step in each cadre. The Rashid Commission also recommended to constitute an apex cadre to be termed 'Senior Services Pool' for staffing the senior and top positions of the Civil Service. This 'Senior Services Pool' (hereinafter referred as SSP) would be an 'Open Structure' like the British Civil Service with openings for all branches of the Civil Service¹². The Commission boasted that the formation of SSP would lead to the abolition of elitism of any particular cadre in the Civil Service. Probably, both the ASRC and the Rashid Commission chose to go for the popularly accepted belief: 'Elitism is not compatible with the existing situation

11 For more details, see Syed Giasuddin Ahmed, *The Image of Public Service in Bangladesh*, Centre for Administrative Study, University of Dhaka, Dhaka, 1975.

12 *Report of the Rashid Commission*, 1976, p. 61.

in Bangladesh'¹³. Maybe it that a belief as such had been a truth in the late 70's when socialism was the creed of the day. But, will the idea of 1978 hold good in the 90's when people have opted for the open market and value for money concept? This point will be discussed in more detail later. It can be mentioned here that the Rashid Commission too accepted that high-flyer system would have attracted the brighter students to the Civil Service career¹⁴. The conduct of the CSPs, the high flyers and animosity of members of other cadres towards the CSPs made the very word "high flyers" and "elitism" a taboo in Bangladesh.

Implementation of Reform Measures: The Senior Services Pool

Based on the recommendations of the Rashid Commission, an open-structured system of civil service called the 'Senior Services Pool' (SSP), meant for the Secretariat positions above grade vi (Deputy Secretary) and other key posts of Parastatals, was constituted in March 1979, and subsequently amended as on 23 August 1979. The SSP would consist of posts requiring diversified experience, administrative leadership and high-level coordination functions. It was primarily designed to constitute a new apex cadre of senior officials of proven quality drawn from all branches of the Civil Service on the basis of merit and ability to be tested in an objective manner through competitive examinations to be conducted by the PSC. In February 1983, the SSP was declared a separate cadre. All officers who had at any time before 1 March 1979 held the posts of Deputy Secretary and above would be automatically encadred into the SSP. The government retained, however, a power to encadre, up to 15 June 1981, as SSP officers any member of any of the erstwhile regularly constituted class I services without any consultation with the PSC and without restriction as to the age or length of service. After several revisions, the ultimate strength of the SSP was fixed at 779¹⁵.

The BCS Cadres

Largely on the basis of recommendations of the Rashid Commission, the government in January 1981 also created 14 cadres and 14 sub-cadres as constituents of a 'unified' national civil service designated as the Bangladesh Civil Service (BCS). Subsequently, when each of the newly constituted sub-cadres was turned into an individual cadre and

13 Ibid., p. 52.

14 *Report of the Rashid Commission*, op. cit.

15 See Syed Giasuddin Ahmed, *Public Personnel Administration in Bangladesh*, University of Dhaka, Dhaka, 1986, pp. 122-26.

with the creation of two more cadres in 1985, the number of the BCS cadres increased to 30¹⁶. Table 3.2 lists the thirty BCS cadre constituted by the government as of December 1990. A comparison of the old and the newly introduced structure of the civil service is shown in Table 3.3: In addition, distribution of posts of different grades in the 24 cadres of the Bangladesh Civil Service is also shown in Table 3.4.

Table 3.2: List of thirty BCS Cadre

-
1. Bangladesh Civil Service (Administration)
 2. Bangladesh Civil Service (Food)
 3. Bangladesh Civil Service (Agriculture)
 4. Bangladesh Civil Service (Forest)
 5. Bangladesh Civil Service (Fisheries)
 6. Bangladesh Civil Service (Livestock)
 7. Bangladesh Civil Service (General Education)
 8. Bangladesh Civil Service (Technical Education)
 9. Bangladesh Civil Service (Economic)
 10. Bangladesh Civil Service (Trade)
 11. Bangladesh Civil Service (Statistical)
 12. Bangladesh Civil Service (Public Works)
 13. Bangladesh Civil Service (Public Health Engineering)
 14. Bangladesh Civil Service (Roads and Highways)
 15. Bangladesh Civil Service (Tele-Communication)
 16. Bangladesh Civil Service (Audit and Accounts)
 17. Bangladesh Civil Service (Customs and Excise)
 18. Bangladesh Civil Service (Taxation)
 19. Bangladesh Civil Service (Foreign Affairs)
 20. Bangladesh Civil Service (Health)
 21. Bangladesh Civil Service (Family Planning)
 22. Bangladesh Civil Service (Information)
 23. Bangladesh Civil Service ((Judicial)
 24. Bangladesh Civil Service (Postal)
 25. Bangladesh Civil Service (Enforcement: Police)
 26. Bangladesh Civil Service (Enforcement: Ansar)
 27. Bangladesh Civil Service (Railway: Transportation & Commercial)
 28. Bangladesh Civil Service (Railway: Engineering)
 29. Bangladesh Civil Service (Co-operative)
 30. Bangladesh Civil Service (Secretariat)
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Source: Establishment Division, Notification No. S. R. O. 99-L/ME/Rectt/1.51 (vol-3)/83, 27th May 1987, published in *Establishment Manual* (vol. 1), Dhaka, Bangladesh Government Press 1995.

¹⁶ For more details, see Syed Giasuddin Ahmed, *Bangladesh Public Service Commission*, University of Dhaka, Dhaka, 1990, pp. 158-61.

Table 3.3

Comparison of Old and New Structure of the Civil Service

All Pakistan and Central Civil Services	East Pakistan Provincial Service	Bangladesh Civil Service
(a)	(b)	(c)
CSP	Civil Service Class I Civil Service Class II	Administrative Service
Police Service	Senior Police Service Junior Police Service	Police Service
Secretariat Service	Secretariat Service	Secretariat Service
Customs & Excise Service	Excise Service	Customs & Excise Service
Taxation Service	Taxation Service	Taxation Service
Information Service	-----	Information Service
Engineering Service	Senior Eng. Service Junior Eng. Service	Eng. Public Works Eng. Public Health Eng. Road & Highways
Foreign Service	-----	Foreign Service
Trade Service	-----	Trade Service
Cantonment Service	-----	(Merged with Administrative Service)
Audits & Accounts Service Military Accounts Service Railway Accounts Service		Audit & Accounts Service (All Accounts & Audits Services have been merged to form Audit & Account Service)
Postal Service	----	Postal Service
Telegraph Eng. Service		Telecom Service
Telegraph Traffic Service		
Geographical Survey of Pakistan		Abolished
Total 17 cadres		
	Judicial Service	Judicial Service
	Education Service (Senior) Education Service (Junior)	Education Service (General) Education Service (Technical)
	Railway Service (Eng.) Railway Commercial, Railway Transportation and Transportation Traffic Traffic & Commercial Service	Railway Engineering
	Agriculture Service	Agriculture Service
	Health Service (Upper) Health Service (Lower)	Health Service
	Livestock Service (Upper) Livestock Service (Lower)	Livestock Service
	Fisheries Service (Higher) Fisheries Service (Lower)	Fisheries Service
	Forest Service (Senior) Forest Service (Junior)	Forest Service
	Food Service	Food Service
		Economic Service Family Planning Cooperative Service Statistical Service Ansar Service
	Total 24 Cadres	Total 30 Cadres

Table -3.4

Pay/Grade-Wise Distribution of Posts of Different Cadres

Sl.	Cadre	Total	Res	Pay Grade							
				VII	VI	VI	V	IV	III	I	I
a	B	c	d	E	f	g	h	i	j	k	l
1	Administration	4080	150	2274	779	845	12	10	2	7	1
2	Food	289	0	193	70	17	0	7	1	1	
3	Agriculture	2553	0	1609	466	377	65	22	7	8	1
4	Forest	109	0	51	6	41	0	7	3	1	
5	Livestock	1222	0	1012	12	158	35	4	1		
6	Fisheries	599	0	491	0	90	12	3	2	1	
7	Education: General	8124	0	4095	356	1968	1364	335	4	2	
8	Education: Technical	924	0	631	2	202	21	41	26	1	
9	Economic	505	21	213	1	138	82	1	42	7	
10	Trade	112	0	69	0	24	6	8	4	1	
11	Statistics	107	0	70	0	26	6	4	1		
12	Public Works (Engg)	577	421	0	112	0	35	7	2		
13	Public Health	112	0	76	0	28	0	6	1	1	
14	Roads & Highways	434	0	247	97	62	0	20	7	1	
15	Telecom	575	0	339	95	99	0	30	11	1	
16	Audit & Accounts	266	11	70	0	127	28	7	21	2	
17	Customs & Excise	129	0	46	0	43	18	8	11	3	
18	Taxation	358	16	160	0	107	27	35	10	3	
19	Health	10302	479	6784	1990	528	1	288	227	5	
20	Foreign Affairs	192	0	44	0	49	53	0	32	4	10
21	Information	541	6	427	39	33	18	9	8	1	
22	Judicial	615	0	460	0	71	26	47	11		
23	Postal	182	0	104	0	43	12	11	11	1	
24	Police	595	0	399	0	179	0	13	4		
Total		33502									

Review of the Reformed System

Thirty BCS Cadres

It seems clear from Table 3.3 that the reorganised Civil Service is purely the revamped old structure patterned in the old manner. The reorganisation of the Civil Service transferred an ad-hoc structure into a permanent one. Changes made in the Civil Service seem to be peripheral and simply a patchwork. The rigid structure of the Civil Service became more complex and lacks dynamism and adaptability to changing condition. All the old Central Services have been retained (except Geological Survey of Pakistan); Provincial Civil Services merged with the Central Services on the basis of homogeneity of functions; and some new departments have been brought under cadre system. Even the Class II grade employees of some of the departments like Fisheries, Livestock rose to class I position. The specialists and the functionalists were included in the Civil Service. Hence a former Establishment Secretary of the government of Bangladesh (Mr. Shamsul Haque Chisty) clarified the point: "To do away with the previous notion of supremacy over the technical ones (by the members of the CSP and the EPCS), all the services were known as the Bangladesh Civil Service".¹⁷

The Civil Service no longer meant the CSP; it embraced doctors, engineers, veterinary surgeon, and offices of the Postal Department and most of the larger departments. Size of a department was one of the factors for inclusion in the Civil Service.

The new responsibilities imposed on the civil servants after the liberation of Bangladesh required qualitative as well as quantitative changes. Old administrative units had been expanded or restructured and numerous new units had been added to all the tiers of the Government. Qualitatively, new areas of administration called for new and special knowledge and techniques and experiential skills. The reform measures only increased the quantity of the civil servants and diluted the quality of the Civil Service.

The members of the erstwhile Provincial Civil Services who had inferior criteria for selection compared to the former Central Services could now hold the positions in the national Government which they were never given before 1971. With the amalgamation of the Provincial and Central Services the quality of the Civil Servants

¹⁷ Shamsul Haque Chisty, "Career Planning in Bangladesh: Problems and Prospects", in *Career Planning in Bangladesh*, BPATC, Savar, Dhaka, 1986, p. 15.

were diluted. The members of the Provincial Civil Services were inferior to the members of the Central Civil Service with regard to their academic attainment, training and experience as they were not deployed in important positions prior to amalgamation. But the new government in Bangladesh intended to do away with elitism in the Civil Service and bring about egalitarianism in the Civil Service by bringing all the services under the umbrella term 'Civil Service'. In the name of egalitarianism, they diluted the quality of the Civil Service by including the inferior elements in the Civil Service. In the name of egalitarianism and removal of elitism, they developed a system which was supposed to ensure equal promotion prospects for all irrespective of their academic attainments, and attainment in the PSC selection examinations. This policy created a perpetual disincentive for the brighter students who would like to join the Civil Service. With elitism firmly rooted and constantly burgeoning in other spheres of society, they closed the door to those who would have filled the top posts by virtue of their merit, capabilities and performance - not by virtue of birth. Ironically, senior members of the Civil Service remained elite as ever and they were accorded VIP (Very Important Person) status.

Creation of cadres led to compartmentalism, separatism, casteism, clannishness and ascriptiveness with all its bickering, bitterness and infighting. Structure of the Civil Service was so designed that placement of an individual in a particular cadre determines his/her future career prospect. Though it was declared by the Government that all cadres would be equal in terms of pay and promotion, it is clear from Table 3.4 that the rank hierarchy and distribution of posts in different grades were designed in such a way that the most of the cadres did not have grade I post in their cadre structure and the BCS administration cadre and the Foreign Service had maximum senior and top posts in their cadres. Besides, the posts of Secretaries of the Ministries/Divisions were kept out of the cadre structures. In fact, the Administration Cadre, especially the erstwhile CSPs, held these posts. If some one is recruited in the Secretariat Cadre, he could at best go up to the level of Joint Secretary (the third senior most post) as there was no post above Joint Secretary in their cadre structure. This is true for the Cooperative cadre, Food cadre and other cadres too. Though the entrants of different cadres come to the Civil Service through the same system, prospects for promotion, privileges differ from cadre to cadre irrespective of their

academic attainments, rating in the BCS examination, performance in job and training and his/ her potentials.

The newly created cadres are strictly based on functional lines. Each civil servant is recruited to a particular cadre which has its own career structure; his/her membership of that cadre determines his/her prospect and range of jobs on which he may be employed. Each member of the cadre's experience, interest and hopes and fears are limited to the cadre he/she belongs to. Consequently narrow departmentalism and prejudices grow. The Administration Reorganisation Committee of 1982, constituted by the government of General Ershad, identified the narrow departmentalism of the Civil Service as one of the nine major inadequacies of the administrative system of the country¹⁸. The rigid compartmentalisation of service into so many distinct and separate entities each operating within the limitation of its own cadre gave rise to inter-service rivalry. The existence of so many services of generalist character like the Administrative cadre, the Food cadre, the Cooperative cadre, the Secretariat cadre, the Foreign Service cadre (the Diplomatic Service) divides the total work of the Government into water-tight compartments, militates against pooling of resources, encourage mutual jealousies, creates conflicts in many common areas of administration and prevents the maximum use of talents in accordance with aptitudes and emotional pulls. Inter-cadre rivalry reached crescendo during the fall of the Ershad regime in 1990 when one group had been accusing others of blackmailing the Government during times of crisis. Whenever a senior position is filled up on promotion from one cadre, the associations of other cadres which failed to get the post for their members or clans issue a public statement condemning the decision of promotion as unequitable and unjustified.

The organic structure and vertical departmentalisation of most of the cadres along functional lines hinder mobility between cadres. For the sake of mobility nobody sensible would suggest mobility amongst specialists, i.e. between doctors and engineers or between lawyers and doctors. Mobility can only be possible between allied services and the services which do not require specialist qualifications. The functions of the Administrative cadre, Secretariat cadre, Cooperative cadre, and the Food cadre are of generalist nature. There could be only one generalist cadre instead of these four cadres. Amalgamation of generalist cadres would prevent them from demanding senior posts

18 Committee for Administrative Reorganization/ Reform (Chairman: Rear Admiral M. A. Khan), *Report*, Government of Bangladesh, June 1982, p. 53.

on the basis of quota and promotion to senior posts could be made on the basis of merit and performance.

Review of the SSP

After the constitution of SSP for free and open representation from all the cadre services, it seemed that the exclusive right of the ex-members of the CSP to senior appointments would be abolished. The rule for automatic encadrement of the incumbent of the posts of Deputy Secretary and above in the Secretariat provided opportunities to the ex-CSP and ex-EPCS officers to maintain their domination in the SSP as they were already holding the most of the posts in the Secretariat.

Initially the last date for entry into SSP was fixed at 29 December 1979. The date was extended several times and ultimately the last date was fixed 30 January 1985. Without consultation with the PSC government appointed a large number of officers holding the post of Deputy Secretary. In addition, between the years 1980 to 1985 the Government also appointed some officers, including officers from the armed forces, directly to the posts of Joint Secretary. Between the years 1980 to 1985 as many as 370 Deputy Secretaries were encadred in the Pool of which 250 were from ex-EPCS (Admin Service) cadre representing about 68% of the total without consultation with the PSC. The SSP was constituted as an apex cadre which was supposed to consist of highly talented, competent and experienced officers from all services. Automatic encadrement of the incumbents negated the fundamentals of 'Open Structure'. This showed the powerful position of the Administrative cadre officer.

The SSP seniority rules gave rise to considerable controversy so much so that following a representation from various cadres no seniority could be finalised. SSP seniority rules were amended several times. Initially the date of entry into the SSP was taken as the date of seniority in SSP posts. This made the automatically encadred officers senior to those who joined the SSP from other cadres through interview. Many of the officers of other services entering the SSP through interview, who had joined the class I services before their counterparts belonging to the CSP and EPCS cadres, now became junior to the automatically encadred SSP members as the date of automatic encadrement was earlier than the date of entry into the Civil Service through interview. The Government failed to ensure entry of officials of high calibre into the SSP at the level of Deputy Secretary through competitive examination which was supposed to be conducted by the PSC. The Government took as long as 9 years to frame examination rules and syllabus for entry into the SSP. Under the rules framed by the Government,

PSC was required to hold at least one examination for each calendar year. All members of the BCS cadres were eligible, subject to passing of Senior Scale examination, to sit for examination for entry into SSP. The examination proposed to be held involved a total of 1000 marks of which 700 were for written part, 150 for oral test and 150 for ACR. The entry into the SSP continued unabated without examination and through informal network.

The introduction of the SSP dismayed most of the brilliant young officers of different cadres as it did not provide them the career mobility. Various cadres voiced resentments against the SSP between 1980 to 1985 primarily on five counts. First, career blockage in the respective cadres. Second, preponderance of the Administration cadre officers (ex-CSP, ex-EPCS, ex-PML, and ex-CSS officers) in the SSP. Third, SSP did not provide them the higher policy making posts. Fourth, they had hardly any representation in the entry level in the SSP. Fifth, the seniority rule was in favour of the Administrative Service. The members of all other cadres argued that the largest number of posts held in the SSP by the Administrative Service men showed that the SSP had become an exclusive preserve of the members of the Admin cadre. This defeated the purpose of the creation of the SSP for providing equal opportunities to higher policy level posts to all cadres. Some of the technical cadres demanded that the members of the technical cadres should exclusively man the posts of the Secretary of the Technical Ministries. The Secretariat cadre officers demanded that since the Secretariat cadre was created exclusively to man the Secretariat positions, none but the members of this cadre should be allowed to hold the Secretariat posts. The Administrative cadre termed the entry of other cadres in the senior positions in the Secretariat as encroachment in their domain that was graced by the Administrative cadre officers for more than two centuries.

Mid-level and senior level officials had one common minimum demand - the abolition of examination for entry into the SSP. If exams would be held many of their juniors would have superseded them¹⁹.

Admiral Sultan Committee

The demands voiced by the various cadres against the SSP led the Government to constitute in December 1985 a Committee under the chairmanship of Chief of Naval Staff Rear Admiral Sultan to review the composition and structure of the SSP and recommend measures for inclusion of talented officers from various cadres into the

¹⁹ See A.M.M. Shawkat Ali, *Aspects of Public Administration in Bangladesh*, Nikhil Prokashan, Dhaka, pp. 26-29.

SSP. Having regard to the views of 74 service cadre associations/organisations and individuals, Admiral Sultan Committee recommended retention of the SSP as a separate cadre. This Committee made some other recommendations to attract talents towards the SSP. It recommended the entry into the SSP through competitive exam to be conducted by PSC, extensive training for the SSP members and their promotions to higher positions should be based on merit. The Government in principle accepted Admiral Sultan Committee report submitted in August 1986²⁰.

The Matin Committee Report

The Council Committee of Ministers constituted a sub-committee led by a Deputy Prime Minister of Government (Professor Dr. M.A. Matin) to devise strategy for implementation of the Admiral Sultan Committee Report. Initially the Matin Committee accepted the recommendations of the Sultan Committee with minor modifications regarding retention of the SSP. The Council Committee (consisting of Cabinet Ministers) on Senior Appointments and Service Structure approved the recommendations of the Matin Committee with further modifications in October 1987. After discussion with the President of Bangladesh, the Matin Committee reversed their earlier recommendations to which the President formally gave his approval in June 1989. It took the Government nearly three and half years to decide on the recommendations of the Matin Committee. Salient recommendations of the Matin committee are as follows:

- a. In order to resolve the problem of lack of promotion opportunities of various cadres, the SSP should be abolished.
- b. The posts of Joint and Deputy Secretaries should be filled up by promotion on the basis of quota reservation for various cadres.
- c. Consequent upon the abolition of the Pool, all posts of Joint Secretaries and Deputy Secretaries would be deemed to be the posts of the BCS cadres in accordance with the quota allocated to them.
- d. Promotion to the posts of Additional Secretary and Secretary, was kept open for officers both from within and outside the Secretariat²¹.


The recommendations of Matin Committee were implemented with minor modifications except the promotion of posts of Additional Secretary and Secretary. Seemingly the decision made by the government based on the Matin Committee's recommendations ultimately helped the members of the BCS administrative cadre to retain

20 See *ibid.*

21 See *ibid.*

their dominant position in the higher echelons of the governmental hierarchy. Chart 3.2 that follow attempts to highlight the historical growth of the Bangladesh Civil Service.

Chart 3.2
Historical Growth of the Bangladesh Civil Service



Inadequacies of the Matin Committee

One might argue that the assigned task of the Matin Committee was not to suggest measures towards the abolition of the SSP. This Committee was rather assigned to design an appropriate procedure for the implementation of the recommendations of Admiral Sultan Committee that had in effect recommended to retain the SSP. Seemingly the Matin Committee went far beyond its task in recommending the abolition of the SSP. According to this Committee's views, it was not possible to rectify the imbalance that had been existing in promotion opportunities of various cadres without the abolition of the SSP. Reservation of quota up to the level of Joint Secretary was however recommended for rectification of this imbalance. Once this was done there would have been no necessity for the abolition of the Pool. While stressing upon the need for designing a separate procedure for filling up the posts of Additional Secretary and Secretary, the Matin Committee at the same time recommended (a) filling up of such posts by transferring some categories of officers of a certain scale of pay, and (b) throwing open for recruitment to these posts by that same categories of officers through the Council Committee for Senior Appointment and Service Structure. For promotion to the post of Secretary and Additional Secretary, seniority list as per Matin Committee was supposed to be based on length of service. The interpretation about 'length of service' gave rise to confusion. Was it the total length of service or the length of service in particular pay grade? If the length in a certain pay grade was taken as 'length of service', the question of range and quality of experience still remained unanswered.

The quota reservation system for senior posts in the Secretariat for different cadres introduced by the Government based on the Matin committee's recommendations might have been guided by inter-cadre claims for senior posts of in the Secretariat (grade V to grade I). By this the Government intended to satisfy conflicting claims of different cadres for distribution of senior posts of the Secretariat. In this process the principle of merit, the corner stone of an efficient and effective Civil Service, was sacrificed. It appears that the Government wanted to have a representative Secretariat with a view to satisfying the civil servants and not a pool of skilled personnel selected on the basis of merit.

Failure of the Reform Measures

Bureaucratic Resistance

All reforms and reorganization efforts seem to have been viewed with suspicion by the civil servants in most of the newly independent developing countries²². In Bangladesh, the ex-CSP officers have been viewing most of the post-liberation reform measures as downgrading their status, position and power and consequently have orchestrated resistance to frustrate reform implementation. On the other hand, members of the Technical and Functional cadres have time and again been making representations to the reform and reorganization bodies to upgrade their status at par with the generalists. Members of different cadres/services have thus endeavoured to influence the reform process at various stages to promote their narrow sectarian interests. The generalists always could divert the reform measures to their advantage as they dominated in the reform bodies, reform implementing agencies, and worked in close proximity with the politicians and decision-makers in the Government. Failure of the reform measures in this way seems to echo the highly pessimistic theories of Niskanen *et al* that officials will always prefer their own self-interests when these conflict with the interests of the government²³. The SSP was abolished mainly due to pressure of the bureaucrats and the technocrats who were in the senior and the mid-level. The mid-level public servants did not want to sit for any examination for entry into the SSP. The abolition of SSP did not lead to increase of any posts which could lead to the promotion prospects of the civil servants. Then the question arises why the civil servants did move against the SSP. Perhaps they were afraid of their likely failure in the examination. If exams were held, many of the juniors would have superseded their seniors by passing the SSP exam. Their likely failure and supersession by their juniors would have harmed their image in the society and amongst their junior colleagues.

Lack of Political Support

The politicians and political institutions in Bangladesh were never strong enough to see thorough the implementation of the reform measures. The politicians as well as the military generals in state power always depended heavily on the civil bureaucrats. They could implement only that portion of the reform measures which suited the interests of

22 Mohammad Mohabbat Khan, *Bureaucratic Self-Preservation*, Dhaka University, Dhaka, 1980, p.20.

23 William A. Niskanen, *Bureaucracy and Representative Government*, Chicago, 1971.

the civil servants. Any thing that seemed to go against the interest of the civil servants had to be abandoned. Moreover, the next government discredited reforms initiated by the previous government. In most cases the ruling government was not a representative government and they easily yielded to the demands of the pressure groups. Organisational imperatives were sacrificed for the interest of the bureaucrats and the technocrats.

Concluding Observations

The structural defects of the Civil Service in Bangladesh highlighted in the preceding paragraphs speak for restructuring the Civil Service. The existing structure does not provide any incentive to the talented youth. With the abolition of the SSP, chances of junior level civil servants to get promotion to senior posts on the basis of merit seem to have gone. This is not a good signal to a prospective recruit who may like to pursue a civil service career. However, one may still suggest the following two options for restructuring the Civil Service in Bangladesh:

- a. Unified Grading System of the Civil Service similar to that of the US.
- b. Category-based British Civil Service System.

The Public Administration Efficiency Study of the Government of Bangladesh, sponsored by the USAID in 1989, and the UNDP's study of Bangladesh's Administrative System in 1993 strongly recommended 'Unified Grading Structure (UGS)' for the Civil Service in Bangladesh. The Administrative and Services Reorganisation Committee, headed by Professor M.A.Choudhury, also recommended in 1973 the same structural reorganization. However, these studies seemingly did not make any in-depth analyses of the inadequacies of the present structure and did not look for remedies of inadequacies without changing the pattern/type of the Civil Service. They even did not show the comparative advantages of the US type of Civil Service over the British type.

The proponents of the UGS think that it is a panacea to all the administrative problems of Bangladesh and the inadequacies of the Civil Service. These reports were not based on fundamental research; they were mere reports of the consultants most of whom were

US-educated academics ~~coming in the universities in~~ Bangladesh and the USA. They did not have adequate in-depth knowledge of the administrative system of the country. Highly efficient and specialised systems of education seem to be the prerequisites for a Unified Grading Structure. The stratification of the Unified Grading Structure is most often correlated and partly defined in terms of knowledge, experience, and skills covering a wide range of educational attainments. Implementation of the UGS in the Civil Service must be preceded by a reform of education in Bangladesh. The present system of education cannot provide necessary input to the UGS type of Civil Service Structure. In Bangladesh, the education system is generalist biased. All attempts to reform the educational system in the past were violently rejected by the students and the governments were rocked. This point has to be borne in mind before making any effort to bring about any reforms. Moreover, the Career Civil Service System of Britain is not doing any bad. Problem may not lie with the pattern of Civil Service; problem may be in the system of its career management or somewhere else.

The Civil Service in Bangladesh has similarities with the British Civil Service. Besides, its government is Westminster type; education is patterned on the British model; and there are similarities in administrative laws and rules. The Government of India Act of 1935 has been adopted in Bangladesh with minor modifications. If the British model is adopted, no major adjustment in the Civil Service will be required. Therefore, Bangladesh should go for a British type of Civil Service and modify it to make adaptable to needs of the country.

The existing generalist cadres, i.e., the Administration, Food, Cooperative, and Secretariat, perform generalist functions and they do not need any specialized education like doctors and engineers to join the respective specialist cadres. These four generalist cadres may be combined to form a Management cadre for maximum use of talents in accordance with aptitudes and emotional pulls of the members of the cadres. Amalgamation of these generalist cadres will facilitate better promotion prospect for talented officers, remove jealousy and conflict amongst generalist cadres. This will also increase mobility of the officers of all these generalist cadres.

If the principle of the open-structure of the British Civil Service could be applied fully in the Civil Service of Bangladesh, talented people will have the chance to fill up the

senior posts. In the United States, open-structure in the name of Senior Executive Service (SES) was introduced. Recent studies of the SES in the U.S. indicate that 'despite the problems of the initial years, when the SES is judged against the objectives set forth at the time the system was proposed to Congress, when viewed from the perspectives of years of operation, the argument can be made that the SES is a successful personnel system'²⁴. Australia, Sweden and New Zealand also adopted much of the structural features of 'SES' for senior positions of their Civil Services. The British Open-Structure and the SES of the developed countries are purely based on merit. The British Open Structure and the 'SES' have improved the efficiency of the Civil Service in these countries as only the high achieving individuals could enter into the SES.

In concluding this chapter, it is suggested that a separate structure for the senior positions, i.e., the grade III, II and I posts, which are empowered to take decisions may be formed in Bangladesh along the same lines of the British Open Structure, the Senior Executive Service of the U.S., Australia and New Zealand. This suggested structure might be termed Senior Executive Service (SES) which will be the apex cadre. Entry to the Senior Executive Service will be through competitive examination, ratings of Annual Confidential Reports of last 5 years, ratings in training programmes, and overall position in the entry exam of the Public Service Commission and academic institutions. This will ensure career advancement of the brighter and efficient ones and thus lead to increase in efficiency of the Civil Service. Members of the organised cadres will have the right to enter the Senior Executive service. Entry will be strictly at the level of grade IV. Deputy Secretaries and officers of grade V of different cadres with minimum 15 years of class I service will be eligible to sit for the examination for entry into the SES. The sitting Joint Secretaries will also have to sit for some sort of tests conducted by the PSC to enter into the SES. Each candidate may be given three chances in consecutive three years to qualify in the exam. Persons who want to avoid the exam and who fail to qualify in the exam will be given option either to retire with extra financial benefit or remain in the same rank. Top and some of the senior positions of the different departments and parastatals will be reserved for the SES. This will

24 Kirke Harper, "The Senior Executive Service After One Decade", in Patricia W. Ingraham and David H. Rosenbloom, eds., *The Promise and Paradox of the Civil Service Reform*, University of Pittsburgh Press, London, 1992, p. 267.

enhance the career prospect of the members of the SES. The incumbent Additional Secretaries and Secretaries will be automatically encadred into the Open Structure. No competitive exam will be held for entry into the SES at the level of Joint Secretary after all the sitting Joint Secretaries will retire from the government service.

Chapter IV

SURVEY OF OPINIONS OF UNIVERSITY STUDENTS ON CAREER CHOICE

Introduction

Indications have it that the Civil Service in Bangladesh has lost much of its traditional public image since the country achieved independence in 1971. The attractiveness of a civil service career to the best and the brightest has substantially been diminished. The Civil Service has increasingly been manned mostly by the mediocrities. Thus, the resultant development is the decline of the overall efficiency level of the civil servants¹. A survey carried out by the Pay and Services Commission (Rashid Commission) in 1976 with the help of the Institute of Statistical Research and Training of Dhaka University among the final year honours and masters students of the universities revealed that the best and the brightest were no longer attracted to civil service career. Most of them either opted to join university-teaching positions or planned to leave country to pursue higher studies abroad². According to a view expressed in a newspaper article by a university vice-chancellor in Bangladesh, 'Highly bright students no longer apply for the Civil Service and most of the meritorious students are leaving the country'³.

The Ministry of Establishment of the Bangladesh Government organised a conference called 'Senior Officials Strategy Conference on Human Resource Management' in April 1988 under the sponsorship of the Overseas Development Administration of England. The Institute of Manpower Studies (IMS) of Sussex (UK) and the British Council in Dhaka conducted the proceedings of this Conference. The IMS Team interviewed the

¹ To confirm this image crisis of the Civil Service, see Syed Giasuddin Ahmed, *The Image of Public Service in Bangladesh*, Centre for Administrative Studies, University of Dhaka, Dhaka, 1975; Syed Giasuddin Ahmed, "Student Attitude Towards Public Service and Public Employees", *The Dhaka University Studies*, vol. xxiv, 1978, pp. 189-204; UNDP (United Nations Development Programme), *Report on the Public Administration Sector Study in Bangladesh*, Dhaka, pp. 38-51; The World Bank, *Bangladesh: The Government that Works*, Dhaka, 1996, pp. 110-111.

² Pay and Services Commission (Rashid Commission), Government of Bangladesh, Report, Part I - *The Services*, vol. 1, 1977, p. 61.

³ Zillur Rahman Siddique, "Bureaucracy", *The Daily Sangbad*, 15 July 1990.

top officials and experts on public administration of Bangladesh prior to the holding of the Conference. The author of this thesis was working at that time as a Deputy Secretary in the Ministry of Establishment and in that capacity he was assigned to act as the local counterpart of the IMS Team. He accompanied the IMS Team members while they were interviewing the top officials to ascertain their views on different aspects of the Civil Service. Key Permanent Secretaries of the Government of Bangladesh; Bangladeshi experts on public administration (including Professor Syed Giasuddin Ahmed of Dhaka University); Chairman of the Bangladesh Public Service Commission and the IMS experts participated in that Conference. This author interviewed about 100 university students through unstructured questionnaires to ascertain their career choice about the same time the Conference was being held. The responses revealed that most of the bright students were unwilling to join the Civil Service. The finding as such was used as a topic of discussions in the Conference. Besides, the Permanent Secretaries and others participating in the Conference also expressed the view that good quality people were not attracted to the Civil Service⁴. According to them, poor career prospect, unattractive pay packages, and the diminishing image of the Civil Service were the causes of unwillingness of the brighter students to join the Civil Service.

An attempt is made in this Chapter to probe the causes of unwillingness of the university students to join the Civil Service as well as the factors that influence the career choice of the prospective civil servants, i.e. the bright university students. A survey research was conducted to this end during the months of 1990 among the bright students of three selected universities and a medical college in Bangladesh. One duly designed questionnaire was administered under this survey to ascertain:

- a. What is the rationale behind the career choice of bright students?
- b. If most of the bright students are unwilling to join the Civil Service, what are the causes of their unwillingness?
- d. Why some students like to join the Civil Services?
- e. Why students want to go abroad?
- f. Professions of parents/guardians of students who want to join the Civil Service.

Naturally a question might arise as to: Who should to be considered a bright student? The Pay and Services Commission of 1976 (i.e., The Rashid Commission)

4 Institute of Manpower Studies, *Report on Organisational Manpower Planning in the BCS, IMS, Sussex, UK, 1988*, p. 33.

defined those as 'bright students who had not obtained a third division/class in any examination'⁵. Following the same criterion the Government of Bangladesh also seems to have been considering those officers as meritorious who obtained minimum one first division/class in their academic career and generally the officers of this category were sent abroad for postgraduate degrees. Hence the criterion of having at least one first division/class in their academic career has been chosen to define bright students in this survey. This survey is directly linked with the hypothesis that poor career management like poor career prospect and low pay may serve as disincentive to most of the brilliant students to join the Bangladesh Civil Service (BCS).

Size of Population and Survey Sample

The survey population included the bright students of one general university, namely the University of Dhaka (the largest amongst the existing five general universities in the country); Bangladesh University of Engineering and Technology (BUET), the only technical university located in Dhaka; Bangladesh Agricultural University (BAU), the lone agricultural university located in Mymensingh; and one medical college, namely Dhaka Medical College, of a dozen of medical colleges existing in the country. Two specific reasons may be indicated as to why these four particular institutions were selected for this survey. First and foremost, the very located of the three institutions (i.e., Dhaka University, BUET. and Dhaka Medical College) in Dhaka were thought to be most convenient for the conduct of this survey. Second, according to reports received from the Bangladesh Public Service Commission (BPSC), mostly the graduates of these four institutions have been successful in the civil competitive examinations held since 1977.

Only those bright students were planned to be targeted who had been studying in the three-year Honours final and one-year Masters final classes at DU, four-year B.Eng. final classes at BUET, four-year B.Agr. final and one-year M.Agr. final classes at BAU, and the four-year MBBS final classes at Dhaka Medical College. In 1990, when the survey was conducted, as many as 1984 bright students were found enrolled in the final classes at these four institutions. The survey was designed to target 1500 bright students of this number (i.e., 1984) belonging to seven broad areas of academic discipline. Accordingly, these 1500 students were selected randomly and the copies of questionnaire designed for the purpose

5 Rashid Commission, op. cit., p. 51.

were distributed among these 1500 students. But, in response to 1500 questionnaires, only 463 students were found to have responded from different institutions. And out of these 463 only questionnaires were found to be complete in all respects. Hence the final sample of this survey comprised of these 330 students. See Table IV.1 for the distribution of population and sample students. Table IV.2 also shown the distribution of bright students by division/class.

Table IV.1

Distribution of Population and Survey Sample by Academic Disciplines

Discipline	Population	Sample	Questionnaire Distributed
Science	481	77(16%)	364
Social Science	525	84(16%)	397
Arts	269	43(16%)	203
Commerce	425	68(16%)	321
Engineering	97	20(20.6%)	73
Medical	85	19(22.4%)	64
Agriculture	102	19(18.6%)	78
Total	1984	330(16.6%)	1500

Table IV.2

Distribution of Bright Students by Division/Class Obtained

Number of 1st Divisions Attained During Academic Career	Population	Sample
One 1st Division/Class	539	87 (16.1%)
Two 1st Divisions/Class	1074	178 (16.6%)
Three 1st Divisions/Class	371	65 (17.5%)
Total	1984	330

It should be noted, however, that the students of such academic departments as Pharmacy, Biochemistry, Geology, Computer Studies, Architecture and Urban Planning, Electronics, Demography, and Chemical Engineering, were not included in the sample. Similarly, the students of the Institute of Leather Technology, Institute of Textile Technology,

Metallurgy, and so on, were also excluded. Because not many students of these academic backgrounds were reported to have joined the Civil Service until 1990⁶. The teachers of these departments/institutes also confirmed it that hardly any of their students joined the Civil Service. The graduates of these subjects have demand both in the private sector and the overseas market. Moreover, the academic departments such as Arabic, Sanskrit, Botany, Soil Science, and Veterinary Sciences, etc hardly got students with first division/class. The students of these departments were also not included in the survey.

However, prior to the distribution of 1500 questionnaires, about 100 questionnaires were distributed among the same number of students to pre-test the questionnaire. In response some of the respondents observed that certain terms used in the questionnaire, i.e., the reward, career prospect, civil service image, and parents' professional backgrounds were not very clear to them and they had different interpretations for these terms. To make the questionnaire intelligible and clear to the respondents a sheet of guidelines in Bengali language was supplied with every questionnaire explaining the background of the survey; purpose of the survey and the terminologies, i.e. career prospect, reward, image, and parents' professions used in the questionnaire. The text of questionnaire and the guidelines thereto are furnished in Appendix IV.1 of this thesis. In most cases the respondents were given detailed briefing on the questionnaire directly by this researcher in their respective classrooms. At times their teachers and this author's research aides also briefed the students about the purpose of the questionnaire.

Methodology of Survey Data Analysis

The persons for and against joining the Civil Service have been termed as 'Civil Service' and 'Noncivil Service' groups, respectively. More specifically, the services, employment and self-employment in the non-civil service category have been termed as 'Noncivil Service' for the purpose of this study to distinguish between the persons who opt for Civil Service and who would not opt for Civil Service. Factors which have been analysed here are based on priori grouping of responses; not on statistical factors.

Bivariate Analysis: To determine which of the factors influence the choice of career among bright students in the study population, the percentage of bright students for and against joining the Civil Service has been analysed by categories of several independent variables. Although examination of percentages analysis is a useful first step in studying

6 Bangladesh Public Service Commission (BPSC), *Annual Report 1990*, Dhaka, 1991, p. 19.

the relationship between two variables, these percentages do not allow for quantification or testing of that relationship. For these purposes, it is useful to consider various indexes that measure the extent of association as well as statistical test of the hypothesis that there is no association. Chi-square test of independence is performed to test the existence of interrelationship among the categories of two qualitative variables and Mann-Whitney U tests have been carried out for the variables that can be quantified.

Multivariate Analysis: Examination of each independent variable individually can provide a preliminary idea of how important each variable is by itself. The relative importance of all the variables has to be examined simultaneously by some multivariate methods. There are a variety of multivariate techniques that can be used to predict a binary dependent variable from a set of independent variables. Multiple regression analysis and discriminant analysis are two related techniques that quickly come to mind. However, these techniques pose difficulties when the dependent variables can have only two values - an event occurring or not occurring. When the dependent variables can have only two values, the assumption necessary for hypothesis testing in regression analysis are violated.

An interesting method that does not require any distributional assumptions concerning explanatory variables is Cox's (1970) linear logistic regression model⁷. This model can be successfully used in the field of discriminant analysis. The logistic regression model can be used not only to identify risk factors but also to predict the probability of success. The general logistic model expresses a qualitative dependent variable as a function of several independent variables, both qualitative and quantitative (Fox, 1984). This model has been used here for multivariate analysis. Details of this method are included in Appendix IV.2. This model includes the choice of a career as the dependent variable which is a binary response variable having assigned '1' for 'not choosing Civil Service as a career' and '0' for 'choosing a Civil Service as a career'.

SURVEY FINDINGS

Complete responses of the 330 sample respondents were received from the following universities/college: (1) Dhaka University - 272; (2) Engineering University - 20; (3) Medical College - 19; and (4) Agricultural University - 19.

Frequency of Response by Institution: P value (significance .0000) of the statistical analysis indicates that there is an association between the institution of the respondents

⁷ See D. R. Cox, *Analysis of Binary Data*, Methuen, London, 1970.

and their choice of a career. It is seen that out of 330 students 64.2%, i.e. most of the bright students are not willing to join the Civil Service. It is evident from the analysis that 68.4% (85/272) of the respondents of Dhaka University, 95.2% (1/20) of the students of the Engineering University, 25.0% (4/190) of the respondents of Medical College, 15% (2/19) of the respondents of the Agriculture University are unwilling to join the Civil Service.

There seems to be good rationale behind this unwillingness of the students to join the Civil Service. Amongst the professionals, engineers have high demand in the Middle East. Besides, the Engineers have very limited scope to go the top posts in the Civil Service. Medical students seem to be less unwilling to join the Civil Service as the medical facilities are expanding fast in the country and the Government is recruiting doctors more in number as compared to others. The biggest attraction of the doctors to the Civil Service is the opportunity given to them by the Government to engage in private practice after office hours. After employment in the Civil Service as doctors, they can claim all the benefits due to the civil servants and at the same time engage in private practice. At times they even use the implements of the Government Hospital. The agriculture graduates are more willing to join the Civil Service as there is hardly any demand of agriculture graduates in the labour market outside the Civil Service. This supports the findings of the PSC that the Agriculture graduates are more inclined to join the Civil Service compared to the students of other disciplines⁸.

Frequency of Response by Academic Faculty: Frequency of response by faculty shows that P value (.000) indicates that the subjects studied in the university has a significant bearing on choice whether a student is going to join the Civil Service or not. 60/77 of Science Faculty, 47/84 of Social Science, 23/43 out of 43 of Arts, 57/68 of Commerce, 19/20 out of Engineering, 4/19 of Medical College, 2/19 of Agriculture University are unwilling to join the Civil service.

Relationship between Level of Merit and Reluctance to Join the Civil Service: 'P' value of .00001 indicates that Number of first⁹ divisions attained by the respondents and relationship between level of merit and reluctance/ willingness to join the Civil Service is shown positively correlated, i.e. there is highly significant relationship between the level

8 BPS, *Annual Report 1989*, Dhaka, 1990, p. 14.

9 Method of determination of First Division. First division is decided on the basis of average marks obtained in all the subjects; first division is not given to any particular subject.

of merit and percentage of people who are reluctant to join the Civil Service. Out of 330 students with one or more first divisions; 43 (49.4%) out of 87 with only one first division in their academic career; 112 (62.9%) out of 178 with double first division in their academic career; and 57 (87.7%) out of 65 with triple first division in their academic career are unwilling to join the Civil Service.

It can be mentioned here that the above statements of having first Division in academic career by respondents does not give the final picture of the result of the students. Of the students who were in Final year Honours or Final year Masters, if the results of their final exams could be obtained, the percentage of number of first division holders would certainly be more. Even for the Civil Service, the picture of educational attainment is not representative of the whole of the Civil Service. Except the three engineering BCS cadres and one health BCS cadre, the standard of educational attainment of other BCS cadres is hardly average.

If the percentage of first division obtained by the students willing to join the Civil Service is compared with that of the members of the above four cadres, one can see that there is some difference in the academic standards between the two groups. The civil servants put forward the argument that the standard of education had sharply fallen after the independence of Bangladesh so the higher percentage of intending candidates does not at all indicate brilliance of the students. Neither the syllabi of different courses nor the marking system and minimum marks for classifying 1st/2nd/ 3rd class in examination papers have been lowered after the independence of Bangladesh. The myth about declining standard of education had been existing since the early fifties. In the fifties, sixties and in late sixties, scholars had been complaining about the lower standard of education¹⁰. It is further said that that the quality of education in Bangladesh's educational institutions is low and still there is much to be done for improving it¹¹.

In 1988, a survey was conducted by the BPSC amongst the oral examiners of the Civil Service Entry Examination through structured questionnaire. Regarding the general

10 The Central Public Service Commission, *Examiner's Report on the Central Superior Services Examination*, Government of Pakistan, Karachi, 1962, pp. 17-19, as quoted in Ali Ahmed, *The Role of Higher Civil Servants in Pakistan*, NIPA, Dhaka, 1968, p. 310.

11 *Ibid*, p. 312.

standard of the examinees, 31 (34%) opined that the candidates were of lower standard, 60 (66%) rated the candidates 'average', and none of the examiners assessed the candidates as of higher quality/standard. 60 (66%) of the examiners opined that the standard of education was low and according to 31 (34%) of the examiners, standard of the education was average. None of the examiners termed the standard of education of the candidates of higher quality¹².

Active involvement of the students in national politics and their participation in terrorist activities, vandalism and occasional gun-battles between the students destroyed the educational environment in Bangladesh. The major political parties are having political student fronts and armed cadre (private army). The universities could not run the courses as per schedule due to student violence¹³.

Lowering down of standard of English and introduction of courses in colleges and universities in vernacular language (Bangla) contributed to the overall decline in standard of examination to a great extent. The Annual Report of the PSC for the year 1990 also identified poor knowledge of English of the students as one of the main causes of decline in the standards of education¹⁴. Besides the causes of decline in educational standard cited above, the students themselves vitiated the academic atmosphere of the highest seat of learning by vandalism and hooliganism¹⁵. Needless to say here that the situation in Rajshahi University, Chittagong University and Mymensingh Agriculture University is no better than that of Dhaka University. A rough idea can be formed about the quality of officers of four BCS cadres under study from Table IV.3.

12 Bangladesh Public Service Commission (BPSC), *The Annual Report 1990*, Dhaka, 1991, pp. 29-30.

13 The Dhaka University remained closed for 451 days during the period between 1972 and 1991 for situation arising out of vandalism/terrorist activities; see *The Weekly Holiday*, 31 January - 6 February, 1992.

14 BPSC, *The Annual Report 1990*, Dhaka, 1991, p. 30.

15 Thirty-three persons died in gun battle and clashes between rival student group in the Dhaka University between 1971 and 1990, *The Daily Ajker Kagoj*, 18 July, 1992.

Table IV.3

Comparison Between Percentages of 1st Division/ 1st Class Holders in Cadres Under Study and Intending Candidates

Members of Cadres/ Students Willing to Join the Civil Service	Details of 1st Division/ Class Holders		
	Only One	Only Two	Only Three
Admin	39.40%	14.30%	3.00%
Secretariat	34.75%	13.75%	2.60%
Agriculture*	29.75%	6.00 %	7.00%
Public Works*	90.00%	65.00%	40.00%

* Generally the better students study medicine, engineering, economics, and MBA. Other subjects do not attract the better students that much. During the last fifteen years, no students with less than two first divisions in SSC/ HSC (GCSE/A level) were admitted into Medical College, or Engineering University.

Table IV.4 shows a great variation in respect of the respondents' career choices. This table identifies about twelve broad professional areas to which the respondents indicated their choices. However, it must be stated here that these professional areas should not be considered to be exhaustive.

Table IV.4

Career Chosen by Respondents

Sl.	Career	Frequency	Percent
(a)	(b)	(c)	(d)
1.	Civil Service	105	31.8
2.	Private enterprise	45	13.6
3.	Self-employment	21	6.4
4.	Teaching	60	18.2
5.	Multi-national companies	20	6.1
6.	Autonomous bodies	1	0.3
7.	Research	11	3.3
8.	Relevant to education	22	6.7
9.	Overseas job	4	1.2
10.	Particular cadres ¹⁶	13	3.9
11.	Non-cadre government jobs	2	0.6
12.	Other jobs (Politics, Social Work, Legal profession)	26	7.9
Total		330	100.0

¹⁶ There are 30 cadres in the Bangladesh Civil Service. All the cadres do not have the similar career prospects and attractions. Some of the respondents opined that they would join the Civil Service if they get the Cadre of their choice, i.e., Foreign Service, Secretariat Service, Customs, Administrative Cadre etc. Choice of cadre does not depend on individual choice, merit position, and quota for the district and different groups and number of vacancies play most important role in placement of an individual in a particular cadre. However, the respondents who opined that they would join the Civil Service if they get the cadre of their have been considered 'Willing to join the Civil service' in this survey.

Lesser number of choices for careers in the Government jobs (2), i.e., the posts not included in the Civil Service cadres, and for positions in Autonomous Bodies (1) indicate that the posts/positions as such much insignificantly attractive to the respondents. It can be mentioned here that in some Government departments, e.g., Department of Social Welfare, Labour and Manpower Departments, where managerial positions are filled 'on the basis of position concept' and each and every position requires specific qualifications. Generally the jobs in this type of departments have restricted upward mobility and hardly any lateral mobility. Senior and top posts of departments are filled up from the secondees who are the members of the BCS cadres. Employment in these departments, which have restricted mobility, does not attract good quality recruits for its managerial positions. Autonomous Bodies, which are specialist biased like Power Development Board; Water Development Board; Bangladesh Oil, Gas and Minerals Corporation, provide good career prospect to engineers. Even in these corporations members of the BCS cadres hold senior and top positions very often. Hence the lesser choice for the parastatals as career. Very few respondents opted for overseas job (4). It is assumed that only those respondents who were more to get overseas jobs chose overseas jobs as their future careers. It is extremely difficult to get overseas job straightaway after passing examinations. Only those who have relations in the Middle Eastern countries can get jobs directly through their relations.

BIVARIATE ANALYSIS OF REASONS FOR CAREER CHOICE

Respondents gave as many as 22 types of reasons for their career choice. The erratic, evasive response or peculiar responses, which are too few in number, have been grouped as other reasons and nonresponse had been categorised as 'reasons not mentioned'. Some of the reasons are similar in meanings, interpretations. As the analysis of all the reasons will not be of any value, responses which have same, similar meaning and interpretation have been regrouped as broad categories of responses. 53/118 (44.9%) of the students who chose Civil Service and 35/212 (16.5%) of the students who would not join the Civil Service stated that they would choose a particular service for 'serving the nation'. For the Civil Service group, 'Serve Nation` reason for choice of career is the most important factor. 'Service to Nation' is not confined within the Civil Service only. In a sceptic society like Bangladesh, this reason may not have any credibility. However, if other reasons seem to influence them less to choose the Civil Service career then this factor for choice may be accepted. Chi-square test shows that there is association between the choice of career of the students for 'Service to Nation' factor.

The statistically significant reasons can be regrouped into a broader group according to similarity of meaning as shown below:

- a. *Money factor*: In a developing country, official power of an individual provides him with the scope of exploiting his position to his personal gains. Privileges can always be understood in monetary terms, e.g. full time transport, good Government accommodation, free telephone, and station of posting.' Higher Pay'; 'Power'; 'Privileges'; 'Scope to Earn Money' can be regrouped/ recorded as MONEY FACTOR' (code 25). This seems to be the main factor behind career choice.
- b. *Honour Factor*: Some responses, which are directly related to honour of a career, has been grouped and recoded as a single factor. 'Prestige'; 'Valued by Society'; 'Noble Job'; and ' Honourable Job' can be combined to form 'Honour FACTOR' and recoded as code 26.
- c. *Recognition Factor*: Some of the responses are directly related to recognition of the performance, sincerity and merit of individuals. 'Recognition of Merit'; and 'Performance Rewarded' can be regrouped as 'RECOGNITION FACTOR (new code 27)'.
'Performance Rewarded'
- d. *Aptitude Factor*: Responses which are related to aptitude, e.g. 'Suits Aptitude'; 'Suits Temperament'; 'Independence'; 'Not Transferable'; 'City Based'; 'Choice of Parents' etc can be interpreted in broader terms as aptitude and can be regrouped/recoded as APTITUDE FACTOR (new code 28).
- e. *Career Factor*: Career prospect can be renamed as Career Factor (29) for analysis separately;
- f. *Job Security*: Job security can be analysed as JOB SECURITY FACTOR separate factor (new code 30).
- g. *Other Factors*: Other reasons and reasons not mentioned can be regrouped as 'OTHER FACTORS (new code 31'. This will not be analysed here as result of this factor will not help in drawing any conclusions.

Money Factor: Responses regarding the choice of a career for money factor are shown in Table IV.5.

Table IV.5

Choice for Money Factor

Reasons for Choice of Career	Chosen Career				Total		Chi-Square Value	DF	P Value
	Civil Service		Non-civil Service		Cases	Percent			
	cases	percent	cases	percent					
(a)	(b)	(c)	(d)	(e)	(f)	(g)	(h)	(i)	(j)
Money Factor							16.76177	1	.00004
No	98	83.1	130	61.3	228	69.1			
Yes	20	16.9	82	38.7	102	30.9			
Total	118	100.0	212	100.0	330	100.0			

38.7% of the noncivil service group and 16.9% of the Civil Service group would like to choose a career for money factor. P value indicates that there is positive association between a choice of a career and money factor. This seems to be the main factor behind career choice. In support of this, following facts can be presented from an official document:

Career choice may also be distorted by some attractive scopes but unsuitable to one's abilities and aptitudes. One illuminating example may be cited as to the higher number of options to jobs in Customs Departments or Income Tax Department due to financial reasons. In such cases good students, instead of choosing profession of his choice he is forced to select types of jobs which are contradictory to their abilities and aptitudes.¹⁷

Reference to 'financial reasons' in the above quotation is actually made to the tendency of earning through bribery of most of the Customs and Income Tax Officers. It should be noted here that during the twenty-four years of Pakistan's united existence until 1971, none of the first 40 successful candidates in the Civil Service exams ever opted for Customs and Taxation Services. But in Bangladesh four candidates who stood first in BCS exams opted for either Customs or Taxation cadres. It can be mentioned here that promotion or pay package in these two cadres is like those of the other cadres.

¹⁷ Fasih Uddin Mahtab, *Career Planning in Bangladesh*, BPATC, Savar, Dhaka, 1986, p. 129.

Honour Factor: Responses regarding the choice of such a career that would provide honour to the respondents are shown in table IV.6.

Table IV.6

Choice of Career for Honour Factor

Reasons for Choice of Career	Chosen Career				Total		Chi-Square Value	DF	P Value
	Civil Service		Non-civil Service		Cases	Percent			
	cases	percent	cases	percent					
(a)	(b)	(c)	(d)	(e)	(f)	(g)	(h)	(i)	(j)
Honour Factor							9.63505	1	.00091
No	77	65.3	171	80.7	248	75.1			
Yes	41	34.7	41	19.3	82	24.6			
Total	118	100.0	212	100.0	330	100.0			

19.3% of the noncivil service group and 34.7% of the Civil Service group would like to choose a career which is honoured, valued, or revered by the society. P value indicates that there is association between a choice of a career and honour given to that career by the society. 86 respondents who would like to pursue a career in the Civil Service gave 152 reasons. Some of them gave only one reason, and some gave two. 31% and 21.7% of the respondents want to join the Civil Service because of `serve nation` and `honour` factors respectively. The respondents of a BPATC study amongst Administrative, Public Works, and Police cadres gave similar reasons for their choice of Civil Service as a career. In two surveys carried out amongst the new entrants and those affected by the career blockage, it was found that 41.2% of the new entrants and 54.9% of the Civil Servants, who are affected by career blockages, joined the Civil Service for status.

Recognition Factor: Responses regarding the choice of such a career that would provide recognition to the individuals are showed in table IV.7.

Table IV.7

Choice of a Career for Recognition Factor

Reasons for Choice of Career	Chosen Career				Total		Chi-Square Value	DF	P Value
	Civil Service		Non-civil Service		Cases	Percent			
	cases	percent	cases	percent					
(a)	(b)	(c)	(d)	(e)	(f)	(g)	(h)	(i)	(j)
Honour Factor							2.73468	1	.09819
No	112	94.9	190	89.6	302	91.5			
Yes	6	5.1	22	10.4	28	8.5			
Total	118	100.0	212	100.0	330	100.0			

10.4% (22 out of 212) of the noncivil service group and 5.1% (6 out of 112) of the Civil Service group would like to choose a career which gives recognition to performance, sincerity and merit. P value indicates that there is association between the choice of a career and recognition given by that career to the incumbents. Responses regarding the choice of such a career that would suit aptitude of the respondents are shown in table IV.8.

Table IV.8

Choice of a Career for Aptitude Factor

Reasons for Choice of Career	Chosen Career				Total		Chi-Square Value	DF	P Value
	Civil Service		Non-civil Service		Cases	Percent			
	cases	percent	cases	percent					
(a)	(b)	(c)	(d)	(e)	(f)	(g)	(h)	(i)	(j)
Honour Factor							23.95433	1	.00000
No	89	75.4	101	47.6	190	57.6			
Yes	29	24.6	111	52.4	140	42.4			
Total	118	100.0	212	100.0	330	100.0			

Aptitude Factor: 26.3% of the Civil Service group and 52.4% of the noncivil service group would like to choose a career which suits aptitude of the respondents. P value indicates that there is positive association between a choice of career and aptitude of the respondents.

Reasons for Reluctance to Join Civil Service

In question number 1, respondents were asked to reply which career they would like to pursue after their final examinations. Those who did not like to join the Civil Service were asked to give the reasons for their reluctance to join the Civil Service. Since the pro-Civil Service group did not respond to the question of reluctance, their response was nil. Respondents gave as many as 15 types of reasons for reluctance to join the Civil Service. The erratic, evasive response or peculiar responses that are too few in number have been grouped as other reasons and nonresponse had been categorised as 'reasons not mentioned'. Some of the reasons are similar in meanings, and interpretations. As the analysis of all the reasons will not be of any value, findings of the bivariate analysis has been summarised in the following tables from which broad categories of responses will be picked out for thorough analysis.

Many of the reasons are similar in character and meaning. These similar reasons have been regrouped. With a view to keeping consistency with reasons for choice, some of the causes of reluctance have been renamed, e.g. MONEY FACTOR for money. These factors have been decided on priori group of responses; not on statistical factors. Regrouped/ recorded/ renamed factors that discourage students to join the Civil Service is shown below:

- a. 16 (New Code)= 1(Poor pay)= MONEY FACTOR
- b. 17 (New Code)= 3(Poor image)= HONOUR FACTOR
- c. 8 (New Code)= 5 (Merit not recognised) + 12 (Performance/ Sincerity not recognised) = RECOGNITION FACTOR
- d. 19 (New Code) = 4 (Chance of getting corrupt) + 6 (Transferable) + 7 (Bad working environment) + 8 (No aptitude) + 9 (Not related to own specialisation) + 11 (No independence) + 10 (No cadre for Scientists) = APTITUDE FACTOR
- e. 20 (New Code) = 15 (Lengthy Selection procedure) = LENGTHY SELECTION
- f. 21 (New Code) = 21(Poor promotion) = CAREER FACTOR
- g. 22 (New Code)= 13 (Other reasons) + 14 (Reasons not mentioned)= OTHER FACTOR

Responses for reluctance to join the Civil Service for aptitude factor are shown in the table IV.9.

Table IV.9

Reluctance to Join the Civil Service for Aptitude Factor

Causes Of Reluctance to Join The Civil Service	Cases	Percent
(a)	(b)	(c)
Aptitude Factor		
No	110	51.9
Yes	102	48.1
Total	212	100.0

The above table shows that 48.11% (102 out of 212) of the respondents are reluctant to join the Civil Service for aptitude factor. This is the number one cause of reluctance of the bright students to join the Civil Service. No body seems to have said any thing about the influence of 'Aptitude Factor' on career choice though aptitude plays a major role in career choice.

Responses for reluctance to join the Civil Service for money factor are shown in the table IV.10.

Table IV.10

Reluctance to Join the Civil Service for Monetary Factor

Causes Of Reluctance to Join The Civil Service	Cases	Percent
(a)	(b)	(c)
Money Factor		
No	118	55.7
Yes	94	44.3
Total	212	100.0

In the above table, it is seen that 44.34% (94 out of 212) of the respondents are reluctant to join the Civil Service for money factor. This finding indicates that many bright students do not want to join the Civil Service for low pay in the Civil Service. It is the second most important factor that discourages the bright students to join the Civil Service.

Responses for reluctance to join the Civil Service for career factor (poor promotion prospect) are shown in the table IV.11.

Table IV.11

Reluctance to Join the Civil Service for Poor Promotion Prospect

Causes of Reluctance to Join Civil Service	Cases	Percent
(a)	(b)	(c)
Career Factor		
No	166	78.3
Yes	46	21.7
Total	212	100.0

From the above table it is clear that 21.70% (46 out of 212) of the respondents are reluctant to join the Civil Service for poor career prospect in the Civil Service. This seems to be the third most important factor for not choosing the Civil Service career.

Responses for reluctance to join the Civil Service for honour factor are shown in the table IV.12.

Table IV.12

Reluctance to Join the Civil Service for Honour Factor

Causes of Reluctance to Join the Civil Service	Cases	Percent
(a)	(b)	(c)
Honour Factor		
No	174	82.1
Yes	38	17.9
Total	212	100.0

From the above table it is clear that 17.93% (38 out of 212) of the respondents are reluctant to join the Civil Service for honour factor. This finding supports the prevalent view that the civil servants and the Civil Service are not accorded proper honour and respect by the society as they were earlier. This is the fourth factor that discourages the bright students to join the Civil Service.

Responses for reluctance to join the Civil Service for recognition factor are shown in the table IV.13.

Table IV.13

Reluctance to Join the Civil Service as Merit is not recognised

Causes of Reluctance to join Civil Service	Cases	Percent
(a)	(b)	(c)
Recognition Factor		
No	192	90.6
Yes	20	9.4
Total	212	100.0

Table IV.13 shows that 9.44% (20 out of 212) of the respondents is reluctant to join the Civil Service for recognition factor. It is the fifth cause of unwillingness of the students to join the Civil Service. It is a fact that merit or performance is not rewarded or recognised in the Civil Service. That is why some bright students do not like to pursue Civil Service career. Some of the students stated that they do not want to join the Civil Service for lengthy selection procedure. It is seen from the analysis that 3.77% (8 out of 212) of the respondents are reluctant to join the Civil Service for lengthy selection procedure. It takes about at least one and a half-year to publish the final results of the BCS exams by the PSC from the date of publication of advertisement for recruitment in newspaper.

**CAREER PROSPECT, REWARD AND
IMAGE OF THE CIVIL SERVICE**

In the note attached to the questionnaire, it was stated that before replying to this question they should assume that they are going to join the Civil Service. It was indicated that opinion on career prospect, reward, and image of the Civil Service affect the decision to choose the Civil Service as career. Respondents were requested to keep this in mind before giving opinion on these aspects of career- (i) the career prospect; (ii) the reward; and (iii) image of the Civil Service. Their responses to these specific questions were sought to compare their opinion with the popular belief that these

factors affect career choice of the students. The responses were ranked bleak, poor, adequate, good, very good (from negative to positive) for the 'Career Prospect', poor, adequate, good, and very good for the 'Reward' and the 'Image' of the Civil Service (from negative to positive). Comparison of weighted mean of the responses on the opinion on the career prospects, the reward, and the image of the BCS and the P values as found out by Mann-Whitney Tests are shown table IV.14.

Table IV.14

Comparison of Weighted Mean and P Value of Responses on Opinion on Career Prospect, Reward and Image

Sl.	Variables	Civil Service/ Non-civil Service	'Bleak/Poor' For 'Pay' & 'Poor ' Remarks For Reward And Image	T-Tests	
				Mean	2-Tailed Significance
(a)	(b)	(c)	(d)	(e)	(f)
1.	Career Prospect	Civil Service	21/118 (17.8%)	2.2 ³	.0000
		Non-civil Service	105/118 (49.5%)	2.93 ²	
2.	Reward	Civil Service	52/212 (44%)	2.95 ⁵	.00039
		Non-civil Service	141/212 (66.5%)	3.5 ⁵	
3.	Image	Civil Service	19/118 (16%)	2.2 ²	.0000
		Non-civil Service	156/212 (73.9%)	2.93 ¹	

Note: The numbers in superscripts show the ranking of weighted means of priorities accorded to the five factors that influenced the career choice of the sample under study.

Number of responses of the students who termed the career prospects 'bleak/ poor', the reward 'poor', and the image 'poor' are shown in column (d) of table IV.14. Columns 1(d), 2(d), and 3(d) show that the students who were not willing to join the Civil Service passed more negative comments about the career prospect, the reward, and the image of the Civil Service than the students who are willing to join the Civil Service. P values in column 1(e), 2(e), and 3(e) show that there are significant differences

between the opinion of the Civil Service group and the Noncivil Service group on the career prospect, the reward, and the image.

Due to due differences in philosophy of life and outlook, the two groups seem to have ascribed different values to the different aspects of the Civil Service.

Willingness to go abroad

Respondents were asked in a closed questionnaire whether they would like to go abroad with jobs even if they get employed in the Civil Service or elsewhere. Respondents were asked to tick any of the three responses - YES/NO/ UNDECIDED. P value (.00006) of bivariate analysis of response to survey shows that there is association between the urges of both the groups for going abroad with jobs. Analysis of response show that 38.1% (45/118) of the Civil Service group, 60.4%(128/212) of the noncivil Service group are willing to go abroad even if they get employment in the Civil Service or elsewhere. 30.5%(36/118) of the Civil Service group and 25.9%(55/212) of the noncivil service group are undecided about going abroad with jobs. It is quite clear from the above findings that most of the people are willing to go abroad even if they get employed in the country. In a survey carried out by the students of The Bangladesh University of Engineering & Technology amongst 390 respondents (students), 13% want to go abroad for permanent settlement, and 48% want to go abroad to earn money (Survey, '90, BUET). The craze of going abroad exists also amongst the Civil Servants. A BPATC survey shows that out of 117 Civil Servants, 31.6 want to go abroad with jobs; and 26.55 are not sure¹⁸.

Reasons for Going Abroad

It is obvious that people in Bangladesh have a craze to go abroad with jobs with only one aim - to earn money. Though many of the respondents directly replied that they want to go abroad to earn money, some of them told they want to leave the country as there is no freedom of speech and hardly any law and order in the country; no guarantee of natural death in the country etc. Some even did not mention any reason for going abroad. All these reasons which are peculiar, erratic or evasive and reasons not mentioned have been categorised as other factor. No analysis of this factor will be made as we will not get any findings from this factor. Few of the respondents had replied that they would like to go

18 Safiur Rahman, "Some Problems of Career Planning in Bangladesh: An Analysis of a Sample Survey", in *Career Planning in Bangladesh*, op. cit., BPATC, 1986.

abroad to see new countries, broaden outlook, etc. Probably they wanted to hide their main aim of going abroad to earn money as many in our country are against brain drain and question the patriotism of the emigrant who have been educated at poor people's money.

P Value (.00259) of the responses of the students in the survey 'to go abroad for very good pay' shows that there is association between the urge to go abroad and very good pay of the overseas country. The bivariate statistical analysis shows that 21.2% (25/118) of the Civil Service group and 37.3% (79/212) of the noncivil service group want to go abroad with jobs for very good pay.

In the survey some of the students stated that they want to go abroad for higher living standard. The Chi-square test finds no association between the urge of both the groups to go abroad and higher living standard of the foreign countries. 6.8% of the Civil Service group and 10.4% of the noncivil service group want to go abroad with jobs for higher living standard. 4.2% of the Civil Service group and 7.5% of the noncivil service group want to go abroad with jobs to broaden outlook. Statistical analysis shows no association between the urge to go abroad and intention of broadening outlook by going abroad. This seems to be an evasive reply to hide the truth about going abroad for money.

P Value (.00259) of the responses of the students in the survey 'to gain experience' shows that there is association between the urge to go abroad and aim of gaining experience from overseas jobs. 21.2% (25/118) of the Civil Service group and 37.3% (79/212) of the noncivil service group want to go abroad with jobs for very good pay.

P Value (.02638) shows that there is association between the urge to go abroad and aim of gaining experience from overseas jobs. The bivariate statistical analysis shows that 5.1% of the Civil Service group and 12.7% of the noncivil service group want to go abroad with jobs to gain experience. Bangladeshis who gain experience in overseas countries are in high demand in labour market. So the reason of going abroad for gaining experience can be interpreted as monetary factor.

Statistical analysis found no relationship between the urge to go abroad and intention to see new countries. 35.1% of the Civil Service group and 5.2% of the noncivil service group want to go abroad with jobs to see new countries. This may not be the main motive of going abroad with jobs. The respondents seem to hide the fact that they want

to go abroad for earning money. Different reasons for going abroad are shown in the table IV.15.

Table IV.15

Factors That Influence Brilliant Students To Migrate From Bangladesh

Factors	Frequency		
	Civil Service	Non-civil Service	Total
(a)	(b)	(c)	(d)
Very good pay	25/118(21.2)	79/212(37.3)	104/330(31.5)
Higher living standard	8/118(6.80)	22/212(10.38)	30/330 (9.00)
Broaden outlook	5/118(4.25)	16/212(7.55)	21/330 (6.37)
Gain experience	6/118(5.12)	27/212(12.7)	33/330 (10.00)
See new countries	6/118(5.12)	11/212(5.2)	17/330 (5.1)
Any other	11/118(9.30)	48/212(21.2)	56/330 (17.0)

Note: Factors within parenthesis indicate percentages.

The respondents who want to go abroad with jobs gave 261 reasons for going abroad. Out of 261,104 (39.85) reasons are for very good pay only. The reasons 'very good pay'; 'higher living standard'; and 'gain experience' can be interpreted in monetary terms and combined to form 'money factor'. Response for going abroad for 'money factor' is shown table IV.16.

Table IV.16

Overseas Job for Money Factor

Reason for Choice of Career	Chosen Career				Total		Chi-Square Value	DF	P Value
	Civil Service		Non-civil Service		Cases	Percent			
	Cases	Percent	Cases	Percent					
(A)	(b)	(c)	(d)	(e)	(f)	(g)	(h)	(i)	(j)
Money Factor							12.716 04	1	.00036
No	92	78.00	124	58.5	216	100.0			
Yes	26	22.00	88	41.5	114	100.0			
Total	118	100.0	212	100.0	330				

categorical variables. The category with the relative odds of 1.000 represents the reference category for that variable.

Table IV.17

Logistic Regression Model of Career Choice of Bright Students of Universities, 1990

Sl.	Variables	Logistic Coefficients (B)	Odds Ratio	Partial R	P Value
(a)	(b)	(c)	(d)	(e)	(f)
1.	Faculty (Science)		1.0000	.2803	.0000
	Social Science	-1.0737	.3417	-.0957	.0148
	Arts	-.7829	.4571	.0000	.1807
	Commerce	.3367	1.4003	.0000	.5099
	Engineering	1.5747	4.8292	.0000	.2045
	Medical	-3.8641	.0210	-.2186	.0000
	Agriculture	-4.3393	.0130	-.2117	.0000
2.	Opinion On Image (Poor)		1.000	.2304	.0000
	Adequate	-1.8320	.1601	-.1516	.0006
	Good	-1.7959	.1660	-.1654	.0002
	Very Good	-3.0886	.0456	-.2476	.0000
3.	Aptitude Factor (No)		1.0000	.1275	.0027
	Yes	1.0291	2.7984		
4.	Education (1 1st Division)		1.0000	.1197	.0062
	2 1st Divisions	1.0466	2.8479	.1145	.0057
	3 1 st Divisions	1.5040	4.4995	.1083	.0079
5.	Money Factor (No)		1.0000	.0994	.0124
	Yes	.8355	2.3060		
6.	Job Security (No)		1.0000	-.1928	.0000
	Yes	-2.5021	.0819		
7.	Constant	1.6507			.0088

Note: Reference category is shown within the parenthesis

While performing the stepwise method for the determination of the significant variables, six out of thirteen variables came out significant in explaining the variation in the choice of a career by the bright students. Statistically significant variables in

accordance with their importance are- (1) department of the respondents; (2) image of the BCS to the respondents; (3) aptitude factor; (4) level of educational attainments; (5) money factor; and (6) security factor. The remaining 10 variables do not seem to have significant independent effect on decision to choose a career. The relative importance of explaining variables has been judged by the value of partial R. The result of logistic regression analysis of career choice of bright students of universities is shown in the table IV.17.

The factors which came out statistically significant in the logistic regression model is analysed in the following paragraph:

- a. *Faculty/ Department:* Out of the six variables in the regression table, faculty/ department of the respondents was found to have most significant effects on career choice. Compared to the science students, the social science and arts students seem to be .3417 times and .4517 times less unwilling to join the Civil Service. The students of Commerce and Engineering seem to be 1.4003 times and 4.8292 times respectively more unwilling to join the Civil Service as there is more demand of these two categories of graduates in labour market. While the engineers have more chances to be employed in the Middle-East, the Commerce graduates have demand in private sector. Hence the less willingness of these two groups to join the Civil Service. The medical graduates and the agriculture graduates are .0210 and .0130 times respectively less unwilling to join the Civil Service. Amongst the graduates of all disciplines the agriculture graduates seem to be least unwilling to join the Civil Service. There is hardly any demand of Agriculture graduates in the labour market. After the agriculture graduates, the doctors seem to be less unwilling to join the Civil Service. The doctors who join the Health cadre of the Civil Service can get immense financial benefit if they can join the Civil Service. The medical graduates, i.e. the doctors are permitted to engage in private practice after the prescribed office hours and hospital equipment for treatment of private patients at nominal cost. They undergo higher training and take foreign degrees at the cost of Government. They can get immense pecuniary benefit from the foreign degrees and higher training. Hence they seem to be more willing to join the Civil Service than graduates of other disciplines.

- b. *Image*: The respondents were asked to give opinion on career prospect, reward, and image of the Civil Service. Out of those three aspects of Civil Service, only the image of the Civil Service has come out statistically significant in multivariate analysis. The image of the Civil Service has next significant relationship with career choice after the department of the respondents. The image of the Civil Service ranked as 'Poor' has been used as a reference here. The image of the Civil Service termed as 'adequate' .1318 times; 'good' .0586 times; and 'very good' .0090 times by the respondents compared to the ranking of the 'poor image' of the Civil Service as '1'. The negative sign against the logistic coefficients indicates that the higher the image, lesser is the unwillingness of the respondents to join the Civil Service. The odds ratio for the image of the Civil Service shows that the respondents who consider the image of the Civil Service 'very good' is likely to be .0456 times less unwilling to join the Civil Service compared to those who rate the image of the Civil Service 'poor'. If we compare the result of bivariate analysis, we see that the pro-Civil Service respondents (who are willing to join the Civil Service) and anti-Civil Service respondents (who are unwilling to join the Civil Service) had difference of opinion regarding the image of the Civil Service, i.e. pro-Civil Service respondents have positive image of the Civil Service and anti-Civil Service people have negative image about the Civil Service.
- c. *Aptitude Factor*: Aptitude factor plays the third most important role in choosing a career. The odds of choosing a noncivil service career amongst bright students is 2.7984 higher compared to those who would like to pursue Civil Service career. Some of the job characteristics of the Civil Service career like 'no independence of action', 'no recognition of performance/merit' and 'bad working environment' etc discourage the bright students to join the Civil Service.
- d. *Educational Attainment*: There exists positive association between level of educational attainment and choice of Civil Service as a career. It is evident from the above table that the brighter a student is, the lesser is his/ her willingness to join the Civil Service. Students with minimum two first divisions in their academic career are about 2.8479 times and students with three first divisions 4.4995 times more unwilling to join the Civil Service compared to those who attained maximum one first division in their academic career. Bright students, if inducted in the Civil

Service, are treated at par with the mediocre students for promotion and posting. Their merit is not accorded due importance in the Civil Service. On the other hand, there are high demands of bright students in private sector, multinationals and in overseas employment. As such the bright students seem to be unwilling to join the Civil Service.

- e. *Money Factor*: Money factor seems to be important determinant for choice of a career. The odds of choosing a career for monetary factor is 2.3060 times higher amongst the respondents who are influenced by the money factor for career choice than those who do not consider money an important determinant for career choice. It does not mean that the respondents who did not choose the money factor for career choice are willing to work without money; to them money factor is not a priority for career choice and they are happy to accept the remuneration attached to a career which they would like to pursue.
- f. *Security Factor*: Job security has a significant association with career choice. The negative sign against the logistic coefficients indicates that the higher the career, the lesser is unwillingness to join the Civil Service. The probability of unwillingness to join the Civil Service is .1928 times lower amongst students who consider 'job security' as a factor for career choice than those who do not consider 'job security' as a factor for career choice.

Concluding Assumptions

In concluding this Chapter, the following assumptions may be drawn based on the statistical analyses of survey data presented in the preceding sections.

- a. Many of the brighter students are generally unwilling to join the Civil Service;
- b. Aptitude plays most important role amongst bright students in choosing a career;
- c. Monetary considerations influence career choice of students and most of the brighter students are in favour of noncivil service career due to monetary factor. It is a fact that the pay in the Civil Service is less compared to the private sector. Any body who give priority to the pay of a career is not likely to choose the Civil Service as career.
- d. Poor promotion prospect serves as a disincentive against joining the Civil Service.
- e. Most of the bright students seem to be less attracted towards the Civil Service as there is no recognition of merit.

- f. Opinion on image of the Civil Service is not very encouraging for the prospective brighter students to join the Civil Service. Students for and against joining the Civil Service are having conflicting views about honour/ status of the Civil Service. This variation in opinion on image of the Civil Service happens as the two groups might be having different philosophy of life and as such they ascribe different values to the image of the Civil Service.
- g. Choice of career differs from faculty to faculty. For example, while the doctors and agriculture graduates are less unwilling to join the Civil Service, students of other faculties are more unwilling to join the Civil Service. This variation in choice of career amongst university graduates is due to variation of demand of graduates of different disciplines in the labour market.
- h. Other reason of the unwillingness of many of the bright students to join the Civil Service is the availability of alternative employment outside the Civil Service.
- i. While asked to pick any of these three replies - YES/ NO/ UNDECIDED - regarding their willingness to go abroad with jobs, 91 out of 330(27.58% of the total respondents) picked 'UNDECIDED'. It means that they may opt for overseas job when the chance comes. The 'Overseas job' might not have come significant in statistical test but undoubtedly the scope of going abroad with jobs discourages many bright students to join the Civil Service. Though influence of 'Money factor' for overseas job has not come out statistically significant, money remains the main motive for going abroad with jobs.

Chapter V

OPINION SURVEY OF BCS OFFICIALS ON CAREER EXPECTATIONS

Introduction

Chapter IV of this thesis included data analyses of a survey that was carried out by the researcher amongst 330 students of different universities to find out the rationale of their career choice and causes of their reluctance as well as their willingness to join the Civil Service. This chapter, i.e., Chapter V, analyses the findings of another opinion survey conducted among a sample of officials belonging to the Bangladesh Civil Service (BCS). The objective was to investigate what influenced the serving civil servants to join the Civil Service; what they expected from the Civil Service career, and how far their career expectations were realised. The civil servants for the survey were selected from two generations with a gap of a decade. The civil servants from two generations were surveyed to see how much the perceptions and realities of attributes of the Civil Service had undergone change during a decade preceding the year 1990. It is understood that the persons in the Civil Service themselves have better knowledge about the career prospects, the reward and the image of the Civil Service compared to the outsiders; they have better knowledge about alleged career blockages in the BCS.

The survey sample included the two categories of BCS officials referred to above. One category comprised of the recruits of 1973, 1974, 1975 and 1976 and the other consisted of recruits of 1985, 1986 and 1988. It is widely believed that the recruits belonging to the first category are the worst sufferers in terms of their career advancement. However, for the purpose of this survey, the recruits of 1973, 1974, 1975 and 1976 were termed as Old BCS and the recruits of 1985, 1986, and 1988 were known as New BCS. Besides, an attempt was also made under this survey to ascertain the opinions of some senior level BCS officials who had been recruited into the Civil Services before 1971, i.e., before the liberation of Bangladesh. It is believed that most of these officials got promoted early or in due time during their service careers. The officials as such were planned to form a control group in between the above two categories of officials in the sample. But, to the utter surprise of this researcher, the

officials belonging to the selected control group did not respond to the questionnaire administered among them on the ground that they had not been promoted in due time or early; rather their long overdue promotion was withheld by the controlling authorities in Pakistan before 1971. In reality, most of the members of the control group would not have been promoted to their present ranks if Pakistan remained intact and the liberation of Bangladesh would not have led to sudden creation of so many senior ranks.

The survey was carried out to see (i) the difference between perceptions of the two groups regarding career attributes before joining the BCS; (ii) the difference between the degree of fulfilment of career expectations from the BCS after joining the BCS; and (iii) compare the perceptions of the students about the attributes of the Civil Service career and the realities of the Civil Service career as felt by the New and the Old civil servants. The findings of the survey would help identify the causes of frustration of the civil servants and suggest measures to attract and retain brighter products of the universities in the Civil Service. In 1988, a strategy conference on 'Human Resource Management in the BCS' was participated by the key Permanent Secretaries, experts on public administration and the Chairman of the Public Service Commission. The researcher was the coordinator and the resource person of this conference. A keynote paper presented in the conference by its Chairman on career expectations of the BCS officials was prepared after extensive informal discussions with the new entrants and those affected by career blockages. During the discussions with the BCS officials it transpired that the BCS officials expected that the Civil Service career would provide them good status, scope to serve the nation, recognition from society; adequate pay package; good career prospects; and good image of the Civil Service would make them proud of their job. They further said that at least they would be promoted to the Joint Secretary level; their training would be taken into account for promotion and posting and their performance would be rewarded¹.

In fact, the questionnaire administered among the officials under this survey was prepared on the basis of feedback of the 1988 conference regarding career expectations of the BCS officials. Prior to finalisation of the questionnaire, informal discussions were held with 20 officers of the Civil Service regarding the questionnaire and they filled the questionnaires for pre-testing. They did not suggest any change in the

1 See Institute of Manpower Studies, *Report on Organizational Manpower Planning in the BCS, IMS, Sussex, UK, 1988.*

questionnaire. As such no further pilot test on the questionnaire was carried out. The questionnaire is attached here as Appendix V.1.

A question may arise here whether the people who joined the BCS before 18/19 years can still remember what influenced them to join the Civil Service or what they expected from the Civil Service career. Generally people take decision about joining any career on being inspired by some attractions or attributes of that career. The perceived attributes of any career cannot be forgotten even after long years. People who had been attracted to the BCS for some thing they craved for and they did not get that thing are not going to forget that. When they joined the Civil Service in 1973, other avenues also were open to them -- the financial institutes, industries and business firms abandoned by the Pakistanis in 1971. Many Bengalis who took over the abandoned business firms and opened up new business in 1973 have now grown into multi-millionaires. It can be mentioned here that almost all the big business and most of the medium level business were in the hands of the non-Bengalis before 1971 and the Bengali business class grew in size and number after the liberation of Bangladesh in 1971. The BCS officials must have analysed the pros and cons of different careers and then they decided to join the Civil Service on being allured by certain attributes of the BCS career. It is established that people do judge the inducements of different careers before pursuing any career:

An underlying framework in many social science disciplines describes the employee-employer relationship as an exchange for employee contributions that include joining and remaining in the organisation. This framework assumes that employees globally assess the inducements (including pay) an employer offers relative to their own preferences, their abilities and skills, and their other employment opportunities, and then make decisions about joining the organisations accordingly. Similarly, employees already within the organisation make global assessments of the continuing inducements offered relative to their own contributions. (The employer side of this exchange is primarily concerned with the relative benefits gained given the cost of inducements)...Rynes and Barber note support for the importance of pay in employee assessments of the inducements an employer offers, and for the ability of relatively higher pay inducements (specifically salaries, recruitment and retention bonuses, and educational incentives) to increase the quality and quantity of an organisation's recruitment pool.²

Methodology and Data Analysis

About 400 questionnaires were distributed amongst the members of four BCS cadres, namely the BCS administration, BCS Secretariat, BCS public works, and BCS agriculture. The sample of respondents was taken from the list of members of these four BCS cadres

² George T. Milkovitch and Alexandra. K. Wigdor, *Pay for Performance: Evaluating Performance Appraisal and Merit Pay*; National Research Council, Washington, D.C. 1991, p. 91.

randomly to have a representative sample. This was done to avoid bias in sampling. A note explaining the purpose of the survey and background of the questionnaire was attached with every questionnaire. 70 (20%) out of 345 of the Old BCS belonging to batches recruited in 1973, 1974, 1975 and 1976 and 70 (11%) out of 645 of the New BCS belonging to batches recruited in 1985, 1986 and 1988 responded to the questionnaires administered among the four hundred BCS members. While the researcher himself filled in most of the questionnaires interviewing personally the respondents, the respondents filled in some questionnaires themselves. Table V.I. illustrates how the sample was collected.

Analyses of the gathered data were made through the use of SPSS programme as per such statistical methods as Cross-tabulations of the variables, Chi-square-tests, and T-tests.

Table V.1

Collection of Sample from the BCS Officials Affected by Career Blockages and New Entrants of BCS

Cadre	Affected BCS Officials				Total	New BCS Officials			Total
	1973	1974	1975	1976		1985	1986	1988	
(a)	(b)	(c)	(d)	(e)	(f)	(a)	(b)	(c)	(d)
Administration	80	44			124(20)	45	214		259(20)
Secretariat	45	44		43	132 (20)	44	32	71	147(20)
PWD	24	1	13		38 (15)	27			27(15)
Agriculture	21	9	21		51(15)		212		212(15)
Total	170	98	34	43	345 (70)	116	458	71	645(70)

Note: Figures within parenthesis denotes percentage.

Factors that Influenced the Officials to Join BCS

In question number 1, the respondents were asked to give priority in ranking order to five factors that influenced them to join the Civil Service namely (i) pay; (ii) status; (iii) career prospects; (iv) image; and (v) recognition from the society. The test results of 'Factors that influence career choice' are shown in the table V.2.

Factors that Influenced the Old/ New BCS to Join the BCS

Sl.	Variables	New/Old BCS	T-Tests		Mann-Whitney 2-Tailed Significance Tests
			Mean	2-Tailed Significance	
(A)	(B)	(C)	(D)	(E)	(F)
1.	Pay*	New BCS	3.0714 ³	.058	.0573
		Old BCS	3.5143 ²		
2.	Status	New BCS	2.6000 ⁵	.241	.4741
		Old BCS	2.3286 ⁵		
3.	Career* Prospects	New BCS	3.1286 ²	.013	.0153
		Old BCS	3.7000 ¹		
4.	Image	New BCS	2.7429 ⁴	.805	.8142
		Old BCS	2.6857 ⁴		
5.	Recognition* from Society	New BCS	3.4571 ¹	.002	.0030
		Old BCS	2.7571 ³		

Note: The numbers in superscript numbers show the ranking of weighted means of priorities accorded to the five factors that influenced the career choice of the sample under study.

Analysis of the Findings

In question number 1, the respondents were asked to accord priority in ranking order to the following factors for pursuing Civil Service career- (a) pay; (b) status; (c) career prospects; (d) image of the Civil Service; (e) recognition from the society. Their responses are described in detail in the following paragraphs.

Influence of Pay on Choice of Civil Service Career: It is seen from column 1(e) of Table V.2 that there is minor difference between the Old and the New BCS in according priority to 'Pay' as factor for choosing Civil Service as a career. Weighted mean of the priorities given to 'Pay' by both the groups show that the Old BCS had been more influenced by 'Pay' to join the Civil Service than the New BCS. If the pay scale of 1972-1975 is compared to that of 1985-1988 in terms of living index, the pay scale of 1972-1975 was far better. Hence the more priority to 'Pay' is given by the Old BCS Officials for pursuing Civil Service career. The weighted mean of the priorities given to five factors that influenced their career choice of both the groups show that the Old BCS's priorities to pay ranked second while the new BCS's priorities ranked third (column 1d).

Ranking of Influence of Status on Career Choice: Mann-Whitney tests and T-tests show no difference between the influence of 'Status' of the Civil Service on career choice of the new BCS and the Old BCS officials. Weighted mean (column 2d) show that the New BCS officials were more influenced by the status to join the Civil Service. From the weighted mean it is evident that both the groups priorities to 'Status' ranked fifth compared to other factors for career choice.

Ranking of Influence of Career Prospects on Career Choice: Column 3(e) of the above table shows that there is difference between the influence of 'Career Prospects' of the Civil Service on career choice of the New BCS and the Old BCS. The weighted means (column 3d) show that the Old BCS officials were more influenced by 'Career Prospects' than the New BCS. Variation in according priority to career prospects happened as there was enough vacancy at the higher level in early '70s. The Old BCS officials who were recruited in early '70s probably were lured by the career prospects of the Civil Service as lot of posts were vacant just after the liberation war. But the scenario changed very quickly; higher posts were filled up from the people who were recruited during Pakistan time. The new entrants knew about the career blockages in the Civil Service before they joined the Civil Service. As such they seem to have given lower priority to career prospects as a factor for career choice. The weighted mean further show that while the Old BCS gave the first priority to career prospects, the New BCS gave second priority to the career prospects (column 3d).

Ranking of Influence of Image on Career Choice: The Mann-Whitney Test and T-tests show that there exists no difference of the influence of 'Image' of the Civil Service on career choice of the two groups of the BCS under study (column 4e). Though the weighted mean shows that the New BCS were slightly more influenced by the image than the Old BCS, there is very minor difference between the mean of the two groups (column 4d). It appears from the weighted mean of the priorities that priorities accorded to image by both the groups ranked fourth (column 4d).

Ranking of Influence of Society Recognition on Career Choice: There is difference of the influence of 'recognition from the society' on career choice of the New and the Old BCS (column 5e of the above table). The weighted mean show that the New BCS were more influenced by the 'Recognition from Society' than the Old BCS (column 5d). As we see from the weighted mean, the new BCS seem to have given first priority to 'recognition from the society' while the Old BCS have give third priority (column 5d).

The foregoing analyses show that perceptions about (i) pay; (ii) career prospects; and (iii) recognition from the society for the Civil Service had undergone changes. This has happened over a period of 12 years. Responses of the 118 university students who would like to join the Civil Service are shown in ranking order: (i) 'service to nation' - 53 responses; (ii) honour, i.e. recognition from the society - 41; (iii) 'aptitude factor' - 29; (iv) 'money factor' - 20; and (v) 'career factor' - 7 (see Chapter IV). It is seen that there are some similarities in choices for career between the reasons for choice of career of the New BCS and the University of Students.

Promotion to JS rank and Career Expectations

'Joint Secretary' is the third tier in the hierarchy of 20-grade pay structure of Bangladesh's public sector employment (Civil Service, Government Service, Autonomous Bodies). In fact, much power of decision-making lies with the officers at the JS level. Joint Secretaries are provided with full time chauffeur driven cars and enough fuel. They may be deputed as Chairmen of parastatals, and heads of Departments. As compared to 30 posts of Additional Secretary and 40 posts of Secretary, there are more than 200 posts of the level of Joint Secretary so the Civil Servants want to be promoted to minimum Joint Secretary. Almost everyone gets promoted to the posts of Deputy Secretary. Blockages start in this rank. Joint Secretaries are officially treated as VIPs (Very Important Persons); in the Airports there is separate waiting room and entry and exit for them. They are normally invited in all national level functions, including in the Prime Minister's residence and President's residence. It is a coveted post. Respondents were asked whether promotion to the rank of Joint Secretary would meet their career expectation. Strong correlation about 'fulfilment of career expectations of the New entrants of the BCS and the Old BCS officials on 'promotion to JS level' is found in Chi-square test. 31.7% of the old BCS officials and 68.3% of the new BCS officials said that promotion to JS level would meet their career expectation. The Old BCS officials seem to be very ambitious since they had seen their immediate predecessors of Pakistan days (those who were recruited in the late sixties) getting promoted quickly with narrow gauge experience and shorter length of service. Promotion to their predecessors happened in quick succession as many senior posts were created immediately after the liberation of Bangladesh and there were few competent men to fill the vacuum. But the new BCS people have already seen that it is very difficult to get promoted to the level of Joint Secretary; promotion to the higher posts seem remote to most of them. Hence they seem to be less ambitious compared to the Old BCS.

Training and Fulfilment of Expectations

On joining the BCS, the civil servants thought that they would be trained to take over new responsibilities and training would give them the skills, and confidence to perform better. The Civil Servants expected that achievement in training would be taken into account for promotion and posting and help in career development. Their responses to the question on training are elaborated below:

Whether Training is taken into account for Promotion: The respondents were asked whether training is taken into account for promotion. Chi-square test shows no correlation between their expectations from training for promotion. 84.29% of the Old BCS officials and 87.14% of the new BCS officials said that training is not taken into account for promotion.

Whether Training is taken into account for Posting: The respondents were asked whether training is taken into account for posting. Chi-square test show that there is no association between their expectations that training would be taken into account for posting. 87.15% of the respondents- both the New and the Old BCS officials believe that training is not taken into account for posting. The new entrants seem to have made above comments from the incidence they have seen while the Old BCS Officials might have made the same comment from their own experience and from what they have seen.

From the forgoing findings it can be deduced that training is neglected as a factor for career development.

Whether Performance is Rewarded: After joining the BCS, they expected that they would be rewarded if they perform better. Respondents were asked whether their performance is rewarded. The analysis shows no relationship between their expectations that performance would be rewarded. 87.14% of the Old BCS and 90.0% of the new BCS said that their performance is not rewarded. Nonrecognition of performance is a demotivating factor for those who are within the Civil Service and discouraging for those who might judge different attributes of the Civil Service career before joining.

Fulfilment of Career Expectations

Respondents were asked to comment on degree of fulfilment of career expectation received from following aspects of Civil Service career- (i) value of work; (ii) recognition from superiors; (iii) recognition from colleagues of same rank; (iv) recognition from subordinates; (v) recognition from the society; (vi) opportunity for professional growth; (vii) opportunity for career advancement; and (viii) pay. Rating of

the degree of fulfilment of career expectation was ranked 'very good'; 'good'; 'adequate'; 'not good'; 'not at all good'. The findings are shown statistically in the table V.3.

Table V.3

Degree of Fulfillment of Career Expectations of the New and the Old BCS

Sl.	Variables	New/Old BCS	T-Tests		Mann-Whitney
			Mean	2-Tailed Significance	2-Tailed Significance
(a)	(b)	(c)	(d)	(e)	(f)
1.	Value of Work	New BCS	3.4143	.003	.0031
		Old BCS	2.7857		
2.	Recognition from Superiors	New BCS	3.2571	.024	.0074
		Old BCS	2.8286		
3.	Recognition from Colleagues	New BCS	2.7143	.594	.6561
		Old BCS	2.8143		
4.	Recognition from Subordinates	New BCS	2.8429	.811	.8061
		Old BCS	2.8000		
5.	Recognition from the Society	New BCS	3.2429	.095	.0801
		Old BCS	2.8857		
6.	Opportunity for Professional Growth	New BCS	3.6571	.191	.0990
		Old BCS	3.3714		
7.	Opportunity for Career Advancement	New BCS	3.8429	.889	.6555
		Old BCS	3.8143		
8.	Pay	New BCS	3.7286	.846	.8685
		Old BCS	3.6857		

Degree of Fulfilment of Career Expectations from Value of Work: Column 1(e) of the above table shows that there is difference in the fulfilment of career expectations of both the New and the Old BCS from value of work. From the weighted mean it is clear that the New BCS gets more satisfaction from value of their work than the Old BCS (column 1d). The Old BCS officials are performing the same or similar tasks for minimum 10 years. These are the likely causes of dissatisfaction of the Old BCS regarding value of work.

Degree of Fulfilment of Career Expectations from Recognition from Superiors: The above table (column 2e) shows that there is difference in fulfilment of career expectations of the new entrants of the BCS and BCS officials affected by career blockages from 'Recognition

from Superiors'. The weighted mean shows that the new lots get more recognition from their superiors than the Old BCS (column 2d). This variation in recognition from superiors happened as the new entrants are academically better product, and better trained. During 1992-77, the syllabi of the BCS were of lower standard, and the civil servants of that period did not receive much training. In the Secretariat the Old BCS officials and the new BCS officials perform the jobs of same level. In the field, there is some difference in level of job. Frustration of the Old BCS officials might have affected their morale adversely and this might have had bad effect on their performance. The Old BCS officials very often openly voice dissatisfaction about their senior's exploitation of opportunities created due to liberation of Bangladesh. As such the senior officials may not have very good opinion about the Old BCS officials.

Degree of Fulfilment of Career Expectations from Colleagues of Same Rank: Regarding fulfilment of career expectations of recognition from colleagues of same rank, the analysis shows no difference between the two groups (column 3e). The weighted mean indicates that the Old BCS gets more recognition from their own colleagues of same rank (column 3d). Long association amongst the Old BCS for the last 15-17 years might have helped them develop camaraderie amongst them.

Degree of Fulfilment of Career Expectations from Subordinates: Column 4(e) of the above table indicates no difference of fulfilment of career expectations of the Old and the New BCS from 'recognition from subordinates'. There is negligible difference in weighted mean of this factor for both the groups (column 4d) so it can be ignored.

Degree of Fulfilment of Career Expectations of 'Recognition from the Society': There is no difference in fulfilment of career expectations of both the groups from 'recognition from the society' (column 5e). The weighted mean in column 5(d) shows that the new lots get more recognition from the society compared to the old lots. Alert public in Bangladesh believe that the civil servants are responsible for mismanagement of general administration and development programmes in the country. Even the donors like the World Bank, IMF, and the ADB (Asian Development Bank) blame the Civil servants for failure to execute development programmes financed by them. Politicians of the major political parties openly criticise the Civil Service for mismanagement of public administration. 39% of the Old BCS and 27% of the New BCS commented 'NOT GOOD-NOT GOOD AT ALL' regarding degree of fulfilment of career expectations from scope for recognition from the society.

Degree of fulfilment of Career expectations from the scope for Professional Growth: Column 6(e) of the above table indicates that there is no difference in fulfilment of career expectations of the Old and the New BCS from 'opportunity for professional growth'. This has so happened because the new lots are getting more chances to have training at home and abroad than the Old BCS. As almost all the Old BCS have crossed 40 years, they are not sent for higher training and educational programme of longer duration. Besides, most of the Old BCS officials do not have any first class in their academic career, which is precondition for foreign training of longer duration and higher studies abroad. 67% of the Old BCS and 61% New BCS commented 'NOT GOOD-NOT GOOD AT ALL' regarding degree of fulfilment of career expectations from scope for professional growth.

Degree of fulfilment of Career expectations from Career Advancement: Column 7(e) indicates that there is no difference in fulfilment of career expectations of the BCS officials under study from 'opportunity for career advancement'. There is insignificant difference in the weighted mean of this variable for the Old and the New BCS (column 7d). 75.71% of the Old BCS and 70% of the New BCS commented 'NOT GOOD-NOT GOOD AT ALL' regarding degree of fulfilment of career expectations from career advancement. The New BCS is yet to face career progression problems. They are seeing what are the career prospects of others. They commented on the basis of what they have seen.

Degree of Ranking of fulfilment of Career expectations from Pay: Statistical analyses as shown in the above table (column 8e) show that there is no difference in the fulfilment of career expectations of the New and the Old BCS from 'Pay'. The weighted mean show insignificant difference in priority given by the two groups regarding fulfilment from the expectation of Career Advancement (8d). 69% of the Old BCS and 69% of the New BCS commented 'NOT GOOD-NOT GOOD AT ALL' regarding degree of fulfilment of career expectations from pay.

Concluding Comments

It is seen from the above analyses that the Old BCS seem to be more negative about fulfilment of their career expectations compared to that of the New BCS. This might have happened due to their higher expectations from the Civil Service career before joining compared to the expectation of the New BCS. The pay and career prospects were certainly had been better when the Old BCS joined the Civil Service. When the

New BCS joined, the career prospects diminished and the remuneration offered by the Civil Service was low. But the New BCS were getting better chances of professional growth because of establishment of new training institutes. Most of the Old BCS officials and the New BCS officials rated the 'opportunity for professional growth'; 'opportunity for career advancement' and 'pay of the Civil Service' 'NOT GOOD, NOT AT ALL GOOD'. This is likely to give a dismal picture of the Civil Service to most of the intending candidates or job seekers.

Chapter VI

RECRUITMENT OF CIVIL SERVANTS

Introduction

Human resources are the lifeblood of any organisation. The performance of an organisation depends to a great extent on the capabilities of its employees. Utmost care has to be taken to recruit people of right calibre for public sector organisations in that the authorities often experience extreme difficulties to get rid of any person from the public service on grounds of inefficiency or incompetence. The selection or early identification philosophy stresses identifying individuals with strong potential and grooming them for positions to which they are likely to be promoted¹. Wrong selection can never be remedied by training. System of recruitment that fails to distinguish between a right person and a wrong person, bright and mediocre or above average and average person is likely to drive away the bright persons from joining any organisation.

This chapter probes the system of recruitment of persons into the Bangladesh Civil Service² (BCS) to find out how far the BCS recruitment process succeeded in skimming the best and the brighter from candidates and recommend measures for improvement of recruitment policy and existing methods of recruitment. To begin with, however, the remainder of this introductory section focuses on the magnitude of Bangladesh's public sector employment.

Several official attempts have since independence been made to ascertain the magnitude of total public employment in Bangladesh. In December 1971, the Establishment Division of the government of Bangladesh conducted a survey to determine the total number of civilians working in the government offices (including those Bengali officers who were

1 Garry P. Latham, "Human Resources Training and Development", in Mark R. Rosenzweg and Lyman W. Porter (ed.), *Annual Review of Psychology*, Vol. 39, University of California, 1988, p. 548.

2 The Bangladesh Public Service Commission (BPSC), a constitutional body having full autonomy in its own spheres of activities, makes recruitment into the managerial posts of the BCS. It is equivalent to the Civil Service Commissions of the UK. For further details about the BPSC, see Syed Giasuddin Ahmed, *Bangladesh Public Service Commission*, University of Dhaka, Dhaka, 1990.

working in the offices of the central government based in East Pakistan) and autonomous and semi-autonomous bodies. Total civilian public employment was estimated to be about 454,450. The breakdown of the figures according to class divisions (I, II, III, IV) shows that the total number of Class I officials was 11,130, including 5,000 officials who belonged to various autonomous and semi-autonomous bodies³.

Similar surveys of the public sector employees were also conducted later by the Establishment Division (named 'Ministry of Establishment' beginning early in the 1990s). Table VI.1 which shows the pattern of employment growth in the public administration sector in Bangladesh is based on such survey data released by the Ministry of Establishment for six scattered years, i.e., 1971, 1982, 1986, 1992, 1996, and 1997. It indicates that Bangladesh had a little less than one million civil officers and employees, i.e., 930,391, as of December 1997, who were working at that time in ministries and divisions, departments and directorates, autonomous bodies and corporations, and in the field level offices of the national level government. The breakdown of figures according to class divisions (I, II, III, and IV) shows that there were 87,667 Class I officials, which included about 35,000 officers who belonged to the thirty BCS cadres. In other words, officers of all the cadres put together were less than half the size of actual number of Class I officials⁴.

Table VI. 1
Public Sector Employment Growth

Class	1971	1982	1986	1992	1996	1997
I	11,130 (2.5)	56,100 (7)	60,106 (5.6)	78,685 (8)	83,336 (9)	87,669 (9.4)
II	12,320 (2.7)	187,700 (24)	32,042 (3)	36,858 (4)	38,046 (4)	43,731 (4.7)
III	245,500 (54)	308,700 (40)	594,300 (55.4)	579,842 (61)	596,770 (64)	597,195 (64.20)
IV	185,500 (41)	226,500 (29)	386,406 (36)	251,364 (27)	212,008 (23)	201,796 (21.70)
Total	454,450 (100)	779,000 (100)	1,072,854 (100)	946,749 (100)	930,160 (100)	930,391 (100)

Note: Figures within parentheses indicate percentage in rounded form.

3 See Syed Giasuddin Ahmed, *Public Personnel Administration in Bangladesh*, University of Dhaka, Dhaka, 1986, pp. 112-115.

4 Mohammad Mohabbat Khan, *Administrative Reforms in Bangladesh*, UPL, Dhaka, 1998, pp. 52-53.

Table VI.1 also indicates that the expansion in public sector employment in Bangladesh has taken place mainly at the level of support staff. Although the ratio of Class I/II staff, as percentage of total staff, has increased from 5% in 1971 to 14% 1997; in absolute terms about 50% of the increase in staff over the last twenty-five years has primarily been on account of class III/IV employees, who have little substantive contribution to handling of state functions. It is more likely that, in line with present-day increasing attention to social sectors (such as education, health and family welfare, local government, rural development, women and children affairs, and social welfare), agencies handling these sectors account for the bulk of the staff, and most of the increase in staff also has been on account of these sectors. And, it is also expected that refocusing of governmental activities would increase the officer level employment in these social sectors as well⁵.

Recruitment into the BCS during 1972-1990

Immediately after liberation in 1971, the Government faced the gigantic task of transforming a provincial government into a national one. Furthermore, in 1972 all people selected by the Pakistani Occupation Force during the liberation war in 1971 had their acceptance nullified. The government faced acute shortages of civil servants to run the administration. With a view to rewarding and enabling the freedom fighters (who took part in armed struggle against the Pakistani Occupation Forces to liberate Bangladesh) to participate in nation building activities, the Public Service Commission recruited 700 Freedom fighters. In 1973, PSC (Public Service Commission) conducted another examination for non-freedom fighters. In 1972, candidates for the Civil Service were selected through oral tests. In 1973, candidates had to take written tests in two papers: - paper I on English and Bangla, the vernacular (250 marks), and paper II on general knowledge and elementary science (150 marks), followed by an oral test/interview worth 150 marks. Syllabi and system of testing of these two batches of 1972 and 1973 were far below the standards compared to what had been used by the PSCs in Pakistan to recruit its personnel into the Central and Provincial Civil Services. According to the view of one Bangladeshi specialist, "the method, standard and syllabi of these two special examinations (Examinations of 1972 and 1973) seemed very much inconsistent with the generally accepted competitive and qualitative criteria"⁶.

5 World Bank, *Government that Works*, The World Bank, Dhaka, p. 89.

6 Syed Giasuddin Ahmed, *Bangladesh Public Service Commission*, University of Dhaka, 1990, p. 162.

In 1976, the Military government appointed the same persons who had been selected by the Pakistani Occupation Forces in 1971 for the Civil Service in Bangladesh. In fact, after liberation in 1972 the Awami League (AL) government refused to accept them into the Civil Service. A set of rules called 'Superior Posts (Examination for Recruitment) Rules' was framed to recruit civil servants in 1976. Under these rules, two batches were recruited in 1977 and 1979. Some Munsiffs (Judges of lower Court) were also recruited in 1978⁷.

Recruitment during 1981-1989

Superior Examination Rules, 1976 were superseded and a new set of rules termed 'Bangladesh Civil Service Recruitment Rules' were framed in January 1981, which in fact ushered in the introduction of new civil service structure in Bangladesh. It should be noted here that before the introduction of the new service structure in 1981, recruitment to various service/posts in the Government scarcely followed systematic procedures. Most PSC Annual Reports released before 1981 repeatedly complained that the Ministries/ Divisions and departments had persistently been reluctant to frame the necessary recruitment rules for the service/posts under their control. They seemed to be more inclined to fill most posts through ad-hoc appointments; thereby unscrupulously evading the jurisdiction of the PSC. In 1983 many posts were created due to the decentralization of administration and creation of 460 Upazillas, the subdistrict below the tier of District and abolition of the Subdivision, the immediate lower tier of administration after District administration. To fill these posts the government relaxed the maximum age limit of entry from 25 to 50. Candidates for the BCS administrative cadre appeared in Intelligence and Psychological tests worth 100 marks and Oral Test worth 200 marks. In 1983, candidates for technical cadres appeared in Intelligence/ Psychological Tests of Comprehension (Essay and Comprehension) worth 50 marks. Compared to the previous examinations conducted by the PSC after 1973, the examination of 1983 was of lower standard.

Recruitment since 1989

Since 1989, the entry examination consists of four parts: (1) a preliminary selection test; (2) a written examination; (3) psychological and oral tests; and (4) medical examination. As the number of applicants is very high compared with the number of vacant posts, a

⁷ Ibid., pp. 163-64.

preliminary objective test of 100 marks covering various fields of knowledge has been introduced to screen out mediocre candidates. The written examination contributes a total of 1000 marks divided between compulsory and optional subjects. The compulsory section of the examination is designed to test the candidates' command on English and Bangla and general knowledge of Bangladesh affairs (100 marks), international affairs (100 marks) and elementary mathematics/every day science. The optional section of the written examination is designed to test the candidates' knowledge in a self-selected academic discipline. There are three papers on optional subjects. The number of optional subjects has been reduced from 73 to 59. The minimum qualifying mark in the written examinations is 45% in aggregate. Any candidate securing less than 25% marks in any compulsory or optional subjects is deemed to have secured no marks in that subject. Candidates qualifying in written examinations have to appear for a psychological test which is designed to assess their personal qualities and traits of character with special regard to their aptitude for the post. From 1976 to 1985, BCS candidates had to appear at a written psychological examination and group discussion, which have recently been discarded. Now a psychologist has been included in the interview board to assess and evaluate the psychological aspects of a candidate. At present no mark is awarded for the psychological test; only a pass or fail is decided in this test.

A board of officers constituted by the PSC interviews successful candidates of the written tests. The interview is said to attach particular importance to intelligence, alertness of mind, vigour, strength of character and potential leadership qualities of the candidates. The board is supposed to take into consideration extra-curricular activities, such as the candidates debating skills, hobbies, etc.

Any eligible candidate with specialist background willing to join the respective specialist cadre has to appear for the compulsory subjects and the psychological and oral tests only. The subjects of the compulsory examination are the same for both technical and non-technical cadres. Candidates for the technical cadres do not have to appear at the examinations for the optional subjects. Their academic attainments are marked in rating scale of 300 marks.

The syllabi of BCS examination of different years are analyzed in tabular form in Table VI. 2.

Table VI. 2

Comparison of Syllabus of BCS Exam of Different Years

YEAR	GENERAL BANGLA I	GENERAL BANGLA II	ENGLISH I	ENGLISH II	MATH	GENERAL KNOWLEDGE	OPTIONAL SUBJECTS	PSY TEST	ORAL TEST	TOTAL
(a)	(b)	(c)	(d)	(e)	(f)	(g)	(k)	(i)	(j)	(k)
72										*300
73										**500
77	100	100	100	100	100	200	600	100	200	1600
79	100	100	100	100	100	200	600	100	200	1600
82	100	100	100	100	100	200	600	100	200	1600
83										*300
83										*100
84	100		100		100	100	200	100	200	900
85-90	100	100				300	300	Pass/Fail	200	1000

Source: PSC annual reports 1972-1990.

The syllabi in the above table indicate that the PSC could not follow a consistent policy for recruitment and selection of Civil Servants. Inconsistency in assessment standards led to selection of people with such calibres which were below the minimum standard set for the Central Civil Service of Pakistan and the East Pakistan Civil Service. The lower qualifications and low grading of the officers recruited during different period bear testimony to the popular belief that variation in standard of syllabi led to selection of people with varying calibre. The higher academic qualifications and grade of exam of the candidates selected during Pakistan period is higher than those selected through these exams between 1972-1984. Academic qualifications and grading of exams of the batches of 1985-1990 period are higher than those selected during 1972-1984.

For optional subjects a candidate is being tested once by the Universities and then again by the PSC for the BCS examination. A recent study has replicated the long established belief that brilliant people perform better in tests for recruitment: "The fuller 1978 statistics of Administrative Training (AT) recruitment show a correlation between class of degree and

success in the completion and demonstrate clearly that better the class of his degree the stronger the applicant's chance of being successful".⁸

The above fact supports the view that any body who does well in University examinations usually does well in tests for selection for jobs. During Pakistani time, the brilliant university students did better in the Examinations conducted by the PSC and the high fliers of those days, i.e. the CSPs (Civil Service of Pakistan) had brilliant academic careers compared to others who joined other Central Services of Pakistan. Therefore PSC examinations in optional subjects may be done away with and the scores in the optional subjects of University Exams may be taken into account for rating of the candidates.

Though most countries of the world discarded the final selection of candidates through psychological testing and interview, Bangladesh still considers these to be acid tests for entry into the Civil Service. Professor Eysenc in the UK, and numerous American authors have criticised selection interviews as useless, or in some other cases worse than useless, with selection by interview merely reflecting the personal prejudices of the interviewer⁹. However they did not offer any alternative to the interview. In Bangladesh too the interview system has been criticised. People who conduct the interviews never received appropriate training. Interviews should be structured to maintain consistency in measuring the standards. It would be better if some sort of rating form were used for the interview. Rating forms help to avoid the so-called 'halo' effect, i.e., the tendency for the interviewer to form a broad overall impression of a candidate often overlooking important weak or strong points¹⁰.

Like the selection by interview, the selection by written examination has also been criticised as can be seen below:

"The greatest defect of the written examination is, however, the fact that it can at most test but a single aspect of an individual's general capacity as a potential civil servant. Of his character and powers of endurance, of his address and resourcefulness, of his general demeanour and discretion, of his moral courage and loyalty, of his honesty and tactfulness, of his powers of co-operation and of creative invention, above all of his quality of mind and outlook - of these vitally important elements the written papers take no account".¹¹

8 Civil Service Commission, *Report of the Committee on the Selection Procedure for the Recruitment of Administration Training*, UK, 1979, p. 9.

9 Civil Service Commission, *Report of the Working Party on the Selection of Specialists*, UK, 1972, p. 7.

10 Ibid., p 9.

11 W. A. Robson, *From Patronage to Proficiency*, (An Inquiry into Professional Qualifications and the Method of Recruitment in the Civil Service & Municipal Service), 1922, Fabian Society, p. 19.

Apart from the above inherent disadvantages, the written examination for selection of Civil Servants is mainly academic biased. This system fails to a great extent to extract hard core intellect of the candidates, their capability of administrative problem solving, level of comprehension and understanding.

The method of recruitment followed in the BCS is still patterned on the model of the British Indian Civil Service. The British have discarded many procedures and methods introduced by them in the British India and Britain before 1947. But the ex-British Colonies still maintain them. The BCS Entry examination is one of these legacies inherited and maintained by Bangladesh. Bangladesh still follows the principle of 'preference for generalists'. This is reflected in two ways: in recruitment and in the pre-eminence enjoyed by the generalist cadres. At the time of recruitment into the Civil Service, a university graduate in natural sciences, social sciences, humanities, engineering, medicine, and other subjects is treated at par and receives no preference for relevance. A university graduate in biology or chemistry, for instance, may be appointed in the Income Tax Department and a graduate in Finance may be selected for Police Department. It is believed that a candidate who has done well in the university examinations is likely to do equally well in any branch of government activity. The origin of this principle goes back to the middle of the nineteenth century, and was enunciated in the following words by Lord Macaulay, whose thinking had a great deal of influence on the public personnel system of the subcontinent.

"We believe that men who have been engaged up to one or two and twenty years in studies which have no immediate connection with the business of any profession, and to which the effect is merely to open, to invigorate and to enrich the mind, will generally be found in the business of every profession, superior to men who have, at 18 or 19 devoted themselves to the special studies of their calling"¹².

The PSC has the vital role of fitting a person to the job to which he or she is best suited. PSC maintains a dossier for successful candidates showing his or her academic, extra academic, social and psychological background. It then assigns all successful candidates into one pay-grade and one stream, irrespective of his or her past academic attainments and performance in the qualifying tests. This serves as a disincentive to brighter candidates. Besides, he/she may be assigned to any of the 30 cadres of the BCS which may be against his/her aptitudes. Usually he or she may join the cadre specified for him as alternative job may not be available. Another person securing lesser marks, by virtue of quota, may get a cadre which has better career prospect.

12 The British Parliamentary Papers, Vol. LV, 1876, "Report on the Indian Civil Service", 1854.

The cadre system creates an artificial barrier in the Civil Service on the following grounds:

- a. Recruitment to the generalist cadre is made through a combined competitive examination requiring similar academic background.
- b. The level of academic qualifications is the same in all cases.
- c. The standard of recruitment is similar in all cases.
- d. The nature of work involved in all these various services is of a generalist nature, which does not require technical qualifications, such as those, necessary for engineers, doctors and scientists.

Placement in a cadre depends on the candidates' relative position in order of merit, their personal options, the quota system, and the number of vacant posts to be filled in various cadres. Career prospect of an individual is usually decided on the day of his or joining any cadre. Thus the system of selection has a vital role in career prospect of a candidate.

Quotas and Reservation of Posts in the Civil Service

The entry-level places in the Civil Service are distributed on the basis of a number of quotas. Excepting 40% vacant posts earmarked for merit, the remaining posts are distributed on the basis of following factors: district (of origin), women, freedom fighters and tribal background. The quota system militates against the principle of equal opportunity, meritocracy and restricts the range of selection to a limited catchment area. Through the quota system, mediocre people enter the Civil Service in preference to brighter ones. The quota system is a departure from the principle of open competition.

The district quota is distributed amongst successful candidates on the basis of population. When the quota system was introduced in 1972, there existed a wide disparity in the representation of the people of various districts in the Civil Service. Facilities and institutions in the northern region were lesser than in other regions. The situation has since changed a lot. New educational institutions have been established in the undeveloped areas and the government has given top priority for the socio-economic development of the underdeveloped regions. Though there are still discrepancies in the relative levels of socio-economic development, divisive regional

sentiments did not grow because of the similarity of the ethnic and linguistic backgrounds of the people.

15% of places have been reserved for women. All the governments, past and present, have declared that women's participation in nation-wide functions would bring about change in the social continuum of the country and enhance the image, status and role of the women in the society. The policy of women empowerment is certainly laudable. But nature and certain type of jobs in the Civil Service make the womenfolk ineligible for some cadres. An Upazilla Nirbahi Officer (the chief executive officer of the Upazilla, the lowest tier of administration) and the field officers of the district administration have to collect revenue, maintain law and order and oversee development activities in the rural areas. The Police and the Ansar Officers have to undergo tough physical training and at times have to perform duties which require substantial physical and mental strength. The womenfolk of the country are not nurtured and groomed to handle this type of job. Most of the women Civil Servants are city-bred. Marriage, family life and separation from husband hinder the efficient deployment and maximum utilization of capabilities of womenfolk in these three cadres. It is extremely difficult to deploy them outside the cities. However, womenfolk may be deployed in desk-jobs when they are qualified by the BCS examination and on the basis of merit. The womenfolk in the Civil Service come from the upper strata of the society and their employment in no way helps development of the womenfolk of the larger society.

The country was liberated in 1971. The quota for Freedom Fighter was introduced in 1972 and now it is 1990. The maximum age limit for a freedom fighter is 32. This means the oldest Freedom Fighter candidate in 1990 was 11 years old during the liberation war in 1971. It was quite impossible for an eleven-year-old to take up arms against an organised army like the Pakistan Army. It is assumed that the freedom fighter quota has been maintained throughout 20 years of independence to deceive the illiterate pro-liberation forces for the ruling coterie, most of whom, were against the liberation war and they did not have any contribution towards liberation of Bangladesh. Details of BCS posts supposed to be filled through quota and actually filled through quota are shown in the table VI. 3.

Table VI. 3

Details of BCS Posts Supposed to be Filled Through Quota/ Actually Filled Through Quota

Year	Posts	Merit	Freedom Fighter		Women		Tribals		District
			Quota	Filled	Quota	Filled	Quota	Filled	
(a)	(b)	(c)	(d)	(e)	(f)	(g)	(h)	(i)	(j)
82	353	141 (40)	105 (30)	26 (25)	35 (15)	29 (83)	18 (5)	0	157 (44.5)
83	650	260 (40)	195 (30)	86 (44)	65 (15)	37 (57)	33 (5)	0	267 (41.1)
84	744	297 (40)	223 (30)	57 (26)	74 (15)	66 (89)	7 (5)	0	323 (43.4)
85	2531	1139 (45)	759 (30)	122 (16)	253 (15)	253 (100)	127 (5)	5 (4)	1012 (39.4)
86	2121	954 (45)	686 (30)	30 (5)	212 (15)	212 (100)	106 (5)	10 (9)	915 (43.1)
88-89	1166	622 (45)	350 (30)	13 (4)	117 (15)	83 (71)	59 (5)	6 (10)	442 (38)
89-90	1201	540 (45)	360 (30)	01 (.3)	119 (15)	46 (39)	57 (5)	1 (2)	586 (49)

Note: After filling 10% posts reserved for women, 99 and 96 women were recruited through merit and district quota in 1985 and 1986 respectively.

It is seen from the above table that only 45 percent candidates were selected through merit and the rest 55 percent got the civil service jobs for some other factors other than merit. It is against the very principle of meritocracy and this is going to discourage the bright students to join the civil service. Low quality of the new entrants of the civil service is going to affect the performance of the Civil Service.

The Public Administration Efficiency Study, financed by the USAID in 1989, identified 'decline in the recruitment standard' as one of the nine problems which cause low productivity in the Civil Service: "There has been a significant decline in the recruitment standard. This is linked to the gradual deterioration of the educational system in the country. The other factor is the retention of the quota system in the Civil Service".¹³

The profession of parents of the successful candidates in BCS examination held in 1982 to 1985 is shown in the table VI. 4.

Table VI. 4

Distribution of Candidates According to Guardian's Occupation

Year	Occupation of Guardian of a Candidate								Total
	Farming	Service	Teacher	Doctor	Lawyer	Engr	Business	Others	
(a)	(b)	(c)	(d)	(e)	(f)	(g)	(h)	(i)	(k)
82	99 (26)	157 (41.3)	32 (8.42)	11 (2.9)	19 (5)	3 (.8)	49 (12.9)	10 (2.7)	380
83	238 (37.4)	226 (35.5)	21 (3.3)	16 (2.5)	12 (1.9)	3 (.5)	10 (16.7)	14 (2.2)	636
84	140 (24.7)	200 (35)	61 (10.7)	28 (4.9)	16 (2.8)	8 (1.4)	100 (17.6)	16 (2.9)	569
85	568 (32.6)	618 (35.4)	141 (8.1)	50 (2.8)	33 (1.9)	4 (.2)	280 (15.6)	60 (3.4)	1788
86	509 (25.8)	778 (39.5)	248 (12)	50 (2.5)	46 (2.31)	21 (1.14)	298 (15.2)	27 (1.4)	1971
88-89	286 (25.8)	447 (40.4)	90 (8.1)	41 (3.7)	21 (1.9)	13 (1.1)	143 (13)	66 (6)	1107
89-90	285 (27.9)	4541 (44.4)	80 (7.9)	37 (3.7)	21 (2)	8 (.7)	135 (13.3)	2 (.1)	1022
	2140 (28.60)	2895 (38.70)	673 (9.05)	233 (3.1)	168 (2.25)	60 (.80)	1111 (14.85)	195 (2.6)	7479

Key: Figures within parenthesis represent percentages of the figures immediately above it.

Source: Annual Report of PSC, 1986, 1989 & 1992

From the above table it is clear that the quota system failed to ensure seats in the Civil Service for the larger section of the population - the farmers though they constitute 80% of total population. It is appropriate to mention that the undeveloped region for which the quota system was introduced is mainly agrarian. The Annual Report of the PSC for the year 1990 shows that 31%, 25%, 28%, 48%, 60%, 63% of the selected candidates came from urban background in 1982, 1983, 1984, 1985, 1986 and 1988/89 respectively and 69%, 75%, 52%, 40%, 37% of the selected candidates came from rural background during the same years¹⁴. This shows that the urban people are gradually taking more and more posts from the rural people. It further demonstrates that the purpose the quota system of helping people of backward regions failed.

13 Ministry of Establishment; *Public Administration Efficiency Study Report*, USAID, 1989, p. 8.

14 The Bangladesh Public Service Commission, *Annual Report*, p. 32, 1990

Yearly income of parents of a sample of successful candidate is shown in the table VI. 5.

Table VI. 5

Distribution of Candidates According to Guardians' Yearly Income

Year	Yearly Income of Guardian of a Candidate (in Taka)								Total
	5000- below	5001- 15000	15001- 25000	25001- 35000	35001- 45000	45001- 55000	55001- above	Not Stated	
(a)	(b)	(c)	(d)	(e)	(f)	(g)	(h)	(i)	(j)
82	26 6.8%	200 52.8%	82 21.6%	18 4.7%	17 4.5%	9 2.4%	4 1.0%	24 6.3%	380
83	44 6.9%	262 42.2%	172 27%	70 11.1%	14 2.2%	6 .9%	30 4.8%	38 5.9%	636
84	33 5.8%	170 29.9%	173 30.4%	71 12.5%	41 7.2%	30 5.3%	24 4.2%	27 4.7%	569
85	78 4.5%	450 25.8%	527 30.3%	214 12.3%	135 7.7%	128 7.3%	80 4.6%	132 7.6%	1744
86	39 1.9%	316 14.9%	452 21.8%	315 15.3%	303 14.4%	310 14.7%	100 5.1%	250 11.9%	2085
	220	1398	1406	688	510	483	238	471	5414

Source: Annual Report of PSC, 1989

The above table shows that the sons and daughters from low-income groups are gradually getting a lesser number of jobs in the Civil Service. The low-income group cannot send their wards to quality schools and colleges or afford private tuition for their children, because of higher cost of quality teaching. Candidates whose fathers earned less than Taka 1500.00 a month (equivalent to 25 US Dollar) got 60% jobs in 1982, 40% in 1983, 38% in 1984, and 30% in 1985. This clearly demonstrates that the quota system failed to ensure representation of the disadvantaged groups. The quota system benefits the individual, not a larger group of the society or a region. It adversely affects the incentives of brighter young candidates who are willing to join, and therefore dilutes the quality of the Civil Service.

Defects of Existing System and Reform Needs

Inadequacies in syllabi, and system of selection and adverse effect of the quota system call for reform of the selection system of the BCS. Poor selection of candidates will certainly result in poor performance of the Civil Service. The inadequacies of the present selection system may compel the bright students to look for jobs elsewhere-not in the

Civil Service. Bangladesh cannot go for French or US type or any other western style recruitment system as the structure of the Civil Service, and education system of Bangladesh is patterned somewhat similar to the British system. Hence the recruitment system of Bangladesh can be modelled on the British system as the latter is more or less universally acclaimed as one of the best systems of selection. The present selection system of the BCS is prototype of Method I of Britain. Method II contains some elements of Method I. As such transition from Method I to Method II will be smoother. Moreover, Bangladesh is more or less administered along British lines, the structure of the BCS has lot of similarities with the British Civil Service and the inputs of the Civil Service are also educated in a British manner. Above factors speak in favour of going for Method II system of recruitment of the British Civil Service. Bangladesh may introduce the British system of recruitment after incorporating the necessary amendments to adapt it to the socio-cultural condition of Bangladesh.

British Civil Service and Method II

However, Method II system of recruitment of the British Civil Service needs to be understood to examine its suitability for adoption or adaptation in Bangladesh. Incidentally, this researcher got an opportunity in 1990 to conduct a series of interviews with Mr. Martin Wheatley, Principal, PM Division, HM Treasury; Mr. Redway, Principal, Statistics Division, HM Treasury; Mr. Robin Horton, Principal, Ministry of Defence, which in fact helped him to have detailed briefing on the recruitment system of British Civil Service. They discussed the system of recruitment in thread-bare and told me that Method II system of examination was found to be better than Method I. Method II is being discussed in brief to examine its suitability in Bangladesh.

Candidates for the higher Civil Service in Administrative Group must have, or obtain in the year competing, a university degree before they are finally declared successful. The competition under this method does not include any written examinations on subjects taught at university level. Method II has three stages and eliminates candidates at each stage. The stages of selection are discussed below:

- a. *Written Qualification Tests:* Written Tests last one day. These consist of a passage to summarise; an exercise to test the candidates' power of constructive thinking and ability to present ideas clearly - a situation is depicted to test how they find solutions; a statistical inference test to assess ability of a candidate to handle problems couched in numerical rather than in verbal terms; a dominoes test to assess non-verbal deductive

reasoning and flexibility of thought; and data sufficiency test to assess careful and logical reasoning.

- b. *Tests by Civil Service Selection Board (CSSB)*: These tests last two days. The test is common to all competitions for entry into the British Civil Service at the level above Executive Officer. In the appointments for Administration competition, the CSSB stage comes after the Qualifying Test and before the Final Selection Board; candidates on their Higher Executive Officer Development (HEOD) competition, on nomination by their departments, go direct to CSSB. In the continuous scheme of recruitment for the Tax Inspectorate, candidates who, from the information given on their application forms or provided by the referees, seem unlikely to succeed are sifted out; the remainder are invited to attend a preliminary interview with two serving members of the Inspectorate. Those recommended are then considered at CSSB, after which a decision is taken - except in a very small number of borderline cases, which are referred to the Final Selection Board. CSSB has following parts: (i) The written part is a simulation of an official file - on an imaginary administrative problem which does not assume any prior knowledge or any special skills to solve the problem. (ii) oral test candidates are organised into group of five or six for informal discussion of two or three topics of general interest. The groups act as mock committees where each participant is rotated as chairman for 15 minutes and asked to give a decision on a particular problem. (iii) A three-member assessment team, consisting of serving or recently retired senior Civil Servants as chairman, a young principal or equivalent post holder, and a psychologist, conducts individual personal interviews of each candidate. Performance at the CSSB, their past academic attainments and the referee's reports (or reference from candidate's university tutor) are reflected in a report of the CSSB. The Commission then selects the candidates on the basis of these reports for final interview.
- c. *The Final Selection Board*: This is composed of the First Civil Service Commissioner or his Deputy as chairman, and four members - two senior Civil Servants, one university teacher, and another outsider. The board conducts open-ended interviews of the candidates on general topics. The board awards marks for candidates' intellectual and personal qualities, performance throughout the selection procedures including the CSSB, and the past academic attainments¹⁵.

Several scholars and social scientists have criticised the Method II system. R. K. Kelsall opined that the candidates selected through method II might be lower in academic standard

15 Alec Atkinson, *Selection of Fast Stream Graduate Entrants for the Home Civil Service*, UK, 1990, p. 17.

than their counterpart in method I¹⁶. The general emphasis of Method II is on width of interest rather than depth of knowledge or understanding¹⁷. The advocates of Method II counter its critic with the argument that Method II represents a genuine effort to match the people with the type of work they will be required to perform¹⁸. According to Professor W. A. Robson, the merit of method II lies in skimming the intellectual qualities of the candidates by putting him or her through tests for the sort of working ability in dealing with hypothetical administrative problems, instead of examining the intellectual qualities or academic knowledge of candidates by making them sit the tests on subjects of their honours degree from a British University. They demonstrate a candidate's powers of leadership, ability to co-operate, alertness in grasping a situation, quickness in assimilating relevant facts, lucidity and persuasiveness in presenting a point of view, ability to understand the administrative or the political implications of a problem, resourcefulness in solving it, capacity for team work and good fellowship. They disclose intellectual power in action, and they make it possible to distinguish the man or woman of constructive outlook from the negative, indifferent, or specious type. They permit a much nearer approximation to a judgement of a whole man from the old-fashioned style of written competitive examination¹⁹. The procedures adopted allow for a friendly but searching review of the candidate's personal qualities and intelligence to be undertaken by the staff of the Board²⁰.

Method II was introduced in 1948 and reviewed in 1957 after 10 years. The British Government found Method II satisfactory. Regarding the utility of Method II Sir Percival Waterfield says:

"As regards the Public Service it may be said with confidence that the use of group selection methods such as employed at CSSB has proved well worthwhile, and that the system has come to stay".²¹

In spite of superiority of Method II over Method I, Method I and Method II continued side by side for some more years. In 1966, Method I produced only 6 successful candidates while 117 came out successful through Method II. About 160 question papers had to be prepared covering the entire range of university syllabuses and there were four times as many question papers as there were candidates to take the examination in Method²². Most of the members of the Fulton Committee wanted to

16 R. K. Kelsall (2nd ed.), *Higher Civil Servants in Britain*, London, 1956, p. 62.

17 Ibid.

18 Muzaffar Ahmed Choudhury, *The Civil Service in Pakistan*, NIPA, Dacca, 1969, p. 153.

19 W. A. Robson (ed.), *Recent Trends in Public Administration in the Civil Service in Britain and France*, London 1956, p. 55.

20 E. N. Gladden, *Civil Service or Bureaucracy*, Staples, 1956, p. 72.

21 Sir P. Waterfield, 'Civil Servant Recruitment in Public Administration', in *JRPA*, 1958, Vol.36. p. 8.

22 Reader, *The Civil Service Commission 1855-1975*, UK, p. 63.

retain Method I after modification with the aim of giving preference to candidates offering 'relevant' degree of subjects. As per the recommendations of the Fulton Committee, an inquiry by J.G.W. Davies concluded that Method II was a selection system to which the Public Service could point with pride²³. Method II has stood the test of time and proved to be effective in recruiting people with right calibre. A Committee on the Selection procedure for the Recruitment of Administrative Trainees, under the chairmanship of Dr. F H Allen CB, the First Civil Service Commissioner reviewed the Method II system in 1979.²⁴ There were peripheral changes in the system. The substance of the Method II remained intact. Alec Atkinson, a senior civil servant was appointed by the British Government to review the Selection Fast Stream Graduate Entrants for the Home Civil Service, UK, in 1982, recommended in his report to continue the Method II system of selection.²⁵

Concluding Comments

Inadequacies of the existing system of recruitment for the BCS in Bangladesh and advantages of Method II of Britain discussed in the preceding paragraphs indicate the utility of the Method II for the BCS. While the syllabi of the BCS exams include the academic subjects which the candidates have already studied previously in their respective academic institutions, under Method II the syllabi include primarily non-academic subjects. It happens more often than not that the PSC in Bangladesh takes approximately one year to select candidates from the date of submission of applications: conducting academic and non-academic exams and issue of appointment letter to the candidate. But under Method II system the time required for recruitment will be reduced to a minimum. By far the most, the introduction of Method II system of selection for the BCS, of course after due modifications to meet the needs of the BCS, may not only ensure recruitment of candidates with right qualifications, but it may also draw brighter recruits to the BCS. Because 'merit' will be the foremost criterion of the selection process under Method II system. The change and management of change from existing Method I type of recruitment to Method II have to be studied in depth for its adoption and adaptation in the BCS.

23 Report of the Committee on the Selection Procedure for Recruitment of Administration Trainees, (Chairman, J.G.W.Davies, Cmnd, HMSO, London, 1969); Gevin Drewry and Tony Butcher, *The Civil Service Today*, Basil Blackwall, 1988, p. 105.

24 Atkinson, Alec, *Selection of Fast Stream Graduate Entrants for the Home Civil Service*, UK, HMSO, 1983, p. 2.

25 Ibid, p. 6.

Chapter VII

ANNUAL CONFIDENTIAL REPORT

Introduction

Performance is a function of interaction of individual's ability, effort and situation. If talented people are recruited, trained to enhance their ability and their performance is properly assessed for reward, recognition or corrective measures, they are likely to put best efforts to achieve organisational goals. Hence performance appraisal of individuals is a very important aspect of career management. To some extent, promotions in the Bangladesh Civil Service (BCS) are based on evaluating the performances of the BCS officers through the use of an instrument called Annual Confidential Report (ACR). If the design and operation of ACRs is faulty or inadequate, ACR will affect the career prospect of serving individuals and make the Civil Service career less attractive to the prospective recruits of better caliber. ACRs of the BCS officers, the literature on the subject, empirical evidence of the systems of performance appraisal in the British Civil Service, the US Civil Service and the Malaysian Civil Service have been studied in this chapter to diagnose inadequacies of the ACR of the BCS and recommend measures for improvement of performance appraisal System in the BCS.

The remainder of this introductory section includes conceptual discussions on such important appraisal issues as factors of appraisal, role of the appraiser and the techniques of appraisal. However, the use and purposes of the performance appraisal system need to be clarified before beginning the discussions on the factors of appraisal. Different countries and different organisations use the Performance Appraisal for different purposes. Government organisations use appraisal for (1) aid in making annual salary recommendations, (2) assist in identifying employees capable of being promoted, and (3) justify adverse personnel actions e.g., dismissals and demotions¹. Lopez² groups the

1 H. S. Field and, W. H. Holley, "Subordinates' Characteristics, Supervisors' Ratings, and Decision to Discuss Appraisal Results", *Academy of Management Journal*, 1977, Vol. 20, pp. 315-321; K. J. Lacho, G. K. Stearns, and M. F. Villere, "A Study of Employee Appraisal Systems of Major Cities in the United States", *Public Personnel Management*, March-April, 1979; J. W. Gardener, *Excellence: Can we be equal and Excellent Too?* New York, Harper & Row, 1961

2 F. M. Lopez, *Evaluating Employee Performance*, Public Personnel Association, Chicago, 1968, p.16.

purposes of the Performance Appraisal into three categories: (1) information, (2) motivation, and (3) development. From the theoretical and empirical research, following four purposes of Performance Appraisal can be identified³: (1) administrative (decisions on promotion, salary increase, placement, discharge etc., organisation planning); (2) motivational (appraisal interviews, counseling, participation in goal-setting and work-planning, self-appraisal etc); (3) developmental (counseling, training and development, communication); and (4) Performance development (through MbO and other goal-setting and work planning processes).

Factors for Appraisal

Continuous research during the last 60 years in the developed countries led to phenomenal development in the Performance Appraisal system. But the validity and reliability of the Performance Appraisal system for evaluation of performance and personality traits is still questioned by many⁴. Notwithstanding the controversy the emphasis on the Performance Appraisal system persists as there is no other alternative. Mainly two factors are appraised-- personality-traits and performance. For the last three decades appraisals were trait-based; emphasis on performance-based evaluation is recent. Trait-based appraisal consists of an evaluation of general factors such as personality traits and general skills or duties that are not unique to a particular individual or job series based upon specific job requirements or performance standard. Performance based evaluations focus upon work behaviour and the results accomplished by the employee⁵. Trait-rating cannot be used for motivational and developmental purposes. Traits cannot be observed directly. The valuation of trait is inferential and subjective. It is vulnerable to various kinds of rater biases and errors, such as 'halo'⁶, 'excessive strictness or leniency'⁷, 'central tendency'⁸, 'constant errors'⁹, 'latest behaviour bias', 'initial impression

3 Mihir K. Basu, *Managerial Performance in India.*, Vision Books, India, 1988, p. 15.

4 S. L. Sokolik, *Guidelines in the Search for Effective Appraisals*, Personnel Journal, Vol. 46, November, 1967, p. 660; F. C. Thayer, "Civil Service Reform and Performance Appraisal: A Policy Disaster", *Public Personnel Management*, Vol. 10, Prentice Hall, 1983, p. 1.

5 B. Tyler Charles, *Employee Performance Appraisal: Factors in Search of a Technique*, *Public Personnel Administration: Problems and Prospect*; Stephen W. Hays and Richard C. Kearney, Prentice Hall, 1993, pp. 121-122.

6 Ernest J. McCromic & Joseph Tiffin: *Industrial Psychology*, Prentice-Hall of India Pvt. Ltd., New Delhi, 1979, p. 209, and 'horns' (George S. Odione: MbO II; Arnold Heinemann Publishers (India) Pvt. Ltd., New Delhi, 1983.

7 Dale Yoder, *Personnel Management and Industrial Relations*, Prentice Hall of India Pvt. Ltd., New Delhi, p. 373.

bias', 'spill over effect', 'status effect', 'same-as-me effect', and 'different-from-me effect' and 'regency effect'. Field and Holley opined that a trait might have more than one dimension; supervisors evaluate on the basis of inference rather than observation; intelligence and learning ability are difficult to assess and require constant observation even to approximate a reliable judgment. Researchers have questioned the validity of using the same factors to evaluate employees in different job classifications and with widely different levels of responsibility¹⁰. Faulty design of the appraisal will hinder the attainment of the objectives of the appraisal.

Role of the Evaluator

Evaluator/rater error is the most serious error in the appraisal. Rater's individual characteristics, personal appraisee related prejudices or negligence attitude towards Performance Appraisal lead to evaluator error. Quality of his/her perception and insight, his/her sense of values matured through many years of experience, his/her observation skills and cognitive abilities i.e., his/her quality of mind will determine the quality of judgment and the value of appraisal. Some supervisors have a great deal of difficulty writing useful and objective performance reports. Some appraisals tend to be very subjective, impressionistic, and noncomparable to the reports of other raters due to error in evaluating. Strong-minded supervisors with very high standards will do their employees an injustice unintentionally when compared with raters who have low standards or who are less professional. Detailed instructions have to be attached with each ACR form cautioning the evaluators against usual rater biases. Terminologies used in the Appraisal form and the prescribed scale-values have to be defined. Specific examples have to be cited by the rater in support of top grade and the lowest grade. A short but comprehensive training on 'performance appraisal' should be included in all training courses. To counter the inadequacies of written assessment by a supervisor, five other types of evaluators have been being used: (1) Self-appraisals: Where appraisee evaluates himself/herself; (2) Peer-ratings: Where one's peers rate him/her; (3) Reverse appraisal: Where the subordinate writes about his/her line managers/supervisors; (4). Group or external ratings: Where an independent rater or a group rates performance of other supervisors; (5) 360° Degree Feedback: Where superiors, peers, subordinates and clienteles evaluate the appraisee.

8 A. Pizzam, "Social Differentiation- A New Psychological Barrier to Performance Appraisal", *Public Personnel Management*, Vol. 4, 1975, pp. 244-247.

9 Dale Yoder, *Ibid.*, p. 373.

10 F. J. Landy and J. L. Farr, "Performance Rating", *Psychological Bulletin*, Vol. 87, 1980, pp. 72-107.

Techniques of Appraisal

There are more than ten techniques of appraisal which vary widely in terms of their purpose and operation. In Essay method it is difficult to compare different pen picture with each other. Besides written expression varies from rater to rater. The report speaks more about the command on language of the rater than the appraisee. As there is no specificity of performance, rater depends more on inferences. It has very limited uses for administrative as well as feedback purposes. In ranking method the subordinates are graded from the best to the worst by the Report Initiating Officer. Paired Comparison is a form of ranking which requires a comparison of each person in the group with each other person and the recording of a judgment of "superior." Selection of the best is too complicated and ranking in large organisations is not useful. Graphic rating scale in its differing variants e.g., alphabetical/ numerical/ graphic require a manager to rate his subordinates on certain pre-determined personality traits or work qualities (or a mixture of both) on a 4-or-5-or-6-point scale, using either numerals, (e.g. 1 to 5) or alphabets (e.g. A to E) or descriptive adjectives (e.g. outstanding and poor) by putting a tick mark at an appropriate position along a continuum. It was originally applied to hourly-rated workers, but was extended after World War II to managerial personnel¹¹. Graphic rating scale apparently may give an illusion of objectivity but fails to eliminate the bias of the raters. In fact the chances of bias may be higher in this method. As Stahl points out, this method "relies on translation of qualitative judgments into quantitative terms under circumstances in which the factors evaluated are too complex or general to permit genuine standardization"¹². More over, it is mainly trait-based and trait-based judgment is subjective. The Forced Choice Technique is so designed that the rater has no way of knowing which of the statements is related to success on the job or which is associated with poor performance. This way the rater bias is supposed to be eliminated. But it involves considerable resources for background research and development effort. As the appraiser cannot know how the final rating values are derived, this system is resented and distrusted by the appraiser. Forced Distribution Method is designed in such a way that the rater is forced to assign certain prescribed proportions of the rated employees to each of the established categories e.g., from outstanding to poor. It presents the rater with several blocks of statements describing favourable and unfavorable characteristics or behavior and rater is asked which of the behavior is characteristic and which least characteristic of the appraisee. The scoring is confidential. The statements are developed on the basis of extensive research

11 Harold Koonz, *Appraising Managers as Managers*, McGraw Hill, New York, 1971, p. 47.

12 O. Glenn. Stahl, *Public Personnel Administration*, New York, Harper & Row, 1976, 7th edition, p. 208.

on effective and ineffective job behaviours. Main purpose of this method is to eliminate the rater's personal bias from influencing rating. Like Forced Choice Technique, problem arises with Forced Distribution Method when merging incumbents in various work units into one overall ranking for the whole organisation. The merger of ranking by different raters may not reflect accurately relative standings between members of different groups. It is not in much use these days as percentage becomes meaningful when a large group is rated by a single appraiser¹³. Flangan and Burns devised the Critical Incident technique¹⁴. The appraiser maintains through out the appraisal period a record of critical incidents of behavior and performance, effective and ineffective, each of his subordinates. The technique is often used in combination with other techniques to provide a tangible factual basis for justifying the final rating and for giving feedback to the appraisee. Main problem with the system is that recording of incident is time consuming, and costly in terms of effort, and money. It only gives data about performance; it is not a performance appraisal by itself. In the BARS (Behaviourally Anchored Rating Scale) technique behavioural scales are based on some form of analysis to determine job related behavioural criteria. This technique is a significant improvement beyond Global Essays and Graphic Rating Scale¹⁵. While the principle behind it is apparently sound, extensive psychometric research is required to develop these scales. In 1954 Drucker introduced the idea of Management by Objective. He says: "Performance that is expected of managers must be derived from the performance goal of the business, his result must be measured by the contribution they make of the success of the enterprise."¹⁶

Odione defines MbO: " ... Process whereby the superior and subordinate managers of an organisation jointly identify its common goals, define each individual's major areas of responsibility in terms of the results expected, and use these measures as guides for operating the unit and assessing the contribution of each of its members." ¹⁷

MbO uses a participative approach as part of broad plan to integrate organisational and personal objectives related to organisational goals. All employees have to participate in varying degrees in setting organisational objectives as well as planning their work,

13 John B. Miner, *Management Appraisal: A Capsule Review and Current References, Organisational Behavior and Industrial Psychology*, 1975, p. 19.

14 C. Flangan John and K Burns Robert, "The Employee Performance Record", *Harvard Business Review*, September- October, 1955; as Reproduced in Reprints of Selected Articles Series, Harvard Business Review, 1972, pp. 89-96.

15 L. Devires Rating David, Ann Morison, L. Shullman Sandra & L. Gerlach Michel, *Performance Appraisal on the Line*, John Wiley & Sons, New York, 1981, p. 67.

16 F. Drucker Peter, *The Practice of Management*, Mercury Books, London, 1965, p. 119.

17 S. Odionne George, *MbO II: A System of Managerial Leadership for the 80's*, Arnold Heinemann publishers Pvt. Ltd, New Delhi, 1983, p. 43.

appraising their performance, and planning their career development. Target dates are fixed, and at predetermined times the results are evaluated against the objectives set earlier. Success of this approach depends on careful planning, active participation, follow-up, and a regular review. This goal-oriented approach, by having focus on the amount and quality of work accomplished, makes it possible to appraise performance more in terms of specific work goals than ambiguous personality traits. This method evaluates the characteristics of the work being done, not the employee doing the work. Employee participation in goal-setting, performance standards, and appraisals promote fairer and objective appraisal and result in increase in efficiency and employee motivation. MbO has drawbacks too: (1) it cannot appraise and identify potential; (2) goal-setting is time consuming; (3) actual accomplishment is often influenced by external factors beyond appraisee's control; (4) the degree to which an individual can be held accountable for results which depend on inter-dependent employee efforts is questionable. Drawbacks of MbO can be offset if it is used in combination with other techniques. For promotability and identification of potential assessment centre techniques, etc can be used along with MbO. Factors which were not beyond control of the ratee and factors which depend on inter-dependent employee effort can be explained by the appraisee during interview with the supervisor and supervisor can record this in pen picture or separately in the ACR form. With all its demerits, the MbO far outweighs the advantages of other methods. Performance Appraisal based on MbO has been introduced in the US, New Zealand, UK, Malaysia and some public enterprises and private enterprises in India. In these countries, performance is linked with all aspects of personnel management including salary increases, and rewarding merit.

ACRs in Bangladesh

In Bangladesh, the period of ACR covers from January to December. As per government instruction, ACR has such purposes as: (1) to ensure accountability in the Civil Service; (2) to provide cumulative record of an officer's performance; (3) to provide a means for improving personnel performance; (4) to supply vital information for posting, transfer, training, career advancements and other personnel decisions; and (5) to provide for an important instrument for career planning.¹⁸ In reality, the ACR in the BCS rarely serves those purposes stated in government instructions referred to above. However, ACRs play a part in promotion decisions. Up until 1984, the ACR form was in 'Essay' method. The officers used to be graded in five point rating scale from very good to poor.

18 Ministry of Establishment, Government of Bangladesh, *Instructions for Filling up ACR Form 1 and ACR Form 2*, 1982, p. 2

Promotability of the officers had to be expressed in specific terms in the ACR. A Martial Law Committee was set up to review the ACR form in 1982. The contents of ACR in the Civil Service were strictly a secret. The officer reported upon (appraisee) was given only the extracts of adverse remarks, if any. The appraisee had no feedback or information about improvement of his weak points, and thereby ACR lost developmental value for improvement of appraisee and encouraging effect¹⁹. Based on the recommendations of the Martial Law Committee, ACR forms were revised incorporating some of the features of ACR forms of the Bangladesh Army. It can be mentioned here that the Bangladesh Army ACR form has been devised in the line of the British Army's Graphic Rating system. The ACR was made open so that appraisees could know their strengths and weaknesses for their improvement and development. The decisions of providing feedback of weak points to the concerned individuals allegedly led to overrating and deterioration of personal relationship between the appraisee and the appraiser. As such the Government made the ACR closed again from 1985. But a BPATC study conducted amongst 293 officers of SSP, BCS (Admin), and BCS (Sectt) found the contention "openness led to overrating" is not based on any hard evidence. Overrating was a phenomenon before openness of the ACR, after openness in 1982 and even the closure of the ACR after 1984²⁰. According to the BPATC survey, about 25% officers got excellent ACRs, and about 83% officers (if the score of second top grading is added with that of the top grading) obtained Excellent/Very good grading²¹. If Bangladesh had so many good officers, Bangladesh could do far better in all fields of government activity. Rater bias/error may make the appraisal system ineffective. Rater error can be minimised through training:

"although the results are mixed, the most promising approach to increasing the quality of rating appears to be a combination of factors including good scales, well-trained raters, and a context that supports and encourages the appraisal process. With respect to training, Latham (1988) and Fay and Latham (1982) found that training in the technical aspects of the performance appraisal process, if done properly, can lead to more accurate ratings. Their results suggest that if raters are trained to recognise effective and ineffective performance and are informed about pitfalls such as the influence of false first impressions, they can provide more reliable and accurate ratings than raters who have not received training."²²

19 Office of Chief martial Law Administrator, *Reports of the Martial Law Committee on the ACR of the BCS*, 1982, para 43.

20 BPATC, *Performance Appraisal System for Class I Officers in Bangladesh*, Bangladesh Public Administration Training Centre, Savar, Dhaka, 1989, p. 26.

21 Ibid., p. 44.

22 George T. Milkovitch and Alexandra. K. Wigdor, *Pay for Performance: Evaluating Performance Appraisal and Merit Pay*, National Research Council, Washington DC, 1991, p. 70.

Another survey of the BPATC found that 84 out of 246 (34%) respondents (members of Admin, Police and Public works) who got more than 80% (grading of A and A+) marks in their ACRs had full knowledge about their ACRs and 82 out of 246 (33.5%) had partial knowledge²³. It indicates that even if the ACRs are not supposed to be shown to the appraisee, they can know about their scores if the markings of the ACRs are very good/good. Appraisees who cannot know about their ACRs are likely to assume that they have not been awarded very good markings in their ACRs. As appraisal results are not disclosed, the ACR lost its motivational and developmental value. Studies in developed countries suggest that disclosures of ACR may not have that negative effects as allegedly experienced by Bangladesh. A study in North America says that lowering of standard does not occur always due to feedback²⁴. Mayer *et al* study says that an excessive amount of criticism (an average of 13) may well provoke defensive feelings especially if the criticism is directed towards the person rather than his or her performance²⁵. Regarding feedback Goodale says that specific feedback is most useful to an employee and general comment without specific reference is not useful²⁶. Several studies in the US on impact of feedback of ACR confirms the positive impact on performance:

" ... performance feedback does have a positive impact on worker productivity as measured in terms of production rates, error rates, and backlogs (Guzzo and Bondy, 1983; Guzzo et al., 1985, Kopelman, 1986). Landy *et al.* (1982) have shown that performance feedback has utility that far exceeds its cost, and that a valid feedback system can lead to substantial performance gains."²⁷

There is no system of interview between the appraisers and the appraisee in the Bangladesh Civil Service. Some surveys indicate that many organisations in the developed countries consider the appraisal interview to be of vital importance to the achievement of developmental and motivational objectives²⁸. But the appraiser should have necessary skills and willingness to conduct the interview. Studies show that subordinate preparation leads to positive interview outcomes²⁹. Some research has shown

23 BPATC, *A Study of the Career Development Programme in the BCS*; BPATC, Savar, Dhaka, 1988, p.XI-3.

24 Williams, 1981, pp. 32-33.

25 W. E. Beveridge, "Attitudes to Appraisal in Three Work Organizations", *Management Education and Development*, 1974, Vol. 5, pp. 123-129, p. 35.

26 J. G. Goodale, "*Behaviorally-based rating scales: toward an integrated approach to performance appraisal*" in W. Clay Hamner and F. L.Schmidt, *Contemporary Problems in Personnel*, Chicago, Ill: St.Clair Press, revised edition, 1977, p. 16.

27 George T. Milkovich, and Alexandra. K. Wigdor, *Pay for Performance: Evaluating Performance Appraisal and Merit Pay*, National Research Council, Washington DC, 1991, p. 65.

28 F. F. Fournies, *Management Performance Appraisal: a national study*, Somerville, N. J: FF Fournies associates, 1973, p. 54.

29 S.V. Dulewicz, "Job appraisal review in HMSO", *An Evaluation including a before and after study*,

that a balanced review of both strengths and weaknesses is most effective in contributing to positive interview outcomes³⁰. In their studies on the effects of voluntary discussion of appraisal ratings Field and Holley found that voluntary discussion tended to be associated with lower than higher ratings though earlier research demonstrated that mandatory disclosure may inflate ratings³¹. The above empirical evidence demonstrates that disclosure of contents of ACR does not necessarily result in overrating. Rather subordinate preparation for disclosure, supervisor's training for interviewing the subordinates, disclosure about level of achievement and how to improve future performance may motivate the appraisees to develop himself/herself.

The BPATC found the revised form superior to the old form as evidenced from the following:

" The objective of the new ACR form is comprehensive. Apart from strengthening supervisory control and testing the suitability for promotion, the new ACR system attempted to identify training needs of individual employees, provide inputs for placement decisions and to provide feedback to employees for increasing productivity.... The new ACR form is obviously an improvement on the old form."³²

The BPATC study criticised some aspects of the revised form, e.g., the post-1982 form had all the faults of graphic rating system, personality traits were given 90% marks while the actual performance had only 10 marks and some of the personality traits were so much correlated that there was no justification of having so many personality traits in the ACR form³³. In the BPATC study, out of 47 respondents, 94% stated that they depend on memory to write ACRs³⁴. If incidents are not recorded and appraisers have to rely on memories, there is a great likelihood of the appraisal being made on more recent events rather than on performance throughout the whole review period. This creates bias in the rating and it is

BSRD Report No. 32, London: Civil Service Department, 1976. See also R. J. Burke, *et al* "Characteristics of Effective Employee Performance and Development Interviews: replication and extension", *Journal of Personnel Psychology*, 1978, Vol. 31, pp. 903-919.

30 C. A. Fletcher, "Interview Style and the Effectiveness of Appraisal", *Journal of Occupational Psychology*, 1973, Vol. 47, pp. 225-230; C. A. Fletcher and R. S. Williams, "Influence of Performance Feedback in Appraisal Interviews", *Journal of Occupational Psychology*, 1976, vol 49, pp 75-83, T. H., Stone "An Examination of Six Prevalent Assumptions concerning Performance Appraisal", *Public Personnel Management*, November-December 1978, p. 35, pp. 408- 414.

31 H. S. Field and W. H. Holley, "Subordinates' Characteristics, Supervisors' Ratings, and Decision to Discuss Appraisal Results", *Academy of Management Journal*, 1977, Vol. 20, p. 11, pp. 315-321; H. S. Field and W. H. Holley, "Subordinates' Characteristics, Supervisors' Ratings, and Decision to Discuss Appraisal Results", *Academy of Management Journal*, 1977, Vol. 20, p. 11, pp. 315-321.

32 *Bangladesh Public Administration Training Center Study of ACRs*, 1989, p. 23.

33 *Ibid.*, p. 26.

34 *Ibid.*, p. 70.

termed recency effects. The BPATC study recommended adoption of result-oriented Performance Appraisal in phases, modifications of ACR forms giving more marks for actual performance, non-pecuniary rewards for good performers, training for appraiser, maintenance of confidentiality of ACRs till introduction of result-oriented ACR, and a project for further study of ACRs³⁵.

Glaring example of inadequacies of ACR system can be found from the following:

" ... very often the officers reported upon have been assessed 'not fit for promotion', though the overall rating of the officer was satisfactory and he had fulfilled all the criteria for promotion prescribed in the recruitment rule... initiating officer had made adverse comments in different column of the ACR forms but the officers reported upon have been recommended for promotion. It is extremely undesirable to have contradictory remarks in the ACRs. The Commission has further noted that the adverse comments are not communicated to the concerned officer for long time. Some cases of writing ACRs after long delay have come to the notice of the Public Service Commission." ³⁶

The Revised ACR in Bangladesh

The government of Bangladesh did not pay any heed to the recommendations of the BPATC Study. The ACR form was again changed without any exhaustive study. In the post-82 ACR, a personal or performance attribute had 5 to 1 scale and every numerical value was linked with a brief statement of trait. The rater could be guided to award the score as per the level of qualities stated against a particular score. In the latest ACR, every trait has been ranked from 4 to 1 and there is no description of qualities which merit 4, 3, 2 or 1. This sort of awarding score may enhance the chance of rater error. As we shall see in subsequent sections, both Malaysian and the British Civil Service have combined score with statement of qualities. There is no written rationale of changing from Forced Distribution Method to Forced Choice Technique. The post 1982-ACR had detail instruction for appraiser, appraisee, and all other concerned players regarding operating the ACR. In the latest ACR, these important instructions have been reduced to bear minimum. There are no instructions for the appraisee to seek recourse against any adverse remarks by the Report Initiating Officer in the latest ACR.

In post-82 ACR, there were 8 PERSONAL ATTRIBUTES and 12 PERFORMANCE ATTRIBUTES (20 attributes in total) with rating scale 1 to 5. Every mark contained descriptive adjective such as "*Punctuality: Never late in attendance=5; Rarely late in*

35 Ibid., pp. 108-110.

36 BPSC, *Annual Report 1990*, Dhaka, 1991, p. 18.

attendance=4; Generally punctual=3; Occasionally late=2; Habitually a latecomer=1". The post-1982 ACR form had only 40% marks for PERSONAL QUALITIES and 60% marks for PERFORMANCE ATTRIBUTES and out of 60, 50 were reserved for personal traits and 10 for quality and quantity of work. In the latest ACR, there are 10 parts, namely- (1) Part I- Bio Data of the Appraiser; (2) Part-II- Medical Checkup Reports; (3) Part III- Job Description; (4) Part IV- Personality Traits; (5) Part 5- Performance: 13 Personal attributes and 12 Performance attributes; (6) Part VI- Pen picture covering 5 attributes - (i) Personality; (ii) Professional Ability; (iii) Loyalty and Reliability; (iv) Any other points; and (v) Advice to the Officer Reported Upon; (7) Part VII- Recommendations; (8) Part VIII- Remarks of the Countersigning officer; (9) Part IX- Additional Remarks; and (10) Comments of the Ministry/Division. Main Part of the ACR is the Part V- Performance which contains 25 attributes. The attributes are graded from 4 to 1 and there is no descriptive adjective for awarding score. In this case the rater will be totally subjective in giving marks. Four new attributes such as reliability, capability to take decision, interest and capability to train subordinates, promptness in initiating and countersigning ACR have been added and 'Sense of Responsibility and Devotion to Duty' has been bifurcated into two attributes- 'Sense of Responsibility' has been included in PERSONAL ATTRIBUTE' and 'Devotion to Duty' in PERFORMANCE ATTRIBUTE. The form contains 52% marks for 13 PERSONAL QUALITIES and 48% marks for PERFORMANCE ATTRIBUTES. Out of 48% mark earmarked for 12 performance attributes- only 8% are earmarked for quality and quantity of work. Some of the items of PERSONAL ATTRIBUTES and PERFORMANCE ATTRIBUTES of the post-1982 ACR have been interchanged in the PERSONAL ATTRIBUTES and PERFORMANCE ATTRIBUTES in the latest ACR. There seem to be no reasoning for such a change. In fact, other than the QUALITY OF WORK and OUTPUT OF WORK, all attributes of the latest ACR form are PERSONALITY TRAITS/BEHAVIOURAL ATTRIBUTES. Scholars, practitioners and Dr. Akbar Ali Khan *et al* (in the BPATC Study on ACR) vehemently criticised the trend or convention of having too many attributes in the Performance Appraisal to the neglect of volume and quality of work. Research on ineffectiveness of personality attribute -as an indicator for performance measurement and empirical evidence led most of the developed countries to put more emphasis on goal-setting/result-oriented method of appraisal. The Ministry of Establishment, in spite of all valid arguments against personal traits, earmarked only 8 percent marks for performance. In the latest form jobs performed in the year of ACR and information about year of ACR is under bio data which does not seem to be proper. There should have been separate 'part' in ACR form for the tasks performed during the ACR year. Comparability of the post-1982 ACR (enclosed as Appendix VII.1) and the latest ACR (Latest ACR enclosed as Appendix

VII.2) became difficult as the score for overall grading has been changed which is shown in table VII.1.

Table VII. 1
Comparison of Score/Grading of Post-1982 and Latest ACR Form

Grading	Score of Post 1982 Form	Score of Latest Form	Remarks
Outstanding	91-100	95-100	
Good/Very Good	81-90	85-94	Very Good in the latest form
High Average/Good	65-89	61-84	Good in the latest form
Average	45-64	41-60	
Below Average	31-44	Below 40	

Comparison between personal attributes of post-1982 ACR and the latest ACR is shown in table VII.2.

Table VII. 2
Comparison Between Personal Attributes of Post-1982 ACR and Latest ACR

Sl.	Post-1982 ACR	Latest ACR	Remarks
(a)	(b)	(c)	(d)
1	Sense of Discipline	Same as post-82 ACR	
2	Judgment and Sense of Proportion	Do	
3	Intelligence	Do	
4	Initiative and Drive	Do	
5	Public Relations	Do	
6	Co-operation	Do	
7	Personality	Do	
8	Security Consciousness	Do	
9		Punctuality	Brought from PERFORMANCE of post-82 ACR
10		<i>Reliability</i>	<i>New addition</i>
11		Sense of responsibility	Bifurcated from PERFORMANCE of post-82 ACR.
12		Interest in work	Same as serial 9
13		Promptness in taking action and carrying out orders	Do

The above changes in the marking for grading are not based on any study. Officials concerned with dealing with the ACRs of the Ministry of Establishment told me that as

too many people were getting top and second top grade, markings for the top and the second top have been raised. This does not seem too justify the change in the score for grading. Instead the Report Initiating Officers and the Countersigning Officers could be instructed to give reasoning with specific examples for giving top grade. This would have stopped overrating to some extent.

Table VII. 3

Comparison Between Performance Attributes of Post-1982 and Latest ACR

Sl.	Post-1982 ACR	Latest ACR	Remarks
(a)	((b)	(c)	(d)
1	Professional Knowledge	Same as post-82 ACR	
2	Quality of Work	Do	
3	Output of Work	Do	
4	Punctuality	Do	Transferred to TRAIT
5	* Sense of Responsibility and Devotion to Duty	Devotion to Duty	Sense of responsibility transferred to TRAIT
6	Promptness in Taking Action and Carrying out Orders		Same as above
7	Interest in Work		Do
8	Ability to Supervise and Guide	Do	
9	Relationship with Colleagues	Do	
10	Capability to Implement Decision	Do	
11	Power of Expression-written	Do	
12	Power of Expression-Oral	Do	
		Capability to Take Decision	New addition
		Interest and Capability to Train Subordinates	New addition
		Promptness in Initiating and Countersigning ACR	New addition

Some of the traits are highly correlated. If some one is disciplined (column 1c of Table VII.2), he has to be punctual (column 9c of Table VII.2). If one does not have sense of responsibility (column 11c of Table VII.2), he cannot have devotion to duty (column 5c of Table VII.2) and nor he can be disciplined and punctual. If an official is having 'sense of responsibility' he is bound to be security conscious'. There seems to be no need for a separate attribute for 'Security Consciousness (column 8c, Table VII.2)'. There is a separate column for personality which may not be required at all since all the other traits of the ACR form combined together make the personality of a person. 'Initiative and drive' (column 4c Table VII.2), 'Promptness in taking action and carrying out orders' (column 13c Table VII.2) and 'Interest in work' (column 12c Table VII.2) are also highly correlated. Co-operation (column 6c Table VII.2), public relations (column 5 c Table VII.2) and relationships with colleagues (column 9c Table VII.2) are so much correlated that deficiency in one may lead to failure in others. There is no logic behind having separate scores for correlated traits. Apart from these, there are other correlated traits in the ACR form too which have not been discussed here.

Equal weightage for different traits like sense of responsibility, professional knowledge and public relations has no basis. A very small percentage of BCS officers have to deal with the members of public directly. Co-operation may easily cover this trait. Professional knowledge is one of the vital requirements for attainment of objectives. But it has been equated with co-operation etc which has lesser importance compared to professional knowledge.

Deficiency in one quality may not create any hindrance to an individual to achieve the objectives if he has other qualities. About this Stahl says:

"Individuals on similar work may differ from each other in such a way that the strength of one are in the very areas in which the other is weak. One employee may be good at meeting and dealing with people but not so good in expressing himself in writing, the other may just be opposite- facile at paper-and-pencil articulation. If the job requires both skills in some measures, who is to say which employee is the better of the two? Together, with a deft organisation of the work, they may make a pretty good team, even though individually they have shortcoming."³⁷

How the individual is likely to perform in the future can be predicted to some extent from an individual's present level of performance. But it is not a perfect guide and good

37 O. Glenn Stahl, 1976, p. 210.

performance in the present grade is not necessarily enough to predict future performance in next higher grade. Performance of some individuals may be outstanding at his present assignment, but at the same time they might have reached their limit. Some others may be performing at a high level but perhaps because of lack of experience, are not yet ready for promotion. Some of the positions or posts may not be having any job content which may help identify the suitability for performing in next higher grade. As such it is better to delink the performance from the potentials and promotability. Recommendation for promotion to the next higher rank on the basis of present performance may not be a sound judgment. In the ACRs, performance, promotability and potential have been assessed on the basis of personal traits.

Same scales and same attributes have been used for field jobs, routine jobs, and policy-making jobs. The same form is used for entry-level officers and the senior most civil servants with a view to achieving uniformity and comparability regardless of job relevance; and nature and type; and level of job. Worst of all, job performed by the appraisee during the period of appraisal is described in narrative form. There was no agreed number of jobs to be performed by the appraisee before the commencement of ACR period. It is difficult for the appraisers at the time of appraisal to judge the volume of jobs done by any individual. This gives rise to subjectivity into judgment of rater. The concerned Department/Ministry does not honour recommendations for training and subsequent next posting.

In spite of all drawbacks of the ACR system, how the ACRs are being operated by the employees seem to be a puzzle. I personally asked several raters how they rate their subordinates. They candidly said that they decide the grade and score first, and then they manipulate the rating to correspond with their pre-selected rating and score. This is not only applicable to Bangladesh; there are instances of this type of rating in the West as seen in the works of DeVires et al.³⁸

The US and British Systems of Performance Appraisal

In the US Civil Service, Performance Appraisal has been linked with Pay. Performance Appraisal and Performance Related Pay are important part of the concept of a Senior


38 David I. DeVires *et. al.*, *Pay for Performance: Evaluating Performance Appraisal and Merit Pay*, *Op. cit.* pp. 61-62; George T. Milkovitch and Alexandra. K. Wigdor, National Research Council, Washington DC, 1991, p. 73.

Executive Service (SES), an open structure for the Civil Service. Performance appraisals and merit pay are designed to improve performance and increase productivity of senior executives. While the performance appraisals provide explicit work guidelines and feedback on performance, the merit pay rewards excellent performance with financial bonuses. Performance criteria are position specific and identify critical elements of the position. Performance appraisals provide a basis for performance awards and for promotions and other executive development opportunities, as well as for retention decisions. SES performance appraisals cover both individual and agency performance, and include such factors as improvements in efficiency, productivity, quality of service, cost efficiency, timeliness of performance and the achievement of equal opportunity requirements. Final appraisals are made only upon review by an agency-level Performance Review Board. Below SES, Performance Appraisals cover individual performance only.

The main uses of staff appraisal of the British Civil Service are: (1) to set objectives for individual performance; (2) to give job holders feedback on their performance; (3) to monitor delivery against objectives throughout the year; (4) to identify performers with above average potential; (5) to identify poor performers; (6) to determine individual development needs; (7) to counsel job holders on career opportunities; (8) to help with matching the right people to the right jobs; (9) to assess potential for promotion. Staff Appraisal system provides a framework whereby both management and individual members of staff can discuss in a formal manner a series of interconnecting matters like (1) communicating corporate strategy and objectives; (2) establishing and reviewing agreed objectives for the individual; (3) improving individual and organizational performance; (4) equipping the individuals with the necessary skills; and (5) the ability to apply them to the benefit of the organisation and themselves. A diagrammatic representation of the two way process of discussion and agreement between management and employees is illustrated in Figure 1.


Figure 1

Two Way Process of Discussion and Agreement Between Management and Employees



Source: National Audit Office, Report by the Comptroller and Auditor General, *Staff Appraisal in the Civil Service*, House of Commons, 24 January 1991, London: HMSO, *ibid.*, p. 9.

The cycle of staff appraisal is set out in Figure 2.



Source: National Audit Office, Report by the Comptroller and Auditor General, *Staff Appraisal in the Civil Service*, House of Commons, 24 January 1991, London: HMSO, *ibid.*, p. 10.

The British Civil Service has two appraisal schemes for non-industrial staff - the main appraisal covers all those of Grade 5 and below; and the other one covers higher graded staff. The key mandatory features of the British Appraisal Report are: (1) A forward job

plan for each job holder, with specific objectives for the year; (2) An annual assessment of performance, made open to the job holder, based on specific objectives and an agreed job description; (3) Regular assessment of promotability and potential; (4) Rating scales for performance (five boxes) and promotability (four boxes) which make clear the assessment criteria; (5) The opportunity for an appraisal interview³⁹. The Staff Appraisal Form 1 is a guideline for performance assessment which is attached as Appendix VII.3. Departments may develop their departmental guidance to personnel managers, and line managers. The central principles laid down by the Cabinet Office (MPO) have to be observed whilst departments are free to establish own detailed arrangements. The Centrally prescribed framework of general principles is as follows.

a. Performance Assessment

An annual written appraisal of performance has to be made on all staff up to and including Grade 5 (Asst Secretary, equivalent post of Joint Secretary of the BCS) and equivalent, with the primary emphasis on assessment of performance in the present job. Performance has to be assessed against an agreed job description including main duties and wherever possible specific objectives, agreed at the outset of the year and revised as necessary. These objectives cover quality and quantity of work. Every performance report includes a scale rating for over-all performance, with a clear line below which performance is regarded as unsatisfactory. A common service wide rating scale of 5 points is combined with blocks of statement as follows: (1) Box 1- Outstanding; (2) Box 2- Performance significantly above requirements (3) Box 3- Performance fully meets normal requirements of the grade; (4) Box 4- Performance not fully upto requirements. Some improvement necessary; (5) Box 5- unacceptable. When performance is rated not fully up to requirements or unacceptable, the individual reported on must be informed specifically by the Reporting or Countersigning Officer (in writing in case of Box 5) and told why the marking was given and what action is proposed. Performance assessment reports may be made available to those responsible for dealing with posting, inefficiency or promotion.

39 National Audit Office, Report by the Comptroller and Auditor General, *Staff Appraisal in the Civil Service*, 24 January 1991, London, HMSO, Ibid., p. 11.

b. *Promotion Assessments*

Written assessments are made at appropriate intervals on the promotability of eligible staff in the context of each department's promotion machinery, with regard to the importance of regular assessment in obtaining fair and thorough judgment of potential. A common service-wide over-all rating scale is used to assess the individual suitability for promotion to the next grades: (1) Exceptionally fitted; (2) Fitted; (3) Likely to become fitted in the next two years; (4) Not fitted. Staff Report Part 2: Promotion Appraisal Form is appended as Appendix VII.4.

c. *Potential Assessment*

Departments have to ensure that they have effective means for identifying staff with future potential to carry pout particular types of work or to reach higher grades. This can be by scale or narrative on staff reports, or through the use of other methods such as panels to review management development needs, the encouragement of self-application of trawls, nomination by management, succession planning, or assessment centres.

d. *Openness*

Staff have the right to know their over all performance marking, and to have it provided in writing, normally in advance of an appraisal interview. The promotability marking, including any riders or qualifications, are disclosed orally at the individual's request. The marking can be confirmed in writing on request at an interview or afterwards. Other details on skills and personal qualities may also be disclosed orally at the discretion of the interviewer, with the exception of any assessment of long term potential.


e. *Appraisal Interviews*

All staff can have an annual interview with a line manager on their job performance and to agree the job description and any objectives for the year ahead. The discussion covers any need for training or for a change of job.

The main stage of Staff Reporting and Appraisal, shown in diagrammatic form, is illustrated in following figure 3.

Figure 3

The Main Stage of Reporting and Appraisal in the British Civil Service



Source: National Audit Office, Report by the Comptroller and Auditor General, *Staff Appraisal in the Civil Service*, House of Commons, 24 January 1991, London: HMSO, Ibid p 13.

Since the publication of "Cassels" Report there was marked improvement in the Staff Appraisal Procedures in the British Civil Service. The Report "Improving Management In Government: The Next Steps" published in 1988 acknowledges that:

"Appraisal systems are now based on performance, not on the possession of particular intellectual qualities. Every body we spoke to welcomed this. Most people like having performance judged against whether they achieved these objectives- not against some hidden agenda in their manager's bottom drawer. Open reporting encourages managers to talk about an individual's performance face-to- face."⁴⁰

Performance Related Pay (PRP), i.e. salary progression on the basis of achievement of target set at the beginning of the year, has been introduced in the British Civil Service. This will be discussed in relevant section.


Performance Appraisal in the Malaysian Civil Service

Malaysia has been influenced by the success of the MbO based Performance Appraisal of the developed world and introduced western-style MbO based Performance Appraisal with effect from early 1990. Like the British Civil Service the Malaysian Civil Service has two types of Performance Appraisal—one for the entry level to mid-level and the other for the senior levels. Performance Appraisal Form for management and professional group is enclosed as Appendix VII.5 to this thesis. The Public Service Performance Appraisal System, which took effect in 1993 have following objectives: (1) to determine salary; progression either diagonal, vertical, horizontal or static; (2) to determine the suitability and eligibility for promotion and acting; (3) to determine the suitability and eligibility for secondment and temporary transfer; (4) to determine the eligibility or suitability of an officer to receive excellent service awards, medals, honours and commendation letters; (5) to identify and plan training needs; (6) to determine suitability of placement and career development relevant to the potential, abilities and talents; and (7) to improve and upgrade the officer's performance and motivation through counseling. Cycle of Performance Appraisal and Salary Progression Management Process is illustrated as follows figure 4.

40 National Audit Office, Report by the Comptroller and Auditor General, *Staff Appraisal in the Civil Service*, 24 January, 1991, London, HMSO, p. 14.

Figure 4

Cycle of Performance Appraisal and Salary Progression Management Process in Malaysian Civil Service



Malaysian Performance Appraisal System contains all the principles of the British Appraisal on (1) Performance Assessment; (2) Promotion Assessment; (3) Potential Assessment; (4) Openness; and (5) Appraisal interview. Salary progression has been linked to the score in Performance Appraisal. The new system, it is believed, marks a significant shift in the work culture and thinking of civil servants. It will serve as an

impetus to efforts aimed at enhancing the quality and productivity of the public service. The annual work target of individual civil servant is set only after the overall directions, goals and annual work targets have been set for the department, divisions as well as units within the department. This in effect links the attainment of the overall goals and annual work targets of the department to the attainment of the work targets of each and every member of the department. Evaluative aspects, weightage and maximum score for appraisal aspect is shown in the following table⁴¹:

Table VII.4
Aspects, Criteria, Weightage and Score of Performance Appraisal of the Malaysian Civil Service

Sl.	Aspects	Criteria	Weightage	Maximum Score
1.	Activities and Contribution (Writing articles, games and sports, social activities)	List of activities and contribution made during the year of assessment	5%	30
2.	Work output	a. Quantity of work b. Quality of work c. Cost Effectiveness d. Timeliness e. Implementations of Regulations and Administrative Directives.	60%	40
3.	Knowledge and skills	a. Work Knowledge b. Ability to Adapt. c. Decision Making Ability d. Effective Communication	10%	30
4.	Personal Traits	a. Integrity b. Commitment c. Fairness and objectivity d. discipline e. Leadership	15%	40
5.	Interpersonal Communications and Relations	a. Relations and Cooperation.	10%	40
6.	Potentials	a. Visionary b. Total Perspective c. Analytical skills d. Proactiveness e. Ability to cope with challenges	5%	10

41 Government of Malaysia, *The Civil Service of Malaysia: A Paradigm Shift*, 1993, pp. 681-682.

Like the British Civil Service Performance Related Pay (PRP), i.e. salary progression on the basis of achievement of target set at the beginning of the year, has been introduced in the Malaysian Civil Service. This will be discussed in relevant section.

Suggestions for Improvement and Concluding Comments

Analyses of the ACR of the BCS show that the design of the form of the ACR and the way the ACR is operated and utilised defeats the purposes of the ACR. Design, operation and utilisation of the ACR indicate poor career management in the BCS and can hardly motivate the serving civil servants and attract brilliant job seekers. As in the U.S., U.K. and Malaysia, Bangladesh can integrate promotion, deployment, and career development plan with appraisal system and introduce the result-oriented appraisal system. Bangladesh also can have two types of ACRs – one for the entry level to mid-level and the other for the senior levels - like the Malaysian and the British Civil Services. The new ACR for the BCS officers must contain all the principles of the British and Malaysian Performance Appraisal Systems, i.e., (1) Performance Assessment; (2) Promotion Assessment; (3) Potential Assessment; (4) Openness; and (5) Appraisal interview. Annual Work Target should be fixed after discussion between the subordinate and the supervisor. Achievement of target has to be periodically reviewed. Factors relating to personality, traits and behaviours may be assessed through BARS. Focus should be on relevant, directly observable behaviours and skills which are job related. Personality trait requiring inferential judgment may be excluded from assessment to avoid rater bias. For motivational and developmental purpose, ACR should be open. External factors which affect the performance of the appraisee and attainment of objectives that depend on inter-dependent employee effort have to be recorded during interview between the appraisee and the appraiser. Appraisee should be told orally about his performance and suggest him for improvement of performance at the end of year. It should be made in a separate form as a distinct exercise on the basis of the following: (a) the quality of performance at present level; (b) strength and weaknesses demonstrated; (c) the nature of past experience both within and outside the organisation. Potential assessment has to be reviewed every year. Through Appraisal interview training and development needs for improving current performance has to be identified. Employee's own views and interest for training has to be obtained.

An appraisal system has major, extensive and long-term implications for effective functioning of the organisation. The needs, the concerns, and the capabilities of the organisation, its tradition, and its culture will have to be considered before introduction of a new system. The effectiveness of the system will depend, to a large extent, on the process through which the system is developed and introduced. A feasibility study project has to be undertaken to study the weaknesses of the present appraisal system, and develop method of introducing the result-oriented appraisal of the British and the Malaysian Civil Service in the BCS. The term 'ACR' may be changed to 'Performance Appraisal' in keeping with the development in other countries of the world. The term 'ACR' seems to be archaic and not in conformity with the changing world.

Since 1978, pay for performance has been introduced for the upper level federal managers and merit pay for the mid-level managers in the US. The idea was based on a conceptual framework that extra pay would motivate people to perform better. The Performance Related Pay/ Merit Pay have been linked with Performance Appraisal Report. The British Civil Service, the Australian Civil Service, the New Zealand Civil Service and the Canadian Civil Service have adopted Performance Related Pay in their Civil Services. The merit pay or performance pay was introduced in the Civil Service of the above countries mainly to improve the performance of the civil servants. As introduction of Performance Related Pay (PRP) may be an inducement to the quality graduates and PRP would involve very less number of money, feasibility of introduction of PRP in the BCS may be studied.

According to expectancy theory⁴², pay enhances employee motivation and the likelihood of increase of performance is achieved. Goal-setting theory (Locke, 1968: Locke *et al.*, 1970), supports expectancy theory predictions about the links between pay and performance by further describing the conditions under which employees see plan performance goals as doable. According to Locke⁴³ the goal setting process is most likely to improve employee performance when goals are specific, moderately challenging, and accepted by employees. The expectancy theory and the goal-setting theory have stood the test of time and probably these two theories led the governments of above countries to introduce the Performance Related Pay in the Civil Service.

⁴² Victor H. Vroom, "Work and Motivation", Jossey-Bass, USA, 1994, p. 103.

⁴³ Edwin A. Locke, Gary P. Latham, Ken J. Smith, Robert E. Wood, "A Theory of Goal-setting & Task Performance", Prentice Hall, 1990, p. 17.

Performance related Pay was introduced in the British Civil Service in 1988. Some specialists in the Inland Revenue Service (IRS) conducted a survey in 1992. The British experience of the PRP in the Civil Service does not seem to be very encouraging⁴⁴. The US model of the Senior Executive Service (SES) and Performance Related Pay (PRP) was introduced in Australia. A Parliamentary Committee expressed some sympathy with the professed intention of the performance pay proposal but also offered strong reservations about its practicality.⁴⁵ A major objective of all the SES models is to improve public service efficiency and effectiveness by getting better performance from senior managers. It is not clear whether this objective has been met. One assessment of the American and the Australian SES suggests that neither SES has significantly altered traditional career paths, fostered a government wide perspective, or improved public management. The research in the USA, the country which introduced the PRP first, does not give any conclusive evidence in favour or against the PRP. In ultimate analysis, researchers in US seem to be in favour of the merit pay.

Many researchers do not accept that the drawbacks of the PRP led to its failure. They attribute the causes of the failure to other factors: The " failure of PRP" of the SES was attributed, in large measure, to problems in implementation ("hostile" implementors, budget and personnel cut backs) and to external pressures (the Reagan administrator's assault on public service). Failures of the PRP in the developed countries were mostly attributed to faulty design and implementation process. Proper designing and implementation of Performance Appraisal Report is a prerequisite for success of PRP. The foremost step for introduction of PRP is the successful design and implementation of the PAR.

Operation of pay for performance requires a substantial investment of time and effort and characteristics of the organisations will dictate the type or approach of the PRP. Approach or design of PRP necessitates prior study of the desired organizational impact of the system on such variables as cost, culture, structure, motivation, skill development, attraction, and retention.

44 David Marsden and Ray Richardson, *Motivation and Performance Related Pay in the Public Sector: A Case Study of the Inland Revenue*, 1992, UK, p. 28.

45 John Coates, "The Development of the SES Performance based Pay", *Canberra Public Administration Bulletin*, July, 1989, p. 169.

There are chances of lack of consistency and fairness in the application of PRP. Negative effects like counterproductive behaviours, the costs of operation, the disunity amongst workforce, and the poor culture associated with incentive pay are features of the PRP which may make it a poor investment.

In the final analysis, introduction of Performance Related Pay in the BCS in Bangladesh may motivate the employees to contribute their best. Based on the recommendations of a consulting firm, namely M/S Cooper & Lybrand, the Government of Bangladesh has already introduced Performance Related Pay in the State-owned Manufacturing Enterprises where the performance can be quantified. Persons who get extra pay for performance usually work beyond prescribed duty hours. The operation of merit pay would be difficult in many departments where quantitative measures of performance are not available. Quantitative performance indicator will not be suitable for the Civil Service managers. PRP necessitates accuracy in measurement of performance. The ACR form presently being used for the BCS officers in Bangladesh seems severely flawed to be integrated with performance. The first and foremost thing is to improve the ACR- its design, operation and utilisation, as has been suggested in the foregoing paragraphs.

Chapter VIII

TRAINING AND STAFF DEVELOPMENT

Introduction

Most organizations in developed countries are putting more emphasis on the development of human resources through the use of such modules as management education, management training and management development, and 'investment in people'. The main objective of these endeavours is improvement of organisational efficiency and effectiveness through development of the managers. Hence the development of managers through training is considered an important aspect of aspect of career management. Provisions of adequate training existing for the BCS officers in Bangladesh may give an indication that the authorities in Government take interest in developing the BCS officer' careers. Training thus may serve as an incentive to motivate people of right calibre to join the Civil Service. It can be mentioned here that Singapore and some other countries in East Asia have programmes of providing educational incentives in the form of scholarships to undergraduate and graduate students as inducements along with other forms of inducements to ensure the supply of qualified young graduates to the civil services.¹ This chapter elaborates on the concept and typology of training in general, as well as probes the shortcomings of the system of training of the BCS officers, and thereafter offers suggestions for improvement the existing training facilities towards efficient career management of the civil servants in Bangladesh. However, the remainder of this introductory section focuses on the concept of training.

Management education, management development and management training are related terms. 'Management education' is a term usually reserved for that type of learning that takes place in a structured, formal, institutional framework, such as a university or college that often involves course work towards the achievement of certain qualifications, for example, honours degrees or MBAs. 'Management training', on the other hand, refers to vocation-oriented education, or hands-on skill development where skills are developed

1 Tech-Wong Soon and C. Suan Tan, "Singapore: Public Policy and Economic Development", in Danny M. Leipsiger, ed., *Lessons from East Asia*, Ann Arbor: The University of Michigan Press, 1997, p. 243.

through practice which is guided by formal structured means or informal means. Management development may include one or both of these, but is used more comprehensively to encapsulate all types of learning which enable an individual to develop his or her skills and understanding to meet current and future organizational needs. While training deals with qualifying a person to perform a job, development covers cultivation of the whole person through training, education, placement, exposure, counselling, and motivation, and so on. Looked from the organisational viewpoint, training is a primary instrument for sustaining and improving the capacities of the employees to contribute to organisational efforts². Training influences decisions from inside out, i.e., training prepares the organisation members to reach satisfactory decisions about themselves without the need for constant exercise of authority or advice. In this sense training procedures are alternatives to the exercise of authority and advice as means of control over the subordinate decision³. At the national level, training has been described as a key to national development⁴. In a developing society, where skills and attitudes need to grow along with technological and scientific development, training is not a simple affair of post entry training to be imparted at the initial stage of one's career; 'training is a continuous process to be carried on throughout the career of a civil servant, if he is to be kept adequately equipped for the complexities of ever changing tasks of public administration.'⁵ Training when understood in this sense becomes an integral part of management tool for bringing about change in individual behaviour and improving organisational effectiveness.

As we review the literature on training and development and human resource development theories and practices, we observe that there are two types of training-formal training conducted by the training institutes and the informal and incidental training conducted by the employing organisations and the individuals themselves. We further observe from the literature review that the boundaries between education, training and development are quite fluid and all these only have one aim - capacity building of the individuals as well as institutions.

2 Felix A. Negro & Lloyd G. Nigro, *The New Public Personnel Administration*, F.G. Peacock Publishers Inc, 1976, p. 227.

3 Herbert A. Simon, *Administrative Behaviour*, 2nd edition, New York, Free Press, 1957, p. 15.

4 Lynton K. Caldwell, *Improving the Public Service Through Training*, Public Administration Division, Educational and Social Development Agency for International Development, Washington, 1962, p. 3.

5 The Indian Institute of Public Administration, *Report on Conference on Training*, February 24-25, 1969, p. 150.

Planning and Conduct of Formal Training

Effective training must be closely tied to the job responsibilities and should include the skilful analysis of human resources needs and proper method for bringing about controlled behavioural change... An effective training programme consists of six major steps: Assess training needs (need analysis); define behavioural objectives (what the learner should be able to do as a result of the training); define the abilities, interest and attitudes of the prospective learners; select the appropriate personnel and methods for presenting the training; make the presentation; evaluate the effectiveness of the training effort.⁶

The setting up of training schemes within an organisation is a highly skilled process. The process involves following major policy factors- (1) Determining needs and requirements for training;(2) Formulating objectives for training; (3) Organising and allocating responsibilities for training, including setting procedures and appointing training staff; and (4) Establishing controls and evaluation systems to ensure that training meets requirement continually⁷.

Determining Training Needs

Tom Boydell distinguishes between identification of present training needs from that of future needs:' Current needs are due to faults in the present situation; to solve such needs will, of course, involve change, but this change occurs after the need is identified. Future needs on the other hand will arise as a result of change.⁸ While objectives represent the basic statements from which training programmes are planned, conducted and regulated, they cannot be directed toward relevant learning experience unless they stem from a determination of training needs.⁹ Determination of training needs involve systematic analysis of jobs and their requirements, a survey of personal qualification and performance levels and a careful study of training methods. Training needs have to be based on following needs- (1) National training needs; (2) Organisational needs; (3) Occupational needs; (4) Individual needs; and (5) Trainers' needs¹⁰. Training needs of the organisation can be assessed from its goals, objectives, and job description,

6 Elmer H. Burrack *et al.*, *Personnel Management*, New York, John Wiley & sons, 1982, pp. 512-525

7 David King, *Training Within the Organisation*, Educational Methods Inc. Chicago, 1965, pp. 149-150

8 Boydell, *Career Management & Career Planning : A North American Practice*, Civil Service Department, 1976, as discussed in Williams, Richard., *HMSO*, UK. 1981, in Williams, 1981, p. 7

9 Kenneth T. Byers (ed), *Employer Training and Development in the Public Service*, Public Personnel Association, Chicago, 1970, p. 91

10 Wyn Reilly and Ronald Clarke, *Training for Public Management: A Hand book for Management Development*, Commonwealth Secretariat, July, 1990, p. 21

appraisal schemes, performance reviews, multi-rater\360-degree reviews, Development Centres, career development interview, questionnaires, job analysis studies, study of documents related to personnel and training, evaluation of previous training etc.

Formulating Training Objectives

As soon as training needs have been established, and weaknesses, gaps and difference have been pointed out, setting training objectives becomes the natural subsequent step. The goals or expected results are not the same for every training activity, but there are some which are fairly constant and which recur in formulation of objectives. These are - enhancement of the efficiency of the Civil Service, speeding up of learning process, morale building, and career development of individual trainees.

Organising Training Responsibility

The organisation of training responsibilities extends throughout the entire civil service and includes a great variety of relationships. Training is a management responsibility as it is directly tied both to management planning and to the achievement of management objectives although the immediate responsibility for the development and conduct of specific training programmes may be widely dispersed. When management and particularly the highest officials of the Government is not deeply involved in the development and evaluation of the training and preferably in its conduct, training programmes are likely to be ineffective at best and detrimental to organisational goals at the worst¹¹. The three general principles indicated as guides to the allocation of training responsibilities are¹²:

- (1) Determination of the purpose and substance of training is an integral part of general administrative responsibility;
- (2) For the technical aspects such as determination of methods and procedures for training, training specialists may be employed and specialists units established to advice and assist in the conduct of training programmes;
- (3) To maximise personnel resources and training efficiency and effectiveness, it is desirable to interrelate all programmes for training for general government purposes. Establishment of special officers or units for training raises the question of how these services are related structurally to the administrative organisation.

11 United Nations, *Handbook of Training in the Public Service*, New York, Department of Economic and Social Affairs, Public Administration Branch, 1966, pp. 207-208.

12 Lynton K. Caldwell, *Improving the Public Service through Training*, 1963, *op. cit.*, pp. 45-46.

Training Institutes

The training institution and schools in different countries have taken a wide variety of forms to meet differing conditions. There seems to have no general agreement as to the organisation and functioning of these institutions. A group of experts assembled by the Brooking Institution in 1961 identified several different patterns of organisational settings; but the report of conference said: "No pattern was singled out as ideal since the choice of setting or affiliation depends heavily on situations peculiar to each country".¹³

However, the pattern that seems to emerge in many countries are the multipurpose schools or institutions whose activities may include teaching at several different educational levels, research consultation, documentation, publication and many tasks of in-service training. With the establishment of a training institution, the most important factor that comes up for consideration is that of staffing and particularly that of selecting trainers. The quality of training very much depends upon the calibre and competence of trainers. Therefore the selection and training of trainers is crucial in a system of Civil Service training. There are different views about the source from which training personnel should be drawn for the training of public employees. There was a time when civil servants were preferred as instructors¹⁴ as instructions are to relate directly to the administrative practice of the country. With the change of time, there seems to be emphasis on combination of professional instructors as well as civil servants as instructors to in the training institutes. Some of the other important factors which need special consideration for making training programme effective and useful are building up suitable curriculum for training, choosing appropriate methods and selecting right type of trainees.

Evaluation and Validation of Training

Evaluation is the process of determining the effectiveness and efficiency of training systems and their competence by noting variations from plans and the causes of variations and identifying alternate means of correction. A Survey of the Civil Service Department of the UK defines evaluation of training as:

"...the assessment of the total value of training system, training course or programmes in social as well as financial terms. Evaluation differs from 'validation' in that it attempts to measure the overall cost benefit of the course or programme and not just the achievement of its laid down objectives. The term is also used in the general judgmental sense of the continuous monitoring of a programme or the training function as a whole."¹⁵

13 United Nations, *Handbook of Training in the Public Service*, op. cit., p. 149.

14 Ibid., p. 130.

15 Civil Service Department, *Evaluation of Training in the Civil Service*, UK, 1977, p. 2.

Validation concerns demonstrating the degree to which the knowledge and skills, which it is intended to convey by the teaching process to the student, have in fact been conveyed. Training and development programmes can and should be evaluated from three different but complimentary perspectives (1) Internal evaluation; (2) Intermediate evaluation; (3) External evaluation. Internal evaluation focuses on ongoing training and development programmes so that both the instructor and trainees get the feedback through questionnaires or interview to improve their strategies, methods and performance either. In intermediate evaluation, trainer's reactions, learning and performance is conducted through post training questionnaires, interviews, ratings, tests, or observations at the conclusion of training. In External evaluation, external criteria are used to evaluate results of training and development when employees get back on the job to see changes in job behaviour and change in the organisation. Evaluation at the job behaviour level can be done by the use of questionnaires and follow up interviews with both the trainees and line managers some months after training. Changes that might have occurred due to training in organisational output and quality of product and service may be measured after several months of service put by the trainee after training. Evaluators must be aware that other factors may also contribute in increasing output and quality.

Informal and Incidental Training

Managers who themselves are not trained to use the workplace for their own and their colleagues' learning are unlikely to perceive the worth of informal and incidental training. Management development literatures propagate that informal and incidental learning processes are worthwhile and are cost effective. These informal, ad hoc or incidental processes can become institutionalized and part of the organizational culture. Any organization that believes in work-based management development needs to: (1) communicate why it is important; (2) instigate training in how to do it; (3) ensure that it is integrated with other formal development and human resource activities such as appraisal and rewards; (4) clarify the roles and responsibilities, especially those of the human resource specialist, the line manager and the individual manager to be developed; (5) ensure that these roles are reinforced in the wider organizational culture¹⁶. Apart from formal training, there seems to exist a provision of work-based

16 Jean Woodal and Diana Winstanely, *Management Development: Strategy and Practice*, 1998, p. 195.

training for the subordinates by the line manager in the BCS as mentioned in the Annual Confidential Report (Appraisal Report) titled "willingness to train the subordinates" which carries 5 marks out of 100 scores earmarked for the annual appraisal. This provision of informal or on the job training exists merely in paper; there is no system of checking how and whether supervisors/line managers at all train their subordinates in the BCS. There is no guideline for conducting training by line managers. Like the West, individual managerial learning in organisational context, group learning, learning from one-to-one relationship and special tasks have to be given due emphasis in the BCS for enhancing organisational and employee efficiency.

Individual Managerial Learning in Organisational Context

Self-development and Learning contract are two concepts where individuals themselves have to play the key role. A learning contract provides a bridge between an academic institution providing educational support, and the learner and their sponsoring organization. Cunningham (1994b) has applied the idea of the learning contract to off the job development activities, including management education¹⁷. In 'Self-development', individuals learn themselves without a teacher and take responsibility at all stages of learning. It may cover a wide range of new wave of management education, e.g. action learning, learning communities, independent study, coaching and counseling¹⁸. In self-development, a personal development plan has to be developed on personal capability profile and job description capability profile¹⁹.

The Learning Organization

The learning organization', though an umbrella term for many different concepts, usually facilitates the learning of all its members and continuously transforms itself' (Pedler et al., 1991). It (1) helps individual members to learn and develop their full potential; (2) extends this learning culture to significant stakeholders; (3) makes human resource development strategy central to business policy; (4) undergoes continuous process of organizational transformation²⁰.

17 Jean Woodal and Diana Winstanely, *Management Development: Strategy and Practice*, 1998, p. 149.

18 Tom Boydell and M.Pedler (ed.), "Some Principles of Self-development", *Management self-development*, 1981, pp. 6-7.

19 Ibid., p. 150.

20 Ibid., p. 150.

Group Learning among Managers

Organisational Development and Action Learning are two methods of Group Learning where clienteles learn from one another in groups. Organization development (OD) is an approach that arose out of the conjunction of research into group dynamics, the development of survey research and feedback and action research. The focus of attention is usually upon formal work team temporary team and inter-group relations (French and Bell, 1990), with an emphasis on the collaborative management of the teams compatible with theory. Action learning, first coined by Revans (1982) and developed upon Rogers' (1969) humanistic philosophy that true development is achieved only by helping individuals to help themselves²¹. Action learning sets are formed usually with five to six people, whereby a group of managers with different problems agree to regular meetings in which they present their problems, listen to one another and offer suggestions under the supervision of a facilitator. Action learning complements many Japanese management practices, such as continuous improvement and organization restructuring, and the broadening of managerial job roles.

Learning from one- to-one Relationship: Mentoring, Role Models

The line managers can counsel, provide insight, and give frank feedback, coach, and sponsor. Mentoring occurs where an experienced manager (not line managers) offers guidance, stimulus, encouragement, feedback and support to clienteles in formal or informal manner. It can lead to sponsorship where a manager takes an active role in creating and communicating career opportunities to an individual and acts as their advocate, giving them visibility within the wider organisation and outside. Line managers or mentors can be useful role models, but there are many other sources of role models within organizations, both positive and negative. Often unwittingly, individuals observe and study the qualities, attitudes and behavior of their role models, and then consciously or unconsciously they imitate their good qualities and the poor ones²². Mentoring, sponsorship and role models, though totally new for Bangladesh, may be adapted in the BCS.

21 Ibid., p. 150.

22 Ibid., p. 150.

Learning from tasks: Special projects, Job rotation, Shadowing, Secondments and Acting up

Task-based management development methods such as special projects, job rotation, shadowing, secondments and acting up all draw upon the principle of job enrichment and need theories of motivation of Herzberg et al. (1959) and Maslow (1943, 1987). Special projects can include wide variety of activities with the emphasis on the ability to stand alone, make decisions and shoulder responsibility, learning new skills, and act under trying circumstances. In Bangladesh, assignment to project is a random and unplanned event. Job rotation involves moving an individual or cohort of managers into different roles and takes within different work groups and environments, with the aim of broadening their knowledge and skill base on a regular and structured basis. It is most commonly used in graduate trainee and executive development schemes in the UK. Job rotation is more widely used in Japan as a key comment in management development, in order to provide wider exposure to the organization and its various activities. Job rotation is done upto certain level in different cadres as a routine in the BCS upto two three levels. In the BCS, job rotation from mid-level upward (grade V to Grade I) is disorganised and unplanned. In 'shadowing', the emphasis is upon observing new skills and tasks being carried out in an unfamiliar job role. An example is where a manager visits another counterpart for company and spends time observing the work of a peer over a period of days or weeks in home country or overseas. Shadowing is not done in Bangladesh. Secondment is a form of work-based development that takes the individual out of the normal unit and places them within a different working environment or a different organization for a defined period of time. Sometimes the secondment may take the form of a job-swap between two individuals who then both have an opportunity to try out a different role but can use each other for consultation and advice. In the changing world of flexible customer-focused organizations, secondments can serve a positive purpose (Chatter and Stokes, 1992). In the BCS, Deputation is something like secondment. Acting Up occurs when, for reasons of temporary absence of a manger, an individual immediately below the absentee manager temporarily assumes the responsibilities of the manager's position. This provides the Acting Manager the opportunity to learn new skills and to explore the suitability of such a career move from both the perspective of the individual manager and the organization with delegation of authority, power and responsibility and autonomy Like Job rotation, Deputation and Acting Up are also random and disorganised events in the BCS.

Development Centre

Many organizations in the USA and the UK have been using 'Development Centres' during the last several years. The British Civil Service has established Development Centre in the Civil Service College, Sunningdale. This has led to the increase in efficiency of the civil servants. To understand the concept Development Centre, the concepts of competencies and the Assessment Centre have to be illustrated. The Development Centre is intricately linked with competencies of an office holder of particular grade and generic competencies of a civil servant. In Bangladesh, the term 'competencies/Competences' is a new term. Competences have varying definitions. Two²³ main themes on competencies are discussed below:

- (1) Description of work tasks or job outputs – These have their origins in national training schemes, such as the National/Scottish Vocational Qualifications and the Management Charter Initiative (MCI). The MCI definition of the concept of competence is 'the ability of a manager to perform to the standards required in employment'. (MCI, 1992).
- (2) Description of behaviour – These have evolved from the work of researchers and consultants specialising in management effectiveness. Many definitions of behavioural competency are variations on the following definition: a job competency is an 'underlying characteristic of a person which results in effective and/or superior performance in a job' (Klemp, 1980). Another variation is: 'A job competency is an underlying characteristic of a person in that it may be a motive, a trait, a skill, an aspect of one's self-image or social role, or a body of knowledge which he or she uses' (Boyatzis, 1982).

Competencies provide a framework for training and development and they can assist in:

- (1) the objective review of training and development needs;
- (2) the design of training and development activities;
- (3) the selection of an appropriate training and development activity;
- (4) the evaluation of activities to ensure that they are in line with the original training and development needs and the organisation strategy;
- (5) monitoring progress towards a training and/or development goal.

23 Steve Whiddett and Sarah Hollyforde, *The Competencies Handbook*, Institute of Personnel and Development 1999, p. 3.

Training and development scheme for the participant will consist of the following elements: (1) an assessment process to determine the development needs of the individual; (2) agreement by the individual about the results of that assessment and the production by the individual of a personal development plan based on these results; (3) attendance at a short core course which covers the subjects directly related to becoming a member of the senior civil service; (4) implementation of the remainder of the individual's development plan; and (5) encouragement of networking possibilities wherever possible.

Inconsistent recruitment standard and selection system for the Bangladesh Civil Service led to wide variation in quality of the civil servants. Development Centre may help identify the gaps in competencies of the members of the BCS. Like the British Civil Service a Development Centre may be established in the BPATC. This will lead to capacity building of the Ministry of Establishment and help the Ministry as well as the individuals plan their career development.

Training Scenario in Bangladesh

During the years of united Pakistan before 1971, the Civil Servants used to receive comprehensive training both at home and abroad. Almost all training institutes meant for civil servants of the Central Government were located in the Western wing of Pakistan (now Pakistan). Performances in induction training programmes in the Civil Service Academy in Lahore used to be taken into account for determination of seniority of the new entrants of the Civil Service of Pakistan (CSP). Unfortunately, however, Bangladesh at independence inherited only a few training institutes and a small number of trainers to train its civil servants. The East Pakistan Civil Service Training Camp in Dhaka was turned into Gazetted Officers Training Academy (GOTA). The existing National Institute of Public Administration (NIPA) in Dhaka and the newly organised GOTA were assigned with the task of training the officers. The NIPA, GOTA, and the Staff Training Institutes (STIs) were merged to create the Civil Service Training Academy (CSTA), functioned from March 1973 to February 1977. The STIs were taken out of CSTA and revival of GOTA and NIPA followed soon after each of which was assigned with different level and types of training. The Civil Officers Training Academy (COTA) was established to train the newly recruited officers of the Civil Service. In the model of Pakistan Administrative Staff College in Lahore and the

Henley Staff College in England, one apex training centre called Bangladesh Administrative Staff College was established in 1977 to train the senior and top-level officials²⁴.

State of Training during 1981-1990

Seemingly, therefore, training in the Civil Service lacked co-ordination and policy direction during the initial years after the liberation of Bangladesh. Some of the existing training institutes were found to have been conducting the same or similar training programmes. However, in 1981, one national level training body called National Training Council, headed by a senior Minister and composed of senior civil servants, was established to analyse and assess training needs, formulate training policies, and co-ordinate training activities at macro level. The government formed one integrated training institute out of the STI, COTA, NIPA, and the Administrative Staff College - namely the Bangladesh Public Administration Training Centre (BPATC) in 1984 as the apex-training institute. The BPATC was designed much similar to the Civil Service Staff College of the UK. While the other training institutes have been invested with the responsibility of imparting training to officers belonging to the respective departments; the training curricula of the BPATC contain subjects related to multiple cadres, various functions and senior civil servants²⁵.

However, as the days went on, many more training institutes mushroomed for imparting training in different areas and at times in allied area of government function. Establishment of departmental training institutes was inspired more by departmental feelings and promotion prospects of departmental officers than the needs of the organisations. To avoid duplication of efforts and maintain economy, the National Training Council (NTC) constituted a committee headed by M. Syeduzzaman, the Permanent Secretary for Finance and later Finance Minister, to recommend merger or amalgamation/abolition or creation of training institutions. The Syeduzzaman Committee recommended establishment of training institutes by grouping allied cadres to minimise cost and maximise output. In December 1987, a new academy for the administrative cadre

24 For more details on the institutional facilities for public service training in Pakistan and Bangladesh, see Muzaffar Ahmed Choudhury, *The Civil Service in Pakistan*, NIPA, Dhaka, 1969, pp. 122-34; Noore Alam Siddique, "Public Service Training in Bangladesh", in *Politics, Administration and Change*, No. 21, July-December, 1993.

25 See Noore Alam Siddique, *ibid.*

named 'The Bangladesh Civil Service (Admin) Academy' was established in Dhaka for imparting training to the members of the BCS administration cadre officers²⁶.

Though each department is entrusted with the tasks of developing skills and potential of its own officers for management of departmental tasks, the Ministry of Establishment, the chief personnel agency of Bangladesh, is entrusted with the task of undertaking monitoring and advisory role. Besides, the Ministry of Establishment is responsible for allocating foreign courses, awarding vacancies for mid-level and senior level courses in the BPATC. All cadres, excepting the Secretariat, Public Works, Public Health, and Roads & Highways cadres, have training institutes to train their staff and officers. The Ministry of Establishment is responsible for training of the members of the Admin cadre, Secretariat cadre, and the holders of the posts of Deputy Secretary and above in the secretariat. Following training courses are made compulsory for all the members of the BCS - (1) Foundation Course; (2) Course related to respective Departmental Functions; (3) Advanced Course on Administration and Development; and (4) Senior Officers' Staff Course.

Foundation Course: This is meant for the new entrants of the Bangladesh Civil Service (BCS). The course aims to (i) inculcate a sense of mutual understanding and esprit de corps amongst participants; (ii) to remove the deficiencies of academic institutions; (iii) to orient with the functions and modus operandi of the government. This course lasts for about 12 weeks.

Departmental Training: For some cadres, academic qualification is not just enough for performance of duties e.g., Customs & Excise, Audits & Accounts, Taxation, etc. Members of these cadres have to undergo thorough and extensive training. For example, the entrants of the Audits & Accounts have to undergo a 26-month long training course after recruitment.

Advanced Course on Administration and Development: This is meant for the mid-level officials. As the course has no bearing on career advancement and subsequent posting, course was not attractive to participants. Officially it was announced that qualification in this course would be considered a precondition for consideration for promotion to net

26 See Ministry of Establishment, Report on Strengthening Public Administration, Vol. 1, 1998, pp. 112-34.

rank. In practice, this precondition was not applied in most cases. This course is compulsory for the officers of Deputy Secretary level. To make it attractive, a two-week foreign study tour has been included in the training programme.

Senior Officers' Staff Course: Senior officers have to attend the course. Course is not graded. As officers try to find pretexts to avoid these courses, two weeks' foreign tour has been included in this course too.

Foreign Training: Every year Bangladesh gets at least six hundred offers of foreign training from the developed as well as the developing countries. The British Council alone offers more than one hundred training offers to Bangladesh every year. But the officers are not deployed in those areas in which they were trained. The British Council asked times and again the Ministry of Establishment of Bangladesh to deploy the people trained by the British Council²⁷ in their respective fields of training. A survey team of Institute of Manpower Studies, Sussex, UK found that foreign training is awarded as a perk to individuals²⁸. In most cases, foreign training is awarded to compensate for low pay and boost morale of the civil servants.

Higher Education and Professional Education: Civil servants are sent abroad for higher qualifications provided the foreign donors bear the entire cost. In almost all cases, the educational qualifications may not have any job relevance. It is very uncommon for a civil servant to pursue higher education inside the country as there is no incentive or encouragement from the organisation²⁹.

Existing Training Inadequacies

Most official documents, reports and public administration scholars criticised the training system in the Bangladesh Civil Service. All concerned at the top level of the administration and policy-making bodies are aware of the problems and importance of

27 The British Council in Dhaka was asked by this researcher to provide the list of officers trained by them in the UK, but deployed by the Government of Bangladesh in areas or desks which have no relations with the training received in the UK. The British Council has the data with them. They already expressed their concern to the government of Bangladesh for not utilizing the people trained in the UK in their respective fields of training. The British Council treated these documents as secret and regretted its inability to provide the data and documents.

28 Institute of Management Study, *Report on the Organisational Manpower Planning in the Bangladesh Civil Service*, Sussex, UK 1988, p. 19.

29 For more details, see Ministry of Establishment, *Report on Strengthening Public Administration Training*, 1998, op. cit.

training. Nothing very fruitful has so far been done to ameliorate the problems of training. The inadequacies in the system of training seem to emanate from poor management, lack of quality trainers, and poor quality of the trainees and inadequate commitment of the government. The National Training Council, headed by a Cabinet Minister failed to give direction and monitor training activities. Investment of money, time, and effort in training activities was wasted to a great extent³⁰.

Training Institutes Surveyed

The researcher initially planned to conduct a survey on training of the BCS officers through questionnaires. But, prior informal discussions with some trainers revealed that they were not in favour of assessment of their performance though it was clarified to them that the intention of the researcher was to assess the state of training in the BCS as part of an academic studies by the researcher. They took the visit and queries of the researchers as a 'fault finding mission' and were very defensive. It took time to convince them that the study was purely academic and the observations and findings of the researchers would in no way be submitted to the authorities for any action.

Nevertheless, instead of the planned formal survey, the researcher embarked on having informal discussions with the trainers of following institutes regarding training conducted by them: (1) BPATC; (2) BCS (Administration) Academy; (3) Academy for Planning and Development (APD); (4) Telecommunication Staff College; (5) Agricultural Management Training Institute; (6) National Institute of Local Government (NILG). The researcher had the following points in mind for investigations: (1) How the training needs was assessed; (2) Whether training was evaluated; (3) Whether training is rated; (4) The reaction level of trainees; (5) Follow up of the trainees after one or two years to see whether training led to increase in performance; (6) Whether any discussion was held with the trainers' boss or chief of the organisation before the training to assess the needs and after the training; (7) Standard of trainers (whether the trainers received training as a trainer, aptitude for training, previous experience, job satisfaction of the trainers); (8) Overall performance of the training institutes; (9) Linkage with allied training institutes or educational institutes; (10) Curricula of the training institute; (11) Overall performance of training institutes;

30 Ibid.

(12) Workload of the training institutes; (13) Problems faced by the training institutes in imparting training; (14) whether there is any research going on to improve the quality of training.

From the discussions with the trainers along the above lines revealed that: (1) Training need is not assessed; (2) Training is not evaluated; (3) No discussion was held with the boss of the trainees or their organisational heads; (4) Training is not rated; (5) No effort has yet been made to assess the reaction level; (6) No follow up of the trainees is done after imparting training to the officials to see whether performance of trainees improved after training; (7) Training institutes are having lot of idle hours; (8) Most of the trainers have not received training as a trainer; (9) None of the trainers held very important portfolios previously in their respective departments; (10). Most of the trainers have been placed in the institutes for a period of three years, excepting the BPATC; (11) There is no linkage with other training institutes or educational institutions; (12) Some of the trainers have the idea about modern system of training. But they are in favour of slow and gradualist approach for improvement in the system of training.

About training needs assessment in particular, the trainers felt that they could very well perceive the training needs since most of them belong to the same departments and they are well aware of the training needs. As they felt that training would certainly improve the standard of performance, they did not follow up the trainees' performance after the training. When asked to give their comments regarding merger of training institutes which were imparting training in allied areas, they vehemently opposed the idea on the ground that this would lead to dilution of quality of training. As reduction in number of training institutes would cause reduction in number of higher posts in the departments, they seem to have resisted the idea of merger of training institutes. In fact, integrated approach to training would save money and effort. The training institutes did not have audio-visual system for training. Very few had aptitudes for trainer; they simply took the job of trainer as decided by their respective departments. While in the army the best officers are sent as trainers, in the Civil Service the mediocre, if not the worst, are deployed as trainers.

Survey of Opinions of High BCS Officials

Assuming that the senior officers would be unwilling to commit anything in writing about deficiencies of training system, the researcher arranged to have informal discussions with a select number of them to ascertain views on the following points: (1) The role of formal training in improving performance; (2). The performance of training institutes; (3) Whether training needs are analysed; (4) Whether they were ever consulted to design training for their subordinates, (5). Whether training improved performance of their subordinates; (6). Whether training is integrated with other process of personnel administration. The most revealing from these discussions that the senior officers were not consulted for designing any curricula for training. All of them stated that training lead to higher performance. They do not like to integrate training with other process of personnel administration like better posting, promotion, or pay hike. These senior officers seem to accord lower priority to training because of the fact that they did not receive much training in their career whilst the ex-CSP officers, who received comprehensive training, laid more emphasis on formal training. According to them, learning in the process of doing a thing slows down the rate of work and more costly than the formal training.

Survey of Opinions of Trainees

Informal discussions with a select number of trainee-officers revealed that the most of the trainees have no motivation to undergo training. Training is not taken into account for either for promotion or posting. 94.3% young officers (with minimum two years and maximum 5 years of service), and 90% officers of Senior Assistant Secretary level officers (with minimum 10 years and maximum 17 years of service) opined in a survey conducted by the researcher that training is not taken into account for posting; and 80% of new officers and 72.9% Senior Assistant Secretary level officials opine that training is not taken into account for promotion (see Chapters IV and V more on these points). Other than increasing efficiency, training does not help in advancement of career. There is no formal system, which acknowledges the place of training courses in career progression. Civil Service training is not linked to academic awards which could be recognised beyond the Civil Service. Though there are arrangements of basic training for the new entrants in some cadres, there is no system of job relevant training. For example, an officer with academic background of Physics or Islamic History and experience in personnel job may be deployed in the Ministry of Finance which requires some training and knowledge in

financial subjects. As to the indicator of training effectiveness, Ivor K. Davies and others seem inclined to comment that the successful achievement of the training objectives and the enhancement of motivation and morale of the trainees are the most important indicators of the effectiveness of training³¹. No training programme can be effective, however well supported, without the commitment of the trainees. According to Ribler, the people to be trained must be susceptible to the training. The cornerstone of the training, according to him, is to permit the trainee, within limits, to define the training needs and then work towards satisfying those needs. Fear of failure is reduced if the trainees are reassured that the objective is for them to succeed³².

Training Inadequacies Reported in Official Documents

Bangladesh achieved independence in December 1971. The government was so busy in nation-building activities of a war-ravaged country for the initial few years. Many may accept the argument that government could not accord due priority to training as there were more priority tasks before the government in the first decade of independence. But 10 years seem to be a sufficient time to gear up training activities. After 10 years of independence, the Ministry of Establishment observed: "... the training activities of these institutes are in most cases uncoordinated resulting in duplication and wastage of valuable training resources." ³³

According to the Third Five-Year Plan, formulated by the Planning Commission of Bangladesh in 1985, 'the training programmes and contents mostly have been ad hoc and not geared to the needs of either the organisation or of the personnel and recommended more realistic and need-based training course under the aegis of the BPATC. A monitoring team of National Training Council (NTC) visited the BPATC in 1984 and remarked that the "performance of BPATC was short of expectation."³⁴ The consultants of the National Committee on Rural Training (NCRT) while studying the situation of the Agricultural Extension Training Institutes (AETIs) found that 'the instructors appeared to be disgruntled and frustrated and saw no career prospect and they had been

31 Ivor K. Davies *et al*, *The Organisation of Training*, Maidenhead, England, McGraw Hill Book Company Limited, UK, 1973, p. 4.

32 Ronald I. Ribler, *Training Development Guide*, Virginia, Reston Publishing Co., 1983, USA, pp. 5-6.

33 Establishment Division, *A Directory of Training Institutes in Bangladesh*", Dhaka, August 1982, p. i.

34 Ministry of Establishment, *Draft National Training Policy*, Dhaka, 1986.

craving for field posting.³⁵ The Syeduzzaman Committee³⁶ observed that same situation was prevailing in other training institutes. The Ministry of Establishment concurred with the above assessment and proposed 'adequate incentives must be given to attract talented instructors.'³⁷ Dr. Shaikh Maqsood Ali, a top ranking civil servant and the Rector of the BPATC, suggested upgradation of top post of the Training institute to the rank of Additional secretary as an incentive to trainers.³⁸ Dr. K.M. Das says that 'Professional development of trainers is not accorded due priority'.³⁹ So far the successive governments failed to provide for adequate incentives for the trainers and to initiate any positive step to improve the situation. There is little recognition at the macro level that training is a specialised job and that trainers must be developed through regular courses of training. Dr. Shaikh Maqsood Ali highlighted lack of political and administrative commitment to training in his research.⁴⁰ A survey by a team of trainers commented that 'despite the government's efforts to a coherent training policy, there are still large gaps in the formulation of a comprehensive training programme [policy]'.⁴¹ After a lapse of 10 years in 1990, the Draft Five Year Plan acknowledges the shortcoming of training system in the BCS stating that available facilities of training has to be studied, institutions reorganised and their programmes replanned.⁴² The general picture of training in Bangladesh demonstrates that the Government of Bangladesh has failed to demonstrate commitment to training activities in general⁴³. The training institutions with such inadequacies in the faculty cannot be expected to be effective in their roles.

Research prevents a training programme from becoming stereotyped. Research is the means by which training is related to the realities and is kept lively. Information through research is an important tool in assessing training needs, setting training objectives, selecting appropriate subject matter and methods of training. Research

35 Planning Commission, *NCRT*, "Existing Situation of Agriculture and Rural Training in Bangladesh", Planning Commission, Dhaka, November 1980, p. iii.

36 Syeduzzaman was the Finance Secretary (Permanent secretary of the Treasury) and later the Finance Minister. He headed the Committee as the finance secretary in 1983.

37 Ministry of Establishment, *Training Policy for the Government Officials*, Dhaka: Government Press, 1984, p. 6.

38 Shaikh Maqsood Ali, *National Training Policy in Bangladesh: An Organic Approach*, Bangladesh Society for Training and Development, Dhaka, 24 September, 1984, pp. 13-14.

39 Dr. K. M. Das, *Training and Commitment*, NILG, Bangladesh, 1991, p. 164

40 Shaikh Maqsood Ali, *National Training Policy in Bangladesh: An Organic Approach*, *op. cit.*, pp. 1-2.

41 Akbar Ali Khan, *Post Entry Training in the Bangladesh Civil Service*, BPATC, Savar, 1984, p. 3.

42 Planning Commission, *Draft Fourth Five Year Planning*, 1990. p. vii - 4.

should cover training outcomes of different courses and the areas being taught. In Bangladesh, research on training is not worth mentioning.

BPATC Survey on Training of Senior Officers

A survey was carried out by a senior instructor of BPATC (Dr. M. Wahiduzzaman) regarding the training needs assessment of the senior civil servants amongst a random sample of civil servants, academicians, trainers and politicians (bureaucrats turned into politicians). The survey focused on short courses as well as long courses. Under this survey⁴⁴ 30 respondents were asked to give their opinion on 'usefulness'⁴⁵ of two training courses they participated earlier. On the question of usefulness of the first training they received, 25% opined that they found the course 76-100% useful; 3.33% found the course 51-75% useful; 27.5% found the course 26-50% useful; and 5.83% opined that course 1-25% useful. The questionnaire was not applicable to 37 (30%) respondents. That means 34 out of 74 (46%) respondents found the course 51-100% useful. It indicates that the course is not useful to majority of trainers and time, effort and resources invested in training seemed to be wasted to a great extent. Regarding the usefulness of the second course they attended⁴⁶, 13.33% respondents stated that training was 76-100% useful, 3.33% found the training 51-75% useful, 27.5% thought that the training was 26-50% useful, 5.83% found the training 1-25% useful and the rest 30% respondents found the question not applicable to them. That means only 17 out of 46 (37%) trainees found the course useful. The responses to the survey regarding usefulness of course no 1 and course no 2 bear testimony to the fact that most of the trainees could not utilise the training they received. As per the above survey, investment of time, effort, and money for training were thus wasted. The response to a question on reasons for usefulness of the training received by the respondents⁴⁷ show that 31(25.33%) think that training courses for them were designed according to their needs; 41(34.16%) opine that they adjusted themselves to the course and tried to get the best out of it; and 40.5% commented that the training course was not need oriented. It demonstrates that training needs were not assessed designing the training programme. At

43 K.M. Das, p. 172.

44 M. Wahiduzzaman, *Assessment Of Training Needs Of Senior Civil Servants: A Case Study*, BPATC, Savar, Dhaka, 1985, p. 69.

45 The term 'usefulness' denotes the ability to apply the knowledge and relevance of knowledge to the jobs the civil servants are likely to perform.

46 M. Wahiduzzaman, p. 70.

present there is no scientific system of identifying training needs. Training need is assessed according to government's perception. Respondents made following comments on the questionnaire regarding methods of identifying training needs⁴⁸: (1) Training needs were identified by the Government's perception: 39(32.5%); (2) Training needs were identified in consultation with trainee: 1(0.83); (3). In consultation with organisation/ or Superior Officers: 11(9.17); (4) Questionnaire is not applicable to them: 69(57.5). These findings indicate that the government followed a top down approach in devising training curriculum. In the top down approach, an employee may not find the skills or knowledge he lacks or he needs. Amongst the respondents, about 63% respondents are in favour of making training a precondition for promotion while 38% are against it. If training is not made be a precondition for promotion, individual's investment in terms of effort, time are wasted and this may lead the trainees to take the training lightly. If training is not rated, integrated with career development and rating of training is not taken into account for promotion; 'some training institutes may become undisguised exile colonies for unwanted officials, while others may be vacation spots where officials can while away their time at government expense.'⁴⁹

Concluding Observations

At present, there is no proper link between career development plan and training though there are arrangements for training at every level from the post of entry level to the posts of Joint Secretary (i.e., Assistant Secretary level officials of the UK). The draft national training policy acknowledges this shortcoming that training is no incentive for career development of officers"⁵⁰. Development of officers takes place primarily through job rotation supplemented by on-the job training and, as required, formal training courses. As such career development plan should include on-the-job training, job rotation and posting of individuals on the basis of training they receive and their aptitudes. The BPATC study found that training was heavily neglected as a factor for career advancement⁵¹.

47 Ibid., p. 72.

48 Ibid., p. 73.

49 A. Raksataya and H. Siedentopf, eds., *Asian Civil Service: Development and Trends*, APDC, Kuala Lumpur, 1980, p. 30.

50 Ministry of Establishment, *National Training Policy*, 1986, p. 3.

51 Ibid., p. iv-19.

Most official reports, documents and studies on training as well as this research amply prove that training needs have remained as yet not duly identified, evaluated or validated in Bangladesh. Trainers seem to be not properly trained. There has persistently been a lack of co-ordination in training activities, and probably training activities lack policy direction. Weak management and lack of application of modern concepts and practices of training tended to have resulted in poor achievement in the area of training. Shortcomings of the system of training are likely to demotivate the able trainees. But, evidences have it that, attitude, motivation and ability of the trainees play significant role in making any training programme a success. Hence, to make the existing training system effective, necessary reform measures have to be taken, perhaps, along the lines suggested in the Ministry of Establishment (MOE) report, *Strengthening Public Administration Training in Bangladesh*, completed in November 1998 under the joint sponsorship of Asian Development Bank and the Commonwealth Secretariat, which probed extensively the state of the current training facilities and suggested an action plan for improvement⁵². Another report, *Towards Better Government*, released in 1993 under the authorship of four secretaries to Government (Rahman et al, 1994)⁵³, also dealt at some length with the deficiencies of the current system. This and the MOE reports highlighted three important areas for reform indicated in the paragraphs that follow.

Training Curricula. The curricula and teaching practices at the training centres need to be reassessed in the light of contemporary needs. At present, the content of training is very traditional. It emphasizes didactic learning in contrast to human resource development (HRD). Thus course content includes excessive emphasis on subjects like culture, history, law and learning about rules - as opposed to developing quantitative and analytical skills.

Linking Training to Career Development. Assignments in the Civil Service Training Centres should be made mandatory requirements for fast-track promotions. In Bangladesh, postings to training institutes are generally treated as a dumping ground, and perceived as a punishment posting. In the armed forces, for example, commandant

52 See Ministry of Establishment, *Strengthening Public Administration Training in Bangladesh*, Dhaka, 1998, pp. 14-15.

53 M. A. Rahman et al, *Towards Better Government in Bangladesh*, Dhaka, Bangladesh Government Press, 1993.

or instructor assignment in the Bangladesh Military Academy or the Military Staff College is a ticket to quick promotion to the highest-ranking jobs in the forces. This pattern should be followed on the civil side as well, combined with assigning a one-step higher grade to jobs in training centres. This kind of policy shift should, however, be part of a comprehensive Human Resource Policy for Government, backed by a specific Action Plan and budget to upgrade training.

Policy for Better Utilization of Trained Officials. Government should also evolve a policy for better utilization of people who receive training abroad in reputed institutions and programs. At present, their deployment and career prospects are determined by normal seniority and cadre rules. An officer who has completed a training program, for example, will have to wait for promotion until his or her senior with an undistinguished record gets promoted; and more often than not he or she will be assigned to jobs remotely connected with the training received in overseas universities. Government may consider accelerated promotion for these officers, and deployment in places where they can better use their knowledge, regardless of their cadre. In recent years, training opportunities have also been offered to officers outside the Government - from banks and training institutes. Government may bring them into the policy making structure on fixed assignment and, subject to their performance in the ministries, consider absorbing some of them permanently.

Chapter IX

STUDY OF CAREER PROGRESSION OF FOUR BCS CADRES

Introduction

The fact remains that the process of introduction of a new civil service structure in Bangladesh began with the establishment of a unified civil service called the Bangladesh Civil Service (BCS) in 1981. Initially, the number of the BCS cadres was twenty-eight, but the number as such increased to thirty in 1990 upon the structural changes into the BCS¹. In the main, the purported objective of the new system was to provide its members continuous and long stretch of work-life and a series of jobs or positions of higher responsibility commensurate with ability, time and experience. This chapter includes descriptions of the existing policy and practices of promotion of the BCS officers, their career blockages, nature and causes thereof, and the resultant effects upon the attractiveness of the BCS to brilliant students. The career structures of two BCS generalist cadres (i.e., Administration and Secretariat Cadres) and two specialist cadres (i.e., Engineering and Agriculture Cadres), which seem typical of their respective categories, will be studied through CAMPLAN (Cambridge Plan) and CAMEL to find out the problems of career related issues of the BCS officers. It is hoped that identification of the problems of promotion and other aspects of career will help find out a strategy to draw the better recruits to the BCS and develop the serving civil servants for the posts which demand manning by persons of higher quality and ability. However, the remainder of this introductory section focuses on the concept of career in the context of the BCS.

Traditionally, 'seniority' is considered to be one of the most important criteria of promotion in the BCS. In this context, the present system seems to have been suffering from inherent drawbacks due to lack of succession planning and career planning; a pool of high potential people cannot be developed up to the threshold of senior managers. The cohorts who were

1 For more about the structural changes into the BCS since 1981, see Syed Giasuddin Ahmed, "Public Administration in the Three Decades", in A.M. Choudhury and Fakrul Alam, eds., *Bangladesh on the Threshold of the Twenty-first Century*, Asiatic Society of Bangladesh, Dhaka, 2002, pp. 330-340; A.M.M. Ali, *Aspects of Public Administration in Bangladesh*, Nikhil Prakashani, Dhaka, 1993, pp. 23-24.

recruited during 1973, 1974, 1975 and 1976 compare their rate of promotion with that of their senior colleagues who were recruited during the Pakistan period. After the independence of Bangladesh, the provincial set up was transformed into national set up. The country experienced rapid introduction of new functions of government. In order to perform the new functions, new administrative agencies were created, older agencies underwent structural changes and huge expansion occurred, and satellite agencies, and corporate enterprises blossomed. The recruits of the Pakistan period reaped the benefits of independence to the fullest with rather limited knowledge, and education coupled with a narrow gauge experience. These people monopolised the higher positions of bureaucracy comparatively at younger age and continued to hold the senior position upto the age of 57 thereby blocking the prospect of promotion of their subordinates. Their subordinates do not foresee better future for themselves. Most of the civil servants claim that there is acute career blockage in the BCS. Though all the direct entrants of the BCS come through the same selection procedures to different cadres, the prospects of promotion vary widely from cadre to cadre. One ex-Secretary of the Ministry of Establishment (Mr. Shamsul Haque Chisty) says "unequal promotion opportunities have led to serious frustration among a number of cadres"². For example, the BCS Admin Cadre has about 1 percent posts above senior scale, while it is 52 percent in the Foreign Service; 27 percent in the Customs and Excise; 22 percent in Education; 3 percent in Police; and 8 percent in Public Works³. Candidates with specialist/professional background tend to opt for generalist cadres instead of the cadres that are directly related to their functional specialism as career prospect in the Specialist Cadre is poor⁴.

At present, there are two types of Promotion Board: (i) Departmental Promotion Board and (ii) Superior Selection Board (SSB). The Departmental Promotion Board deals with promotion up to Senior Assistant Secretary level posts, while the SSB deals with promotion to the posts of Deputy Secretary, Joint Secretary, Additional Secretary and Secretary in the Secretariat, including the posts of Director and above in corporations. Cases of promotion to these senior posts are finally approved by a Council Committee consisting of some senior Ministers. For promotion, service records, gradation list

2 Shamsul Haque Chisty, *Career Planning in Bangladesh*, BPATC, Savar, 1988, p. 17.

3 Ministry of Establishment (Implementation Cell), *A Study of Career Development Programme in the BCS*, BPATC, Savar, 1988, pp. xiv-2.

4 BPSC, *Annual Report 1989, 1990*, p. 15.

(seniority) and Annual Confidential Reports (ACR) are taken into consideration. Seniority is one of the main criteria for promotion. Seniority for promotion cannot be totally discarded; but if seniority is given priority over merit, brighter candidates will be indirectly discouraged to put up their best and take any initiative. The principle of promotion on seniority adversely affects the efficiency of the Civil Service. More on the selection criteria of the BCS cadre officers under study in this chapter follow.

Selection Criteria of the Four BCS Cadres

Already stated is that the BCS comprised in all 30 cadres when the fieldwork of this research was in progress in 1990. It was not possible at that time to study the career prospects of all these thirty cadres. Four specific cadres had been selected in such a way that two cadres were representative of the generalists and the other two representatives of the specialists. Study of these four cadres was thought then to lead to generalisation of findings for all cadres of the BCS. All the four cadres had to be dissimilar in functions. Those cadres which seem to have lesser problems of career blockages or other benefits to compensate for career blockages, e.g. doctors, tax and custom officials, members of diplomatic service, were not selected for study.

The Admin and the Secretariat cadres represent the generalists, and the Public Works (Engineering) cadre represents the engineers, and the Agriculture cadre represents the Agriculture related cadres, e.g. Forestry, Fisheries, Livestock, and Agriculture cadres. As these cadres meet the criteria for selection for study, career structures/career prospects of these cadres are analysed in the following paragraphs.

Dissimilarities of Cadres: There are 20 pay grades in the BCS. The rank of Class I BCS officers starts from grade viii (entry point of the BCS) in ascending order. Pay grades in generalist cadres do not necessarily indicate higher level of responsibility. In the Admin cadre, grade viii and grade vii perform the same functions in the field. In the Secretariat, grade viii, vii, and vi officials of the Admin cadre and the Secretariat cadre perform the functions of the same level. Be it in the field or in the Secretariat, the grade v and iv officers of the Admin and the Secretariat Cadres perform the same functions. Grade iv is time scale⁵ for these two cadres (upgradation of pay grade) only. But in

⁵ Any individual who stays in the same pay grade for 10 years and does not get promotion, he is upgraded to the next pay grade. A Committee headed by the Cabinet Secretary decides cases of time scale pay grade. That Committee puts up their recommendations to the Minister concerned. If there is nothing adverse is written in the Performance Appraisal Report or there is no disciplinary action pending against any officer, he/she is almost certain to get the time scale. Time scale is given once in a lifetime. Anyway with time scale rank and duties of an individual dose not change.

case of the specialist cadres, functions definitely vary from grade to grade. Below grade viii, all the 12 grades, i.e. grade ix to xx, posts are of supervisory, assistant levels, clerical levels and messenger levels.

It should be noted here that the twenty pay scales for the public sector employees in Bangladesh were introduced effective from July 1977, which also emanated from the recommendations of the Pay and Services Commission (also known as the Rashid Commission) of 1976. The minimum and maximum pay was Taka 225 and Taka 3000 per month, respectively. These twenty pay scales covered almost all the employees within the civil service system, including those who were working in various corporations, autonomous bodies, banks, and financial institutions⁶. However, to enable the public sector employees to cope with the rising prices of the basic commodities including foodstuffs since independence, governments have to take measures from time to time to adjust salaries of the public employees – by setting up National Pay Commissions at four to eight years intervals. In 1985, for instance, a Pay Commission doubled the basic pay, and in 1991 it increased the same by about 1.7 times, and in 1997 the increase as such was about 1.8 times, together with the increase in ‘dearness’ allowances at times. The present salary structure also has 20 distinct national scales which has come into effect from July 1997 (see Table IX. 1).

Administrative Cadre: They are the generalist administrators. At present they are responsible for general supervision of the maintenance of law and order, directing and supervising the management of land (land administration and collection of land revenue), looking after the criminal justice up to certain level, coordination of the development activities of the district and finally acting as the public relations agency of the Government providing direct contact between the people and the political Government at the centre. This cadre is composed of the (i) CSPs (The Civil Service of Pakistan, the administrative elite), (ii) the EPCS (the East Pakistan Civil Service, the generalist administrators who used to deal with generalist administration of the province and could hardly be promoted beyond grade V during Pakistan days), (iii) the recruits of Bangladesh period and (iv) some Circle Officers and (v) officers of class II level. Though the ICS, and the CSPs, the predecessors of this cadre used to receive comprehensive training there were gaps in training in this cadre after liberation of Bangladesh.

6 Syed Giasuddin Ahmed, "Composition and Structure of Services in Bangladesh", *Indian Journal of Public Administration*, vol. XXX, no. 1, 1984, pp. 184-186.

Table IX. 1. New National Scale of Pay 1997

Existing National Scale of Pay 1991	Newly Introduced National Scale of Pay 1997
1. 10000 (fixed)	15000 (fixed)
2. 8600-8×225-9500	12900-350×4-14300
3. 7800-6×200-9000	11700-300×6-13500
4. 7100-8×200-8700	10700-300×8-13100
5. 6300-10×175-8050	9500-260×10-12100
6. 4800-175×14-7250	7200-260×14-10840
7. 4100-150×16-5440	6150-225×16-8160
8. 3200-140×16-5440	4800-210×16-8160
9. 2850-125×7-3725-EB-130×11-5155	4300-185×7-4590-EB-195×11-7740
10. 2300-115×7-3105-EB-125×11-4480	3400-170×7-4590-EB-185×11-6625
11. 1725-7×105-2460-EB-11×115-3725	2550-155×7-3635-EB-170×11-5505
12. 1550-100×7-2250-EB-105×11-3405	2375-150×7-3425-EB-155×11-5130
13. 1475-90×7-2105-EB-95×11-3150	2250-135×7-3195-EB-140×11-4735
14. 1375-80×7-1935-EB-85×11-2870	2100-120×7-2940-EB-125×11-4315
15. 1300-70×7-1790-EB-75×11-2615	1975-105×7-2710-EB-110×11-3920
16. 1200-60×7-1620-EB-65×11-2170	1875-90×7-2505-EB-100×11-3605
17. 1125-55×7-1510-EB-60×11-2170	1750-80×7-2310-EB-90×11-3300
18. 1050-45×7-1365-EB-50×11-1915	1625-65×7-2080-EB-75×11-2905
19. 975-40×7-1255-EB-45×11-1750	1560-60×7-1980-EB-65×11-2695
20. 900-35×18-1530	1500-50×18-2400

Source: Bangladesh Gazette Extraordinary, October 21, 1997

Quality of this cadre deteriorated significantly with the absorption of members of provincial cadres and recruitment of average type of officers at entry level. This cadre has its own academy. The system of its training has improved to some extent. Members of this cadre take full advantage of foreign training as they are in control of the higher administration of the country⁷. The members of the Admin cadre hold all the post of Secretaries save two less important Ministries, 3 post of Ambassadors, 4 posts of member (equivalent or senior to the post of Secretary) of Planning Commission out of 5, and 37 posts of Additional Secretaries out of 45. They virtually monopolize all the senior and top most posts of the Civil Administration.

7 Ali Ahmed, "Reorganising Civil Service for Democratic and Development Administration", *The Daily Observer*, Bangladesh, 17 April 1990.

Data received from the Public Administration Computer Centre shows that the total number of members in the Administrative Cadre is 3302. This represents the final results of the flows (recruitment, promotions, and natural wastage) up to December 1990.

Secretariat Cadre: The Ministry of Establishment controls this cadre. They have no career plan. Until very recently, there was no system of training of young officers although there was a separate training academy for Secretariat Cadre during Pakistan days. At present the young officers of this cadre are being trained in the Administrative Service Academy. None of its member could reach the level of Permanent Secretary. They are mainly deployed in the desk-oriented jobs in the Secretariat.

Public Works: Engineering: Members of the Public Works are responsible for construction and maintenance of Government Buildings. Functions of the Public Works are somewhat like that of the Property Services of the British Government. In 1980, Government constituted 14 cadres, and 14 subcadres. Engineering was one of the main cadres and it had three sub-cadres--(i) Public Works under the Ministry of Public Works, (ii) Public Health Engineering Service under the Ministry of Local Government and Rural Development; and (iii) Roads and Highways Service under Roads Division of Ministry of Communication. Later all these subcadres were turned into separate and distinct cadres. Mainly civil engineers enter into Public Works Department. Certain number of Electrical Engineers and Architects also join this cadre. Inputs to this cadre come directly from one Engineering University, and 4 Engineering Colleges. Diploma degree holders of 18 Polytechnics⁸ join a lower rank and after serving for few years in lower posts may enter into cadre posts on promotion. Members of this cadre have the best academic career/ attainments if the results of O level, A level, and degree examinations are taken into account. Unlike other cadres, members of the Public Works do not undergo any departmental or professional training. Until very recently, even they did not undergo foundation training. Though members of this cadre have the best academic career amongst the civil servants, they do not undergo much professional or managerial training. Lack of training on management at times makes them unworthy of deployment outside the area of their own specialism. In the generalist-specialist controversy, they spearhead the movement against the generalists specially the Admin cadre.

8 Polytechnics of Bangladesh are different from that of the UK. The latter offer only Diploma in Civil, Mechanical and Electrical Engineering courses of three years duration. On Passing 'O' level examination, an individual may get admitted into these polytechnics.

Agriculture Cadre: The Department of Agriculture was founded in 1870 on the basis of recommendation of Lawrence Commission (1868). With the passage of time this department grew in size and importance. Unlike other services, there was no central cadre for agriculture since agriculture was primarily a function of the provincial Government during Pakistan days. The entry point of officers for this cadre was class II post which was inferior to the entry posts of Public Works, Admin and Secretariat in terms of pay, privileges, and dignity. Following the recommendations of the Rashid Commission, a cadre known as Agriculture cadre was constituted. It had three subcadres---(i) Agriculture: Agriculture; (ii) Agriculture: Forest; (iii) Agriculture: Livestock. Later on all these subcadres were converted into separate cadres. The entry point of Agriculture cadre was upgraded to class I in 1981 after a bitter struggle of the specialists against the generalists. That is why number of aged officers at entry grade in this cadre seems to be so high compared to other cadres though they might have entered into the agricultural service while they were young.

This cadre draws its inputs from Agricultural University, and Agricultural College. Yearly output of agricultural graduates far surpasses the demands for them in Government sector. There is hardly any labour market in the private sector specifically for the agricultural graduates. Function of this cadre is subdivided into three different areas--(i) Directorate of Agricultural Extension (DAE); (ii) Soil Research Institute; and (iii) Department of Agricultural Marketing. Total strength of officers in DAE is 1947; while the Soil research Institute has 75 officers; and the Department of Marketing only 75 officers.

The agricultural graduates are opting more and more for other generalist cadres. A survey of opinion of the agricultural graduates` on the cause of choice of other cadres as profession by agricultural graduate' carried out by the PSC⁹ reveals the following:

- a. Number of vacant posts in agricultural cadre has reduced substantially over the last few years.
- b. Due to lack of required implements, equipment, and paucity of funds, subject matter officers (entry level officers of agricultural cadre) cannot apply their own implements and modern technology in agricultural extension activities.

9 BPSC, *Annual Report of PSC 1989, 1990*, p. 14.

Career Issues of the Four BCS Cadres

Career prospects

Career prospect varies from cadre to cadre. In the past, there had been movement and even industrial actions by some cadres against the administrative cadre. At present there are two strong groups diametrically opposed to each other---the 23 cadres Coordination Committee and the 7 cadres Coordination Committee (the generalists). Inequality of promotion prospect in different cadres can be found from the table IX.2.

Table IX. 2

Details of 18 Cadres Having Less than 12% Posts above Grade VI

Sl.	Cadre	Present Career Prospect	Prospect of Promotion of Official (Keeping JS And DS in SSP Posts) after Abolition of SSP	Prospect of Promotion If Quota Reserved on SSP and Cadre Posts are Combined
(a)	(b)	(c)	(d)	(e)
1.	Public Health Eng.	8(7.14)	11(9.82)	15(12.93)
2.	Statistics	11(10.28)	11(10.28)	14(12.73)
3.	Cooperative	3(1.84)	17(10.43)	20(12.05)
4.	Roads & Highways	28(8.31)	36(10.68)	43(12.05)
5.	Forest	11(10.68)	11(10.62)	14(13.20)
6.	Public Service	44(7.62)	63(10.92)	73(12.44)
7.	Ansar	44(2.67)	25(11.11)	28(12.28)
8.	Family Planning	84(7.3)	134(11.63)	140(12.08)
9.	Education:Tech	96(9.51)	118(11.69)	122(12.04)
10.	Telecom	46(8.42)	65(11.88)	68(12.36)
11.	Health	521(6.27)	992(11.93)	1003(12.04)
12.	Agriculture	103(5.02)	246(12.0)	255(12.38)
13.	Livestock	40(3.31)	149(12.31)	155(12.75)
14.	Food	26(11.87)	29(13.06)	29(13.06)
15.	Admin	37(1.12)	489(13.32)	447(12.96)
16.	Fisheries	189(1.12)	82(13.38)	85(13.80)
17.	Police	17(2.86)	94(15.75)	101(16.72)
18.	Secretariat	26(4.3)	110(15.92)	99(14.60)

In column 1(c), only 8 posts have been shown in grade vi and above. These 8 posts are within the Public Health cadre. 3 of their members were encadred in the SSP (see column 1d). When the SSP is abolished, these 3 will be included in their cadre thus bringing the

number of posts to 11. These 3 posts will remain within the Secretariat even after the abolition of SSP. After the abolition of SSP, the Secretariat posts are supposed to be distributed as per strength of the Cadre. Then the Public Health cadre gets 4 more posts thus bringing their total number of grade vi and above posts to 15 which is about 12.93% of the total number of Public Health cadre. Same analogy applies for other cadres.

The government of Pakistan reformed the Civil Service and converted the career service into unified grade structure. In 1987, only 75% posts at the top tiers were held by the members of the former CSPs and other services¹⁰.

The Secretaries' Committee¹¹ made a through study of career blockages in all the cadres and made some suggestions to bring about parity in promotion prospects in different cadres. As the SSP was heavily balanced in favour of the Generalists, the Secretaries' Committee recommended abolition of the SSP and distribution of the posts above entry level and below grade II and I on the basis of strengths of cadres. Models suggested by the Secretaries' Committee are shown in Table IX. 3.

Table IX. 3: Percentage of Posts According to MNS of Different Cadres

MNS	Model- I		Model- II		Model- III	
2	0.5	21.5	0.5	17.5	0.5	25.5
3	1.0		1.0		1.0	
4	5.0		4.0		4.0	
5	15.0		12.0		10.0	
6	30.0		25.0		20.0	
7	48.5		57.5		64.5	
10						
	100.0		100.0		100.0	

Key: MNS: Modified National Scales of Pay introduced effective from July 1985.

Implementation of model-I, II, and III would involve Taka 13.6 million, 7.62 million, and Taka 3.60 million per annum respectively. The Secretaries Committee recommended the model-II to a Cabinet sub-committee headed by Dr.M.A.Matin, the then Deputy Prime

10 Charles H. Kennedy, *Bureaucracy in Pakistan*, Oxford University Press, Karachi, 1987, p. 33.

11 The Secretaries Committee is composed of all the Secretaries of the Ministries and Divisions. They deal with problems common to all the Ministries and any other tasks assigned with by the Council of Ministers.

Minister of Bangladesh (hereafter referred as Matin Committee), accepted the recommendations of the Secretaries Committee with some modifications. They kept the grade 2 posts out of this model and grade II and I were kept reserved for only those people who would be selected on the basis of merit. This model would not be applicable to those cadres who are already having more than 17.5% posts above grade vi¹². Other cadres construed 'the reservation of top two grades for people with potential' as machinations by the top level members of the Secretaries' Committee to deprive them of the top posts.

Study of Career Data of the Four Cadres by CAMPLAN

Career data of the four cadres under study were analysed through CAMPLAN (Cambridge Plan) software in the Institute of Manpower Studies in Sussex (UK)¹³. To be more specific, CAMPLAN can be a useful tool for extracting information about career progression. Constructing a frequency distribution by age for the whole service can see career patterns. The analysis drawn from prospectus diagram cannot be regarded as predictive but as descriptive of the present position. Though the prospectus diagram is a snapshot of the present situation, conclusions can still be drawn from the analysis. It is actually based on all stocks and flows in a graded manpower system for all current employees. Study of the prospectus diagram drawn by CAMPLAN quantifies the career prospects for individuals within an organisation. A clear picture of career patterns can be seen such as when some one is likely to be promoted from the present grade and what proportion of different streams will ultimately reach the top of the organisation.

From what has already been explained in this thesis there is no planned career development. There are no guidelines that individuals with a given ultimate potential will progress up the career ladder at any specific rate. Preplanned average ages of promotion do not exist. Indeed, the idea of assessing an individual's is not applied within the BCS.

CAMEL is used to project the age distribution forward, under assumptions about future recruitment ages, future growth, future wastage and retirement patterns as there is no

12 Government of Bangladesh, Report of the Cabinet sub-committee (*Matin Committee Report*), 1989, p. 26

13 The Cambridge model or Cambridge plan (CAMPLAN) developed by Morgan, Keenay, and Ray use a different model of promotion from both the Markovand renewal types which allows them to dispense with the need for data on eternal flows, for detailed study, please refer to Keenay, G.A., Morgan, R.W (1979), 'The Camel model: a model for career planning in a hierarchy', *Personnel Review*, 6, 43-50, UK.

intention to recruit much older or younger people, as there is no intention to change the size of the BCS particularly in the mid-level upwards (grade v to grade i) and as wastage (again concentrating on old workers) is likely to comprise almost entirely of retirement, then we can make the following assumptions:

- a. The recruitment age will not change;
- b. There will not be lateral entry in any grade;
- c. The structure of the Civil Service remains unchanged;
- d. The promotion policy and practice is maintained;
- e. There is no wastage other than the normal retirement.

Age/grade stock data presented by Prospectus are being reproduced the table IX.3.

Table IX. 4

Comparison of Age/ Grade Stock Data of BCS Administration (Admn.), Secretariat (Sect.), Works, and Agricultural (Agri.) Cadres

Grade/Rank	Average Age				Proportion in Grades				Proportion in Grade & Above			
	Admin.	Sect.	Works	Agri.	Admin	Sect.	Works	Agri.	Admin.	Sect.	Works	Agri.
viii/ Asst Secretary	37.04	37.90	36.18	31.92	.719	0.540	.246	.487	1.000	1.000	1.000	1.000
vii/ Asst Secretary	*	*	42.98	37.88	*	*	.443	.271	*	*	0.754	0.513
vi/ Sr. Asst Secretary	43.77	43.54	44.25	40.78	.133	0.381	.228	.189	0.281	0.460	0.311	0.242
v/ Deputy Secretary	48.43	47.10	NA	51.31	.101	0.044	NA	.038	0.148	0.078	0.083	0.053
iv/ Deputy Secretary	**	**	52.03	54.77	**	**	.066	.008	**	**	0.083	0.015
iii/ Joint Secretary	51.05	51.75	54.29	54.83	.027	0.034	.013	.004	0.046	0.034	0.016	0.008
ii/ Additional Secretary	51.76	NA	54.00	53.86	.007	NA	.002	.004	0.019	NA	0.004	0.004
i/ Secretary	54.05	NA	56.00		.012	NA	.002	***	0.012	NA	0.002	***

Notes: The data in the table has been derived from CAMERA option 5.

* Not calculated separately: the analysis combines grades viii & vii in these cadres.

** Not calculated separately: the analysis combines grades v & iv in these cadres.

*** Not calculated separately: the analysis combines grades ii & i.

NA Not applicable to these cadres as there are no such grades in these cadres.

Comparison of Average Age

The average age of members of the Admin and the Secretariat cadres at grade viii and vii is 37 (See Table IX. 4). Average age of officers of Agriculture at the grade viii is 32 while the average age for the viii graders of the Public Works are 36. The average age of the Public Works people seem to be high as there has been no recruitment in this

cadre after 1985. The average age of people at grade at vii in Works is 43 while that of Agriculture is 38. Members of the Admin, the Secretariat, the Works at grade vi are in the age group of 43 -44 while the Agriculture people of same grade are at 41. The astonishing feature of the age structure of the top three tiers of the Admin Cadre and the top grade of the Secretariat Cadre- grade ii seem to be in their early fifties which is likely to block the career advancement of the people at grade v and iv severely as those at the top grade are not going to retire before they reach 57.

Current age of promotion of people in the Agriculture cadre is much younger at the lower grades: those at grade vii are 32 on average. They are 4 to 6 years younger than their counterparts in the Admin, the Secretariat and the Public Works. This continues at grade vii; there the comparison is limited to Public Works and Agriculture cadres: those at the former are 5 years older-- 43 versus 38. At grade vi the gap narrows; Agriculture people who are 41, whilst the others are around 44. However, from this level upwards members of the Admin and the Secretariat cadres are younger. The probable reason for the difference is the recent growth of the Agriculture cadre, caused by the establishment of Upazilla. The growth of the Agriculture cadre is at the lower levels. Any way this is not going to ease promotion blockages in this cadre. Due to introduction of Upazilla, large number of posts was created in the lower levels and these were filled up from the people of higher ages. This growth also will not ensure early promotion in the Admin cadre.

Comparison of Proportion in Grades

The proportion in each grade varies widely. At grade viii and vii (combined), Admin has the 72% of its total cadre strength; Secretariat has 54%; Works 69%; and the Agriculture has 76%. Similar variations can be found in other grades. The Matin Committee made an effort to solve the problem by creating new posts in grades vi, v, iv, and iii to bring some sort of equality in percentage of posts in different cadres.

Proportion in grade viii and Above: If there were proportionately more posts at the senior level, all things being equal, then career prospect would be better in this cadre. Due to variation in detailed organisational structures, comparison at all levels is difficult. However, consistent comparison can be made at grade vi. The proportion of people in grade vi or higher posts in specific cadres varies: Secretariat 46%; Public works 31%; Admin 28%; and Agriculture 24%. As 46% of the posts of the Secretariat cadre are at grade vi or higher, either there has been a lot of grade drift or genuinely

there are reasons for their promotion and therefore many more opportunities for people in this cadre to reach this grade to progress.

There are many opportunities to reach at least grade vi in the Secretariat cadre. Conversely in the Agriculture cadre there are only just half this proportion of posts at grade vi or higher. With fewer more senior posts, most of these people will stagnate at lower grades.

The proportion changes dramatically at grade v. Here Secretariat, Agriculture and Works all have between 5 and 8% of their people at grade v or higher: Admin has 15% of its people at these levels. Here lies the best career prospect for these four cadres.

Comparison of Average Age of Promotion

Comparative average ages of promotion in the four cadres for each stream of people under study are shown in table IX. 5.

Table IX. 5

Comparison of Average Ages of Promotion in Four Cadres under Study

Final Grade	Average Ages of Promotions in Four Cadres																		
	Administration					Secretariat			Public Works				Agriculture						
	Promotion to rank					Promotion to ranks			Promotion to grades				Promotion to grades						
	SA	DS	JS	Adl Secy		SA	DS	JS	G 7	G 6	G 4	G 3	G 1 & 2	G 7	G 6	G 5	G 4	G 3	G 1 & 2
Secy/Grade 1	35	41	47	51	52	No grade 1 post			Grade 1 & 2 combined				Grade 1 & 2 combined						
Adl Secy/ Grade 2	37	43	50	56		No grade 2 post			30	36	46	52	55	34	36	43	48	49	50
JS/Grade 3	39	44	53			31	42	49	31	37	50	55	35	37	45	49	50		
DS/Grade 4	41	47				33	44		32	38	54		35	38	46	53			
Grade 5	Grade 4 & 5 combined					Grade 4 & 5 combined			No grade 5 post				37 41 49						
SAS/Grade 6	44 (Grade 6 & 7 combined)					36			33 39				no grade 6 post						
AS/Grade 7									36				39						

KEY: Secretary.

Adl Secy : Additional Secretary.

JS: Joint Secretary.

DS: Deputy Secretary.

SAS: Senior Assistant Secretary.

AS: Assistant Secretary.

G 7: Grade 7; G 6: Grade 6; G 5: Grade 5; G 4: Grade 4; G 3: Grade 3; G 2: Grade 2; G 1: Grade 1.

Notes:

1. Due to smoothing, prospectus diagram produced negative value. As such information in these cells have been omitted.
2. Secretary & grade 1 gets same pay scale. A grade 1-post holder is not equivalent to a Secretary in status.
3. Additional Secretary & grade 2-post holder gets same pay scale. A grade 2-post holder is not equivalent to an Additional Secretary in status.
4. Joint Secretary and grade 3 post holders get same pay. A grade 2-post holder is not equivalent to a JS in status.
5. In the Admin cadre, grade 6 (SAS) and 7 (AS) perform functions of the same level. As such they have been combined together.
6. In the Secretariat, the grade VII (AS) and Grade VI (SAS) perform functions of the same level. As such they have been combined together.
7. For the Admin and the Secretariat cadres, grade VII is an upgradation of pay scale only.
8. For the Public Works and the Agriculture cadre, grade VII is a promotion post from grade VIII, the entry point of the BCS.

Those people who proceed to the top of any organisation are likely to get their first promotion younger than those who only get one promotion throughout their whole careers. On average this is almost certain. Basically the stream of people moving to the top progress faster than those who will ultimately only achieve middle levels. In turn these people progress faster than those who only receive one or two promotions, or may be indeed none at all.

Interpretation of Table IX. 5

Admin Cadre People who ultimately get to grade vi, got promoted to their final grade (present grade) at the average age of 44. In fact usually people get promoted to this grade after seven years of service. Thus average age of promotion may seem to be high but may be because of recruitment of 650 people of age between 25-50 in 1982 and lateral entry of Circle Officer Class I into this cadre at their late age. People who will achieve grade v and iv (combined) get their 1st and 2nd promotions at the average age of 41 and 47 respectively. Those who will achieve grade iii get their 1st, 2nd, and 3rd promotions at the average age of 39, 44, and 53 respectively. Those who will reach grade ii had their at the average age of 37, 43, 50, and 56 respectively. The top civil servants at the grade i on their way get their 1st, 2nd, 3rd, 4th, and the 5th promotions at the average age of 35, 41, 47, 51, and 52. Civil servants at grade ii and i get their promotions at an earlier age as compared to others. They are the high flyers. Some of them are holding the positions for 10 or 12 years. On average these top civil servants are there for six years, assuming they retire at 58. Continuous holding of posts at the

top levels for many years will create career blockage for those down below. As the wastage of the CSPs are treated as a depletion of the gene pool of the country so some of them are even kept in the service on contract even after retirement.

Secretariat Cadre Members of the Secretariat cadre who will achieve grade vi get their only promotion at the age of 36. Those achieving v and iv (combined) have their 1st and 2nd promotion at the ages of 33 to vi and 44 to v respectively. People at grade iii have their promotions at the age of 31, 42, and 49 respectively. These young civil servants at the senior positions will create career blockages for their subordinates. There are no posts above iii in this cadre. As such people with potential are most certainly to be demotivated/ demoralised.

Public Works: Members of this cadre who only get to grade vii get their 1st promotion at the average age of 35. People achieving grade vi get their 1st and 2nd promotions at the average age of 33 and 39. There is no grade v. Those who get to grade iv have their 1st, 2nd, and the 3rd promotion at the age of 32, 38 and 54 respectively. Those achieving grade iii had their 1st, 2nd, 3rd, and 4th promotions at the age of 31, 37, 50, and 55 respectively. The people at the top 2 grades get their 1st, 2nd, 3rd, 4th, 5th, and the 6th promotions at the age of 30, 36, 46, 52, 55, and 56 respectively.

Agriculture Cadre: People who only achieve grade 7 get promoted to this grade at the average age of 39. The average age seems to be high as the new recruits to this cadre used to enter at grade ix which was a class II post. The entry post was upgraded in 1981. Moreover, there are many promotees who had been promoted from assistant level posts to grade viii. Officers at grade vii get their first promotion at the average age of 39. Average age of promotion of those achieving grade vi could not be given as computer gave small negative value due to smoothing. This means that people reaching this grade will not end up here; if they get there they will go higher. Those achieving grade v get their 1st, 2nd, and 3rd promotions at the average age of 37, 41, and 49 respectively. People ending at grade iv get their 1st, 2nd, 3rd, and 4th promotions at the average age of 35, 38, 46, and 53 respectively. People at grade iii get their 1st, 2nd, 3rd, 4th, and 5th promotions at the age of 35, 37, 45, 50, and 49. Those at grade 2 and 1 get their 1st, 2nd, 3rd, 4th, 5th, and the 6th promotions at the average age of 34, 36, 43, 48, 49, and 50 respectively.

Average promotion age in four cadres

The table shows that average age of promotion vary widely. The variations have been caused by recruitment policy, promotion policy, and age structure of the members of the cadres. Recruitment at older age in the Admin cadre and absorption of people with higher age distorts the picture about the average age of promotion. Agriculture people reached the higher grade relatively younger. Secretariat people progress quicker but stagnate at grade vi. Pattern of promotion of the cadres under study is shown in the table IX. 6.

Table IX. 6

Comparison of Rate of Promotion in Administration (Admn.), Secretariat (Sect.), Works, and Agricultural (Agri.) Cadre of the BCS

From Grade/Rank	Proportion of Staff Promoted in Cadres				Proportion of Future Promotion in Cadres +				Average Age on Promotion			
	Admin.	Sect.	Works	Agri.	Admin.	Sect.	Works	Agri.	Admin.	Sect.	Works	Agri.
viii/Asst Secretary	.2811	.4597	.7540	.5127	.5763	.6798	.9158	.9995	39.55	34.88	33.32	36.16
vii/Sr. Asst Secretary	*	*	.3106	.2416	*	*	.4581	.9800	*	*	37.31	39.29
vi/Sr. Asst Secretary	.1477	.0784	.0826	.0530	.4579	.1772	.3920	.9990	44.55	42.31	50.68	47.81
v/Deputy Secretary	.0462	.0339	NA	.0153	.3131	.1311	NA	.4438	50.55	49.45	NA	51.34
iv/Deputy Secretary	**	**	.0162	.0077	**	**	.2782	.1781	**	**	54.97	49.99
iii/Joint Secretary	.0191	NA	.0036	.0041	.1488	NA	.0385	.1026	50.92	NA	53.51	
ii/Additional Secretary	.0125	NA	.0018		.1471	NA	01.66		52.65	NA	55.58	

Notes:

* Not calculated separately: the analysis combines grades viii & vii in these cadres.

** Not calculated separately: the analysis combines grades v & iv in these cadres.

*** Not calculated separately: the analysis combines grades ii & i.

NA Not applicable to these cadre as there are no such grades in these cadres.

+ The proportion of staff who are already there or will get promoted if they stay to retirement.0.1488 proportion of admin cadre people are likely to be promoted in future if the present policy and practice of promotion persist while .0385 and .0667 proportion of Public Works can get promoted to grade i and grade ii if the present policy and practice of promotion persist. As there is no reserved post for Secretariat cadre in grade i and ii there will be no promotion to grade i and grade ii in future in this cadre. There is no promotion prospect in agriculture cadre in grade II and grade I as the people at the top are of very young age.

Comparison of Career Prospects

Table IX.7 that follow compares the proportion of people in different grades of the four cadres, i.e., Administration, Secretariat, Public Works, and Agriculture.

Table IX. 7

Comparison of Career Prospectus in Administration (Admn.), Secretariat (Sect.), Works, and Agricultural (Agri.) Cadre of the BCS

Grade	Proportion in Stream of Cadres				Proportion in Stream & Above in Cadres			
	Admin.	Sect.	Works	Agri.	Admin.	Sect.	Works	Agri.
viii/ Asst Secretary	.4237	.3202	.0842	.0005	1.000	1.000	.1000	1.000
vii/ Asst Secretary	*	*	.4576	.0195	*	*	.9158	.9995
vi/ Sr. Asst Secretary	.1184	.5026	.0661	.0190	.5763	.6798	.4581	.9800
v/ Deputy Secretary	.1448	.0460	NA	.5552	.4579	.1772	NA	.9990
iv/ Deputy Secretary	**	**	.1138	.2657	**	**	.3920	.4438
iii/ Joint Secretary	.1664	.1311	.2397	.0755	.3131	.1311	.2782	1781
ii/ Additional Secretary	.0017	NA	.0282	.1026	.1488	NA	.0385	.1026
i/ Secretary	.1471	NA	.0667	***	.1471		.0667	***

Notes:

* Not calculated separately: the analysis combines grades viii & vii in these cadres.

** Not calculated separately: the analysis combines grades v & iv in these cadres.

*** Not calculated separately: the analysis combines grades ii & i.

NA Not applicable to these cadres as there are no such grades in these cadres.

The table shows that percentage of people promoted in different stream of the four cadres vary widely. This has happened due to inconsistency in promotion policy, rate of wastage, and growth of the cadre. While the Admin cadre grew in number due to introduction of Upazilla, and new districts, there was hardly any increase of posts in the Secretariat cadre. The members of the Admin cadre have the highest proportion in grade ii and i above as compared to others. They kept the post of Secretaries and Joint Secretaries out of the purview of Matin Committee. They showed only 8 posts (1 Secretary and 7 Additional Secretary) in their cadre strengths which is about .203 of their total strength.

Age/Grade Histogram, Grade Proportion Diagram and Fitted Logistic Curves

The age grade histograms, grade proportion diagrams and the fitted logistic curves and their analyses are shown in appendix IX. 1. The histograms show that there are troughs and crests at different age level of the cadres under study. Comparison of troughs and crests of different cadres show that there has hardly been any consistency in past policies for recruitment or promotion. This has happened largely due to poor personnel policy. This is partly due to cessation of recruitment in different calendar years and promotion of people with higher age at the entry point either directly or from lower ranks.

The smoothed grade proportion diagrams show that there is wide variation in proportion of people promoted in different grades of the four cadres. There is hardly any consistency in rate of promotion of people at different grades. Variation in age structure, rate of growth in the cadre, rate of wastage, and promotion policy seemed to have caused this inconsistency in proportion of promotion in different grades of the four cadres.

The fitted logistic curves show that pattern of wastage differ from grade to grade in every cadre. This variation seems to have happened due to variation in policies and practices of recruitment and age structure of the four cadres.

Inference drawn from CAMPLAN Output

From the output of the camera diagram and career prospectus drawn by CAMPLAN, it can be inferred that there is severe imbalance in career structures of the four cadres due to wide variation in age structure, recruitment policy, promotion policy, proportion of promotion, and rate of wastage and availability of number of vacancies in each grade. This is the product of the history. Removal of career imbalance will take a longer time and new strategy.

Investigation into Myths about Career Blockages and Study of Possibility of Early Retirement by CAMEL

The analysis of the data tabulated from the histograms and prospectus diagram has, up to this point, sought to understand promotion policies in each cadre. The CAMEL technique provides a picture of the consequent grade structure of a cadre if the average age of promotion is maintained, lowered, or raised. Possibilities of early retirement of Deputy Secretary and posts above the level of Deputy Secretary have been studied through CAMEL software in the IMS, Sussex, UK. The detailed analysis is enclosed in Appendix IX.1.

Findings of CAMEL about Career Blockages

The findings of the CAMEL show that there is hardly any career blockages in the Secretariat Cadre, e.g. after 1990, number of persons for the posts of the Deputy Secretary and above are either about the same or decrease after three or four years (see Appendix IX.1). In future persons with younger age than the present Deputy Secretary

and Joint Secretaries will be promoted to the post of the Deputy and the Joint Secretary. In other three cadres there are career blockages. Degree of career blockages vary from cadre to cadre and in different grades within the same cadre, e.g. problems of career blockages in grade iv and grade iii than grade ii and grade i of the Public Works Cadre see appendix (IX. 1).

Career Blockages in the Admin Cadre: Career blockages in the Admin cadre are acute in all the grades above v. Only grade V is shown here to illustrate the degree of career blockages.

Forecast Numbers in DS
Grade and above at 2 March Each Year
Recruitment assumption: Constant total size of 3202 staff

Final Grade	Proportion in Stream	Ages of Promotion (Changes in Brackets)		
		(0)	(2)	(-2)
Deputy Secretary	0.145	48	50	46
Joint Secretary	0.164	45	47	43
Additional Secretary	0.002	43	45	41
Secretary	0.147	42	44	40
Total	0.458			

Year	Numbers in Grade for each Set of Promotion Ages		
	(0)	(2)	(-2)
1990	466	366	565
1991	513	412	611
1992	547	448	640
1993	577	480	666
1994	604	511	693
1995	623	534	711
1996	631	542	721
1997	630	541	728
1998	640	550	749
1999	663	565	783
2000	686	578	817

In 1990 there will be 466 people for promotion when we maintain average age of promotion. 565 people will be at this level if we lower the average age of promotion by 2 years than the present promotion age. If we had promoted on average two years later than presently there would be only 366 people to fill these posts.

In 1991 there would be 513 people for promotion if we had promoted them in average age of promotion. If they were promoted 2 years younger, there would be 611 people for promotion as DS. If they had been promoted 2 years later than the average age of promotion, there would have been 412 persons for promotion.

In 1992 there would be 547 people for promotion if we maintain the average age of promotion. There would be 448 persons for promotion if they are promoted 2 years later than the average age and 640 persons would expect promotion if they are promoted 2 years earlier than the average age of promotion.

From 1993 onwards, situation gets worse whether people are promoted at average age of promotion, two years younger or two years earlier. Even if we promote on average two years later than currently, we would still find the numbers of people expecting promotions increasing by over 100 every year.

Basically DS (deputy secretary) and above cannot grow at this rate, i.e. that structure is untenable. Career blockages in the other grades are also acute (appendix IX.1).

Career Blockages in the Agriculture Cadre: The promotion prospects of the Agriculture cadre are shown below if the ages of promotion are maintained:

Forecast Grade Sizes Using Career Prospectus with Promotion Ages Shifted by 0. Years

Year	VIII	VII	VI	IV	III	II	I
1990	806.	404.	392.	67.	14.	6.	7.
1991	706.	404.	485.	73.	15.	6.	7.
1992	622.	378.	584.	83.	16.	7.	7.
1993	546.	330.	693.	97.	16.	8.	7.
1994.	459.	300.	785.	119.	16.	9.	8.
1995	373.	293.	850.	147.	15.	10.	9.
1996	275.	296.	891.	194.	18.	12.	11.
1997	196.	295.	909.	247.	22.	14.	13.
1998	137.	272.	911.	312.	31.	18.	16.
1999	97.	233.	887.	392.	42.	25.	21.
2000	74.	178.	842.	482.	56.	36.	29.

It is seen in the above analysis that there will be severe career blockages in this cadre from 1991 onwards in grade vi and above. In 1991, there will be 485 persons for 392 posts in grade vi, 73 persons for 67 posts in grade iv. In 1992 584 persons for 392 posts in grade vi, and 97 persons for 67 posts in grade iv. Promotion prospects worsen for these two groups from 1992 onwards. There seems to be no problems of career blockages in grade ii and i up to 1994 as the incumbents of these posts have been promoted early, i.e. at the age of 49 (see table V.6). From 1994 onwards career blockages start at these grades.

Effects of Change of Promotion Policy on the four Cadres

The CAMEL model shows that any specific change in promotion policy does have varying effects on the career prospects of the four cadres under study. Effects also vary in different grades of same cadre. Variations in effects on change of promotion policy are caused by age structure and lack of homogeneity in organisational structure. Effect of age structure on career prospects has been recognised in a study on the Belgian Civil Service:

'In a career structure, a great deal of attention has to be paid to the age structure of the personnel. Only if there is a balanced age structure, will career chances be equally distributed over different generations. The stopping of recruitment introduced in Belgium in 1982 has already disastrous consequences in this respect'.¹⁴

Causes of Career Blockage and Defects of the Matin Committee's Recommendations

The CAMPLAN and CAMEL analyses show that career blockage in the four cadres, to a great extent, is due to age structure of the members of the four cadres. Wide variations in age structures occurred due to inconsistent recruitment policy, i.e. recruiting one year up to the age of 27, the next year the maximum age limit is extended up to 50, and followed by discontinuation of recruitment for few years. Also recruitment in some cadres may occur in one year and the next year in other cadres. Though the Matin Committee approved the recommendations of the Secretary's Committee for creation of posts to bring about parity of posts in grade vii, vi, v, iv and iii, this proposed parity in posts will not solve the problem of career blockages as the blockages are mainly created by age structure. The lacuna in the recommendations of the Secretaries' Committee was only discovered after study of the career prospects of the members of above cadres in the Institute of Manpower Studies in Sussex (UK). The Secretaries' Committee in their deliberations took account of the number of posts at each tier of the cadre, distributing the posts proportionately. Unfortunately they did not take into account the age structure of members of the cadres in the different tiers which contributed to career blockages to a great extent. This finding highlights potential problems with potential consequences far beyond internal career prospects. The Secretaries' Committee, all of them ex-CSPs and now members of the Admin cadre, are supposedly keeping the top posts open for selection of people with potential from all cadres. In reality, these posts are held mainly by themselves; only people from the Admin cadre are being promoted whenever a post falls vacant.

¹⁴ International Institute of Administrative Science, *The Higher Civil Service in Belgium and in Industrialised Countries: Recruitment, Career and Training*, Brussels, June 1987, p. 69.

The Civil Service has a pyramid structure. There had been growths in the lower and some mid level posts only. Increase of posts in senior and top level had been very insignificant. The pyramid structure diminishes the promotion prospects. While there was growth of the Civil Service at the lower levels in the Admin and the Secretariat cadre, there was no growth in the posts of the Joint Secretary/grade iii, Additional Secretary/ grade ii and the Secretary/grade i.

Concluding Observations with Suggestive Reform Measures

It seems clearly indicative from the preceding discussions that the BCS cadres in Bangladesh generally vary in structure, promotion policy, rate of recruitment, rate of promotion, and rate of retirement. There are wide variations in age structure in different grades, proportion of promotion in different grades and chances of promotion from grade to grade. The career structures are so unique that there is hardly any comparability about career prospects between and amongst the cadres. CAMEL proves that there are career blockages in the Admin cadre, Public Works cadre, and the Agriculture Cadre. Despite the lack of comparability in different cadres, it can be generalised that there are career blockages in the BCS.

Generally speaking, career blockage is not a new phenomenon in the Civil Service. From the discussions this researcher had with the officers of the HM's Treasury (Personnel Department in UK) in 1990, one should get an impression that career blockages are acute at the level of principal and contraction in the number of the civil servants over the Thatcher era led to poor promotion prospects throughout the British Civil Service. Career blockages are problems in most of the Western European Civil Service. Even in the Japanese Civil Service there are career blockages above a few grades of entry level. After the introduction of the Civil Service Reform Act in 1978, there were good career prospects for the senior level civil servants in the USA. The Reagan administration's policy on the US Civil Service diminished the career prospect of many civil servants. People who are not promoted have to be counselled that every one cannot go to the top. Many have to settle in a particular grade and contribute their best at their level. If people were promoted on the basis of merit and performance, there would be a less demoralising effect on those who do not get promotion. Those passed over would know that only abler people could reach the senior or top grades.

The media, the alert public and the civil society may mould people's opinion in favour of a Civil Service that will be based on merit and performance. The development partners also may play a great role in urging the government to go for selection and promotion of the Civil Service mainly on merit and performance. Promotion remains a factor for boosting morale in the service and efficiency of the civil servants depend a lot on the morale of its members. Promotion should be based on merit, and performance. Seniority may make individuals eligible for promotion.

Most of the respondents indicated while the opinions of the bright university students were sought in 1990 that they would not join the Civil Service due to career blockages. Early promotion may be an incentive to the bright students. Early retirement of the less efficient ones may not help career blockages; it may help induce the brighter ones to join the Civil Service. Early retirement will not be enough to draw the talented ones to the Civil Service if the promotion policy is not based on merit and performance. In Bangladesh, thousands of employees of some departments and parastatals (state-owned enterprises) have been separated from jobs with extra remuneration. Voluntary retirement of the less efficient civil servants with incentives in the form of extra financial benefits may be considered for bringing in the talented ones from the labour market to the Civil Service.

One way to counter the decay of the Civil Service in this country is to consider constituting a 'fast stream' cadre comprising civil servants of higher caliber and then placed in responsible position at comparatively younger age. The 'fast stream' concept is based on the premise that civil servants of outstanding calibre should be appointed to positions of responsibility involving decision-making at a comparatively young age. These "High Flyers" concept would attract highly talented students to the Civil Service career. Fast streaming of the very bright young persons is a common feature of the French, Swedish, Malaysia, and Indian Civil Services. Fast streaming or high flyer concept reminds many of us about the bitter memory of the CSP officers in United Pakistan. Unlike the CSPs, fast streaming must not ensure 'guaranteed promotion throughout the whole career' to the fast streamers. At every tier of hierarchy, they will be promoted on the basis of performance. It needs, however, to be clear that the fast streamer will not be a prototype of the CSP and will not be confined to only one particular cadre. Fast streaming will be applicable to all the cadres. The practice of fast streaming in the BCS was abandoned in 1972 on the grounds that this was not in

keeping with the socialist ideology of independent Bangladesh. But, to many Bangladeshis these days, 'euphoria for socialism seems to have evaporated.

One finds, however, that the two major political parties in this country are now in favour of capitalism and free market economy. Bangladesh is more socially stratified than ever before. The higher civil servants are widely accepted elites of the society. There is a remarkable growth of the educated gentry and nouveau riche in Bangladesh. In the changed society, the introduction of fast promotion route for the brighter civil servants may not meet much opposition. Fast streaming should start from the grade V posts and fast streamers should be first identified from their academic attainments, achievement in training and ACRs, and then they should undergo test to enter the 'Open Structure'. Unlike the CSPs, the fast streamers must not have the right of assured promotion at every grade. Performance of the fast streamers should be reviewed for promotion to every grade.

Chapter X

PUBLIC SERVICE REMUNERATION POLICY

Introduction

Remuneration policy for the public service is considered to be an integral part of a sound administrative system. Pay is one of the main inducements of any career. The civil servants of Bangladesh and other experts on civil administration hold a firm view that career blockage and low pay in the Civil Service discourage the bright students to join the Civil Service. If the pay of the Bangladesh Civil Service is compared to that of what was in place in united Pakistan during 1969-70, the pay package of present day is certainly lower in real terms¹.

This researcher's opinion survey on career choice of 330 students of different institutions indicate that 45% of those who would not join the Civil Service said that one of their causes of reluctance to join the Civil Service was the low pay of the Civil Service (see Chapter V). In another survey amongst the civil servants, 68.57% of the civil servants consider the pay as 'NOT-GOOD/ NOT GOOD AT ALL (see Chapter V)'. Many social science experts assume that job seekers globally assess the inducements including pay offered by an employer before making any career choice². Brighter graduates can fetch much better price in the labour market from the ever-burgeoning private sector and the overseas employers. Students who consider pay as one of the principal determinant factors for choosing a career are not likely to join the Civil Service. Pay and incentive schemes are inseparably linked with career management. Adequate pay is one of the main inducements to draw better recruit to the Civil Service and retain the quality civil servants in the Civil Service.

In this chapter, the public service pay system will be discussed and analysed to find out inadequacies that may discourage most of the brighter students to join the Civil Service and demotivate the talented civil servants. The fact remains, however, that the public

1 World Bank, *Bangladesh: Government that Works*, The World Bank, Dhaka, 1996, pp. 122-23.

2 George T. Milkovitch, and K. Wigdor Alexandra, *Pay for Performance: Evaluating Performance Appraisal and Merit Pay*, National Research Council, Washington, DC, 1991, p. 91.

service pay system in the subcontinent has traversed a long way to attain a democratic form from an imperialistic dispensation. For following the evolution of the pay policy in Bangladesh, the history of the pay policy in the subcontinent has to be studied. This history may be divided into four parts - (1) the pay policy during the period of British rule in India before 1947, (2) remuneration policy in independent India, (3) remuneration policy in Pakistan up to 1970, and (4) remuneration policy in Bangladesh.

British Period

In 1887, a commission called The Public Service Commission, headed by Lord Aitchison (referred as Aitchison Commission), recommended a dual service system - an Imperial Civil Service and the Provincial Civil Service, and a dual pay structure - one for the Imperial Civil Servants and another for the Provincial Civil Servants. The Imperial Civil Service was manned by recruits from England and the Provincial Civil Service by the native Indians. There was wide disparity between the pay levels of these two classes of Civil Servants³.

The Royal Commission on the Public Services in India, 1915, headed by Lord Islington (known as the Islington Commission), recommended that "the Government should pay so much and so much only as is necessary to obtain the recruits of right stamp and to maintain them in such comfort and dignity as will shield them from temptation and keep them efficient for the term of their office". The vital recommendation of this Commission was its insistence on the principle of "equal pay for equal work". This principle apparently removed the class distinction in pay fixation. Recruits of government service irrespective of their origin of recruitment were to be paid the same pay for the same job. But higher level jobs remained the monopoly of the British nationals⁴.

The Lee Commission (The Royal Commission on the Superior Services in India 1924), constituted in 1924 to investigate into the superior Civil Services accepted the principle of payment system laid down by Islington Commission. It, however, expressed its anxiety over the widening gap between the private sector and the public sector and recommended that the gap should be bridged without any delay. For the first time "the ability to pay" consideration was introduced in the determination of pay levels for the civil servants. The

3 See *Report of the Public Service Commission, 1886-87*, Cmd. 5327, Vol. 1, Calcutta, 1888.

4 See *Report of the Royal Commission on Public Services, 1915*, Vol. 1, Cmd. 8382, 1917.

Commission also introduced the "cost of living concept" explicitly as a main determinant of pay levels. In retrospect it appears that the Lee Commission report was more thorough in its approach to the principle of pay determination. Lee Commission suggested that the pay level could not be allowed to fall below what was needed to cover the cost of living and could not exceed the limit of the ability of the Government to pay⁵.

But, none of the above Commissions mentioned the pay problems of the lower and the middle grades of the Civil Service. Defects of the above Pay Commissions have been highlighted by one researcher in the following words;

"... nor there were any concern about the middle and lower grade employees. For example, during the colonial regime and the post-colonial period the comfort and dignity which a Civil Servant in charge of a subdivision or a district administration were enjoying never matched that of the in-charge of a police station (sub-inspector of police) or a sub-registrar in-charge of the records of land purchase and sale transactions of a small jurisdiction. These were primary units for revenue and civil administration. The salary which was offered to a sub-inspector of police or a sub-registrar was insignificant in comparison to the power he could exercise on the imperial subjects. Opportunities to acquire wealth by exercising power were available to them. The colonial government as an employer was not interested in the moral well-being and the dignity of its lowest grade employees. Thus their design to create a power hierarchical bureaucracy guaranteed "comfort and dignity" at the top and bribery and corruption was institutionalised at the bottom."⁶

Remuneration Policy in Independent India

The remuneration policy of the Central Government of in independent India was based on the recommendations of the Varadachariar Commission (1946-47). It recommended that "their minimum pay in public service would not be less than a living wage". Living wage was defined as "the standard minimum emoluments required for a working class family and a middle class family". According to the Commission, the maximum pay should be kept "within a reasonable ceiling consistent with essential requirement of recruitment and efficiency". The Varadachariar Commission laid down criteria for fixation of minimum pay and the maximum pay⁷.

The Second Pay Commission of India, 1959, headed by Justice Jagannadha Das (known as the Das Commission), added newer dimensions to the principle of pay policy already

5 See *Report of the Royal Commission on the Superior Services in India*, Cmd.2128, 1924.

6 Mawdudur Rahman, "Compensation and Motivation in the Civil Service of Bangladesh", in A. Raksasataya and H. Siedentopf, eds., *Asian Civil Services: Technical Papers*, Vol. 3, ADPC, Kuala Lumpur, pp. 3B, 10-11.

7 See S.R. Maheshwari, *A History of Indian Administration*, Orient Longman, New Delhi, 2001, pp. 209-210.

formulated by the Varadachariar Commission. The Das Commission examined the pay issue in the greater perspective of national and social policy of the state. The guiding principle of this Commission was economy of expenditure on pay account; keeping apart enough money for development purposes; and to reduce current consumption for mobilisation of resources for investment. The Commission recommended that the pay spread between the lowest and the highest need not be unjustifiably wide. The Commission recommended a liberal interpretation of the concept of "living wage" by way of including education, accommodation, medical attention and security in the consumption basket of a working class family. The social considerations and egalitarianism were introduced as determinants of pay policy in the subcontinent for the first time⁸.

Remuneration Policy in Pakistan 1947-70

A Pay Commission was set up in 1948 under the chairmanship of Justice Muneer to recommend a pay structure in Pakistan. Muneer Commission displayed greater realism in their interpretation of concept of "comfort and dignity" by saying that "while every state must aim at raising the standard of material comfort of its subjects we can not make fetish of conventional standard of life or recognise standards of living for its servants quite out of tune with the generally prevailing standards"⁹. Social considerations were introduced as a parameter for the determination of the level of comfort and dignity. The essence of the Muneer Commission's recommendation was that pay levels should not be so high as to be out of tune with the prevailing social conditions of the country and should not be so low as to tempt the Civil Servants to be corrupt. The right level would be that which would be required to attract the right stamp of people to public service. The Second Pay and Service Commission was set up in 1959 with Justice Cornelius as Chairman. The Government neither accepted the recommendations of this Commission, nor published the Report of the Commission.

In 1962, the Government of Pakistan announced a pay policy independent of any Pay Commission recommendations. For the first time, egalitarianism, i.e. narrowing down of pay differentials between the highest and the lowest, was introduced as a principle for determination of pay policy by the Government of Pakistan.

⁸ Ibid., pp. 285-87.

⁹ Pay and Services Commission, Cabinet Division, Government of Bangladesh, *Report, Part II: Pay and other Benefits*, Vol. 1, 1977, p. 5.

The Third Pay Commission was set up in Pakistan in 1970 under the chairmanship of Mumtaz Hassan. They submitted an interim report in 1970 on the salaries of non-gazetted staff (mainly supporting staff). The Commission suggested reduction of about 500 scales into 15 scales.

The lowest scale of pay in 1949 was Rs.28 -1/2-32 and the highest pay level was Rs. 4000. Average per capita GDP in 1949 was around Rs.30 per month. The lowest pay was fixed at a level lower than the average per capita GDP. The highest pay was about 133 times higher than the prevailing per capita GDP. This was a disproportionately high ratio. The lowest pay scale was Rs.65-1-80 and the highest was Rs.4000 in 1962¹⁰. The respective disparity ratios in the two years 1949 and 1960 are shown in Table X.1.

Table X. 1

Comparison of Maximum and Minimum Pay Scale of 1949 & 1962 (in Rupees)

Salary	1949	1962
Minimum of the lower scale	28	43
Highest pay	4000	4000
Disparity ratio	1:143	1:61
Maximum of the lowest scale	32	80
Highest pay	4000	4000
Disparity ratio	1:125	1:50
Mean of the minimum and the maximum	30	72.5
Highest pay	4000	4000
Disparity ratio	1:133	1:55

Source: Pay and Services Commission, *Report*, Part II, vol. 1, 1977, p. 19

Table X .1 shows that the span between the highest and the lowest level of pay was considerably reduced between 1949 and 1962. The disparity ratio worked on the basis of the mean of the minimum and the maximum of the lowest pay scale is considered, it will be seen that their disparity ratio fell from 1:133 in 1949 to 1:55 in 1962, a fall of 242%. This was quite a good achievement within a period of 13 years. This achievement was made absolutely by an increase in the lowest pay level by raising the lowest scale of pay

¹⁰ For more details about the public service pay policy, see Pay and Services Commission, *Report*, Part II, Vol. 1, 1977, *ibid*.

from 28-1/2-32 to 65-1-80 and retaining the highest pay level at Rs.4000. The comment of the 1972 Pay Commission on this issue is as follows:

" It is obvious that the somewhat rudimentary pay plans in the sub-continent were colonial in origin with sharp cleavages. Disproportionately high dispersals were maintained. It would hardly be an overstatement to say that separate pay policies, pay structure and pay administration existed for different classes of employees. The principles and criteria of pay policy hardly got transformed into fact of life for the intermediate and lower classes of officials."¹¹

Remuneration Policy in Bangladesh

Pay Commission of 1972

In conformity with the state principle of 'Socialism' and in view of the financial difficulties arising out the devastating war of liberation, the new Government of independent Bangladesh, reduced the salary of all public sector employees to maximum of Tk.1000 per month. Within a short time the Government found that price hike and high inflation had already eroded the value of money and Tk.1000 was not enough for the civil servants to maintain their life. Apart from inflation, decrease in pay scale adversely affected the morale of the civil servants. Soon the government raised the ceiling from Tk.1000 to Tk.2000 per month. The government nationalised the major industries, banks and financial institutions as a step towards building up a socialist economy. The First Pay Commission (The National Pay Commission, 1972) headed by Mr.Abdur Rab was set up to recommend a National Pay Structure for all public sector employees including the members of the Armed Forces "having regard to the declared objective of the government to establish a socialist society in Bangladesh" and "to suggests means to rationalise and standardise the pay scales of those serving in the public sector both under the former Central and Provincial Government". Simultaneously with the appointment of First Pay Commission, the government constituted the Administrative and Services Reorganisation Committee (ASRC), headed by Muzaffar Ahmed Choudhary (Vice-Chancellor of Dhaka University), to recommend a suitable service structure for the Republic of Bangladesh. Both the Pay Commission and the Services Re-organisation Committee kept liaison with each other¹².

The NPC (National Pay Commission) faced gigantic tasks in recommending pay structures. There were as many as 753 pay scales because there were too many occupational groups and classes. The occupational groups greatly overlapped with one

11 The National Pay Commission, Cabinet Division, Government of Bangladesh, *Pay Commission Report*, 1972, p. 14.

12 Syed Giasuddin Ahmed, *The Image of Public Service in Bangladesh*, Centre for Administrative Studies, University of Dhaka, Dhaka, 1975, 29-40.

another because the criteria followed for grouping were not uniform and consistent. Some occupational groups were on the basis of functions; some were on the basis of duties and responsibilities. The definitions of classes were very general and vague. The qualifications guides were too meagre and did not serve the purpose for which they were intended. Employees performing the same kind of work had different salaries depending on their eligibilities. ASRC commented on the shortcomings of the pay structure inherited by Bangladesh:

"In the past, certain jobs were palpably overvalued and certain other carrying heavier responsibilities were undervalued... These, in our view, were cases of misutilisation of personnel which was the result on an imbalance in the pay structure through which pay in the Secretariat was unjustifiably overvalued in comparison with more onerous and important field positions. It may be pointed out that even in regard to the remuneration for the same kind of posts, the pay structure introduced difference based on the service origin of the person holding the post... The above discussion leads to the conclusion that in the interest of sound and effective personnel management, the following shortcomings arising out of the existing pay structure should be removed¹³.

- (a) The absence of healthy principle of equal pay equal work based on a careful evaluation of the work-content of jobs at different levels and the matching pay scales thereto;
- (b) The imbalance in the remuneration attached to Secretariat or Headquarters posts and the field posts leading to rush for the former and to misutilization of talent;
- (c) The absence of a rational pay structure which would take into account distinct levels of work and responsibility, rendering it difficult to give effect to a programme of career development based on merit and talent and a planned development thereof;
- (d) The disadvantage due to the existence of long pay scales and the feeling of easy attainment of increments, which such scale induce, is that it does not provide for the recognition of merit and for a continuous incentive for the best performance; and
- (e) The existence of multiplicity of scales of pay for different groups neither makes for a rational system of remuneration related to work content nor does it facilitate the selection of personnel from different services for higher positions¹⁴

Though the recommendations of the ASRC regarding service structure were not published, the part containing recommendations for pay structure was published in May 1973. The principle of socialism was given priority by the First Pay Commission which is evident

13 Overvaluation occurred as the officers of the Secretariat were working in the seat of power- the Secretariat and they could easily influence the decision-makers that could change pay levels. Technocrats working in the Central Government were drawing higher pay than their counterparts in the Provincial Government with similar qualifications and similar responsibilities. Besides, the staff working in the Central Government used to draw higher pay compared to their counterparts in the Provincial Government.

14 The Administrative and Services Reorganization Committee (ASRC), *Report, Part I: The Services*, 1973, pp. 28-29.

from this comment: "This Commission is convinced that a proper plan has to be evolved for a national bureaucracy which will dedicate itself to achieve the goals of national development through the socialistic approach." ¹⁵

The Commission took into account the following points for recommending the pay structure:

- a. The "floor"¹⁶ should be founded on a living rate of wage;
- b. The ceiling should be such as will be a socially¹⁷ acceptable multiple of the "floor";
- c. Functionally distinguishable levels of responsibility should constitute the different tier of administration and duty should be standardised into a minimum number of uncomplicated levels;
- d. The anatomy of pay structure (grade structure) should be founded on a time scale as it has been the historical pattern, i.e. every ascending pay grade after the entry grade must have a fixed time limit for promotion. For example, for promotion from the pay grade vii to pay grade vi, one should have minimum 5 years service, and from pay grade vi to grade v, one should have minimum 7 years of service. It can be mentioned here that time scale is not the only criteria for promotion or upgradation of pay; performance, vacancy etc will be other important factors for moving into higher grade.
- e. The processes of social reproduction of skills¹⁸ prevailing in the country should also determine the compensation tiers and differentials, with vertical and horizontal parties for careers requiring almost similar time and cost;
- f. With a primitive agricultural economy, its administrative tiers can necessarily be unsophisticated, broad and standardised; and

15 *The National Pay Commission Report*, 1972, p. 1.

16 Floor has to be determined in such a way that minimum 3 adult members (husband and wife = 2 adults; 2 children = 1 adult) can be fed upto the required nutritional level and children can be provided education and necessary health care.

17 After the liberation of Bangladesh, socialism was the creed of the day and ethos of the people underwent a revolutionary change. Ceiling should not be so high that it is out of tune with the prevailing social conditions and so less that the civil servants are forced to leave the job. The Ceiling has to be acceptable to both the people and the civil servants.

18 Social reproduction of skills means encouragement for development of more skilled manpower by rewarding the educated, skilled and trained persons. To ensure availability of persons with requisite knowledge and skill in all fields of national economy, it is necessary that there are adequate educational and training facilities in the country and that the wage structure contains appropriately graded incentives to motivate people for acquisition of knowledge and skills of varying sophistication and intricacies. Unless there are adequate compensation to be anticipated on successful completion of a difficult professional course or on mastery of an intricate and painstaking skill, persons may not come forward to acquire such professional knowledge or skill... Reproduction of skill is likely to suffer due to inadequate return against cost of training and foregone opportunities (*Report of the National Pay Commission*, Bangladesh, Vol. I, May, 1973, pp. 22-23).

- g. The resources being what they are, full monetary compensation at international levels for higher professional competence is unlikely to be available. Motivation has to be obtained on patriotic grounds.¹⁹

Instead of 753 pay scales the NPC recommended 10 pay grades - the highest being Tk.2000.00 (US \$ 254.00) and the lowest Tk.120.00 (US \$ 15.25). In addition to basic salaries, fringe benefits ranging between Tk.300.00 and Tk.70.00 per month were allowed against the basic salary. Amount of allowances should not exceed the basic salary. Allowances were proportional to most of the pay grades; maximum limit of allowances were fixed for pay grades v-iv. By this pay structure the disparity ratio of 1:143 which had existed in 1949 between the lowest and the highest salary of public servants was reduced to 1:15 in the case of basic pay and 1:15 in the case of total emoluments because of enhancement of the lowest pay. The recommendations for pay structure was based on the "assumption" that there would be "unfailing supply" of essential items like rice, wheat, edible oil, sugar, pulse at subsidised price through normal ration shops or Department/Co-operative Stores throughout the country. Unfailing supply of rice was taken into account for calculation of floor of the pay structure.

The Commission was overwhelmingly constrained by two factors in deciding the levels of pay. These were what the Commission called "social compulsions" which represented the direct reflection of the State Policy of Socialism and the resource constraints of the government. The Commission recommended ten grades of pay on the assumption of a Unified Service Structure in line with the recommendations made by the Service and Administrative Reorganisation Committee and brought the public sector pay level much nearer to the per capita GDP level. Per capita per month GDP in 1973 was around Tk.45.00 and as such the recommended maximum pay of Tk.2000.00 was 44 times higher than the prevailing per month per capita GDP level. The lowest pay level of Tk.130.00 was about three times higher than the per capita per month GDP level. This was an improvement over the situation that had prevailed in the years following the 1962 pay award. The notable feature of this achievement was the substantial increase in the lowest pay as compared to the per capita GDP. Substantial achievement was also made by the Commission in respect of narrowing down the gap between the

19 *The Pay Commission Report*, 1984, pp. 73-74.

highest and the lowest pay levels. If the initial pay of the lowest scale of Tk.130.00-240.00 is used in the working out of disparity ratio between the highest and the lowest pay, a disparity ratio of 1:15 is found.

Many inadequacies and inconsistencies in the classification and salary structure were found. The classification of positions, as a matter of fact, was based more on the required Civil Service eligibility rather than on the nature of duties and responsibilities. While position classification and salary structure were recommended as parts of the personnel system, there seemed to have been no attempt at formulating a government-wide wage and personnel classification in Bangladesh. The Commission was not charged with the function of making a factual survey and recommending a classification of positions which would determine the qualifications of persons that would occupy them and the nature and extent of their duties and responsibilities. There was inadequate data on the comparative duties and responsibilities of positions. Hence the allocation of positions was inaccurate, and led to inequities in salary adjustments which adversely affected morale of the senior officers.

Though the recommendations were accepted in principle, pay scales of Grades X to V were implemented from July, 1973. The remaining four Grades IV to I were not implemented. Nevertheless, the senior four grades, including the top grade, were allowed to draw maximum Tk.2, 000 per month. The government faced problem with the implementation of pay scales for grade IV to I (senior officers). Merging existing pay scales of class I officials into the four new national pay grades would require drastic reduction of salary, rank and grade of service for relevant officials²⁰. Officers in the top of grade of course drew salary of Tk.2, 000 per month, which was not in accordance with the maximum set in recommended pay structure; in their pay bills they showed their salary at Tk.3, 000 from which Tk.1, 000 was shown deducted every month. This shows that implementation of the recommendation was being avoided in some hope of change in the future. The public employees belonging to the former class divisions of II, III and IV and some of the officers of class division I received their salary according to the new scales while the senior class I officials were drawing their salaries according to scales of the pre-liberation period. This duality in pay administration continued until July 1977, when a new

20 M. Jainul Abedin, "Classification System in Bangladesh", in 'A. Raksastaya and H. Siedentopf, eds., *Asian Civil Services: Technical Papers*, Vol. I, Kuala Lumpur, APDAC, 1980, p. 17.

pay structure was introduced based on Rashid Commission Report.²¹ Anyway, what the researcher feels is that when the recommendations were immediately implemented without facing any difficulty in the cases of the lower six grades, they could have been implemented in the cases of four higher grades had there been a sincerity of purpose. From the middle of August, 1974, Interim Relief of Tk.500 per month was allowed and from May, 1976, sumptuary allowance of Tk.250 per month was also allowed to the Secretaries to counter inflation and price spiral.

The "assumption" which was the basis of the recommended pay structure remained a mere assumption as uninterrupted supply of the essential items could not be ensured by the government. Due to inadequate supply of essential commodities and poor performance of the public sector, price of all commodities showed continuous upward trend rendering the new pay scales meaningless even before its implementation. Price spiral of necessary commodities and rising inflation immediately after the implementation of the report of the First Pay Commission made the pay scale irrelevant to the developing situation. This needed a revision in pay levels. On the other hand, glaring anomalies resulted from the implementation of the recommendations in many cases because of the squeezing of the previous scales and because of such compression, superior officers and their subordinates in many cases were placed in the same grade. The top scales were compressed without corresponding changes in the lower scales. This seriously affected the service discipline and produced deleterious effects upon the entire administration. The Bangladesh society is totally status ridden and at times pay stratification is related to stratification of status. Upgradation of lower pay grade holders to the higher grades had an adverse effect on the morale of those who were getting higher pay from Pakistan days and this in turn affected performance of these Civil Servants who felt downgraded. Anomalies in pay structure and allowances, price hike and galloping inflation necessitated review of the pay structure.

Pay Commission -1976

A new Commission titled "The Pay and Services Commission (hereafter referred as Rashid Commission) was set up in February, 1976 to suggest reforms and

21 Syed Giasuddin Ahmed, *Public Personnel Administration in Bangladesh*, University of Dhaka, 1986, p. 166.

reorganisation of Civil Service and Pay Structure of the Public servant. The notification regarding the appointment of the Rashid Commission, shows that the recommendations of the First Pay Commission could not be fully implemented in view of the changes in the objective conditions and various difficulties arising out of squeezing a large number of scales of pay in a few national scales. Terms of reference of the Second Pay Commission, so far as the pay matter was concerned, were similar to those of the First Commission. The principle of socialism was specifically stressed there and the Commission was asked to examine the existing pay structure of the public sector employees and recommend a suitable pay structure including fringe benefits, "having regard to the fundamental objective of the policy to establish socialism". But enthusiasm for socialism subsided to a great extent by this time and the government which took over power by coup d'état on 15 August and 7 November 1975 gave reconsideration to the Nationalist Policy and was thinking of strengthening the private sector of the economy. In these circumstances the New Pay Commission made its own interpretation of the constitutional provision for the establishment of socialist economy and observed that what was aimed at by "socialism" was the "establishment of an egalitarian society where both public and private sectors shall be allowed to play their appropriate roles without any let or hindrance, which in other words can be termed a mixed economy". Among other directions given in the terms of reference of that was a direction to further reducing the disparity between the lowest and the highest salaries of the public sector employees.

With the introduction of mixed economy, Bangladesh entered a new era. Some of the nationalised industries were being disinvested and private sectors had a big boost. The labour market for Bangladeshis expanded and 17 percent of the professionals left Bangladesh for the Middle East. There was a big demand for quality graduates in the labour market. Persons who aspired for higher pay exploited their marketable skills either to the private sector or to the Middle East. It can be mentioned here that the first government of Bangladesh earned the wrath of the Middle East countries for breaking away from Pakistan and espousing a secular state principle. Most of them did not recognise Bangladesh before the killing of Sheikh Mujib, the founding father of Bangladesh in August, 1975. The Middle East countries started cooperating with Bangladesh after his death and allowed massive entry of the labourers from Bangladesh.

The Rashid Commission devised a new pay structure consisting of as many as 52 scales of pay within limits of Taka 230 (lowest) and Taka 4000 (highest)²². Its recommendations relating to pay structure were largely based on the following principles:

- a. The pay scales in the public service should be comparable with that obtainable outside;
- b. Although the supply of unskilled labour is abundant, the wages to be paid to this class of employees should be related to essential physiological needs rather than to conditions of supply and demand;
- c. Since the bulk of employees are engaged in administrative and administrative functions (which often prove unprofitable), pay in the public service cannot always be related to productivity;
- d. A national pay structure should be designed to attract the ablest and the most qualified persons to the various tiers of the Civil Service;
- e. Salaries paid to different categories of employees should be enough to ensure the maintenance of their relative standard of living; and
- f. Posts requiring pre-entry technical and/ or vocational qualifications should be placed at a premium by giving better scales of pay or higher initial pay in the scale²³.

In recommending this pay structure the Second Commission, like the First Pay Commission, also assumed that the essential food items would be supplied at subsidised price, such as Tk. 2.25 per seer (equivalent to 2 lbs) of rice. Disparity ratio in the salary remained practically unchanged between the highest and the lowest salaries.

National Grades and Scales of Pay

The recommendations of the Rashid Commission were thoroughly examined by the Council of Advisers²⁴ to the President of Bangladesh. Five separate Council Committees were duly constituted to work out the details for their implementation, as well as to suggest necessary changes to the original recommendations in the light of the existing realities and

22 Pay and Services Commission, *Report*, Part II, vol. *Pay and other Benefits*, 1977, Vol. 1, p. 12.

23 See Syed Giasuddin Ahmed, *Public Personnel Administration in Bangladesh*, op. cit., 1986, pp. 145-46.

24 An Adviser of the Council of Advisors was equivalent to a Minister during Martial Law in 1977. There were no Ministers at that time.

the state of finance²⁵. The government did not accept the recommendations either in respect of the number of grades or the amount of salary recommended for the corresponding grades by Rashid Commission. The government issued an official order called the Services (Grades, Pay and Allowance) Order, 1977, which contained a new set of national service grades and scales of pay. It provided for 21 grades and scales of monthly pay within limits of Taka 225/US \$ 14.60 (lowest) and Taka 3000/US \$ 194.55 (highest)²⁶.

The Services (Grades, Pay and Allowances) order of 1977 was both a pay plan and a system of classification of services. It was a classification system in that it divided all positions in the Civil Service into 21 mutually exclusive hierarchical grades based on the nature of work and the level of responsibility assigned to various positions in each grade in the hierarchy. Each grade also reflected matching educational, mental and physical standards demanded of the incumbents. Therefore the grades were in the decreasing order of the difficulty and responsibility of their work. The order in which they appeared also symbolized their place in the official hierarchy²⁷. The government subsequently reduced the 21 grades into 20 and termed them as New National Scales. Though the basic salary for the employees were same for all the regions of Bangladesh, house rent allowances varied from place to place.

Implementation of New National Scales of Pay

The new system of grades of service and scales of pay was made effective from 1 July 1977. But the process of implementation was not smooth. Placement in the new grades of service and scales of pay had adverse effect on many of the government employees. Previously, all government employees were grouped into four class divisions (I, II, III, and IV), and the employees belonging to same class received varying salaries under different scales of pay. In the new system, when an employee belonging to class I was placed in grade X and an employee of class IV in grade XX, in keeping with their inter-se seniority position in the service and existing salaries, the concerned employees were not prepared to accept their fresh placements because they felt they were being degraded.

25 Mawdudur Rahman, "Composition and Motivation in the Civil Service of Bangladesh", in A. Raksasataya and H. Siedentopf, eds., *Asian Civil Services: Technical Papers*, Vol. 3, *op. cit.*, pp. 29-32.

26 Ministry of Finance, Implementation Division, *Introduction of New National Grades and Scales of Pay*, Dacca, BGP, 1977, p. 2.

27 M. J. Abedin, *op. cit.*, pp. 32-34; Syed Giasuddin Ahmed, *Public Personnel Administration in Bangladesh*, Dhaka, 1986, p. 169

In 1978, a year after the pay plans were partially implemented, there was widespread complaints against the NPC. Agency heads complained that while they were in the best position to judge the value of the duties and responsibilities of position in terms of the overall functions and objectives of their respective agencies, they had to accept whatever classification and salary allocation were given by the NPC. They also had claimed that some subordinate positions had been specially favoured by the NPC plans such that employees had higher salaries than those of other agencies with comparable duties and responsibilities. The accusations, in most cases, were not based on facts. In Bangladesh departmental feelings and parochialism tend to blur the sense of judgement of the people when question of reform or distribution of power and privileges arise. Departmental heads and Service Associations always try to protect the interest of their own group by inflating their role and importance of their functions and in the process ignore the importance of other groups.

New grades of service led to great anomalies in respect of fixing new rates of allowances and fringe benefits. Under the previous system of four class divisions, employees belonging to same class division were more or less entitled to uniform rates of allowances and fringe benefits. Maintenance of such uniformity in the new system was difficult due to splitting of each class division into several grades. These anomalies in pay scales gave rise to sharp criticism. In the face of agitation and protests by the affected employees the government had to take steps to rectify the anomalies created due to introduction of the new grades of service and scales of pay. In January 1978, government constituted a Council Committee on Pay and Services (consisting of the members of the Council of Advisers to the President) to review the new grading system and scales of pay in light of representations received from a large number of affected employees. Subsequently, an Appellate Committee, with Justice Abdus Sattar (Vice President of Bangladesh) as Chairman, was also formed to consider the cases of anomalies which might still remain after the Council Committee completed its review²⁸. The government compressed the pay scale in such a way that many of the higher scales had to be merged with lower scales. This affected the salary and allowances of those who were in the higher grades during Pakistan period. Opposition to the new pay scale came mainly from this group.

28 *Ibid.*, p. 171.

The Appellate Committee and the Council Committee failed to ease the mounting discontent and tensions and remove the anomalies. On 22 April 1978, the government abandoned the grading system and made modifications in the New National Scales of Pay, keeping the basic framework of the newly introduced National Scales of Pay intact²⁹.

Through agitation and threats of industrial actions some professional and employee groups had successfully obtained salaries higher than the NPC scale, to the extent that some officers and employees were getting more pay than their superior officers in the same agency in real terms. Many government employees, with identical duties and responsibilities, were getting varying compensation only because they were in different departments or agencies. "Equal pay for equal work" remained an illusion.

As was the case following the First Pay Commission's Report, the government could not supply the essential items nor were they available in the market at the price on the basis of which the Second Pay Commission recommended the pay structure. There was price spiral following the implementation of the New National Scales.

Ad hoc Increment of Pay: To counter effect of influence of inflation and combat rising prices of essential commodities, government, from time to time, provided additional allowances at certain percentage of pay fixing the maximum and minimum limit of such allowances.

Pay Commission - 1984

From 1 July 1977 (i.e., the date of effectiveness of New National Scales) till mid-June 1984 when the Pay Commission 1984 was set up, the cost of living registered a rise by 125 per cent. Within this period, Dearness Allowance was granted to the employees on two occasions, in 1982 and 1984(June), to the extent of 60 per cent of the basic pay subject to the maximum of Tk.1000 per month. With these benefits, the highest pay came to Tk.5,200 per month including house rent allowance of Tk.1200 p.m. and the lowest of Tk.602 p.m. including house rent allowance. Besides, officers in the highest three grades were allowed the use of government transport on whole-time basis on payment of Tk.200 per month and entertainment allowance of Tk.300. Conveyance

29 *The Daily Bangladesh Observer*, 23 April 1978; E. Ahmed, *Development Administration*, Dacca, CENTAS, 1981, p. 53.

allowance of Tk.20 p.m. was allowed to the employees of the lower grades only -from grade XX to XI. Festival Allowance equivalent to one month's pay was allowed to all grades of employees since July 1984.

The cost of living index rose to 759 by the middle of 1982 taking the pre-independence year of 1969-70 as the base. The World Bank in its Report No. 4822 (February 27, 1984) commented on the drastic fall of real wages of the government servants causing eight-fold increase in their cost of living. As a major aid giving agency they drew the attention of the government to this matter emphasizing the need to "*attract, retain, and motivate persons of sufficient training and ability to carry out their important functions*" particularly in respect of implementation of the development projects and pointed out: "the provision of adequate compensation (salaries and other incentive) is clearly extremely important in this regard". The Report further observed:

"The deterioration in the real value of the salaries of public officials over the years is well known.... A Secretary who earned Tk.3000 per month at independence has suffered an eight-fold increase in the cost of living over the past thirteen years. His present salary, at Tk.3000 plus a dearness allowance of Tk.400 has plummeted in real terms to the equivalent of Tk.425. Improving the compensation of public servants would certainly have a financial cost. This fact need not be an insurmountable barrier to reform, provided that the direct cost of the presently inappropriate structure are recognised.... A salary structure designed solely to motivate those in a supervisory position would increase the level of recurring expenditure by only 0.6 per cent.... Salary excluding benefits amounts to only 18 per cent of the total recurring budget: thus an across the board increase in salaries of 25 per cent would increase the recurring budget by less than 5 per cent".

The World Bank expressed its worries for the top five grades of Civil Servants numbering 3766 out of 6,38,000 employees who constitute 0.60 per cent of the total and accounts for only 2% of the expenditure on the salary of these government employees. The Report ignored the vast majority of the lower grade employees. If salaries along with fringe benefits of those employees were also increased threefold, there would have been serious impact on the revenue budget. If any increase in salary of the top five grades was not matched by some increase in that of the lower grade, there would be serious problem of industrial relations in the country. By Bangladesh standard, the pay differentials of top five grades are very important.

As a measure against the effects of inflation on the emoluments of the public employees, the government announced the constitution of the Pay Commission in 1984. According to its terms of reference the Commission had to examine the existing pay

structure including all fringe benefits of employees of the government, parastatals, statutory bodies, and universities and had to recommend:

- a. A suitable pay structure for these employees including all fringe benefits, such as house rent, medical allowance, conveyance allowance;
- b. Death-cum-retirement benefits; and
- c. A suitable mechanism or appropriate principles for periodical re-fixation of pay/allowances, retirement benefits in response to the change of prices in the market.

In making the recommendations the Commission was required to take into account:

- a. Resources of the government, demand therein of essential sectors, such as Administration, Security, the necessity of fund for national development and of gradual achievement of self-reliance;
- b. Cost of living of a four-member family;
- c. Educational and other job requirement and their availability for various services and posts;
- d. The need to attract and retain in the public sector highly talented and trained, professionally and technically qualified persons;
- e. The requirement of efficiency, quality and incentives for work;
- f. The demand and supply in respect of various professions and occupations.

The Commission kept in view the natural law of economic and social justice as its guide and the following principles while firming up its recommendations:

- a. "Pay so much and so much only as is necessary to obtain recruits of the right stamp and maintain them in such a degree of comfort and dignity as will shield them from temptation, and keep them efficient for their service."³⁰
- b. The lowest compensation for work should not be lower than a 'living wage'³¹ and the highest salaries should be kept down as far as possible, consistent with the essential requirement of efficiency and output (Vardachariar Commission, India, 1946-1947).

30 The Royal Commission on the Public Service in India, *Report*, Vol. 1, 1917.

31 The "Living Wage" is bound to vary according to different standpoints. It can be fixed at any of the following standards: a. Poverty level, b. Minimum of subsistence level, c. Health and decency level, d. Comfort level, e. Cultural level.

Poverty level cannot be taken as a living wage. In the context of Bangladesh, comfort level and cultural level seem to be high. Health and decency level is the proper standard for minimum wage and this is taken as living wage. Living wage may be defined as that level of wage which will provide the employee with his subsistence needs and keep him fit to perform his job (Pay Commission, 1984, p. 30).

- c. Second internal relativity in the setting of compensation rates intermediate between the highest and the lowest rate of compensation- Second Pay Commission (the Das Commission, India, 1956-1957 as quoted in the Report of the National Pay Commission, 1984, pp. 4 11).

During the period from 1977 to 1984 the state policy regarding "the provisions for establishing a socialist economy and egalitarian society by removing exploitation of man by man" were substituted by the concept of "socialism meaning economic and social justice" which had been left undefined. In keeping with the altered constitutional position the terms of reference of the Commission had been framed making no mention of 'egalitarian' pay structure or the necessity to bridge the disparity between the highest and the lowest salary of public employees. In other words, the terms of reference neither required nor constrained the Commission to recommend an egalitarian pay structure.

A new economic policy had been adopted with reliance on the dynamism of private initiative and enterprise. The industrial policy of 1984 opened virtually all sectors of the economy to private entrepreneurs. Pursuant to the policy of the government to encourage free enterprise, a large number of enterprises, including jute mills and textile mills, had been denationalised and handed over to their former Bangladeshi owners. The employees of the denationalised enterprises and industries, prior to denationalisation, drew the pay scales granted to government employees. After privatization, they were granted higher pay than the government servants. The procedure for granting loans to private sector were simplified. The commercial, monetary, fiscal, and wage policies were restructured to give the private sector the needed support and incentives. Six private banks had been allowed to function and two nationalised commercial banks were converted into companies. The economic policy of the government was a significant departure from the socio-politico-economic scenario of 1972-1977. The private entrepreneurs started looking for the skilled, trained, and talented people in the labour market. The BCS started facing stiff competition with the private sector for the quality graduates in the labour market.

The Pay Commission recommended a new pay structure with twenty pay scales to replace the same number of the New National Pay Scales, 1977 and the different scales be deemed to be applicable to those employees to whom the corresponding scales of the New National Pay Scales, 1977, would apply except the university teachers whose scales had been separately recommended within the limits of the national pay structure. The new pay scale applied to all categories of employees belonging to government and semi-government organisations. The government planned to bring all sort of employees under a uniform system of payment by introducing only one payment system for all.

The pay in the pay structure recommended by the Commission meant the basic pay only and would not include fringe benefits, such as house rent allowance, medical allowance, conveyance allowance and the like. In recommending pay structure, the dearness allowance and the ration compensation allowed by the Government since the application of the New National Scales of Pay, 1977, had been merged in the pay scales. The Pay Commission recommended increase of all existing allowances; and discontinuation of provision of government transport to officers of grade I, II and III on whole-time basis from 1-7-1986 and car allowance of Tk.3000 p.m. in lieu thereof was to be introduced.

Pay Award-1984

Due to resource constraints, government allegedly could not implement the pay structure. It can be noted that the recommendations of the Pay Commissions were never implemented by the government in their entirety; government made changes in the pay structure recommended by all the previous Pay Commissions. Needless to mention here that the members of all the previous Pay Commissions had all the qualifications to be included in the Pay Commission. Like the previous Pay Commission Reports, the government made changes in the recommended pay structure and implemented the following pay³² scales:

³² Generally people are recruited at entry point of Class I, Class II, Class III and Class IV. Pay progression is based mainly on length of service for Class IV, III and II. For Class I posts pay progression is made on the basis of length of service and merit. Merit is a secondary consideration.

Sl.	Pay Scale 1977	Recommended Pay Scale 1984 ³³
I	3000(Fixed)	6000(Fixed)
II	2850(Fixed)	5700(Fixed)
III	2350-100-2750	4750 ³⁴ -150-5500
IV	2100-100-2600	4200-150-5250
V	1850-75-2375	3700-125-4825
VI	1400-75-2225	2800-125-4425
VII	1150-65-1800	2400-120-3600
VIII	900-55-1285-65-1610	1850-110-2620-120-3220
IX	750-50-900-EB-55-1230-60-1470	1650-100-2250-EB-110-3020
X	625-45-985-EB-55-1325	1350-90-2250-EB-100-2750
XI	470-35-645-EB-45-915-55-1135	1000-70-1560-EB-90-2280
XII	425-30-575-EB-40-735-50-1035	900-650-1550-EB-75-2075
XIII	400-25-525-EB-30-825	850-55-1400-EB-60-1700
XIV	370-20-470-EB-25-745	800-50-1300-EB-55-1630
XV	325-15-430-EB-20-610	750-45-1200-EB-50-1550
XVI	300-12-396-EB-18-540	700-40-1100-EB-45-1415
XVII	275-10-375-EB-15-480	650-35-1000-EB-40-1280
XVIII	250-8-282-EB-8-365	600-30-900-EB-35-1110
XIX	240-7-282-EB-7-345	550-25-725-EB-30-965
XX	225-6-315	500-20-860

Number of Pay Scales

There are twenty different levels of employees according to different degrees of responsibilities and job contents between the highest and the lowest employees. For this variation, the employees are being traditionally and historically paid at different scale. In the existing scheme of things, the officials of the government and other public sector organisations have been grouped into twenty different levels each corresponding to a supposedly common degree of responsibility and comparable workload requiring equivalent or comparable entry qualifications for the employees. For these twenty levels of employees twenty different levels of pay are in force. Although all the twenty levels of employees may not be available in any one organisation, there are some

33 One US \$ = Taka 25.96

34 Interpretation of Pay Scales: 4750-150-5500. The first figure 4750 is the basic and the starting pay, the middle figure 150 is the yearly increment and the last figure 5500 is the maximum pay achieved with five increments.

employees of some organisations belonging to each level for which a pay range has been allowed. On a strict scrutiny and thorough study it is possible to redistribute the employees into a different number of levels less than the existing number. Any such exercise would involve a re-examination of the degree of responsibilities, the job contents of all employees and all matters connected with classification of services. Any attempt at reconstruction of the services is fraught with the risk of creating resentment amongst affected quarters. Considering all implications of the matter the Commission rather maintained the status quo.

Annual Increments

As each scale of pay starts with a minimum and increases with time the question of the rates of increments is of considerable significance. The increment was supposed to be so designed that it could take care of the gradually increasing liability of an employee and, to some extent, take care of the inflationary trends in market, particularly in respect of essential commodities. Keeping these aspects of life in view the Commission recommends annual increments at rates which it considers reasonable enough to meet these ends at all levels. Apart from the annual increments, generally the government granted interim relief in the form of extra allowances to counter inflation and price hike.

Efficiency Bar

In order to apply a check on the efficiency of an employee as also to provide a basis for higher rates of annual increments in the same scale where the span is pretty long and there is no definite opening for promotion, an Efficiency Bar (shown at the pay scale as EB) has been placed. The Efficiency Bar has been placed at the middle or slightly away from the middle of the pay scales of the above categories. At the stage of the EB the performance of an employee would be assessed and if his efficiency is found satisfactory, he would be allowed to cross the EB and draw the higher rate of increment in the scale. Efficiency bars have not been prescribed for the levels of employees whose scales of pay are spread over a shorter period and there is scope for a regular assessment of his efficiency for promotion to a higher level. Unfortunately the Efficiency Bar is not strictly applied. Mere requisite period of service is enough to enable an individual to attain efficiency bar.

Technical Pay

In recognition of the necessity of this pay in appropriate cases, the Commission had decided to retain the practice of allowing advance increments to certain cadre officers- doctors and engineers- at the entry point only. Probable reason for retention of technical pay is to recruit and retain the technical graduates in the country. In late 70's, there existed lucrative overseas labour market for the doctors and engineers in the middle-east.

Fringe Benefits

Apart from the salary, employees were given fringe benefits. Fringe benefits mean and include certain facilities and benefits which an employee gets from his employer in addition to his basic salary. These are accommodation free of rent or house rent allowance, free transport or conveyance allowance, medical benefits, rest and recreation allowance, washing allowance etc. These benefits are essentially meant to contribute towards the environmental facilities of an employee. Installation of telephone at residence of officers of grade V and above could also be included in fringe benefits since a telephone, though primarily meant for official purposes, might be used for private purposes also except in trunk calls or overseas calls, thus bringing in additional benefits to the employee. Allowances varied from rank to rank.

Incentives to Senior Officers

From 1984, the government allowed full-time use of government vehicle for the people of grade III and above. They are provided with a chauffeur and 7 litres of fuel a day. If these indirect benefits are interpreted in financial terms, each of these employees are getting Tk.30,000.00 per month as an extra benefit over and above their monthly salaries. The senior civil servants receive many benefits and privileges, other than pay and allowances and fringe benefits and car. They are given a telephone and a residence in posh areas of the city. By the standard of Bangladesh economy, they get enormous benefits. Almost all the senior servants are provided with a plot of land at subsidised rate in the costliest areas of the capital. Increase in basic salary to senior civil servants would have given rise to demand for pay hikes by others. Instead they were given fringe benefits and benefits in the form of a free car. Some of these civil servants are not bothered about a car; they are more bothered about cash money. A section of the senior officers are ready to forego a car for cash money.

The Entry Point for Cadre Services

At the level IX starts the lowest rung of the constituted cadre service and some other public services comparable to them for the purpose of pay awards. This is the stage where provisions need be made for attracting the talented younger generation and for retaining them in their career to provide the best possible service to the nation. The pay scales of level XI start with a proportionately higher differential.

Introduction of Variable Pay

The government introduced variable pay in the public sector in different form and name, e.g. overtime, meal-charge, incentive bonus, profit bonus, and annual remuneration. In 1987, The Cooper & Lybrand, a consulting firm did a study on feasibility of performance bonus in certain parastatals and recommended performance pay for certain parastatals for a specific group of employees. Based on their recommendations; the Government of Bangladesh introduced performance pay in the parastatals where the performance could be quantified. Initially there were problems in implementation of the performance pay system which led to groupings amongst the employees. However, the collective bargaining agents of the parastatals accepted the programme and helped the management to implement the programme. In the Ministry of Finance, officers (below grade v) and employees who have to work after the office hours for preparation of the annual budgets of the Government are given one month's pay as remuneration; other officers who are not involved with budget preparation are not given any remuneration.

Achievements and Failures of the Pay Commissions

Reduction of Disparity between Pay and Per Capita GDP: In the report of the First Pay Commission, the disparity ratio between the maximum pay and the per capita GDP (calculated for total population) worked out to 44:1 and that between the minimum pay and the per capita GDP to 2.89:1. The Second Pay Commission changed these disparity ratios to 30:1 and 2.09:1 respectively. The pay award of 1977 reduced these ratios still further to 27:1 and 2.04:1. The per capita per month GDP in 1984 was estimated around Tk.227. This disparity ratio between the per capita GDP and the maximum pay and the minimum pay work out to 1:26.43 and 1:2.20 respectively. This ratio is slight improvement over the ratio that was the result of the 1977 pay award. A progressive

narrowing down of the gap between the per capita GDP and the pay levels is clearly discernible in the pay structure. The disparity ratios between the per capita GDP and the level of maximum pay are shown in the table X.2.

Table X.2
Comparison of Maximum and Minimum Pay Scale of 1973, 1977 and 1984

Pay commission/ Pay Award	GDP (P.M)	Per-capita Maximum pay (P.M)	Disparity Ratio
1973 Pay Commission	45	2000	1:44.44
1977 Pay Commission	110	3300	1:30.00
1977 Pay Award	10	3000	1:27.27
1984 Pay Award	227	6000	1:26.43

Source: *National Pay Commission Report, 1984, p. 17.*

The achievements of the past three Commissions in respect of equity can be noted-1: 15 in the First Commission's report and 1:14 in the Second Commission's report. The pay award of 1977 reduced the ratio to 1:13.5. The Pay award of 1984 further reduced the ratio to 1:12. It can be mentioned here that the disparity ratios in all cases have been calculated on the basis of the fixed maximum pay and the starting pay of the lowest scale.

No Measures against Inflation: The history of pay in Bangladesh shows that phenomenal rise in cost of living seriously eroded the real wages given to the employees. Previously the Government indirectly increased the pay grades by giving interim relief to counter inflation. These ad hoc measures did not prove fruitful at all. Pay should have been index-linked to counter inflation.

Maintenance of Status Quo in Pay Grade: Pay Commission of 1984 did not make any substantive change in the pay grade. They were in favour of doubling the pay scale. The Commission did not remedy the anomalies of previous Pay Commissions.

Attraction of Talent to the Civil Service: Without talented people in the public service, the quality and efficiency of work in public service will suffer with consequential deleterious effects on the standard of national development activities and public service. Talents can be attracted only with adequate level of remuneration. Attractiveness of remuneration will be determined by the level of living that the remuneration ensures. If the standard of remuneration is determined with due regard to the relative social positions of the various grades of employees in terms of their income

levels allowed by the pay plan compared to the levels enjoyed by their counterparts in the society, it is reasonable to expect that talented people will be encouraged to choose the Civil Service as a career. Terms of reference required the last two Pay Commission to take into account the necessity of determining the pay levels which should be attractive to talented people. This is a prerequisite for any sound pay plan. But none of the Pay Commissions made any specific recommendations to attract the talented students to the Civil Service.

Though there was no incentive for the talented officers of middle tier and below, enormous benefits were given to the senior officers in the form of chauffeur driven full-time car with free petrol and other benefits. Barring few, they are not brilliant as compared to others of middle or junior tiers. Had there been no independence of Bangladesh, most of them could hardly reach middle-tier, i.e. grade V and IV.

Comparison of Civil Service Pay with that of Private Sector: The Pay Commissions of 1984 opined that the levels of pay in public service should not be guided by those in the private sector for following reasons: firstly, different rates of pay prevail in different private enterprises for posts with comparable responsibility; secondly, private sector pay levels cannot be used for the determination of public sector pay levels as the terms of employment in the two sectors are not comparable; thirdly, security of job is almost non-existent in the private sector, nor does the private sector service offer the "intangibles" in the form of prestige and privileges that are enjoyed by public sector employees; and fourthly, higher levels of pay in the private sector are necessarily for compensating the employees for the aforesaid disadvantages. There are many positions in the public sector which have no comparable counterparts in the private sector.

People who propagate that private sector pay policy must not be a guiding factor for determination of pay of public service tend to forget that private sector is burgeoning in Bangladesh. They have entered into labour market and are alluring away the talented ones to private sector. There may not be total job security in the private sector. But there is better working environment in the private sector. Unlike the public sector, there is lesser pressure by the labour unions on the managers. Unfortunately, the entire public sector is hostage in the hands of the trade union leaders of the public sector.

Disguised form of Pay Increase of the Senior Civil Servants: The government's decision of giving car and other facilities to the senior officers instead of pay increase was mainly resulted from the fear of repercussion from the low level employees against any payhike of the senior level employees.

Promotion to senior ranks now not only enhances the status, power, and honour in the society; promotion brings in lot of monetary benefits too. Senior posts are not too many. These disguised form of pay increase fueled the cravings for promotion to senior posts to such an extent that aspirants can go to any length to get promotion.

According to Aoki, there are two types of ranks in Japanese firms- 'ranking hierarchy' and 'tournament hierarchy'. In ranking hierarchy, promotion to each rank is associated with a level of pay and standard of performance and in 'tournament hierarchy', there is a predetermined slot for each rank and employees are promoted according to their "relative" performance (vis-à-vis others) rather than according to absolute standard. E.Lazear and Sherwin Rosen labelled the latter sort of promotion as 'rank-order-tournament'³⁵.

The cravings and lobbying for promotion in the BCS can be compared with tournament hierarchy of promotion. The specialists and functionalists who traditionally had very few representations in the level of Permanent Secretary and Additional Secretary went into industrial actions several times to press for their demands for proportional distribution of senior and top posts of the Secretariat. They officially stopped cooperation with the senior generalist officers for few days. During the mass upsurge of 1990, some Cadre Associations openly supported political parties in the hope that they would be given senior posts if their chosen party comes to power. For example, the Secretariat Cadre Association met the Awami League Chief and expressed their support for her. Ironically the Awami League lost to the Bangladesh Nationalist Party though they got maximum popular votes.

Effects of Low Pay in the Civil Service

Reluctance of the Brighter Graduates to join the Civil Service: The survey carried out by the researcher amply show that the low pay in the Civil Service serves as a disincentive to the bright students to join the Civil Service. while higher pay in private sector or

³⁵ Aoki M, *Information, Incentives, and Bargaining in the Japanese Economy*, Cambridge University Press, 1988, p. 75.

overseas jobs influence the choice of career of the students. With the growth of the private sector, public sector lagged further and further behind their counterparts in the private sector in terms of offering salaries to their managers. The BCS has to compete with the private sector for quality graduates. Availability of highly paid jobs in the private and the Middle East market made the Civil Service a relatively unattractive career in the labour market for high achieving individuals who can command significant price.

Corruption in the Civil Service: Low pay in the Civil Service is one of the main causes of widespread corruption in the Civil Service. "Government encourage corruption among their officials when salaries are inadequate"³⁶. Views of Mr.Skylark Chadha, a Swedish consultant who worked extensively in Bangladesh, on the corruption in the Civil Service is reproduced below:

"The Bangladeshi currency is called Taka and is divided into 100 Paisas. One US\$ is approximately Taka 32 (April,1989). Senior most Government officers are not paid more than Tk.6500 per month excluding other fringe benefits like transport, housing etc. Senior managers are paid around Tk 4500-5700, making the emoluments to be one of the lowest in the world and thus causing great temptation to corruption. A young engineer may be paid Tk.1850. A senior about the same. An industrial worker around 1365 per month. An unskilled labourer can cost Tk 60-80 per day. Unskilled labourers are, except in plantation period, abundantly available. Skilled workers are difficult to get, due to the expertise exodus to middle east countries. International companies pay much higher; upto Tk 25,000 per month can be expected by middle management personnel. Besides there are very attractive fringe benefits and pension schemes. Salaries higher than this are rare."³⁷

Abuse of Official Power: Abuse of official power or use of official position to get a benefit for self or others are very common features of Bangladesh. As almost all the activities of the country are directly or indirectly regulated by the government, any case starting from an application for small bank loan or a small trade license can be expedited if one has a link with officials. Officials at times use their power to help fulfil the desire of a client who can offer a commensurate return.

The children of some of the top and senior level officials are sent abroad for education. Wealth accumulated by some of the Civil Servants is far beyond the ostensible means. They always show far less expenditure incurred on properties than real expenditure. They take advantage of the legal loopholes to justify their income. All people are not

36 UN, *A Handbook of Public Administration*, UN, New York, 1961, p. 41.

37 Skylark Chadha, *Managing Projects in Bangladesh*, UPL, Dhaka, 1989.

corrupt. However, there are notable exceptions. Some people are not corrupt because they do not hold the positions to bestow legal or illegal favour on any one and some are not easily purchasable because they have a higher price than others. Needless to mention here that the corruption is not limited within the Civil Service; it is rampant in all spheres of the society.

Moonlighting by the Civil Servants: Many of the civil servants resort to moonlighting to earn some extra money in order to survive in the higher society. Moonlighting is done through investment in business, in factories and industries through friends and relatives. The extended family system is still prevalent in Bangladesh. It is easier to do moonlighting through members of own family. There are legal provisions for the government officials to engage in business. Officials have to seek permission to engage in business from the authority. Permission of business in such areas where the applicant can influence decision because of his official position is not given by the government. In a recent seminar of auditors, Chairman of the Public Accounts Committee directly accused the senior officials of indirect involvement of private business³⁸.

In concluding this chapter, one seems tempted to say that corruption, abuse of official power and moonlighting by the civil servants have tarnished the long established image of the Civil Service in this country. 'Approbation and adulation' of friends, relations and members of the public for which many joined the Civil Service in the past are no more there. Many students during this researcher's opinion survey replied that they would not join the Civil Service as the Civil Service is both ill paid and corrupt, and many did not want to join the Civil Service because of its poor image.

38 *The Daily Ajker Kagaz*, 21 May, 1992.

Chapter XI

CONCLUSIONS

Introduction

Established in 1981, the Bangladesh Civil Service (BCS) was designed to be a 'unified career service' at the upper echelons of the civil bureaucracy, which comprised as of December 1997 about 35,000 members belonging to its constituent thirty functional cadres. These functional cadres and the members thereof are meant to play important role in the development and administration of Bangladesh. But indications have it that the inadequacies in the career management of the BCS has been affecting the performances of its members, resulting in factors that seem to have been thwarting the development activities of this country. Given the employment situation in Bangladesh, although a government position is still a very desirable job, indications also have it that high quality individuals are not attracted to the BCS. Inevitably, the situation as such does affect the efficiency and effectiveness of the Civil Service. This awareness in effect prompted this researcher to pursue an academic study centring on the topic of career management of the BCS. To be more specific, the study to back up the completion of this thesis has been initiated with the objective of probing the career management of the BCS, suggesting reform measures to improve career management and exploring feasibility of introduction of inducement for better performers of the BCS, similar to what have been in effect in the Civil Services of Malaysia, U.K., and the U.S. The main concern has been how to attract quality people to the Civil Service career.

Accordingly, this thesis based on the completed study has been arranged towards the fulfillment of objectives referred to in the preceding paragraph. Chapter I, i.e., 'Introduction', narrates in a nutshell the central issues, such as the important role that the Civil Service plays in a country's socio-economic developmental spheres, importance of effective career management in the Civil Service, followed by a

description of the study objectives in specific terms, then the reasoning of the significance of this study. This introductory chapter also indicates the methodology followed in conducting the study, including the surveys of opinions of both the prospective and the working civil servants. Chapter II includes discussions on the concept of career management both in general and comparative terms. Chapter III deals with the structure of the Civil Service. Chapters IV and V examine the findings emanating from two separate surveys conducted by this researcher to ascertain the opinions of bright university students as well as the serving officials regarding their choice of career. While Chapter VI probes the existing system of recruitment of persons into the BCS, Chapter VII examines the flaws of the existing system of evaluating the performances of the BCS officers. The latter also examines the existing staff appraisal system of the Civil Services of Malaysia, Britain and the US to ascertain whether the introduction of that system in Bangladesh would attract quality individuals to the BCS. Chapter VIII deliberates upon the existing facilities for training the BCS officers; Chapter IX deals with career blockages of four cadres of the BCS, and Chapter X critically examines the public service remuneration policy. All the chapters of this thesis have been duly designed to investigate into different aspects of career management of the BCS officers, diagnose inadequacies, and then to pinpoint the reform needs.

Finally, this chapter, i.e., Chapter XI, concludes the study along with recapitulating some of the main structural-functional features of the BCS and its main career management aspects treated in all the previous chapters, including some observations pinpointing the interim reform needs.

Structural Organisation of the BCS

The Bangladesh Civil Service can claim to be a descendant of the institutions of Civil Services that evolved and then got crystallised in British India and Pakistan until 1947. The Bengali members of the Civil Service of Pakistan, Central Services, and the Provincial Services in Pakistan formed the nucleus of the Civil Service of newly independent state of Bangladesh in 1972. In 1973, Administrative and Services Reorganisation Committee (ASRC) suggested Unified Grading Structure for the Bangladesh Civil Service, which was not accepted by the government of the day. In

1977, Pay and Services Commission (Rashid Commission) recommended the formation of 29 cadres based on functional lines for the Civil Service and an Open Structure along the lines of the British Civil Service. In 1979, the Senior Services Pool (SSP), an Open Structure in the line of the UK was established. In 1981, the Government introduced 28 cadres largely on the basis of recommendations of the Rashid Commission. The formation of cadres in the Civil Service seemed to have been simply a patchwork. Because the Government kept the old Central Service of Pakistan intact, merged the erstwhile Central and Provincial cadres on the basis of similarity of functions, and some of the erstwhile Provincial Cadres were converted into cadres. Prior to the formation of the 28 cadres in 1981, the term 'Civil Service of Pakistan' meant the CSP, the administrative elites of the country. The remarkable thing the Government of Bangladesh did is the redefinition of the term 'Civil Service'- the Civil Service embraces generalist administrators, tax and customs people, engineers, doctors, accountants, agricultural graduates, veterinary doctors, postal people. Creation of cadres led to schisms amongst the members of the 28 cadres, the number of which increased to 30 in 1990, but decreased to 29 later. The structure of the Civil Service was so designed that placement of an individual in a particular cadre determines his future career prospect¹.

Entry into the SSP was to be through competitive examinations to be conducted by the PSC. But automatic entry of many civil servants into the SSP without examination subverted the very purpose of the SSP. The mid-level public servants did not want to sit for any examination for entry into the SSP. They were afraid of their likely failure in the examination which would have harmed their image in the society and amongst junior colleagues. The ruling government sacrificed organisational imperatives for the interest of the bureaucrats. Due to pressure of the Service Associations, Government had to form a Committee to study the suitability of the SSP under the chairmanship of Professor M. A. Matin, Deputy Prime Minister in 1989. The Matin Committee recommended the abolition of the SSP and distribution of the senior posts proportionately to different cadres in 1989. The abolition of SSP however did not lead to the increase of any posts that could enhance promotion prospects of the civil

¹ For more details on the formative phase of the civil service in Bangladesh, see Syed Giasuddin Ahmed, "Composition and Structure of Services in Bangladesh", in *IJPA*, vol.30, no. 1, 1984, pp. 184-210.

servants. While studying issues related to structure and career progression, it was found that the rank hierarchy and distribution of senior posts in different grades of the cadres gave rise to problems of inequality of promotion prospects. The structure of the BCS administration cadre was so designed that it contained most of the senior and top posts².

The Administration cadre, Food cadre, Co-operative cadre and the Secretariat cadre are generalists by nature and as such they may be combined to form a single cadre for maximum use of talents in accordance with aptitudes and emotional pulls of the members of the cadres. Amalgamation of the generalist cadres will facilitate better promotion prospect for talented officers, remove jealousy and conflict amongst generalist cadres. This will also increase the lateral mobility of the officers of the generalist cadres³.

If the principle of the Open Structure of the British Civil Service could be implemented, the Civil Service would have been much benefited. In the USA, Australia, Sweden, and New Zealand 'Senior Executive Service' or SES⁴ has been introduced in the line of the British Open Structure. The 'SES' in these countries and the Open Structure of the British Civil Service have improved the efficiency of the Civil Service. Introduction of an Open Structure in the BCS like the Open structure of the British Civil Service and SES of the developed countries after necessary modification will ensure career advancement of the brighter and efficient ones and thus lead to increase in efficiency and effectiveness of the Civil Service. Members of the organised cadres and certain percentage of the members of the non-cadre and parastatals will have the right to enter the Open Structure at the level of IV posts only. The sitting Joint Secretaries and Additional Secretaries will also have to sit for some sort of tests conducted by the PSC to enter into the Open Structure at the level of III posts. Every individual will be given three chances in consecutive three years to qualify in the Competitive Examination. Persons who want to avoid the examination and who fail to qualify in the examination will be given option to retire with extra financial benefits.

2 See Syed Giasuddin Ahmed, *Public Personnel Administration in Bangladesh*, University of Dhaka, Dhaka, 1986, pp. 189-67; The World Bank, *Government that Works*, 1996, pp. 121-22.

3 It should be noted here that the government made a decision in 1991 to merge the Secretariat cadre with the Administration cadre.

4 For more details on the SES, see Patricia W. Ingraham and David H. Rosenbloom, eds., *The Promise and Paradox of Civil Service Reforms*, University of Pittsburgh Press, London, 1992.

This study has found out structural shortcomings and inadequacies in the BCS. For efficient and effective administration of the country, the BCS needs to be restructured in such a way that meritorious people can be drawn towards the Civil Service and then they can be provided with upwardly mobile career. Structuring any organisation is a very difficult job and the BCS, with its 30 cadres and 35,000 members, has a very complicated structure. Proper career management is affected by its structure. Structural defects affect career management and may discourage the brighter people to join the BCS. Further studies need to be made into its structure to diagnose in-depth its inadequacies and suggest new structure for better career management.

Surveys of Opinions of Students and BCS Officials

This researcher conducted a survey of opinions of a sample of final year honors/masters 330 brighter students of some universities of Bangladesh in 1990 to find out the rationale of career choice of the students and causes of their unwillingness to join the Civil Service. Career attributes, which the students identified as factors that influence career choice, have been statistically analysed. Statistical analyses indicate that aptitude and monetary considerations influence career choice of most of the students. Image of the Civil Service, poor pay, poor promotion prospect and non-recognition of merit and aptitude discourages many brighter persons to join the Civil Service. Educational faculty influences type of career an individual chooses. This variation in choice of career amongst different academic faculties is due to variation of demand of graduates of different disciplines in the labour market. Educational attainments play important role in career choice. High achieving students are unwilling to join the Civil Service. Some students want to join the Civil Service 'to serve the nation' though the Civil Service cannot offer good pay and good career prospects. Though influence of 'monetary consideration' for overseas job has not come out statistically significant, money seems to be the main motive of the students for going abroad with jobs.

In addition to the opinion survey of the students, another survey was carried out amongst two groups of the BCS officials to investigate what influenced the serving civil servants to join the Civil Service; what they expected from the Civil Service career and how far their career expectations were realised. The civil servants for the survey were selected from two generations with a gap of a decade. The survey

population included the BCS officials (who had been affected by the career blockages) were recruited in 1973, 1974, 1975 and 1976 (Old BCS) and the new BCS entrants included the recruits of 1985, 1986 and 1988 (New BCS). The survey assessed the degree of influence of (i) pay; (ii) status; (iii) career prospects; (iv) image of the Civil Service; and (v) recognition from society on their choice of BCS as a career before they joined the BCS. Comparisons of the weighted means of all the five variables for career choice show that the civil servants who got maximum one promotion during last 15 years stated that following factors influenced them to join the Civil Service in order of priority: (i) career prospects; (ii) pay; (iii) recognition from the society; (iv) image; and (v) status. The New BCS said that following factors influenced them to join the Civil Service in order of priority: (i) recognition from the society; (ii) career prospects; (iii) pay; (iii) career prospects; (iv) image of the Civil Service; and (v) status. Compared to the BCS of 1973, 74 and 1976, the New BCS of 1985, 1986 and 1988 get more satisfaction from value of their work, recognition from their superiors and recognition from the society. This might have happened as the new BCS are better educated and better trained than the old BCS. Most of the old BCS officials and the new BCS officials rated the 'opportunity for professional growth'; 'opportunity for career advancement' and 'pay of the Civil Service' not attractive. These negative perceptions held by the members of the BCS about the career attributes of the BCS do not portray a good picture to the prospective brighter students.

According to the survey findings, training does not seem to help career development of the BCS officials. Regarding their promotion to senior ranks (Joint Secretary and above), the BCS officials who got maximum one promotion during the last 15 years seem to be highly ambitious. Even the expectation of the new BCS officials (who have put on two years of service) for promotion seems to be unrealistic. These BCS officials seem to rate the pay, the career prospects, and the opportunity for professional growth 'not attractive'. Poor career prospects and low pay of the Civil Service, as expressed by the civil servants, do not portray an attractive career to the bright students who may be having better offer elsewhere. The survey found out two vital inadequacies of the career management - poor pay and poor promotion prospect. High achievers cannot be motivated to join the Civil Service that does not provide well career progression and adequate pay and which does not have a good image. To improve the image, the BCS

has to improve its performance. For improvement of performance, the BCS needs capable workforce. To recruit capable workforce, good career prospect and adequate pay has to be ensured.

Recruitment of BCS Officers

The method, criteria, and content of selection system determine the quality of the recruits and cumulative results of the recruitment system predetermine the future health of the organisation. Bangladesh seem to have not been following a consistent policy of recruitment into its Civil Service. Recruitment rules, method and syllabi of the BCS examinations have been changed time and again to meet the short-term needs without taking into account the long-term implications of inconsistent recruitment standards. Inconsistent recruitment policy led to wide variation in the quality of the BCS officers and decline in the quality. Poor performance of the Civil Service can be ascribed to some extent to a poor selection system. Recruitment on quota system militates against the principle of meritocracy and affects the quality of the Civil Service. Quota system has failed to achieve its aim of development of underprivileged group and community. Quota system for different sections of the society drives away the meritorious candidates⁵.

In Bangladesh, educational system at each level of entry depends upon a certain proficiency level measured by academic distinctions like first division/first class, second class, second division, and so on. In the BCS, there is no system to attract the brighter students who get first class or first division in their academic life. On entry they are treated at par with other students of average calibre, i.e., a talented student who all through got A (AYE)'s in the examinations are given the same pay grade/status with another person who hardly had B (BEE)'s in academic life. If no distinction is made in the level of academic attainments, and achievements in the entry examinations at the entry stage of services, students with higher academic attainment may not be willing to join the Civil Service. Even if some bright students join the Civil Service, their talents are likely to diminish if their merit is not recognised. Inadequacies of the recruitment system, one of the important components of career management, may compel many meritorious graduates to look for careers elsewhere which reward merit⁶.

5 For more details on the system of recruitment and selection of civil servants in Bangladesh, see Syed Giasuddin Ahmed, *Bangladesh Public Service Commission*, University of Dhaka, Dhaka, 1990.

6 See World Bank, *Government that Works*, Dhaka, 1996, pp. 121-233.

The system of recruitment is so designed that it cannot draw out the intellectual capabilities of the candidates. The Method I system of recruitment, which Bangladesh follows, has been abandoned by the British long ago. The Method II system has stood the test of time in the British Civil Service. But Bangladesh still follows the Method I type of selection for civil servants. The recruitment system of the Civil Service of Bangladesh needs immediate modernisation to cater for the changing needs of the country. The Bangladesh Civil Service may adopt the Method II system of recruitment of the British Civil Service, after necessary changes to make it adaptable to the situations prevailing in Bangladesh.

Performance Appraisal System in the BCS

Performance Appraisal (PA) of individuals is a very important tool for career management. According to the AP concept and practice, it can be used for the following purposes- (1) administrative; (2) motivational; (3) developmental; and (4) performance development; (5) assessing promotability; (6) Potential assessment; and (7) making annual salary recommendations. Performance appraisal has passed through the following stages of development: (a) Appraisal of personality traits; (b) Appraisal against objectives. Behavioural and result-oriented approaches are much less dependent on inferences and much less susceptible to rater's biases than the traditional personal trait-rating approach⁷. In Bangladesh context, the technique of appraisal of its civil servants depends on the purposes specified in the system of Annual Confidential Report (ACR) that is being used for evaluating the civil servants' performances. Governments in the UK, the USA, Australia, New Zealand and Malaysia have introduced the result-oriented appraisal in their public service and derived benefit out of it. Official documents and study on ACRs indicate that there are shortcomings in the system of recording ACRs of the BCS Officials⁸. These shortcomings have been analysed by the researcher on the basis of discussions with the concerned officials, and studies of ACRs, official reports and BPATC studies on ACRs. Suggestions for incorporation of goal-oriented ACR in the BCS have been offered in the light of literature on the subject, empirical evidence of the British Civil Service, the US Civil Service and the Malaysian Civil Service.

⁷ See O. Glenn Stahl, *Public Personnel Administration*, Harper & Row, New York, 1976, pp. 206-223.

⁸ See Akbar Ali Khan et al, *Performance Appraisal System of Class I Officers in Bangladesh*, BPATC, Savar (Dhaka), 1989.

The ACR of the BCS is defective mainly in three counts: firstly the design of the ACR is faulty which focuses personal traits than performance; the operation of ACR is not done properly and utilisation of the ACR is rarely done except for promotion. ACR of the BCS lacks objectivity because of (i) the absence of the practice of goal-setting for individual managers, (ii) failure to identify relevant job related criteria, and (iii) emphasis on personal traits to the neglect of quality and quantity of work; (iv) no developmental and motivational value of ACR; (v) rater error/bias in evaluation; (vi) very low rating for actual performance; (vii) no link of ACR with career development plan, (viii) ambiguity and duplication in the measurement of personal and professional trait in the ACR form and (ix) overrating by the appraiser. These inadequacies of the appraisal system indicate poor career management in the BCS which may make the Civil Service career less attractive to the prospective recruits of better calibre and discourage the better performers from putting their best.

In the British system of performance appraisal, the appraisee decides his forward job plan with the appraiser; the appraisee is judged against his set objectives and given a feedback by the appraisers about his achievements and failures. He is rewarded in terms of posting, promotion and paid extra for good performance. Proper appraisal system in the British Civil Service has improved their performance. Like the BCS, the problem of overrating exists in the British and the US Civil Service too though they differ in degree. Researchers say that training of the rater can reduce overrating. MbO approach or the goal-oriented approach has been introduced in the Civil Services of the USA, Malaysia, Great Britain, New Zealand, Canada and Australia. Research findings show that performance in these Civil Services have increased due to introduction of goal-oriented approach of Performance Appraisal. In these countries, Performance Related Pay (PRP) has been introduced to motivate good performers and PRP has actually led to increase in performance of the employees.

ACR forms of the BCS need to be redesigned to record performance and ACR has to be operated and utilised in such a way that it leads to increase of efficiency of the civil servants. Raters have to be trained to reduce rater errors. Appraisee has to be given feedback to motivate and improve performance. As the goal-oriented system of Britain has improved the performance in the Civil Service of the UK, the USA and Malaysia. MbO based Appraisal System may be adapted in the BCS with necessary

modifications. In this regard, the British Model of Appraisal may be adopted as there are lot of similarities between the British Civil Service and the BCS. Mere introduction will not do; the ACR has to be operated and utilised the way the British Civil Service does. To counter the demerits of the goal-oriented approach, other techniques like BARS may be introduced in combination with the goal-oriented approach.

Proper appraisal of an individual and recognition and reward of performance will improve career management in the BCS and this will encourage the candidates with good potential to pursue Civil Service career. A Study team of academicians and practitioners, both local and expatriates, may investigate into the weaknesses of the ACRs and suggest measures for improvement of the appraisal system of Bangladesh.

The Performance Related Pay/ Merit Pay have been linked with Performance Appraisal Report. in the Civil Services of the UK, Australia, New Zealand, Canada and Malaysia. Introduction of merit pay or performance pay in the Civil Service of the above countries improved the performance of the civil servants. Introduction of Performance Related Pay (PRP) may be an inducement to the quality graduates to join the BCS. Expectancy theory⁹ and Goal-setting theory¹⁰ supports links between pay and performance of individuals. Failures of the PRP in the developed countries in certain areas were mostly attributed to faulty design and implementation process. Proper design, efficient and effective implementation of the PAR is prerequisite for introduction of PRP. Before introduction of PRP, design, operation and utilisation of the Performance Appraisal in the BCS need to be modernised in the line of the goal-oriented PARs of the UK and Malaysia.

Training of the BCS Officers

Training, formal or informal, enhances skills, quality and capability of individuals and organizations. In the developed countries, training is an investment in human capital. Organizations, which invest in managers for their professional growth, are likely to draw brighter human inputs in their pool. To make any training effective, training needs have to be identified, adequate resources in the form of material and quality

9 Victor H. Vroom, "Work and Motivation", Jossey-Bass, USA, 1994, p. 103.

10 Edwin A. Locke, Gary P. Latham, Ken J. Smith, Robert E. Wood, "A Theory of Goal-setting & Task Performance", Prentice Hall, 1990, p. 17.

trainers have to be provided to the institutions, training has to be evaluated, and validated and reviewed. These days informal and incidental training also play very important role in development of managers. These informal and incidental training are work-based. In work-based training method, individuals learn through self-development, learning contracts and learn from groups. In-group learning, individuals learn the methods of 'Organisation Development' and 'Action Learning'. Individuals learn from their mentors and role models. 'Learning Organisations' play an important role in the informal and incidental training. Managers may also learn from tasks like special projects, job rotation, shadowing, secondments and acting up¹¹. Development Centres, which operate like Assessment Centre, have been established in the USA, the UK and many other developed countries to diagnose the inadequacies of their managers measured against competencies set for the respective grades and prepare tailor-made training programme for training and development of managers. Development Centre may be established in the BPATC to assess the competencies of the BCS managers and their development through custom made training.

After the liberation of Bangladesh in 1971, there was dearth of trainers and training institutes. Situation improved a bit after 1980 when new institutes started coming up. Quantitative growth of institutes did not lead to much qualitative growth. At present four courses are obligatory for the members of the BCS - (1) Foundation Course for the newly recruited officers; (2) Departmental Training for officers of respective cadre or departments; (3) Advanced Course on Administration and Development for mid-level officials; and (4) Senior Officers' Staff Course for officers of grade III. Government sends civil servants abroad for higher qualifications and training provided by the foreign donors bear the entire costs. In most cases, foreign training has no relations with training needs of the BCS¹².

In the Bangladesh Civil Service, training system has inherent disadvantages - training need is neither identified nor evaluated and validated. Training is more a ritual rather than a means to improve efficiency of the Civil Service. No survey has so far been made to measure the contributions of training in improvement of performance. The

11 See O. Glenn Stahl, *Public Personnel Administration*, Harper & Row, New York, 1976, pp. 225-248.

12 For a comprehensive study on the state of public administration training in Bangladesh, see Ministry of Establishment, *Report on Strengthening Public Administration Training in Bangladesh* (3 volumes), Asian Development Bank, 1998.

training suffers due to lack of qualified and dedicated trainers. The policy makers, trainers and trainees seem to lack commitment to training. In most cases, quality of trainers is not of desired standard. Profession of trainer is not attractive nor there has been an attempt to make it attractive. All these inadequacies have been found by researchers, academicians and practitioners and they presented hard evidence in support of their findings regarding inadequacies of training¹³.

Failings of the system of training have its impact on the serving civil servants. The civil servants feel that they are not being afforded the chance for professional growth and groomed up for higher responsibilities as has been seen in the survey of the BCS Officials (chapter VI). Students who would judge the attributes of different careers before pursuing any career are likely to be not interested to join the Civil Service due to neglect of training by the management.

Bangladesh should follow modern practice of good training. Trainers have to be especially trained and extra privileges have to be given to the trainers in the form of special allowances, privileges and better posting on successful completion of tenure as a trainer. Quality, intellectual ability and commitment of the trainers are very important for success of any training programme. All training activities undertaken are to be related to the employees' job and results are to be measured in terms of the contributions the training makes to improve performance. Performance of the trainers in the training has to be objectively rated, and rating in training should be taken into account for promotion and subsequent deployment of the trainees. Only those foreign training courses, which have utility, should be accepted and donors should be requested to design courses for the BCS as per training needs of the BCS. To make training effective, training needs have to be assessed, training has to be evaluated and validated. Training has to be integrated with career development plan¹⁴.

Study of Career Progression of Generalist and Specialist Cadres

Career prospect of the Civil Service is one of its main attractions. In the BCS, the higher posts have been distributed amongst different cadres in such a manner that the placement in cadre determines the career of an individual. Merit and efficiency do not

¹³ See Akbar Ali Khan et al, *Post-entry Training in the Bangladesh Civil Service: The Challenges and Response*, Savar, BPATC, 1986.

¹⁴ See World Bank, *Government that Works*, Dhaka, 1996, pp. 121-122.

seem to play due role in matters of promotion in policy making posts. These phenomena are disincentives to the brighter students who would have pursued Civil Service career provided merit and performance would have been recognised. Not only the aspiring individuals, even the serving talented civil servants will be put off by the incidence of promotion on the rule of seniority and vacancy in respective cadre.

The dissimilarities in career structure in the four cadres, found through CAMPLAN and CAMEL in the IMS (Sussex, UK) occurred due to variation in structure, age structure, rate of promotion and number of higher posts in different grades. Other 26 cadres are supposed to have similar variation in career structure and blockages may vary from cadre to cadre. There are career blockages in the Civil Services of the developed countries too. The possibility of early retirement of the supposedly less efficient ones before two years of their normal retirement, studied through CAMEL, show that early retirement does not help the problem of career blockage. Voluntary redundancy schemes for less efficient civil servants in the form of 'golden hand shake' may be examined for introduction in the Civil Service to bring the talented ones in the entry level through Method II system of selection of the British Civil Service. Fast Streaming may be introduced in the BCS to provide better career prospect to the brighter officers. There may be very less resistance to 'elitism' in the Civil Service since Bangladesh has already given up socialist creed and introduced free market economy.

Public Service Remuneration Policy

The pay policy followed during the period of British rule created a class of public officials at the top level (who incidentally were mostly the British) with the halo of a ruling class without any regard for the principle of equity. During the Pakistan period, the principle that 'the public sector pay policy should not be completely out of tune with the prevailing living standards of the country was implemented to a great extent' and egalitarianism for the first time was introduced into the philosophy of pay policy. Subsequently, principle of equity was also considered as a determinant of pay policy.

In 1972 and 1977 in Bangladesh, the policies of egalitarianism and equity were applied narrowing down the gap between the highest and the lowest pay in Bangladesh. After 1984, the higher officials are being given indirect pecuniary benefits in the form full-time transport and other facilities.

Pay is one of the main attractions for the Civil Service. Low pay in the BCS leads to low morale of the civil servants which is manifested in their memoranda to the government. With low pay it is difficult to maintain honesty and dedication of the employees in the Civil Service. To supplement the poor pay many civil servants resort to activities that are conducive neither to the Civil Service nor to the society. Consequently, the Civil Service lost its image to a great extent. Poor image may have negative effect on the meritorious graduates in choosing the Civil Service as a career.

Main defect of the Pay Commission Reports is that none of the Pay Commissions devised a pay mechanism to attract the talent; all the Commissions suggested the same pay for the talented persons who topped the examinations out of few thousands and the mediocre persons who managed to get the job through quota. Low pay in the BCS discourages brighter student to join the BCS. Without the quality civil servants, the performance of the Civil Service will remain far below expectation¹⁵.

Promotion gives pay increase and other pecuniary incentives. The government tends to have concentrated on giving lucrative incentives in the form of free car and other incentives in the senior posts only. Consequently people aspiring for promotion follow the system of tournament hierarchy for promotion to senior ranks. In traditional tournament hierarchy, people out perform their colleagues for upward mobility, whereas in Bangladesh the civil servants outmanoeuvre their colleagues in all possible ways to reach senior ranks.

Increase in the remuneration of the Civil Service may be an incentive to the talented graduates to join the Civil Service and this will improve career management. The resource constraints of the country may not permit wholesale pay increase. Reward mechanism of the Civil Service may have to be redesigned to attract the quality people to the Civil Service¹⁶.

This chapter and indeed this thesis has identified inadequacies in the components of career management structure (hierarchical distribution of senior and top posts), recruitment system, training, performance appraisal, career progression and

¹⁵ See Syed Giasuddin Ahmed, "Public Administration in the Three Decades", in A.M. Choudhury & Fakrul Alam, eds., *Bangladesh on the Threshold of the Twenty-first Century*, Asiatic Society of Bangladesh, Dhaka, 2002, pp. 321-326.

¹⁶ See World Bank, *Government that Works*, Dhaka, 1996, pp. 121-126.

remuneration policy and suggested changes in all the components of career management to enhance attractiveness of the BCS career to brilliant students. These components of career management are subsystems of organisations. According to Lawler's congruence model¹⁷ of organisational change, any incremental change in organisation will necessitate changes in other subsystems of organizations leading to a series of changes in the organisations. The series of changes as such will culminate into comprehensive change in career management. This comprehensive change will cover structural and behavioural aspects. For behavioural change, training and performance system has to be modernized and an adequate remuneration system has to be introduced to attract the talents. The existing BCS has to be restructured to ensure entry and promotion of talented persons in all the tiers of hierarchy. For a comprehensive change for improved career management, an in-depth study has to be made by experts. If inadequacies in the career management system are remedied, bright individuals will join the Civil Service; productivity of the Civil Service will increase and flow of the bright students into the BCS will be perpetuated. And, hopefully, there will be continued pace of development in Bangladesh.

17 E. Lawler Edward III, ' Strategic Choices for Changing Organizations', in Jeffrey Pfeffer, ed., *Organizations and Organization Theory*, Pitman Publishing Inc., 1982, pp. 256-257.

APPENDICES

Survey of Opinion of Bright Students of Universities on Career Choice

**GUIDELINE FOR RESPONDING TO QUESTIONNAIRE
ON
CHOICE OF CAREER OF FINAL YEAR STUDENTS OF UNIVERSITIES**

Students are requested to kindly go through this guideline before responding to this questionnaire.

1. Prior to finalisation of this questionnaire, questionnaire was pretested amongst 100 students. When the pilot questionnaires were distributed, some of them wanted to know the meaning of the terms used in question no 3, i.e. career prospect, reward, and image of the Civil Service. The terms are clarified below for comprehension of the questionnaire:

- a. **Career prospect:** Prospect of promotion during the whole service period of an individual.
- b. **Reward:** The term 'reward' embraces pay, allowances, other pecuniary benefits, house rent, transportation from residence to office, free telephone and pension packages of the Civil Service. The term reward means pay and allowances of the whole service career; not the initial pay
- c. **Image:** The overall impression of the people in general about the Civil Service.

While responding to these questions students are requested to consider all the attributes of the Civil Service as a career from the viewpoint of a job seeker.

2. In question no 5, the term 'parents' includes father, mother, legal guardian or any relation on whom the respondent is a dependent.

Note:

If there is any query about the questionnaire, the respondents are requested to kindly contact the undersigned in the following address:

Muhammad Abul Hossain
Deputy Secretary, Ministry of Finance
Room No. 122, Building No 6
Bangladesh Secretariat

Questionnaire
on

CHOICE OF CAREER OF FINAL YEAR STUDENTS OF UNIVERSITIES

Name of Student _____ Division is SSC _____

Institution _____ Division in HSC _____

Department _____ Division in Degree _____

Class in Honours _____

Class in Masters first part _____

STUDENTS ARE REQUESTED TO WRITE THEIR COMMENTS/ ANSWERS TO QUESTION ON. 1 & 2 IN ATTACHED PAPER

1. Which career would you like to pursue after passing your final examinations? State reasons for your choice.

2. If you are not willing to join the Civil Service, please state reasons for you reluctance

STUDENTS ARE REQUESTED TO TICK THEIR CHOICE/ ANSWER TO QUESTION NO. 3, 4, 5 & 6

3. What is your opinion regarding following aspects of the Civil Service ?
- a. Career prospect : Very good/ good/ adequate/ poor/ bleak.
- b. Reward : Very good/ good/ adequate/ poor
- c. Image : Very good/ good/ adequate/ poor.
4. If you have any overseas job (not under the Govt. of Bangladesh) even after getting selected for the Civil Service will you go ? _____ YES/ NO/ UNDERCIDED
(If yes, please state reasons in the attached paper for opting for overseas job.)
5. What is the profession of your parents ? ___ Civil Service / Govt. Service/ Semi-Govt. Service/ Employment in Private Organisations/ Business/ Farming/ Any Other.
6. Is any of your close relations (Brother, Sister, Uncle, Father-in- law, Mother-in- law, Brother-in law) in the Civil Service ? _____ YES/NO _____

THE ABOVE QUESTIONNAIRE HAS BEEN PREPARED BY MAJOR MUHAMMAD ABUL HOSSAIN PSC (RETD) AS PART OF HIS M PHIL THESIS. THE QUESTIONNAIRE HAS BEEN APPROVED BY LONDON SCHOOL OF ECONOMICS. MAJOR HOSSAIN (RETIRED) WILL INTERVIEW SOME OF THE STUDENTS. AS SUCH STUDENTS ARE REQUESTED TO WRITE THEIR RESIDENTIAL ADDRESS AT THE REVERSE PAGE OF THE QUESTIONNAIRE SO THAT THEY CAN BE COPNTACTED BY MAJOR HOSSAIN (RETD).

ANY STUDENT WHO HAS ANY QUERY OR WHO WANTS TO CONTACT MAJOR HOSSAIN (RETD) MAY DO SO IN THE FOLLOWING ADDRESS:

MAJOR MUHAMMAD ABUL HOSSIN , PSC (RETD)
DEPUTY SECRETARY, FINANCE DIVISION, BANGLADESH SECRETARIAT

SURVEY OF THE OPINION OF THE BRIGHT STUDENTS OF UNIVERSITIES (CHAPTER IV)

THE MULTIVARIATE ANALYSIS

If P is the probability of not choosing Civil Service career, then

$$P = [1 + \exp(-BX)]^{-1}$$

where B is a vector of the unknown co-efficients and X is a vector of co-variates that affect the reluctance of Civil Service. The general logistic regression model can thus be expressed as:

$$\text{Log } e^{P_i/1-P_i} = BX = \sum_{j=0}^k [B_j X_{ji}]$$

which expresses the log odds of not choosing Civil Service as a linear function of the independent variables.

In logistic regression, the parameters of the model are estimated using the maximum likelihood method and can be interpreted as the change in the log odds associated with a one unit change in the independent variable. Since it's easier to think of odds, rather than log odds, the logistic equation can be written in terms of odds as

$$\frac{P}{1-P} = \exp\left(\sum_{j=0}^k [B_j X_{ij}]\right)$$

As in the case with multiple regression, the contribution of individual variables in logistic regression is difficult to determine. The contributions of each variable depend on the other variables in the model. This is the problem particularly when independent variables are highly correlated. A statistics that is used to work at the partial correlations between the dependent variables and each of the independent variables is the R statistics. A positive value indicates that as the variable increases in value so does the likelihood of the event occurring. If R is negative, the opposite is true. Small values for R indicate that the variable has a small partial contribution to the model (Atkinson, 1980).

Questionnaire to Study Career Expectations of New Entrants of BCS

	Serial No	<input type="checkbox"/>	1-2
	Interview/ Questionnaire	VI <input type="checkbox"/>	3
NAME.....	DESIGNATION.....		
MINISTRY.....	CADRE	V2 <input type="checkbox"/>	4
Year of entry.....		V3 <input type="checkbox"/>	5
1. What influenced you to join the Civil Service? Please rank them in order of priority)			
a. Pay		V4A <input type="checkbox"/>	7
b. Status		V4B <input type="checkbox"/>	8
c. Career prospect		V4C <input type="checkbox"/>	9
d. Image		V4D <input type="checkbox"/>	10
e. Recognition from the Society		V4E <input type="checkbox"/>	11
2. Will your promotion to JS level meet your expectation of career advancement?			
a. Yes / No		V5 <input type="checkbox"/>	13
3. What is your opinion regarding following			
a. Training is taken into account for promotion: Yes / No		V6A <input type="checkbox"/>	15
b. Training is taken into account for posting: Yes / No		V6B <input type="checkbox"/>	16
4. Is the performance of an individual rewarded?			
a. Yes / No		V7 <input type="checkbox"/>	18
5. Please state the degree of fulfillment of following aspects of career expectations.(Please tick the answer whichever is applicable)			
a. <u>Value of Work:</u> (Very good/ Good/ Adequate/Not good/Not at all good)		V8A <input type="checkbox"/>	20
b. <u>Recognition from Superiors:</u> (Very good/ Good/ Adequate/Not good/Not at all good)		V8B <input type="checkbox"/>	21
c. <u>Recognition from Colleagues of same rank</u> (Very good/ Good/ Adequate/Not good/Not at all good)		V8C <input type="checkbox"/>	22
d. <u>Recognition from Subordinates:</u> (Very good/ Good/Adequate/Not good/Not at all good)		V8D <input type="checkbox"/>	23
e. <u>Recognition from the Society:</u> (Very good/Good/Adequate/Not good/Not at all good)		V8E <input type="checkbox"/>	24
f. <u>Opportunity for professional growth:</u> (Very good/ Good/Adequate/Not good/Not at all good)		V8F <input type="checkbox"/>	25
g. <u>Opportunity for career advancement:</u> (Very good/ Good/Adequate/Not good/Not at all good)		V8G <input type="checkbox"/>	26
h. <u>Pay:</u> (Very good/ Good/Adequate/Not good/Not at all good)		V8H <input type="checkbox"/>	27
		V9 <input type="checkbox"/>	28

ACR Form-1

Confidential

GOVERNMENT OF THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF BANGLADESH

ANNUAL CONFIDENTIAL REPORT
IN RESPECT OF

Name

Designation

Service/Cadre/Post.....

S1. No. in the Gradation List

CONFIDENTIAL

1

SALIENT POINTS FOR COMPLETING THE ACR FORM
(All concerned must read the 'Instructions for filling up ACR Forms')

PARTS OF ACR

- I. Various parts of ACR Form 1 provide following information in respect of the officer reported upon (ORU) and have to be filled in by different categories of superior officers as shown below:
- | | | | |
|----|-----------|---------------------------------------|--|
| a. | Part I | Bio-data of the Officer. | To be filled in and initialed by the ORU himself. |
| b. | Part II | Medical Check up Report | To be filled in and initialed by an authorized medical officer (AMO). |
| c. | Part III | Job Description | To be filled in by the report initiating officer(RIO) |
| d. | Part IV | Personality Traits | To be filled in and initialed by the RIO. |
| e. | Part V | Performance | To be filled in and initialed by the RIO |
| f. | Part VI | Pen picture | To be filled in and signed by the RIO. It has also to be signed by the ORU in the presence of the RIO. |
| g. | Part VII | Recommendations | To be filled in and signed by the RIO. |
| h. | Part VIII | Remarks of the Countersigning Officer | To be filled in and signed by the Countersigning Officer. |
| j. | Part IX | Additional Remarks | In specified cases, to be filled in by a superior authority. |
| k. | Part X | Comments of the Ministry/Division | To be filled in by the Division/Division |

GENERAL GUIDELINES

2. Normal ACRs are initiated once in a year in respect of an officer.
3. Special ACRs may be initiated at, any time to meet any special requirement, when called for by higher authority, provided the ORU has served under the RIO for a minimum of three months.
4. Parts VII to X will not be shown to the ORU unless there is an adverse remark in which case the Ministry/Division concerned will send the extract of the relevant parts only to the ORU for his information and representation (if the ORU so desires).
5. ACR forms are not to be folded at any stage and a. filled in ACR must be Submitted from one office to another in a closed envelope with secrecy marking 'CONFIDENTIAL'.

INSTRUCTIONS FOR DEPARTMENTS

6. Ministries Divisions Departments will indicate RIOs and CSOs in respect of all gazetted officers under their administrative control. They will also lay-down the channel of submission of ACRs.
7. This form has been designed to cover the basic qualities of an officer. Where necessary, comments on other qualities required of an officer belonging to a specialized service or employed on a particular kind of duties should be made in Part IX of the ACR Form 1. Departments should issue administrative instructions in this behalf to the reporting officers under them, indicating the specific qualities required for any particular service or post deserving special mention in the confidential reports. Suitable entry headings relating to these qualities should be typed in the space provided.
8. The report should be initiated by the next superior officer and countersigned by an officer higher than the reporting officer, both being concerned with the work of the officer (ORU).
9. The Ministry of Health will appoint Authorised Medical Officer as required *vide* paragraph 3.3 of the Instructions on ACR.
10. When an adverse remark is made in the confidential report of any officer by a CSO/any other superior officer then the extract of the relevant portion of the report should be furnished to the officer reported upon at the earliest opportunity, and in any case within one month from the date the report is countersigned, with a DO letter, a copy of which should be signed and returned by him in acknowledgement of the report.

CONFIDENTIAL

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11. When report is built up on the individual opinions of the reporting and countersigning officers, it is only the opinion as accepted by the latter (highest authority) which should stand.

12. A confidential report containing adverse remarks should not be taken into consideration until a decision has been taken on the representation of the officer reported upon, if any.

INSTRUCTIONS FOR THE OFFICER REPORTED UPON (ORU)

13. Fill in PART I of the ACR Form in duplicate and sign both copies at the appropriate space and put in date.

14. Ensure that the personal data given in this part are true and in conformity with the latest Officers Service Record Form submitted by you.

15. Get yourself medically examined by the AMO. Send the form to the Initiating Officer so as to reach the latter by 31 December.

16. If you do not agree with the opinion of the AMO, you can apply for convening a medical board to ascertain your physical condition.

17. After the Report Initiating Officer (RIO) has filled in the relevant parts and calls you to read the report and sign it, you may demand an extract of the parts filled in by the RIO for the purpose of filling a representation, if you so desire.

18. If you desire to file a representation then you will make an endorsement to that effect at the left bottom corner of page 9 while signing the form.

INSTRUCTIONS FOR THE REPORT INITIATING OFFICER (RIO)

19. While reporting on your subordinates:

- a. Be as objective as possible.
- b. Be as circumspect as possible.
- c. Be clear and direct, not ambiguous or evasive, in your remarks.
- d. A void exaggeration and gross understatement.

20. Point out to the Officers concerned their failings and weaknesses as soon as these come to notice and thus give them a change to rectify before the same are noted in the ACR of the Officers reported upon.

21. Fill in this form in duplicate by initialing the relevant boxes in both original and the duplicate copies.

22. While filling up the space meant for 'Pen Picture' of the officer reported Upon bring out his strong as well as weak points with suggestions, if any, for improvement so that a clear picture about the personality, performance and traits of character of the officer concerned are brought out.

23. After completing Parts II to VII, send the form to the countersigning officer. If the ORU wishes to represent against an adverse remark, then provide him an extract of the ACR. On receipt of the representation, forward the ACR to the countersigning officer along with the representation and your comments about that.

24. Submit report in respect of each officer who has served-under you for a minimum period of three months.

INSTRUCTIONS FOR THE COUNTERSIGNING OFFICERS

25. Weigh the remarks of the report initiating officer against your personal knowledge of the officer reported upon and then give your own remarks in Part VIII.

26. If you consider that a particular remark of the reporting officer is wrong and should be expunged, add any other remark which you may consider appropriate. If you do not wholly agree with a remark. give your own remarks under "Remarks of the Countersigning Officer" in Part VIII.

27. After endorsing your remarks and countersigning the form, forward it to the officer responsible for the custody of the ACR in the respective Ministry/Division/Department.

Confidential

GOVERNMENT OF THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF BANGLADESH

Name of Ministry /Division/Department/Office

CONFIDENTIAL REPORT

Annual/Special Report for the period from to

PART I-Bio-Data

(To be filled in by the Officer Reported Upon)

1. Name (In block letters)
2. Designation
3. Date of Birth
4. Father's Name
5. Name of Service/Cadre (if any)
6. Sl. No. in the Gradation List (if any)
of 19 .
7. Date of only Into;
 - a. Government Service
 - b. Gazetted Post
 - c. Cadre
8. Date of Joining till Present Post
9.
 - a. Scale of Pay
 - b. Present Pay
10. Academic Qualification.
11. Training (in service) .
 - a. At Home
 - b. Abroad
12. Foreign Language other than English
with Proficiency in Speaking/Reading/
Writing
Speak
Read
Write
13. Period actually served under
the Initiating Officer. From To

Signature of the Officer Reported Upon with date

Name..... Designation

Part II-Medical Check up Report
(To be filled up by the Authorised Medical Officer)

Name.....Designation.....

1. Height.....Weight.....

Eyesight.....Blood Group.....

BP.....X-Ray Report.....

ECG Report.....

2. Medical Category.....

3. Nature of disability in brief.....

Date.....

Signature of the Medical Officer
(with name and Designation)

Part III-Job Description

(To be filled in by the Initiating Officer)

A brief description of the jobs performed during the period under review

- a.
- b.
- c.
- d.
- e.

.....

Initial of the Initiating Officer

CONFIDENTIAL

Name..... Designation

Part IV-Personality Traits

(To be completed by the Initiating Officer)

NOTE: Cross out the inapplicable Ratings and initial in the box opposite the awarded Rating.

		Rating	Initial
1. Sense of Discipline:			
	a. Of the highest order	5	
	b. Of high order	4	
	c. Disciplined	3	
	d. Not very serious	2	
	e. Indifferent	1	
2. Judgment and Sense of proportion			
	a. Of the highest order	5	
	b. Of high order	4	
	c. Takes reasonable views on most matters	3	
	d. Tends to be erratic/partial	2	
	e. Poor	1	
3. Intelligence:			
	a. Exceptionally intelligent	5	
	b. Highly intelligent	4	
	c. Intelligent	3	
	d. Rather less than expected	2	
	e. Poor	1	
4. Initiative and Drive:			
	a. Shows outstanding initiative	5	
	b. Shows commendable initiative	4	
	c. Shows adequate initiative	3	
	d. Waits to be told everything and requires constant supervision	2	
	e. Somewhat lacking	1	
Total Rating Scored out of 40			

.....
Initial of the Initiating Officer

CONFIDENTIAL

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Name..... Designation

5. Public Relation;		Rating	Initial
	a. Outstandingly effective	5	
	b. Considerate and firm	4	
	c. Gets on well with the people	3	
	d. Tends to be unfriendly	2	
	e. Poor	1	
6. Co-operation			
	a. Exceptionally Co-operative	5	
	b. Highly Co-operative	4	
	c. Generally Co-operative	3	
	d. Sometimes Co-operative	2	
	e. Hardly Co-operative	1	
7. Personality			
	a. Most dignified, effective and dynamic	5	
	b. Commands obedience	4	
	c. Average personality	3	
	d. Partially effective	2	
	e. Weak	1	
8. Security Consciousness:			
	a. Very much conscious	5	
	b. Very conscious	4	
	c. Generally maintains security	3	
	d. Not very much particular about security.	2	
	e. Ignorant about security- rules and regulations.	1	
	Total Rating Scored out of 40		

Initial of the Initiating Officer

Name..... Designation

PART V-Performance

(To be completed by the Initiating Officer)

NOTE: Cross out the inapplicable Ratings and initial in the box opposite the awarded Rating.

	Rating	Initial
1. Professional Knowledge:		
a. Remarkable depth of knowledge	5	
b. Sufficient depth of knowledge	4	
c. Moderately well	3	
d. Inadequate	2	
e. Poor	1	
2. Quality of Work:		
a. Distinguished for accurate and thorough work.	5	
b. Maintains a high standard	4	
c. Generally of good quality	3	
d. Performance uneven	2	
e. Inaccurate	1	
3. Out-put of Work:		
a. Outstanding in the amount of work	5	
b. Gets through a great deal of work	4	
c. Satisfactory	3	
d. Rather less than expected	2	
e. Regularly insufficient	1	
4- Punctuality :		
a. Never late in attendance	5	
b. Rarely late in attendance	4	
c. Generally punctual)	3	
d. Occasionally late in attendance	2	
e. Habitually a late comes	1	

Initial of the Initiating Officer

Name.....Designation

	Rating	Initial
5. Sense of Responsibility and Devotion to Duty:		
a. Seeks and accepts responsibility at all times	5	
b. Very willing to accept responsibility	4	
c. Accept; responsibility as It comes	3	
d. Inclined to refer matters up which be can decide	2	
e. Avoids taking responsibility	1	
6. Promptness in Taking Action and Carrying not Orders:		
a. Extraordinary	5	
b. Very prompt	4	
c. Attempts to be prompt	3	
d. Slow	2	
e. Indifferent	1	
7. Interest in work:		
a. Shows extraordinary Interest	5	
b Shows sustained Interest	4	
c. Takes reasonable Interest	3	
d. Interest not adequate	2	
e. lacking In requisite Interest	1	
8. Ability to Supervise and. Guide:		
a. Source of inspiration to the subordinate.	5	
b. Manages distinctly well	4	
c. Ordinarily helpful to the subordinates	3	
d. Cannot control the subordinates	2	
e. Handles badly	1	

Initial of the Initiating Officer

Name.....Designation

9. Relationship with Colleagues:		Rating	Initial
a. Wins and retains highest regards of all		5	
b. Highly liked and respected		4	
c. Cordial		3	
d. Tendency to avoid colleagues		2	
e. Dealings appear to be erratic		1	
10 Capability to Implement Decision:			
a. Extraordinary		5	
b. Very good		4	
c. Good		3	
d. Sometimes wavers		2	
e. Weak		1	
11. Power of Expression (Written):			
a. Brilliant on paper		5	
b. Clear, cogent and very well set out		4	
c. Generally tries to be clear and concise		3	
d. Not good enough to get by		2	
e. Ideas not clear		1	

Initial of the Initiating Officer

CONFIDENTIAL

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12. Power of Expression (Oral):		
a. Extremely Effective	5	
b. Convincing and forceful	4	
c. Adequate	3	
d. Expression not always clear	2	
e. Ineffective and hazy	1	

13. Total Rating Scored out of 60 in Part V

14. Total Rating Scored out of 100 in Part IV and V

15. Overall Grading: (Strike out the inapplicable Grading and Initial in the box Grading Awarded.)

Grading	Initial
OUTSTANDING (91-100)	<input type="text"/>
GOOD (81-90)	<input type="text"/>
HIGH AVERAGE (65-80)	<input type="text"/>
AVERAGE (45-60)	<input type="text"/>
BELOW AVERAGE (31-44)	<input type="text"/>
UNSATISFACTORY (20-30)	<input type="text"/>

Initial of the Initiating Officer

CONFIDENTIAL

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Name.....Designation

PART VI -Pen Picture

1. Personality Traits:

2. Professional Ability:

3. Loyalties and Reliability:

4. Any Other Point:

5. Advice to the Officer:

.....
Signature of the Initiating Officer
Name,
Designation.....
Date.....

.....
Signature with date of the
Officer Reported Upon

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Name.....Designation

PART VII -Recommendations

(Not to be shown to the Officer Reported Upon)

1. Brief Comments on:
 - a. Special Aptitude (Administrative/Secretariat/Field/Diplomatic/Others),
 - b. Suitability for next posting
 - c. Recommendation for further in-service training
 - d. Integrity and Reputation
2. Fitness for Promotion: (Cross out the inapplicable box and initial the applicable one)

a. Recommended for accelerated promotion (if the officer has been graded Outstanding)	
b. Fit for promotion	
c. Recently promoted, time for assessment for further promotion not yet ripe.	
d. Not yet fit for promotion. but may become fit in course of time.	
e Unfit for further promotion. reached the ceiling	

3. Other Recommendations;

Date

Signature of the Interring Officer
(with name and designation)

Name Designation

PART VIII - Remarks by the Countersigning Officer.

1. Period served under you from..... to
2. Pen Picture:
3. Overall Grading:
4. Recommendations:

Date

*Signature of the Countersigning Officer
(with name and designation)*

PART IX -Additional Remarks (If any).

Date

*Signature of the Officer Endorsing Remarks
(with name and designation)*

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Name- Designation

PART X-For use by the Ministry/Division

1. Date of receipt of completed form
2. Reasons for abnormal delay
3. Disposal of representation (if any)

**Bangladesh Form No. 290 d (modified)- Annual Confidential Report Form-1
translated into English from Bangla**

CONFIDENTIAL

Annual Confidential Report Form 1

GOVERNMENT OF THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF BANGLADESH

**ANNUAL CONFIDENTIAL REPORT
IN RESPECT OF**

Name

Designation

Service/Cadre/Post.....

S1. No. in the Gradation List

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Part I-Medical Check up Report
(To be filled up by the Authorised Medical Officer)

Name.....Designation.....

1. Height.....Weight.....

Eyesight.....Blood
Group.....

BP.....X-Ray
Report.....

ECG Report.....

2. Medical Category.....

3. Nature of disability in brief.....

Date.....

Signature of the Medical Officer
(with name and Designation)

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(Part III and Part IV will be filled in by the Report Initiating Officer by initialing)

Part III- PERSONAL ATRIBUTES

ATTRIBUTES FOR EVALUATION		SCORES ACHIEVED			
		4	3	2	1
1.	Sense of Discipline				
2.	Judgment and Sense of Proportion				
3.	Intelligence				
4.	Initiative and Drive				
5.	Personality				
6.	Co-operation				
7.	Punctuality				
8.	<i>Reliability</i>				
8.	Sense of Responsibility				
10.	Interest in Work				
11.	Promptness in Taking Action and Carrying out Orders				
12.	Security Consciousness				
13.	Public Relations				

Part IV- PERFROMANCE ATRIBUTES

ATTRIBUTES FOR EVALUATION		SCORES ACHIEVED			
		4	3	2	1
3.1	Professional Knowledge				
3.2	Quality of Work				
3.3	Output of Work				
3.4	Capability to Supervise and Guide				
3.5	Relationship with Colleagues				
3.6	Capability to Take decision				
3.7	Capability to Implement Decision				
3.8	Interest and Capability to Train Subordinates				
3.9	Power of Expression-written				
3.10	Power of Expression-Oral				
3.11	Promptness in Initiating and Countersigning ACR				
3.12	Devotion to Duty				

Total number scored:

Outstanding	Very Good	Good	Average	Below Average
95-100	85-94	61-84	60-41	40 and Below

Initial of Report Initiating Officer

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PART V -Pen Picture

PART VI -Recommendations

(Report Initiating Officer will fill up)

1. Brief Comments on:

a. Special Aptitude (Administrative/Secretariat/Field/Diplomatic/Others):

b. Integrity and Reputation: (1) Moral:

(2) Intellectual:

(3) Material:

c. Recommendation for further in-service training

2. Fitness for Promotion: (Cross out the inapplicable box and initial the applicable one_)

a. Fit for promotion

b. Not yet fit for promotion

c. Reached the maximum ceiling

d. Recently promoted; time for assessment for further promotion not yet ripe

3. Other Recommendations (if any):

Signature of the Initiating Officer and Seal

Name (legible letters)

Designation

Identity Number:

Date:

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PART VII - Remarks by the Countersigning Officer.

I think that the evaluation of the Report Initiating Officer is Very Sound/ Reasonably Sound/Strict/Lenient/Biased

a. General Comments:

b. Total number on the basis of overall judgments

Signature of the Countersigning Officer and Seal

Name (legible letters) -----

Designation -----

Date -----

PART VIII

(For use by the Ministry/Division)

1. Date of receipt of completed form

2. Reasons for abnormal delay

3. Disposal of representation (if any)

Signature of the Officer-in-Charge and Seal

Name (legible letters) -----

Designation -----

Identity Number -----

Date -----

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SALIENT POINTS FOR COMPLETING THE ACR FORM

(All concerned must read the 'Instructions for filling up ACR Forms')

GENERAL GUIDELINES

1. Normal ACRs are initiated once in a calendar year in respect of an officer.
2. Special ACRs may be initiated at, any time to meet any special requirement, when called for by higher authority, provided the Officer Reported Upon has served under the Report Initiating Officer for a minimum of three months.
3. If there is an adverse remark in the ACR, the Ministry/Division concerned will send the extract of the relevant parts only to the Officer Reported Upon.
4. ACR forms are not to be folded at any stage and a. filled in. ACR must be transmitted from one office to another in a closed envelope with secrecy marking 'CONFIDENTIAL'.

INSTRUCTIONS FOR DEPARTMENT'S

5. Ministries Divisions Departments will indicate Report Initiating Officers and Countersigning Officers in respect of all gazetted officers under their administrative control. They will also lay-down the channel of submission of ACRs.
6. The report should be initiated by the next superior officer and countersigned by an officer higher than the reporting officer, both being concerned with the works of the Officer Reported Upon.
7. Any clarifications, interpretations and instructions on ACR, if required, may be sought from the Ministry of Establishment.

INSTRUCTIONS FOR THE OFFICER REPORTED UPON

8. Fill in PART I of the ACR Form in duplicate and sign both copies at the appropriate space and put in date.
9. Ensure that the personal data given in this part are true and in conformity with the latest Officers Service Record Form submitted by you.

INSTRUCTIONS FOR THE REPORT INITIATING OFFICER (RIO)

10. While reporting on your subordinates:
 - a. Be as objective as possible.
 - b. Be as circumspect as possible.
 - c. Be clear and direct, not ambiguous or evasive, in your remarks.'
 - d. A void exaggeration and gross understatement.

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11. Point out to the Officers concerned their failings and weaknesses as soon as these come to notice and thus give them a change to rectify before the same are noted in the ACR of the Officers reported upon.
12. Fill in this form in duplicate by initialing the relevant boxes in both original and the duplicate copies.
13. Overall assessment of the OFFICER REPORTED UPON may be made in the pen picture. Mention in brief traits of the OFFICER REPORTED UPON which have not been covered in Part III and Part IV in specified space for pen picture.
14. After completing Parts III to VI, send the form to the countersigning officer.
15. Submit report in respect of each officer who has served-under you for a minimum period of three months.

INSTRUCTIONS FOR THE COUNTERSIGNING OFFICERS

16. Weigh the remarks of the Report Initiating Officer against your personal knowledge of the officer reported upon and then give your own remarks in Part VII. Award total scores on the basis of overall judgment.
17. If you consider that a particular remark of the reporting officer is wrong and should be expunged, add any other remark which you may consider appropriate. If you do not wholly agree with a remark give your own remarks under "Remarks of the Countersigning Officer" in Part VII.
18. After endorsing your remarks and countersigning the form, forward it to the officer responsible for the custody of the ACR in the respective Ministry/ Division/ Department.

Cabinet Office
Staff in confidence

Note: The Cabinet Office is an equal opportunity employer

Staff Report part 1

Performance Appraisal

This form will be photocopied; please use black ink

1 Personal information

Surname Mr/Mrs/Miss/Ms (delete as appropriate)
Forenames
Date of birth Grade Date entered grade.....
Date started present job Period of report from to
Seniority Date Periods of temporary promotion from to
.....
Qualifications:

Sign here only if you do not wish to read part 1 when complete

The sections below on this page are to be completed during or after the interview

Interviewer's action record
Record what you have agreed in the interview. This may include training, change of job and the Job Holder's views and preferences. Where performance did not meet normal requirements you must set out what action is proposed.

I have/have not* disclosed the section 3b (part2) marking, orally/ in writing.*
*delete whichever is not applicable

Signature Grade Date.....

Job Holder's comments
Please sign below to show that you have had the opportunity to read this performance report and discuss it with your interviewing officer and that you have agreed and recorded your job description for the next reporting period.

Comment below if you wish.

Signature
Date.....

2 Job Description

Job title if any-----

Refer to the forward job plan agreed at the start of the reporting period in writing this description. It should be agreed between the Reporting officer and the Job Holder and reflect any changes during the period.

Rough percentage
of time spent on
each duty

a. Set out the purpose and main duties of the job.

b. List specific objectives.

c. Give a broad indication of the resources managed, eg how many staff are in the Job Holder's command? How much expenditure is directly controlled or advised upon? Other resources?

*Job Holder
interview
preparation*

Set aside some time to prepare for the interview. Think about what you have done best, what you have done less well and why. How well have you done on the aspects of performance listed in section 3?

3 Performance assessment by the Reporting Officer

Definition of ratings

1 Outstanding 2 Performance significantly above requirements 3 Performance fully meets normal requirements of the grade	4 Performance not fully up to requirements, some improvement necessary 5 Unacceptable
---	--

a. Give a rating 1-5 each relevant aspect of performance making full use of the space for your comments

Work activity Quality for work Output of work Planning of work	
Management Management of staff Effective use of other resources	
Communication Oral communication Written communication	
Working relationships Relations with other staff Relations with the public	
Knowledge/skills Professional and technical knowledge Application of knowledge and skills Numerical ability	

b. How effectively have each of the main duties been carried out and specific objectives achieved? Give examples of work done well and areas where performance could be bettered.

3 c. Rating of overall performance

1-5 complete using definitions on page 3

Your rating should not make allowances for any special factors such as age, inexperience, ill health and unusually high turn over of staff, but they should be stated below. Also use this space to complete the picture of the Job Holder so that the report presents a fully balanced and informative assessment.

The Job Holder has worked for me for-----months/years.

Signature-----Grade-----

Name in capitals-----Date-----

4 Countersigning Officer's comments

Indicate how much you see of the Job Holder's work and how far you can confirm the comments and rating given. Record any areas of disagreement which may remain after discussion with the Reporting Officer. Add any further relevant comments.

Signature-----Grade-----

Name in capitals-----Date-----

Cabinet Office

Note: The Cabinet Office is an equal opportunity employer

Staff in confidence

FOR ORAL DISCLOSURE ONLY; NOT TO BE HANDED TO THE JOB HOLDER

Staff Report part 2

Promotion Appraisal

This form will be photocopied; please use blank ink

1. Personal information

Surname Mr/Mrs/Miss/Ms (delete as appropriate)

Forenames

Date of birth Grade Date of this report.....

2. Assessment of personal qualities and abilities by the Reporting Officer

Tick a box for each quality or ability :

X	X applies	Y applies	Y	Comments
Acceptances of responsibility				
	Seeks and accepts responsibility at all times		Avoids responsibility wherever possible	
Judgment				
	Fully thought out sound decisions		Takes superficial or unsound decisions	
Ability to produce constructive ideas				
	Full of ideas which provide fresh insight		Few ideas; does not innovate	
Drive and determination				
	Wholehearted application to tasks; determined to carry them through		Lacks energy; easily discouraged; wastes time	
Reliability under pressure				
	Completely reliable at all times		Easily thrown off balance; not reliable	
Ability to handle change				
	Responds readily to new situations and deals with them effectively		inflexible; unable to cope with change	

3. Promotion assessments

Assess potential to perform the duties of **the next grade**. Look back at the ration of aspects of performance in part 1 as well as the ratings above and ensure any fitted assessment is justified.

		Not fitted	likely to become fitted in the next 2 years	Fitted	Exceptionally fitted
a. Reporting Officer's assessment	Please tick				
b. Countersigning Officer's assessment	Please tick				

4. Comments on promotion assessment

Reporting Officer's comments

Justify your recommendation. If relevant show how the job Holder has demonstrated the ability for the higher grade.

Signature _____ Grade _____

Name in capitals _____ Date _____

b. Countersigning Officer's comments

Justify your assessment and confirm whether the Job Holder Has demonstrated the potential for the higher grade, including management potential. You should indicate any areas for disagreement with the Reporting Officer's recommendation. If you consider the Job Holder has exceptional potential, please state the reasons.

If marked fitted would you accept the Job Holder in the higher grade ? Yes No

Signature _____ Grade _____

Name in capitals _____ Date _____

PSD FORM Performance -2/96

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Refer to the guideline on Performance Evaluation Public Service Department before filling the form

Identification No)

MALAYSIAN GOVERNMENT

PERFORMANCE EVALUATION FROM
MANAGEMENT AND PROFESSIONAL GROUP OFFICER)
YEAR 19.....

PART I –I PERSONAL DETAILES AND SEVICE
(To be filled by officer to be evaluated)

NAME

DATE OF BIRTH

QUALIFICATIONS
ACADEMIC/PROFESSIONAL)

POSTION AND PRESENT DEPT

1. Position
2. Grade
3. Date Held
4. Salary Received During Year of Assessment
5. Date of Salary Increment
6. Type of increment during year of Assessment
8. Name of Ministry/ Dept

PRESENT SERVICE

1. Name of Scheme
2. Appointment Date
3. Confirmed/Not confirmed
4. Actual Grade
5. Head of Service

ASSET REPORT

Declared/ Not Declared	Date Approved
------------------------	---------------

DISCIPLNARY ACTION

Taken/ Not	Type of Discipline
	Date of Disciplinary Action

LIST OF RESPONSIBILITIES

Refer attachment "A"

(Delete where appropriate)

Part II: AWARDS AND RECOGNITION

(To be filled by Appraise)

1. Awards

Year	Awards	From

2. Recognition/ Commendation letter received the past 3 years

Year	Recognition / Commendation letter	From

PART III- LANGUAGE PROFICIENCY

(To be filled by Appraisee)

(Tick in appropriate boxes)

Language	Oral			Written		
	Fluent	Average	Not Fluent	Good	Average	Fair
Malay Language						
English Language						
Other Language(state)						

PART IV- TRAINING (To be filled by Appraisee)

1. Training program seminar, course, workshop and others) attended during year of assessment

Training (specify certificate)	Date/ Duration	Place

2. Qualification: academic /professional

Level -certificate/ Diploma/ Degree/ Master/PhD	Date	Place/ Institution

3. Training Required

Name/Type of Training	Why required

PART V: FREQUENCY OF DISCUSSION

(to be filled by appraisee)

1. Frequency of dissension with Appraiser and/ or Reviewing officer as reg. to Annual Work Target) and work achievement

Occasionally

Seldom

None

2. Frequency of Motivation and looking session with reappraise and/ or Reviewing officer

Occasionally

Seldom

None

PART VI: SUITABILITY OF PLACEMENT

(To be filled by appraisee)

1. Specify present placement as suitable or not (Tick in appropriate boxes)

	Suitable	Not too suitable	Not suitable
a. Nature of work	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
b. Place of work	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
c. Work Environment	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>

2. If not too suitable or not suitable, specify reasons: _____

APPORTIONING OF ANNUAL WORK TARGETS, MID YEAR REVIEW OF ANNUAL
WORK TARGET AND ACTUAL ACHIEVEMENT IN YEAR OF ASSESSMENT

(to be filled by Appraisee)

1. Appraiser and Appraisee to discuss Annual Work Target at the beginning /Middle/ end of year
2. Apportioning AWT, half yearly review and actual work achievement at end of year to be recorded in the AWT form.
3. Appraiser to ensure AWT from to be kept in department all time except during usage at beginning. middle and year-end. Appraisee can make photocopy of the AWT.
4. The AWT from to be affixed as Attachment to the Annual Performance Appraisal Form.

PART VIII- ACTIVITIES AND CONTRIBUTION

- I. Appraisee to list activities and contribution out of official duties such as sport associations/ creativity at Unit/ Division/ Village/ Kensing scheme/ pupt/ service/ state or National/ International levels which benefited the organisation/ society/ community. Maximum mark 5%.

List of activities / contribution in year of assessment	Level of activities and contributions (Specify post and achievements))

I confirm all the above statements in Part I to VIII are true

Signature of Appraisee

Date

Note: Part I to VIII to be filled in by the appraisee

2. Based on the information in para 1, the Appraiser and the Reviewing officer is required to evaluate based on the scale as follows. No marks could be given if the appraisee does not specify contribution

Field of Activity and contribution	Sports / Association/ Creative contribution	Total mark based on weig
Appraiser		$\frac{\quad}{10} \times 5 =$
Reviewing officer		$\frac{\quad}{10} \times 5 =$

Unit / Division/ Village/ Housing scheme/ Dept/ Service/ District level	
Less Active	Active
1 .2. 3. 4	5. 6. 7. 8

National/ International level	
Less Active	Active
4. 5. 6. 7	8. 9. 10

PART IX- WORK OUTPUT

1. The appraiser and Reviewing officer is required to evaluate based on actual performance vis-a-vis planned AWT taking into consideration the resources available. 60% marks is earmarked for AWT/work output.

CRITERIA	APPRAISER	REVIEWING OFFICER
1. WORK OUTPUT QUANTITY (For example total, number, percentage, frequency ant others based on planned work output targets	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
2. WORK OUTPUT QURITY (Perfectness, well arranged, neat and accurate based on planned work quality targets	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
3.COST EFFECTIVENESS The actual cost for resourced used in the process of producing output and /or services in comparison with planned output and cost estimates.	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>

CREITERIA <small>University Institutional Repository</small>	APPRAISER	REVIEWING OFFICER
4. TIME ACCURACY The ability of implementing tasks in the specified time fixed	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
5. ADOPTING PROCEDURE'S AND ADMINISTRATIVE REGULATIONS The ability to appreciate and implement policy, procedures and administrative instructions in order to develop and enhance organizational performance and the public service.	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Total marks according to weightage	$\frac{\quad}{50} \times 60$ =	$\frac{\quad}{50} \times 60$ =

Very Low	Low	Average	High	Very High
1. 2	3. 4	5. 6	7. 8	9. 10

2. Actual/ Overall/ Annual Work Performance Comments

The Appraisee is required to give comments on actual yearly work performance of the Appraisee based on set work targets taking into consideration the semi-annual review and the changes that have taken place including the status of resources available under the control of the appraisee as described in the AWT form. This comment should be in line with the evaluation undertaken based on the 5 criteria as in para 1 above .

PART X

KNOWLEDGE AND EXPERTISE

This section contains 10%

CRITERIA	APPRAISER	REVIEWING OFFICER
1. KNOWLEDGE IN WORK RELATED FIELD Knowledge and ability to undertake work which enable appraisee to contribute to attainment of work excellence	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
2. ABILITY TO ORGANISE Combining of important resources such as manpower, equipment, information and financial resources to achieve organizational objective and government goals	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
3. ABILITY TO MAKE DECISION In line with organizational objective and according to the time allocated	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
4. EFFECTIVE COMMUNICATION Creating understanding on policies, goals and strategies in order to cultivate team spirit, determination and dedication	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
5. ABILITY TO SOLVE PROBLEMS The ability to identify problems and suggest alternatives and solving them effectively	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
6. OVERALL PERSPECTIVE Ability to foresee problems from various dimensions and focusing on important matters according to priorities when undertaking actions.	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>

CRITERIA	APPRAISER	REVIEWING OFFICER
7. ANALYTICAL ABILITY The capability to review, and interpret problems, facts, situation, and incidents for recommending appropriate actions	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Total marks based on weightage	$\frac{\quad}{70} \times 10$ =	$\frac{\quad}{70} \times 10$ =

Very Low
1. 2

Low
3. 4

Average
5. 6

High
7. 8

Very High
9. 10

PART XI- PERSONAL QUALITIES
(10% for this section)

CRITERIA	APPRAISER	REVIEWING OFFICER
1. LEADERSHIP Having vision and ability to mobilize, manage resources and organise with positive personal qualities/ values that could be emulated, and possessing ability to make firm decision for attainment of organizational objectives.	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
2. INTEGRITY (Sincere, acceptable and proper conduct in discharging duties without abusing power and position)	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
3. COOPERATIVE, FAIR AND JUST Understanding, friendly, fair and just during work	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
4. DISCIPLINE Ability to control oneself in terms of mental and physical aspects including adherence to procedures, timing and promise, patience and tactfulness.	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>

CRITERIA <i>Dhaka University Institutional Repository</i>	APPRAISER	REVIEWING OFFICER
5. PROACTIVE, CREATIVE AND INNOVATIVE Ability to anticipate, take precautionary measures, giving new ideas and paving improvements, and useful for achievement of organizational objective	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
6. ABILITY TO MEET CHALLENGES Ability to face and overcome internal and external challenges in the ever changing environment	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
7. COMMITMENT Hardworking, dedicated, responsible and puts his utmost effort in undertaking tasks	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Total marks based on weightage	$\frac{\quad}{70} \times 10$ =	$\frac{\quad}{70} \times 10$ =

Very Low
1. 2

Low
3. 4

Average
5. 6

High
7. 8

Very High
9. 10

PART XII

INTERRELATIONSHIP AND COOPERATION

(5% for this section)

CRITERIA	APPRAISER	REVIEWING OFFICER
1. INTERRELATIONSHIP AND COOPERATION Ability, wisdom and effectiveness of an officer to create friendly cooperation with other officers within and outside the organisation	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Total marks based on weightage	$\frac{\quad}{10} \times 5$ =	$\frac{\quad}{10} \times 5$ =

Very Low	Low	Average	High	Very High
1. 2	3. 4	5. 6	7. 8	9. 10

PART XIII

TOTAL OVERALL MARKS

In totaling the marks, the appraiser and the reviewing officer have to add up all the marks from section VIII to XII

	APPRAISER	REVIEWING OFFICER
(% of overall marks)	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Average Marks (to be filled by the Secretariat of the panel on the condition of performance appraisal and salary progression)	<input type="checkbox"/>	

RECOMMENDATION FOR SALARY PROGRESSION

(The appraiser and reviewing officer to use the total marks as the basis to recommend the salary progression of the appraisee)

	Static	Horizontal	Vertical	Diagonal
Appraiser	<input type="text"/>	<input type="text"/>	<input type="text"/>	<input type="text"/>
Reviewing Officer	<input type="text"/>	<input type="text"/>	<input type="text"/>	<input type="text"/>

PART XV

SUITABILITY FOR PROMOTION AND AWARDS FOR EXCELLENT SERVICE, HONOURS, MEDALS AND COMMENDATION LETTERS)

	APPRAISER	REVIEWING OFFICER
1. Suitability for promotion	<input type="text"/>	<input type="text"/>
a) Possessing a high level of competence and should be given priority	<input type="text"/>	<input type="text"/>
b) Possessing the ability and suitability for promotion in normal circumstances	<input type="text"/>	<input type="text"/>
c) Incapable and not suitable for promotion	<input type="text"/>	<input type="text"/>

2. Awards of Honors, Medals and Commendation

a) The appraiser may recommend in the PSD Forms (Performance) the Excellent Service Award based on the performance of the appraisee.

b) The reviewing officer may comment, if necessary, on the recommendation of the appraiser regarding the suitability for promotion and the award of honors, medals and commendation awards

PART XVI

CAREER DEVELOPMENTS PLAN

(To be filled by the Appraiser after discussion with the Appraise)
(Tick the appropriate box)

(Is the officer suited to his scope of works and present placement)

1. Suitable

(Recommend suggestion to improve performance of appraise)

1. Less Suitable

(Identify causes and suggest that the appraise be provided with the basic course and training

PART XVIII

OVERALL COMMENTS AND RESPONSIBILITY TO INFORM ON OFFICER'S PERFORMANCE

(To be filled by Appraiser)

1.The appraiser is required to comment on the overall works achievement of the appraisee based on the annual work targets according to the criteria set in Part VIII to XII and other criteria not covered in any Part.

Period of Appraisee working under my supervision Year Month

2. Specify whether outstanding, good, average or unsatisfactory performance has been informed to Appraisee

Yes No

3. Specify whether recommendations for improving officers performance has been made known to appraisee

Yes No

4. Specify Appraiser's reaction to the criticisms in 2 and 3 above

i) Discusses and accept criticisms openly

ii) Only accepts part of criticisms

iii) Unsure

iv) Not willing to accept criticisms

v) Others (specify)

Name of Appraiser

Position

Signature

Identify Card No

Ministry/Department

Date

PART XVII

OVERALL COMMENTS BY REVIEWING OFFICER

The reviewing officer is required to make an overall comment whether he agrees or disagrees with the appraisal and to state his views on the overall performance and state other matters which are related

Period of Appraise working under my supervision Year Month

Name of Reviewing Officer

Identification Card No

Position

Ministry /Department

Signature

Date

PART XIX

REMARKS BY THE CHAIRMAN OF PANEL ON THE COORDINATION OF PERFORMANCE APPRAISAL AND SALARY PROGRESSION (IF NECESSARY)

Chairman's Name

Position

Signature

Date

LIST OF TASKS AND RESPONSIBILITIES

Name :

Position :

Responsible to :

List of Responsibilities :

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BIBLIOGRAPHY

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- The Bangladesh Civil List, 1976-77*
- Organisation-cum-Functional Charts of the Different Ministries/ Divisions*, 1977.
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