

THE NATURE OF BANGLADESH STATE AND MILITARY RULE

A DISSERTATION SUBMITTED TO THE UNIVERSITY OF DHAKA. IN
FULFILMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS OF THE DEGREE OF
DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY.

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


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
DECLARATION

The material embodied in this thesis is original and has not been submitted in part or full for any other Diploma or Degree of any University.



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Inspite of my best efforts there are some mistakes in typing the study. I regret these mistakes.

Dhaka
7th February 2002.

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ABBREVIATIONS

AL	Awami League
AML	Awami Muslim League
B.N.P	Bangladesh Nationalist Party
CCCR	Coordination Committee of the Communist Revolutionaries
CHTDB	Chittagong Hill Tracts Development Board.
CMLA	Chief Martial Law Administrator
CPB	Communist Party of Bangladesh.
CPI	Communist Party of India.
CPI (M)	Communist Party of India (Marxist)
DCMLA	Deputy Chief Martial Law Administrator
EBCP (M-L)	East Bengal Communist Party (Marxist - Leninist)
EPCP (M-L)	East Pakistan Communist Party (Marxist - Leninist)
JP	Jatio Party
JSD	Jatio Samajtantrik Dal
KPP	Krishak Praza Party
KSP	Krishak Sramik Party
LFO	Legal Framework Order
ML	Muslim League
NAP (B)	National Awami Party (Bhasani).
NAP (M)	National Awami Party (Muzaffer)
PBSP	Purbo Banglar Sarbohara Party
PCJSS	Parbottya Chattagram Jana Sanghati Samity
PPP	Pakistan Peoples' Party
UPP	United Peoples' Party.

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INTRODUCITON:

BANGLADESH: BIRTH OF A NEW STATE

Bangladesh (former East Pakistan) was a part of British India before 1947. Prior to British rule in India, Bengal was called "Bangadesh" or "Bangladesh."¹ The decline of Moghul Power paved the way for the British Raj to conquer Bengal in 1757 at the battle of Palassey. The British Raj in collaboration with the local Hindu landlords, placed the Muslim population at a backward position. The permanent settlement, introduced by Cornwallis in 1793, created a Hindu dominated new landed aristocracy i.e. the zamindar class in Bengal. Among the Muslims the Nawabs of Dhaka, Bogra and Jalpaiguri were benefited by the permanent settlement. British agrarian policy provoked Mir Nesar Ali Titu Mir and Pir Mohsinuddin Dudu Miah to lead Wahabi movement and Farizi movement respectively. Although Haji Shariatullah was the founding father of the Farizi movement, his son Dudu Miah gave it a revolutionary character. This movement was threat to the landed Hindu Zamindar class. The leaders of the movement advocated that the land belong to God. The Farizi movement was rural based movement that lateron produced great leaders in Bengal like A. K. Fazlul Haque,

Maulana Bhasani and Sheik Mujibur Rahman. In fact, they were the products of Farizi movement.²

The creation of new Bengal, through the partition of Bengal in 1905 as a Muslim majority province contributed to the rise of Muslim middle class intellegensia in the province under the leadership of A. K. Fazlul Haque. He fought against the landlords of Bengal who were mostly Hindus and directed the socio-economic, political and administrative life of the region. Permanent settlement created antagonistic relationship between the Hindus and the Muslims. As a result of the permanent settlement Hindu domination was present in all aspects of the society. Abul Mansoor Ahmed rightly expressed this: "In Bengal, the landlord is Hindu, the peasant is Muslim. The money-lender is Hindu, the indebted man is Muslim. The pleader is Hindu, the client is Muslim. The doctor is Hindu, the patient is Muslim. The jailor is Hindu, the prisoner is Muslim. The magistrate is Hindu, the accused is Muslim."³

In the early 20th centry Bengal leadership went into the hands of the extremist. Anushilan samity, jugantor group and swadeshi movement served the interest of the Hindu middle class. They had no support

among the muslims in Bengal. Their activities helped develop militant nationalism and communal feelings in Bengal. Hindu goddess 'Kali' was their source of inspiration. They divided the Bengalis into Hindus and Muslim. Even the extremists group did not recognize Muslim as Bengalis. It has become clear from the writings of Basanta Chatterjee. He reveals: "The Bengalis 'bhadralok' society composed mainly of three well known high castes of Bengal, namely the Brahmins, the vaidyas and the Kayasthas. The vaidyas are special castes of Bengali Hindus and are generally regarded as half-Brahmins being entitled to discharge the function of priest-hood. The 'Kayasthas' on the otherhand, though technically shudras in Bengal, have always been a prosperous and influential community because their attachment to learning and governmental service through ages; So they are also counted among the bhadralok. Some isolated members of other sub-castes may also be admitted to this society through their knowledge and wealth over a few generations. But the crucial point is that all these people must necessarily be Aryanised Hindu for being included in Bengali bhadralok class. In other words, no low caste animistic Hindus, Tribal or Mussalman, a member of some other denomination can ever be regarded as 'Bengali'

however naturally he may speak the language or whatever his social status or learning³⁴. Although the extremists in Bengal did not recognize Muslims as Bengalis, but there is no denying the fact that Muslim rulers in Bengal played a vital role in developing Bengali literature and culture. Among the Muslim sultans Rakanuddin Barbakh shah and Shamsuddin Ilias shah were remarkable. They patronised Bengali language and literature. Later on, the current of militant Bengali nationalism was vehemently opposed by the Muslim leaders, philosophers and writers through the propaganda of the Muslim league. The two-nation theory of the ML developed Muslim Bengali nationalism and made a demarcation between these two communities.

The Hindu-Muslim antagonistic relationship that developed in the 19th century took a concrete shape in the 20th century. The foundation of the Muslim league (ML) in 1906 added fuel to militant nationalism led by the extremists Hindu leaders. The ML was born to protect the rights and interests of Muslims in India. Although Muslim league was born in Dhaka its leadership went into the hands of the upper Indian Muslims. Aga Khan became the permanent president of the ML. The enlightened middle class Muslims of Bengal with radical views came out as a new

force in Indian politics under the leadership of A. K. Fazlul Haque. In 1916, A. K. Fazlul Haque was the president of the Muslim league and the general Secretary of the All India National Congress.⁶ The concept of Pakistan was gradually taking shape in the 1930's. The idea was presented by Iqbal in his presidential address at the annual session of the Muslim league in 1930 : "I would like to see the Punjab, North-west Frontier Province, Sind and Baluchistan amalgamated into a single state. Self government within the British empire or without the British empire, the formation of a consolidated North-West Indian Muslim state appears to me to be the final destiny of the Muslims, atleast in North-West India. Iqbal recognised with remarkable clarity that the basis for such a state has to lie for such a state had to lie not simply in Muslim majority areas but in Muslim majority areas in India which were geographically, and therefore to a politically significant extent culturally contiguous.⁷ In 1933, Chaudhuri Rahmat Ali, a Cambridge student, brought the idea of Pakistan which comprised the Punjab, Afganistan (i.e. the North West Frontier Province), Kashmir, Sind and Baluchistan.⁸ In 1937, after the victory of Fazlul Haque's KrishakPraja Party (K.P.P.) in the Bengal elections, Rahmat Ali spoke of two more Muslim states-Bang-e-Islam (Bengal and

Assam) and Usmanistan (Hyderabad). But according to his conception, neither of these two countries was to be a part of Pakistan.⁹

During the 1930's the Muslim league in Bengal was a weak political party and the K.P.P. of Fazlul Haque was the only party with wide popular support of the Bengali Muslims. The K. P.P. was a rural based non-communal organisation. Its support came from the middle class, lower middle class and landless peasants. Although the K.P.P. was a middle class and lower middle class based party, its leaders, including Fazlul Haque, were generally jotedars. In fact, the party had many Hindu jotedars in its fold. The leaders of the party advocated a radical program demanding the abolition of the Zamindari system, restrictions on large-scale holdings and relief from usury. The K.P.P. - ML coalition government came into being in Bengal in 1938. In fact, the Muslim middle class in Bengal found that the Hindu interests remained firmly entrenched in different spheres of economic and social life of the province even after the K.P.P-ML coalition came to power. They thought that the only way to get rid of Hindu domination was to make Bengal a part of a Muslim homeland. They, therefore, decided to support the Muslim league and, in the early forties, induced the poor Muslims to join

the same organization in large numbers¹⁰. By this way the ML became a mass party in Bengal in early forties.

M. A. Jinnah put forward 'Two-Nation theory' in 1940 at the All India Muslim league conference that paved the way for creation of Pakistan in August 1947. Ramkrishna Mukherjee rightly observes that the two-nation theory of Mr. Jinnah was not merely a political manoeuvre: a nation was being built on the basis of the Muslim way of life." The basic foundation of Pakistan state was inherent in Islamic ideology. By the creation of Pakistan the hegemony of the Bombay-Uttar Pradesh group was replaced by the supremacy of the Punjabis. The Punjabi elites controlled the political and commercial life of Pakistan. The Pathan generals who dominated the armed wing of Pakistan maintained a link with the Punjabi elite. The Bengalis found themselves in a status of political and economic inequality.¹² The Bengali representation in both the civil service and the Army of Pakistan had always been negligible. Both the army and the civil service served the interests of the feudal lords and the bourgeoisie of the west Pakistan. This exploitation continued till the last days of the united Pakistan.

The uneven economic development between the Hindu and Muslim bourgeois contributed to the creation of Pakistan. East Bengal was dominated by the Hindu landlords and money-lenders. After Partition the Hindu landlords and money-lenders went to India, the non-Bengali refugees who came from India replaced them. In absence of a strong industrial business class, the rural-based middle class, occupied the leadership in East Bengal Politics. The Awami Muslim League (AML), a party of the Petty-bourgeoisie, was formed in 1949. The AML, was formed with Maulana Bashani as the president, Shamsul Haq as secretary and Sheik Mujibur Rahman and Khandakar Mustaq Ahmed as joint Secretaries. The socio-economic background of the Awami League leadership indicates that it was rural-based middle class political party. The Muslim League Leadership in East Bengal, on the other hand, was mainly in the hands of feudal-landlords who identified themselves with the original Muslim conquerors and considered Urdu as their language. On the other hand, in the 50's an educated middle class emerged in East Bengal, who considered Bengali as their own language. This group made a tremendous appeal among the rural as well as urban middle class and led the Language movement. The Language Movement of 1952 was a

cultural movement in its original shape but within a short period of time it turned into a mass political movement. In fact, the language movement was a turning point in the history of Bengali nationalism. The Bengali Muslim gradually learnt to think that he was a Bengali first and a Muslim second.¹³

The introduction of the East Pakistan Acquisition and Tenancy Act in 1950 abolished the Zamindari system in East Pakistan. This was possible because of the absence of Hindu Zamindars who migrated to India. Abolition of Zamindari system changed the character state in East Pakistan from the feudal to semi-feudal system.¹⁴ The policy of the Pakistan's central government also did not help to create indigenous capitalist class in this area. The Bengali middle class, which is identified as vernacular elite by Rounaq Jahan, was united in 1954 when the central government declared the date of elections in East Pakistan. They made a United Front to fight against the Muslim League candidates. The United Front (UF) was composed of the AML, the Krishak Sramik Party, the Pakistan National Congress, the Scheduled Castes Federation, the Communist Party, the Ganatantrik Dal and the Nizam-e-Islam Party.¹⁵ The UF fought the elections with 21-point demand and got 223 out of 237

Muslim seats. The ML got only 9 seats. The absence of strong industrial and business classes paved the way for professional middle classes to take the pioneering role in politics. Bengali Muslims got a chance to grow themselves as new industrial class in 1956 when the AL came to power in central government with H.S. Suhrawardy as Prime Minister and Abul Mansoor Ahmed as industrial Minister. In 1956, the name of East Bengal was officially changed into East Pakistan. In the same year Suhrawardy accepted the 'One Unit' Scheme of the central government and pursued a pro-western foreign policy. On this ground Maulana Bhasani left the AL and formed the National Awami Party (NAP). The military coup of 1958 led by Ayub Khan destroyed the last hopes of the Bengali Muslims to be an industrial class. Ayub regime prevented the growth of Bengali as a bourgeois class. (The middle class and upper middle class wanted to establish itself as the new bourgeois of East Pakistan and highly educated people wanted a greater share in the civil and armed services of the country. But the people of East Pakistan did not get their due share. They were also deprived from the decision-making process on vital national issues. Moreover, the Lion's share of Pakistan's national income had been grabbed by the 22 industrial families and their associates in the civil

and the military services.¹⁶ As a result, during Ayub period the Bengali nationalist movement reached its climax which drew its strength from the rural as well as urban middle class. In 1966 Sheikh Mujibur Rahman aggregated the grievances of the people of East Pakistan and put forward six-point demand. The AL articulated the politics of East Pakistan through six-point program. In fact, the six-point program was a middle class movement. In spite of its middle class character, the six-point movement received tremendous support from all stratum of society as it was seen to provide independent prosperous growth for Bengalis as a whole within the framework of a united Pakistan.¹⁷ The upheaval of 1969 popularized the six-point program of the AL and helped lay down its foundation at the grass root level. Maulana Bhasani was the central figure of the 1969 upheaval. He organized demonstrations and incited peasants to militant actions including gheraos. People from all walks of life joined the historic movement. The East Pakistan Students Action Committee was formed with a view to materialize 11-point demand. The 11-point of the students was more radical than that of the six-point of the AL.¹⁸

On March 25, 1969, Ayub Khan handed over power to Agha Mohammad Yahya Khan, the army chief. Yahya Khan proclaimed martial law throughout the country and became the Chief Martial Law Administrator (CMLA). On March 31, 1969, Yahya Khan appointed himself as the president of the country. In March 1970 he also proclaimed Legal Framework Order (LFO) to conduct the general elections. The elections result of 1970 took everybody by surprise. The AL fought the election with six-point demand and secured 160 out of 162 seats in East Pakistan and the Pakistan Peoples' Party (P.P.P). Which was formed in 1967 under the leadership of Zulfikar Ali Bhutto fought the elections with four slogans: (i) Islam is our faith; (ii) Democracy is our policy; (iii) Socialism is our economy; (iv) All power to the people and got 81 seats in West Pakistan.¹⁹ The elections result of 1970 indicates that people voted for parties not for personalities. Personalities like Fazlul Quader Chowdhury and Khan A Sabur of the ML were defeated badly. Whereas unknown personalities won the elections by the AL tickets. The elections result of 1970 heralded the death of United Pakistan. After the elections Yahya Khan, Bhutto and Sheikh Mujib failed to determine the fate of Pakistan through constitutional way. On March 25, 1971, East Pakistan's

political situation because ^{more} worse. At mid night on march 25, the Pakistan military launched an attack on the innocent people of East Pakistan. The AL chief Sheik Mujbur Rahman himself was arrested and a large number of leaders fled to India. Bullets could not silence the voice of the millions. On April 17, the AL formed a government in exile in India with the blessing of the then Soviet Russia. Heavily attacked by the Pakistan army, the Awami League led by Sheikh Mujibur Rahman started liberation war through guerrilla tactics.²⁰ On December 16, 1971, Bangladesh became a sovereign nation state.

Bangladesh started with parliamentary form of government alongwith four basic principles viz; (1) democracy; (2) socialism (3) nationalism; and (4) secularism.²¹ The idea of parliamentary democracy has been closely connected with the liberation war of Bangladesh. People from all walks of life fought the struggle against the Pakistani ruler on the issue of popular participation. However, parliamentary supremacy according to the constitution was accepted only in principle but not in practice. Many important issues were settled mostly outside of the parliament. In 1975, Sheikh Mujib turned the democratic state into a

totalitarian state by introducing one party dominated presidential form of Government. The political independence of Bangladesh under the Mujib regime was realized with the withdrawal of the Pakistani metropolitan bourgeoisie and the introduction of Indian monopolists. With the withdrawal of Pakistani bourgeoisie, the Indian bourgeoisie immediately stepped in even before the Bangladesh Government could establish its authority, to investigate the viability of Bangladesh as a future market of India.²² Soon after assuming power the AL came into conflict with the representatives, managers, administrators and business executives of the state. In international field, the Soviets had tremendous impact on the Mujib regime. This pro-soviet policy of the regime antagonised the western metropolitan bourgeoisie. Like Pakistan, Bangladesh became a administrative state under Zia. During Mujib regime military-bureaucracy was ousted from the decision-making process of the state but in post-Mujib era it re-emerged as the dominant forces in the state apparatus.²³ The military bureaucratic oligarchy re-organised their corporate interest by forming an alliance with the elements of the old bourgeoisie. The Zia regime began a process of denationalization of the public sector in favor of the private sector and raised the private investment ceiling

progressively upward. The world Bank, the Asian Development Bank, and the Multinational companies came forward to invest capital in Bangladesh. The Ershad regime also followed the economic policy of the Zia regime. The state under Zia and Ershad served the interest of the metropolitan bourgeoisie as well as indigenous bourgeoisie.

In my dissertation I shall focus on ideological, socio-economical and behavioral patterns of the armed forces and political leaders with special reference to the formation of Bangladesh state. In this context, I shall examine the following question. How did Bangladesh come into existence? What was the origin of Bangladesh armed forces? What role did the political parties and the armed forces play during and after liberation war? How were the armed forces politicised with Maoist ideology? Why did the armed forces intervene into Bangladesh Politics? What role did the metropolitan bourgeoisie play in Bangladesh after military intervention? What role did the state under Zia and Ershad play in the process of national integration and development? What are the main bases of support for the armed forces? What is the future of the armed forces in Bangladesh?

Methodology of the Study:

I have followed historical method in this study. I have taken help from secondary sources i.e. documents and other writing of the researchers. I have conducted a survey on the top ranking political leaders and high level civil and military officers. Its main purpose was to get the socio-economic background and educational status of them. Prepared questionnaires have been used for information of the members of the political parties and the high level officers. I have also collected information from newspaper reportings, assembly proceedings, government documents and other publications. Finally I have followed statistical method and case analysis method to process and to analyse collected data.

In order to examine above mentioned questionnaire systematically. I have divided my whole work into the following chapters.

- (1) Chapter I dealt with the concept of the state and its relations with the armed forces.
- (2) Chapter II has dealt with mode of production and class conflicts in Bangladesh society.

- (3) In Chapter III I have discussed the historical background of the Bangladesh armed forces.
- (4) Chapter IV has analyzed the role with the armed forces and its role in Mujib administration.
- (5) Chapter V has taken up with the role of the state under Zia.
- (6) Chapter VI has discussed the role of the state under Ershad.
- (7) In Chapter VII I have discussed the socio-economic Background of the Members of the Fifth Parliament.
- (8) Chapter VIII has dealt with the military rule and dependent capital formation in Bangladesh.
- (9) In Chapter IX I have discussed the problems of national integration and militarisation in the Chittagong Hill Tracts.
- (10) Chapter X is the concluding chapter of this thesis.

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CHAPTER- ONE

STATE, MILITARY AND POLITICS : A THEORETICAL ANALYSIS

There has been an increasing trend towards the concept of state. Greek political thinkers Plato and Aristotle compared the state with organization. They see the state not as a whole of society but only as special organization of society. Later on Rousseau, Hegel and Green joined with this group. "The State," Hegel said, "must be comprehended as an organism"². It is a natural growth. It is a whole greater than the parts. Whereas Hobbes and Locke see the state as machine. Utilitarian philosophers Jeremy Bentham and James Mill also supported the mechanistic view of the state. They analysis the nature of the state on the qualitative point of views i.e, maximum happiness to the maximum number of people. Whereas liberalists like J.S. Mill see the nature of the state on the quantitative point views. Green and Hegel approved the supremacy of the state over associations. But there is a significant difference between them in the reasons for it and the nature and exercise of it. For Hegel, associations are important because they embody the state

instinct which is co-operative, not the principle of "bourgeois society" which is competitive. For Green, associations are important because they fulfill the individual. The state must be supreme over the associations because it must co-ordinate and adjust them. It must also preserve them. To Hegel the supremacy of the state is unlimited, to Green it is limited. Hegel said that, "the state is the Divine idea as it exists on earth.... we must therefore worship the state as the manifestation of the Divine on earth." Marx picked up where Hegel left off half a century later, promising that socialism could become the functional equivalent of religion. Religion, said Marx, was nothing more than the sign of a distressed creature....the spirit of spiritless conditions.... the opiate of the masses³ Marxists see the state as an executive committee of the bourgeois. State represents the interest of the economically powerful class. The higher echelons of the executive office, legislature and judiciary are well connected to the ruling class and they provide the channels through which the state apparatus pursues their policies thereby using the state as an agent of class domination. A group of writers argued that the state is not an instrument of class domination and oppression, but a power block in which a relationship has been forged between the dominant class and the

state. Within the framework of this analysis some writers opined that the state acts as an independent player with regard to social classes and class conflicts. This chapter deals with the nature of the state and its relations with military.

THE STATE AND THE MILITARY

According to Marx, the state is an organ of class rule, it is the creation of "order." which legalizes and perpetuates this oppression by moderating the conflict between the classes.⁵ The bourgeoisie has created the complex administrative system and bureaucracy for controlling the class conflict with the help of force. A standing army and police are the main instruments of force of the state power. V.I. Lenin says " two institutions are most characteristics of this state machine: the bureaucracy and the standing army. In their works, Marx and Engels repeatedly show that it is the bourgeoisie with whom these institutions are connected by thousands of threads The bureaucracy and the standing army are a " parasite on the body of bourgeois society - a parasite born of the internal contradictions which rend that society, but a parasite which chokes all its vital pores."⁶ Marxists see the institution as the

historical product of social conditions. Karl Liebknecht identified the history of militarism with the history of class struggle.⁷ To him, force play an essential role in the process of economic and social change. In the words of Karl Marx, "force is the midwife of every old society pregnant with a new one that it is the instrument by means of which social movement forces its way through and shatters the dead, fossilized political forms"⁸

Military as an institution does not play same role in every country. In a bourgeois state military role is seen as an instrument of capitalists, and in a revolutionary state its role is seen as an anti-imperialists. Military as an instrument protected the interest of the bourgeoisie and the landed class. Marxists emphasized that the administrative and bureaucratic apparatus of the bourgeois state always works to subdue class antagonism with the backing of the military and police. Here military is used as an instrument of the bourgeoisie. For this reason, Marxists see the military as a neutral instrument. Engels says 'the state is economically and politically dominant class and thus acquires new means of holding down and exploiting the oppressed class'. He also

writes, 'exceptional periods occur in which the warring classes balance each other so nearly that the state power, as ostensible mediator, acquire, for the moment, a certain degree of independence of both' ⁹.

Antonio Gramsci defines the state in the following manner:

State = Political society & civil society, that is hegemony armoured by coercion. State in the integral sense: 'dictatorship & hegemony'.

According to him, "The state is the entire complex of political and theoretical activity by which the ruling classes not only justify and maintain their domination but also succeed in obtaining the active consent of the governed."¹⁰ Gramsci has taken the idea of civil society from Hegel. Interesting is that Gramsci departed not only from Hegelian usage but also from Marx's equation of civil society with the material substructure (i.e. the structure of economic relations). Hegel's civil society is the complex of commercial and industrial life, the totality of economic instruments and relations, together with the public services needed to maintain order within them (i.e., civil courts, police). Gramsci identifies civil society with the ideological superstructure, the institutions and technical instruments that create and diffuse modes of thought.¹¹ To him, hegemony is the ideological predominance of bourgeois values and

norms over the subordinate classes. It emanated primarily from the organs of civil society. According to Marx: "The ideas of the ruling class are in every epoch the ^{ruling} ideas; i.e. the class which is the ruling material force of society is at the same time the ruling ideological force."¹² For all Marxists before Gramsci, conflict, not consensus, permeates the system: our epoch, the epoch of the bourgeoisie possesses this distinctive feature: it has simplified the class antagonism. Society as a whole is more and more splitting up into two great hostile camps, into two great classes directly facing each other. Bourgeoisie and proletariat.¹³ In Karl Marx's view the fundamental classes of the present epoch are the bourgeoisie on the one hand and the proletariat, on the other. The latter must elaborate an ideology of its own counter that of the former and thus join the battle for 'hegemony' on the 'terrain' of civil society. "To the extent," he says, "that ideologies are historically necessary they have a validity which is psychological they 'organize' human masses, and create the terrain on which men move acquire consciousness of their position, struggle, etc."¹⁴ The dimension of inherent ideology and its manipulation by the ruling classes in societies such as Pakistan, assumes considerable significance. Islam's prevarices in the form of inherent ideology, however, provided to

the Muslim elite of Northern India the means with which to galvanize popular support for an independent state in the sub-continent. The basic foundation of Pakistan state was inherent Islamic ideology.

Whereas Marx defines state as the executive committee of the bourgeoisie, Gramsci distinguishes between state power and class power. This idea got top most priority to the neo-marxists. Neo-marxists opined that the state to some extent enjoy some sort of autonomy.) The concept of the relative autonomy of the state was developed by the neo-marxists. The post-colonial states are the classic example of this thinking. Hamza Alavi argued that in post colonial societies, no single class has the capacity to emerge as the dominant class and the state frees itself from the influence of any single class. The second source of such autonomy is the 'overdeveloped' state structure inherited from the colonial past. Alavi opined that 'at the time of independence the post-colonial society inherits that overdeveloped apparatus of state and its institutionalized practices through which the operations of indigenous social classes are regulated and controlled', and that the post-colonial state is 'equipped with a powerful bureaucratic-military apparatus'. Hamza Alvi's theory is that the state is relatively autonomous and it mediates the competing interests of

the three propertied classes—the metropolitan bourgeoisie, the indigenous bourgeoisie and the Landed classes. While at the same time acting on behalf of all of them in order to preserve the social order in which their interests are embedded, namely, the institution of private property and the capitalist mode as the dominant mode of production.¹⁵ (From this point of view we can assume that Bangladesh state enjoy certain degree of autonomy but their activities are constrained by the world capitalism. The influence and Power of the transnational corporations (TNCs) has been increasing day by day. The state is represented by a military bureaucratic oligarchy till 1990. Star L. Lings argued that in peripheral societies, state obtained a significant amount of autonomy from the domestic ruling class by relying on foreign capital. These types of state lacks a strong dominant class due to the capitalist development backed by the western imperialist countries. In these societies, there is a multiplicity of classes due to the absence of bourgeoisie, the intermediate class plays the role of ruling class.¹⁶ In the developing countries, military role is seen as an intermediate class.

MILITARY IN POLITICS

Military intervention in the politics of the Third World countries is a common phenomenon. There are various reasons for military intervention, they include communist threat, nationalism, anti-oligarchism, failure of parliamentary democracy, weak political institutions, lack of legitimacy and strong leadership, lack of political consciousness of the workers and peasants, the desire to promote modernization and economic development.¹⁷ Finer's proposition is that the military is more likely to intervene in politics if political institutions are weak and lacking legitimacy. Huntington, Finer, pye, Janowitz, Lissak, Perlmutter and Stephen see the nature of the military as an organization and an agent of modernization.¹⁸ But classical Marxists (including the Hamburg Group) look at the military as a class. Marxists see the military as a more or less neutral instrument of the ruling class precisely because force is subordinate to the economic order and the instruments of force are subordinate to the mode of production. In Engel's Words: "Force can not make money; at most it can only take away money that has already been made and even does not help very much."¹⁹ It is to be said that sometimes the warring classes play a neutral role but

not all the time. But Engel's sees the military a neutral force. The Hamburg Group of Marxists see the role of the military in the world-wide allocation of resources as a mechanism for extracting surplus product in the periphery in order to support capitalist accumulation in the metropolis.²⁰ Roza Luxemburg pointed out the importance of arms expenditure as a method of realizing surplus value. Mary Kaldor implies that a fresh approach combining elements of both these thoughts is necessary since the modernization theorists and Marxists both fail to explain the difference in the behavior of military institutions in third world countries.²¹

POLITICAL SUPREMACY OVER THE ARMED FORCES

General Karl Maria Von Clausewitz argued that the "subordination of the political point of view to the military would be unreasonable, for policy has created the war, it is the intelligent faculty, war only the instrument and not the reverse. The subordination of the military point of view to the political is, therefore, the only thing which is possible."²² He wrote that "war is only a part of political intercourse, therefore by no means an independent thing in itself war originates

through the political intercourse of governments and nations". War can never be separated from political intercourse. He explained that wars are only the expression or manifestations of policy itself. War is to be regarded as an organic whole from which the single parts can not be separated. The whole is called the policy. War is an instrument of policy. Clausewitz opined that the armed forces are created by states and argued for leaving to political leaders the key decisions regarding the use of power and force.²³ C.E. Welch commented : "The armed forces were to stand behind civilian authorities, leaving governance to them. Soldiers would obey; they would accept civilian supremacy, while providing the coercive support necessary for internal and external preservation of the government."²⁴

Marxists also denied the supremacy of military power over the civilian authority. Lenin said "war is the continuation of politics by other (i.e. nonforcible) means"²⁵ He also opined that "Marxists have always considered this axiom as the theoretical foundation of the meaning of every war."²⁶ Lenin's ideas would bring him near to the particular ideas of Van• Clausewitz. Mao Tse Tung stated, " Every Communist grasp the truth that political power grows out of barrel of the gun. Our principle is

that party controls the gun and the gun must never allowed to control the party²⁷ The Marxists social scientists are critical of the role of the standing army in the nation-building process of the developing countries.

- They emphasized more on the role of the Communist Party than on the bourgeois army. The bourgeois army always serves the interest of their own class. Marx in his work "Civil War in France" summed up the experience of the Paris Commune and pointed out that the first decree of the Commune was the liquidation of the standing army and its replacement with the armed people²⁸ Lenin was also of the opinion that the armed should merge in one with army people. According to him. "The Homeland belongs to the entire people, therefore, it must be defend by the entire people. The army is only part of the armed people. Only the army which is led by a communist party, which emerges from the people which is trained, keeps vigilant guard and lives with people, which remains loyal to the people, becomes strong and invincible. There is no army which is stronger than the people armed and military trained, and there is no weapon which is more powerful than the popular war in the fire of which any aggressor is consumed and destroyed²⁹

Trotsky argued that the question of submerging army with the people can be possible only after the interest of the working classes had become permanent. The abolition of the standing army is possible in the proletarian state. According to him, " War bases itself on army sciences, but war itself is no science -- its is a practical art, a skill ... a savage and a bloody art"³⁰

French army was a symbol of unity. It is said that the military was a source of human pride and French integrity. The Red Army of USSR under Lenin and Stalin and the Peoples Army of China under Mao Tse Tung were different types than that of the Western European Army. In these countries politics controls the professional officers. The armed forces of these countries is regarded as the professional revolutionary army. According to Amos Perlmutter and V.P. Beniet. "The professional revolutionary soldier is neither a bureaucratic agent of the regime (as is the professional soldier) nor is he the menacing praetorian guard, he is rather an independent and coequal part of the government"³¹

There are two groups of analysts regarding the role of the armed forces in a state. One looks at the military as an organization, and the other as a class. L.W.Pye, S.P. Huntington, Morris Janowitz, Edward

Shils and Guy Pauker belong to the former camp, and Lenin, Stalin, Mao Tse Tung and other Marxists belong to the latter camp. The former group sees the military institution as an agent of modernization. They do not wholeheartedly support the classical theory of subordination of the armed forces to political authority. They look at military as a part of the middle class. The army is middle class because it stands between landed property on the one hand, and the laboring class on the other. Samuel P. Huntington has offered an extensive critique of this reliance on formal organizational properties in the analysis of the military's role in the modernization process. In his 'Political Order in Changing Societies,'⁷ he argues that the social and political condition of a society will determine the role played by the military, not the army's organizational characteristics. Thus, military intervention will in some societies be conservative toward modernization, and in other societies its impact will be "Progressive." The factor that determines which of the two patterns military rule will take is, according to Huntington, the state of the political participation in a polity at a given time. "As society changes, so does the role of the military. In the world of oligarchy, the soldier is a radical; in the middle-class world he is a participant and arbiter, as the

mass society looms on the horizon he becomes the conservative guardian of the existing order.... The extent to which a politicized officer corps plays a conservative or a reform role in politics is a function of the expansion of political participation in the society"³² Armies are said to be a modernizing force, cohesive institutions and disciplined agency in the developing countries. But sometimes they have been seen as an obstacle to social and political change because of their origins in the rural reinter classes or the urban grand bourgeoisie and because of their conservative political philosophy.

It has been said that the military in new nations has a higher degree of national' consciousness than most other elite's, including the politicians and this may be a factor which pulls it into politics rather than keeping it out. L.W. Pye. and Guy pauker contend that in the new states the military organization represents the most effective public institution available for leading the modernizing effort. They view's the military as a harbinger of progress.³³ R.M. Price also shares the ideas of L.W. Pye. He opines that the military in developing countries is an ideologically and structurally cohesive organization capable of high levels of internal discipline and serving as a repository of technological and managerial

skill, whose members share a professional belief-system combining the elements of secular rationality, puritanical asceticism, patriotic nationalism, dedication of public service, and an orientation toward the goal of modernization.³⁴ Analyzing African politics E.W. Lefever came to the conclusion that the military has been playing an important role in the national- building process of these countries. He asserts:

"African armies tend to be the most detribalized, westernized, modernized, integrated, and cohesive institutions in their respective states. The army is usually the most disciplined agency in the state. It often enjoys a greater sense of national dignity than other institutions. In technical skills, including the capacity to coerce and to communicate, the army is the most effective agency in the country ... A more vivid symbol of sovereignty than the flag, the constitution, or the parliament, the army often evokes more popular sentiment than a political leader."³⁵

The fact remains that military has played an important role in the nation-building process of developing areas till the breakdown of the Soviet Union. But after the collapse of the Soviet Union, bio-polar world became unipolar system. The entire political scenario of developing areas has changed rapidly. Recently United states of America shows less

interest in militarization process in developing areas, rather they tend to establish democratic institution toward capitalist development. Militarization is a characteristics of the political systems which is itselfs embedded in a still more complex world economic systems determined by the imperatives of global capitalist accumulation. So among the peripheral capitalist states of Asia, Africa and Latin America, militarization was the norm rather than the exception. In developing countries, the material foundation the military bureaucratic oligarchy and the old bourgeoisie was and still is intricately interdependent and correlated with the metropolitan structures shaped by economic conditions and colonial traditions.

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CHAPTER-TWO

MODE OF PRODUCTION AND CLASS CONFLICTS IN BANGLADESH SOCIETY

Bangladesh is a country of 130 million people with an area of 55 thousand square miles, surrounded by Indian territory on three sides (east, north and west). There is also a small boundary with Burma on the southeast. In the south lies the Bay of Bengal. It is a homogenous country. Over 98 per cent of the population are ethnically Bengali, and about 85 per cent belong to the same religion, Islam. The religious minority groups, such as the Hindus, Buddhists and Christians, who constitute 13.5 per cent, and 0.13 percent respectively of the total population, are scattered throughout the country claiming no separate identity or special status in the political system¹. Chittagong Hill Tracts is the exceptional case. The economy of Bangladesh is agrarian i.e., peasants based economy, where feudal landlords play a dominant role in politics. But there has been a changing trend in the economy of Bangladesh. The aim of this chapter is to discuss the changing patterns of Bangladesh economy.

Bangladesh under British Rule and Pakistan Rule

During the reign of the Moghul, Bengal was regarded as " the Paradise of India"² It was the richest province in the Moghul Empire, For this reason, the Dutch, the Portuguese, and the British chose Bengal as their principal trading center. Bengal became under the control of the British East India Company in 1757 when Nawab Sirajuddowla was defeated in the battle of plassey. After assuming state power in Bengal, the British make an attempt to bring a change in the field of principal means of production (land) by introducing the permanent settlement Act in 1793. It radically transformed the relations of production in Bengal.³ The permanent settlement made a far-reaching impact on Indian socio-economic sector. By dint of this Act Zaminders became the permanent owner of land. It evolved a new social structure in Bengal. This law totally changed the Moghuls introduced land owner system in India as well as Bengal. During the period of Moghul land belonged to the state or to the emperor. Commenting on Moghul's land system Francis Bernier says," In Hindustan every acre of land is considered the property of the king, and the spoliation of a peasant would be a robbery committed upon of the king's domain"⁴ Moghul's state was autocratic-bureaucratic in

nature. Like European landlordism, there was no strong feudal class in India during this time. Gun, not politics, was the main weapon to the emperor to control state power. As a result, emperor was the commander-in-chief of the armed forces. Besides this, the character of the Indian feudalism was different from that of the European feudalism. European feudalism laid its foundation on big landlord while in India a peculiar type of state patronized feudalism was developed under Moghul emperors.

However, the main aim of the permanent settlement was to create a new privilege class and to hinder industrial development in India. Lord Cornwallis letter to the Directors of the East India Company gave vivid description of this argument. He write:

"As soon as the ownership in land is declared permanent, the vast surplus in the lands of the natives will be used in purchasing lands instead of being invested in industries.⁵

Through the introduction of the permanent settlement in India, the British successfully established a feudalistic society in India. It is interesting to note that the British were bourgeoisie in their own land, but in Bengal and other parts of India they became the patronizer of

feudalism-the anti-thesis of capitalism.⁶ Commenting on permanent settlement. Marx wrote:

" In Bengal they created a caricature of large scale English landed states, in south eastern India a caricature of small parcelled property, in the north west they did all they could to transform the Indian economic community with common ownership of the soil in to a caricature of itself⁷.

By the side of formation of a new class i.e. the Zamindar, the British developed a middle class in India by introducing Tenancy Act of 1885 that recognized the ownership rights of ryots on land. This middle class played a prominent role in the politics of Bengal. To enrich the middle class and to abolish the Zamindari system the Krishak Praza Party (KPP) led by A.K. Fazlul Haque raised the slogan " Land to the tillers" in the provincial elections of 1937. The results of the Bengal provincial elections brought the K.P.P. in power in 1937 in the form of Muslim league (ML) dominated coalition government. The opposing attitude of the Muslim league cabinet members-representative of the Zamindari class, and well -to-do families-prevented A.K. Fazlul Haque to abolish Zamindari system completely.⁸

Pakistan came into existence in August 1947. The uneven development of Hindu and Muslim bourgeoisie contributed to the creation of Pakistan from undivided British India. East Bengal became the part of Pakistan. As I have earlier mentioned that the Bengal peasant society was dominated by the Hindu landlords and money-lenders. The business and industrial sectors were controlled by the Marwaris and the Hindu industrialist and traders. After partitions, they migrated to India. The ruling class of Pakistan abolished the Zamindari system of East Bengal in 1953. This was possible due to the migration of the Hindu Zamindars to India, but not for the progressive character of the Muslim league. The Muslim Bengali middle class had neither the funds nor the experience needed to fill the breach left by the departure of the Hindu Bengali. This Bengalis were satisfied to fill the vacuum created by the out-going Bengali Hindus from the lower and middle strata of administrative and economic activities.⁹ The abolition of the Zamindari system formed a new agrarian social structure in East Bengal with following classes, viz.; (1) Landlords commonly known as jotedars; (2) middle peasants that stands in between the Zamindars and the sharecroppers; (3) share-cropper; (4) and the Kamra day labors¹⁰. The

latter group possesses revolutionary character. They have nothing to lose but the kachi in their hands. In China, Mao Tse Tung characterized this group as revolutionary class. According to him, to reject the poor peasant is to reject the revolution, to neglect them is to neglect the revolution!¹⁶

In Bengal the ML faced an organizational set back in 1949 when the peasant leader Maulana Bhasani formed Awami Muslim League. From its very inception the Communist Party of Pakistan (CPP) started working through the Awami league (AL).¹⁷ This progressive section of the AL played a vital role in the language movement of 1952. It is to be noted here that the language movement of 1952 was progressive in nature but failed to develop class consciousness among the working classes i.e. workers and peasants. Because this movement was spearheaded for the interest of the Bengali bourgeoisie, petty-bourgeoisie, and the intellectual. This movement did not bring any benefit for the working classes in Bengal. Rather this type of movement created class collaborationist politics which factionalized the working classes. The basic forment of the Pakistan movement was religious sentiment while the linguistic fabric played an important role in Bangladesh movement. However, the petty bourgeoisie failed to accommodate themselves in the

format of power. As a result, the AL witnessed its first split in 1957 when it was in power. Assuming the post of Prime Minister in Pakistan, S.H. Suhrawardy pursued a pro-western foreign policy and discarded the demand for "full provincial autonomy" for East Pakistan (Bangladesh).¹²

The AL chief Maulana Bhasani did not agree with the policy of the Prime Minister. On this ground, Maulana Bhasani left the Awami league and formed the National Awami Party (NAP) in 1957 with the progressive forces. The NAP was formed at a time when there was no bridge between the Communists of East and West Pakistan. So the coming of the NAP was the water mark for the Communist Party. But ironically the NAP was not basically equipped with class struggle. It was far from becoming a Party of the Proletariat. Rashiduzzaman said, "The NAP did not originate with Marxist ideology. Maulana Bhasani, the NAP leader, was never a Marxist although his ideas would bring him near to that particular camp."¹⁴ There is no denying the fact that the NAP was a sort of banian tree under which shadow various kinds of politicians took shelter.

In 1962 the International Communist Movement was divided into two separate camps. The division of the International Communist Movement split the NAP and Communist Party of Pakistan. In 1966 the CPP became divided into "Pro-Peking" and "Pro-Moscow" factions. The Pro-Moscow faction led by Moni Singh argued that socialism should be established through a parliamentary process, while the Pro-Peking factions led by Mohammed Toaha and Sukendu Dastidar advocated class struggle for bringing about socialism.¹⁵ By the end of 1967, the NAP itself also was divided into Pro-Moscow faction and Pro-Peking faction. The Pro-Moscow wing of the NAP was led by Wali Khan and the Pro-Peking factions was led by Maulana Bhasani. The next split of the NAP (B) came about in 1970 when the Yahya Khan regime announced the date of an election. The Pro-Peking Communist Party split on the question of mode of production and tactics of guerrilla warfare. The EPCP (M-L) led by Huq, Toaha and Sukendu Dastidar argued that Pakistan was a semi-feudal and semi-colonial country. The main contradiction was between the people of East Pakistan and imperialism on the one hand and bureaucratic comprador capitalism and feudalism on the other hand.¹⁶ The EBCP (M-L) theoreticians argued that Pakistan was bourgeoisie

state with a capitalist economy. The establishment of Pakistan was itself only a bourgeois revolution.¹⁷ The theoreticians of the Co-ordination Committee of the Communist Revolutionaries (CCCR) opined that Pakistan was a semi-feudal, semi-colonial and semi-capitalist country; that the main contradiction was between the landlords and lower class peasants on the one hand and feudalism on the other.¹⁸ The East Bengal workers Movements (EBWM) declared East Bengal as colony of Pakistan and determined principal contradiction between the people of East Bengal and the ruling class of Pakistan!¹⁹

The Petty-bourgeoisie represented Awami League was unable to compete with the more advanced bourgeoisie of west Pakistan. As a result, the AL led by Sheikh Mujibur Rahaman put forward six-point program in 1966 that articulated the grievances of the various classes of East Pakistan. The first Point called for the establishment of federation on the basis of the Lahore Resolution and a Parliamentary form of government, with supremacy of legislature to be directly elected on the basis of adult franchise. The second point demanded that the federal government deal with only two subjects- defense and foreign affairs and that all other subjects "rest in the federating states." The third point

demanded that there shall be either two separate but freely convertible currencies for the two regions. The fourth point denied the center the right of taxation. The fifth point called for the setting up of separate foreign exchange accounts for East and West Pakistan. The six point demanded the setting up of a militia or a paramilitary force for East Pakistan.

The six-point program of the AL was middle class movement. It represented the middle class interest. The six-point movement received enormous support from every segment of life. It was projected as the “Magna Carta” to the Bengalis. Though Six-point movement was short-lived it radicalized the youth of East Pakistan.²¹ The upheaval of 1969 popularized the six-point program of the AL and helped lay down its foundation at the grass-root level. The 1969 upheaval was the dressrehearsal of the liberation war of Bangladesh as the 1905 revolution was the dressrehearsal of the October Revolution of Russia.

The Bengali nationalist movement drew its strength from the rich peasantry with that of the urban petty-bourgeoisie. Bengali petty-bourgeoisie always had close connection with economically powerful class in the countryside. These resulted in the two traditions in the

Bengali movement (i) a Petti-bourgeoisie elitist tradition and (ii) a rural populist tradition.²² This dominant coalition of the Bangladesh state at the movement of independence in 1971, is not the dominance of a single class, but by class plurality. The state reflected a complicated balance between the metropolitan bourgeoisie, the small indigenous bourgeoisie, the dominant petti-bourgeoisie and the rich peasantry²³ Fact remains that in the mid 50's the AL led by S.H Suharwardy opposed the provincial autonomy for East Pakistan, but in 1971 they led the liberation war under the leadership of Sheikh Mujibour Rahaman. Lack of well-organized Communist Party the class question became subordinate to national question in 1971.

MODE OF PRODUCTION AND CLASS CONTRADICTIONS IN BANGLADESH

Social contradiction of a country can be understood through the theory of mode of production. Marx in his Capital stated that the transition from feudalism to capitalism was accomplished according to two different models either the producer becoming merchant (the "really revolutionary way"), or the merchant becomes a producer, is not the way

of the total real transition.²⁴ Transition from feudalism to capitalism is the way of western European development. Asiatic mode of production was completely different from that of western-European one. The main characteristics of the Asiatic mode of production are: (a) The absence of private ownership ; (b) despotism as a political system; and (c) domination of the non-economic forces.²⁵ Marxists recognized the progressive role of the bourgeoisie in a certain stage but not all the stages. Basically this progressive role was based on the ideas of 'progress' that Marx took from Hegel.²⁶ The theories of 'dependency' 'unequal exchanges' and 'world system' can all be treated as neo-Marxist in methods, while the theory of the mode of production, the means of its articulation is closer to the Marxist notion of underdevelopment.²⁷ In Dependency theory commerce is regarded as the main unit of analysis, but not exploitation of the labor force in the field of production.

There is a controversy about the mode of production in Bangladesh among the Marxists. The AL, a party of the petty-bourgeoisie, came to power in independent Bangladesh in December 1971. Assuming the state power the AL regime adopted socialist program in the economic system of Bangladesh. For this purpose the AL

nationalized heavy industries, banking sectors and insurance companies. The imperatives of the liberation war forced the political leadership to nationalize industrial sector. In agricultural sector two decisions were taken in 1972. One was to fix ceiling of 100 bighas landholdings for per family, and the other was to exempt land holding of less than twenty-five bighas from taxation. But the irony is that the AL could not implemented the ceiling of 100 bighas landholdings due to the petty- bourgeoisie class character of the regime. Beside this, there were groupings within the AL on the question of economic system. One group led by Tajuddin Ahamed advocated for socialist system, whereas khandoker Mustaque Ahmed and Syed Nazrul Islam were in favor of mixed economic system.²⁸ To satisfy the socialist group Mujib fixed a ceiling of Taka 2.5 million on private investment. But when the situation deteriorated Sheikh Mujib tilted the balance in favor of the capitalist group and modified its socialist program and raised Taka 2.5 million to Taka 30 million on domestic investment in 1974. The AL Government also declared a tax holiday for seven years.²⁹ But none of the indigenous as well as international capitalist came forward to invest money in Bangladesh for the fear of nationalization policy. It is to be noted here that the regime's agricultural policy also did

not bring any benefit for the poor and the landless peasants. Rather it served the interest of the landed class.

The interest of the rural landed classes, being authoritarian and representing the vested interest groups, dominated the rural power structure and maintained control over the peasantry. The strength of the rural landed classes was successfully manifested in thwarting land reform that would have involved lowering land ceilings to 33 acres and withholdings progressive land taxation on holdings above 8 acres. The political leadership of the Awami League was rural oriented. Not only Sheikh Mujib was of rural origins, but most of the Awami league leaders too were descendants of farmers and landlords. Unlike the political leadership, the bureaucrats and the business executive of the state had strong urban social origins. A small scale survey revealed that only 32 percent of the civil servants were of urban origin.³⁰ The Mujib regime viewed their policies as a transitional stage toward socialist society in Bangladesh. In a true sense, we can say that Mujib's Bangladesh was neither a socialist nor a capitalist. It was a mixture of the two.

During this time almost all the Marxists parties came to the conclusion that Bangladesh is a semi-colonial country. But a small faction

opined different views. The Sammbadi Dal (M-L) led by Toaha argued that Bangladesh was new colonial country of "Soviet Social imperialism" through the medium of expansionist India. So the principal contradiction was between the people of Bangladesh and India-Soviet axis. The East Pakistan Communist Party (EPCP) led by Abdul Huq argued that Soviet Social imperialism dismembered Pakistan through the help of Indian expansionism and established a social colony in East Pakistan. So the Principal contradiction in East Pakistan was between the people and social imperialism. The Jatio Samajtantrik Dal (JSD) only Party that characterized Bangladesh as a capitalist country. They came to this conclusion on the basis of three features of the Bangladesh economy. These are: (a) growing number of landless peasants who are joining the poor agricultural wage labors (b) extent of market and (c) the use of modern inputs like chemical fertilizer mechanical irrigation etc.³¹ They identified the principal contradiction between the elite of the Awami League and the masses. The Purbo Bangler Sarbohara Party (PBSP) termed the Awami League Government as a Puppet government of India and determined the principal contradiction between the people of East Bengal and the Indian expansionism.

After the death of Sheikh Mujibur Rahman, both the government of Ziaur Rahman and H.M Ershad tilted the balance to the capitalist countries instead of the socialistic bloc in making diplomatic as well as trade relations. During this time donor countries came forward to invest capital in Bangladesh. The state under Zia extended support to the rural rich with a view to creating a condition whereby the rich peasantry would provide support to the indigenous bourgeoisie. The state's policy integrated the rich peasantry since they play a key role in establishing links between the state at the national level and the local level power structures in rural areas which it dominates. The state under H.M. Ershad also followed the policy of Zia. During this period state created an industrial class without industry. Industrial loans were given to a limited number of families and rural economy was controlled by 5000 families. The landlords were the privileged class. They were given licenses and permits because of their relationship with the urban elite. This led to a contradiction between the various social forces in Bangladesh.

Under this circumstance, the PBSP declared Bangladesh as a new colony of US imperialism and determined the principal contradiction between the people of East Bengal and imperialism led by the USA.³² A

small faction of the Sammobadi Dal led by Mahafuz Bhuyain expressed more or less similar views and declared Bangladesh as a neocolonial country. The Bangladesh Communist Party (M-L) led by Badruddin Umar and Dr. Syfuddahar disagreed with them and argued that the character of agrarian economy of Bangladesh is backward capitalism rather than semi-feudalism. While most of the Marxist Parties characterized Bangladesh as a semi-feudal and semi-colonial and determined the principal contradiction between the poor peasants and feudalism, Bangladesh Mozdur Party led by Abul Basher identified the principal contradiction between the working people and bureaucratic comprador capitalism.³³

My views are different from that of the traditional Marxists regarding the mode of production in Bangladesh. Although Bangladesh is a homogeneous country, but there is no denying the fact that different parts of Bangladesh economy show different characteristics. Uneven economic development in different parts of Bangladesh characterized it as neo-capitalist and semi-feudal country. The penetration by the international finance capital into the industrial as well as agricultural sector of Bangladesh has turned it into a neo-capitalist country. Present Government's economic policy has encouraged the capitalists of the

donor countries as well as the indigenous bourgeoisie to invest money in industrial sector. Recently a section of the service holders in urban areas has entered into the share market business due to low rate of interest in Banking sector. This policy will accelerate industrial capital and will turn peasants into workers. The penetration of finance capital has also developed the communication system in rural areas. As a result of this, large section of the peasants has turned into Rickshaw pullers, Van pullers and Baby taxi drivers. They are politically conscious and possess bargaining capacity to materialize their demands. More over, modern electronics media viz; radio, television etc. have increased the consciousness of the workers and peasants and helped broken the traditional values of the society. The introduction of the neo-capitalistic program of Green revolution has changed the agricultural sector. In some selected areas like Comilla, Jessore and Savar in Dhaka where it was experimented, feudal relations were basically transformed and agricultural production took predominantly a capitalist form. The effects of this Green revolution have been quite uneven in different areas. So the implementation of green revolution in the agricultural sector has changed the old feudal class relations and technique of peasant movements in the

above mentioned areas. In these areas peasant movements are led by the newly emerging capitalist farmers who are pressurizing policy makers to make policy favorable to them for equality with industrial products. They are forced to sell their products at fixed price while they have to purchase agricultural inputs and other necessities at market price. Together with the emergence of a new class of capitalist farmer, big sections of poor and landless peasants have been transformed into agricultural laborers who have waged a series of struggle for higher wages. In areas where feudal exploitation still dominates, militant movements of peasants have continued. The emerging agricultural bourgeoisie of capitalist farmers and the agricultural laborers are new classes in the Bangladesh socio-economic formation. They are the products of the neo-capitalist economy of Bangladesh. Their immediate targets is the government and the bureaucratic bourgeoisie who control the imperialist policies. So on the basis of above analysis we can determined four major contradictions in Bangladesh. These are (1) between the people of Bangladesh and imperialism led by the U.S.A. (2) between the bourgeoisie and the workers of Bangladesh; (3) Between the landlords and landless peasants (4) between the people of Bangladesh and Indian expansionism. Among these four, the first one is

principal contradiction. Semi-feudalism existed as a principal phenomena, despite the capitalist trend in the economy of Bangladesh. The private ownership (of the feudal lords) and possession of the means production characterize the feudal mode of production. The development of the productive forces within new relations of production and the growth of consciousness may lead to the establishment of a strong and antagonistic countervailing power.

Footnotes :

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 22. Monzurul Mannan, op.cit. pp.390.-403.
 23. Monzurul Mannnan, op.cit., pp.390-401.
 24. Karl Marx, Capital, Vol. III, BIGZ, Beograd, 1971, p. 1175.

See also Miomir Jaksic, The Theory of Modes of Production and Changes in International Economic Relations, Journal of Contemporary Asia, Vol. 15, No. 3. pp. 361-374.

25. Moimir Jaksic, op.cit., p.371.
26. Moimir Jaksic, op.cit., p.361-374
27. M. Jaksic, " Theory of Modes of Production and Socio- Economic Development of Developing Countries", Sociolism in the World, No.15.
28. Manzurul Mannan, op.cit., pp.390-406.
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30. Manzurul Mannan, op.cit., pp.390-406.
31. See, The Lal Jhanda (An organ of the East Bengal Sarbohara Party), No. 2, October 1988
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CHAPTER-THREE

HISTORICAL BACKGROUND OF THE BANGLADESH

ARMED FORCES

Like the South Asian conventional army; Bangladesh inherited her armed forces from the British Indian Army through the post colonial Pakistan state. The liberation war of 1971 made a tremendous impact on the armed forces of Bangladesh. During the period of liberation war, a section of the army was influenced by the Maoist ideology and its guerrilla warfare strategy. This section wanted to form "production oriented army" on the model of the Chinese People's Army instead of the conventional army. This chapter deals with the origin, development, and the radicalization process of the Bangladesh armed forces.

The origin of the Bangladesh armed forces go back to the advent of the British rule in India. After the defeat of Sirajuddowla at the battle of Palassey in 1757, the British East Indian Company successfully

recruited soldiers from Bengal. With the help of the native forces the British were able to penetrate mercantile capital in India. When the British Government took over direct rule, the East India Company's army became the Indian army. Thus the native armed forces commanded by the foreigners became the instrument of the British. At the early stage Bengal was fertile land to the British for recruiting soldiers. But after the sepoys' mutiny of 1857 the British imposed embargo on the Bengalis to become soldiers in the British armed forces as they revolted against the British in mutiny. During this time the British created a myth of martial races in India. The Punjabis, Dogras, Jats and the Gurkhas from Nepal were given the status of martial races. The fact remains that these races served the interest of the British in the famous sepoy mutiny of 1857 by betraying the native causes. The Bengalis were deprived from this privileges until 1910 as they revolted against the British in the mutiny of 1857. The Indian statutory commission of 1930, gave vivid description of this discrimination policy. The Indian statutory commission reported: "Bengal with a population of 45 millions, provided 7,00 combatant recruits; the Punjab

with a population of 20 millions provided 349,000 such recruits. The Punjab and the United provinces between them provided three-fourths of the total number of combatant recruits raised throughout India.² The British also adopted the policy of "divide and rule" on the question of deployment strategy. The deployment strategy was based on the following dictum: "keep your Sikh regiments in the Punjab, and they will be ready to act against the Hindoos, keep your Hindoos out of the Punjab and they will be ready to act against the Sikhs."³ The British officers occupied the commanding positions in the British Indian Army.

THE PAKISTAN ARMY

Pakistan came into existence on 14 August 1947. Pakistan was officially an Islamic state. As a result of its Islamic character almost all the Muslim members of the British Indian army joined the Pakistan. This conservative and anti-national military became the armed protector of the post-colonial state. From its very inception the United States of America became the main suppliers of sophisticated arms and weapons. When Pakistan became the member of the SEATO and

CENTO, the US gave Pakistan extra facilities providing it with military and economic assistance. The US imperialist formed the SEATO and CENTO to resist communism but not to stop Indian expansionism. By 1969 Pakistan had received upto \$ 2,000 mn, in American military assistance and # 3000 mn in American economic aid. Lack of well organized Political Party and strong leadership, the military in collaboration with the civil bureaucracy took over state power in 1958. The U.S. military assistance converted the Pakistan army into the dominant political forces and chief defender of the propertied classes in the country. Like the British Indian Army, most of the Pakistan Army officers came from the landed aristocratic families with English medium educational background.

In 1947 there was not a single Bengali regiment or cantonment in Bengal. In 1964 there were four Bengali regiments in East Bengal whereas in west Pakistan the number was five times more than that of East Bengal. There was a big disparity in the field of soldiers recruitment policy between East and West Pakistan. In 1971 the total

strength of the Pakistan army was 4,12,000. Among them 60% were form Punjabis 35% from Pathanis and the rest 5% were form Bengal and other regions.⁵ Stephen Cohen rightly pointed out that " The history of the Pakistan army was the history of the Punjabi Muslims and the army"⁶ Pakistan Government adopted a policy of discrimination regarding recruitment, training, pay, promotion and other facilities in the army. The following distribution of the armed forces between East and West Pakistan gave a vivid description of this analysis.

// Table 1: East & West Pakistan's representation in the Armed forces in 1964.

East Pakistan	East Pakistan	West Pakistan
<u>The Army</u>	Authorized percent	Authorized percent
1. Officers	5.00	95.00
2. Junior Commissioned Ranks	7.4	92.6
3. Other Ranks	7.4	92.6
<u>The Air Force</u>		
1. Officers	// 16.00	84.00
2. Warrant Officers	// 17.00	83.00
3. Other Ranks	// 30.00	70.00
<u>The Navy</u>		
1. Officers	// 10.00	90.00
2. Branch Officers	5.00	95.00
3. Chief Petty Officers	1.04	89.6
4. Petty Officers	17.3	82.7
5. Leading seaman and below	28.8	71.2

Source : Golam Hossain, Civil Military Relations in Bangladesh : A comparative study (Dhaka: Academic Publishers, 1991) P. 34.

The disparity which started from the very beginning of Pakistan existed till the last days of United Pakistan. The outbreak of this disparity was the upheaval of 1969 that led to the fall of the Ayub Khan and turned to a new military administration of General Yahya Khan. After coming to power Yahya Khan announced the date of general elections of Pakistan. Elections were held in December 1970. The Awami League (AL) headed by Sheik Mujibur Rahman won an overwhelming victory in East Pakistan and the Pakistan Peoples party (PPP) led by Z.A. Bhutto bagged 81 seats out of 138 seats in West Pakistan.⁷ Infact, the election results of 1970 heralded the death of United Pakistan. The election results sharpen the conflict of East and West Pakistan. As a result, Yahya Khan, Bhutto and Sheik Mujib failed to determine the fate of unlucky Pakistan through constitutional way.⁸

THE LIBERATION WAR AND THE RADICALIZATION OF THE ARMED FORCES IN BANGLADESH.

On March 25, 1971, East Pakistan's Political situation became turmoil. At mid night on 25 March, the Pakistan army launched an attack on the innocent people of East Pakistan as well as the EBR, EPR and

Police to disarm the Bengali Units of the armed forces. But bullets could not silence the voice of the millions. The Awami League chief Sheik Mujibur Rahman himself was arrested and large number of leaders fled to India. As a result, Major Ziaur Rahman first declared the independence of Bangladesh over the Chittagong Radio Station that created misunderstanding among the politicians and the enlightent people of East Bengal. To avoid this misunderstanding Ziaur Rahman slightly altered his earlier speech and on 27 March, 1971, declared :

"I major Zia, provisional commander-in-chief of the Bangladesh liberation Army, hereby proclaim on behalf of Sheik Mujibur Rahman, the independence of Bangladesh.

I also declare, we have already formed a sovereign, legal government under Sheik Mujibur Rahman which pledges to function as per law and the constitution. The new democratic government is committed to a policy of non-alignment in international relations. It will seek friendship with all nations and strive for international peace. I appeal to all governments to mobilize public opinion in their respective countries against the brutal genocide in Bangladesh.

The government under Sheik Mujibur Rahman is the sovereign legal government of Bangladesh and is entitled to recognition from all democratic nations of the world"⁹/

The Pakistan army faced the first resistance from the EBR, EPR and Police. People from all walks of life came forward to help the regular forces in the army and police. In this stage they fought against the Pakistan army in conventional way. About one third of the officers and men of the EBR, EPR, and Police were killed during this resistance movement. The Bengali rebellion officers formed the Mukti Bahini in early April 1971, with M.A.G Osmani, a retired East Pakistan military officer, as the Commander-in- Chief. On April 17, Bangladesh Government was formed in exile with Sheik Mujibur Rahman and Tajuddin Ahmad as the president and prime minister respectively. The Government-in-exile approved the formation of the Mukti Bahini and recognized its appointment of General M.A.G Osmani as C-in-C. Their function was to organize all the trained Bengali military personnel into conventional units which would operate from bases in India. The high command of the Mukti Bahini divided Bangladesh into four sectors viz;

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Chittangong, Comilla, Sylhet and Kusthia with Major Ziaur Rahman, Major Khaled Mosharraf, Major Shafiullah and Major Osman Chowdhury as sector Commanders respectively. In July the four Sectors were reorganized into 11 sectors on the basis of the "Teliapara Strategy" with the following officers in command.

Table 2: Sectors, Sector Commanders and number of Soldiers

Sector : 1: Chittagong, Chittagong Hill Tracts and Feni : Major Ziaur

Rahman, BU upto the June 1971 and then Major Rafiqul Islam, BU Army (a) Sector Forces 2100 (Twenty one hundred) (b) Guerrilla forces 20000 (Twenty thousand)

Head Quarter: Harina

Sector 2 : Noakhali, Parts of Comilla, Sylhet and Dhaka District :

Major Khalid Mosharraf, BU upto September and then Major A. T. M. Haider, BU Army : (a) Sector Forces 4000 (Four thousand)

(b) Guerrilla Forces 30,000 (Thirty thousand)

Head Quarter : Melachar.

Sector 3 : Parts of Comilla, Nabigong of Sylhet and parts of Dhaka and Kishoregong: Major K. M Shafiullah, BU, upto May and then Major A.N.M. Nuruzzaman, BU.

Head Quarter: Montola
Sector 4 : Eastern part of Sylhet : Major C.R Dutta, BU.

- Army : (a) Sector Forces 3000 (Three thousand)
(b) Guerrilla Forces 8000 (Eight thousand)

Head Quarter : Khoyai.

Sector 5 : Western part of Sylhet : Major Mir Shawkat Ali. BU.

- Army : (a) Sector forces 800 (Eight hundred)
(b) Guerrilla forces 7,000 (Seven hundred)

Head Quarter : Shilong.

// **Sector 6 :** Rangpur and Thakurgaon of Dinajpur : Wing Commander M.K. Bashar. BU

- Army : (a) Sector Forces 1200 (Twelve hundred)
(b) Guerrilla Forces 6000 (Six thousand)

Head Quarters: Tuka
Sector 7 : Western part of Dinajpur, Rajshahi, Pubna and Bogra:

Major Kazi Nuruzzamn, BU

- Army : (a) Sector Forces 2000 (Two thousand)

(b) Guerrilla Forces 2000 (Two thousand)

Head Quarter : Temporary

// **Sector 8** : Kushtia, Jessore, Parts of Faridpur and Khulna.

Major Abu Osman Chowdhury upto August and then

Major M.A Manzur, BU

Army : (a) Sector Forces 2000 (Two thousand)

(b) Guerrilla Forces 7000 (Seven thousand)

Head Quarter : Temporary.

Sector 9 : Southern parts of Khulna, Barisal and Patuakhali :

Major M.A Jalil upto December and then Major Joinal

Abedin

Army : (a) Sector Forces 1500 (Fifteen hundred)

(b) Guerrilla Forces 12000 (Twelve thousand)

Head Quarter : Hasnabad

// **Sector 10** : Coastal areas and Water ways.

// **Sector 11** : Mymensingh and Tangail.

Major Abu Taher, BU, upto November and then Squadron leader M. Hamidullah, BP.

Army : (a) Sector Forces

(b) Guerrilla Forces 20,000 (Twenty thousand)

Head Quarter : Temporary.

Emajuddin Ahmed, Military Rule and the Myth of Democracy op.cit.p.44 ✓

With a view to implementing the 'Teliapara Strategy' M.A.G Osmani, the Commander -in-Chief of the Bangladesh armed forces, formed three independent Brigades to launch guerrilla warfare against the Pakistan army. These three brigades were titled according to the first letter of the three commanding Officers' viz; "Z" Force for Zia, 'S' Force for Shafiullah, and 'K' Force for Khaled Mosharraf. On 7 July 1974 'Z' force was consisted of the First, Third and Eight East Bengal with the following officers.

Table :3 Commanding Officers and deployed regiments of the 'Z' Force

- Z Force
- (1) Commander -Major Ziaur Rahman.
 - (2) B.M. -Captain Wali
 - (3) D.Q. -Captain Sadek Hossain
 - (4) Signal Officer - Captain Abdul Halim
 - (5) Armed Forces --

(a) First East Bengal Regiment

(1) Commander - Major Ziauddin

(2) Other officers:

Captains B.G. Patwari, Hafizuddin,

<p>Captains B.G. Patwari, Hafizuddin, Shalauddin, Momtaz, (Shahid), Mahbubur Rahman, Lts. Waker Khan, Abdul Mannan, Qaium Chowdhury, Noor, Mujibur Rahman Fakir (A.M.C.) and Ft. Lt. Liaquat Ali Khan</p>	<p>(b) Third East Bengal Regiment (1) Commander-Major Shafat Zamil (2) Other Officers: Captains Anwar Hossain, Mohsin, Akbar, Lts. Nurunnabi, Manzoor, Fazle Hossain and Ft. Lt. Ashraful Alam. The Commanding officer of the Eighth East Bengal was Major Aminul Haque. Other Officers were Captain: Khalikuzzaman Chowkhury, Lts. Modassher Hossain Khan, K.M. Abu Baker, Waliur Rahman, Imadul Haque, (Shahid) and Mojibur Rahman.</p>
	<p>(c) Second Mujib Bahini (Artillery) Commanding officers Captains Rashed Chowdhury, Rashid and Lts. Sajjad Ali. Zahir.</p>

Source : Smrity (Memory), An Organ of the Freedom Movement Project, vol, 2 1991.

'S'. Force was consisted of the Second and the Eleventh East Bengal regiments. It made a tremendous contribution in the liberation war.

Table 4: Commanding Officers and involved regiments of the 'S' Force.

'S' Force: Commander: ---Major Shafiullah

- 2. B.M. Captain Azizur Rahman
- 3. D.Q. Captain Abul Hossain
- 4. Armed Forces

<p>(a) Second East Bengal Regiment Commanding Officers Major Moinul Hossain Chowdhury. Other Officers Major Motiur Rahman, Captains Iraj Ahmed Chowdhury, Lts. Anisul Hasan, Golam Helal Murshed Khan, Ibrahim, Bodiuzzaman, Salim Quamrul Hasan, Abul Hossain (A.M.C), Nazrul Islam.</p>	<p>(b) Eleventh East Bengal Regiment. Commanding Officers Major A.S.M. Nasim (Upto 5 Sept.) Major Abdul Matin (6 Dec. to 16 December). Other Officers Major Subed Ali Bhuiyan, Lts. Nazrul Islam, Naser, Shamsul Huda Bacchu, Kabir, Moinul Hossain (AM.C), Abul Hossain.</p>
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Source: Smrity (Memory), An Organ of the Freedom Movement Project, Vol. 2, 1991.

K' -Force was consisted of the Ninth, Tenth and Fourth East Bengal regiments with the following officers.

Table 5: Commanding Officers and deployed regiments of the 'K' forces.

Forces:	1. Commander	Major Khaled Mosharaf
	2. D.M.	Major Salek Chowdhury
	3. D.Q.	
	4. Armed Force.	

<p>(a) Fourth East Bengal Regiment Commander Captain Abdul Gaffer Howlader. Other Officers Lts. Fazlul Kabir, Mahbubur Rahman, Jamaluddin Hasan, Hasan, Fazlur Rahman</p>	<p>(c) Tenth East Bengal Regiment (1) Commander Captain Zaffer Imman Other Officers Lts. Imamuzzam, Mizanur Rahman, Dider Ataur Hossain, Muklisur Rahman (c) Tenth East Bengal Regiment (i) Commander Captain Zaffer Imman other officers Lts Imamuzzaman (d) First Mujib Batt (Artillary) Commander Captains Abdul Aziz pasha, Anwarul Alam</p>
<p>(b) Ninth East Bengal Regiment (1) Major Deanodin: Commander Other officers Captain Ashraf Hossain, Lts. Harun-Ur-Rashid, Aziz, Shahriar Huda and Humaiyun Kabir.</p>	

Source: Smrity (Memory). An Organ of the Freedom Movement Project. Vol. 2, 1991.

The Bangladesh Air Force and the Navy which were formed on 28 September, and in November 1971 respectively also played a vital role in the liberation war. The Bahini was divided into two main groups viz; the Mukti Fouj and the guerrilla forces. The Mukti Fouj was consisted of the EBR, EPR, Police, Ansar and Mujaheeds, Whereas the guerrilla forces was composed of youths, students, peasants, workers and others. In addition to Mukti Bahini, there was Mujib Bahini led by Sheik Fazlul Haque Moni, Serajul Alam Khan, Abdur Razzak and Tofail Ahmed. Besides Mukti Bahini and Mujib Bahani, there were Quader Bahini, Afsar Bahini and Hameyet Bahini who played a vital role in the liberation war.¹⁰ Their political goal was to bring the AL to power through Indian Intervention with the help of the Soviet Union. Besides this, the pro-peking guerrilla forces also played a vital role in the liberation war.

ANTI-INDIAN GUERRILLA GROUPS

While a large number of the army supported Indian intervention to bring AL to power, a small group led by Major Taher and Major Ziauddin advocated for guerrilla warfare strategy with 'hit and run'

policy through which a modern well equipped Pakistan army could be defeated without Indian intervention. They also argued that all military headquarters should be based on Bangladesh soil instead of Indian territory. Their thinking brought them to the particular Maoist camps. Maoists saw the liberation war from different angle. During the liberation period East Pakistan Communist Party (M-L) led by Huq, Toaha and Sukhendu Dastidar came forward with the thesis that the conflict between Yahya and Bhutto on the one hand and Sheik Mujib and his lieutenants on the other, was a struggle between the "two boot-licking dogs of the American imperialists."¹¹ The EPCP (M-L), therefore, urged the people of East Bengal to fight against both these groups. They operated mainly in Noakhali Jessore and Kusthia districts.

The East Bengal Communist party (M-L) under the leadership of Matin, Alauddin, Deben Sikder and Abul Basher argued that Pakistan was a bourgeois state with a capitalist economy. The establishment of Pakistan was itself a bourgeois revolution.¹² They raised the slogan "Swadhin Jatio Gonotantrik Purbo Bangla (independent people's

Democratic East Bengal)." In order to materialize this objective they launched a "People's democratic revolution under the leadership of the Communist Party", i.e. the East Bengal Communist Party. During the period of liberation war' the EBCP (M-L) became divided into three groups. By mid-1971, Deben Sikder and Abul Basher took shelter in India and joined the " Bangladesh Jatio Mukti Sangram Sommonnoy Committee." At the end of the same year they separated themselves from the EBCP (M-L). A small section under the leadership of Ohidur Rahman formed the Attrai Communist Party and Participated in the liberation struggle. This group established a hold on several thanas of Rajshahi district.

✓ The Third group, led by Motin and Alauddin, saw the liberation war a fight between the two bourgeois dogs and adopted the line of killing all class enemies //from the Pakistan army through feudal landlords to the Mukti Bahini ✓ They blindly followed the line of the Indian Naxalite leader Charu Mazumder and raised the slogan," Chairman Mao is our Chairman, Charu Majumder is the leader of the EBCP (M-L)." The East Bengal Co-ordination Committee of

Communist Revolutionaries led by Kazi Zafar Ahmed, Haider Akbar Khan Rono and Rashed Khan Menon put forward a program for "Swadhin Purbo Bangla (Independent East Bengal) through a peasants revolution"¹³ During the period of liberation war Zafar, Rono and Memon had found shelter in India and joined the 'Bangladesh Jatio Mukti Sangram Sommonnoy Committee, patronized by Jyoti Basu, leader of the Communist Party of India(Marxist).

The East Bengal Workers Movement (EBWM) was the first organization that declared East Bengal as a colony of Pakistan and called for a national liberation struggle against Pakistani ruling class. They advocated a national democratic revolution through armed struggle under the leadership of the Communist Party, because in the epoch of 'imperialism' and 'social imperialism' the bourgeoisie has no right to lead the revolution. The EBMW also chalked out a program for establishing sovereign, Democratic Peaceful Neutral Progressive Republic of East Bengal, uprooting imperialism, Social imperialism, expansionism, feudalism and all kinds of exploitation.

The EBWM opened its guerrilla activities through wall writings at various places, quoting Maos famous dictum, " Power comes through the barrels of guns."¹⁴ During the period of liberation war, the EBWM mobilized its organizational strength at peara Bagan in Barisal district. Soon peara Bagan became a mini-battlefield. From this base, the EBWM launched a guerrilla war against the Pakistan army. On June 3, 1971, the EBWM was transformed into the Purba Bangla Sarbohara Party (PBSP) at the battlefield of peara Bagan.

By mid- August 1971, the freedom fighters close to the Awami league returned to Bangladesh equipped with sophisticated arms and weapons and the PBSP proposed to them that they fight jointly against Pakistan army. The Awami League rejected this proposal and started killing the Sarbohara Party guerrilla workers. As a result, direct conflict started between these two groups. In October 19971, the Sarbohara Party circulated a document that called the people of East Bengal to fight against the Awami League, India army and Pakistan army.¹⁵

Most of the Maoist Parties activities were localized and support was limited to a section of the intelligentsia. Except for a few pockets, they has no support among the industrial workers and poor peasants whose interests they claim to uphold. It is reported that Major Taher and Major Ziauddin at one-stage made a plan to merge their trained personnel with these Maoist elements and thus build an army of a type never seen before in South Asia.

In countries where the army played an active part in the Liberation war it has a tendency to intervene into the politics of the said countries. They feel that their contribution to and sacrifice for the achievement of indenpence are much more greater than the civilian politicians. In this connection it will not be exaggerated to quot Prof. Van Der Mehden. He said: Where the army has been in the vanguard of the struggle for independence, as in some parts of Asia, it may enter the political arena because of a belief that the ideals of the independence movement have been destroyed by self-seeking and corrupt civilian politicians whose factional quarrels have led to confusion and turmoil.¹⁶

Morris Janowitz characterises these armies as the armies of national liberation in contrast to armies of other types, such as 'ex-colonial,' 'post-liberation' and 'non-colonial.'¹⁷ The Burmese, the Indonesian and the Bangladesh armies are examples of 'armies of national liberation types.'

To understand the role of the Bangladesh army in politics we must go back to its revolutionary origin. Bangladesh army has played a heroic role in the liberation war against the Pakistan army. Having played a revolutionary role in the liberation war Bangladesh army has built an image for itself as the 'guardian of the state and of the people'. They have also created a political following among the soldiers in the cantonment and among the masses. This self earned image and their links with the imperialist powers have inspired them to intervene into the politics of Bangladesh.

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
CHAPTER- FOUR

ARMED FORCES AND ITS ROLE IN MUJIB ADMINISTRATION

At the time of its independence, Bangladesh lacked a distinct, developed, industrial capitalist class. The movement for Bangladesh, though supported by the workers and peasants, was actually led by the petty bourgeoisie. (During the Mujib era (1972-1975), pervasive corruption created a situation of primitive accumulation. State patronage was extended to a few to enrich themselves by plundering the state sector and creating monopoly control. However, a strong capitalist class did not clearly emerge. In the post-1975, in keeping with the old Pakistani tradition, the military took over state power and with the assistance of the bureaucracy declared itself the custodian of the capitalist order. It actively involved itself in promoting capitalist development. This chapter deals with the civil-military relations in Mujib Administration.

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After independence, the AL headed by its charismatic leader Sheikh Mujibur Rahman, proclaimed nationalism, socialism, democracy and secularism as the four fundamental principles of state policy and



established its authority throughout the country. The Indian model of Parliamentary form of government was adopted. From the very beginning the AL regime allowed all political parties to function except the pro-Islamic parties (the Jamat, the Muslim League, etc.) which collaborated with the Pakistan Army during the struggle for independence. The Jamat i-Islami, The Muslim League and other rightist Parties were anti-Hindu, anti-India, and anti-Moscow and pro-America. The Awami League Government also ignored the importance of the military and the bureaucracy in the nation-building process of Bangladesh.

During the Pakistan period (1947-71), state power was dominated by the military and the bureaucracy. The struggle against Pakistan state power was therefore perceived as the struggle against the bureaucracy and the traditional army. The Awami League was extremely suspicious of both these institutions. The power of the bureaucracy was curtailed by appointing professionals as policy makers. The bureaucrats lost their ^{wa}grantee of employment by the introduction of the President's Order No. 9. Indeed the entire membership of the planning Commission consisted of professionals economists. The AL government imposed excessive political control over the bureaucrats. As a result, majority of

the senior bureaucrats stated non-cooperation with the Mujib government. On the other hand, the AL regime neglected the role of the military, the AL developed a para-military force, the Jatio Rakkhi Bahini (JRB, National Security Force): This para-military force was trained in India and threatened the very existence of the Bangladesh armed forces. The Rakkhi Bahini was similar to the Indian Central Reserve Police (CRP), and the Federal Security Force of Z.A. Bhutto in Pakistan. It was supposed to be a politicized unit, in essence the armed wing of the AL.² The Rakkhi Bahini was frequently used to suppress underground activities, control worker's strikes and to subdue the rebellion of the Chittagong Hill Tracts. Mujib did not trust the military. The creation of the JRB helped develop suspicion among the army personnel's. It became more acute when the AL government attempted to increase the strength of the JRB from about 2500 in 1973 to 1,30,000 in 1975. The AL government reduced budget allocations for the armed forces from 17 per cent in 1972-73 to 16 percent in 1973-74, 15 percent in 1974-75 and 13 per cent in 1975-76 while allocation of the defense budget to the JRB increased unexceptable³ In the first Five year plan (1973-77) ; the allocation for the military was not as much significant as it was in the Pakistan period.

(From an economic point of views, the planners regard the military institution as an unproductive sector.) In connection with decreased military budget, the regime also stopped new recruitment and removed a large number of senior officers. This created discontent in the army against the government. The recruitment's of the JRB came mainly from former members of the Mujib Bahini, the Mukti Bahini, and other organizations affiliated to the AL. The officers of the Rakkhi Bahini were trained in India, and the organization ousts anyone not completely accepting the AL government. The traditional power of these two institutions was further weakened due to the division within them between those who went into exile during the war and those who were struck in Pakistan.

(Ali Rias in his writings argued that Bangladesh armed forces was comprised of five types of erstwhile Pakistan Army personnel. These are:

"(1) those who actively participated in the liberation war by joining the Mukti Bahini officially, (2) those who helped organize the resistance movement in their homes and villages, (3) those who left Pak Army and did not participate either way and stayed home, (4) those who

were arrested and remained in Army custody until liberation , and (5) those who served under the occupation army."⁴

Ali Riais justified his argument cited examples from the writings of A.K. Azad. But there is no denying the fact that major portion of the armed forces came from the EBR trained in Pakistan with anti-India orientation. This faction of the armed forces was not satisfied with pro-India activities of the AL government. Then a army resort the absence of General Osmani, the Commander-in-chief of the liberation forces, at the time of surrender of the Pakistan army, and interpreted it as a conspiracy of the Indian government to rob the Mukti Bahini of its glory for liberation Bangladesh.⁵ The army also resented the fact that the Indian army had taken away all the vehicles and sophisticated weapons captured from the defeated Pakistani forces. There were also some reports of the armed clashes between the Indian army and Mukti Bahini force just after the liberation. Within a very short time, the army's dissatisfaction with the AL government turned into an anti-Indian orientation.

The Awami League had always maintained warm relations with India. In order to formalize this relationship the two governments signed a Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation and Peace for a period of 25

years. The Indo-Bangladesh Treaty was part of a joint Declaration of the two Prime Ministers signed on the concluding day of Mrs. Gandhi's visit of Dhaka on March 19, 1972. Articles 8 and 9 were of paramount importance as they related to both foreign and defense policies of the countries. Article 8 stipulates that no country "shall enter into or participate in any military alliance directed against the other party" and each "shall refrain from any aggression against the other" and "shall not allow the use of its territory for committing any act that may cause military damage or constitute a threat to the security of the other". Article 9 stipulates that "each party shall refrain from giving assistance to any third party taking part in an armed conflict against the other party. " In case either party is attacked or threatened with attack, the parties" shall immediately enter into mutual consultations in order to take appropriate effective measures to eliminate the threat and thus ensure the peace and security of their countries. 62

REACTIONS OF THE OPPOSITION PARTIES:

The AL regime signed the Treaty to eliminate external as well as internal threats. As a result of this Treaty the Awami League secured the permanent support of the largest minority group i.e. the Hindus, the pro-Moscow National Awami party (NAP), and the Communist Party of Bangladesh (CPB). The Treaty also helped the Awami League curtail the military budget of Bangladesh, because of a decrease in the threat from India. It must be remembered that India was considered the number one (No.1) enemy of Pakistan. Ironically, however, the Indo-Bangladesh Friendship Treaty created more internal problems than it solved. Almost all the opposition Parties vehemently criticized it. Maulana Bhasani, chairman of the National Awami Party (NAP), always concluded his speech with a biting attack on the Treaty. Bitter criticism came from the JSD, the Bangladesh Communist Party (Leninist), and the pro-peking Marxist Parties, viz; (1) the Purbo Bangler Sarbohara Party (PBSP); (2) the Sammobadi DA1; (3) the East Pakistan Communist Party (Marxist-Leninist), and (4) the East Bengal Communist party. The theoreticians of these parties argued that the JRB was designed and planned by the Indian

authority simply for the safety of a pro-Indian Government in Bangladesh. The pro-peking parties tried to bring about a second revolution in Bangladesh through armed struggle by identifying the Awami League regime as the "puppet government of India". Among these parties, the Purbo Banglar Sarbohara Party led by Siraj Sikder and the East Bengal Communist Party (M-L) led by Motin and Alauddin played a vital role to overthrow Mujib regime.⁷

By determining the principal contradiction between the people of East Bengal and the Indian expansionism, the PBSP launched massive operations in different parts of the country. The party troops established their hold on Dhaka, Barisal, Faridpur, Mymensingh, Tangail, Chittagong, Sylhet and Comilla districts. From 1972- to early 1975, the Sarbohara party shook the foundation of the Awami League regime by looting thanas and killing national enemies. The year 1975 came with a bad signal to the PBSP. The first day of the year, Siraj Sikdar was arrested and a day after arrest he was killed burtally by the Mujib's Rakkhi Bahini. Shiek Mujibur Rahman, the then Prime Minister of

Bangladesh, indirectly claimed the responsibility of Siraj Sikdar's Killing, publicly declaring, "where is your Siraj Sikdar?"⁸

The EBCP (M-L) led by Matin and Alauddin established their hold in Attrai, Dinajpur, Pubna, and Kushtia districts. Mujib's Rakkhi Bahini launched a massive operation in these areas and killed a large number of guerrilla workers. It will not be exaggerated to say that Mujib's decision to destroy the Motin-Alauddin stronghold was actually influenced by the Indian government, which suspected a strategic link between west Bengal Naxalites and East Bengal Marxist-Leninists.⁹ Like the Sarbohara Party, the Sammabadi Dal regards the Rakkhi Bahini as essentially an Indian army in Bangladesh, receiving arms and ammunition from the Indian Government and taking direct aid from Indian armed forces to suppress rebels in the Chittagong Hill Tracts and other areas.¹⁰ The pro-Peking parties had created some "liberated pockets" in the rural areas of Bangladesh and has almost broken down systematic state control of the countryside by attacking police stations, Rakkhi Bahini (para-military force) camps and looting banks and bazars. Facing tremendous threat from these radicals parties, the AL regime declared emergency throughout the country in December 1974.

Apart from the radical Marxist, the AL regime also faced opposition from the moderate progressive political parties. On April 14, 1974, six opposition parties viz, (1) National Awami party (Bhasani), (2) Bangladesh Jatio Lesgue, (3) Bangladesh Jatio Leau, (4) Bangladesh Gono Mukti Union, (5) Bangladesh Communist party (Leninbadi), and (6) Sramik Krishak Samajbadi Dal formed a United Front (UF) with Maulana Bhasani as Permanent president.¹¹ The UF declared to launch a mass movement on June 30 with holding of public meting at Dhaka. On June 2, the police arrested most of the leaders of the UF and took Maulana Bhasani to his home at Sontosh in Tangail. The Awami League government's distribution policy of licenses and permits among the party members and appointment policy of unskilled administrators and nationalized industries created a havoc in economic sector and political arena, Mismanagement of the economy and wide spread corruption created discontent among the masses. A large number of the army repatriated from Pakistan were posted insignificant posts after their repatriation. To check widespread corruption, smuggling and political

violence Mujib ordered the armed forces to conduct an all-out operation through out the country.

The army was given the power to supersede the civil administration. Mujib's decision to bring army for operation was a major back fire for his administration. As a result of this operation the armed forces got a bad impression about the AL administration. The victims of the mass scale army operation were the top ranking Awami Leaguers who were involved with the smuggling, selling and reselling permits and license. It is alleged that Mujib's nearest relatives were involved with this business.¹² At one stage, Mujib was bound to stop the army operation facing heavy pressure from his partynen. However it created discontent among the army personnel's.

FORMATION OF BAKSAL

If the Awami League had represented a developed bourgeoisie things probably would have been different. The AL petty-bourgeoisie class character was also reflected in dissolving parliamentary form of Government in 1975. Due to petty-bourgeoisie mentality the AL leadership was not in a position to tolerate opposition's criticism. So that

on January 25, 1975, the AL introduced presidential form of government by abolishing parliamentary form of government through the promulgation of the Fourth Amendment to the Constitution. Talukder Moniruzzaman termed it as a constitutional coup'. Through the amendment to the constitution Sheik Mujibur Rahman became the president of the country for a term of five years from the date of constitutional amendment. On 6 June 1975, Sheik Mujib declared the formation of the National Party- the Bangladesh Krishak Sramik Awami League (BAKSAL). Mujib's aim was to introduce people-oriented politics and administrative system. In this regard he said, "secretariat would go,' 'red- tapim would be abolished' and 'bureaucratic system would be replaced with people-oriented systems'.¹³ With a view to materializing this program Mujib restructured the administrative system of Bangladesh and on 21 June he issued a presidential ordinance whereby 61 district were created instead of 19 districts and on 16 July he announced the names of the 61 District Governors.¹⁴ The Districts Governors were given immense power and authority to implement the planning of development projects. The District Commissioners, who had enjoyed immense power and authority in the bureaucratic system, became

the Secretary of the Governor. The Governor would control all the Government departments at the district level including the Rakki Bahini. The introduction of the one-party authoritarian system forced Mujib to depend more and more on the Rakkhi Bahini.¹⁵ In this regard Hamza Alavi rightly said that the military under Sheikh Mujib however, did not enjoy relative autonomy as it did in Pakistan, a post colonial state.¹⁶ Fact remains that Mujib did not like to see the military as an independent and powerful force which virtually might endanger his own regime. As a result, the AL failed to evolve an effective civil-military working relationship in Bangladesh.

In conclusion, we can say the economic and political situation started deteriorating from 1972. The reconstruction of the war-ravaged economy suffered from the pervasive corruption of the AL Government. The famine of 1974 resulted in the people's total disillusionment with the AL. The government unleashed a Rakkhi Bahini reign of terror to ruthlessly repress the radical Maoist group and further alienated the people. Finally on 25 January 1975, the AL which had always proclaimed its adherence to democracy, amended the constitution, dissolved all other

political parties and installed one- party rule. Thus the separation of the AL from the people was complete.

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CHAPTER- FIVE

BANGLADESH UNDER ZIA: QUEST FOR A NEW STATE

Military intervention in Bangladesh Politics was the result of the failure of parliamentary democracy, dissatisfaction of the army and bureaucracy, and inner conflict of the ruling party. The pro-Soviet policy of the AL also antagonized the U.S. that added fuel to the military intervention. Mismanagement of the Mujib administration, deterioration of the law and order situation in the country and introduction of the one-party authoritarian system totally diminished Mujib's image as administrator and a national leader. The countrywide famine of 1974 alienated Sheik Mujibur Rahman from the middle class and the lower stratum of the society. The Bangladesh armed forces which have taken over power came from the middle class and lower middle class, declared themselves as 'liberators' and 'great saviors.'

The armed forces were unhappy with the creation of Sheik Mujib's Rakkhi Bahini and BAKSAL. BAKSAL was the Mujib's means through which he created one party dominated totalitarian state. On

August 15, 1975, a group of young military officers killed Sheik Mujib and his family members. Khandoker Mushtaque Ahmed, a member of the Mujib Cabinet, became the president¹ Lawrence Lifschultz says that Mushtaque Ahmed had plotted Mujib's downfall almost a year before the actual event, and that the American embassy had received such information six months earlier.² According to Lifschultz, it was a pro-American coup although U.S. authority always denied this charge. It can be noted here that AL led by Sheik Mujib was a pro-American political party till the 1970's election. During the period of liberation war the AL left the American bloc due to its support to Pakistan military government and entered into the Soviet socialistic bloc through India. The formation of the BAKSAL was an attempt to create a socialist Bangladesh on Soviet model. So that America was annoyed with the Mujib government. Mushtaque Ahmed was a creature of the coup that destroyed Mujib and the forces that it unleashed enabled Ziaur Rahman to assume greater control of the Bangladesh Army. Zia was one of the more celebrated officer of the war of independence.³ He announced the declaration of independence of Bangladesh. Mushtaque Ahmed appointed Ziaur Rahman as chief of staff of the army and ruled the country for only 82

days. Khaled Musharraf was given the post of chief of the General Staff of the armed forces and general M.A.G. Osmani was made Mushtaque's Defense Advisor. During this period Mushtaque has to face external as well as internal threats. A small section of the senior army officers and a majority of the members of parliament opposed Mushtaque. India too expressed its unhappiness with the coup. However, China's formal recognition of Bangladesh on August 31, 1975, helped to soften the aggressive attitude of the Indian government towards Bangladesh.

↙ On November 3, a group of officers led by Khaled Musharraf staged a counter-coup which lasted four days. The coup leaders forced Mushtaque to hand over the presidency to A.M. Sayeem, the chief justice of the Supreme Court. On November 7, the jawans of Dhaka Cantonment revolted against Khaled Musharraf and his associates. Musharraf was killed by the jawans while trying to flee from the cantonment. (4) Lt. Col. Abu Taher, a retired army officer, who lost a leg in the war of independence, was the principal architect of the uprising. The Jatio Samajtantrik Dal (JSD), which had made inroads in the Bangladesh armed forces, played a decisive part in the mutiny. The Biplobi Gano

Bahini (Revolutionary People's Army) that led the sepoy mutiny
presented a Twelve-point charter of demands. The opening declaration of
the charter read:

"Our revolution is not simply to change one leadership for
another. This revolution is for one purpose---the interest of the oppressed
classes. For that the entire structure of the armed forces must be changed.
For many days we were the army of the rich class. The rich have used us
for their own interests. The events of August 15 are but one example.
However, this time we have revolted alongside the masses of the country.
From today onwards the armed forces of the nation shall build themselves
as the defender of the country's oppressed classes."⁵

The second demand called for the immediate "release of all
political prisoners." The declaration demanded a "classless army" as a
fundamental step towards the establishment of a classless society. The
other demands included "ending of all differences and discrimination
between the officers and soldiers, changing of existing British rules and
regulations," and a number of economic demands, i.e., "improvement of
the soldier's wages and ending of rent payment for their accommodation.

“The twelve-point demands also urged the formation of a central revolutionary army organization that would be the supreme decision-making organization in the country.⁶ Class conflict within the Bengali armed forces was the product of the colonial rule. The military uprising of November 7, 1975, was a historic event. It was the first time that a major section of a South Asian army revolted, demanding an end to the conventional hierarchical army and replacing it with a people’s army. Once radicalized, the germ of mass revolt would perhaps always remain ingrained in the minds of the common soldier. But there is no denying the fact that a section of the sepoys came out of the streets of Dhaka with their traditional Pakistan oriented slogans- “Bangladesh Ziandabad”, “General Zia Zindabad,” “Sepoy Revolution Ziandabad” and “Narayer Takbir Allahhu Akber”.⁷ This group upheld the Islamic spirit as well as Pakistani army culture which contradicts the revolutionary spirit of the former group. It is interesting to note here that Taher and his comrades were failed to understand Lenin’s dictum. Lenin argued that before waging such kind of socialistic revolution at least fifty per cent of the armed force should be socialized with Marxist ideology. From this point of view Taher’s strategy was wrong. Islamic sentiment among the armed

force was another barrier for educating them with Marxist literature. In this connection Z.R. Kahan rightly pointed out: Bengali Marxists of different varieties have so far failed to mobilize elite, sub-elite and grassroots support for their causes because they have been unable to overcome basic contradictions between Marxism and Islam⁸. However after sepoy mutiny Ziaur Rahman consolidated his leadership within the armed forces. After assuming leadership of the army, Zia's first attempt was to integrity of the forces under his command. He did not punish Mujib's killers because he wanted to avoid intensifying the division within the armed forces.

India Reacts

As a result of the twelve-point demand, the new regime faced threats from both inside and outside the country. Zia suppressed the extreme left in the army by arresting their leader and holding secret trials. The India reaction was very sharp. A spokesman warned: "The developments in Bangladesh are its domestic affairs but India cannot remain indifferent and unconcerned about (What is) taking place there."⁹ There were reports of Indian troop movements close to the border. The

Ziaur Rahman

phase of antagonistic relationship now started. There were open clashes along the border. India gave shelter to a group of armed dissidents led by Kader Siddiqui. At the same time it started withdrawing water at Farraka. The Farraka Barrage issue was another barrier for cordial relationship between the two countries. The Farraka Barrage, Located in India, controlled the flow of Ganges water into Bangladesh. It was originally built to prevent the port of Calcutta from silting up, but it also adversely affected Bangladesh's agriculture system, navigation, industry, power generation, fisheries, forestry livestock and drinking water.¹⁰ Sheikh Mujib and Indira Gandhi had reached a tentative agreement on the management of Ganges water in 1974. But after the death of Sheik Mujib India showed her negative attitude to implement the agreement. So that Zia government brought the Farraka issue before the Third World Forum and the United Nations in 1976. Like a militarized Pakistan, Bangladesh became a militarized state under Zia. In India armed force had been subordinated to civilian control since independence, Whereas Pakistan's political process had been rapidly subverted by its army. So India was unhappy with the developments in Bangladesh. Since that time India has been perceived as a threat by the successive governments of Bangladesh

and both countries played this power games. Both sides regularly accuse each other of supporting 'terrorist' autonomy or independence movements on the other's territory. Bangladesh blame India almost entirely for continuing resistance of the Jatio Sanghati Sangsta [JSS] and the Shanti Bahini in the Chittagong Hill Tracts [CHT], While India accuses Bangladesh for supporting Indian insurgency movements such as the United Liberation Front of Asam [ULFA], Mizo National Army (Military wing of the Mizo National Front), Tripura National Volunteers [T.N.V], Peoples Liberation Army of Manipur [PLA] and allowing the Pakistani intelligence service [ISI] to train Kashmiri insurgents in the CHT.⁽¹¹⁾

To counter Indian threats, Bangladesh cultivated friendly relations with China. In order to formalize this relationship, Ziaur Rahman visited Peking in January 1977. It was a successful trip for Zia. As a result, China openly supported Bangladesh's stand on Ganges water and her sovereignty. At a banquet in Zia's honour, Li Hsien-nien, the Chinese vice premier, said that his country "firmly supported the Government and people of Bangladesh in their just struggle to safeguard national independence and state sovereignty and resist foreign

interference."¹² Zia was also able to secure the support of the Islamic countries.

To face the external as well as internal challenges, Ziaur Rahman increased military expenditure. The budget of 1974-75 as framed by the Mujib government included a military allocation of Taka 750 million (13% of the total revenue budget). In the budget of 1976-77 the allocation for defense and internal security force was increased to Taka 2194 million (29% of the total revenue budget). The strength of the police forces was increased from about 40,000 to about 70,000. A full new division (9 Division) was raised by the army. The 9 Division was given responsibility for maintaining security of the capital city. (13)

Zia also reinforced the Bangladesh Rifle, and Ansars, Army-controlled Para-military organizations that numbered almost 1,50,000. In 1976, under Zia, an aid agreement was signed with the British to provide of f 7,20,000 for the improvement of police telecommunications. In 1977 an eight-member British military advisory team came to assist in setting up the Defense staff college at Savar near Dhaka. This advisory team was commanded by Colonel Gibson, a senior member of the SAS, the Special Air Services Brigade. The SAS is the counter insurgency unit of the

British Army and the legacy of Robert Thompson's Emergency strategy against the communist insurgency emergency in Malay. An agreement between the British and the Bangladesh government for military training [BIMET] ended in 1992. According to British diplomatic sources the British are still involved in military training. Military officers from Bangladesh have gone to Great Britain and to the U.S. as well for training.¹⁴

Zia increased expenditures for the armed forces, standardized the uniform, and rewarded those demonstrating professional performance. He raised the pay scales of all ranks, and transformed the Bangladesh military profession into a coveted career. He also obtained modern more sophisticated weapons from the friendly countries. For consolidating power, Zia realized the need of support at the grassroots village level. With a view to materializing this objective Zia introduced Swanirvar Gram Sarkar (self-sufficient village government) and Gram Pratirakhi Bahini (Village Defence Force-VDF). The main function of the Gram Sarkar was to introduce production oriented politics viz; to take care of local problems, maintain law and order, control population growth and double food production through a self reliant economy.¹⁵ The Gram

Pratirakkhi Bahini of several hundred thousand men and women were charged policing their particular locality.

CIVILIANIZATION PROCESS OF ZIA

During the first few months, without assuming formal leadership of the state, Zia ruled the country while remaining in the background as the deputy chief martial law administrator. Justice Sayeem was allowed to remain the titular head of the state. However, on November 30, 1976, Zia formally took over as president of Bangladesh, retaining the post of CMLA and commander-in-chief of the armed forces. In 1976 military government issued the Political Parties Regulation (PPR). As many as 60 Political groups applied to get a 'licence' to operate as political parties. On May 30, 1977, he sought popular support for himself through a referendum. He claimed to have received 99.5 per cent of the votes cast.¹⁶ It was apparently a vote of the kind Ayub Khan had sought in February 1960, to enable him to declare himself the first elected president of Pakistan. Ayub Khan was not only interested in modernizing the Pakistan army, he was also interested in the political and administrative transformation of the government. We can

equated Zia with Ayub in rural development program. Both of them focused attention of the peasant character of the society. Zia issued 19-point program, which promised in part, the promotion of the private sector, Self-sufficiency in food production, population control and agricultural development. (see, Appendix-1). Zia's first act as president was to "~~drop secularism~~" from the officially declared objectives of the Republic, proclaiming "absolute trust and faith in the Almighty Allah." By this amendment Bangladesh did not become an Islamic State but stressed that "the state endeavor to consolidate, preserve and strengthen fraternal relations among Islamic countries based on Islamic solidarity" The Islamic forces welcome the change and supported Zia.¹⁷ The term "Socialism" was retained as a constitutional rhetoric to satisfy the leftists, but it was given a new meaning: "economic and social justice," and the pledge to establish a "socialist economic system" was dropped to satisfy the rightists. Zia also changed the nationality from "Bangalee" to "Bangladeshi". The term Bangalee national 'refers to all people sharing their common language and culture, which would also include the people of West Bengal (in India). The term Bangladeshi refers to all people living within the geographical territory of Bangladesh. General Zia

argued that nationalism of the people of Bangladesh is determined by the country's geographic location and historic evolution, and by the economic aspirations, the psychological orientation of the people. Zia's emphasis on the term Bangladeshi was an attempt at Islamization of the cultural heritage of the people to appease the rightist forces. However, neither the secular Bangalee nationalists, nor the religious and ethnic minorities, accepted the ideology of Bangladeshi nationalism as defined by Zia. After the referendum, presidential election was held on June 3, 1978. Ziaur Rahman, the nominee of Jatiyotabadi front, won a landslide victory, securing 76 per cent of the votes cast. His opponent, General Osmani, the nominee of the Gonotantric Oikyo Jote (Democratic United Front), got 21 per cent of the votes cast.¹⁸

After consolidating his position in the army, Zia tried to build up a self-sustaining political order through which political development could be achieved. In his process of civilization, Zia adopted the 'Kemalist model' of 'personalize transformation' from a ~~junta leader to a~~ civilian leader.¹⁹ Following the Kemalist model, he formed a political party, the Bangladesh Nationalist Party (BNP) in September 1978, with various interest and ideological groups. The politicians who joined the

B.N.P came from the National Awami party, the Muslim league, the Awami League, the United People's Party and the Democratic league. The Jatiyatbadi Gonotantric Dal (GAGODAL) which was floated in February 1978 under vice President justice Satter as the convenor and ten members of Ziaur Rahman cabinet as leading members was the main component of the B.N.P. There were some new comers who belonged to various socio-economic groups. They had no definite political commitment and were mainly concerned with their individual or group interest. As a result of this, the B.N.P was unable to take a united stand within the party or the administration. The B.N.P was launched and organized by President Zia. The President himself was the chairman of the party as well as final authority. The central organs of the party such as the National Standing Committee, the National executive Committee and the Parliamentary Board were not elected by party members or party organs but were nominated by the chairman. General Zia was president of the country, chairman of the B.N.P and commander in chief of the armed forces. Within the top decision-making structure of the B.N.P, the military bureaucratic oligarchy worked in close association within the urban bourgeoisie. The executive committee was dominated by

businessman (35.5 per cent), professionals (31.2 per cent) and agriculturists (11.8 per cent).⁽²⁰⁾ The B.N.P won an overwhelming majority of seats in the parliamentary elections of 1979.

Table 1 : parliamentary Election Results (February 1979)

Party	No. of Seats Contested	No. of Seats won	% of Seats	% of Votes
B.N.P	298	206	68.3	41.2
AL (Malek)	295	40	13.3	14.4
Muslim League and Alliance	265	19	6.3	10.0
J.S.D	240	9	3.0	4.9
AL (Mizan)	183	2	0.7	2.8
Independents	425	17	6.1	12.9
Other Parties	419	7	2.3	10.7
Total	2125	300	100.00	100.00

Source : Syed Serajul Islam, "the State in Bangladesh Under Zia (1975-81) Asian Survey, Vol. XXIV, No. 5, May 1984.

The B.N.P won an absolute majority seats in the election of 1979. Out of 300 seats in the Parliament the B.N.P won 206 seats, the AL (Malek) won 40 seats, the ML-IDL 19, the JSD 9, AL (Mizan) 2, and other minor parties 7, After the election, 10 of the 17 independent members joined the B.N.P. By this way Ziaur Rahman transformed

himself from a military ruler to a civilian one. In April 1979 Ziaur Rahman formed 29 members cabinet. In his 29 members cabinet six were military bureaucrats, two civil bureaucrats, eight technocrats and thirteen were political leaders. All executive authority of the cabinet including appointing and dismissing authority was in his hand. Thus the party and the parliament had very little influence over the structure of decision-making. Zia's system was neither parliamentary nor presidential nor an amalgam of both. Rather, it was an authoritarian one appended with the level of democracy like Ayub Khan's "Basic democracy" in Pakistan, Nasser's 'presidential democracy' in Egypt, Soekarno's "Guided democracy" in Indonesia, François ^{smi} "Organic democracy" and straoessner's "Selective democracy" in Spain (2)

Syed Serajul Islam characterized Bangladesh under Zia as a administrative state. In administrative state bureaucracy civil and military forms a coalition and assumes control of the state apparatus. In fact, the state under Zia was a state of civil and military bureaucracy. Whereas the state under Mujib was a state of "intermediate class", i.e. rich peasants, petty traders and businessmen, urban professionals and intellectuals had

played a dominant role in the decision-making bodies. Ziaur Rahman appointed civil and military bureaucrats in key administrative positions as well as foreign services. He also annulled the President order No. 9 of 1972 under which any officer could be dismissed without any show cause notice. It seems clear that the military bureaucratic oligarchy when consolidating its position in the state apparatus needed the support of the petty bourgeois leadership in order to justify the modality of the existing state order. Under these circumstances, bureaucratic oligarchy played a double role. On the one hand they articulated the demands from the masses and, on the other, manipulated public relations on behalf of the oligarchy. Zia regime was also free from external pressure as it provided opportunities for the metropolitan bourgeoisie to entrench their positions. ²² During this period the flow of external resources into Bangladesh increased considerably through food aid, commodity aid and project aid. The major share of these funds came from the Multinational corporation, the International Monetary fund (IMF), the Asian Development Bank (ADB), the World Bank (WB) and the west German Government. Australia, Canada, Norway, Netherlands, and Swedish government was powerful partners of the process. They came forward in

their interest to support capitalist Development in Bangladesh. Private invest in industry increased from Taka 87.4 million in 1973--74 to taka 2091.4 million in 1977-78. The ceiling on private investment was raised from taka 30 million to taka 100 million. The regime extended a wide range of privileges of foreign private investors such as tax holiday, general rules for depreciation of fixed assets, and the "free zone" concessions. The financial bodies, particularly the Bangladesh Shilpa Bank and Bangladesh Shilpa Rin Sangstha were directed to help the private entrepreneurs on a high priority basis. By 1979, forty percent of the nationalized industries had been handed over to private entrepreneurs. Zia government also took step to create an export -Processing zone near at Chittagong. Top priority was given to export-oriented industries in national context and the British companies and the American companies in international field. The Dhaka Stock Exchange which had remained defunct since independence was reopened as from mid-1976²³ From the Marxist point of view the state under Zia played an instrumental class role i.e., protected the interest of the landlords, the indigenous bourgeoisie and metropolitan bourgeoisie.

To sum up, the state under Zia benefited the businessmen, industrialists, bureaucrats and foreign donors. The civil-military bureaucrats occupied the important positions of the state apparatus. Zia, for the first time, allowed the direct intervention of the foreign capital in the development of the foreign capital, in the development of the indigenous bourgeoisie and accumulation of capital for the capitalist countries. However, Zia tried to build a new Bangladesh through the penetration of the metropolitan capital, but failed due to the inner contradiction of the ruling elite's as well as for grouping and re-grouping of the power mongers.

Foot Notes :

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CHAPTER-SIX

THE STATE IN BANGLADESH UNDER ERSHAD

On May 30, 1981, Ziaur Rahman was assassinated by a group of military officers in Chittagong. After his death, justice Sattar came to power with the blessing of the army generals. Immediately after taking over, justice Sattar legitimized his position through presidential elections. Sattar's campaign centered on Zia's nineteen-point program which stressed social improvement and economic development. People voted for Sattar to sustain the momentum of Zia's reforms. General Ershad the chief of the Army staff was very much obedient to the constitutional government up to the elections period, but his intention to interfere in politics became clear in October 1981. During this period, Sattar faced serious problems from H.M. Ershad. On November 20, General Ershad publicly demanded a constitutionally active role for the military in the national decision making process. He expressed his concern over "a grave and deep-seated politico-military problem". He observed:

" Our military is an efficient, well-disciplined and most honest body of truly dedicated and organized national force. Potentials of such an excellent force in poor country like ours can be effectively utilized for productive and nation-building purposes in addition to its role of national defense. This concept requires us to depart form the conventional western ideas of the role of the armed forces. It calls for combining the roles of national-building and national defense into one concept of total national defense".¹

Sattar immediately responded in an intractable manner by arguing that "the Army has a role to protect the sovereignty of the country and I do not think any other role is possible"² However, Sattar included the three service chiefs in the National Security Council, the highest policy making body.

The member of the newly constituted national security council were (1) President Sattar, (2) Vice- President Dr. M.N. Huda, (3) Prime Minister Shah Azizur Rahman, (4) Deputy Prime Minister Jamal Uddin Ahmed, (5) Home minister M.A. Matin, (6) Finance Minister Saifur Rahman (7) Chief of the Army staff General H.M. Ershad, (9) Chief of

the Naval Staff M.A Khan, and (9) Chief of the Air Staff, Air vice Marshall Sultan Mahmood. But the formation of the National Security Council could not meet the demand of the army chief general H.M. Ershad. On February 12, 1982, Justice Sattar had to dissolve the 42-member cabinet under heavy pressure from the army and formed a new 18-member cabinet³

THE SECOND MARTIAL LAW

On March 24, 1982, the chief of the army staff, Lt. General H.M. Ershad, took over power from Sattar and proclaimed martial law throughout the country. Ershad became the chief martial law administrator (CMLA). He appointed chief of naval staff, Rear -Admiral Mahbub Ali Khan, and chief of air staff, Air Vice-Marshal Sultan Mahmud, as deputy chief martial law administrators (DCMLA). The CMLA also divided the country into five martial law zones. Major-General Abdur Rahman, Major-General Mohammad Abdus Samad and Brigadier K.M. Abdul Wahed were appointed zonal martial law administrators for these zones.

The CMLA suspended the Constitution, dissolved the Jatio Sangsad (parliament), dismissed the cabinet, banned political activities and abolished Zia's Gram Sarkar and Jubo Complex.

Under the system introduced by Ershad, the deputy chief martial law administrators (DCMLAs), zonal martial law administrators (ZMLAs), and district martial law administrator held significant positions in the power structure. They were responsible for the development programs in their respective areas.³ Army personnel were also appointed in most of the higher posts of sector corporations, secretariat and in the governing body of nationalized banks. About 25 percent Foreign Service posts were earmarked for army personnel.⁴

In July 1982, the CMLA formed council of ministers to aid and advise him. Most of the cabinet positions were given to the military officers and leading bureaucrats. Out of 16 cabinet members seven were military bureaucrats, three civil bureaucrats, two technocrats and four were lawyers. Like the cabinet of 1982, Ershad's council of minister in 1985

was also dominated by the civil-military bureaucrats. The civil-military bureaucrats occupied the important portfolios in the state apparatus.

Immediately after taking over, Ershad chalked out some reformative programs for what he called the betterment of the masses. These included decentralization of the administrative structure, disinvestment of industries, arresting the rapid growth of population, and reforms in educational and judicial spheres.

Ershad's Response to Opposition

The University of Dhaka, which is regarded as the second contention as well as the political barometer of the country, again proved its vitality by challenging the military regime headed by H.M. Ershad. On November 8, 1982, the police beat up a University teacher when he was taking his tutorial class in his office. This incident reactivated the students of Bangladesh and united them. Various student organizations, notwithstanding their differing ideological orientations, gave a united call for a protest against the police excesses. They violated the martial law order by holding demonstrations. Thereafter, they formed a Students Action Committee (SAC) to lead an anti-education policy movement, terming the

education policy as unscientific, commercial and undemocratic. The student movement was transformed into a movement for the restoration of democratic rights. In mid-February 1983, a student upheaval took place at the campus of Dhaka University, Ruthless suppression followed. Police firing killed many students. After the mid-February upheaval, the regime realized the necessity of open politics. In order to democratize his regime, Ershad permitted indoor politics and announced a socio-economic program containing 18 points. On November 27, 1983, the 18-point (see, as appendix-2) implementation committee gave birth to the new political party called Janadal. Like the JAGODAL, the Janadal was preparatory stage of the Jatio Party of H.M. Ershad. JAGODAL was formed on the initiative of Ziaur Rahman before the creation of the BNP. Similarly the Janadal was formed on the initiative of H.M. Earshad before the creation of the Jatio Party (J.P). Both of them successfully performed the dresrehershal before staging drama i.e. forming political party.

On November 14, 1983, all restrictions imposed on political activities were withdrawn and the dates for holding presidential and parliamentary election on May 24 and November 25, 1984 respectively

were announced. After the formal withdrawal of restriction on political activities the 15- party alliance led by Awami League (Hasina) and the 7- party alliance led by the BNP(Khaleda Zia) were formed to over throw Ershad regime. The 15- party alliance was composed of the following parties viz; (1) Awami League (Hasina), (2) Awami League (Nur-e-Alam Siddiqui), (3) Bangladesh Krishak Sramik Awami League (Razzak), (4) Jatio Samajtantrik Dal (Shajahan Siraj), (5) Gana Azadi League (Abdus Samad); (6) Bangladesh Samajtantrick Dal (Khalekuzzaman), (7) Workers Party (Rashed Khan Menon), (8) National Awami Party (Haroon-ur-Rashid), (9) National Awami party (Professor Muzaffor Ahmed), (10) Sammobadi Dal (Toaha), (11) Sammobadi Dal (Nagen Sarker), (12) Jatio Ekota party (Syed Altaf Hossain), (13) Sramik Krishak Samajbadi Dal (Siddiqur Rahman), (14) Bangladesh Samajtantrik Dal (A.F.M. Mahbul Hoque), and (15) Mazdur party (Abul Basher).

After the formation of the 15-party alliance, the BNP Chairperson Khaleda Zia led 7-party alliance was formed consisting of the following like minded political parties viz; (1) Bangladesh Nationalist Party (Khaleda Zia) , (2) United People's Party (Kazi Zafor), (3)

Ganatantrik Party (Mirza Nurul Huda), (4) Bangladesh Jatio League (Ataur Rahman Khan), (5) National Awami Party (Nur-ur-Rahman) (6) Krishak Sramik Party (Azizul Haque), and (7) Bangladesh Biplobi Communist League (Tipu Biswas).

As the election dates were announced, two major questions resurfaced: (1) the military's constitutionally guaranteed role in the national decision-making process, and (2) the nature of the constitution (i.e. parliamentary or presidential). The 15-party alliance led by Awami League (Hasina) demanded a return to the parliamentary form of government as the 1972 constitution. The 7-party alliance led by the BNP (Khaleda Zia) demanded a presidential form of government. Finally, the 7-party alliance and the 15-party alliance reached a consensus and formulated a 5- point minimum program aimed at the restoration of democracy. The demands were: (1) an immediate end to martial law; (2) restoration of fundamental rights, including the lifting of the ban on political activities; (3) parliamentary elections to be held prior to any other elections; (4) release of the all political prisoners and the withdrawal of charges against

politician; and (5) the trial of those who were responsible for killing student during the mid-February upheaval in Dhaka.⁵

After the formulation of the 5- point program, the regime's design of legitimization in the name of democratization by holding elections stage by stage ^{was challenged} seriously by the opposition parties. At last Ershad declared that parliamentary elections would be held on April 6, 1985. The 15-party alliance, the 7-party alliance and the Jamaat-e-Islami pressurized the government to accept their 5-point demand, before holding the election. Ershad reacted by banning all political activities on March 1, 1985. In the national referendum held on May 30, 1985, Ershad claimed to have won a massive vote of confidence with an affirmative vote of 96% from among the 87% voter turnout.⁶ After the referendum Upazila elections were held throughout the country. The Upazila chairman was given the power and status of the deputy commissioner. The Upazila, therefore, was not only a unit of administration, the leader of the Upzila was also politically tied to the central government and hence to general Ershad.

In the initial stages Ershad ruled the country with the help of the military and bureaucracy. He did not feel it necessary to build up democratic political institutions. He did not feel threatened by politicians because the political parties were at that moment too weak to topple him. They were factionalized and did not command much support of the people. So he emphasized more on military than on political institutions. In order to consolidate the power of the armed forces, he increased the strength of the army and a lion's share of the annual government expenditure to the armed forces. He allocated 176 million and 184 million U.S. dollars for the budget year 1982-83 and 1983-84 respectively. By 1985 the defense budget was more than three times higher than the health budget, whereas in 1973 it had been lower. For the financial year 1991-92, the allocation for defense was Tk. 1209.83 crore (14.96 per cent), for the police Tk. 307.07 crore, for the BDR Tk. 157.51 crore.⁷ Defense, police and BDR together made up 20.45 per cent of the official budget. For education 1,225.57 crore (15.5 percent) was allocated and for health and population control only Tk. 409.75 crore.⁷ He also increased the strength of the armed forces. Total armed forces in 1976 were 63,000 with 3,000 airforce and

1,000 navy members. In 1984 the total armed forces stood at 81,000 with 3,000 airforce and 5,300 navy members.⁸ In addition to the armed forces, the military government of Bangladesh also increased the strength of the paramilitary forces. //

The year 1986 witnessed the formation of the Jatio Party (JP) led by General Ershad. The General formed the Jatio Party with a view to legitimizing his regime through democratic process. In the political manifesto of the Jatio Party Ershad declared his commitment to improve the socioeconomic conditions of different sections of the people including marginal and landless farmers, laborers, employees, small and medium businessmen and other professional groups. In its political manifesto the Party also determined five fundamental principles that included 1. Independence and Sovereignty 2. Islamic Ideology and freedom of all religions 3. Bangladesh nationalism 4. Democracy and 5. Social progress and economic emancipation of the people⁹. In fact, H.M. Ershad declaration of making Islam the only state religion of Bangladesh was one of the shrewd policies taken by the Ershad regime. The declaration of Islam as State Religion by the Eight Amendment was made by the military ruler

to exploit religion for political purpose which undermined the spirit of liberation war. Reactions to the state religion amendment was sharp to all sections of people. The Awami League vowed to cancel the amendment if returned to power. Begum Khaleda Zia, Chirperson of B.N.P., commented that the amendment would divide the nation and hence was undesirable.¹⁰

H.M. Ershad's Jatio Party was infact, a conglomeration of the politicians mainly from the Awami League and the B.N.P. and party from Democratic League and other political parties. However, following the some strategies of the predecessor President Zia, Ershad was not able to establish strong political support base among the different sections of the people of Bangladesh such as student organizations, youths, farmers and workers. Adopting Zia's strategies of promoting socio-economic development of Bangladesh Ershad introduced Upazila system, a new system of decentralized administration in order to bring the benefit of public administration vis-a-vis-social justice nearer to the door of the common masses. But Ershad himself was a corrupt and characterless ruler and most of his political disciples and associoates were also dishonest. Despite its weak political support bases the Jatio Party afforded to gain

the supports of the people from greater Rangpur in the successive elections where Ershad was born.¹¹ Although general Ershad was not able to establish strong support base within his party he remained in power for more than nine years that was the longest reign of a ruler in the history of the new nation Bangladesh. However, the main reason of retaining Ershad's power for a long period of time was because of the support of the military civil bureaucracy.

General Ershad's religion policy was also bluff to the nation. During his period Bangladesh entered massively into the mass electronics media i.e., global cultural invansion, which was anti-thesis to the Islamic values. In 1966 Bangladesh had 5,860 licensed TV sets. The number increased to 4,81,926 in 1990. Video-Cassette recorders/players began to spread in Bangladesh from the middle of 1970s. In 1984-85 there were only 2443 licensed VCRs in Bangladesh. It increased to 23956 sets in 1991-92. In 1980 there were only 10 commercial video rental shops in the country. In 1989 there were 4000 such shops in the country. The recent growth of satellite technology has opened up the country for total penetration by the foreign electronics media.¹²

The Jatio Party was a multi-dimensional "umbrella" Party and a combination of diametrically opposed beliefs and interests. Infact, the Jatio Party was a platform of the 'dalsut' politicians and civil and military bureaucrats ¹² As a government party, the JP distributed favor among its supporters and used state machinaries to subdue the opposition parties demand. Before the formation of the JP, H.M. Ershad formed the Natun Bangla Jubo Shanghati, Natun Bangla Chatra Samaj and Swadhin Trade Union Federation. Thus, after the formation of the JP Ershad held parliamentary election in 1986. The 7-Party alliance led by BNP under Khaleda Zia did not participate in the elections. On the question of participation in the parliamentary election, the 15 party- alliance was divided into two camps. The leftists quit the alliance and formed a 5- party alliance led by Rashed Khan Menon, leader of the workers party. However, Ershad was able to hold the parliamentary and presidential election in 1986 peacefully and convinced the donor countries and agencies that he had initiated the democratization process in the country.

Table-1

Table-1 shows the Results of the parliamentary Election of 1986.

Party/ Independent	No of Seats won	% of Seats Won	No. of Votes Received	% of Votes Received of Total Votes cast
Jatio Party	155	51.00	1,20,79,259	42.34%
Banaglesh Awami League	76	25.33	74,62,157	26.16%
Jamaat-e-Islam Bangladesh	10	3.33	13,14,067	4.61%
Bangladesh National Awami Party	5	1.66	3,68,979	1.29%
Communist Party of Bangladesh	5	1.66	2,59,728	0.91%
Jatio Samajtantrik Dal (Rab)	4	1.33	7,25,303	2.54%
Bangladesh Muslim League	4	1.33	4,12,765	1.45%
Jatio Samajtantric Dal (Siraj)	3	1.00	2,48,705	0.87%
Bangladesh Krishak Sramik Awami League	3	1.00	1,91,107	0.67%
Bangladesh Workers Party	3	1.00	1,51,828	0.53%
National Awami Party (Muzaffar)	2	0.66	2,03,365	0.71%
Other Parties	-	-	4,90,389	1.73%
Independents	32	10.66	46,19,025	16.19%

Source : Government of the People's Republic of Bangladesh, Election Commission, Report, Jatio Sangsad Elections, 1986 (Dhaka: 1988).

In the 1986 parliamentary election the JP emerged as the majority party in the parliament with 153 seats and 42.43 percent of the votes cast. The AL, with 76 seats became the second largest party in the parliament. The Jammāt-i-Islām and independents won 10 and 32 seats respectively. All small parties fared badly. The National Awami Party and the communist Party of Bangladesh secured 5 seats each while the Jati Samajtantik Dal (Rob) and Bangladesh Muslim League obtained 4 seats each. Bangladesh Krishak Sramik Awami League secured 3, workers party 3 and National Awami Party (Muzaffor) 2 seats. The B.N.P leaders termed this parliamentary election as an arranged game between Ershad's Jati party and Hasina's Awami League. But the AL, on the otherhand, blamed Ershad's government for vote rigging and ballot hijacking. Ershad reacted " Hasina had her rigging statement ready before the elections were actually held. She was preparing a ground for her possible defeat in the elections.¹³ The BNP demanded the immediate dissolution of parliament and a fresh, free and fair election. But the General rejected the demand of the BNP.

Democratic Forces Triumph

The anti- Ershad movement received a stimulus in November 1987 when the three major alliances and the Jamaat-i-Islami declared a 'Dhaka gharao' program. Although the gharao program's spirit was short-lived, it inspired the opposition parties to continue their movement against the autocratic regime. As a result of this movement Ershad was compelled to dissolve the parliament on December 6, 1987. The fourth parliamentary elections were held in 1988 without the participation of the three major alliance and the Jammat-i-Islami. However, the real threat to the regime came in October 10, 1990, when the three alliances chalked out a fresh program asking General Ershad to hand over power to a neutral and non-political person acceptable to them. The events and developments of October and November 1990 cleared the way for the victory of the democratic forces in Bangladesh. The two months long anti-Ershad movement spearheaded by the All Party Students Union (APSU), supported by political parties and professional groups as well as pressure from donor countries and agencies, compelled Ershad to resign on December 4, 1990. On December 6, 1990 Ershad handed over power to a

caretaker government headed by Chief Justice Shahabuddin Ahmed.¹⁴ On the same day chief justice Shahabuddin Ahmed, nominee of the three alliances, was sworn in as acting president of the country. After assuming the post of acting president Shahabuddin Ahmed announced that parliamentary elections would be held on February 27, 1991. These elections are among the most important in the history of Bangladesh politics.

Table- 2 shows the results of the 5th parliamentary elections in Bangladesh.

Name of party	No. of seats secured
Bangladesh Nationalist Party (BNP)	140
Awami League (AL)	88
Jatio Party (JP)	35
Jamat -i-Islami	18
Communist Party of Bangladesh (CPB)	5
Bangladesh Krishak Sramik Awami League (BAKSAL)	5
National Awami Party (Muzffar)	1
Islami Okkaya Jote	1
Jatio Smajtantrik Dal (Seraj)	1
Workers Party	1
Gonotantrik Party	1
National Democratic Party (NDP)	1
Independents	3
Total	300

Source: Election Commission

The results of the fifth parliamentary elections in Bangladesh surprised every body. People voted for BNP for its anti- Indian stand and uncompromising struggle against General Ershad. Neither the BNP nor the Awami League has any realistic program in its election manifesto which would reflect the interest of the poor peasants and workers, or the middle and lower middle classes. The voters, both in the rural and urban areas considered the following issues before casting their votes: (1) Bengali or Bangladeshi nationalism, secularism or Bismillah in the Constitution; (2) Joy Bangla or Bangladesh Zindabad and (3) pro-Indian or anti-India sentiment (27) However, after elections the B.N.P. headed by its leader Khaleda Zia established its authority stage by stage throughout the country by introducing parliamentary form of government through the 12th Amendment to the constitution. On October 9, 1991, Abudur Rahman Biswas, the nominee of the B.N.P. was elected president of the country.

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CHAPTER-SEVEN

SOCIO-ECONOMIC BACKGROUND OF THE MEMBERS OF FIFTH JATIO SANGSAD OF BANGLADESH

In a parliamentary system of government like Bangladesh, legislature plays an important role in nation-building activities, especially in making public policies and promoting socio-economic development. The Fifth Jatio Sangsad election (held in 1991) under a caretaker government brought about a new change in the legislative history in Bangladesh.¹ The Fifth Jatio Sangsad election reintroduced a parliamentary system of government after a huge breakthrough since 1972 that was first introduced after independence of Bangladesh in 1971. The legislature of Bangladesh is a unicameral parliament called Jatio Sangsad (JS). The Jatio Sangsad of Bangladesh consists of 330 members, of which 300 members are elected through universal suffrage, and the remaining 30 seats are reserved for women, who are indirectly elected by those directly elected 300 members of the parliament. The principal objective of this chapter is to examine the social profiles as well as the patterns of recruitment of the members of the Fifth Jatio Sangsad of

Bangladesh. Based upon the extensive review of scholarly literature relating to the political system in Bangladesh, this chapter makes an effort to verify the following specific proposed research hypotheses based on the empirical data on the members of the Fifth Jatio Sangsad of Bangladesh.

Hypothesis 1: In general the educational level of legislators in Bangladesh will tend to be much higher than that of the general population of the country.

Hypothesis 2: Most legislators across the board will have more India-related experiences and connections than Pakistan-related connections and experiences.

Hypothesis 3: The level of organizational affiliations of the legislators will be varied across the political parties.

Hypothesis 4: There will be significant differences between the male and female legislators in terms of their educational and political experiences.

DATA ANALYSIS AND HYPOTHESIS TESTING

In the following sections an effort has been made to analyze the SPSS output data in order to test the above hypotheses regarding the social background of the members of the Fifth Jatio Sangsad of Bangladesh.

HYPOTHESIS 1: IN GENERAL, THE EDUCATIONAL LEVEL OF THE LEGISLATORS IN BANGLADESH WILL TEND TO BE MUCH HIGHER THAN THAT OF THE GENERAL POPULATION OF THE COUNTRY.

Bangladesh is one of the developing countries of the world where majority of the people are illiterate and uneducated. According to 1998 statistics nearly 38 percent of the people of Bangladesh are literate in which 49 percent are males and only 26 percent are female (U.S Department of States, June 1998). Among the literate people of Bangladesh a very small percentages of people have college and university education that would be below 5% of the total population of the country. Data suggest that in compared to the general people of Bangladesh the rate of education among the legislators of Bangladesh is very much higher. However, table 1 also supports hypothesis 1 in that all the legislators of the Fifth Jatio Sangsad were literate despite the

differences in the level of education across the political parties, and a very high percentages (79.7%) of the total legislators had either bachelor's, master's, postgraduate diploma or doctoral degrees. More specifically, of the total 330 members of the Fifth Jatio Sangsad 304 members (92.31%) had either high school, college or university degrees and only 5(1.5%) legislators had no high school degrees while data regarding the educational background of 21 (6.4%) legislators were missing.

TABLE 1
Educational Attributes of Jatio Sangsad Members, by Party

Level of Education	AL N=92	BNP N=170	JP N=35	Religion oriented Parties N=21	Leftist Parties N=8	Other N=2	Indepe dent N=2	All members N=330
Non-High School Education	2.2% (2)	.6% (1)	5.7% (2)	0	0	0	0	1.5% (5)
S.S.C	1.1% (1)	3.5% (6)	0	0	0	0	0	2.1% (7)
H.S.C	8.7% (8)	12.4% (21)	5.7% (2)	14.3% (3)	0	0	0	10.3% (34)
Bachelor's Degree	54.3% (50)	37.6% (64)	57.1% (20)	47.6% (10)	75% (6)	50% (1)	0	45.8% (151)
Master's Degree	28.3% (26)	29.4% (50)	22.9% (8)	33.3% (7)	25% (2)	50% (1)	100% (2)	29.1% (96)
Postgraduate Diploma	1.1% (1)	4.7% (8)	2.9% (1)	0	0	0	0	3% (10)
Doctoral Degree	1.1% (1)	2.4% (4)	2.9% (1)	0	0	0	0	1.8% (6)
Missing Data	3.3% (3)	9.4% (16)	2.9% (1)	4.8% (1)	0	0	0	6.4% (21)
Total	100% (92)	100% (170)	100% (35)	100% (21)	100% (8)	100% (2)	100% (2)	100% (330)

HYPHESIS 2: MOST LEGISLATORS ACROSS THE BOARD WILL HAVE MORE INDIA-RELATED EXPERIENCES AND CONNECTIONS THAN PAKISTAN-RELATED CONNECTIONS AND EXPERIENCES.

Overseas travel experience is a social phenomenon of the legislators that reveals their economic and social status in the country. From table 2 it is presentable that the overseas travel experiences of the

legislators from different political parties of Bangladesh had very significant differences. However, table 2 supports hypothesis 2 to some extent in that the legislators from all the political parties had much more India related connection than Pakistan. The table shows that of 330 members of the Fifth Jatio Sangsad 117 (35.6%) members visited India while only 48 (14.6%) members of the Fifth Jatio Sangsad visited Pakistan. Table 2 also reveals of fascinating fact that among the legislators from two major political parties of Bangladesh, the percentages (42.4%) of the legislators from AL who visited India were much higher than that of the percentages (32.5%) of the legislators from the ruling BNP who visited India. On the other hand, the percentages of the legislators from BNP were much higher than the percentages of the legislators from the AL who visited Pakistan, UK, US and Europe or Middle East. ✓

Table 3 has also some supports for hypothesis 2 because it shows that the legislators of the Fifth Jatio Sangsad of Bangladesh have much India related connection in terms of foreign education. According to the table, out of 330 members of the Fifth Jatio Sangsad only 42(12.7%) members

obtained foreign education of which 10 members (3% of the total members) obtained foreign education from India and only 3 members (.9% of total members) obtained their foreign education from Pakistan. However, the highest percentages (5.8% or 19 of 330) of the legislators who received foreign education were from United Kingdom. Even the percentages of legislators who received foreign education from US were higher than that of the percentages of the legislators who obtained foreign education from Pakistan. However, several inferences can be drawn from table 2 and table 3 in support of hypothesis 2. First, India is a neighbor country of Bangladesh and there are much culture similarities between India (especially West Bengal of India) and Bangladesh than Pakistan. On the other hand, Pakistan is more than one thousand miles away from Bangladesh. Besides, both the cost and standard of higher education in India is less and better than that of Pakistan. Finally, after separation of Bangladesh from Pakistan in 1971 the Bangladeshi people especially the middle-class Bangladeshis were alienated from Pakistan.

TABLE-2
Overseas Travel Experience of JS Members, by Party.

Overseas Travel	AI. N=92	BNP N=170	JP N=35	Religion- oriented Parties N=21	Leftist Parties N=8	Other N=2	Independ ent	ALL members N=330
Travel to India YES	42.4% (39)	32.5% (55)	34.3% (12)	23.8% (5)	50% (4)	100% (2)	0% (0)	35.6 (117)
NO	57.6% (53)	67.5% (115)	65.7% (23)	76% (16)	50% (4)	0% (0)	100% (2)	64.4% (213)
Travel to Pakistan YES	10.9% (10)	18.3% (31)	8.6% (3)	9.5% (2)	0% (0)	50% (1)	50% (1)	14.6% (48)
NO	91.1% (82)	81.7% (139)	91.4% (32)	90.5% (19)	100% (8)	50% (1)	50% (1)	85.4% (282)
Travel to UK YES	16.3% (15)	27.2% (46)	11.4% (4)	14.3% (3)	25% (2)	100% (2)	50% (1)	22.2% (73)
NO	83.7% (77)	72.8% (124)	88.8% (31)	85.7% (18)	75% (6)	0% (0)	50% (1)	77.8% (257)
Travel to US YES	8.7% (8)	21.3% (36)	14.3% (5)	4.8% (1)	12.5% (1)	50% (1)	50% (1)	16.1% (53)
NO	91.3% (84)	81.7% (134)	85.7% (30)	95.2% (20)	87.5% (7)	50% (1)	50% (1)	83.9% (277)
Travel to Europe YES	27.2% (25)	36.1% (61)	20% (7)	9.5% (2)	50% (4)	100% (2)	50% (1)	31% (102)
NO	72.8% (67)	63.9% (109)	80% (28)	90.5% (19)	50% (4)	0% (0)	50% (1)	69% (228)
Travel to Middle East YES	7.6% (7)	23.1% (39)	8.6% (3)	19% (4)	0% (4)	50% (1)	50% (1)	16.7% (55)
NO	92.4% (85)	66.9% (131)	91.4% (32)	81% (17)	100% (8)	50% (1)	50% (1)	83.3% (275)

Source: Md. Rafiqul Islam. Recruitment of Legislators To Bangladeshi Parliament: Pathways to National Politics in A Developing Nation. Indiana. Journal of Political Science. vol. 15, 2000.

TABLE 3

Foreign Education/Degree/Diploma of Fifth JS Members of Bangladesh

Foreign Education	Frequency	Vilid Percent	Cumulative Percet
USA	5	1.5	1.5
UK	19	5.8	7.3
Elsewhere in Europe	1	.3	7.6
India	10	3	10.6
Pakistan	3	.3	11.5
Elsewhere Abroad	4	1.2	12.7
No Foreign Education	288	87.3	100
Total	330	100	

HYPOTHESIS 3: THE LEVEL OF ORGANIZATIONAL AFFILIATIONS OF LEGISLATORS WILL BE VARIED ACROSS THE POLITICAL PARTIES

Data on the organizational affiliations of the legislators (table 4) show that their affiliations with different organizations such as membership in parliamentary committees, business organizations and/or social cultural organizations were varied across their political parties that were supportive of hypothesis 3. Table 4 shows that 61 (66.3%) of 92 legislators from AL, 91 (53.8%) of 170 logislators from BNP, 16(45.7%)

of 35 legislator from JP, 19 (90.5%) of 21 from religion-oriented parties and 7 (87.6%) of 8 legislators from leftist parties were members of the parliamentary committees. On the other hand, only 8 (8.7%) of 92 legislators from AL, 26 (15.4%) of 170 legislators from BNP and 1 (2.9%) of 35 legislators from JP were affiliated with business organization while no legislators of religion-oriented or leftist parties had affiliation with any business organizations.

TABLE 4
Organizational Affiliations of JS Members, by Party

Organizational Affiliation	AL N=92	BNP N=170	JP N=35	Religions oriented Parties N=21	Leftist Parties N=8	Other N=2	Indepe dent N=2	All members N=330
Membership in Parliamentary committee	66.3% (61)	53.8% (91)	45.7% (16)	90.5% (19)	87.5% (7)	50% (1)	100% (2)	59.9% (197)
YES								
NO	33.7% (31)	46.2% (79)	54.3% (19)	9.5% (2)	12.5% (1)	50% (1)	0% (0)	40.1% (133)
Membership in Social/Cultural Organization								
YES	35.9% (33)	53.3% (90)	31.4% (11)	0	12.5% (1)	0	50% (1)	41.3% (136)
NO	64.1% (59)	46.7% (80)	69.6% (24)	100% (21)	87.5% (7)	100% (2)	50% (1)	59.7% (194)
Membership in Business Organization								
YES	8.7 % (8)	15.4% (26)	2.9% (1)	0	0	0	0	10.6% (35)
NO	91.3% (84)	84.6% (144)	97.1% (34)	100% (21)	100% (8)	100% (2)	100% (2)	89.4% (295)
Membership in Social Welfare Organization								
YES	32.6% (30)	46.7% (79)	22.9% (8)	4.8% (1)	25% (2)	0	0	36.5% (120)
NO	67.4% (62)	53.3% (91)	77.1% (27)	93.2% (21)	75% (6)	100% (2)	100% (2)	63.5% (210)

Source : Md. Rafiqul Islam, *op.cit.* p. 45

Likewise, 30 (32.6%) of 92 elected members of AL, 79 (46.7%) of 170 from BNP of 8 (22.9%) of 35 elected legislators from JP were the members of the social welfare organizations. Besides, only 1 (4.8%) from 21 elected legislators

of religion-oriented parties and 2 from 8 elected legislators or the leftist parties had affiliation with social welfare organizations that are indicative of the variation of the level of organizational affiliations of the legislators across the political parties of Bangladesh.

HYPOTHESIS 4: THERE WILL BE SIGNIFICANT DIFFERENCES BETWEEN THE MALE AND FEMALE LEGISLATORS IN TERMS OF THEIR EDUCATION AND POLITICAL EXPERIENCES

The educational and political backgrounds of the legislators significantly impact upon their behavior, role perceptions and /or legislative or political decisions.² Due to the differences in educational and political backgrounds of the legislators there might have differences of attitudes and outlooks among the legislators. The differences in educational and political backgrounds of legislators are perceived not only in terms of party affiliations, religion or ethnicity but also in terms of gender. However, in the following section an effort has been made to examine the educational and political backgrounds of the male and female legislators of the Fifth Jatio Sangsad of Bangladesh in order to test hypothesis 4.

Educational Differences Between Male and Female Legislators

The tables 5,6 and 7 partly support hypothesis 4 that present the differences between the male and female members of the Fifth Jatio Sangsad of Bangladesh in terms of their educational experiences. Table 5 shows that a very small number (5 of 296) of elected male legislators do not have any high school degree while all the female legislators have a minimum high school degree. This table also shows 47.6% (141 of 296) of the male legislators had bachelors degree and 29.4% (87 of 296) of them obtained Master's degree. Only 2% (6) of the male legislators had doctoral degree. Of the female legislators, 29.4% (10 of 34) had bachelor's degree and 26.5% (9 of 34) of them had Master's degree. But none of the female legislators obtained a Ph.D.

TABLE 5

Educational Background of JS Members, by Gender

Level of Education	Male (N=296)	Female (N=34)	All Members N=330
Non-High School Education	5(1.7%)	0	5 (1.5%)
S.S.C Degree	5(1.7%)	2 (5.9%)	7 (2.1%)
H.S.C. Degree			
Bachelor's Degree	26 (8.8%)	8 (23.5%)	34 (1.5%)
Master's Degree	141 (47.6%)	10 (29.4%)	151 (45.8%)
Postgraduate	9 (3%)	1 (26. 5%)	96 (29.1%)
Doctoral Degree	6 (2%)	0	6 (1.8%)
Missing Data	17 (5.7%)	4 (11. 98%)	21 (6.4% %)
Total	296 (100%)	34 (100%)	330 (100%)

Table -6

Legal Educational	Male (N=296)	Female (N=34)	All Members N=330
L.L.B.	59 (19,9%)	0	59 (17.9%)
L.L.M.	4 (1.4%)	0	4 (1/2%)
Barrister at Law	7 (2.4%)	0	7 (2 1%)
No Law Degree	226 (100%)	34 (100%)	260 (78.8%)
Total	296 (100%)	34 (100%)	330 (100%)

Table 6 shows that a large number (23.7%) or 70 of 296) of male legislators of the Fifth Jatio Sangsad had legal education while no female legislators of the Fifth Jatio Sangsad of Bangladesh had law degree. Table 7 shows the significant differences between male and female legislators

in terms of foreign education. This table shows that among the male legislators of the Fifth Jatio Sangsad 42 (14.2%) of 296 male legislators obtained foreign education while no female legislators of the Fifth Jatio Sangsad has foreign education.

TABLE 7

Foreign Education of Fifth JS Members, by Gender

Foreign Education	Male (N=296)	Female (N=34)	All Members N=330
USA	5 (1.7%)	0	5 (1.5%)
UK	19 (6.4%)	0	19 (5.8%)
Elsewhere in Europe	1 (.3%)	0	1 (.3%)
India	10 (3.4%)	0	10 (3%)
Pakistan	3 (1%)	0	3 (.9%)
Elsewher Abroad	4 (1.4%)	0	4 (1.2%)
No Foreign Education	254 (85.5%)	34 (100%)	288 (87.3%)
Total	296 (100%)	34 (100%)	330 (100%)

Male and Female Legislators and Their Political Experience

In the developing country like Bangladesh women participation in political system either in local or national level is very low especially in compared to their male counterparts. However, differences in political experiences between male and female legislators of Bangladesh will best be understood from analysis of the following tables. Table 8 shows that of 296 male members of the Fifth Jatio Sangsad 73 male members (24.7%) achieved party office either in central or local levels while 10 (29.4%) of 34 female members held party offices before entering the Jatio Sangsad. This table in fact, shows very little differences between the male and female legislators in terms of their political experiences. However, table 9 supports hypothesis 5 to some extent which shows that 20 (6.7%)

of 296 male legislators had achieved local/municipal offices before entering the Fifth Jatio Sangsad while no female legislators achieved any local or municipal elected offices before entering the Fifth Jatio Sangsad.

TABLE 8
Holding Party Office of Fifth JS Members, by Gender

Holding Party Office	Male (N = 296)	Female (N = 34)	All Members (N=330)
Yes	73 (24.7%)	10 (29.4%)	83 (25.2%)
No	191 (75.3%)	24 (70.6%)	247 (74.8%)
Total	296 (100%)	34 (100%)	330 (100%)

TABLE 9
Local/Municipal Offices held, by Gender

Local/Municipal Offices Held	Male (N = 296)	Female (N = 34)	All Members (N=330)
Yes	20 (6.7%)	0	20 (6.1%)
No	276 (93.3%)	34 (100%)	310 (93.9%)
Total	296 (100%)	34 (100%)	330 (100%)

TABLE 10
Current Cabinet Member/Speaker, by Gender

Current Cabinet Member/Speaker	Male (N = 296)	Female (N = 34)	All Members (N=330)
Cabinet Minister	20 (6.8%)	1 (2.9%)	21 (6.4%)
State Minister	17 (5.8%)	2 (5.9%)	19 (5.8%)
Deputy Minister	3 (1%)	0	3 (.9%)
Speaker	1 (.3%)	0	3 (.3%)
Deputy Speaker	1 (.3%)	0	1 (.3%)
None	254 (85.3%)	31 (91.2%)	285 (86.3%)
Total	296 (100%)	34 (100%)	330 (100%)

Since independence of Bangladesh in 1971 a very few women held Cabinet positions in the successive cabinets in the land of the nation. Table-10 presents the distribution of current ministerial positions by gender. From this table it is evident that of 296 male legislators 20 (6.8%) were cabinet ministers, 17 (5.8%) were state ministers and only 3 (1%) legislator was deputy minister. On the contrary, of the 34 female legislators, 1 legislator was cabinet minister (Prime Minister) and 2 legislators (5.9%) were state ministers.

TABLE 11

Past Cabinet Members, by Gender

Past Cabinet Member	Male (N = 296)	Female (N = 34)	All Members (N=330)
Yes	22 (7.5%)	0	22 (6.7%)
No	274 (92.5%)	34 (100%)	308 (93.3%)
Total	296 (100%)	34 (100%)	330 (100%)

However, table 11 shows a significant difference between the male and female legislators in terms of their past experience in the cabinet. This table shows that of 296 male members of the Fifth Jatio Sangsad 22 (7.5%) were past cabinet members while no female members of the Fifth Jatio Sandsad were the member of past cabinet.

Table 12 shows the legislative experience or seniority pattern of the male and female members of the Fifth Parliament. Data from this table indicate that of 296 male legislators of the Fifth Jatio Sangsad 23 (7.8%) were elected to 1st Jatio Sangsad, 51 (17.3%) were elected to 2nd Jatio Sangsad, 32 (10.8%) were elected to 3rd Jatio Sangsad and 24 (8.1%) legislators were elected to the 4th Jatio Sangsad. Among the 34 female legislators of the fifth Jatio Sangsad only 2 legislators (5.9%) were elected to 1st Jatio Sangsad and 5 (14.7%) were elected to the 2nd Jatio Sangsad while no female members of the Fifth Jatio Sangsad was elected to either 3rd or 4th Jatio Sangsad.

TABLE 12

Legislative Experience of the Fifth JS Members, by Gender

Legislative Experience	Male (N = 296)	Female (N = 34)	All Members (N=330)
Elected to 1st Jatio Sangsad			
Yes	23 (7.8%)	2 (5.9%)	25 (7.6%)
No	273 (92.2%)	32 (94.1%)	305 (92.4%)
Total	296 (100%)	34 (100%)	330 (100%)
Elected to 2nd Jatio Sangsad			
Yes	51 (17.3%)	5 (14.7%)	56 (17%)
No	245 (82.3%)	29 (85.3%)	274 (83%)
Total	296 (100%)	34 (100%)	330 (100%)
Elected to 3rd Jatio Sangsad			
Yes	32 (10.8%)	0	32 (9.7%)
No	264 (89.2%)	34 (100%)	298 (90.3%)
Total	296 (100%)	34 (100%)	330 (100%)
Elected to 4th Jatio Sangsad			
Yes	24 (8.1%)	0	24 (9.3%)
No	272 (91.9%)	34 (100%)	306 (92.7%)
Total	296 (100%)	34 (100%)	330 (100%)

CONCLUSIONS:

The analysis of the social background of the members of the Fifth Jatio Sangsad reveals the fact that the patterns of recruitment of the legislators from different political ^{party} have significant differences. These differences among the legislators from political parties are perceived not only in terms of gender but also in terms of regional origin or birthplace, achievement of elected offices, education, occupation, overseas travel experiences or even in terms of their organizational affiliations. One interesting thing is revealed from the study of the social backgrounds of

the legislators of Bangladesh that is much India-related experiences and connections of the legislators than that of Pakistan in terms of both foreign education and travel experience. However, despite the differences in social backgrounds of the legislators from different political parties, there is a commonality among all the legislators of Bangladesh. This commonality of social background of the legislators is perceived in terms of their level of education as well as occupation that is entirely distinct from the educational level or occupation of the common masses of the country.

Finally, based on the empirical data on the biographical background of the members of the Fifth Jatio Sangsad an effort was made to present a common profile of the sociopolitical background of the legislators in Bangladesh. With the change of social, economic and political conditions of many developed and developing countries, many changes have been taken place about the role perceptions and political behaviors of legislators in the 21st century. In this respect, findings of this study are expected to generate new knowledge about the legislators and their role, as well as in understanding the recruitment patterns and socialization process of legislators in the developing nation like Bangladesh.

Footnotes;

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CHAPTER - EIGHT

MILITARY RULE AND DEPENDENT CAPITAL FORMATION IN BANGLADESH :

Bangladesh has long been ruled by the military dictatorship. Since late 70's and early 80's Bangladesh has made policy reforms and liberalized economy to accelerate local and foreign investment in the private sector. The industrial policies of 1982 and 1991 have put much emphasis on denationalization, privatization, marketization and globalization of the economy. This chapter deals with the process of dependent capital formation in Bangladesh.

Since independence of Bangladesh in 1971 till to-date multinational corporations (MNCs)/transnational corporations (TNCs) have been investing in different sectors of the economy in Bangladesh through foreign direct investment (FDI) with majority or minority equity participation. Table I of this chapter indicates that since 1971 to 1994, the amount of sanctioned totaled about Tk. 47,870 million in current prices for a total of 293 sanctioned units.¹ It is apparent from this figure that up-

to 1971 the amount of investments were about Tk. 383,69 millions in current prices for only 23 sanctioned units. Since 1971 to 1976 there was no trend of FDI flow in Bangladesh. This was because of the nationalization policy of industries of the then government. During that period the political condition of the country was volatile, economic growth was damaged by both floods and droughts and per capita income of the

TABLE-1
Flow of FDI in Bangladesh

Year	Total sanctioned units	No. of units in production	Amount of Investment in the sanctioned units (in million taka)
Upto 1971	23	23	359.69
1972/73	-	-	-
1973/74	-	-	-
1974/75	-	-	-
1975/76	-	-	-
Sub-total	23	23	359.69
1976/77	2	2	3.70
1977/78	2	1	30.87
1978/79	3	3	354.11
1979/80	2	2	14.88
1980/81	12	11	134.84
1981/82	-	-	-
Sub-total	21	19	538.40
1982/83	9	8	609.68

TABLE-1
flow of FDI in Bangladesh (Contd.).

Year	Total Sanctioned Units	No. of Units in Production	Amount of Investment in Sanctioned Units (in million taka)
1982/84	18	14	1097.89
1984/85	6	4	350.59
1985/86	5	1	93.56
1986/87	16	4	2280.01
1987/88	17	3	2546.97
198/87	19	-	4079.51
1989/90	N.A.	N.A.	1954.00
1990/91	11	6	331.80
Sub-total	111	40	13335.01
1991/92	24	18	1245.31
1992/93	41	-	954.65
1993/94	83	-	31503.58
Sub-total	148	-	33703.54

Source: Government of Bangladesh, Board of Investment (BOI). Reza, S. 21-22. Board of Investment Prime Ministers office Shilpa Bhaban, 91, Motijhil C/A Dhaka, Bangladesh.

Population was severely decreasing. So TNCs were discouraged to invest capital in the land of Bangladesh. But the political environment of Bangladesh was changed from mid-August, 1975 after the downfall of

Mujib government. Therefore, from 1975-77 to 1971-82 TNCs invested about Tk. 538 millions in current prices for a total of 21 sanctioned units in addition to the amount of sanctioned investment of total about Tk. 383 millions up-to 1971. Repeatedly, there was no trend in FDI flow in the country during 1981-82 due to the change of the government that occurred by the assassination of President Ziaur Rahman through the fourth military coup-d'etat in the history of new nation Bangladesh. During that time TNCs were discouraged to invest capital in fear of incurring loss that might occur due to the change of political environment in Bangladesh.

One significant feature visualizing from the table I is that FDI by TNCs in Bangladesh increased by leaps and bounds in 1993-1994 because of the liberalization procedures of the Industrial Policy 1991 and the stable political environment of Bangladesh. During that time the amounts of investment were about Tk. 31503 millions in current prices for a total of 83 sanctioned units. During the democratic government of Begum Khaleda Zia from 1991 to 1994 about Tk. 33703.54 millions in current prices were sanctioned through FDI by the TNCs for a total of

148 sanctioned units that were almost two-thirds of the total sanctioned investments in current prices since 1971 to 1994.

FDI by TNCs is a major catalyst of the industrial growth of Bangladesh. About 2.5 TNCs of more than 30 countries are making investments through FDI in different sectors and geographical areas of Bangladesh. Data suggest that prior to independence, pharmaceutical and chemical industries, followed by petroleum companies, were seen to have dominated the foreign capital inflow in Bangladesh in terms of attracting the bulk of FDI.² But in post independent Bangladesh, the past scenario has been changed and the FDI scene is at present found to be dominant mainly by textile (primarily ready-made garments followed by textile spinning mills and some hosiery units), followed by chemicals and food processing industries. Between 1973 and 1994 these three industries together accounted for over three-fourths of the total FDI flowing into Bangladesh. The other industries that attracted FDI flows are metals (3.49%) electrical goods (2.81%), paper and paper products (2.32%), leather and leather products (1.65%), pharmaceuticals (1.21%) and plastic products (1.18%). Compared to the earlier trends, TNCs now seem to be interested in making investments not only import substituting,

but also in a number of export oriented products like ready-made garments, canning and preservation of fish, fruits and vegetables, shrip culture and other food processing industries.³

From the start in 1978, the ready-made garments industry has emerged as a major export sector in Bangladesh. In 1992-93, garments alone accounted 52% of total export earnings, and if knitwear is included the contribution of this sector rises to 60%. Bangladesh now exports some 100 categories of garments to about 50 countries, with the U.S., Germany, France, the U.K., Italy, the Netherlands, Canada, Sweden, Belgium, and Norway. Bangladesh is now seventh largest exporter to the U.S, ninth largest exporter to Canada, and the largest exporter of shirts and t-shirts to EC.⁴ 29 of 205 foreign firms in the country have invested in ready-made garments: Fourteen from Hong kong (presently China), six from South Korea, two each from Singapore and Netherlands, one each from India, the U.S., Switzerland, Lichtenstein, and Japan.⁵

Besides the FDI inflow of TNCs, foreign investments by TNC have also taken the other forms in this country like technical collaboration, marketing/managerial collaboration, and licensing arrangement. Technical collaboration has taken place in insdustries that

include cigarettes, chemicals and pharmaceuticals (with UK firms), footwear (with Indian firms), standards prints (with Thai firms), electrical goods (South Korea firms) etc. Marketing collaboration has occurred with sterling companies in the tea industry and in the ready-made garments industry. Licensing arrangements are found predominantly in the chemical/pharmaceuticals sector wherein a growing number of indigenous firms are producing TNC brand products under license but without equity participation.

Factors Attracting TNC Participation Bangladesh

TNC investments in Bangladesh are affected by several factors. One of the fundamental factors that affect the participation of TNCs in domestic economy is the market size. From the geographical standpoint, Bangladesh has a land of 144,000 square kilometers with her population of about 130 millions. It has a limited natural resources, large population, low per capita income, low sectoral growth rate and widespread poverty and unemployment. With a current per capita income of only US \$220 and a high degree of inequality characterizing its distribution groups, under doubly, the size of domestic market is not considered to be very attractive for large-scale industrial investments, particularly by TNCs.

The rate of foreign investment in Bangladesh is lower than other South Asian countries including India, Pakistan, and Sri Lanka. Moreover, widespread administrative corruption, red tapism, inefficiency, centralized authority in decision making etc. hinder the implementation of different development programs that are also the stumbling blocks to the growth of TNCs in Bangladesh. Despite all these difficulties, the number of TNCs and the amount of capital investment are increasing day by day with some exceptions in Bangladesh. So, naturally some questions arise: How are TNCs increasing in Bangladesh? Why do TNCs invest more capital than the past? What things attract TNCs to invest capital in Bangladesh and how are TNCs dependent on these things? If TNCs are dependent on Bangladesh for resources then what strategies do they adopt to balance the dependency? Answers to these questions lie in different factors.

First, although the economic growth of Bangladesh is not satisfactory, but it has been improved in compared to the past decades after its independence. Current per capita income of the country is US \$220 but ten years ago it was below US \$145. So per capita income of the country is increasing day by day that is one of the reasons of

attracting TNCs in Bangladesh. Some observers view that by the year 2005 the population of the country will be about 140 millions that help attract TNCs invest capital in Bangladesh.

Besides, the present political condition and liberalization of government's industrial Policies are encouraging TNCs to invest capital in Bangladesh. Presently, Bangladesh government has introduced broad-based reforms in the sectoral policies, i.e., progressive liberalization in trade and industrial policies, reduction in subsidies and market-oriented pricing policies for agricultural inputs and outputs, cuts in public expenditures to reduce budget deficits, privatization of government owned enterprises, implementation of reforms in financial sector, increased efforts at domestic resource mobilization, through tax reforms and reform in tax administration, strengthening poverty-focused rural development effort etc. that are encouraging TNC investment in Bangladesh.⁶

One of the important resources of Bangladesh on which TNCs are to depend on while investing their capital is its labor market. Bangladesh possesses vast manpower resources. According to 1989 Labor Force Survey Report the total labor force in the country is stands at 50.7

millions of whom 29.7 millions were males and 21.0 millions females⁷. Due to the huge labor force TNCs employ laborers from Bangladesh by low labor cost in compared to their home countries. This labor costs help the TNCs to save their capital that is further invested for production which in turn bring more profits to them. From Marxist points of view, capitalists accumulate capital by exploiting the laborers/proletariats. Because they are lower paid. The profits that capitalists make by exploiting the laborers through offering lower pay than the actual is called surplus value that help them to accumulate more and more capital. This theory suggests that the rise of capitalism fully depends of the means of production i.e. the labor force. So is the case of the TNCs in Bangladesh.

TNCs make profits through their investment in Bangladesh. On the other hand, Bangladesh depends on TNCs for bringing about economic and social development through employment generation, technology transfer, increase tax revenue, increase exports and so on. TNCs use bargaining/negotiating strategy for balancing its dependency relationship.

From these discussions, it is apparent that Although presently TNCs are investing more in Bangladesh than the past it does not mean that TNCs are dependent on Bangladesh. Actually TNCs operating in Bangladesh are playing a monopolistic role. If TNCs break off relations with Bangladesh or do not invest in Bangladesh then the economic growth of Bangladesh will be hampered. Because the developing countries like Bangladesh heavily depend on foreign investment for social and economic transformations of these countries. TNCs also play a significant role in the increase of taxes of the Bangladesh government. Therefore, for a variety of reasons Bangladesh is more dependent on TNCs than ^(the) are on Bangladesh.

Footnotes :

1. Sadrel Reza, Transnational Corporations in Bangladesh : Still at Bay? (University Press Limited, Dhaka, Bangladesh 1995) pp.21-22
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3. Sadrel Reza, op.cit, P. 33

4. Saiful Islam, "Foreign Investment Effects on Balance Payment : A Bangladesh Case Study" in Asian Survey, vol XXXIV, no. 1, April 1994. P. 44
5. Saiful Islam, op.cit, P. 346
6. C, Humphrey, Privatization in Bangladesh : Economic Transition in a poor country (University Press Limited, Dhaka, 1992) .
7. See, Statistical year book of Bangladesh, 1992.

CHAPTER-NINE

PROBLEMS OF NATIONAL INTEGRATION AND MILITARISATION IN THE CHITTAGONG HILL TRACTS.

Bangladesh is a homogeneous country. The Bangladesh society does not have any major ethnic- linguistic cleavage. Social scientists say that regional, historical, religious, linguistic, cultural or ethnic divisions among the population are the major problems of national identity.¹ So far as these problems are concerned, Bangladesh appears to be one of the most favored nations of the world. The Chittagong Hill Tracts, however, is a trouble area where Shanti Bahini, the organization of the Chakma tribe, has been trying to establish a separate homeland through armed struggle. This chapter deals with the problems of national integration and militarisation in the Chittagong Hill Tracts.

The Chittagong Hill Tracts (CHT) consists of Bandarban, Rangamati and Khagrachari districts of Bangladesh and is surrounded by the Indian state of Mizoram in the east, Burmese state of Arakan in the

south, Indian state of Tripura in the north and northwest and Chittagong in the West. It has an area of approximately 5,093 square miles or about 10 per cent of the total land area of Bangladesh, and a population of more than six hundred thousand of which four hundred thousand are tribals and the rest are Bangladeshis settled from the plains. The tribals are ethnically allied to the Mongoloid race and differ much from the rest of the Bengali majority of the country. Their economies, culture, social and political organizations bear much similarity to those of Assam and Upper Burma tribes.² The CHT is a land of ethnic national minorities, namely; Chakma, Marma, Bom, Lushai, Tanchangya, Tripura, Murung, Ryang, Pankhui, Chak, Khumi, Mro and Khyang of which Chakma is dominant numerically, educationally, socially and culturally. These diverse ethnic and national minorities have a close cultural, ethnic and religious affinity among themselves but are socially, linguistically and culturally different from the majority Bengalis in the plains. The majority of the tribal population is Buddhist, the second largest segment is Hindu and the rest are Christians and Animists.³ Their livelihood depends on subsistence agriculture, mainly shifting cultivation called jhum (slash and burn)

farming. The political system of the Chakma was influenced by the Moghuls, but the basic structures were shaped by the political systems of the Arakanese.⁴

In 1860 the British officially annexed the area and established the Chittagong Hill Tracts District (CHT). To restrict all migration into the area the British promulgated the CHT Regulation of 1900.⁵ The CHT Regulation of 1900 gave the indigenous people more or less limited self-government, though it destroyed their tribal political system. The 1900 Regulation divided the Hill Tracts into three revenue circles each headed by a Raja (King). The Process of detribalisation of the CHT by political migration from the plains was started in a large scale directly by government -sponsored programs.

THE ROOTS OF THE SECESSIONIST MOVEMENT

The seeds of the dissatisfaction of the CHT tribal people lay in the construction of the Kaptai Dam in 1960 at Karnapuli. The Dam was built with a view to accelerating economic development in the then East

Pakistan (now Bangladesh) but it was done at the cost of the tribal people. It submerged an area of 400 square miles, including 250 square miles of prime agricultural land, making up 40 per cent of the total cultivable land of the area. Nearly 18,000 families totaling more than 100,000 persons were affected by the flooding.⁶ The Dam not only submerged a large tract of cultivable land but also caused irreparable damage to the 'jhum' pattern of cultivation and created serious unemployment problems for the tribal people. Even as late as 1984, some people were complaining: "We have not been able to construct a house like the one built by our ancestors and which is now under the waters of the Kaptai Lake. We now live in a makeshift thatched house."⁷ This was the version of a good number of well-to-do people. The condition of the poorer section was worse.

After the emergence of Bangladesh the Awami league government led by Sheikh Mujibur Rahman committed another misdeed by not granting special status to the CHT people under the constitution of 1972 which they had enjoyed under the 1900 Regulation. These wrong decisions generated anti-Bangladeshi feelings among the CHT tribal people. By exploiting this anti-Bangladeshi sentiment, Manobendra

Narayan Larma, a member of the parliament, rose to the position of a hero of the CHT tribal people. On February 15, 1972, a delegation led by Mr. Larma called on Prime Minister Mujibur Rahman and presented four basic demands of the tribal people. These were :

- (1) Autonomy of the Chittagong Hill Tracts with its own legislature.
- (2) Retention of the 1900 Regulation in the Bangladesh constitution.
- (3) The tribal chiefs to be allowed to continue in office with full administrative powers.
- (4) A constitutional guarantee that the 1900 Regulations would not be amended and that Bengali families would not be allowed to settle in the area.⁸

MUJIB'S RESPONSE TO THE CHT PROBLEMS

Sheikh Mujibur Rahman rejected the demands and threw away the memorandum saying "forget your ethnic identity, be Bengali". He also threatened the delegation with the possible mass Bengali settlement from the plains to the CHT and the process of militarisation. No provision of the CHT has been included the constitution.⁹

The 1972 constitution of the people's Republic of Bangladesh designated the citizens of Bangladesh as Bengalis and "Bengali" nationalism was defined as the basis of the "Unity and Solidarity" of the Bengali nation. In its bid to underscore Bengali nationalism, the A.L. government did an injustice to the other nationalities, because in Bangladesh, besides the Bengalis who form an overwhelming majority, there are also Chakma, Tripura, Marma, Murung, Chak, Khiyay, Lushai, Pankho, Pown and Khumi people from CHT. Rakhain from Chittagong and Barisal; Manipuri from Sylhet; Garo from Tangail and Mymensingh; Hajong, Munda and Santal from Dinajpur, Bagura and Rangpur districts.¹⁰ The government's unicultural and unilingual nation-state policy antagonized the tribal people. As a result, the CHT tribals refused to identify themselves with Bengali nationalism. M.N. Larma declared. "I am a Chakma, not a Bengali. I am a citizen of Bangladesh, a Bangladeshi. You are also a Bangladeshi but your national identity is Bengali..... They (Tribals) can never be Bengalis."¹¹

But the A.L. considered the CHT as an integral part of Bangladesh like any other part and refused to recognize the tribals as separate sub-national groups. It insisted that the tribals would be called Bangalis and must have the same Bengali education and identity as the rest of the people. Mujib's advocacy of Bengali nationalism was unwise, unreal, and impolitic. His cultural assimilation policy towards the CHT tribal people brought him close to the cultural assimilation policy of the Pakistani leaders who, immediately after independence, introduced Urdu as state language to strengthen national unity. This lingua franca policy created an identity crisis for Pakistan rather than the sought for integration. As a result, the vernacular elite of East Pakistan (now Bangladesh) revolted against the ruling elite of Pakistan and this helped develop Bengali nationalism and paved the way for the independence of Bangladesh.¹² Mujib's cultural assimilation policy frustrated the CHT tribal people as Pakistan's policy had frustrated the Bengalis. They formed the Shanti Bahini, led by Manobendra Narayan Larma, to achieve their demands through a protracted armed struggle. After Sheikh Mujib's rejection of the four point demand, the CHT tribal people formed the Parbottya Chittagong

Jana Sanghati Samiti (PCJSS) led by Monobendra Naryan Larma in 1972. An armed wing of the PCJSS has been working for the realization of these demands. It is commonly known as the Shanti Bahini (Peace Force).

Militarisation of the CHT issue.

After the assassination of Sheikh Mujibur Rahman the Shanti Bahini leader, Manobendra Narayan Larma, along with most of the top ranking members, took shelter in India and launched sporadic attacks in the non-tribal areas. During this time, they were able to maintain relations with the Indian Government. As a result, the successive governments after Mujib faced internal threat from the CHT rebellion. With a view to minimizing this threat, Ziaur Rahman followed a "stick and carrot" policy. He described the CHT problem as an economic one. In order to step up the CHT tribal people's economic development he undertook a massive development program in the neglected tribal areas and to hasten local participation in development activities the government created the Chittagong Hill Tracts Development Board (CHTDB) at Rangamati in 1976. But it is noteworthy that the real power of the Board lay in the hands of the government, although sixty per cent of its members were from

among the tribal people. So the CHTD could not bring about any structural change for the tribal people. M.M. Hoque rightly observed. "Real authority lies with the Cabinet Division at the central secretariat..... Even if the tribal component of the Board's personnel were 100 per cent, instead of the present 60 per cent, and the tribal representatives were in the majority in the consultative committee, the situation could not have changed substantially."¹³ The motives of the CHDB were political and military. On the one hand, Zia allocated a huge amount of money for the economic development of the tribal people, on the other, he deployed about one division of soldiers to subdue the CHT rebels. This dual policy triggered off the armed struggle of the tribal people. His support for Bangladeshi nationalism, which de-emphasized the linguistic and cultural basis of Bengali identity, also could not satisfy the tribals.

The situation in the CHT became worse in early 1980 when the Shanti Bahini killed 2 army men, including an officer. This incident angered the troops stationed at Kaokhali. On March 25, 1980, the Bangladesh army perpetrated a massacre at Kaokhali Bazar, breaking all previous records of

brutalities.¹⁴ But bullets could not silence the voice of the CHT tribal people. Upendralal Chakma, a member of parliament belonging to the CHT area, vehemently criticized the Bangladesh army activities at Kaokhali Bazar and demand neutral inquiry into the incident. The Zia government formed a five-member parliamentary committee to review the law and order situation in the CHT. The committee did not include a single member from the opposition party. As a consequence, a three-member fact-finding committee comprising opposition M.P.s Shahjahan Siraj and Upendralal Chakma of Jatio Samajtantrick Dal and Rashed Khan Menon of Workers Party was formed to investigate the incident. The committee opined that the CHT problems was a political one and should be resolved politically by ensuring the rights of the oppressed nationalities. The committee urged the government to recognise the rights of the nationalities of the CHT for immediate implementation of the following six measures :

- (1) judicial inquiry into the incident of March 25 and punishment of the killers;
- (2) rehabilitation of the distressed with due security arrangements;
- (3) reconstruction of the damaged Buddhist religious institutions, compensation for the losses incurred by the Kyangs and apology for

hurting religious sentiments; (4) check on the influx of Bengali people; (5) immediate withdrawal of plainsmen settled in the district; and (6) withdrawal of restrictions on the movements of goods in the markets and bazars.¹⁵

A HARSH LAW

Zia did not give any importance to the recommendations of the three-member fact-finding committee. Rather, he introduced the Disturbed Areas Bill in parliament in December 1980. The Bill gave a junior or non-commissioned officer, police sub-inspector or " officer of the Bangladesh Rifles not below the rank of Habildar" (a junior or non-commissioned officer) unrestricted powers to shoot anyone suspected of anti-state activities. It also allowed military and paramilitary personnel to arrest people without warrant in any defined politically disturbed areas. All actions provided for in the Bill were given unqualified protection from judicial challenge.¹⁵ The new law immediately became a target of criticism from various quarters. Upendralal Chakma termed it as a genocide solution to the problems of ethnic minorities of the CHT. The Guardian (of

London) wrote." The army and police would be immune from challenge in the courts and could enter any premises without warrant. For the paramilitary opposition the Act was seen as sanctioning violation of human rights. Such legislation is indeed extraordinary since even legislation enacted in war-time, such as the Defense of India Rules passed during promulgated the second world war or the Defense of Pakistan Rules during 1965, do not provide such powers of shooting to kill as are provided under the Disturbed Areas Act.¹⁷ However, the law did not come into effect because of the assassination of President Ziaur Rahman in May 1981.

Like Zia, the Ershad regime also followed a "stick and carrot" policy to minimize the grievances of the tribal people. On the one hand, he engaged a large number of regular troops to subdue the rebels, and on the other, declared general amnesty in mid-1986 to satisfy them. This dual policy evoked a mixed reaction among the tribal rebels. During this period, some 2500 rebels belonging mostly to the Priti group laid down their arms voluntarily in order to be reintegrated into the mainstream tribal life.¹⁸ But

the Larm group intensified its guerilla activities with the military backing of the Indian government. To counter the Shanti Bahini activities, Ershad patronized the Tribal Convention which had been formed in early 1980 by president Zia with Charu Bikash Chakma as its general secretary. But the convention failed to establish its base in the CHT as a counter-weight to the Shanti Bahini. Its main support came from a small number of urban CHT educated middle class who were detached from the masses. He also established Jukta Gram, Adarsha Gram. Ershad considered the problem as political one. With a view to solving the CHT problem politically Ershad Government opened dialogue with the Jano Sanhati Samity (JSS) in 1985. In 1987 the JSS presented Five-Point program to the government. These are :

- (1) Removal of all non-tribal settlers from the CHT.
- (2) Withdrawal of all Bangladesh armed forces from the CHT, including the non-tribal police force.
- (3) Retention of the Chittagong Hill Tracts Regulation of 1900 and a constitutional provision restricting the amendment of the regulations.

- (4) Autonomy for the CHT with its own legislature and recognition of the Jumma nation's right to self-determination.
- (5) Deployment of the the UN peace keeping Force in the CHT and implementation of these measures under the auspices of the United Nations organisation.¹⁹

To counter the Five-point program of the J.S.S. the government presented Nine-point program with district councils. Ershad government rejected the Five-point demand as it was inconsistent with the constitution of Bangladesh and a threat to the sovereignty and independence of Bangladesh. In 1988 government presented the Nine-Point Rupa Rekha with District Council but the J.S.S. rejected the proposal. Under these circumstances, the J.S.S. placed its Five-point charter of demands in a modified form by dropping the demand of legislature for CHT. Government rejected the modified demand on the plea that Bangladesh is a "Unitary state" with a single legislature. The country has five administrative divisions, but the basic structures are highly centralized.²⁰ In 1989 Government brought four bills in the parliament viz;

- (1) The Chittagong Hill Tracts Regulation-1900 (1 or 1900) Repealment Bill, 1989.
- (2) Rangamati Parbattya Zilla Parishad Bill, 1989.
- (3) Khagrachari Parbattya Zilla Parishad Bill, 1989.
- (4) Bandarban Parbattya Zilla Parishad Bill, 1989.

Bangladesh Government Passed the bills in February, 1989 and announced the date of Zilla Parishad election to be held on 25 June, 1989. In February 1989 the Parliament passed the Bills Providing for limited local autonomy in the Chittagong Hill Tracts through the creation of three elected Hill District Councils in the districts of Rangamati, Khagrachari and Bandarban. Elections to the councils were held in June. The Legislation gives responsibility to the councils for several areas for civil administration, including the appointment of police up to the rank of assistant subinspector and approval of land sales.²¹ The new legislation did not satisfy the J.S.S. and Shanti Bahini which opposed its passage through parliament and boycotted the elections. Prior to the elections, President Hossain Mohammad Ershad offered an amnesty to Shanti Bahini activities

who surrendered between 23 April and 20 May and asked them to Participate in the elections. The Shanti Bahini has since then continued its campaign of violent opposition to the government and of attacks on non-tribal settlers in the region.

The J.S.S. called upon the CHT people to boycott the elections. But they failed to foil the elections. Zilla parishad elections served the Govt's interest in nationally and internationally. As a result of this election, Government got an opportunity to solve the CHT problem politically. Bangladesh Government was also able to give an impression to the donor countries that Shanti Bahini's unconstitutional activities prevented the constitutional solution to the problem. The CHT problem is a foreign aid problem and it is connected with the human rights issue. Through the Zilla Parishad elections, Ershad Government successfully adopted discrimination policy among the tribal people.²²

Zilla Parishad Elections and Discrimination Policy

The Chakma, who constitute 48.12 per cent of CHT tribals, are the majority group. The Marmas are the second and the Tripuras are the third

largest groups, who constitute 27.78 and 12.31. Percent respectively. But through the Districts Councils elections Government deprived the Chakmas from their due seats and widen the rift among the tribals. The following table I shows the discrimination policy of the Government.

Table-1: No. of Tribal Households by tribes as in 1981 and number of representation allotted to tribes in District Councils in 1989.

Tribes	Bandarban Dist.		Khagrachari Dist.		Rangamati Dist.	
	2	3	4	5	6	7
Chakma	635	1	17,344	9	21,026	10
Marma	9,518	9	7,286	6	5,719	4
Tripura	1,236	1	7,812	6	729	1
Tonchonga	1,015	1	53	-	2,179	1
Lushai	3	-	-	-	188	1
Pangkhu	-	-	-	-	418	1
Khiang	93	1	-	-	163	1
Uchai	179	1	557	-	-	-
Chak	148	1	2	-	-	-
Bom	1,013	1	15	-	12	-
Mura	3,147	3	-	-	-	-

Source : Chittaprya Roy and Bimal Pramanik, Problems Of Chakma and other Tribes of Chittagong Hill Tracts.

Table 1 shows that the Chakmas are the majority group in the CHT but received less seats. The Chakmas have been given 20 seats, and Marmas have 19 seats in the three District councils. In Khagrachari while the Marmas & Tripuras together have less households than the Chakmas, the latter was allotted 9 seats while the Marma and Tripura were given 6 seats each. Similar disparity exists in Rangamati and Bandarban District. In Bandarban district Tripura, Kiang, Uchai, Chak, Tanchanga, Chakma, and Bom tribe have been allotted one seat each. The non-tribal Muslim settlers in these three districts have been allotted 30 seats in all. The Chakmas were not given their due seats. The Chakmas form 60 per cent of the tribal population, yet they are allotted 33.33 per cent of the tribal seats; while the Marmas with 23 per cent of the tribal population received 31.66 per cent seats. The non-tribal settlers form 40 per cent of the population of the CHT were allotted less seats proportionally.²³

The Hill District Council Acts largely designed by the military, and the elections process and its outcome were fully controlled and determined by the military. Officially, the army was involved in making the

government policy for the CHT through the National Council Committee for the CHT in which the General Officer Commanding (G.O.C) Chittagong, who was in charge of the CHT, occupied the top most seat. The District Council Act of 1989 has no constitutional basis and can be changed or repealed at any time without the consent of the hill people or their representatives. The District Councils have not been given any real power. They have been fully controlled by the military.²⁴

The autocratic government of H. M. Ershad was overthrown by a popular uprising in December 1990. Justice Shahabuddin Ahmed became the acting president of the Care Taker Government. Justice Shahabuddin Ahmed dissolved all the District Councils in Bangladesh except the three Hill District Councils. Khaleda Zia's government followed Ershad's policy for the Chittagong Hill Tracts. The CHT Policy was decided by the National Co-ordinating Council Committee for the CHT, headed by Prime Minister Khaleda Zia with three army Chiefs and Senior Minister as member. Khaleda Zia government also allocated a lion's portion of the financial budget for the military. According to the financial year 1991-92

the allocation for the defense was Tk. 1,209.83 crore (14.96 percent). For the police Tk. 307.07 crore, for the BDR Tk. 157.51 crore. Defense Police and BER together made up 20.45 per cent of the official budget. For education Tk. 1,255.57 crore (15.5 percent) was allocated and for health and population control only Tk. 409.75 crore. The estimated income of foreign aid was Tk. 7,296.61 crore.²⁵

Khaleda Zia government tried to settle the CHT issue because of the Indian pressure and to satisfy the foreign donors. Most likely at least a section of the army was against a political settlement. Janneke Arens argued that the army has its own political and economic interests in remaining in the CHT; they are the ruling power in the area, many army officers have made huge financial gains from timber trade, development programs, sale of food aid, special benefits, etc. and the CHT is a training ground for counter-insurgency.²⁷ With the blessing of India Sheikh Hasina's government signed Peace Treaty with the CHT leaders on December 2, 1998. 'Peace Treaty' created more internal problems than it solved. Almost all major opposition parties became critical of this treaty, because of its anti-

sovereignty character as well as anti-military orientation. Hasina government has diminished the military presence in the CHT. Peace Treaty serves the interest of the Indian government and CHT tribal people ignoring the basic rights of the Bengali settlers.

In sum the militarisation of the CHT issue began in Mujib Era (1972-1975) and reached its peak in Zia and Ershad regime. After the death of Sheikh Mujibur Rahman Indo-Bangladesh relationship deteriorated to its lowest point. So that India uses the Farakka Dam and CHT issue to pressurize Bangladesh for its own interests, such as a transit route from north-east India through Bangladesh to eliminate the Assamese ULFA insurgency movements. It is noteworthy to argue here that militarisation process of the CHT has changed the mode of production, way of life and culture of the Jumma people. In a true sense, we can say that they have entered into the era of modernization which will ultimately help the process of national integration.

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CHAPTER- TEN

CONCLUSION

The beginning of the Bangladesh State can be traced to the Awami league rise in power in 1971. The new state under Sheikh Mujib introduced a constitution in December 1972. The constitution was based on the four basic principles i.e. democracy, socialism, nationalism and secularism. In principle, the AL regime introduced a parliamentary form of government but in practice it was one party dominated parliamentary form of government. During the period of Mujib regime the Bangladesh economy was in a shambles, and the standard of living was swiftly deteriorating. Growing poverty and rising unemployment generated an increasing number of strikes and demonstrations. To stabilize the situation the regime resorted to coercion and political repression. The development policies that the regime pursued benefited a small segment of the society and marginalized the majority of the population. The state's economic programs could not improve the living standard of the people. In the mid 1970's political instability and stagnant economic conditions led the state to launch a campaign toward Baksalization of the country's social, educational

and cultural life. Those who were not affiliated with the BAKSAL were barred from employment in the important official posts. The party used all educational, civic and trade unions as instrument to implement BAKSAL policies and programs. Opposition members were arrested, tortured and executed. The state consolidated under their leadership was based on political repression and developing linkages necessary for its survival. The political system created, sustained and ensured the dominance of landowners and lawyers, excluded the bourgeoisie from decision making process and exploited the disadvantaged social strata in rural and urban areas. It also created the conditions for anti-establishment radical opposition that tried to overthrow the regime through armed struggle. The radical opposition parties commonly known as Maoist Parties, which advocated the ideology of proletarian revolution, failed to establish its authority on the working class movement because most rank and file members for these parties came from middle class background, i.e., small businessman, shopkeepers, professionals and semi-professionals employed in public services as teachers, doctors, engineers and army officers. They could not effectively engage in organizational and ideo-political work.

among the workers and peasants. During the Mujib era (1972-1975), pervasive corruption created a situation of primitive accumulation. State patronage was extended to a few to enrich themselves by plundering the state sector and creating monopoly control. However, a strong capitalist class did not clearly emerge.

From 1971 to 1990 Bangladesh politics so far has been dominated by three regimes: that of Sheikh Mujibur Rahman (1972-1975), of Ziaur Rahman (1975-1981) and H. M. Ershad (1982-1990). The subsequent changes of various regimes could not change the nature of power structure of Bangladesh. There are 300 elected seats in parliament for M. Ps. As evidence suggests, 44 MPs of the Mujib regime became the MPs of the successive regime. Mujib's regime was toppled by the short-lived Mustaque's regime, 22 MPs of the Mujib regime became the MPs in the Mustaque's regime. The Mustaque government was overthrown by general Ziaur Rahman's regime. Again the 88 MPs of Zia government who became MPs in Ershad's Parliament were either members of Mujib's, Mustaque's or Zia's parliament. More interestingly, the 24 most influential MPs of Ershad's regime were close kin. The dynamics of politics in the post

independence period tend to give rise to the family dynasty in the politics. Shiek Mujibur Rahman was killed in the August military coup of 1975, so his daughter Shiek Hasina became the head of her father's party, the Awami League. In 1981 President Ziaur Rahman was killed. So the leadership of this party, the Bangladesh Nationalist Party was taken over by his wife Khaleda Zia.

The state under president Zia advocated a capitalist route of development. In the political arena the state agitated Bangladeah nationalism and called for a unity of all segments of the society in the struggle against Indian expansionism. Zia brought back to multi-party system. The fifth Amendment and the declaration of Islam as state-Religion by the Eight amendment contradict with the spirit of liberation war. With the support of the rightists president Zia turned the secular constitution of 1972 into a religious one, and general Ershad put Islam as state-Religion in the heart to satisfy the rightists; instead of making an egalitarian society, the state under Zia and Ershad became a peripheral bourgeoisie state. President Zia's state policies of transforming the Bangladesh's backward economy and building a popular system was

supported by a wide spectrum of Bangladeshi society because of its declared policies were consistent with popular slogan for Bangladesh withdrawal from the Indo-Bangladesh Twenty Five years Treaty. Sheik Mujib's development strategies ran counter to the interests of the international capitalism.

The Bangladesh State patronizes president Zia and General Ershad to form the B.N.P. and the J.P. respectively to consolidate power. The military bureaucratic oligarchy in collaboration with the urban bourgeoisie occupied the top decision-making structure of both these parties. Both Zia and Ershad regime represented the interests of the urban bourgeoisie and merchant class whereas lawyers and landowners dominated the Mujib regime. Both Zia and Ershad denationalized the state industry in favor of the old bourgeoisie and created a new industrial bourgeoisie. The development of industry and urbanization resulted in the growth of a new urban working class. However, the nature of the state remains same in spite of changing power structure from civilian to military rulers.

The internal conflicts within the ruling class led the resignation of president Satter and his replacement by H.M. Ershad as Bangladesh's head of the State in March 1981. Ershad consolidated his power by distributing favors to the army officers and appointing his relatives and faithful persons to the key government posts. To maintain stability Ershad tried to build a strong army. Ershad modernized his security apparatus, intelligence services, military units etc. Both Zia and Ershad improved Bangladesh's relations with the United States of America. The state under Ershad's leadership was based on standing army, bureaucracy and coercion. The military leadership is the product of organizational hierarchy of the state.

The Bangladesh state which is established in 1971 remains an instrument of class domination and oppression. The ruling class utilized the State's coercive apparatus (military, police, etc.) to maintain their domination and to safeguard their vested economic interests. They exploited the state's ideological apparatus (Schools, Colleges, Mosques, Media etc) for their morale interests. The State under Zia and Ershad followed capitalist model of development. The globalization of production and the liberalization of trade offer both opportunities and challenges for

the least developed countries (LDCs) like Bangladesh. The globalization of production and liberalization of trade have put the Bangladesh economy at increasing risk of instability and marginalization in world trade. This will threaten the very existence of Bangladesh economy. The information technology, and communication technology has reduced the distance and made the world, a global village in a real sense. However, the industrialized countries are getting benefit from the process of globalization. The Multi-national Corporations (MNCs) and Trans-National Corporations (TNCs) are controlling the whole process.

Bangladesh State under president Zia and general Ershad was an aid dependent country. This trend continued till today. Dependent capital with corruption has produced hundreds of millionaires. Most of the aid was spend on huge capital consuming infrastrucunal projects which do not benefit the poor and a lot of the capital come back to the aid giving countries in the form of goods delivered, salaries for consultants and experts etc. Large amount of money from foreign aid disappeared in the pockets of military officers and bureaucrats. Ershad himself had a good

share of the cake. The head of the state in coalition with civil servants and politicians misused this foreign aid to stay in power.

Finally, the task of nation-building in Bangladesh is very difficult. The military can not be expected to accomplish this task because the military is not people oriented like the Chinese People's Army. It is the politicians who will have to complete this task through mass participation. Bangladesh should not maintain such a large standing army because it is not facing any serious external or internal threat. The Chittagong Hill Tracts (CHT) is the only source of internal trouble which should be tackled Politically, not militarily. Military action in the CHT trouble area may endanger territorial integrity and create an identity crisis for Bangladesh as well.

Appendix- I

ZIA's 19-POINT PROGRAM OF DEVELOPMENT

1. Preserving the independence, integrity and sovereignty of the state at all cost;
2. Reflecting in all spheres of our national life the four fundamental principles of the constitution, i.e., absolute trust and faith in the Almighty Allah, nationahsm, democracy and socialism meaning economic and social justice;
3. Building ourselves into a self-reliant nation through all possible means;
4. Ensuring people's participation at all levels of administration, development programs and in the maintenance of law order;
5. Strengthening rural economy and thereby the national economy by attaching priority to agricultural development;
6. Making the country self-sufficient in food and ensure that nobody has to starve;
7. Increasing cloth production with a view to ensure supply of at least coarse clothe for everybody;
8. Taking all possible measures so that nobody remains homeless;
9. Freeing the country from the curse of illiteracy;

10. Ensuring at least minimum Medicare for everybody;
11. Confirming the rightful position of women in the society, and organizing and motivating the youths for nation-building;
12. Providing the private sector necessary incentives for the economic development of the country;
13. Improving the condition of the workers and developing good employer- employee relations in the interest of increased production;
14. Increasing the spirit of public service and nation-building among the government employees and improving their financial condition;
15. Checking population explosion;
16. Building up friendship based on equality with all countries, and strengthening the relations especially with the Muslim countries;
17. Decentralizing the system of administration and development and strengthening the local governments;
18. Establishing a social system based on justice and fair play and free from corruption; and
19. Safeguarding the rights of all citizens irrespective of religion, colour and sect and consolidate national unity and solidarity.

Appendix-II

E RSHAD's 18-POINT PROGRAM OF DEVELOPMENT

1. Achieving rural development;
2. Increasing agricultural production in order to achieve self-sufficiency in food;
3. Taking steps for further land reforms;
4. Expanding the activities of Grameen bank in rural areas;
5. Increasing industrial production;
6. Encouraging industries in the private sector and creating atmosphere for investment;
7. Developing cooperative system and cottage industries;
8. Reducing the gap between the rich and the poor through proper distribution of national incomes;
9. Introducing development and production-oriented educational system;
10. Creation maximum employment opportunity;
11. Ensuring at least minimum medicare for everybody;
12. Taking steps for the establishment of Islamic ideals and values in national life;
13. Elimination corruption;

14. decentralising the administrative system and handing over power to the elected representatives;
15. Checking population explosion;
16. Transforming "politics" into "politics of production" and securing political freedom through economic emancipation;
17. Reconstructing judiciary in order to ensure justice at all levels; and ensuring the socio-economic rights and status of women.
18. Ensuring socio-economic rights and status of women.

Appendix-III

OF THREE 1990 JOINT DECLARATION OF THREE ALLIANCES

"People from all classes and professions are waging a heroic struggle. The goals are: emancipation from the misrule of the autocratic Ershad regime; ouster of Ershad regime; establishment of a stable democratic process and way of life; and re-establishment of the consciousness and values of the War of Liberation.

"People have suffered jails, torture and repression and have even sacrificed their lives at various stages of the struggle. This they have done with the goal of establishing a genuine representative system of government.

"One of the main aims and purposes of the struggle, which the people have been waging at the cost of their blood, is to end the malpractice of changing government through unconstitutional means like killings, coups etc, and to ensure, instead, change of government through the constitutional means of free and fair elections.

"Hence the central theme of our struggle is the establish a sovereign parliament through a free and fair election.

"But the Ershad regime, which usurped power through unconstitutional means, has been tirelessly endeavouring to perpetuate itself in power through all sorts of chicaneries, tricks and use of force and farcical elections.

"Every election held under this regime followed a regular pattern—vote-stealing, false voting, forcible occupation of polling centres, hijacking of ballot boxes, vote-dacoity, media coup, and finally, announcement of the results of voterless elections. Under these circumstances, no free and fair election can be held under this regime.

"We, the 15-party alliance, the 7-party alliance and the 5-party alliance, shall not take part in any election held under Ershad and the illegitimate Ershad government—be the election presidential or parliamentary. We shall not only boycott such elections but also shall resist these elections.

APPENDICES

"We, the 15-party alliance, the 7-party alliance and the 5-party alliance, shall participate only in an election to a sovereign parliament and only when such an election is held under a non-partisan, neutral government.

"Keeping this in view and reflecting the hopes and aspirations of the people as well, we are jointly issuing the following unequivocal declaration regarding the main demands and aims of the current movement.

1. "With a view to freeing the country from the clutches of autocratic Ershad and his regime which has been fisted on the nation through murders, coups and conspiracies, and establishing genuine democracy and democratic system of government in line with the consciousness and values independence and War of Liberation:

"(A) Ershad and his government will be forced to resign and a Vice-President, who will be acceptable to the three alliances which are engaged in the anti-autocracy and anti-communal movement, will be appointed while continuing the constitutional process and under the relevant process and under the relevant provisions of the Constitution, i.e., Article 51(A) Clause 1. The President will dissolve the present government and

Parliament and will himself resign and hand over power to that Vice-President.

"(B) An interim, caretaker government will be formed under that Vice-President; the prime responsibility of that government will be to ensure holding of a free and fair election to a sovereign parliament within three months.

"2. (A) The head of the caretaker government will be non-partisan and neutral, i.e., he will not be a follower or be associated, directly or indirectly, with any political party, and will not participate in presidential, vice-presidential or parliamentary elections. No minister of his caretaker government will likewise participate in elections.

"(B) The caretaker government will only run the routine administration and will reconstitute the Election Commission as well as reorganize the work and responsibilities of the Election Commission with a view to holding free and fair elections.

"(C) The confidence of the voters has to be re-established that they will be able to exercise their right to vote freely and without any pressure in accordance with their own choice and conscience; and this has to be ensured.

"(D) The mass media, including the radio and television, will have to be made into independent and autonomous bodies so that they become

completely neutral; and it has to be ensured that all parties participating in elections will get unhindered scope for publicity.

"3. The interim, caretaker government will hand over power to the sovereign parliament, elected through free and fair elections, and the government will remain accountable to that parliament.

"4. (A) In recognition of the sovereignty of the people, the process of constitutional rule in the country will be made safe and undisturbed, and all attempts at usurping power through unconstitutional means will be resisted. An elected government must not be unseated without election through any unconstitutional or extra-constitutional means or on any other plea.

"(B) The fundamental rights of the people, the independence and impartiality of the judiciary, and the rule of law will be ensured.

"(C) All laws that conflict with fundamental rights will be rescinded."

APPENDIX- IV

List of military officers served as ministers during 1976-90

Major General Majid-ul-Haque

Major General Nurul Islam Shishu

Captain Abdul Halim Chowdhury

Captain Nurul Haq

Lieutenant Colonel Akbar Hossain

Lieutenant Colonel Mustafizur Rahman

Major Iqbal Hossain Chowdhury

Lieutenant Colonel Jafar Imam

Air Vice Marshall M.G. Tawab

Colonel M.M. Haq

Rear Admiral Mahbub Ali Khan

Air Vice Marshall A.K. Khandaker

Air Vice Marshall A.G. Mahmood

Rear Admiral Sultan Ahmad

Air Vice Marshall Sultan Mahamood

Major General Abdul Mannan Siddiqui

Major General Shamsul Haque

Major General Mahabbat Jan Chowdhury

Major General M.A. Munim

Major General Mahmudul Hasan

Air Vice Marshall K.M. Aminul Islam

Lieutenant Colonel Oli Ahamad

Lieutenant Colonel H.M.A. Gaffar

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