


**The Civil Service at the Cross-roads :
A Study of the Recruitment, Training, Performance and Prospects
of BCS (Administration) Cadre**

Sk. Abdur Rashid

**Thesis Submitted for the Degree of
Doctor of Philosophy**

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Supervisor's Declaration

This is to certify that Mr. Sk. Abdur Rashid, a Joint Secretary to the Government of Bangladesh, was a part-time student of the Department of Political Science, University of Dhaka. Under my supervision, he conducted a research work titled as *The Civil Service at the Cross-roads: A Study of the Recruitment, Training, Performance and Prospects of BCS (Administration) Cadre*. I am satisfied that this thesis, or any part of the same, has not been published anywhere in any form. I am confident he has demonstrated in his thesis a high standard of academic feat.

I wish Sk. Abdur Rashid every success in life.

Emajuddin Ahamed
Professor of Political Science

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GIFT

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প্রশাসন

Acknowledgement

All praise be upon Allah, who bestows on people ability to do important things. This study has been possible for the permission of the Government of the People's Republic of Bangladesh. The Government granted me study leave, which was later converted into deputation on the basis of a scholarship received from the Social Science Research Council. I am grateful to the Government and the Council for these gracious favours.

It occurred to me long ago that the bureaucratic system of Bangladesh had been beset with problems accentuated by both endogenous and exogenous factors. I was also convinced that Bangladesh Civil Service (Administration) cadre still being a kingpin of the current administrative set-up, one should make an in-depth study of the cadre. The matter was discussed with some of my well-wishers and colleagues, who encouraged me to carry forward the idea. I am thankful to all of them, including all those who helped me through invaluable advice and also through their benevolent assistance in the opinion survey. In this respect, I am indebted to Professors Shahnewaz Nazimuddin Ahmed and Fawzia Hamid for their precious assistance with regard to the processing of survey data.

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Professor Emajuddin Ahamed, my revered teacher and supervisor of this study, and who is a former Vice-Chancellor of the University of Dhaka, was far more than a guide. He was a guardian, and a whip, who reminded me many times about my urgent need for resuming the research work. But for his affectionate reprimands, my occasional spells of inertia and other preoccupations would have killed this ambitious academic pursuit. No words can sufficiently express my profound respect, gratitude and humility due for this fatherly teacher.

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Finally, the views expressed in this paper are very much my personal ones and they do not have any bearing on my professional life and work. I accept the responsibility for those views and also for the errors and lapses that may have occurred in the thesis.

Dhaka, 08 September 2004
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Abstract

After years of debates and experimentations, in 1980, a unified civil service structure was introduced in Bangladesh with the expectation that it would mitigate the problems resulting from a bureaucracy dominated by one particular band of officials. It was also expected to enhance the efficiency of bureaucracy. Political neutrality was retained as a cornerstone of the system. The Administration cadre of Bangladesh Civil Service became a distinct component of the 29-cadre structure. However, all the expectations pinned with its introduction were not fulfilled in the following years, when everybody could find incessant and seemingly irresolvable disputes about the relative statuses of different cadres. The country also experienced a short and aborted stint of experimentation with a decentralized local government system. Both endogenous and exogenous factors are still at play in the administrative domain. In the formative phase of modern Indian administration, recruitment was generally a matter of favour from those who held sway on the East India Company. After about two centuries of company rule and decades of intense debates, competitive examinations were introduced in 1850s for recruitment to civil service posts. Public Service Commissions were established to select and induct meritorious recruits. Max Weber's prescriptions for neutral, permanent, talented and salaried public officials assumed almost a universal acceptance. However, the inroad of politics, sectarian considerations and option for a so-called representative bureaucracy resulted in the formulation of various quota reservations for some groups. It made a serious dent in the concept of merit. Inconsiderate induction of huge numbers of officers threw a stupendous burden on the system. The increasingly vociferous claims of various technical functionaries added a new dimension to an already complicated public administration. Compromises on the part of regimes failed to bring any qualitative improvement in the public administration of Bangladesh. The Administration cadre, itself dissatisfied with a sense of disavowal, virtually became singled out as an adversary of most other cadres and groups of functionaries. Their members keep on laying a claim to the top government positions. Administration cadre officers have also experienced constant attacks on their traditional domains from the peers of other cadres. Fatal intra-faction feuds among the members of the Administration cadre too were sustained by default, or rather encouraged by indulgence.

The interference of political forces further worsens the scenario. The global political-administrative dichotomy assumes a unique dimension in Bangladesh. There has emerged a trend of political jockeying among the civil servants alongside the politicians' efforts to subjugate the public administration. Neutrality seems to have lost some of its appeal. There are

gossips of partisan favours and disfavours in recruitment by promotion as well as initial induction. Slipshod measures of instant expediency have gained much acceptability among the people who decide in relevant affairs. Against such a background, the onlookers and informed observers are apprehensive of a plummeting image of the country and a still worsening plight of its populace. As the holders of key positions of the government machinery, the officers of BCS (Administration) cadre are already exposed to serious criticism. Their efficiency and administrative ethos are in the wane while their training has been getting a lesser attention from authority and incumbents alike. However, results of an on-the-field opinion survey reveal that people are still inclined to put these officers' performance in a far better place than most other officials and politicians. People are still overwhelmingly in favour of retaining for BCS (Administration) cadre officials a special place in the country's public administration. While acknowledging the dwindling competence of the Administration cadre officers, the members of an informed public tend to believe that, given an appropriate regime of training and under the air of rejuvenated administrative and political culture, the officers of BCS (Administration) cadre may be able to better serve the country. It is held that these officers can still deliver their expected goods if their confidence is restored and if interference ceases on their discharge of duties. It also transpires that any attempt at administrative reforms should preferably be preceded by reforms in political fronts too. The Administration cadre may still prove its immense worth if its members may become intelligent, efficient, dynamic, objective, fair and just, clean and honest, and capable of securing people's trust, confidence and cooperation. Merit has to be given its due worth in the scheme of things.

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The Civil Service at the Crossroads: A Study of Recruitment, Training, Performance and Prospects of B. C. S. (Administration) Cadre.

1. Introduction

1.1 Objectives

There have been intermittent discussions and debates on the nature, scope and future of bureaucracy in Bangladesh as elsewhere in the world. The discords around this important socio-political institution are pretty knotty, and finding a universal consensus on its various issues seems almost impossible. Bureaucracy of Bangladesh now-a-days attracts glaring attention – positive or otherwise – from practitioners, scholars, observers and critics (Ali 2002:102; Zafarullah 1992:5). In this phenomenon, the single most conspicuous object of attention is Bangladesh Civil Service (Administration) [BCS (Administration)] Cadre, which, like its predecessor the Civil Service of Pakistan (CSP), is traditionally singled out as the country's elite corps of bureaucracy (Khan 1980:121; Morshed 1986:17). Considered by many as the protégé of colonial heritage (Morshed 1997:74; Mahmood 1990:35), it is often projected as a pivotal modernizing force, and sometimes it is also dubbed as a retrograde institution that impedes the pace of development. The administrative service officers were able to overcome the initial post-liberation hardships largely caused by the serious reservations of political elite against them. However, the bureaucratic elite soon regained much of its ascendancy after the country had experienced a series of debacle in many fronts (Ahamed 1980:162). There are obvious differences between BCS (Administration) cadre and its historical precursors – the Indian Civil Service (ICS) and the Civil Service of Pakistan (CSP) – in terms of their contexts, compositions and standings. Unlike their illustrious predecessors, the present-day administrators do not possess an omnipotent suzerainty in statecraft and an overbearing posture over other functionaries of public administration. But, they are still in the gaze of those who matter. In their turn, many members of BCS (Administration) cadre covetously long for a return to the glorious days of their predecessors, while some others take it as an improbable proposition. The country's public administration has in recent years become a huge edifice composed of various service cadres, organizations and classes of officials. The top-echelon positions of these bodies are generally manned by officers of different service cadres. Many of these top brass officials belong to BCS (Administration) cadre. The other functionaries of the huge state bureaucratic apparatus, i.e., mostly the members of other service cadres, now focus their expectant eyes to

the coveted seats traditionally occupied by this so-called elite group. The result is the incessant scrambling among persons regarded by society as the repositories of wisdom, knowledge and competence and who are supposed to deliver goods and services for the people. In the process, bureaucratic functionaries lose sight of their mission and they get engaged in the never-ending feuds for top government positions, without much regard for a rational way of running the government. Many bureaucratic ills further complicate the complex scenario of public administration. Consequently, civil servants lose necessary motivation and empathy for the people for whom they are employed and appointed in their respective positions (Younis and Mostafa 2000:123). Poor administrative performance becomes the order of the day. The system appears to be ultimately heading for a fall and everybody – be he generalist, or technocrat or a political link-pin – has a share of the responsibility for such an undesirable state of affairs.

Younis and Mostafa (2000:94) underscore the effects of elitism generally discerned in the administrative system of Bangladesh. They find an opinion that civil servants tend to rule the people and serve only those at the top. At the same time, it is added that the bureaucratic elites are loyal to either their ministers and various other shades of vested interests or their own self-interests. However, fingers are pointed on the bureaucrats belonging to the Administration cadre of Bangladesh Civil Service, for their pre-eminence in the system. This cadre is sometimes described as an elite corps that substituted for CSP, its predecessor super-elite in Pakistan's public administration (Obaidullah 1999:45, 68). In the public administration of Bangladesh, the preeminence of BCS (Administration) cadre is evident from the following table:

Table 1.01. Proportion of BCS (Administration) Cadre Officers in Top Positions

<u>Designation</u>	<u>Total</u>	<u>Administration Cadre</u>		<u>All Other Cadres</u>	
		<u>Number</u>	<u>Percentage</u>	<u>Number</u>	<u>Percentage</u>
Deputy Secretary	906	754	83.22	152	16.78
Joint Secretary	282	234	82.98	48	17.02
Additional Secretary	124	94	75.81	30	24.19
Secretary	37	26	70.27	11	29.73
Total	1349	1108	82.13	241	17.87

Source: Data available with PACC as on 27 September 2003.

It shows that the cadre occupies a premier position in the administrative set-up of Bangladesh. It is comparable with the formidable position occupied by its immediate

predecessor, the CSP in Pakistan (Goodnow 1969:31), although their powers and influences far outweighed those of the present-day BCS (Administration) cadre. There are counter-claims too, largely from the insiders, that the cadre suffers from a worst possible environment and that many of the evils are directly or indirectly caused by the steady neglect of the cadre. However, against all this, there are really little enquiries as to how this omnipotent BCS (Administration) Cadre has been faring now. Maybe many of the blows inflicted on it are actually thrown into the dark. On the other hand, some of the contentions held by many incumbents of BCS (Administration) cadre may also be without a substance. The people may know very little about this particular set of bureaucrats; and most of those who decry them do not care to know. People have many things to know about these officers in their real perspectives. After due disposition of the facts in issue, critics are likely to shy off most of the misgivings and take a rationalistic assessment of the role and position of this cadre, thereby paving the way for a more coherent and concerted public service. The domain of generalist bureaucracy, in which BCS (Administration) cadre occupies a key position, becomes a propitious ground for academic discourses. Studies of the public administration of Bangladesh carry little sense if this cadre is not examined in its true context. In order to remedy many of the country's malaise of body politic, an attempt should be made to introduce and re-orient a civil service system suited to the needs of the present age and at the same time responsive to the republic's demands.

At this backdrop, an academic pursuit about the realities of BCS (Administration) Cadre was required. Since many people tend to consider this set of civil bureaucrats as carrying the key to *everything*, one needs to discover their place in society of now and after. A number of studies were conducted in the past by experts and bodies like various administrative reforms commissions. However, they dealt with the administrative system in general, with no particular attention paid to this service cadre, although many of their recommendations had a bearing on its functions and prospects. The members of BCS (Administration) cadre may not possibly be seen as proto-types of their glorified predecessors in the ICS and the CSP, although they inherit and share a number of characteristics. Their functions and positions underwent significant changes over the decades. More changes are likely to follow. Many boundaries of this cadre vis-à-vis the other officials including political functionaries are likely to be redefined. Such changes are necessitated by the need for a quicker pace of development of the country in quite many spheres. The current aura of decentralization,

contracting out and privatization may only accelerate the changes. All changes preferably have to be made in desired directions, in which the existing administrative system may have to abdicate many of its privileges and positions. However, new functions too may be added to its portfolio, thus retaining for it a big role in the process. With this in view, dispassionate studies needed to be undertaken on the country's public administration. Hence, an exploration of the genesis, development and possible future shape of one of its most important components was of prime necessity. Such a study could shed light on the life situation of an important group of public servants, who, so far may not have generically been much successful as a body of effective, forward-thrusting and modernizing governmental bureaucrats.

1.2. Necessity

Bangladesh has already spent its thirty years of independence. Its civil society may be considered to have come of age. However, none can claim that the country has been able to fulfill all the stated objectives for which the people fought an independence war. Commensurate with the prevailing political and economic dicta, the new state took on its shoulder the onerous task of improving the standards of living of its people. The nation's socio-economic and intellectual development is still a prime objective of the state. With that in view, different public institutions are put in place. Public administration is such a very important instrument for the state to materialize its goals. It is now generally taken that this all-important institution is not in a position to discharge its functions at a reasonable level of efficiency. Obviously, there are maladies in this instrument. With a view to reaping optimum services from this institution, a foremost requirement was to discern the malaise and seek their remedies. A study of the administrative branch of public administration was thought useful for an assessment of the potentials and analysis of the dysfunctional syndromes of the country's public administration. A study of the Administration cadre of BCS was necessary, because it occupies a determining position in the country's bureaucracy. Any complete study had not been conducted on the cadre. Hence, the study could serve a good academic purpose. At the same time it could provide valuable inputs to studies periodically conducted by experts in line with various governments' intention to introduce reforms in the administrative system.

1.3. Research Questions

Assuming a premier position for BCS (Administration) cadre in the total scheme of public administration, the study has dealt at length with various issues relating to the functioning of the cadre. The study has covered a history of the institution, evolution of the relevant concepts, the environment in which the institution operates, the position it occupies in the statecraft and its probable future directions. In a word, the study has analyzed the following:

- a) Origin and evolution of bureaucracy and civil service
- b) Evolution of Bangladesh Civil Service (Administration) Cadre
- c) Recruitment and training in BCS (Administration) Cadre
- d) Performance of BCS (Administration) Cadre
- e) Prospects of BCS (Administration) Cadre.

Different issues relating to all these come up for discussion. Consequently, suggestions may be put forward for an effective and useful civil service system. In the course of the study, following research questions have been kept in mind:

- a) Is BCS (Administration) really elitist in the country's public administration?
- b) Does it need any change? If yes, where?
- c) What are those changes?

1.4. Literature Review

There were a number of studies on various individual aspects of the administrative system of Bangladesh. Likewise, some studies dealt with various issues of public administration alongside their focuses on bureaucracy in general or public administration in larger perspectives. Still there were some studies that covered the institutions which preceded the present-day system. Such a work, Chaudhuri's 'Civil Service in Pakistan' (1969) made a description of the evolution of the administrative system in British India before scrutinizing the origin and functioning of Pakistan's public administration. Chaudhuri (ibid, p. ii) largely concentrated on what he put as 'All-Pakistan and Central Civil Services', although there was only one all-Pakistan service having a name of *civil service*, which was the elitist Civil Service of Pakistan (CSP). His work dealt at length with the affairs of the CSP and also examined the subjects of recruitment, training and general conditions of employment of various other higher services of Pakistan, with particular emphasis on the elite services. It contained a commendable barrage of information on the results of the Central Superior Service Examinations of various years. Moreover, he covered the issue of professional standards of conduct and made a comparative assessment of staff relations in the civil services of Pakistan and the United Kingdom. His was a pioneering work, which contained

quite a lot of demographic information on a number of issues pertaining to the all-important CSP. It is still the most elaborated research work on the higher strata of administrative system in Pakistan and a great source of information for further research on related subjects. This was a very valuable research work, whose only notable shortcoming was insurmountable. That is its temporariness in the sense that it was naturally confined to the Pakistan era. This also underscored the need for similar works covering subsequent periods.

Ali's 'Aspects of Public Administration in Bangladesh' (1993) contains information on different aspects of the country's public administration. It gave a short and sketchy history of its administrative system and also went on to cover issues like the secretariat system and the decentralization efforts in relation to the administrative units and local government structure of Bangladesh. Ali also examined in brief the knotty issues of the quest for separation of judiciary from executive and shed some light on the relationships between politicians and civil servants. He touched upon many other issues and episodes that came under the purview of the country's public administration. Most of the sides covered in Ali's work are very relevant and lively issues for the present-day administrative and political life of the country. Hence, a historical account of the developments of various issues, supplemented by an indicative touch of personal experiences, made the book a valuable source for further research to be pursued by other researchers and students. A practicing civil servant personally involved with a number of important events in the country, Ali gave a period-wise description of the occurrences on the subjects to make the observers understand the trend of developments. A collection of essays composed for different purposes, Ali's work had its natural limitations since it often lacked in analysis of issues and events commensurate with the requirements of a standard research. Still, Ali's work may continue to serve the purpose of a starter for many researchers.

Obaidullah's 'Bangladesh Public Administration – Study of Major Reforms, Constraints and Strategies' (1999) focused its attention mainly on the efforts towards reorganization and reforms carried out or purported to be brought about at different times in the history of public administration in Bangladesh. The social, economic, bureaucratic and political factors that came into play in the arena of administrative change were made its subject-matter. It too was a collation of facts extracted from some of his own previous writings. Khan's 'Bureaucratic Self-Preservation' (1980) dealt with a similar theme – reforms in the

bureaucracy and the hurdles faced in its path. Khan considered the efforts towards reforming the elitist generalist bureaucracy simply as a failure (p. 127) and ascribed it to many factors akin to those cited by Obaidullah. In his pursuit of the subject of reorganization, the latter also covered at length the structure of pay and salaries for public officials. Furthermore, Obaidullah discussed different methods of control on the administrative functions. Such controls included the constitutional provisions, parliamentary supervision and judicial interpretation of events and administrative decisions. He also assessed the efficacy of different other institutions like ombudsman and parliamentary commissions on administrative affairs as prevailing in some western countries. His work stressed the need for putting in place the proto-types of such structures in Bangladesh. In a similar analysis, Maniruzzaman (1980:203) aptly showed that despite various experts' strong suggestions at the initiative of a still stronger Planning Commission of Pakistan, the then regimes were too strife-ridden, weak and unstable themselves to give a thought on the subject of curtailing the position of an elite bureaucracy. This stock of literature quite genuinely held that reforms, especially in developing countries, were very difficult to come by.

Ali's 'Decentralized Administration in Bangladesh' (1995) dealt with the wider sides of many possible issues in the administrative and political milieu of the country. In addition to the common issues of public administration, aspects like the general profile of Bangladesh, optimum legislation for a better administrative system, and evolution of democratic institutions were given a conspicuous place in this work. Another former high-ranking civil servant personally involved in many administrative developments of the country, Ali infused his knowledge, experiences and analysis of events and also pinpointed the criticism labeled against the bureaucratic institutions of Bangladesh. Ali's work – although not of a high academic standard – contained huge information, and was a very useful tool for prospective researchers. This researcher benefited from his analysis of the administrative dichotomies (pp. 28-40). His delineation of the functions of a key functionary of public administration, the Deputy Commissioner, was also very useful.

Morshed's vernacular work 'Bangladesher Civil Service' (1986) shed some light on the concept and forms of bureaucracy in general and dealt with several aspects of public administration in Bangladesh. Recruitment and training in civil service and the functions of Public Service Commission were given a prominent place. He strongly stressed on the

foreign training with a view to evolving an effective and efficient public administration. However, a particular emphasis of his work was on the tricky issue of promotion in bureaucracy. Morshed, himself a civil servant, used as source of information a number of memoranda of a particular service association in which he was involved and drew many of his conclusions on the points contained in the papers submitted by such associations. It may be pertinent to note that his work was published six years before the merger of two existing cadres into a single BCS (Administration) cadre in 1992¹. Although full of useful information, his work – or at least some of its inferences – may have been based on parochial and incomplete analyses.

1.5. Methodology

Bureaucracy and public administration are prominent academic subjects, and they have produced quite an enviable literature. There are quite a number of writings on civil service too, although very few reliable discourses are made on Bangladesh's civil service. All such secondary sources of information were used in this study. Moreover, published and unpublished official documents and individual academic works were perused as far as practicable. Articles published in newspapers and journals were also scrutinized, when they were considered to be of sufficient academic worth. Besides, an attempt was made to elicit opinions of cross sections of people on a few aspects. For the purpose, structured questionnaires (*Appendix AA*) were used. The respondents included politicians, leaders of society, serving and former bureaucrats, scholars, students, and members of the public. The researcher's personal experiences as a serving civil servant were of some use, although descriptions in the first person akin to autoethnographic work in social sciences by a *complete-member researcher* (Ellis and Bochner 2000:740), encouraged now-a-days in a vigorous way, was avoided. Both narrative discussion and quantitative analyses were made, while the former method got a conspicuously stronger place.

¹ The Administration and Secretariat cadres were abolished and an Administration cadre was constituted forthwith with the officers of the two previous cadres so abolished.

1.6. Chapter Plan

A thesis is prepared on the basis of the findings of the study. It contains seven chapters, each dealing with a defined area of the subject. At the end, the titles of the chapters are made as in the following:

- 1 Introduction
- 2 Bureaucracy and Civil Service
- 3 Genesis of BCS (Administration) Cadre
- 4 Recruitment
- 5 Training
- 6 Functions and Forces
- 7 Utility and Performance
- 8 Prospects
- 9 Conclusion

As the study proceeded, the contents of the chapters of the thesis covered different areas as delineated below:

1. Introduction

1.1. Objectives; 1.2. Necessity; 1.3. Research Questions; 1.4. Literature Review; 1.5. Methodology; and 1.6. Chapter Plan.

2. Bureaucracy and Civil Service

2.1. Meanings of bureaucracy and civil service; 2.2. Evolution of civil service; 2.3. Civil service in different perspectives; and 2.4. Concluding remarks.

3. Genesis of B. C. S. (Administration) Cadre

3.1. Mode of governance in India before the British conquest; 3.2. Administration under the Company; 3.3. The Indian Civil Service; 3.4. The Civil Service in Pakistan; 3.5. First decade of bureaucracy in Bangladesh; 3.6. Experiments since 1980s; 3.7. Present state of affairs; and 3.8. Concluding remarks.

4. Recruitment

4.1. Recruitment during British period; 4.2. Recruitment during Pakistan period; 4.3. Experiments in the first decade of Bangladesh; 4.4. Recruitment since 1980s; and 4.5. Concluding remarks.

5. Training

5.1. Training as a tool of public administration; 5.2. The British days; 5.3. Experience under Pakistan; 5.4. Post-independence situation; and 5.5. Concluding remarks.

6. Functions and Forces

6.1. Functions of cadre officers; 6.2. The Cadre and political forces; 6.3. The cadre and other professional forces; 6.4. Possible future relationships; and 6.5. Concluding remarks.

7. Utility and Performance

7.5. Perceptions of utility; 7.2. Perceptions of performance; 7.3. Prevalent impressions; and 7.4. Concluding remarks.

8. Prospects

8.1. Trends of administrative reforms; 8.2. Probable directions; and 8.3. Concluding remarks.

9. Conclusion

9.1. Necessary institution; 9.2. Points to ponder.

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2. BUREAUCRACY AND CIVIL SERVICE

2.1. Meanings of Bureaucracy and Civil Service

2.1.1. Origin. Some form of organizational apparatus is the essence of civilized life. Human beings took to this essential tool of civilization since the inception of gregarious life. Man's innate self-aggrandizement on the one hand and needs for a relatively secure life on the other led to the perennial search for and introduction of human organizations that could best cater to his societal needs. Modern states have to achieve and sustain useful *patterns of actions, interactions and behaviour* – prerequisites for an orderly human society. A large part of their attention is focused on the tools and personnel employed in these tools with a generic name, *bureaucracy*. No other term in social science has attracted more attention, more criticism and more eulogy. Bureaucracy is one of the least-understood or most misunderstood terms in social science. A careful and dispassionate understanding of the term is central to a successful analysis of political and social process. One has to understand bureaucracy without putting on it any stigma or eulogistic mark.

2.1.2. Meaning. *Bureaucracy's* dictionary meaning is (a) "an administrative system operated by a large number of officials following rules and procedures", or (b) "rules and procedures followed by government departments and similar organizations" (Collins 1990:185). The administrative apparatus of all governments, from local to national levels, is called bureaucracy – a term that combines the French noun *bureau*, meaning "office," or "department," with the Greek verb *kratos*, meaning "to rule." Bureaucracy has two meanings. It may be the governance of a company or institution by a specific set of officials, such as management. Or, it may mean the governance of a whole nation by means of agencies, bureaus, commissions, and departments. In this sense, bureaucracy denotes all the agencies and departments contained within the executive branch of a national government. However, things are not as simple or innocuous as they look or sound. Bureaucracy is a key instrument for development and nation-building. Modernization, growth and development are impossible without a competent bureaucratic apparatus. Still, bureaucracy may be a source of burden for and an impediment to development if its organization, structure, and behavioral characteristics do not correspond with the purposes for which it is created (Jain 1989:xiii). However, with all the words for and against *the state* and its *bureaucracy*, they still occupy a prominent place in social studies.

In social science, *bureaucracy* is an illusive term denying it a universally acceptable meaning. Its pejorative and semantically confusing denotations are responsible for such a situation. A peculiar tension exists between the term's denotations and connotations. From various points of views, it is variedly considered as (a) *rationality*, (b) *rigidity*, (c) *chaos*, (d) *rule by officials* (*Beamtenherrschaft*), (e) *excessive multiplication and concentration of power in administrative bureaus*, (f) *size maximization*, (g) *oversupply*, (h) *waste*, (i) *uncontrol*, or as (j) *private choice* (Lane 1987:21). But one needs to distinguish bureaucracy between a form of organization for the conduct of public administration and an ailment of organization – an ailment obstructing good management. One also needs to distinguish bureaucracy in the sense of big government, as an establishment of vast proportions for better or worse, and as a blight always for the worse, falling on liberty (Marx 1957:16). For a workable definition of the term, one needs to have an objective and neutral vision. An instrument with records and potentials of great performance or misdeeds, it concerns considerable human, material and organizational resources, and has distinct reasons for which it is created or accepted. Thus, bureaucracy is defined as *a systematic organization of tasks and individuals into a pattern, which can most effectively achieve the ends of collective efforts*. In the same vein, it is the regulated administrative system organized as a series of interrelated offices (Dey 1978:1). These definitions contain utilitarian and other organizational explanations. The institution's complexity and enormity are reflected in another complex definition: *Bureaucracy is a highly elaborated hierarchy of authority superimposed upon a highly elaborated division of labour with three structural characteristics: hierarchy, differentiation or specialization, and competence or qualification* (Heady 1966:17-20).

Max Weber, who began the modern discourses on bureaucracy, did not try to define bureaucracy. Instead, he provided some criteria for an *ideal type* of bureaucracy based on his famous *legal-rational authority system* with certain abstract rules. His criteria of bureaucracy are personal freedom and impersonal role, hierarchy of offices, spheres of competence, contractual relationships, selection on merit, compensatory salaries, career service of incumbents, service as vocation, separation of work, and strict discipline (Eisenstadt 1965:184; LaPalombara 1969:172). Weber did not refer to *beamtenherrschaft*, or rule by officials, which he strongly attacked in his political writings. He took bureaucracy as among many other organizations and stressed on the rationality of a pure type over all other types of administration. Weber believed that contemporary civilization necessitated his *ideal-type* bureaucracy for the very criteria just cited (Krygier 1979:63-4). Under his view, bureaucracy is characterized by a highly developed

division of labor, an authority structure, the assignment of certain tasks to specific individuals, and regulations established for the operation of the organization. A member of the bureaucracy, called a bureaucrat, is recruited for a job on the basis of qualifications, such as education or experience, which demonstrate an ability to perform specialized tasks. Usually the wages paid to a bureaucrat depend on the person's status or grade within the organization, rather than performance or productivity. From the achievemental point of view, bureaucracy may be a purposive organization that maximizes efficiency in administration, or an institutionalized method of organized social conduct for administrative efficiency. Such a description encompasses most functional and human aspects of bureaucratic organizations. A very close relationship is evident among relative performance and positions of different strata of public bureaucracy. A plan nicely prepared at the top may fail at the hands of lower level implementers. In that case, bureaucracy as a whole becomes a target of public decries. However, for practical considerations and analytical convenience, discussion of bureaucracy generally covers certain activities and personnel in public organizations. In simpler words, it denotes the body of regular government employees mostly in the civil service, especially the higher service (Marx 1957:17). This is a workable description of the term

2.1.3. Civil service. Now that the meaning of the term *bureaucracy* is evident, or, in another word, the intense nebula around the term is somehow presented, one may look at what *civil service* denotes. If history is recounted, the statecraft was almost entirely a military affair till very recently. Only after the *Renaissance* and the *Industrial Revolution* and their attendant developments were experienced, the other facet of statecraft was increasingly felt. That *another facet* soon became prominent as the government's all-powerful and peripatetic arm. This is the civil service, whose origin is in its distinction from the military arm of rulership. Civil service becomes an essential part of governance in the modern era. In its absence, man seldom finds himself in contact with government. Unpaid volunteers cannot run contemporary states, since the task of carrying out the states' business requires the establishment and functioning of structures generally manned by a body of efficient people, collectively known as *civil service*. As a necessary institution, it is composed of men and women employed for and trained in the task of carrying out the government's broad decisions. The term *civil service* emerged in statecraft during the late 18th century when the British East India Company was consolidating its colonial gains grabbed after its defeats of the Indian rulers. The term was first used in 1785 to distinguish between military and civil sectors of the Company's personnel. But it was only after

the introduction of impartial selection through open competition that the idea of a professional, impartial and devoted service of the state took its modern shape irrespective of governments' political colour. The civil service means a professional body of neutral experts in administration dedicated to serve without regard to its own gains or without reference to party political views or class interests (Rai and Singh 1979:26). This trait of professionalism distinguishes it from amateurish or hereditary officials.

The civil service is more than a government institution. It stands for a spirit essential to the success of modern democracy, and it is an ideal of a vocation in public officials who devote their lives to the service of the community. It is here that *civil service* differs from *bureaucracy*, which very often sounds as self-seeking and self-controlled or an instrument of a narrow oligarchy. The civil service is the people's service set up to do nothing more than people's will. Its vital characteristic is that it is professionally inspired and politically neutral. The Russian Federation's 1995 Law on the Basic Principles of Civil Service (Article II) defines civil service as "the professional activities aimed at facilitating the exercise of the authority of the state bodies." In this definition, the civil service is rather construed as a body of benefits emanating from governmental authority. Since different forces are engaged in internecine struggles among themselves for relative advantages in society, a neutral civil service is often the most acceptable refuge for solution of problems. Hence, 'civil service' is also defined as; 'mediating institutions that mobilize human resources in the service of the affairs of state in a given territory' (Morgan and Perry 1988:84). It is assumed that a citizen who is not prepared to loyally serve any government legally chosen by the people and established under the constitution, be whatever its political colour, should not think of entering the civil service. The growth of civil service in different countries is spectacular. For example, in UK the number of people employed in the civil service in 1949 rose to 711,000 from 17,000 in 1842 (Finer 1950:10). The development of civil service to its contemporary size went with the evolution of modern *Welfare State*. In developed countries, public expenditure and size of public service in relation to GNP showed a sharp rise in a century since 1870 (Musgrave and Musgrave 1984:138; Harris 1990:22-9). The developing countries show the same trend (Mackintosh 1992:77). The governments began to act as regulator, mediator, underwriter, provider of services, subsidies and loans, and promoter of a decent living (Pierre 1995:140). The *Welfare State* means a political system or the policy with a predisposition towards welfare, cuddling man to the point where he is glad to *let state do it*. The state is historically justified for its role to foster general welfare. The US constitution took the

promotion of welfare state as its basic purpose (Marx 1957:2), and was followed by others. Welfare state is now synonymous with *administrative state*, a trait which starts cracking only recently. The possible rolling off of modern states on economic front necessitates even new sets of tasks to perform (Pinto 1995:320). Constraints and complexities of task environments call for specific administrative apparatuses with rivalry among occupational groups. The civil service is viewed under these perspectives.

2.2. Evolution of Civil Service

2.2.1. Universality. Civil functions and civil services have been existent in almost all societies in all ages in one form or another. But, bureaucracy had primarily been in military form since the inception of gregarious life. The military character of bureaucracy was the result of an omniprevalent warfare. As social life became more and more complex, many more public issues demanded attention. A number of people were to be employed for discharging the new useful public tasks, which were different from the military duties of states. For example, revenue collection, irrigation management, road construction and canal digging were among the foremost of these non-military tasks. Since those times, all forms of government establish bureaucracies to administer governance and deal with public welfare, e.g., to collect taxes, provide for defence, give police protection, administer welfare and social security programs, operate school systems and manage public transports. Private institutions too – church bodies, corporations, banks, hospitals and charitable foundations – must have bureaucracies of paid directors and other hired personnel to discharge particular tasks. Bureaucracies played a significant role in civilizations by providing a kind of continuity in society. Emperors, kings, presidents and dictators die or are removed from office. But bureaucracies are more durable and continue the process of administering. Bureaucracies had their origin in the households of kings in ancient societies of Egypt, Babylonia, Assyria, India, and China. Kings required officials to collect taxes, manage agriculture, govern outlying provinces, and lead armies. The most elaborate bureaucracy was developed in China (Huque 1990:159). Originated in the 3rd century BC, it was called *the civil service*. Schools and examination systems were used for the entrance and promotion of civil servants. During the Sung Dynasty (960-1279), schools were established for the poor but talented, with a view to recruiting personnel in civil service. The bureaucracy managed nearly every aspect of Chinese public life. As it followed and preserved ancient traditions, there was little room for innovation or invention in China by the time the Middle Ages ended in Europe.

The western bureaucracies were largely under the control of the kings until the modern era. The European rulers generally tried to reserve the civil service positions for members of the nobility, but the training and expertise required of an official often necessitated accepting commoners into positions of power. The French Revolution, which ended in 1799, greatly influenced the democratization of the nation's civil service. Entrance examinations and formal qualifications for office became the means of selection. Since 1855, the members of Great Britain's civil service have been chosen on the basis of competitive examinations. Interestingly, this open competitive system of recruitment was introduced first in the case of the British Indian Civil Service in 1853. In the USA, patronage or *spoils system* filled the agencies of government for most of the 19th century. It largely meant that friends of elected officials filled the vacant positions. A fatal mishap in 1881 spurred the passage of the epoch-making Civil Service Act. An unsuccessful job seeker had shot and killed President Garfield, thus pointing to the gravity of the inherent problems of the so-called spoils system. An end to this situation was everybody's expectation. New York passed the first state civil service law, requiring its employees to take a competitive examination. Most of the states and larger cities have since adopted civil service systems. The Congress, which had nullified an earlier reform bill by withholding necessary funds, finally took corrective action by passing the Pendleton Act in 1883. It became the basis of the modern civil service system. The Act created a three-member Civil Service Commission, appointed by the President with Senate's consent. Its chief job was to establish a merit system of appointment to certain public offices – that is, on the basis of demonstrated fitness without regard to politics, race or religion. The 1883 Act provided competitive examinations for 13,000 government clerks. Since then the number of similar positions has steadily increased. More than 90 percent of all federal employees now get and hold their jobs under the civil service. However, policy-making positions are all excluded from it. Many states and most large cities have civil service systems of their own. Canada too has a merit system of employment since 1908. But, the new method that replaced spoils system tended to reward length of service rather than job performance. So, there were more than 20 Congressional attempts since 1937 to restructure the civil service. President Carter proposed a law to 'restore the merit principle'. Under the Civil Service Reform Act 1978, the Commission's major functions were transferred to an Office of Personnel Management. It handles recruitment, examinations, training, promotion, and various kinds of incentive awards. Another agency – the Merit Systems Protection Board – hears appeals from federal employees, who have been fired, suspended or demoted, or who had genuine grievances to be redressed.

2.3. Civil Service in Different Perspectives

2.3.1. Universal phenomenon of expansion. Although management structure has been in existence in some form or other throughout the civilization, remarkable changes took place in recent decades in the structure and nature of the civil service. The philosophy of welfare state and post-war rehabilitation works called for huge expansion of administrative organs of governments. Growing liberalism and adoption of modern technology brought forth expansions in private bureaucracy too (Rickover 1971:151). Significant developments were effected in the public bureaucracy in both developed and developing countries. But, the latter invite greater interests, because many such bureaucracies seem to be more of a problem than a solution to the existing and emerging problems in these transitional societies (Huque 1990:111). This is partly for their great thrusts for state-led development. Moreover, the developing countries had to create a lot of employment for their burgeoning educated populations where there was no viable and effective private sector to absorb eligible work force (Rahman 2001:11).

2.3.2. India. In India, the civil service system was reorganized after 1947. At the central level, civil services included the All-India services, such as Indian Administrative Service (IAS), Indian Foreign Service (IFS), and Indian Police Service (IPS), and the central services. The central services were grouped into four categories (Groups A, B, C and D) in order of their importance. The All-India and central services serve the union territories. Similar grouping of services is found in other commonwealth countries too (Huque 1990:140). The onset of economic planning in India in 1951, with the launch of the Five-Year Plan, enjoined on the civil service a role of development administration. In this new mould, they were expected to participate in the administration of public enterprises, regulation of private sector, formulation of socio-economic and political policies, elimination of poverty and social inequity, development of rural areas, combating inflation, effective monetary management, reduction of gender gap, etc. India had its first experience with the severe resource crunch in the 1980s. It led in 1991 to a new economic policy, which saw a rollback of the state in economic activities both at macro and micro levels. The new macro-economic policy spurred favorable environments for private sector participation and reforms at macro-level leading to the contraction of the public sector. In other words, the 1990s foresaw for the state a facilitator's role, and the civil services (three all-India services – IAS, IFS and IPS – and 29 other central services) had to have a new orientation. In short, the civil servants acted as personal servants of the rulers in ancient India. However, in medieval age, they became state servants, and in British-India civil servants acquired the

complexion of public servants. During this period, the civil service also became a protected service, as the Indian Civil Service Act of 1861 gave many privileges to the civil servants as regards their recruitment, promotion, termination, pension, salaries, etc. The ethos of the civil service in India changed from welfare-orientation in the late 1940s to development-orientation between the 1960s and 1980s, and finally to facilitator's role in the 1990s, as dictated by emerging challenges.

2.3.3. Asia. The administrative systems of the three independent countries in pre-World War Asia – China, Japan and Thailand – performed essential functions without much difficulty. The rest of Asia was under colonial rule, where regimes were characterized with the roles of maintaining law and peace and collecting revenues. The War hastened the liberation of Asian nations. The new states undertook many functions and created functional and specialized institutions to cope with the emerging development needs. The post-War and post-Depression containment politics during cold war era and the UN-declared Development Decades led in many countries to the planned and interventionist states. Although created for continuity, regulation, control and stability, bureaucracies were thrust into the role of development and distribution (Baker 1991:358). Rapid growth of administrative and technical offices and agencies in the Philippines, Malaysia, South Korea and Thailand is typical of Asia's bureaucratic proliferation (Raksataya 1989:267). Marking a shift from interventionism, the Asian states including even China now choose relatively liberal and private initiative approach and their bureaucracies like those in the sub-continent embrace changes (Zhou 1995:447). China is already in the process of restructuring its huge bureaucracy. They laid off almost half of its eight million officials in the party and government departments. Out of its 41 Ministries, 11 were going to be merged with others or closed altogether (Bezlova 1999).

2.3.4. USA. Despite the public bureaus' immense services to the citizens (Niskanen 1971:20), bureaucracies in OECD countries too may be endemically inefficient, self-interested and unresponsive to political goals or to client interests. Besides reducing their size, two approaches of reforms are at play. The governments now-a-days try to privatize and regulate, contract out and bring in market forces. In this way, the internal functioning of administration in these countries is considerably improved (Bonwitt 1989:217). Increased attention was paid to the subject in the 1980s, when UK and USA were ruled by relatively conservative regimes. Others followed suit. The government of France had been trying hard to implement its plan to reduce

the size of public bureaucracy¹. Reforms required great deal of determination, tenacity and resources, because it involved and affected so many basic interests and sections of population. In the United States, reform efforts seem to bear fruits very slowly. In the twenty years since the passing of the Civil Service Reform Act of 1978, the civil services have largely remained untouched. In the 1980s, the Reagan presidency produced a tattered public service, diminished in both size and morale. In subsequent years, emphasis was laid on *rightsizing*, with a notional target in the personnel strength generally in terms of percentage. In the 1990s, the three major themes of civil service changes were *downsizing*, *simplification* and *flexibility* (Ingraham 1997). The US government is plagued by endemic and seemingly irresolvable debates on the size of bureaucracy and public expenditure. The endemic ill-will between the executive and legislative organs of the US government is a testimony to the complexity of the problem. In 1995 alone, many federal government agencies were temporarily shut down twice because of the inability of the two organs to agree on the means to reduce public debt and prepare a balanced budget. The State was almost unable to fulfill its obligations on public debt servicing. The administration had to take unusual measures to handle the situation². After the New Deal, the welfare state principles have pushed the wealthiest state of the world to a status of the most indebted state.

2.3.5. Australia. The development of Australian civil service is traced to the earliest European settlements in the late 18th century. But, a national government came into being as late as 1901. Five phases are identified in its evolution: a) colonial administration, b) popular control of representative institutions, c) personnel and business efficiency, d) the administrative state, and e) contemporary reforms (Halligan 1994). The *colonial administration* was a paternal or colonial autocracy, administered by a Governor who was responsible to the British government only. The *popular control of representative institutions* was associated with differentiation of political officials from non-political ones. Ministers assumed control of public servants and became responsible to the legislature. Ministerial departments were developed as basic units of administrative organization. 'Departmentalism' surfaced with the creation of an expanding number of agencies, each responsible for its personnel management. Another feature was the reliance on patronage of elected representatives. It was 'exercised with due regard to political situation and needs of the public service'. Only Victoria, between 1870 and 1883, allowed something akin to a US spoils system (Caiden 1965:39). The phase of *personnel and business*

¹ A high-ranking bureaucrat in the Prime Minister's Office of France, while talking to this student in June 1996, described the issues at stake for the ongoing debates about public sector reforms in France.

² As much as \$ 55 billion was transferred from federal pension funds to meet the debt-servicing obligations.

efficiency was spread between 1880 and 1914. Experimentation with new forms of organization and procedures drew on ideas such as separation of administration and politics, scientific management, and making public administration more efficient by drawing on business methods. A central control was instituted through a Public Service Board, or Commission to create a career service and eventually shield public agencies from patronage. Provisions were made for independent control of public service, open competition for entry, promotion by merit, classification and grading of personnel and salaries based on work value. The 'new doctrine' had three main features: (i) a centralized Board or Commission; (ii) recruitment to base-grade by open competition; and (iii) a career service based on promotion by merit, but keeping seniority as a central element (Spann 1979: 255, 288). Following the World War II, the Commonwealth expanded more rapidly and developed a professionalized public service. The period from 1918 to the 1970s was characterized by incremental changes. Governments relied on the bureaucracy for both administering the system and taking the initiatives in policy directions. The non-departmental public sector expanded greatly as did the discretion of public servants, who operated within a framework dominated by administrative standards and processes. Both served to obscure the role of the politician and extend that of the bureaucrat. Public services acquired the characteristics of the administrative state (Waldo 1984). Lastly, since 1980s, the so-called *reform period* is characterized by an acceleration of the changes in public sector. The overall direction could be taken as a move away from a more administrative, closed and centralized system toward a more political, management-centered, open and decentralized system.

2.3.6. Russia. Members of the Russian bureaucracy between the 10th and the 17th centuries were in reality the kings' personal servants. In Russia, bureaucracy too traced back to the reigns of Ivan the Terrible and Peter the Great. Under the latter, enthroned in 1696, Russia witnessed an end to the privileged positions of nobles in civil service. Peter introduced in 1722 a Table of Ranks, which included 14 ranks of service each with its distinctive orders and conditions. The system began to be more professionalized and specialized, but at the same time less flexible and invert-looking. Peter the Great defined the authority, responsibility and functions within the administrative apparatus and forced the public servants to work in accordance with standard norms and rules. In 1802, Emperor Alexander I created eight Ministries and the State Council, a façade (not the essence) of the parliaments in its western neighbors. He also brought about judicial reforms. However, the conservative tendencies amidst tsarist bureaucracy were sustained by its privileged position, absence of overseeing by any representative organ,

atmosphere of despotism, total obedience to the superior and suppression of independent thinking. In 1917, the Bolshevik Revolution dismantled the old edifice. Vacancies created by the fleeing or uncooperative bureaucrats were filled up with people of questionable professional competence and performance, selected mainly on the basis of origin and fidelity. The Soviet system led to a rigidly bureaucratic and inward-looking administrative apparatus, performing strictly controlled functions and having a very limited capacity of decision-making. It rested upon the Communist Party's Politburo and Central Committee. Membership of the Communist party was a minimum requirement for any post of significance. Following the disintegration of the Soviet Union in December 1991, and transfer of its legacy to the Russian Federation, the old regulatory framework and administrative structures became unsuitable for meeting the emerging problems. The newly created Chief Department on Personnel Training (Roskadry) was made responsible for progress in public administration reforms and training of personnel. A Law on the Basic Principles of the Civil Service was enacted in 1995. The Russian Federation, with its heritage of the just-dismantled Soviet Union, reduced the number of 100-odd federal Ministries to 65 and made a slow transformation of its authoritarian 'Byzantine' type of administrative structures³. The administrative reforms became inherently political, with *governance* tradition, although some traits of *management* traditions may be traced. The five groups of civil service positions are termed as supreme, key, major, senior, and junior. On the whole, the professional quality of civil service cadres is declining, as the promising specialists prefer more attractive and rewarding private sector jobs, and dismissal of incompetent and ill-disciplined personnel often leads to further problems.

2.3.7. South Africa. The national civil service in South Africa has its roots in the political and administrative institutions and practices brought by the settlers and the colonists, and the policy of *apartheid* of the political party in power for 44 years since 1948. Since the arrival of the Dutch East India Company in 1652, the territory had a system of governance fashioned on that of Holland. In 1795, the Cape came under the British, whose philosophy of government and administration was characterized by rule of law, which provides for limited discretion of the executive authority, equality before law, and an independent judiciary. The Cape became a British Colony in 1806 and remained such till 1910, when the British Parliament passed the South Africa Act 1909. It adopted the draft constitution for the political unification of all territories, drawn on the principles enunciated by a National Convention. It also heralded the

³ Adapted from internet sources.

beginning of a national civil service that included most provincial administration officials. A Public Service Commission was created in 1912 with powers to make recommendations on civil service matters like grading and classification of posts, appointments, promotions, termination of service and the organization and reorganization of departments. When the National Party came into power in 1948 with *apartheid* as its governing policy, various legislative and administrative institutions and practices were instituted over time to give effect to it. Improving upon the 1961 apartheid constitution, the regime introduced the Republic of South Africa Constitution Act of 1983. It made provision for separate chambers for White, Coloured and Asian population groups. There were separate classes of subjects like "own affairs" and "general affairs", for which there were in effect as many as thirteen Houses of Parliament and a quasi-legislative President's Council. The new democratic dispensation in 1994 in accordance with the provisions of the interim Constitution of 1993 led to an end to all these. The new government started correcting the constraints in civil service: (a) lack of rational traits – representativeness, popular legitimacy, service delivery, accountability, transparency, a professional ethos and work ethics; (b) absence of effective management information; (c) centralized control and top-down management; (d) low productivity; (e) poorly paid and de-motivated staff; and (f) conflicting labour relations. The phenomenal growth in the South African civil service is attributed to population growth (at 257% from 1920 to 1980), urbanization, changing perceptions on the role of government, the policy of apartheid, and economic, scientific and technological development. At the advent of the Government of National Unity (GNU) in March 1994, the Whites occupied 94% of the management positions in the civil service. In less than two years up to January 1996, Blacks and Whites took 37% and 63% respectively of the posts filled. There was also progress in respect of gender. Before the GNU, women occupied only 5% of all management positions. Up to January 1996 women filled 10% of such positions.⁴

Most African states adopted interventionist model in the context of an underdeveloped private sector. They undertook production and distribution functions as well as judicial and regulatory ones. Their huge social sector expenditure and deficit financing soon clashed with their development goals. The welfare state philosophy and a socialist ideology were the two distinct reasons for bureaucratic expansion in the industrialized west and the socialist USSR. However, for most developing states, the pretext was a need for realizing economic and social

⁴ In 2004, when South Africa celebrates the 10th anniversary of democracy, the administrative system was far more representative. The Newsweek, 29 April 2004.

development planning. A yawning public sector and negative growth went parallel. As a reaction, economic role of states and size of civil service are cut in some cases (Moharir 1994:7; Rasheed 1996:12). Under *structural adjustment*, many states seek to reform public services. Uganda, the trendsetter, assumes existing bureaucratic structures as imperfect and strikes in six areas: rationalization of offices, capability enhancement to manage reforms, benefit monetization, grading of job, code of conduct, and MIS strategy (De Haan 1996:9). Ethiopia, Tanzania, Zimbabwe and other states also tried to do away with their socialist ideology and politicized bureaucracy. Despite the serious anxieties on the sustainability of reforms for many factors – political sensitivity, private sector weaknesses, inadequacy of resources and institutional capacity, donor influence, and lack of experience – the reform measures are inspiring (Corkery and Land 1996:7), and help the states which could not so far reach out into society for their existing clientelist and dyadic patterns of relationships⁵. These may also pave the way for stronger governance in Africa (Hyden 1992:25).

2.3.8. Pakistan. After the British left the sub-continent in 1947, the two newly independent states – India and Pakistan – inherited a common administrative system. In the following years, Pakistan was way ahead of India in retaining the most of the structural and ideological tenets of the British Indian steel-frame administrative system. Like the illustrious ICS in the just-ended colonial rule, an elitist Civil Service of Pakistan (CSP) was built into a monolithic band of system maintainer in the new state. The relative weaknesses of politicians contributed to the emergence of such a towering position of the generalist administrators. Almost all attempts at reforming the administrative system went without much fruits. Like in the British days, the bureaucracy in Pakistan was blessed with a constitutional protection against any adverse change in the conditions of service for the incumbents (Chaudhuri 1969:47). An overtly centralized public administration was just made into a pliant tool in the hand of the powerful. On the other hand, the bureaucracy, in which an elite generalist CSP occupied the prime position, was among the best-known integrating force for Pakistan. However, public administration's paraphernalia was not very effective and popular in its integrating role in the then East Pakistan, which was soon to become a sovereign Bangladesh after a bloody liberation war in 1971. A mass rising by the Bangalees led to an unceremonious dismantling of a largely administrative state of Pakistan.

⁵ Many African states are still dominated by hometown or tribal considerations rather than national goals.

2.3.9. Bangladesh. Bureaucracy in Bangladesh is quite conspicuous with its omnipresent posture and the huge cost involved with its existence. This high-profile apparatus of the statecraft is avowedly meant for production, distribution, progress and peace. Its strength expanded from 454,500 on the eve of independence to 610,615 in 1973 and to 1,073,107 in 1991 (Ahamed 1980:141; O'Donnell 1984:160; Khan 1991:22). Besides the 36 Ministries and 15 Divisions⁶ in 1996, there are 166 attached departments, public corporations, autonomous bodies and subordinate offices (GOB 1995:22). Six administrative Divisions, 64 Districts and 469 Upazilas are there, each with its regulatory and development units. Six city corporations and 277-odd township municipalities also function with their own bureaucratic bodies. A number of big and medium industries are still managed by the State. In absence of a viable private sector, government is still the largest employer. The bureaucracy is considerably big and germane with conflicts and problems to bewilder policy makers, practitioners and experts (Barenstein 1994:9).

2.4. Concluding Remarks

2.4.1. Omnipresence. Some form of bureaucratic apparatus was always required largely to contain the inherent self-aggrandizement of mankind. Initially it was a military body, since warfare was the most conspicuous group activity. As time went on, non-military aspects gained prominence, especially in the hands of far-sighted monarchs, whose rules became watersheds of history. They took care to improve the life of their subjects. Some of them even took it as their bounden duty ordained by God. In the result, civil employees gained prominence since the civil sides of public life became significant. Man's chances of self-actualization necessitated the introduction and operationalization of so many institutional devices. The bureaucracy or civil service was regarded as one of such fine edifices on which the establishment of an orderly human society was possible. Owing to the institutionalization of modern life, there gradually came into being the *big state*, or *administrative state*, or *welfare state*. Hence, the bureaucracy also got larger and stronger.

2.4.2. Checkered history. The evolution of civil service or bureaucracy has a checkered history. The states initially took military causes as their primary responsibilities. So, attention and resources were directed to the military objectives of the states or of those who controlled the states. After the introduction of civil bureaucracy, as a sequel to an increasingly pre-eminent non-military agenda of statecraft, the civil functionaries were considered as the kings' servants.

⁶ The number of such organizations has been constantly shifting. It is discussed at Section 6.1.2.2.

The kings appointed them and they held offices and got elevated to higher positions at the pleasure of the monarchs. At a later phase, the nobles and oligarchs enjoyed a privileged in having their men recruited in state employment. In the late 18th century, the term *civil service* gained prominence. The coinage of the term civil service and the first open competitive recruitment to it were made in the context of Indian subcontinent. There also began thoughts about things like impartial or partisan bureaucracy, and personal or impersonal rule. More importantly, a merit-based open competitive system of recruitment was accepted as a principle. At the same time, recruitment to a part of bureaucracy continued to be made on consideration of party affiliation. It was commonly termed as the *spoils system*, based on the principle: *to the victors belong the spoils*. Partisan bureaucracies were in control in socialist countries too. However, the general propensity favours a neutral, impersonal and professional civil service recruited on the basis of merit through an open competitive examination.

2.4.3. Major variations. Different countries experienced different modes of development of their civil services. China and India have a rich heritage of well-organized civil bureaucracy. The ancient Chinese emperors even went as far as establishing specialized schools, from where recruits could be drawn for civil employment. They even provided for scholarship programmes for poor but talented students who were appropriately regarded as prospective guardians of the Chinese public administration. Some great kings and emperors of India introduced elaborate civil service structures to cater to their noble schemes of all-out development. Again, under oligarchic regimes, some countries got a closed and narrow-ended civil bureaucracy and had civil servants suited to these systems like in the apartheid South Africa and Rhodesia. The Soviet Union introduced a bureaucracy, which was in effect an organ of the ruling Communist Party. After long periods of ambivalence and turbulence, the Europeans evolved the professionalized neutral bureaucratic systems under the overall control of political office holders. The present-day Australian, Japanese and Russian systems are similarly poised, because their neutral bureaucracies learnt to live under the aegis of political functionaries within a broad framework. The US has a mixed system where a small number of civil servants at the top are recruited on party consideration, while the vast majority is employed, on the basis of merit, through open competition. China still follows a partisan line, introduced after the 1949 communist revolution. They have made attempts at reforms in terms of size and efficiency. A remarkable drive for industrialization and financial reforms provides impetus to reforms.

2.4.4. The cross-roads. Bangladesh inherits a legacy of the steel-frame British Indian administration, which allowed the civil servants to efficiently exercise a paternalistic administration in order to perpetuate the British colonial rule in India. In absence of a democratic order, the civil servants held the key to governance. The self-confidence, a strong sense of responsibility and an absence of other institutions made their personalistic administration possible and largely successful in India. It was only on the eve of Partition in 1947 that the civil servants sensed the possibility of sharing power with politicians. The civil servants adjusted to a fact that they are a separate and distinct group of officials holding specific posts that required active cooperation with politicians (Alam 1990:6). The generalist bureaucrats in Pakistan enjoyed an overwhelming position in the absence of respectable politicians to look after the country's interests. Democracy was a far cry, and powers were largely shared between civil and military bureaucrats on the one hand and upstart business leaders and self-seeking politicians on the other. The country was eventually split into two independent states in 1971 through a bloody liberation war. Bangladesh continued with the bureaucratic edifice inherited from Pakistan, albeit with initial misgivings and reservations of the political elite. Out of a nationalist-socialist intonation, the first government made a tentative move to bring the bureaucracy under the effective suzerainty of a one-party political system. It did not ultimately succeed, and the country experienced spells of military rules and, with that, a (re)consolidation of bureaucratic powers. Lately, there was some experimentation with the bureaucratic system, for example through the introduction of a unified civil service structure and through a kind of bureaucratic de-concentration. However, very little substantive changes can be perceived. Moreover, the level of efficiency and reputation of the civil servants of various categories is possibly at a low. Everybody seems inclined to speak for the need for a change in the system. Against the backdrop of a crumbling edifice, and in the midst of a barrage of words regarding its utility, the civil service of Bangladesh now stands at the crossroads. It has a hard task of accommodating conflicting interests of its own segments. It has a more stupendous option of returning to a glorious elite paternalistic aura. And, it has before it a difficult mission of meeting the demands of time and of becoming an instrument for development. From the crossroads, the civil service has to choose the best and the most opportune option as to how it can be more effective, efficient and efficacious, and how it can become a tool for forwarding the country's march for development and progress.

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3. GENESIS OF B. C. S. (ADMINISTRATION) CADRE

3.1. Mode of governance in India before the British conquest

3.1.1. Uniqueness of Indian situation. Since administration is an essential component of, and prerequisite for, organized social life, there had always been some sort of administrative apparatus in India like in all other civilizations. But, unlike many other oriental societies, India did not fully conform to Karl Wittfogel's concept of *hydraulic society*, as the scarcity of water was an important public issue in only few areas in India. Hence, administrative apparatus centering on management of water resources as evident in many oriental societies was largely absent from India. A very sketchy and fragmentary account of the ancient Indian administrative system can be traced in history.

3.1.2. Ancient Indian administration. The Mauryan and the Gupta dynasties set the foundation of an organized administrative system in India. Chandragupta Maurya (322-298 B.C.), founder of the former, declared as the *emperor* of India, had put in place an elaborate administrative body. The most famous ruler of the dynasty, Asoka (273-232 B.C.), provided direction and leadership to the administrative system, which reached a high degree of efficiency. He stressed on 'safety, self-control, peace of mind, and happiness of all animate beings' and addressed Indians as 'my children', who should 'obtain every kind of welfare and happiness both in this world and the next' (Wolpert 1989:63). The kings played an active part in administration and, unlike many of their European, oriental and African counterparts, they did not claim divine ancestry. They had chief ministers and councils of ministers. Howsoever strong and learned they were, the monarchs rarely ruled on their own. Governing was based on consultation. 'A wise king should always follow the opinion of the members of the council. When the sovereign becomes independent of his council, he plans for his ruin. In fine, he loses the State and the subjects' (Rathore 1993:33). The Mauryan system performed constituent and ministrant types of functions. The former functions included the duties of law and order, security of person and property, and defense against aggression. The later were the welfare services. The highly organized government machinery was divided among many departments. The army and the secret police supplemented the Mauryan administration, whose complexity remains a matter of legitimate astonishment (Rathore 1993:34).

3.1.3. All-pervasiveness of Mauryan administration. The Mauryan administration affected ordinary men's life at all points – maintenance of discipline, regulation of prices, levy of tolls,

issue of passports, appointment of inspectors, imposing penalties to offenders, and so on. The administration was divided into four or five outlying *pradeshas*, or provinces, each under the charge of a viceroy responsible to the central government, and a Home Province also. Provinces enjoyed considerable autonomy and provincial administration was further sub-divided into *sthanas*, or districts each with an administration under district commissioners of several grades. The District officials, *sthanikas* as they were called, were pretty powerful as controllers of the districts' public affairs (Sapru 1985:101). Asoka appointed several *Mahamattayas* – overseers of law – who traveled to different corners of the empire to supervise local officials' performance of duties. It was indeed the beginning of an attempt to enforce central bureaucratic control over the fiercely autonomous or virtually unsettled areas. Interestingly, the administration established a Ministry of Morals, which was responsible for the task of the moral regeneration of the subjects. However, the other outstanding feature was that the system combined the traits of a military force and a bureaucratic despotism. After the death of Asoka, the God-King-Father, the efficiency of his administrative system began to crumble due to the technological obstacles to integration and the cost of so enormous a bureaucracy (Wolpert 1989:69). However, the system persisted till the later Middle Ages in a progressively degenerated form.

3.1.4. The Gupta era. The Guptas (185 BC – 700 AD) maintained and improved upon the Mauryan system. However, the bureaucracy was less pervasive in the Gupta period, when the elite corps of spies and elephant-borne soldiers helped them maintain the realm (Wolpert 1989:94). *Sandhibigrahika*, a top official responsible for war and truce, was appointed to look after the foreign affairs of the realm. As heads of civil departments, the *Amattayas* too had positions of strength. The Guptas appointed a new group of officials, *Kumaramattayas*, at the highest level of administration (Sapru 1985:102). Thus, like the Mauryans, the Guptas too were interested in administrative experimentation. In fact, the immense expanse of the Indian realm naturally called for experimentation in administration. The natural excellence of the Guptas was rather in the cultural regeneration of India. Classical serenity and simplicity were the guiding approach reflected in almost every act of statecraft. Great monarchs like Harshabardhana could pay only part of their energies in governance. The experimentation pursued in Mauryan and Gupta periods was unfortunately absent during the many centuries since the Gupta reign fell. Short-lived empires, internal conflicts and invasions from outside were so frequent that a settled pattern of administration was not possible. The stabilizing factors were very hard to find.

3.1.5. The Sultanate period (1206-1526). During the interregnum between the thriving ancient reigns and the vivacious Mughal Empire, the Sultans were not always really well-saddled in their thrones. So, there could really be very few attempts at innovations. Administration was limited to the barest minimum. Territories under the control of the Sultans were divided into provinces and sub-divided into districts and sub-districts, each administered by a responsible officer. The only serious attempt to introduce a well-organized administrative system was made by a Pathan ruler, Sher Shah Shuri, who re-designated the provinces as *sarkars* and divided them into *parganas*. He paid much attention and resources to the non-military cause of the statecraft by developing a very efficient postal service for the first time and rationalizing the land revenue system, which subsequently was improved further by Akbar, the great Mughal. Sher Shah also initiated the evolution of a public works system for the construction and maintenance of his notable public highways.

3.1.6. The Mughal administration. Many dynasties had reigned in many parts of India before the establishment of the famous Mughal Empire. Many Muslim dynasties too were established in Delhi for several centuries. But it was only after the Mughals got a firm control on most of India that some remarkable changes were made on the empire's administrative system. Akbar, the greatest of the Mughals, was a man of high calibre and he displayed administrative abilities of a high order. The Empire, spread in most of India during his time, was probably the best organized and most prosperous under an administration, which was a product of the genius of Akbar himself. It was a *perfect autocracy with an ideal of benevolent and paternal government*. The Emperor was the fountainhead of all authority – executive, civil, judicial and military. Centralization was of such an extent that almost all details of important matters had to be placed for order before the Emperor, who seldom delegated authority and always kept a careful watch upon the activities of his servants. The emperors treated the governors merely as their agents. Akbar took care to devise an elaborate system of checks and balances with a view to holding centrifugal forces under his firm control. His scheme of installing three top officials in the provincial administration – subedar, dewan, and bakhshi – was a fine measure of checks and balances so that nobody could become outstandingly influential at that level. However, the emperors allowed the governors a substantial measure of freedom of action in certain matters, which did not concern high imperial policy.

Akbar's administration, however, did not make any room for specialization. Except for agrarian administration, there was no separate department like commerce or social service or health. He increased the efficiency of the agrarian administration put in place during the short-lived reign of Sher Shah. The system was based on the belief that the empire's prosperity depended on the welfare of peasants. The agrarian administrative system also developed around itself an elaborate judicial and magisterial administration. These helped create a sound system of financial administration that defined the sources of revenue and also delineated the channels of expenditure. Despite these characteristics of civil management, the Mughal administration should not be termed as purely a civil administration. Indeed, it was a highly bureaucratic system of elaborate hierarchy in which the officials held relative weights demonstrated in terms of *mansab*, or rank. Each official discharging a civil responsibility was given a *mansab*. The *Mansabdars*, meaning nominal commanders of respective numbers of horsemen, were in effect the *corps d'elite*. These numbers determined their status and pay. All these were indicative of a great degree of bureaucratization in the Mughal administration.

In the civil side of Mughal administration, the rulers were great believers of merit and virtue. They drew capable men from every known place – no matter from within India or from outside – for their efficient system of administration and allowed them due elevation if they were successful to prove their ability and loyalty (Sapru 1985:103). There was nothing of the sort of service conditions or rules for recruitment. In absence of departmentalization, and for a personal nature of the system, a superior in office was regarded as superior in all respects. So, recruitment was strictly shown to be on the consideration of merit. Selection was almost a prerogative of the royal officials. Hence, not surprisingly, the administrative system was a highly urbanized institution seldom perceived below the district headquarters. However, the system was very efficient and it could aptly demonstrate the high ideals of Mughal government and meticulous care for the welfare of people. The courts dispensed justice without fear or favour, and an atmosphere of justice was prevalent throughout the reign. This *district system*, an administrative organization centred on collection of land revenue and the development of amazing office procedure – was subsequently accepted as foundation of the British rule (Tinker 1962:64). The most outstanding legacy of the Mughal administration, bequeathed to next generations, was the yet-to-be pronounced principle that governments must rest on the affection and confidence of the people of the realm (Rathore 1993:40).

During the Mughal period, like in the Mauryan and Gupta eras many centuries ago, administration – more so, civil administration – was a natural corollary and a direct result of effective conquest of a vast territory. So far, these were the two most effective kingships that India experienced in its history. They could enjoy a fair amount of control and virtual allegiance in the huge territorial limits allowed by their conquests. In order to consolidate their military victories and with an expectation of having a tranquil environment in which to foster a system of benevolent despotism, these two great dynasties sought to introduce effective administrative systems, though dissimilar in many respects. Both the dynasties enjoyed acclamation for the legacy of an orderly statecraft, which allowed – or even fostered – education, literature and contemporary technology along with better systems of military affairs and public administration.

3.2. Administration under the Company Rule

3.2.1. Twilight of Mughal era. The glorious Mughal rule came to oblivion with the death of the last great emperor Alamgir in 1707. He spent a large part of his reign in fighting the enemies all around. He was a great believer of simplicity and an astute follower of unscrupulous expediency. His successors did not match his sense of purpose or competence as a warrior and a statesman. His preoccupation with warfare had imposed a heavy drain upon the imperial resources and aroused too much opposition to Mughal rule. His heirs failed to live up to the expectation, as they lacked his indefatigable energy and determination. The vast bureaucracy was overawed with probable wrath of the emperor in the event of the officials' performance failure. The post-Alamgir administration was just incapable of doing the service required for a glorious empire. At one point Nizam-ul-Mulk, the able Vazir of an incompetent emperor Muhammad Shah, despondently left Delhi to avoid disarray and settled in the south in 1719 to establish his own dynasty. The administrative system was poised for an inglorious decay as payment of salaries for services were not guaranteed any more. New forces – indigenous and foreign alike – were emerging in the outskirts of the empire to inflict a deathblow to it. The Nizam's forces in the south, the Marathas in the west, the Rohila Afghans in the north, the Sikhs in the north-west, and a conglomerate of many forces gathered in Oudh to the east of Delhi – all poised to play the game of power in India. An anarchic situation set in and it was soon clear that the Mughal rule was rather a façade and that it was a matter of time only to witness a formal demise of the decaying empire. Overtly preparing for the scrambles for booties expected out of the figurehead Mughal Empire's imminent demise, foreign powers were increasing their strength in many parts of India. After initial ups and downs and with active support of treacherous Bengal courtiers and

renegade generals, in 1757, the English captured the reigns of Bengal, Bihar and Orissa through the Battle of Plassey. This victory was consolidated by another more decisive victory in the Battle of Baxer in 1764 against a united front of forces still available to Bengal, the Mughals and the Nawab of Oudh. The British East India Company emerged as the single most powerful and victorious player in the struggle for power in India. It was time for the Company to consolidate and perpetuate its hold on the subcontinent.

3.2.2. Company raj. The East India Company was a joint venture business enterprise of a few British merchants interested in trade with the east. Incorporated on 31 December 1600 by Queen Elizabeth under the title *The Governor and Merchants of London Trading into the East Indies*, the Company did not have its best days either home or in India until 1657 when Oliver Cromwell granted the Company a Charter that provided it with a permanent joint stock subscription. Three years earlier, a treaty with Portugal allowed the British ships the right to free trade in the Portuguese territories in Asia. Although the royalists subsequently burnt down the Charter after the Restoration, King Charles II granted the Company an even more attractive Charter. The revitalized East India Company now possessed superb rights including permission to coin money, to exercise full jurisdiction over all English subjects residing at its factories¹, and to make war or peace with “non-Christian powers” in India. The merchant adventurers of London thus became a virtual state unto them and acted accordingly in the areas east of the Cape of Good Hope (Wolpert 1989:147). Emperor Jahangir had allowed it to establish its three *factories* in Surat, Fort St George and on the Hooghli. In 1661, King Charles gave to the company the possession of Bombay, which he had just received from Portugal as a wedding gift (Sapru 1985:105). Against this backdrop, it is no wonder that the Company turned into the ruler of a vast territory after its victory against the Nawab of Bengal, Bihar and Orissa in 1757 and especially after its decisive victory at Baxer in 1764.

3.2.3. Diwani and dual rule. A year after the Battle of Baxer, on 12 August 1765 the Company received the first title whatsoever to the control of affairs in at least part of India from Emperor Shah Alam, the Mughal known to be possessing *a crown more of thorns than of pleasures*. It was the *Diwani* – right to the management of revenue administration in Bengal, Bihar and Orissa – granted to the Company in lieu of an agreement to pay the emperor an annual sum of 260,000 pounds. This way, the East India Company became an official servant of the Mughals.

The triple province's *nizamat* or official responsibility of military and judicial affairs remained with the Nawab in Murshidabad (Ali 1995:81). However, by taking advantage of the fast collapsing façade of Mughal rule, the Company went straight ahead to establish its *raj*, or rule in India. The servants of the Company under the captaincy of Robert Clive, himself a *mansabdar* under the decaying Mughals, embarked on an orgy of plunders through Clive's handpicked puppet Nawab of Bengal. Most of the revenues collected in their respective areas along with other booties allegedly went into their own pockets. The servants of the company were so engrossed in their hectic private trading alongside the company's business that they found no time to worry about the Nawab's unbalanced budget or the break-down of law and order. It was the worst form of all possible dual governments: those with responsibility possessed no power, and those with power were not constrained with any responsibility. Despite his own untainted personal records of plunders, Clive reported in 1765, "Such a scene of anarchy, confusion, bribery, corruption and extortion was never seen or heard of in any country but Bengal; nor such and so many fortunes acquired in so unjust and rapacious a manner" (Wolpert 1989:187). In the wake of such spoliation at the hand of the British, a devastating famine struck in 1770 in Bengal – a land known for peace, plenty and pestilence – and an estimated one-third of its peasants perished in it.

3.2.4. Reorganization. There were informed gossips about the private fortunes of its servants despite the Company's poor finance, stories of oppression and experiences of a devastating famine. Combined with it, the Company's novel position of controlling Indian politics led to a strong public opinion in London in favour of a greater parliamentary control on the Indian and the Company affairs. In 1772, the Regulating Act was passed to make important changes in the way of handling administration of Indian territories as well as in company affairs. The responsibility of making and issuing rules, alliances and regulations for the good order and civil government was handed over to the Governor General of Bengal assisted by three councillors. It also constituted a Supreme Court in Calcutta. In the new *double government*, the Company now had to share power with the Crown government in Great Britain, not the decaying and ineffective Mughal Empire. The India Act of 1784 heightened the position of the government and subordinated the role of the Company in the governance of India. A Board of Control was established with six Commissioners 'to superintend, direct and control all acts, operations and concerns which in any way relate to the civil and military government or revenues of the British

¹ Centers of trade and military establishments.

territorial possessions in the East Indies' (Anderson 1988:10). Governor General Warren Hastings had brought back semblance of authority and order although high-handedness of the company servants and personal plunders were not altogether gone. He reorganized the revenue administration, remodeled the judicial system, freed trade from its existing abuses and laid the foundations in India of a civil service in the modern sense (Sapru 1985:109). The judiciary was also divided into two parts. The Collector – chief official at the district level – headed the civil judiciary. This position was to be occupied by a British. A *native* judge, whose decisions could be appealed against to the Collector, headed the criminal judiciary.

The East India Company enjoyed a monopolistic mercantile right in its India trade under the Charters periodically granted it from the Crown. These trading privileges were reserved to the members, their sons over 21 years of age, and their apprentices, factors and servants. The 1,014 stockholders of the commercial organization held the privilege of sorting out their business with men of their own quality. The owners resolved “not to employ any gentleman in any place of charge”. Servants of the Company were mostly recruited from the kith and kin of its owners. The company used to have a covenant signed by every servant before joining its service. The covenant entailed certain privileges and responsibilities. The term *covenanted civil service* thus came into being in India. Warren Hastings divided the covenanted civil service into two categories. One was concerned with purely commercial functions and the other with general administration. The latter was to attain functional superiority in due course. Under the India Act of 1784, the Court of Directors of the company retained the powers of appointment to all ranks of the company's services – civil, military and judicial – including a statutory power to appoint the Governor General as well as the Governors of Bombay and Madras presidencies. However, the Crown, on the advice of the president of the Board of Control, was empowered to recall any servant including the Governor General. Hastings's deeds and misdeeds earned him good number of foes as well. Counting his days in the wake of mounting criticism of his misdemeanors, he resigned and was replaced by Lord Cornwallis, another able Governor General, who effected profound changes in the administrative apparatus of India.

Cornwallis enshrined his administrative system in Bengal within a Code of Forty-Eight Regulations, popularly called as the Cornwallis Code. It created the *covenanted civil service*, in which the Company's high officials bound themselves, under covenants with East India Company, not to receive presents or to take part in trade. Certain important posts were reserved

for the members of this service. It laid the foundation of the British rule throughout India, and set the standards for services, courts and revenue collection. These have remained remarkably unaltered over time. In his judicial regulations, Cornwallis abolished the *faujdari* courts manned by Indian judges and replaced them with provincial circuit courts presided over by English judges. Police and judicial authorities were merged at the hand of the District Magistrates, who themselves were the Collectors. They could hold summary trial of petty offences. The Collector was invariably a British young man, who became the kingpin of the British Indian administrative system. He was assisted by a number of Indian assistants, clerks and servants of different grades. The efficiency of the newly installed functionaries and the benefits of an even more efficient land revenue system in the following years resulted in a profound state of law and order unknown in this region for many decades. The primary concern of the British officials was *survival through stability* (Chaturvedi 1988:63). There emerged a conflict of two different approaches: a pragmatic administration and an idealistic principle of civilized rule in India. In 1813, for the first time, the Charter Act required the Company to earmark 10,000 pounds for purposes of education. It was regarded more convenient to educate the Indians about modern education rather than educating the British functionaries about India, its society and its languages. All these were for their objective of evolving an efficient administration. The strength of high stature and strong job security made the superimposed officials all-powerful.

Under an air of liberalism, the Charter Act of 1833 was a milestone in the evolution of Indian public life. The reformist Governor General, Lord William Bentinck, was soon joined by his law member of the council, Thomas Macaulay, a great liberal who undertook a historical task of codifying the prevailing laws. He also helped outline the future education system geared to “form a class who may be interpreters between us and the millions whom we governed; a class of persons, Indian in blood and colour, but English in taste, in opinions, in morals, and in intellect” (Wolpert 1989:209, 215). On the other hand, bands of young Englishmen were regularly being picked up by the directors and Board of Control from the ever widening pool of younger sons of relatives, friends and lesser gentry for the service under the Company’s employ in India. Otherwise, these people could find no better place in the job market. Several hundred annual appointees to the Covenanted Indian Civil Services spent two years of indoctrination at the Company’s Haileybury College, between 1809 and 1858, receiving education and mis-education about India, their promised land for rule and vicissitude. The young civilians, specially processed in their ages between 15 and 22 at Haileybury, were taught that they were

born to lead *heathen natives* toward the very wisdom they themselves epitomized. Many of Britain's brightest, dullest, or simply the best-connected young men joined the growing stream of *leaders*, each appointed through a covenant by and under the Company. They were to become the links of a steel-frame British Indian administration.

Lord Dalhousie's administration introduced in India what he termed as *three great engines of social improvement* – railway, uniform postage and electric telegraph. In his far-sighted administration, non-martial aspects of statecraft and rule were accorded due importance and prominence. Meanwhile, two significant events took place in Great Britain in the early 19th century. In 1813, on Wellesley's motion on East Indian affairs, Lord Grenville spoke in the House of Lords in favour of free competition and public examinations for recruitment to the Indian administration. These words bore no results until twenty years later, when the Act of 1833 incorporated it at the painstaking efforts of Macaulay, Secretary to the Board of Control. The Directors of the Company were able to withhold these provisions until 1855, when the first competitive examinations for recruitment to the Indian Civil Service were held after the passage of the Government of India Act 1853. The examination was made open to all British subjects and it ended the nomination system in which company directors used to have an exclusive privilege. Another event was the Parliament's assumption of responsibility for the payment of salaries to government officials, who had hitherto derived their salaries from a number of sources including fees and gratuities (Reader 1981:2). The administration in India too was poised for change. Indeed, some changes in the Indian administration preceded similar events in the Home Civil Service in Britain.

The administrative system during the company rule in India was primarily geared to the task of establishing a firm control in the sub-continent. The system largely succeeded in this task. By the time when an end to the company's rule was being sighted, there was a more or less stable structure for land management. A fairly efficient regional arrangement for administrative functions was put in place. The system also introduced several other useful traits of modernity – English education in a limited scale, railway, telegraph, and postal services. Signs of social advancement began to be evident. News on curses like self-immolation of widows was being increasingly taken over by those on useful developments like widow remarriage. The administrative officials in many places became successful in projecting the beneficial image of the company raj. Many more developments could be possible but for the abrupt, but not

unnatural, end of the company rule following the Sepoy Mutiny of 1857. The first Indian war of liberation, or *the first peasant uprising* of history as it was subsequently called, nearly ended the British rule altogether from India. But, it is the administrative apparatus that proved singularly effective in rising to the occasion in Britain's favour. The civil policy of appeasement toward the Sikhs and others in the Punjab and the use of telegraphic mode of communication made a tremendous service to the British power in India and they averted a catastrophic defeat. However, the events in the sub-continent led to the inevitable. The Company's reign was taken over by the Crown in 1858. Queen Victoria was crowned as the Empress of India the following year. The affairs of India were now to be handled by the Parliament. The administration of the colony was made a subject of the British government. The civil service was now the *Imperial* civil service – sanctioned, framed, nurtured and guided by the British government. The top echelon imperial service was the Indian Civil Service, a name that gained singular prominence in the following decades.

3.3. The Indian Civil Service

3.3.1. Statutory Service. The Civil Service Act was enacted for the new realm in 1861, and a list of appointments reserved for the members of the Covenanted Service was drawn up, although in special cases the Secretary of State in Council could allow deviation from such reservations. Otherwise, the Indian government was left largely as it had been. Two other important pieces of legislation were made in the same year. The Indian Councils Act provided for a number of provincial Legislative Councils and restored to the Governments of Bengal, Bombay and Madras the power of legislation with certain reservations. The High Courts Act established three High Courts in those three provinces through the abolition of the Crown and Company Courts and it also made provision for Indians to join the bench (Philips nd:535). The judicial administration was now put on a less complicated framework. A powerful Secretary of State was appointed in Her Majesty's Government. However, he generally initiated little. As long as the Government of India could carry on the administration without a large increase in the cost of existing establishments, it was practically independent, as far as its action in the India's internal affairs was concerned (Anderson 1988:17).

Although the two-party political system was by the time well-ingrained in Great Britain, the civil service was left largely unaffected by partisan considerations. The Indian administration was not an exception. Regulations with regard to the age and qualifications of the candidates of

civil service posts were well determined. Any alteration to them must first be laid before the Parliament. The Civil Service Commissioners conducted the examinations. Thus, the civil service was freed from the baneful influences of party politics, and from charges of nepotism and favouritism. However, resentment grew in India, as the Indians were almost non-existent in the Indian civil service. Despite the fact that only 11 *natives* had been recruited to the covenanted civil service between 1866 and 1875, the upper age limit for competing in the civil service examinations was lowered in 1876 from 21 years to 19 years. From 1876 to 1883, only one of the 28 Indian candidates passed the civil service examination. In 1879, the Statutory Civil Service was framed, keeping it open to Indian candidates of proven merit and ability to be nominated by local governments. One-fifth of the vacancies in the covenanted civil service was proposed to be filled this way. In 1886, one-sixth of such posts were kept out of the scope for Civil Service Examinations. Such measures, however, did not succeed in securing for the Indians a larger berth in civil service. The government had to have a way out.

3.3.2. The Aitchison Commission (1886). As a major step since Macaulay Commission's recommendation for competitive examination for recruitment in the Indian civil service in the early 1850s, the Government appointed in 1886 a Public Service Commission under the chairmanship of Sir Charles Aitchison, a former Lieutenant-Governor of the Punjab. The Commission's mission was to devise a scheme that would "do full justice to the claims of natives of India to higher and more extensive employment to the public service." There were many reasons for poor Indian representation in the civil service. They included the difficulties of travel, question of finance, Hindu taboos against sea voyages, lack of educational facilities in India, comparative ignorance of the Indians about British life, and Indians' reluctance to let their young sons go at a very tender age to England for *the* examination. The Commission recommended the raising of lower age limit from 19 to 23 years. The suggestion for raising the age limit was made to allow more Indians an entry to the civil service. But, the Commission dismissed the demand for simultaneous examination in India, citing many reasons for so doing. It asked to abolish the statutory service, create provincial services and transfer some scheduled posts to such services. The schedules contained some important posts earmarked for members of the Covenanted Civil Service. On recommendation of the Commission, civil services were divided into three groups – Imperial, Provincial and Subordinate. The first was the Civil Service of India, better known as the Indian Civil Service, successor to the covenanted civil service. A Subordinate Service was constituted with clerks and others, who could be promoted to positions

of the other services by dint of exceptional merit and abilities. Their status, however, was to remain lower than that of an officer originally holding the post. Some posts included in the schedules were transferred to provincial services whose ranks rose quite rapidly. The posts thus transferred were termed as *listed posts*. In 1898, the number of provincial service officers in executive and judicial branches were 1,827 (i.e., 1,030 and 797 respectively) as against 1,898 covenanted civilians (Sapru 1985:112).

3.3.3. Islington Commission (1912-1915). Another royal commission appointed under the chairmanship of Lord Islington was guided by three major needs: a) to attain high standards of civil administration, b) to safeguard the paramount interests of the British rulers, and c) to satisfy reasonable Indian demands and ensure harmonious relationships among different communities in India (Chaudhuri 1969:25). The Commission reported in 1917 that in early 1913, only 63 Indians had been among the 1,371 members of the ICS – barely 4.5 percent of the total. The Commission recommended that 75 percent of the vacancies in the ICS should be filled in England by open competition, while the rest were to be filled in India through nomination. It also recommended equal status to civil servants promoted in higher posts from lower ranks, alongside the regular recruits. In addition to suggesting the creation of four categories of services (Imperial, Central, Provincial and Subordinate), the Commission recommended rationalization of salary structure to allow officers a degree of comfort and dignity, to shield them from temptation and keep them efficient. The Report was submitted in the midst of the War, and many of its recommendations were accepted except those on nominations.

3.3.4. Post-war years. The Montagu-Chelmsford Report (1918) advised the civil servants to act as imperial advisers to Ministers in policy making, while reminding politicians that the effective and smooth functioning of the government depended on the cooperation, goodwill, tolerance and confidence of Ministers and civil servants. It recommended that 33 percent of the superior posts be recruited in India and the quota be increased by 1.5 percent annually. Many ideals of the Report were incorporated in the Government of India Act 1919. The Act provided that every civil servant held office during the Majesty's pleasure and that no civil servant could be dismissed or removed from office by any authority subordinate to the one, which appointed him². The Act empowered the Secretary of State in Council to make rules to govern various aspects of civil service and also provided for the creation of a Public Service Commission in

India³. The civil services in British India began to lose its previous charms. There was a visible impact of financial stringency reflected in the fall of real value of salaries earned by civil servants. The Act led to a progressive diminution of bureaucracy's power, and the lure of power and prestige suffered a great deal (Chaudhuri 1969:33). Furthermore, it created stir when 150 British war veterans were recruited by nomination in the civil service in the years between 1918 and 1923. The introduction of dyarchy or dual rule, under the 1919 Act, created worry for civil servants who had joined before 1920. Many of them claimed that their dual allegiance breached the provisions of security of tenure enjoyed under the *covenant* with their employer, i.e., the Crown. The Government had to allow premature retirement to about 200 civil servants of all-India category in 1921 and 1922. In the next ten years, another 156 ICS officers followed suit. However, a remarkable event took place to make a positive development. In 1922, after 70 years of bitter opposition, the government allowed the ICS examination to be held in Allahabad as well as London, thereby accepting at long last the claims for holding simultaneous examinations. However, the probation period for an Indian candidate, passing the examination in India, was made two years. He had to spend it in a British university. On the whole, the competitive examination and the nomination were established as two recognized methods of recruitment to the civil service.

Another royal Commission was appointed in 1924 under the chairmanship of Lord Lee of Fareham. It recommended that 20 percent of the all-India civil service posts should be filled by promotion from Provincial Civil Service and that the rest be recruited through a competitive examination on the basis of parity between British and Indian candidates. For different services, the Commission recommended different ratios of British and Indians for recruitment, with a view to eventually achieving parity. However, the much talked-about parity was not achieved. In 1933, the number of British and Indian officers in the all-India services was 2,193 and 1,235 respectively. It means, Indian officers were only 35 percent of the total ICS strength. The Commission indeed failed to satisfy none of the parties – British politicians, British civil servants, Indian leaders, Indians in the civil service, and the others – for different and often mutually exclusive standpoints.

² The Government of India Act 1919, Section 36.

³ Section 41 of the said Act.

3.3.5. Twilight of the British rule. The services in British India received ample attention in the 1930s. The Simon Commission in 1930 recommended that among the five all-India services, the Secretary of State should make recruitment on an all-India basis to two of them, i.e., ICS and Indian Political Service (Philips nd:292). The Round Table Conference (1930-31) and a Joint Select Committee of the Parliament also reviewed the situation of the civil service in India. Needs for Indianisation, impartial character, a strong English element, equitable representations of different Indian communities, and adequate safeguards for civil servants were the main tenets of suggestions made by these bodies. The Government of India Act 1935 sought to accommodate these views and it provided for a federal type of representative government in India, albeit with the balance of power tilting in favor of the central government in Delhi. The Act defined the rights and status of the officers of all-India services in the proposed federation and provinces and guaranteed the existing privileges of service⁴. The 1935 Act, whose provincial autonomy provisions were put into operation in 1937, made the ministers learn about the stubborn facts of administration, while making the implications of democratic control known to the civil servants (Chaudhuri 1969:43). The Act made provision for establishing a Federal Public Service Commission and Provincial Public Service Commissions, one of which had been established in 1926 in Madras. Competitive examinations for recruitment in the civil service continued to be held in India and there was a quicker pace of its Indianisation. At this point, in fact, there was a shortage of eligible candidates for vacant civil service positions. The Secretary of State took recourse to nomination to make up the deficiency, thereby creating an outcry in the universities in India. During 1941-43, only half of the vacant posts were filled keeping the other half to be filled through nomination from among the war veterans in India. Hence, at the end of 1942, there was a clear edge in the number of Indian officers over their English colleagues of the ICS – 625 Indians against 573 English civilians (Sapru 1985:118). The trend continued during the last years of the British raj. The Indian Civil Service remained the kingpin of the imperial administration. India was going to get independence and the governance of the would-be independent countries in India was to depend largely on the efficiency of the bureaucracy they inherited. The British India was divided into two independent states – India and Pakistan – and the two countries chose their own ways of statecraft. Pakistan was created to represent the interests of India's Muslims, on the basis of Jinnah's Two-Nation Theory, which depicted Muslims as a separate nation completely separate from the rest of a Hindu-dominated India.

⁴ The Government of India Act, Chapter 11.

3.4. The Civil Service in Pakistan

3.4.1. **Beginning of the new states' services.** With the creation in 1947 of India and Pakistan as two separate independent countries in the sub-continent, under the statutory arrangements made by the British Parliament⁵, the power of the Secretary of State in respect of recruitment to the Indian Civil Service and the Indian Political Service came to an end. The British members of these two services were offered options to serve either of the two dominions or retire with proportional retirement benefits. Their Indian colleagues were also served with similar options, subject to certain limitations. Only 82 members of former ICS and IPS came to Pakistan in 1947, although the strength of lower staffs was quite sizeable (Kennedy 1987:32). Not even ten among those few former ICS officers had worked as Deputy Secretary or above in national level. Pakistan was too eager to enlist the experienced English civil servants, as there was an acute shortage of trained senior officials. Pakistan began to be ruled under the Indian Independence Act 1947, which made for representative government. In 1956, the first constitution of Pakistan introduced a parliamentary form of government under a federal structure. The constitution lasted for less than three years before it was abrogated in October 1958 by the country's first martial law regime, which introduced the second constitution in 1962. The new constitution, claimed by its fathers as having *suit*ed to the *genius of the people* of the country, introduced *basic democracy*, and arranged for direct election of 80,000 basic democrats or members of the Union Councils (UCs), the lowest-tier local government institution. These basic democrats functioned as the Electoral College to elect the Chairmen of the UCs (CUCs), the Members of the National and Provincial Assemblies, and the President (Ali 1995:46). The President held all powers of the republic and everything else depended on his pleasure. Ministers of central government and Governors of provinces were appointed by the President and held offices during the President's pleasure. The provincial Ministers held office during the Governor's pleasure. There was little accountability except to the President. The system was somehow sustained till the independence of Bangladesh through a sanguinary war in 1971. On the whole, bureaucracy was a pivotal force and it enjoyed huge powers and privileges. Inadequate scope for accountability and relatively poor stature of politicians contributed to the emergence of a powerful bureaucracy. Unlike politicians, the civil servants lacked rights to political activities, but they indeed had a great hold on the political life and leaders of Pakistan (Chaudhuri 1969:307).

⁵ The Indian Independence Act 1947, passed on 18 July 1947, provided for independent India and Pakistan.

Both the 1956 and 1962 Constitutions had specific provisions for the privileges of civil servants and both also provided for the continuance of the all-Pakistan services. Two such services – the Civil Service of Pakistan (CSP) and the Police Service of Pakistan (PSP) – were put in place. The tenure and conditions of services would not be varied to the officials' disadvantage, and no civil servants could be dismissed or removed from service or reduced in rank by any authority subordinate to the one by which he was appointed. And, no civil servant was to be dismissed, removed from service or reduced in rank without being given an opportunity of self-defence. Both the constitutions also retained and guaranteed the same terms and conditions of service and rights enjoyed by senior civil servants prior to independence in 1947. Provisions were made to bring about parity of representation in services between the two wings of the country⁶, and to abolish communal representation. The central and provincial Public Service Commissions were made independent, impartial and powerful. These gave a formidable position to the civil servants, who gradually became the symbol of stability in Pakistan (Goodnow 1969:14).

For the specific needs of colonial administration imposed in many places, an elitist bureaucracy had been distinctly favoured by colonial powers. The British introduced such a type in India to administer that vast territory to the advantage of the rulers. The Indian Civil Service (ICS) was its kingpin. It was regarded soon as the symbol of a *steel frame* bureaucracy. For efficiency and integrity, the ICS was considered as *almost certainly the finest civil service that man has yet devised. It bred honourable men, even when it had not acquired them in the first place* (Moorhouse 1983:144). The success of the British Indian civil service had been largely due to the limited objectives of the rulers. While gaining independence, former colonies had a single object of perpetuity, i.e., the bureaucracy, whose elitist version was retained in Pakistan. The Civil Service of Pakistan (CSP) was the direct descendant of the ICS-dominated steel-frame. Reconstruction of a public administration befitting independent Pakistan was a difficult task. It needed the will of politicians and administrators (Huque 1986:293). The CSP sought to perpetuate the Indian Civil Service legacy and regarded itself as an elite minority, detached from and better than the other segments. The incumbents of other services, especially those of technical and professional departments, felt alienated and thought they could not participate in the formulation of state policy (Mahmood 1990:35).

⁶ However, parity remained a far cry till the last days of united Pakistan. See Ahmed (1980:65).

3.4.2. **Expansion.** Pakistan was not an exception to global bureaucratic expansion, accelerated by governments' efforts after the World War II to bring forth *welfare state* in different parts of the world. The concept of welfare state was ingrained in the political philosophy of modern age, referring to government allocation or influence on allocation of a large range of goods and services like housing, medical care, recreation, fire and police, occupational training, education, transportation etc. Redistribution of income through welfare payments, subsidies, guarantees of loans, etc secured equity and justice. Sometimes services were supplied directly, as in education, hospitals and quality control (Thompson 1976:71). Such an enormous role required more organizations for the tasks to reduce complex environments to manageable proportions (Moharir 1989:166). There is no permanent organizational solution to problems and only more and more formal organizations emerge in the scene. Their internal dynamics, uncertain environments and controversies of political forces complicated the problems further (Meyer 1985:185). Under an aura of modern welfare state, public expenditure and size of public service in relation to GNP in developed countries showed a steep rise for a century since 1870 (Harris 1990:22,29). Developing countries too had the same trend (Mackintosh 1992:77). Various states historically undertook special roles to foster general welfare. Governments became regulators, mediators, underwriters, providers of services, subsidies and loans, and dispensers of the standards of decent living (Pierre 1995:140). The US Constitution heralded this trend in a big way, and the welfare state turned synonymous with *administrative state*, a trait that showed great tenacity before the recently surfaced signs of cracks. However, despite the crack, the state's withdrawal from economic front is sure to necessitate a new set of tasks to perform (Pinto 1995:320).

3.4.3. **Overbearing stature.** Upon the deaths of Jinnah in 1948 and Liaquat in 1951, the general stature of politicians was low in Pakistan. It increased the bureaucracy's powers and put it in an unassailable position. The executive's dominance was attributed to many reasons, some of which are inherent in the nature and character of the forces, issues and problems whose solutions were too complex for the politicians. The transformation of a negative state into a positive one added strength to the trend. All sectors of public life demanded the state's intervention and there was no limit to the services it had to render (Chaudhuri 1968:316). Bureaucracy attended to system maintenance and stability, a condition for political development (Dwivedi 1994:5). Yet, politicians prodded civil servants to join politics, and some bureaucrats turned into politicians⁷.

⁷ Two senior bureaucrats, Ghulam Muhammad and Iskandar Mirza, assumed the top-most positions of the country, Governor-General and President.

It enhanced the cause of ambitious bureaucrats (Mahmood 1990:28). Still, the bureaucracy played a vital role, while politicians locked themselves in feuds. The former prevented the state from crumbling for a long time, but in the process they ended up with an administrative state (Khan 1980:115). Characterized by the preeminence of a hegemonic CSP, the bureaucracy had signs of systemic obstinacy against possible changes. The elitism and protectionism for CSP, a colonial legacy, showed negative outlooks toward politicians, a generalist heritage and a paternalistic attitude (Kennedy 1987:8). Shielded from public opinion, the elite civil servants considered politicians as no more than mob leaders and unfit for complex state affairs. Studies on Pakistan's bureaucracy advocated substantive shifts in its structure and orientation. The Pay and Services Commission in 1962 held that the *main feature of the elitist CSP was mediocrity*, and their call for an end to the preeminence and reservation of positions for CSP officers and for induction of officers from professional services were not implemented, due to pressures from those who declined to abdicate their positions (Khan 1980:123; Mahmood 1990:48). Opportunities for reforms lapsed under Ayub's rule from 1958 to 1969, when military and civil bureaucrats unitedly guarded their interests (Hayes 1984:54). In preference to politicians, Ayub relied on the bureaucrats who managed his brand of guided democracy. Despite a negative public opinion, bureaucracy remained entrenched and as strong as ever. After his departure, they sustained some serious onslaughts in Yahya era (1969-71). Still, the bureaucracy retained preeminence (Mahmood 1990:57). Bangladesh inherited the legacy.

3.4.4. Attempts for balance. The public administration in Pakistan was a clear case of injustice and imbalance. Even with an absolute majority of the country's population, East Pakistan was very poorly represented in the bureaucracy. In 1956, none of the 19 Secretaries to the Government was from East Pakistan. In the next senior three positions, there were only 51 officers from East Pakistan as against 722 from the West (Chaudhuri 1969:56). Things did not improve notably in the following years. The public administration was under the effective grip of CSP, which was joined by the Police Service of Pakistan (PSP), to constitute the all-Pakistan services. The CSP and PSP officers served both central and provincial governments. An *Economic Pool* was created in 1959 to build a team of 126 officers who would man the Ministries of Finance, Commerce and Industries. The key positions of the Pool and most other important posts were occupied by officers of CSP, while PSP officers filled a few posts. Sixty percent of the posts of Under Secretaries and two-thirds of the posts of Deputy Secretaries outside the Economic Pool were reserved for CSP officers. The top echelon civil bureaucracy

was virtually a preserve for the just-mentioned two Services. However, some lucky officers of the other *Central Superior Services* could vie for the rest of the important posts in general administration. A sense of disgruntlement could be discerned in the mind of other functionaries of the state, of course without avail. Morshed (1986:27) delineates the following 12 Class I *Services*, according to their order of precedence, which constituted the *Central Superior Services*:

- 1) Civil Service of Pakistan
- 2) Foreign Service of Pakistan
- 3) Police Service of Pakistan
- 4) Pakistan Audit and Accounts Service
- 5) Pakistan Military Accounts Service
- 6) Pakistan Taxation Service
- 7) Pakistan Customs and Excise Service
- 8) Central Information Service
- 9) Central Secretariat Service
- 10) Pakistan Postal Service
- 11) Pakistan Military Land and Cantonment Service
- 12) Trade Service of Pakistan.

In addition, there were three Class II Services, such as (1) Pakistan Postal Superintendent Service, (2) Assistant Income Tax Officer, and (3) Executive Officer (Import and Export).

Pakistan was theoretically a federal type of state. Hence, there were both central and provincial governments and services. There were different functional and technical services at the provincial level. On top of the provincial governance, Provincial Civil Service officers enjoyed prominent positions after those occupied by CSP officials, who alternated in central and provincial governments' positions in regular intervals. A CSP officer had a *tenure system* of career in the central Secretariat, in which he spent three years as Under Secretary, four years as Deputy Secretary, four years as Joint Secretary and about five years as Secretary. Except in the highest echelon, after each period spent there, he was deputed to a province for posting either in the provincial secretariat or any of its functional wings, or in field administration. The provincial governments had considerable powers with enough justification to accept, reject or return any officer deputed to it by the central government (Chaudhuri 1969:70). The bureaucracy, especially officers in field administration, had evidently strong links with central government in Rawalpindi. It had also a strong position in the statecraft because of the peculiar nature of governance in which democracy hardly found a solid footing. During the last days of united Pakistan, Ayub heavily depended on bureaucracy for his *basic democracy*, which soon became

an anathema in East Pakistan. Bureaucracy too had its share of ill-repute. Despite its remarkable contribution to the development works in the province, it was sometimes considered faceless, callous, formal, closed and anti-people. The Yahya interregnum, following Ayub's decade-old regime, was basically bureaucratic governance. The War of Independence in 1971 was a sequel to the politico-bureaucratic abuses in the province.

3.5. First Decade of Bureaucracy in Bangladesh

3.5.1. The beginning. In 1947, East Pakistan had only one former ICS officer out of 82 such officers, who had opted for Pakistan and were absorbed in the newly constituted CSP. The number rose to 24% of the elitist service in 1958. By 1966, it rose substantially to 34%, still far short of its population share. Before independence in 1971, in the centre, there were only five Secretaries and a handful of other senior officers from the then East Pakistan (Jahan 1980:7). Many of those CSP officers were in West Pakistan or actively served the occupation regime during the liberation war. After independence, there was not much discussion on bureaucracy in the Constituent Assembly of Bangladesh. But, the antipathy to an elite civil service structure led the new state to make a significant legal departure for bureaucracy. Constitutional provisions against any adverse change in service conditions used to protect Pakistan's bureaucracy, like its predecessor. But the Constitution of Bangladesh, adopted and enforced within a year of liberation, denied the sort of protection civil servants used to enjoy, and it empowered the government to enact law for the reorganization of the republic's services by their creation, amalgamation or unification (Ahamed 1980:144). It was now possible to vary or revoke the conditions of service of any person employed in the republic (Rashid 1994:76). It was an abrupt break from the past and the Services (Reorganization and Conditions) Act of 1975 (*Appendix A*) was enacted to put such provisions into retrospective effect from 1 July 1973 (GOB 1988:4). Earlier, President's Order No. 9 of 1972 empowered the President to dismiss any civil servant without assigning any reason whatsoever for so doing. It also conferred on the authority a power to deny any right for officers thus dismissed to appeal if it considered such a denial of the right to self-defense as *necessary in the interest of the republic*. Provision for such arbitrary measures seriously undermined the ethos and confidence in the civil service. Subjective criteria for distribution of positions and patronage compounded the problems further (Jahan 1980:112; Maniruzzaman 1980a:158).

3.5.2. **Strife.** The situation of the Pakistan period, when civil-military bureaucracy held the key to policy making and governance, was largely reversed. Bureaucracy was weak and overtly faction-ridden vis-à-vis a dominant political structure, (Jahan 1980:111). There were rifts along central-provincial, Muzibnagar-regular-expatriate and other lines. Many senior officials were denied favoured posting or even an assured employment owing to their alleged tie with Pakistan. The Administrative and Services Reorganization Committee (ASRC) asked for: (a) abolition of the distinctions between former all-Pakistan and provincial services; (b) dispensation with reservation of posts for CSP officers; and, (c) creation of a single classless grading structure for the whole civil service (Ali 1993:18). The powerful Planning Commission too called for an end to the elitist status of former CSP officers (Hasnath 1987:62). The government showed a clear preference for political cadres to bureaucrats, who began to be considered *unfit for development needs* (GOB 1973:8; Westergaard 1985:76). The country's top leader too was suspicious of those in the conventional bureaucracy (Ziring 1980:42). The civil servants' inexperience in socialistic policy pursued by the government worsened their position further (O'Donnel 1984:161). The edifice of elitist bureaucracy seemed to be heading for an imminent crumbling. Surprisingly, the government shelved the ASRC report. Instead, a slow rehabilitation of top former-CSP officers started being felt and was intensified after the bloody coup in 1975. As the new regime was more favourably disposed toward them, most ex-CSP officers got employed and were again placed in key positions. The high echelon bureaucracy continued to be highly skilled and trained in generalist traditions of ICS and CSP (Baxter et al 1987:288; McCarthy 1993:107). Prospects for an end to the preeminence of elitist generalist bureaucracy seemed aborted and averted.

3.5.3. **Reorganization.** The Pay and Services Commission in 1977 recommended the creation of: a) an administrative top management and specialist group drawn from various service cadres; b) a middle management and executive group; c) a ministerial, inspectorial, technical and support group; and d) a messengerial and custodian group. It proposed for organizing 28 cadres, each with a chance to contribute to an apex cadre that would consist of posts requiring all-round experience, administrative leadership and high-level coordination (Ali 1993:19). This contrived democratization in bureaucracy was sure to upset the generalist top bureaucrats. The Bangladesh Civil Services (Reorganization) Order (*Appendix B*) was promulgated in 1980 to constitute 14 cadres and 28 sub-cadres under a *unified civil service* (GOB 1996:5). It was envisioned to improve the competence and impartiality of bureaucracy to a great extent (O'Donnel 1984:267).

3.6. Experiments since 1980s

3.6.1. Creation of civil service cadres. The first government of independent Bangladesh was pre-disposed towards change. But, in effect, it could not bring about any substantial change before it was toppled through devastating events in 1975. The next government sought to effect changes, albeit after it was confident of its hold on the political system (Obaidullah 1999:57). The changes were largely fashioned on the recommendations of bodies appointed by successive governments. The foremost among the changes in the administrative system of the country was the introduction in 1980 of a unified civil service. Officials belonging to different services now assumed a label of prestige through the acquisition of a broad title for their job – *civil service*. To many officials, the introduction of the unified civil service marked the end of a long tradition of monopolistic suzerainty held by the former CSP, since incumbents of different cadres enjoyed the scope for elevation to higher positions. After subsequent conversion of the sub-cadres into separate cadres, the following 28 cadres in Bangladesh Civil Service were created (*Appendix C*):

- 1) Bangladesh Civil Service (Administration)
- 2) Bangladesh Civil Service (Food)
- 3) Bangladesh Civil Service (Agriculture)
- 4) Bangladesh Civil Service (Forest)
- 5) Bangladesh Civil Service (Fisheries)
- 6) Bangladesh Civil Service (Livestock)
- 7) Bangladesh Civil Service (General Education)
- 8) Bangladesh Civil Service (Technical Education)
- 9) Bangladesh Civil Service (Economic)
- 10) Bangladesh Civil Service (Commercial)
- 11) Bangladesh Civil Service (Statistical)
- 12) Bangladesh Civil Service (Public Works)
- 13) Bangladesh Civil Service (Public Health Engineering)
- 14) Bangladesh Civil Service (Roads and Highways)
- 15) Bangladesh Civil Service (Telecommunication)
- 16) Bangladesh Civil Service (Audit and Accounts)
- 17) Bangladesh Civil Service (Customs and Excise)
- 18) Bangladesh Civil Service (Taxation)
- 19) Bangladesh Civil Service (Foreign Affairs)
- 20) Bangladesh Civil Service (Health and Family Planning)
- 21) Bangladesh Civil Service (Information)
- 22) Bangladesh Civil Service (Judicial)
- 23) Bangladesh Civil Service (Postal)
- 24) Bangladesh Civil Service (Ansar)
- 25) Bangladesh Civil Service (Police)
- 26) Bangladesh Civil Service (Railway Engineering)
- 27) Bangladesh Civil Service (Railway Transport and Commercial)
- 28) Bangladesh Civil Service (Secretariat).

Later on, consequent upon the creation of two other cadres in Bangladesh Civil Service, namely the Cooperatives and the Family Planning cadres, the Health and Family Planning cadre was renamed as the Health cadre. In 1992, by another order, the Administration and Secretariat cadres were abolished and a separate Bangladesh Civil Service (Administration) cadre was constituted by incorporating officers of the two cadres so abolished (GOB 1996:11, 13). Hence, there are now 29 cadres in Bangladesh Civil Service.

In 1980, for top positions in secretariat and other bodies, a Senior Services Pool (SSP) was created comprising officers of the ranks of Deputy Secretary and above⁸. Provisions were made for induction of such officers in SSP in consultation with the Public Service Commission (PSC), but consultations were never made. Some officers, including those among the first post-independence (1973) recruits, were allegedly opposed to the examinations under the PSC. They argued that their seniors had never been examined for promotion. Then separate bodies were formed with ministers and high officials to recommend officers for induction in SSP. The generalists opposed the composition of committees with political functionaries, which they termed as unprecedented. In their turn, the functionalist-technocrats were unhappy about the quota arrangements and held that they were not given due shares (Obaidullah 1999:60). Faced with opposition on many fronts, the government made a retreat in 1989. On recommendation of the report of Matin Committee, the government abolished the Pool and made another quota system for different cadres for posts of Joint Secretary and Deputy Secretary (GOB 1996:145). The posts of Secretary and Additional Secretary were kept open for all cadres (*Table 6.04*). The principle of merit was sacrificed for an intended representative Secretariat. A pool of skilled officials selected on merit was no more cherished. The restructuring of services in this period had three major tenets: (a) abolition of the concept of elite cadre by creating a unified civil service, (b) equal opportunities for promotion to officers of all cadres in higher level posts, and (c) instilling vigor in public services. The first is fulfilled through a unified BCS; the second remains a difficult task; and the third is a far cry. No breakthrough is found in bureaucracy. The quickly shifting policies and disorganized measures against conflicting claims reaffirmed a low morale, lack of administrative commitment and a fall in efficiency (Ali 1993:34). No particular group is satisfied and there is only a thin shade of bureaucratic accountability, a situation antithetical to principles of good governance and development (Khan 1994:14).

3.6.2. BCS (Administration) Cadre. Under the *unified civil service* structure, different services were abolished to make room for a single Civil Service. Now, every official of the different regularly constituted services became a member of a specific cadre of the civil service. Hence, there are now 29 cadres in Bangladesh Civil Service, among which Bangladesh Civil Service (Administration) is one such cadre. For many reasons like composition, power, scope and nature of work, this cadre has emerged as a distinguished band of public officials. It has got its numerous benefactors and innumerable foes. As a cadre, BCS (Administration) was constituted with officers of so many earlier descriptions: Civil Service of Pakistan (CSP), East Pakistan Civil Service (EPCS), Central Secretariat Service (CSS), Pakistan Military Land and Cantonment Service, East Pakistan Secretariat Service (EPSS) and the like. Major responsibilities of the cadre remained as they had been with the generalist elite civil service. Although there were obvious changes in the scope and contexts of the new incumbents, major thrust of the system at national and local levels remained at the hand of administration people. Secretariat and field administration still were dominated by officers of this cadre, albeit with visible signs of an erosion of authority. At this era, another significant development merits special mention. On recommendation of the Pay and Services Commission of 1977, a Senior Service Pool (SSP) was formed in 1980, with room for eligible high-level officers of various cadres. And, despite the debates it raised on the size of the pie allocated to each cadre, the SSP was a significant step (Morshed 1997:81). The high echelon of bureaucracy could in a period of time emerge as a useful development tool at the hand of, and under, a democratic political authority. However, the SSP was abolished in 1989, at the backdrop of irresolvable debates and conflicts for the formula of entry into it. In its place was devised a less cogent scheme of quota allocation for each cadre.

3.6.3. Decentralization. A major departure in the time was an attempted decentralization by the military regime installed in 1982. Upon recommendation of a committee named as Administrative Reorganization Committee, the thanas were upgraded as Upazilas each with a set of officials, most of whom were of an elevated status. The Upazila Parishads (UZPs) were reposed with substantially greater powers and resources. The singularly distinguishing feature of the Upazila system was that a popularly elected Chairman was placed at the head of the structure. The government transferred more than a dozen subjects to the UZPs. The services of officials, whose departments dealt with these *transferred subjects*, were placed at the disposal of

⁸ The originally termed Senior Policy Pool was later on renamed as Senior Services Pool. See *Ali 1993:20*.

Upazila Parishads, for which no *prescribed authority* was designated. It meant that there was no intermediate tier between the national government and this newly installed powerful local government institution. As regards the Administration cadre, an officer of the status of a formerly Sub-Divisional Officer was posted in the Parishad as the Upazila Nirbahi Officer (UNO), or *Chief Executive Officer*. His position was functionally emboldened by the posting of an Assistant Commissioner and an Upazila Magistrate, both of whom belonged to his cadre. The former had a great influence on affairs by dint of his position as Upazila Planning and Finance Officer, while the latter tried criminal cases and discharged other magisterial functions. The Officer-in-Charge of the Police Station was legally and functionally bracketed within the inner circle of *retained subject* functionaries in which the UNO was the leading figure. So, the position of the UNO was quite formidable in the newly evolved structure. The bureaucracy was put under an elected local government body, a potent field of training for civil bureaucracy under political control (Ali 1987:104). The new system signified a shift of balance, at least at the local level, in favour of elected functionaries vis-a-vis salaried public servants. Around one thousand officers of the BCS (Administration) cadre were now directly under this new system.

Subsequently, an attempt was made to effect substantial changes in administration in the district, where a Zila Parishad (ZP) was created in 1989 with a purported objective of bringing all government departments at that level under its functional control. However, an important difference of ZPs from the UZPs was that the former had at the top a Chairman, who was appointed by the government. Except in one case, 63 MPs were appointed as Chairmen of ZPs. All these MPs belonged to the ruling political party. The heads of almost all district level offices of various departments were made members of the ZP. But this institution was indeed short-lived. After being installed through a democratic election, the new government virtually put the Zila Parishad to an unceremonious death. The caretaker government, in 1991 promulgated an ordinance to make for a stop-gap arrangement after the Zila Parishad Chairmen were dethroned. But, when the next Parliament was convened in its first session, the new government did not table the ordinance for the Parliament's approval. As a result, its life was too short to make a judgement as to whether the ZP would be an effective local government institution. The demise of the Zila Parishad was followed in 1992 by the demise of its more glorified sister institution, the Upazila Parishad. Attempts to place salaried government officials under the disposal of the local government institutions could not make much of headway (Morshed 1997:66).

3.7. Present state of affairs.

3.7.1. Measures undertaken. The prevailing scenario of the civil service in Bangladesh does not pose a particularly promising posture. Scores of officers, or even hundreds of them, are being recruited to particular cadres without much regard for their career prospect or possible contribution to the country's wellbeing. There is an incessant struggle among members of different civil service cadres. At times, the skirmishes take an untenable proportion, and thereby the civil society is seriously perturbed. The opening to the top positions remains the apple of discord, while the nation's perceptions of these warring claimants for the small pie are left to oblivion. The Senior Services Pool was abolished in 1989, on recommendation of Matin Committee, named after the then Deputy Prime Minister. In respect of top secretariat and other senior positions in the government, a somewhat precarious formula of quota was devised for different cadres. However, no group ever publicly accepted the formula. It was generally provided that every cadre would have 12 percent of its total posts in the grades meant for Deputy Secretary and above. On the one hand, the Administration cadre officials feel that, in the absence of senior positions exclusively along their line, they did not get a just share of the only available senior positions, i.e., those of the Deputy Secretary, Joint Secretary, Additional Secretary and Secretary. On the other hand, officers of other cadres – especially those generally known as technocrats – claim that they are far short of a fair share of the pie⁹.

3.7.2. Bodies to recommend changes. In this backdrop, the civil society hears periodic claims and counter-claims on the disadvantages suffered by respective service groups. However, they seldom hear self-assessment of these civil servants' performance towards realizing their respective objectives. One may often hear cries from all corners that the system does not work well. The expectation of the body politic is heightening day by day, and the administrative system cannot keep pace with the changing needs and thrifty innovations in the environment (Rahman 2001:3). Conflicting claims of different civil service segments sound nuisance to many, who expect only an improved performance from them. Many commissions and committees have so far worked to project a time-worthy administrative apparatus in the country. But, little is changed, except that the size of the state paraphernalia is always on the increase. After the recent (Nurunnabi) Commission had submitted to the government a multi-volume report, the government appointed a new high-profile Public Administration Reforms Commission (PARC) for recommending measures to reform the administrative system. A

former top civil servant, and at the time a member of the ruling political party, was made its chairman with the status and privileges of a cabinet minister. A number of former and serving senior civil servants were appointed as members of the Commission, which enlisted the services of key office holders. They submitted their report in July 2000. It is yet to be seen what serious efforts the government takes to consider the Commission's recommendations, not to speak of their implementation. After the change of government in October 2001, a new committee under the chairmanship of S T Hossain, a serving secretary to the government, was assigned with the task of reviewing the recommendations of various previous committees or commissions. The latest committee has reportedly submitted its report in early 2003. An informed source has personally intimated to the researcher that no concrete steps have yet been taken about it.

3.8. Concluding Remarks

The administrative system of a country is vital for the achievement of its objectives. Bangladesh is a long-cherished independent homeland for a nation, which was traditionally subjugated by alien rulers. Dreams of an exploitation-free and prospering homeland were the activating force for this freedom-loving nation. In the post-independence era, it has become imperative for this nation to appreciate the problems of the system, which is not helping it gain a pace for prosperity and honour. An abysmal disenchantment spreads on its psyche. There must have been some serious flaws in the system, which should be put to a thorough diagnosis for its improvement. In order to study the ills of the administrative system, one needs to study the performance of the country's civil service, which enjoys so much of influence and takes at its disposal so much of resources, purportedly for the benefit of the country. Here in this study, an attempt is made to scrutinize the recruitment, training, career plan, promotion and performance perceptions of the civil servants falling into the category of the Administration cadre. This cadre is decidedly an elite group (Younis and Mostafa 2000:94), by dint of its nature of job as well as its traditional heritage, and on account of its possession of offices and resources that count most for the development of the country. By the study, it is hoped, some lacunae are discerned and some remedies surface from the objective analysis of the problems and the environment in which the system operates. In turn, this may help evolve a system of public administration that keeps pace with the constant changes occurring in the environment, and the one which helps the republic fulfill its constitutional obligations.

⁹ ATM Obaidullah (1999) describes the claims and counter-claims in a lucid manner (ibid, pp 59-61).

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4. RECRUITMENT

4.1. Recruitment during British Period

4.1.1. Beginning of the service. It has been seen in the foregoing chapters that having been historically originated as the governing offshoot of the mercantile-administrative edifice of the East India Company, the Bangladesh Civil Service (Administration) cadre inherits a legacy of the [British] Indian Civil Service and its Pakistani version, the Civil Service of Pakistan. However, it is equally evident that, under the clout of the unified civil service structure, there have been a number of tributaries that contributed to quite a large BCS (Administration) cadre of the present day. Quite now and then, the controversies, debates and noises around the cadre bewilder many curious onlookers. The pattern of recruitment in the cadre, especially in the recent years, is equally perplexing, if not more. The system of recruitment to the civil service is studied in some detail in this chapter. Recruitment is the process of securing new employees to an organization for filling posts required for the conduct of its work (Sapru 1985:239). Although there are various modes of recruitment to public administration, the most widespread among them are the direct recruitment and recruitment by promotion. The first of these two categories of recruitment is the principal subject of this part of the study. Many of its ills may be ascribed to the peculiar pattern of recruitment in the cadre. In the beginning, only men of humble origin and status entered into the Company's services. The new recruits, under a covenant, had to bind themselves to the effect that they would contribute to a pension fund, would not take any unwarranted present, and they would remain ready to serve anywhere in India without complaints, and the like (O'Malley 1931:84). This is the reason why the service was termed as the *Covenanted Civil Service*. The Company's policy was 'not to employ any gentleman in any place of charge.' The representatives of the Company's shareholders used to recommend candidates for employment in the service. After the Restoration, there was a friendly relationship between the Company and the Court. However, men of good birth began to be recruited only in the 18th century and, by 1838, the character of the service was entirely changed. It was now swarmed by men who had high birth and great interest, but no recommendation (Sinha 1985:10). These changes in the patterns of induction in the civil service, set in motion in the British days, have not yet ceased to bewilder the practitioners and scholars.

4.1.2. Recruitment under the Company. For more than one hundred years, the Crown periodically granted the East India Company a royal mandate for monopolistic trade in the East Indies. Since 1674, when it saw an immediate prospect for future expansion of their lucrative

trading, the Company enunciated the rules for civil employment. It followed a policy of employing and maintaining a large staff on nominal pay. In the lowest ladder of the service, an Apprentice was appointed for a term of seven years, on completion of which he might be retained for another three years. There was, however, no dearth of aspirants for a possible position in India, because the Company granted its servants a right to private trading alongside their official duties. The next higher grade was a Writer's, whose qualifications were limited to good penmanship and willingness to serve in India without complaint. A Writer could prove his worth and be promoted to higher grades, i.e., as Factor, Junior Merchant and Senior Merchant. These appointments were based on recommendations of somebody having influence on the Company's Court of Directors. The salary of those civil servants may be seen from the following table.

Table 4.01: Salary Structure of the Company's Civil Servants in the Beginning

<u>Name of Post</u>	<u>Annual Salary</u>			<u>Remarks</u>
	<u>First 5 years</u>	<u>Next 2/3 years</u>	<u>Another 3 years</u>	
Apprentice	£ 5	£ 10	£ 20	The post was dropped in 1694.
Writer	£ 10	£ 20		
Factor	£ 20			
Junior Merchant	£ 30			
Senior Merchant	£ 40			

Source: Adapted from Misra (1980:42).

Before all such appointments, each candidate had to sign a *Covenant*, undertaking to serve the Company with loyalty and good conduct. Thus, there grew a career service, where the principle of seniority was the basis for promotion unless the exigencies of business demanded otherwise. After 1682, qualifications for appointment as Writers were extended to general education, with some knowledge of book-keeping and commercial accounting. The patron-centred recruitment in the Covenanted Civil Service and almost unfettered rights to private trade begot endemic troubles. The Court of Directors introduced an improved selection process in 1714, when it put for scrutiny all applications to its Committee of Accounts, whose reports were decided in the Court by ballot. The finally selected candidate, before sailing for India, would furnish two securities of £500.

The Court was generally reluctant to pay attention to the administrative issues unless they had a strong bearing on their business interests. But, several years after the Diwani¹ in 1765, the Company felt it necessary to strengthen its administrative system. Governor General Warren Hastings sought to bring about discipline in the service and his efforts were largely successful. The Regulating Act of 1773 established some kind of parliamentary control on the Company's rule and distinguished its civil and commercial functions. Later on, Pitt's India Act of 1784 put an end to the monopolistic trading rights in the Company's territorial possessions in India, which had already begun to be termed as *imperial dominions*. The Act raised the minimum and maximum age limits for appointment as Writer at 15 and 18 years respectively. Hastings's successor, Lord Cornwallis, was more successful in bringing about a relatively synchronized civil service structure. He was particularly undaunted in his persistent refusal to allow improper appointments. The Charter Act of 1793 provided: "all officers, places or employments in the Civil Line of the Company's Service in India from time to time shall be filled up and supplied from among the Civil Servants of the said Company," i.e., from the Covenanted Civil Servants (GOP 1962:23). The Act established the general principle that posts in the civil administration should be filled up by the civil servants. Moreover, it prescribed restrictions as to the length of residence in India required for posts carrying a certain salary (O'Malley 1931:41). The maximum age for appointment as Writer was raised to 22 years. Paying attention to serious consequences of mischievous nominations, the Directors were now required to take an oath that they would not take any gratification against nominations made by them (Misra 1980:48). When Wellesley succeeded Cornwallis, the rationale for a strong bureaucratic system was all the more evident because of the strong imperialistic outlook of the new Governor-General and the Court of Directors in London. More and more territories were being annexed to the Company's domain. He dispatched his famous Minutes of 10 July 1800, where he considered the rule of India as a "duty, policy and honour" and implored his bosses in England to accept it that the Indian realm must be considered as a permanent possession. Wellesley made it clear that the success in that mission lay in a civil service capable of an inexhaustible supply of knowledge, cultivated talents and disciplined morals. Thence, he set up the Fort William College in Calcutta to inculcate those qualities in the young Englishmen destined to rule the subcontinent. The aim of the College was to put the new recruits to the Covenanted Civil Service to a comprehensive three-year training programme in humanities, general science and Indian subjects. Skeptic from the beginning, the Court of Directors soon got the grandiose programme of the College closed in

¹ License for revenue administration including tax collection and law enforcement in that connection.

1803 and established the East India College at Hertford in 1805, patterned after the very principles and practice of the Fort William College (Kennedy 1987:112). Four years later, it was moved to Haileybury. The College at Calcutta lived in an attenuated form for another half a century only to give the Europeans an opportunity of learning oriental languages.

The College was run to ensure that every candidate, nominated for the covenanted service, was to successfully undergo a three-year probationary training. The Charter Act of 1813 confirmed this regulation. The candidates' results in the examinations of the College were crucial for the placement of the successful ones. Discipline was a strong tenet in the whole affairs. However, the Court of Directors enjoyed and exercised a system of patronage under which they could nominate their candidates for admission into the Haileybury College. Patronage was not confined to relatives of Directors alone. Between 1809 and 1850, among those admitted into the College, as much as 23 percent came from 'relatives', while 55 percent were from the 'friends' category (Misra 1980:71). The India Act of 1833 sought to reduce the extent of patronage and, as was expected, the Court showed a stiff opposition to the proposed change of their special privilege. Major components of the reforms envisaged in the Act had to be suspended in 1837. The Court of Directors, however, voluntarily adopted a set of restrictions regarding patronage. They also allowed Greek and Latin, history, geography, philosophy, mathematics, arithmetic and geometry to be included in the syllabus for admission test. Classical literature, history, mathematics and political economy too were duly stressed in the programme (Awasthi 1979:5). Quality of selection received a very high premium and the Board of Control assumed a more decisive role. Each student of the College had to pass four terms of six months each. Notwithstanding the diverse backgrounds of students, the College could implant a strong *esprit de corps* among the recruits, who were interested soon more in the Service than in the country they served. From the Indian point of view, it was not a welcome phenomenon, but it suited the purpose of the rulers. The College, especially after the India Act of 1833, contributed to the introduction of an open competition under the Charter Act of 1853.

4.1.3. Open competition. Consequent upon the 1853 Charter, the nomination system for admission to Haileybury College, and to the civil service, came to an end on 1 May 1854. It enabled any natural born subject of Her Majesty to be examined as a candidate for admission into the civil service, subject to the regulations framed from time to time by the Board of Control. Indians were not barred from competition, but only if they could go to England and

pass the examination. But, framers of the new system, including its vanguard, Lord Macaulay, had it in mind that the Indians so recruited must adjust themselves to the conditions of English education. A committee headed by Macaulay was appointed to study all related issues. On its recommendations, the maximum age for admission was raised to 23. Competitions were now expected among talented young men, not boys. In January 1855, the Board appointed examiners, under whose supervision the open competitive examination was held for the first time on 16 July 1855. The academic subjects along with their scales of marks earmarked for competition for admission into the College at Haileybury may be seen from the following table.

Table 4.02. Subjects and Marks in the Competitive Examination held in 1855.

<u>Sl. No.</u>	<u>Subjects on Offer</u>	<u>Allotted Marks</u>
1	English Composition	500
2	English Literature and History, including that of the Laws and Constitution of England	1,000
3	Language, Literature and History of Greece	750
4	Language, Literature and History of Rome	750
5	Language, Literature and History of France	375
6	Language, Literature and History of Germany	375
7	Language, Literature and History of Italy	375
8	Pure and Mixed Mathematics	1,000
9	Natural Science – Chemistry, Electricity and Magnetism; Natural History, Geology, and Mineralogy	500
10	Moral Science – Logic, Mental Moral and Political Philosophy	500
11	Sanskrit Language and Literature	375
12	Arabic Language and Literature	375
	Total	6,875

Source: B. B. Misra (1980:160); K. M. Reader (1981:12).

Since a man of 22 would not be proficient in all these varied subjects, it was decided to count the aggregate marks a candidate would secure in the examination, not the sheer number of subjects taken by him. Knowledge of wide surface and small depth was shunned and it was decided that no candidate would be given any credit for taking up subjects in which he was a mere dabbler (Reader 1981:13).

In the next twenty years, natural science, mathematics, Sanskrit and Arabic were given additional weights of 500, 250, 125 and 125 marks respectively (Misra 1980:161). Science gained in importance and several new subjects were added. There were two rounds of examinations in 1878 in April and July. For the second one, the upper age-limit of candidates was lowered at 19 years. In departure from Macaulay's recommendation, subjects and marks for

the examination underwent significant changes. The branches of knowledge and marks assigned for the July examination were as in the following table.

Table 4.03. Subjects and Marks in the Competitive Examination held in July 1878.

<u>Sl. No.</u>	<u>Subjects</u>	<u>Marks</u>
1	English Composition	300
2	History of England – including a period selected by candidates	300
3	English Literature – including books selected by candidates	300
4	Greek	600
5	Latin	800
6	French	500
7	German	500
8	Italian	400
9	Pure and Applied Mathematics	1,000
10	Natural Sciences: the elements of any two of – Chemistry 500, Electricity and Magnetism 300, Experimental Laws of Heat and Light 300, Mechanical Philosophy and Astronomy 300	
11	Logic	300
12	Elements of Political Economy	300
13	Sanskrit	500
14	Arabic	500

Source: B. B. Misra (1980:162).

The rigor of the examination was considerably dwarfed and provisions for candidates' choices of scientific subjects and parts of certain other subjects and dropping of histories of languages and philosophies made it less awesome. The position held in the examination entitled a successful candidate to a choice of province in India, where he would be serving for the best part of his career. Once admitted, during the one or two years of probation, he was taught the following four branches of major subjects:

- a) Indian History, that included –
 - (i) Geography,
 - (ii) Knowledge about different races,
 - (iii) Progress of British power in India, and
 - (iv) Constitution of Government;
- b) Principles of Jurisprudence and the laws enacted under it;
- c) Commerce and Finance, including banking, exchange and taxation; and
- d) One oriental language.

4.1.4. Imperial responsibility. Macaulay Committee's tasks were transferred to the Civil Service Commission established in 1855. Under the open competitive system, Haileybury College lost its utility and was closed in 1858. The Government of India Act 1858 enabled the Secretary of State for India in Council to make regulations for admission to the civil service. He got the powers of both the Court and the Board. O'Malley (1931:86) found in it a greater

security as it ended periodical enquiries prior to Charter Acts every few years, when civil servants had to brace for changes in service structure and positions. The Indian Civil Service Act 1861 reserved for the *Covenanted Civil Servants of the Crown in India* all vacancies in the following posts, leaving the rest for the uncovenanted servants:

Administrative

- Secretaries, Junior Secretaries, and Under Secretaries to the several governments in India, except those officials in the Military, Marine and Public Works Departments
- Accountant General
- Civil Auditor
- Sub-Treasurer

- Judicial
- Civil and Session Judges, or chief judicial officers of districts in the provinces now known as Regulation Provinces
- Additional and Assistant Judges in the said provinces
- Magistrates or chief magisterial officers of districts in the said provinces
- Joint Magistrates in the said provinces
- Assistant Magistrates or Assistants to Magistrates in the said provinces

- Revenue
- Members of the Boards of Revenue in the Presidencies of Bengal and Madras
- Secretaries to the said Boards of Revenue
- Commissioners of Revenue or chief revenue officers of divisions
- Collectors of Revenue or chief revenue officers of districts in those provinces
- Deputy Collectors or Subordinate Collectors whose offices are combined with the offices of Joint Magistrates in the said provinces
- Assistant Collectors or Assistants to Collectors in the said provinces
- Salt agents
- Controllers of salt chowkies²
- Commissioners of Customs, Salt and Opium
- Opium agents (GOP 1962:33).

Despite the introduction of the open competitive system, the entry of Indians in the Civil Service remained utterly negligible for a long time. It caused widespread resentment and consternation in the progressively increasing number of the Indian educated classes. The grand promises of 1858 during the royal assumption of the realm were not realized. The pattern of recruitment of Europeans and Indians in the civil service may be seen in the Table 4.04 at the next page.

² Outposts maintained largely on a temporary basis for specific functions like control of entry or exit.

Table 4.04. Pattern of Recruitment in the Indian Civil Service during 1855-1904

Year	Age Limit	Posts Available	European Candidates		Indian Candidates	
			Examined	Successful	Examined	Successful
1855	18-23	20	105	20	--	--
1856	18-23	21	56	21	--	--
1857	18-23	12	60	12	--	--
1858	18-23	20	67	20	--	--
1859	18-23	40	119	40	--	--
1860	18-22	80	154	80	--	--
1861	18-22	80	171	80	--	--
1862	18-22	82	170	82	1	--
1863	18-22	60	187	59	2	1
1864	18-22	40	217	40	2	--
1865	17-22	52	282	52	2	--
1866	12-21	52	242	52	--	--
1867	17-21	50	278	50	1	--
1868	17-21	50	317	46	8	4
1869	17-21	50	317	46	8	4
1870	17-21	40	325	39	7	--
1871	17-21	37	224	36	5	1
1872	17-21	36	195	36	4	--
1873	17-21	35	194	34	9	1
1874	17-21	40	196	38	11	2
1875	17-21	38	192	38	6	--
1876	17-21	31	197	31	5	--
1877	17-21	31	200	29	3	2
1878 April	17-21	13	66	13	3	--
1878 June	17-19	13	134	13	3	--
1879	17-19	29	173	29	1	--
1880	17-19	27	180	27	2	--
1881	17-19	31	144	31	3	--
1882	17-19	40	137	39	3	1
1883	17-19	42	149	42	1	--
1884	17-19	38	181	37	4	1
1885	17-19	43	205	42	6	1
1886	17-19	38	201	38	4	--
1887	17-19	46	193	44	6	2
1888	17-19	47	232	46	4	1
1889	17-19	49	227	49	6	--
1890	17-19	47	195	42	10	5
1891	17-19	33	144	31	4	2
1892	21-23	32	61	29	8	3
1893	21-23	56	96	55	11	1
1894	21-23	62	117	56	14	6
1895	21-23	68	145	67	9	1
1896	21-23	63	179	60	14	3
1897	21-23	68	211	65	26	3
1898	21-23	65	163	58	22	7
1899	21-23	56	195	53	18	3
1900	21-23	52	196	50	17	2
1901	21-23	47	183	43	20	4
1902	21-23	54	175	52	25	2
1903	21-23	51	150	48	23	3
1904	21-23	53	162	50	13	2
Total		2260	9059	2190	354	68

Source: B. B. Misra (1980:101-2)

Anuradha Chanda (1986:32) gives slightly different figures by stating that in the period between 1858 and 1869, out of 16 Indian candidates only one was successful in the competitive civil service examination.³ In another account, between 1855 and 1876, there had been 57 Indian candidates in the examination, where only 10 turned successful – seven of whom were from Bengal (Kabeer 1965:104). These are indeed the fine differences in mathematical figures only, having very little bearing on the substantive issue. Queen Victoria's Proclamation of 1858 was largely unmet as far as the recruitment of Indians was concerned. She had promised that after the assumption of the Indian administration the Indians would be recruited in large numbers and in high and responsible places. The policy of expanding university education appeared to have been designed to give effect to such proclamations (Philips nd:535). Indians remained a very insignificant component in the Indian Civil Service. There arose another serious obstacle to whatever scope had been created for the recruitment of Indians. In addition to the problem of holding the competitive examinations only in London, in 1878, the maximum age limit was reduced from 21 years to 19. It was allegedly a clever ploy to keep the Bengal intelligentsia off the civil service. Such a state of affairs persisted notwithstanding the then Secretary of State Northcote's strong directives in favour of recruiting Indians 'of ability and character to a more important, dignified and lucrative sphere of employment in the administration of British India' (Philips nd:537). Under the new arrangements, only 21 Indian candidates could appear in the examination from 1876 to 1883 and only one of them (a Parsee) was successful. On the whole, the promised Indianization of the civil service was distinctly a far cry. In addition to the formidable taboo for the Hindus to cross the oceans, a great obstacle to larger Indian participation in the process was the framing of the syllabi of the examination in conformity with those adopted in the great academic institutions of England and Scotland. While describing the strong resentment of Indians against the continued preclusion of Indians from the civil service positions, Kabeer (1965:107) quotes the *Amrita Bazar Patrika* of Calcutta, which wrote in its editorial of 28 March 1871, "... Natives are pining away under discouragement, disappointment and poverty, while government servants are indented from England at ten-fold cost.... It might take one-million of years to fulfill the promises that were made by the Queen." It was possibly the most expected reaction from any disgruntled population.

³ C H Philips (nd:539) had the same figure, but it corresponded to the 14 years since open competition was introduced in 1855.

4.1.5. Statutory Civil Service. Against rising demands for Indianization of the civil service, a committee appointed by the Secretary of State for India in 1860 recommended in favour of simultaneous examinations in India. But, the government remained opposed to it. Moreover, the lowering of the maximum age for candidates from 21 years to 19 worsened the prospect of Indian participation. A scheme of granting nine three-year scholarships each year was introduced for young Indian students aspiring to join the Indian Civil Service or any other dignified profession in the Indian public life (Philips nd:538). However, it could not change the scenario. Moreover, the lowering of maximum age for recruitment to the civil service reduced the number of English candidates as well. Indians now began to raise two-fold demands: simultaneous examination and the raising of age-limit. The heedless authority had enacted a law in 1870 authorizing appointment of Indians to high offices by nomination or promotion. The rules made thereunder in 1879 allowed one-sixth of the vacancies in the covenanted civil service to be filled by nominations and promotion. Indians of a maximum age of 25 years could be inducted under the scheme. All nominations had to be sanctioned by the Governor General and the civil servants recruited this way had to undergo a two-year probationary period. These officers, however, would not be appointed to key positions without a previous sanction of the Governor General. This clever ploy of recruitment of Indians in the civil service through nomination was adopted to allay the hard feeling of educated Indians. Governor General Lytton held that if they could get hold of young men of good family for the service through nomination, 'it will secure along with them all the members and all the influence of their family; and this will ramify far and wide' (Kabeer 1965:95). However, things did not mark any substantive change. Hence, the governments of different presidencies were allowed to choose candidates by any manner they thought it fit, with the proviso that if a candidate's worth was not tested through services, his educational attainments could be considered. Accordingly a limited competition was evolved involving (a) officers in the service of the Government, or (b) holders of a bachelor's degree from the Calcutta University, or (c) persons of proved merit and ability in the practice of a profession. From 1879 to 1886, only 9 persons were inducted in the service (including 3 on intellectual grounds and 2 on promotion) and only one of the four gentlemen inducted in the uncovenanted service in the manner up to 1884 successfully passed through the probationary process (Kabeer 1965:112). Only 69 *statutory civilians* were appointed under the system. But the new Service had neither the status nor the prestige of the covenanted service. The new incumbents, all men of educational and aristocratic worth, viewed the statutory service as a secondary and lower service, incapable of meeting the aspirations of the educated Indians.

Table 4.05 shows the clear dominance of English officials in the subordinate services in Bengal, especially at their higher levels.

Table 4.05. Grade-wise Strength in Subordinate Executive Service in Bengal in 1881

<u>Nationality</u>	<u>Grade I</u>	<u>Grade II</u>	<u>Grade III</u>	<u>Grade IV</u>	<u>Grade V</u>	<u>Grade VI</u>	<u>Total</u>
European	7	7	9	14	28	8	73
Indian	2	5	3	12	32	31	85
Total	9	12	12	26	60	39	158

Source : Anuradha Chanda (1987:49).

The high officials too were opposed to the government's policy of employing more Indians in important positions. Chanda (1986:34-50) illustrates the theme in great details to show their inherent disavowal. The total strength of the uncovenanted executives in India in 1881 was 4,082, among whom 2,058 were still English.

Corresponding with the rules of 1879, the number of appointments made by competitive examination in the covenanted civil service was reduced by one-sixth in 1886. However, as the salary and status of members of the statutory civil service was no match for those in the covenanted civil service, and as the former did not belong to any organized service, the statutory service was not favoured by the educated Indians. The growth of western education and consequent influx of European ideas stimulated their aspirations. The Indian National Congress, since its very inception in 1885, started demanding simultaneous examination in India. The Government felt it incumbent to cause a public inquiry of the subject and related issues. It led to the appointment of Aitchison Commission in 1886, which was to devise a scheme that possessed necessary element of finality and do full justice to the claims of the natives of India to higher and more extensive employment in the public service. But, the Commission rejected the idea of simultaneous examinations for many reasons. It maintained that as the ICS needed able men of distinctively English character and English education, only the stimulating and invigorating atmosphere of Britain could ensure a kind of education and examination suitable to that service. The uneven spread of English education in different Indian society would lead to a more spectacular inequality. Third, the Commission maintained, simultaneous examinations could generate a naked competition India to shape their courses to suit the civil service examination. It was also apprehended that secrecy of examination papers would be extremely difficult and that qualified examiners were rarely available in India. These problems, however, were not entirely irresolvable. But, they could effectively block a quick Indianization of the Indian civil service.

Despite the Commission's recommendation for naming the Covenanted Civil Service as the Imperial Civil Service, it was soon officially renamed as the Civil Service of India. However, it assumed the popular epithet, the Indian Civil Service (ICS). The government accepted the Commission's major recommendations for creating Provincial Services and for raising the numbers for Sanskrit and Arabic in recruitment examinations. The provincial services were to succeed the *statutory services*, which had proved inadequate for and unattractive to Indians. The Provincial Civil Service was to be initially encadred against posts made surplus from reduction in the reservations for the Covenanted Civil Service. Such posts were to be filled on a local basis with recruitment of officers under the authority of individual provinces. Thus, the ICS was encadred from the ranks of the reformed Covenanted Civil Service, i.e., after deducting the posts assigned to the newly created Provincial Civil Service. The Uncovenanted Civil Service was divided into two groups on the basis of relative statuses of posts. The higher group constituted the Provincial Civil Service, while the lower administrative cadres were encadred as Subordinate Civil Service. At that time, the central government's service structure contained 17 departments, on top of which was the Indian Civil Service. Again, the ICS and the Forest Department were composed of two branches of each – imperial and provincial (Kennedy 1987:24).

When the Public Service Commission, popularly known as the Aitchison Commission, was set up in 1885 to review the question of recruitment of Indians in the services, there were 2600 uncovenanted officers vis-à-vis 940 covenanted ones in India. The Commission tried to make a distinction on the basis of places of recruitment. Those recruited in England were to be regarded as members of the Imperial Civil Service and remunerated in a distinctly higher scale. On the contrary, officers recruited in India would be members of Provincial Civil Services and they would rise to more and more important positions, commensurate with a progressive reduction of covenanted service posts. Unlike the all-India scenarios, the Commission's recommendations brought about some positive changes in the provincial scene. In 1870, the executive branch of Bengal's provincial service was composed of 231 members of whom 81 officers were Europeans, Eurasians and Americans. In 1893, the corresponding figures were 368 and 38 (Kabeer 1965:125). This shows a marked improvement as far as induction of Indians in the government's services was concerned. However, throughout India, imperial designs on the one hand, and Indian obstinacy and apathy on the other, were largely responsible for a very meagre induction of Indians in the uncovenanted services, not to speak of the covenanted services. Later on, acting on the Islington Commission's recommendations for reserving 25 percent of the ICS

posts for the 'listed post' holders, the Indian Civil Service (Temporary Provisions) Act of 1915 authorized the Secretary of State for India to make rules for admission to the Service [without examination] of British subjects possessing of such qualifications as might be prescribed. The provisions for recruitment to civil service without examinations were necessitated by the exigencies created by the World War I, during which recruitment remained for the most part suspended (Misra 1980:163).

Kennedy (1987:114) narrates how the Montague-Chelmsford Reforms increased the combined quantum of nomination for and promotion to 33 percent of the ICS posts. On 1 December 1920, the government of India, in a Resolution, laid down five principles of recruitment to the Indian Civil Service: a) through an open competitive examination in London, b) through a separate competitive examination in India, c) through nomination, d) through promotion from the Provincial Civil Service, and e) through appointment from the Bar (Sapru 1985:240). These provisions were used in later years to recruit in the civil service the veterans of the War in Europe. As of then, Indians were free to join the *Service* if they could go to England and pass the competitive examination, which was in essence purely literary in character. The demands for holding the examination in India were not being conceded to. There was a rising concern for the deterioration of the standards of recruits and on the conduct of civil servants, particularly younger ones. Suggestions were put forth for scrutiny of character through involving the school headmasters, university teachers and civil servants. But these were not acted upon in a regular way. However, in 1921, a *viva-voce* test was introduced for candidates who came out successfully in written examination, as an additional test of character and personality.

4.1.6. Simultaneous examination. Notwithstanding the introduction in 1855 of the open competitive recruitment system for the Covenanted Civil Servants of the Company and the retention of the system under the imperial assumption of the realm in 1858, the entry of Indians into the positions of responsibility and authority was very scanty. Queen Victoria's pledges for allowing greater entry of Indians in India's high civilian positions was unfulfilled. Among the principal causes for the poor representation of Indians in the civil service was the fact that the examinations used to be held in London only. It was impossible for average eligible Indians to go to England at a very tender age and acclimatize with the local environment before sitting for the examination in London. Hence, a cry for holding the examination simultaneously in England and India was constantly aired by educated Indians, especially its intelligentsia. But, the

authority remained heedless on different pleas including, lack of competent examiners, problems of confidentiality, and a possibility of a rat race among local institutions keen for tutoring students for the competitive examinations thereby disregarding the students' real needs. The Government of India even defied the Parliament, which resolved on 2 June 1893 *that all open competitive examinations heretofore held in England alone for appointments to the Civil Services of India shall henceforth be held simultaneously both in India and England, such examinations in both countries being identical in their nature, and all who compete being finally classified in one list according to merit* (Philips nd:563). The Government of India, in its response to the Secretary of State for India on 1 November 1893, summarized some *reasons* for which they were 'unable to adopt the proposal embodied in the House of Commons' resolution'. The reasons included the lack of necessity for the fulfillment of the *so-called pledges* upon which the claim stood. The practical difficulties of introducing a system of simultaneous examinations were also termed as extremely serious. Next, they held that simultaneous examinations would run counter to the indispensability of a minimum number of European officials for the sake of efficient government. They also refused to consider reducing the existing minimum of such officers. The Government spoke against open competition among the Indians on count of relative backwardness of certain sections and races of people who were accustomed to rule and possessing of exceptional strength of character, but deficient in literary education. Lastly they held that simultaneous examinations would lead to injustice to the officials recently appointed to provincial services (Philips nd:564).

The situation seemed to be assuming a welcome turn for the Indian educated class in the early years of the next century. Against the long and continuous demand for simultaneous examinations for recruitment to the public services in India, the government's policy showed a perceptible shift in this regard, although it caused ample rifts among the top functionaries. These demands and several other factors led to the appointment of a Public Service Commission in 1912 under the chairmanship of Lord Islington. It may be mentioned that Lord Hardinge, the Viceroy at the time, was more favourably disposed towards the cause for a speedier induction of Indians in the important public offices and public services (Philips nd:565). The Commission, in its report, laid paramount importance on (a) the need for high standards of civil administration, (b) the British imperial interests, and (c) the desirability of satisfying reasonable aspirations of Indians for promoting harmony between Indians and Europeans. The Commission recommended creation of four categories of Civil Services (Imperial, Central, Provincial and Subordinate). It

also asked for simultaneous examination in England and India, though of an experimental and tentative character, for the recruitment in most of the services. It also recommended the method of promotion to a limited extent with a warning that too much emphasis on promotion might jeopardize the civil servants' initiative, vigour and freshness of outlook (Chaudhuri 1969:25-7). The Commission boldly maintained, "If responsible government is to be established in India there will be a far greater need than is even dreamt of at present for persons to take part in public affairs... lessen the burden of Imperial responsibilities if a body of capable Indian administrators could be produced.... We cannot rely on the present method of recruitment in England to supply a sufficiency of Indian candidates. That system must be supplemented in some way or other: and we propose to supplement it by fixing a definite percentage of recruitment to be made in India..." (Philips nd:565). The Government was positive on the main suggestions, but it was not in a mood to take immediate measures on all these recommendations owing to its preoccupation with the First World War. Subsequently, on 20 August 1917, the House of Commons adopted another resolution which stated that His Majesty's government favoured gradual development of self-governing institutions for a progressive realization of responsible government in India.

The Montague-Chelmsford reforms of 1919 in a way recognized that Indianization of the higher public services had been lukewarm. After the enactment of the Government of India Act 1919, the Government finally gave in and, for the first time, in 1922, the examination was held in Allahabad as well as London. As the civil service is a living organization, the recruitment examination naturally underwent a change of posture. New subjects were incorporated along with reallocation of marks. Indeed, the growth of new knowledge and the experiences of the War gave birth to new ideas and principles. It created an impact on this important socio-political institution. For the first time, subjects were distributed into *compulsory* and *optional* categories. A 500-mark compulsory part contained five papers each carrying a total of 100 marks: (a) Essay, (b) English, (c) Present Day questions on contemporary social and political subjects, (d) Science – questions on general principles, methods and applications of Science including Geography, and (e) Translation from one of the languages included in but not taken from the optional part. A 300-mark viva-voce examination was included in the compulsory part. Under the optional part, candidates could offer subjects that carried a total of 1,000 marks from among a host of 61 subjects each carrying 100 or 200 marks. Subjects were arrayed in a wide range of branches – Language, Literature, History, Law, Social Science, Mathematics, Science etc (Misra 1980:167).

4.1.7. Last years of the British rule. The Indian Civil Service by this time began to lose much of its charm among the English young men and the number of candidates for positions in India was progressively on the wane. At the same time, the pace of Indianization was being considered too slow and illiberal. The political scenario too was volatile with symptoms like non-cooperation movement and civil disobedience campaign. In 1924, another royal commission on the Indian superior services under Lord Lee of Fareham suggested that some central services like Indian Civil Service, Indian Police Service, Indian Service of Engineers (Irrigation Branch) and Indian Forest Service should continue to be recruited and controlled by the Secretary of State for India. These all-India services were to handle affairs for which the Secretary of State for India was still responsible to the Parliament in London. For other central services and the provincial services, it was recommended that the Government of British India and the provincial governments would exercise certain amount of powers. In certain spheres like political, ecclesiastical and imperial customs departments the Secretary of States would continue to recruit officials and in senior positions of railway and post and telegraph departments he and the Government of India would share the same authority. In line with the proposition for Indianization of the civil service, the Commission recommended that twenty percent of the vacancies in the Indian Civil Service should be filled by promotion from the Provincial Civil Service, while the rest be filled by direct recruitment of Europeans and Indians in equal numbers. Such measures were expected to bring the numbers of Indians and the English in the Services on an equal footing in a few years (Kennedy 1987:114). The government accepted with small modifications these recommendations along with host of other ones in different aspects of the Indian statecraft.

Like the Civil Service Commission in Britain, a permanent Public Service Commission was set up in India in 1926. It was entrusted with the tasks of recruitment to services and advising the government on issues relating to discipline and protection in services. However, the Government of India continued to take measures to ensure representation of different communities, castes and tribes in different services under its disposal. The bosses in Delhi and London could thus exercise subjective predisposition and biased inclinations for one or the other group of people. The situation became more and more complex, because 'if *jati* is important in Bihar politics, class is important in Bengal. If Hindu-Muslim is a factor in Uttar Pradesh, Brahman-non-Brahman conflicts assume a great importance in Madras' (Bhambhri 1971:58). Correspondingly, the eagerness of the educated British young men to join Indian services was progressively on the

decline. The authority had to strike a suitable balance for all these factors. Under the circumstances, the Simon Commission and the Joint Parliamentary Committee on Indian Constitutional Reforms expressed their views in favour of continuing to recruit Indians and Europeans in ICS under the Secretary of State for India. They also called for retaining the ICS and the Indian Police as the only two all-India Services under the direct charge of the Secretary of State (Kennedy 1987:28). For the Civil Service and the Police, a strong British element and scopes for representation of different sections of people were regarded essential for handling the intense cleavages and bitter animosities among Indians. Moreover, as Ashok Chanda (1967:99) had it, 'the recruitment and control, and the terms and conditions, of the all-India services were so determined as to ensure the flow of young British university graduates, which was considered essential for manning such services.' The Commission held that, in view of the communal tensions in India, English officers were all the more required for the sake of neutrality. Moreover 'Indian political life would gain from the advice and service of men in whom the practice of British democracy is instinctive' (Braibanti 1962:206). All the parties regarded the maintenance of adequate standards of recruitment to civil service as essential for the sake of an efficient administration in India (Chaudhuri 1969:41). The Government of India Act 1935 contained safeguards for such standards of recruitment and sustained the proportion of Europeans and Indians for recruitment as recommended by Lord Lee, and reiterated by the subsequent bodies. As a consequence of the British policy in favour of those *adequate standards*, by 1939, out of a total of 1,299 posts in the Indian Civil Service, only 540 were held by Indians (Philips nd:535).

Recruitment to the Indian Civil Service continued in the manner throughout the end of the British rule India. There was a temporary halt in the beginning of the Second World War. In the last decade of that rule it was becoming evident that civil servants were to forget about much of the past glory enjoyed by their predecessors or even by themselves. The increasingly volatile situation in the socio-political front and installation of progressively powerful political functionaries marked a decay of omnipotent bureaucrats. They now had to start learning how to live with and work under the suzerainty of those political leaders who had often been very critical of these very bureaucrats' high-handedness. India was approaching a chaotic situation and the Indian Civil Service officials were to face it. Socio-political factors intruded in a big way into civil service recruitment. The authority had to strike a balance among the aspirations and interests of different groups, sects and communities. It was no more wholly true that recruitment was always made through open competition on the basis of merit alone (Huque 1990:109).

Reservations of quota for various sections of people were definitely to militate against the principle of merit. But, the authority, on this plea or the other, had to take recourse of such reservations. The whole process tended to become somewhat perplexing and subjective. Against such a background, enthusiasm for being a member of the elite body was not as intense as it had been a few decades ago. Macaulay's educated gentlemen, who had shown brilliance in the universities, were considered competent to run the administration. Specialization of any kind was not appreciated in the new recruits. But the brilliant young men sensed both prospective and real threats to the dominance of merit. So many exceptions were contemplated that many brilliant graduates were convinced of an impending compromise with the principles of merit. To the government, clearly merit was not always the sole decider amidst various significant socio-political factors (Bhambhri 1971:59). Different sections of people and nationalities had to be satisfied in some way or other and the principle of merit in civil service recruitment was tempered mostly by political considerations. In the few years up to 1947, many superior service recruits of India entered the services on the basis of an implicit quota (Kennedy 1987:115). Probably it was not unnatural in a literally multiple society where the ends of numerous sections of people usually did not have a chance to meet under universal arrangements. To suit the interests of different communities and groups, painstaking efforts had to be made.

4.2. Recruitment during Pakistan Period

4.2.1. A humble beginning. Pakistan started with a parliamentary form of government as provided for in the Government of India Act 1935. The new country substantially retained the main framework of British rule (Ahmed 1990:48). On the eve of independence of Pakistan, the service structure of the central government of India was composed of four categories of Services: a) *All-India Services* (10 regular Services including ICS and IPS), b) *Central Services, Class I only* (11 regularly constituted Services including the Indian Audit and Accounts Service), c) *Central Services, Classes I and II* (seven regularly constituted Services including Geological Service and Income Tax Service), and d) *Central Services, Class II only* (12 regular Services like Imperial Secretariat Stenographers Service). However, the spotlight around which the structure stood was the ICS. The new elite were interested to retain it (Kennedy 1987:30-1). In independent Pakistan, another elite service – the Civil Service of Pakistan (CSP) – was created and the power of the then Secretary of State in respect of recruitment to its predecessor, the ICS, came to an end. The CSP, along with the Police Service of Pakistan (PSP), was made an all-Pakistan service and it became an important role-player in the new state. Only 82

members of the former Indian Civil Service and Indian Political Service came to Pakistan in 1947. The representation of East Bengal, the most populous province, was worse off. Only two Muslim officers from East Bengal were among them. Some English members of the ICS were invited to serve in Pakistan. The government had to induct in CSP some non-ICS officers too. Kennedy (1987:32) states that, out of the strength of 175 CSP officers in 1950, only 94 were from former ICS. The authorities in Pakistan embarked upon induction of public officials in sufficient numbers. The Government of India Act 1935 provided for continuation of the Public Service Commissions (PSCs). The Act remained in force until the first Constitution of the new country was framed in 1956. Meanwhile, 338 officers were recruited on the basis of their results in the Superior Services Examinations from 1950 to 1953 under the aegis of PSC. One-fifth of them were recruited on merit alone, and the rest on quota reservations. Out of these 68 officers recruited on the principle of merit, 38 were from various parts of Pakistan, and the rest 30 from different parts of former British India. Again, of the 38 officers recruited from the inhabitants of Pakistan, only 6 from East Pakistan could find a berth. The corresponding figures for other provinces and areas were: Punjab 25, Sind 2, North-West Frontier Province 2, Khairpur 1 and Karachi 2 (Chaudhuri 1969:107). A disturbing disquiet and feeling of despondent was being created and felt by a negative discrimination in the pattern of recruitment in the civil service.

4.2.2. Quota system. Despite a higher literacy rate in East Pakistan vis-à-vis West Pakistan on the eve of independence, the circumstances of Partition left the former with inadequate institutions of higher learning. Most successful candidates for the higher services were thus found to be coming from West Pakistan (Goodnow 1969:161). Hence, there was an increasing decay of the poor representation of East Pakistan in the service. A persistent demand for remedial measures followed. In its "Directive Principles", the first Constitution of Pakistan in 1956 (Article 31) enunciated that "steps shall be taken to achieve in the representation of East Pakistan and West Pakistan" in all non-defense spheres of federal administration. Similar provisions were made subsequently in the Constitution of 1962 (Article 16) as "Principles of State Policy". A detailed quota arrangement was evolved under the principles. It allocated 40 percent vacancies to East Pakistan, 23 percent to the Punjab and Bhawalpur, 2 percent to Karachi (federal territories), and 15 percent to a conglomerate of areas like Sind, Khairpur, NWFP and Frontier States and tribal areas, Baluchistan, Azad Kashmir and refugees from (Indian-administered) Kashmir. The rest, i.e., the first 20 percent of the vacancies were to be filled up from those who topped the list of successful candidates on the basis of merit without

any regard to provinces or areas of their origin (Braibanti 1962:213). In this portion, vacancies were to be apportioned equally between East Pakistan and West Pakistan. Communal representation in the service was abolished. However, 6 percent of the vacancies in the centrally recruited services were reserved for the members of the [Hindu] scheduled castes. This reservation was to count as a part of the allotment of the province or area from where the low-caste Hindu candidates appeared in the competitive examination (Chaudhuri 1969:106). This provision had a bearing on East Pakistan as almost all the Hindu population of the country hailed from there. From an account it is amply found that the position of East Pakistan regarding the recruitment of officers in the important Civil Service of Pakistan (CSP) was very poor from the beginning and that it marked an expected level of improvement only at the last years of united Pakistan. The next table explains the case.


Table 4.06. Representation of Provinces in Recruitment to CSP

Year	East Pakistan		West Pakistan		Total
	Number	Percentage	Number	Percentage	
1950	4	36.4	7	63.6	11
1951	5	29.4	12	70.6	17
1952	3	23.0	10	77.0	13
1953	7	28.0	18	72.0	25
1954	5	29.4	12	70.6	17
1955	11	52.4	10	47.6	21
1956	7	35.0	13	65.0	20
1957	10	41.7	14	58.3	24
1958	12	48.0	13	52.0	25
1959	10	33.3	20	66.7	30
1960	11	39.2	17	60.8	28
1961	12	44.5	15	55.5	27
1962	13	46.5	15	53.5	28
1963	13	41.9	18	58.1	31
1964	14	42.2	19	57.8	33
1965	15	50.0	15	50.0	30
1966	14	46.7	16	53.3	30
1967	13	65.0	7	35.0	20
1968	11	55.0	9	45.0	20
	190		260		450

Source: Emajuddin Ahamed, 1980:66.

It justifies the resentment in the then East Pakistan about the injustice meted out to it in the years after the Partition. The above figures may give a more readily striking appreciation of facts if they are presented in a graphical form. Based on the above data, the next graph shows the trendy representations of the two wings of Pakistan relating to the recruitment of officers in its elite

corps – the Civil Service of Pakistan. It may also give out a poor state of affairs meted out to the most populous and more educated province of a peculiarly created and administered country.



Source: *Emajuddin Ahamed, 1980:66.*

It becomes clear that the recruitment policy of Pakistan was largely based on reservation, inflicting a serious blow to the principle of universal criteria. Pakistan was indeed a state of compromises and in the midst of so many centrifugal forces, it possibly had no option but to adopt such measures. A sheer injustice was experienced by East Pakistan, the province inhabited by more than a half of Pakistan's population, but which provided merely a minority of elite public administrators. In the military too, the scene was equally bad or even worse off.⁴ These aspects of depredation dented a fatal blow to the dream for a united nationhood in Pakistan.

4.2.3. The recruitment examination. After the initial acts of adjustments in the wake of partition, and consequent upon the departure of many experienced civil servants, the Public Service Commission started conducting yearly Central Superior Services (CSS) Examinations for recruitment to the all-Pakistan and central services. The CSS examination was 'combined'

⁴ In 1956, out of a total of 897 officers in the Army – the bastion of power for the country – there were only 15 were from East Pakistan. Similarly, there were only 7 East Pakistani officers in the 700-strong officer corps of Pakistan

for recruitment to all superior services till 1957, when the FPSC made an experiment of holding three separate examinations – one for CSP, another for PSP, and the third for all other services. This short-lived experiment was abandoned in 1961 and the examination became combined once again (Kennedy 1987:127n). The yearly vacancies in the Central Superior Services were around 70 including some 20 in the CSP. Candidates had to be Pakistani nationals and their age limit was fixed between 21 and 24 years, except for those from the Hindu scheduled castes and from tribal areas and some other specific backward sections. Chaudhuri (1969:113) shows that the upper limits of the eligible age group were changed several times, but the lower limit remained static. In the mid-1960s, the upper limit was raised to 25. Relaxation for three years was allowed for candidates from Hindu scheduled castes, Buddhists, tribal areas in West Pakistan, excluded areas of East Pakistan and Azad Kashmir and those from Jammu and Kashmir who now lived in different areas of Pakistan. Again, a two-year relaxation was made for the candidates who had served in Pakistan's armed forces except on a regular basis (Chaudhuri 1969:115). This latest provision was made to facilitate the entry of 1965 Indo-Pak war veterans. To the bright young university graduates, the CSS Examination was becoming *the examination*, which contained several phases – written, viva voce, psychological test and a medical test. In the initial years, an average of 600 university graduates showed active interest for CSS examination, and generally a little more than 10 percent of them would be successful in landing in any of the coveted services, most preferably in the CSP, if possible. The CSS examination for the Civil Service of Pakistan (CSP) was of 1400 marks including 300 allocated for an interview (subsequently followed by a formal psychological test). The candidates for recruitment as a CSP officer had to take a test of (1) an essay in English (100 marks), (2) ability to comprehend and write English (200 marks) and (3) grasp of General Knowledge and Pakistan Affairs including current affairs and elementary science (200 marks). These *compulsory subjects* together carried a total of 500 marks. There was a host of some 30 *optional subjects* (20 of 200 marks each and 10 of 100 marks each) from which candidates, under detailed clustering arrangements, could choose and take several subjects that carried a total of 600 marks (Braibanti 1962:112, Goodnow 1969:157). All possible subjects like, e.g., classical literature, history, natural and biological sciences, agriculture, commerce, social science, etc were placed on the list of optional subjects. The minimum standard of the subjects in the examination was equivalent to that required for a baccalaureate honours degree from any university of the country. The pass marks for written test

Air Force. The situation remained more or less the same until the demise of united Pakistan in 1971. Numerous references on this issue include Maniruzzaman (1980), Jahan (1980).

were fixed at 40 percent of the full marks. Candidates securing more than that level were called in to an interview and psychological test. In 1956, the pass marks were raised to 50 percent. Candidates would get no credit for a subject if they secured less than 25 marks in it.

The Public Service Commission conducted a 300-mark interview or viva-voce test of the candidates who came out successful in the written examination. The interview was held in Karachi, Lahore, Dhaka, London and Washington. Different committees or boards were constituted with the Chairman and Members of the Commission, senior government officers, prominent educationalists, Chairmen of the Provincial Public Service Commissions and representatives of the elite services like CSP, PFS, and PSP etc. For the test in London and Washington, a member of the Civil Service Commission or similar body in the host country was invited on the board. A retired ICS officer was frequently invited on the board in London. The object of the interview was to assess the candidates' suitability for the service in terms of different qualities like alertness, intelligence, vigour, strength of character and leadership potential. Their extra-curricular activities were also taken into consideration. While conducting the interview, their records were placed before each member of the interview board. Generally speaking, questions thrown to the candidates from a board reflected the interests and experiences of the members of such a board. Every probable subject under the heaven could surface during the interview, which was very crucial for any candidate because of the very meagre margins among his peer competitors who, like him, had succeeded in the written test. It was likely that candidates having the same bias like those of the interviewers would be doing better in the interview. Again, since the members of the interview board were senior and experienced people in their fields, it was not unlikely that the environment of the interview would have a generalist bias, thereby making a better chance for candidates with humanities and social science background. However, if one failed to secure 100 of the 300 marks allocated for the interview, he would be considered to have failed in the entire examination, no matter how excellent he had fared in its written part. Failure in the interview was not very few and far between. As Chaudhuri (1969:140) states, out of the 546 candidates who secured qualifying marks in the written examinations in a period from 1951 to 1952, as many as 271 failed while 275 passed in the viva-voce test. Hence, interview was more, or at least equally, crucial as the written examination. There was no numerical weight put in the psychological test. It was about the assessment of character, moral strength and attitude of the candidates. In other words, the psychological test was designed to assess their inherent tendencies and capabilities, their

personal qualities and traits of character with regard to their prospective role and position in the prestigious service of the republic. However, it was not impossible for the Commission to suggest, based on the recommendations of the psychologist(s) appointed for the purpose of conducting such tests, that such and such candidates were found to be not psychologically suitable for the civil service job. Quite often such things happened.

Scores in all stages were totaled after the examination was over and, subject to the number of vacancies and observance of different quotas, a list of successful candidates was sent to the government. The Commission also made recommendations as to who should get which service. The Establishment Division of the Cabinet Secretariat arranged a physical test to ensure that they were physically fit for the discharge of their duties as civil servants. Again, a verification of the applicants' antecedents had to be made before a final decision was reached on their recruitment. This was to eliminate candidates hostile to the existing civil service system and whose previous records disclosed their involvement in harmful activities or organizations (Goodnow 1969:159,164). When the Government was satisfied at the end of the lengthy process, the Establishment Division issued appointment letters and the appointees were assigned to different occupation groups, according to PSC's recommendations (Kennedy 1987:116). Candidates appointed to different services became the concern of respective Ministries. The CSP remained the charge of the Establishment Division. Thus the recruitment process came to an end although a nominal hurdle of one-year probation was left on the young officers, whose services had to be confirmed after they fulfilled a number of requisites.

During the first years, Pakistan had a very narrow base of education, and the proportion of university graduates was still smaller. Only male graduates were eligible for application for positions in CSP and most of the remaining superior services. The prospective candidates from East Pakistan had to pass an additional hurdle. The whole process had to be carried out in English and in an all-Pakistan competitive aura. It should be taken in light of the Muslim Bengalees' comparative backwardness in the recruitment to the Civil Service of India in the pre-partition days. In the early years, young men having graduated from non-descript educational institutions could hardly dream of a success even if they dared to sit for the competitive examination. Eligible graduates were progressively on the increase. Moreover, the CSS examinations were in many respects more important than the university graduation examinations, because the former required the candidates to be adequately well-conversant in a

number of standard subjects. A large number of candidates began to vie for the vacancies in the higher services, especially the Civil Service of Pakistan (CSP). Although a separate account of the recruitment in CSP is not readily available, the trend of manifested intention for joining in and recruitment to the Central Superior Services may be found from the following table:

Table 4.07. Year-wise Recruitment of Officers in the Central Superior Services

<u>Year</u>	<u>Number of Candidates</u>			<u>Percentage</u>	<u>Year</u>	<u>Number of Candidates</u>			<u>Percentage</u>
	<u>Appeared</u>	<u>Qualified</u>		<u>of Success</u>		<u>Appeared</u>	<u>Qualified</u>		<u>of Success</u>
1949	555	140		23.7	1957	630	168		26.7
1950	622	124		19.9	1958	1016	264		26.0
1951	417	68		16.3	1959	788	187		23.7
1952	486	84		17.3	1960	1031	327		31.7
1953	385	63		16.4	1961	771	118		15.3
1954 'Jan	422	81		19.2	1962	854	303		35.5
1954 'Dec	382	69		18.1	1963	1242	266		21.4
1955	530	82		15.5	1964	1259	253		20.1
1956	676	102		15.1					

Source : Mozaffar Ahmed Chaudhuri (1969:110).

However, alongside persistent claims for greater representation of East Pakistan in the recruitment of civil servants, reservations were also aired against recruitment in large numbers, lest quality was compromised. Maulvi Farid Ahmed, an outspoken parliamentarian from East Pakistan questioned in the National Assembly about the validity of recruiting 20 to 25 officers in the CSP. On 15 February 1957 he told in the House, "Are we to suppose that there is such abundance of talent in our country that ... all of a sudden overall availability of talent in the country is on the increase?" (Braibanti 1966:363). Notwithstanding the fact that the recruitment base was becoming progressively bigger, it was quite evident from such expressions that public leaders were also sensitive to different sides of the recruitment of the country's civil servants. The civil service was still regarded as the kingpin of the statecraft. A scholar, while analyzing the background of the military coup in the late 1950s, was constrained to remark, 'There were the inefficient men who had found their way into the service and, by various devices, have even secured advancement' (Feldman 1967:72). Despite repeated suggestions by a number of recommendatory bodies and personalities, it is alleged, the government did not go for a completely merit-based recruitment and promotion systems and for a restructuring of the administrative apparatus (Obaidullah 1999:2).

The above trend continued up to the end of the unified Pakistan. There was a notable exception in that, since 1959, the authority began to take special measures to make for a better

representation of East Pakistan in the higher services. A number of East Pakistani officers were given promotions along their service ladder and adequate care was taken to ensure that quota reservations for the province were not left unmet in any year. The quota system (in merit and provincial reservations) gradually improved the participation of East Pakistan in the civil service. As found earlier at section 3.5.1 above, Jahan (1980:7) shows that the representation of East Pakistan in CSP was raised to 24 percent in 1958, and further to 34 percent in 1966. The military regime installed in 1958 seemed more inclined towards a balanced representation of the two wings of the republic in its civil service as well as the armed forces. During this period, a departure was made in terms of eligibility of the candidates. It was decided in 1967 that thenceforth no candidate who obtained a third division in his Bachelor's degree examinations would be eligible for CSS examination, except in cases where he obtained a higher division in his Master's or law degree (Chaudhuri 1969:116). This may be reasonable in the aftermath of establishment of a number of universities, which were producing more and more graduates. However, East Pakistan, the province that had majority of the country's population, still had a very poor share in decision-making position including those in the civil service. In 1969-70, only three East Pakistani officers attained the rank of Secretary to the central government. At the time there were a total of 20 such officers in the government. Promotion of those three officers to that level under the personal intervention of General Yahya Khan, the new martial law President, as a concession to the East Pakistan demand for greater representation in the civil service, could not gain full effectiveness since all the officers under them were from West Pakistan (Maniruzzaman 1980a:21n). The reciprocal mistrust between the two parts of the country was evident from that. In such an environment, recruitment to the civil service was never to be up to an expected level for this part. In this context, Kennedy (1987:98-99) describes that the strength of the CSP rose in 1970 to 473 officers, of whom 188 were presumed to have opted for Bangladesh in or after 1971. Thence, at the end of 23-odd years under the 'federal state' of Pakistan, one could see that not more than around 40 percent of the elite CSP officers were from East Pakistan. In this regard, the most populous province of the republic was given to hold a despondent view akin to the view held by the educated Indians about a hundred years ago against the British rulers. A feeling of deprivation was all the more visible in the psyche of the educated youth who constituted the most vociferous section of the already politically electrified population of East Pakistan.

4.2.4. Different tributaries. In addition to the premier administrators of the Civil Service of Pakistan (CSP), there were some other sources of personnel for BCS (Administration) cadre, which is the subject of this study. Foremost among them was the Provincial Civil Service that had come into being in the 1880s as a pacifier for the educated Indians. The background of its creation is narrated in section 4.1.5. The Bengal Provincial Services Recruitment Rules 1930 made it possible for recruitment to the services by competitive examination, by promotion or by selection. It was also possible on exceptional circumstances to recruit such provincial civil servants on the government's nomination. The provincial services were (1) Bengal Civil Service (Executive) or the BCS (Executive), (2) Bengal Junior Civil Service (BJCS), (3) Bengal Excise Service, and (4) Bengal Junior Excise Service. Half of the vacancies in the BCS (Executive) were filled by direct recruitment on the basis of a competitive examination, and the rest by promotion from members of the BJCS. In terms of the hierarchy of status, the BCS (Executive) ranked just next to ICS and the proportion of its Muslim officers was much smaller than their ratio in the population of the province (Huque 1986:304). The said Rules also prescribed that separate lists of successful candidates would be prepared for (a) the Muslims, (b) the Hindus, and (c) the Minority Communities and Backward classes, which were composed of 85 groups or sections of people (GOEP 1965:14-5). The age of the candidates for direct recruitment was fixed at between 22 and 25 years, while the age for promotion from Bengal Junior Civil Service officials was fixed initially at 40 years. It was subsequently extended to 50 years in 1952. After independence, the Government promulgated the East Pakistan Civil Service (Executive) and East Pakistan Junior Civil Service Amalgamation Rules of 1958. This legal instrument merged the two services under the name of the former service, and provisionally fixed the strength of this service at 780 posts. The Rules were devised to resolve many contentious issues relating to the interests of the two services, and they provided that 12 percent of the vacancies in the EPSC (Executive) would be kept reserved for promotion from a number of specific feeder posts. In 1961, the Governor made the Rules for East Pakistan Civil Service (Executive) which provided that 50 percent of the vacancies at any time in the said service would be filled by direct recruitment through a competitive examination to be conducted by the East Pakistan Public Service Commission (EPPSC), from among candidates who were graduates and who were between 22 and 25 years of age. The remaining vacancies at any time would be filled, in consultation with the provincial Public Service Commission of East Pakistan, by promotion

from the feeder services. In a nutshell, for the purpose of recruitment of officers in the then East Pakistan Provincial Civil Service, the following posts were declared as *feeder posts*⁵:

- (i) Inspectors of Registration;
- (ii) Departmental District Registrars;
- (iii) District Sub-Registrars;
- (iv) Sub-Registrars;
- (v) Development Officers;
- (vi) Sub-Divisional Managers of Government Acquired Estates;
- (vii) Revenue Circle Officers;
- (viii) Settlement Kanungoes;
- (ix) Revenue Officers (on deputation to work as Circle Inspectors);
- (x) District Kanungoes;
- (xi) Revenue Circle Inspectors;
- (xii) Sub-Divisional Relief and Rehabilitation Officers;
- (xiii) Special Relief Officers;
- (xiv) Cooperatives Inspectors and Auditors;
- (xv) Sub-Divisional Controllers of Food;
- (xvi) Chief Inspectors of Food;
- (xvii) Inspectors of Food;
- (xviii) Subordinate Agriculture Service, Class I;
- (xix) Graduate Project Supervisors of National Development Organization;
- (xx) Relief Officers.

For both direct recruitment and promotion categories the candidates had to be citizens of Pakistan and domiciled in East Pakistan. For promotion, a candidate had to be less than 50 years of age and had a minimum of 7 years of service in feeder posts. These provisions held good with no substantial modifications. Officers were posted in field administration and similar places and were accorded occasional promotions to still higher positions.

Another service that merits some mention in this respect is the Lands and Cantonment Service. The British established in India a good number of cantonments which were administered by the military personnel until 1924, when most of the relevant posts began to be transferred to civilian control. There were two branches of the Cantonment Department – Land Branch and the Cantonment Executive Service (CES). The former used to look after the expanses of land under the disposal of each cantonment and garrison, while the military areas were administered by the CES in the fashion of municipalities. In 1947, the two branches were combined into Pakistan Military Lands and Cantonment Service (PMLCS) and the existing officers were absorbed into it. Its subsequent vacancies were filled through open competitive examination under the Public Service Commission like other central superior services. Its members used to remain confined in

⁵ Posts, holders of which are eligible for promotion to specific superior posts.

the professional areas of the cantonments, while a few of them would occasionally occupy some senior positions in the Ministry of Defense. The affairs remained like that till the dismemberment of united Pakistan and independence of Bangladesh (Kennedy 1987:40,100). There were 41 officers in the service in 1961. Commensurate with the expansion of the armed forces, in 1970, the strength of the service rose to 46 officers, out of which 15 opted for Bangladesh, during and after 1971. They were subsequently absorbed in the administrative service of the new state.

The other major contributory for BCS (Administration) cadre of today is the former secretariat services – central and provincial. The first martial law regime of Pakistan sought to introduce changes in many fields and secretariat management was not an exception. The G. Ahmed Commission, appointed for the purpose of recommending measures for reforming the secretariat management, suggested that a Section Officer's scheme be introduced by redesigning Assistant Secretaries and Under Secretaries as Section Officers with a greater power to dispose of cases. The existence of those two officers under the supervision of a Deputy Secretary was regarded as wasteful, cumbersome and dilatory. The commission followed the principles of the Tottenham Report of 1946, which called for creation of the Imperial Secretariat Service. G Ahmed Commission recommended some other measures too. First, members of the central superior services should be made eligible for promotion as Section Officers. Secondly, 70 percent of the remaining vacancies should be filled by promotion from Superintendents, Assistants and other class II posts. It was also suggested that the remaining 30 percent posts would be filled by direct recruitment. These proposals were accepted by the Government and the Section Officer's Scheme was introduced in 1959. As Kennedy (1987:35n, 98) has it, notwithstanding the debates about the efficacy of the scheme, the Central Secretariat Service (CSS) was officially encadred in 1965. The strength of the service rose to 576 officers in 1970. However, he (ibid, p 44) states that almost all officers of CSS were Section Officers and that no CSS officer was reported to have held a charge higher than that of Deputy Secretary up till 1970. Alongside the Central Secretariat Service, there was also a provincial version of that service, the East Pakistan Secretariat Service (EPSS). Its strength was fixed at 130 officers (2 Joint Secretaries, 11 Deputy Secretaries and 117 Section Officers in the provincial secretariat), of which 2 posts of Deputy Secretary and 17 posts of Section Officer were kept reserved as a separate pool for Finance Department. The others, i.e., the majority of officers constituted a common pool, from where transfers could be and were often made from one department to another (GOEP 1965:51). Two-

thirds of the vacancies in the service were meant to be recruited through a competitive examination conducted by the East Pakistan Public Service Commission, while the remaining posts would be filled, in consultation with EPPSC, by promotion from Head Assistants, Upper Division Assistants and Stenographers. For direct recruitment to the service, 22 to 25 year old citizens of Pakistan and resident or domiciled in East Pakistan were eligible to be candidates if they were university graduates, and possessed sound health. Some members of CSS and EPSS also got transferred periodically to and from central and provincial secretariats. They were also returned to their respective places in course of time usually after a stint of two years or so. Officers of these two services were not promoted to positions above that of the Joint Secretary (ASRC 1973:11). Obaidullah's (1999:51) description that two of the Secretariat Service officers were holding the ranks of Secretary/Additional Secretary to the government of East Pakistan needs to be construed in the sense that those two officers belonged to the CSS, not the EPSS. Officers of the all-Pakistan and central superior services used to be conferred ranks higher than their substantive ranks while being posted in the provincial secretariats or under the provincial governments. For example, a Secretary to the provincial government would hold the rank and status of a Joint Secretary or rarely an Additional Secretary to the central government.

4.3. Experiments in the first decade of Bangladesh

4.3.1. Restoration. In the Pakistan days, Bangladesh experienced an unenviable position with regard to administrative system in general and personnel issues in particular. In the wake of independence, Bangladesh got not only a war-ravaged economy and physical infrastructure; it had to start with a crippled and atrophied administrative system too. The government of the new country had to restore an administrative set-up through incorporating the personnel of diverse sides like the former all-Pakistan services, former central superior services, former provincial services and a host of officials who were employed under the government in exile during the sanguinary liberation war. Their diverse interests and aspirations had to be met, keeping in view the policies and orientations of the newly installed government in a just-independent war-torn country. For a week or so after the victory, there was indeed no semblance of order and the entire political leadership including the Ministers of wartime government was absent. Rehabilitation of the administration could be taken up with the help of such personnel who could be collected hastily on the basis of the existing set-up. It was like the repetition of the 1947 experience (Huque 1986:573). On 27 December 1971, ten days after the victory, the Government appointed a Civil Administration Restoration Committee (CARC), which in its

report a week later recommended that 'officers and staff of the civil administration should be given due status and respect as lawful organs of the Government and media of airing and redressing public grievances' (CARC 1972:2). This was the first formal attempt to recover the charge of public affairs from the hands of the exterminated Pakistan administrative set-up and the liberation warriors, who had been at the time informally and haphazardly filling the void. The new state's administrative set-up and personnel occupying different positions in it, at both national and local levels, had been showing serious signs of the lack of any credible authority. In light of the suggestions of CARC, the Government started taking various steps in the process of restoration of the administrative system. Side by side with taking immediate steps for restoring the administrative and judicial order, the Government, on 15 March 1972, appointed the Administrative and Services Reorganization Committee (ASRC), 'to determine the policy regarding the fresh recruitment to the Government Services'. The Committee's terms of reference were subsequently extended to cover wider issues of administration with that original scope of ASRC retained as only one of its five areas of concern (ASRC 1973:iv).

By the time ASRC submitted the first volume of its report in April 1973, the country had adopted its Constitution, which guarantees equality of opportunity for citizens for recruitment to the services of the republic, albeit with provisions for allowing the state to take special measures to facilitate the backward sections of people in this regard (Article 29 of the Constitution). The new state's character and ideology were fundamentally different from Pakistan's. The public administration of the country was denied the constitutional protection provided for in Pakistan's constitutions of 1956 and 1962 (Ahamed 1980:153). Articles 134 and 135 bestowed on the executive vast powers to determine the conditions for public service and to take substantive measures that might even adversely affect the holders of public service positions. However, in its report (Vol. I, p. 50ff), the ASRC held, that merit should be the only criterion for recruitment to services and posts in Grade V upwards and that any deviation from it would militate against the creation of a strong administration. Grade V was prescribed by ASRC as the first step of top echelons of public service in a unified 10-grade structure, with Grade X meant for lower and manual staff. The ASRC recommended that 60 percent of vacant posts at Grade V should be filled by direct recruitment through open competition of Honours standard to be conducted by the Public Service Commission. For the rest of the vacancies, the Committee recommended two separate promotion examinations to be conducted by the PSC. For direct recruitment, at least 21 years old graduates of any discipline would be eligible for application. The upper limit was

recommended at 24 years (up to 26 years for technical graduates). While prescribing four modes of recruitment (open competitive examination, competitive interview, competitive promotion examination, and promotion on the basis of performance records), it also suggested that recruitment to all non-technical civil servants of Grade V should be made through a single competitive examination. Separate such examinations could be arranged for technical civil servants, the Committee held. The open competitive examinations for the purpose of direct recruitment would consist of two parts – written and oral. The written part would again be divided into compulsory and optional portions. The former was to carry a total of 500 marks (Essay 100, Composition 100, General Knowledge in the form of everyday science and current affairs 200, and Bangladesh Affairs 100). The optional portion would comprise three subjects each carrying 200 marks from a host of alternatives. The Committee recommended a ‘pre-board interview technique’, in which a single member interviews a candidate and reports thereon to the board, which interviews him in a latter phase. This technique was considered useful for keeping scope for the candidate to have a double chance to show his merit and also allowing the board to double-check his worth. Candidates securing 45 percent marks in the written test would be called in to the viva voce and psychological test that was to carry 300 marks. Failure to secure 100 marks in the latter would mean failure in the whole examination. The Committee opined for special examinations for technical service posts and also for especially meritorious graduates to meet the need of the day. The ASRC put the highest premium on a merit-based public administration. The Committee dealt with the other areas too. However, the Government seemed not very interested to give effect to the recommendations and the report of the committee met an oblivious fate.

4.3.2. Erratic induction. Through a memorandum in September 1972, the Government had promulgated an interim recruitment policy which prescribed that, like in the Pakistan days, in respect of appointment to Class I services and posts, 20 percent of the vacancies should be filled on the basis of merit, and the rest on the basis of population of districts. It laid down that 30 percent of the vacancies would be reserved for freedom fighters and another 10 percent for women affected by the war of liberation, subject to the principle that this 40 percent should be calculated on an overall basis without affecting the district quota. The recruitment rules and principles prevailing since the Pakistan days were given validity subject to the modifications necessitated by the provisions of the interim recruitment policy. The way the policy was framed was not in full conformity with the constitutional and statutory principles, because the Public


Service Commission had not been consulted. Moreover, the interim recruitment policy, being just an administrative decision, sought to override statutory rules (Ali 2002:215). Things remained like that for the next years and recruitment to civil service and public service in general continued to be made on slipshod and haphazard manner as and when there was felt a necessity to recruit some officials. The interim policy was questionable on moral grounds also. Recruitment in large numbers had to be made in the public service and preferences had to be given to the freedom fighters too for obvious reasons. But this could be done only at the cost of efficiency (Huque 1986:571). The Government seemingly chose not to act on ASRC's advice. The interim policy was adhered to in its subsequent acts of recruitment to the public service and political expediency was allowed a free hand (Ali 2002:80-82).

The total number of vacancies in the superior positions in 1972 was known to be 771, of which 20 percent, i.e., 154 posts were to be put on the merit quota according to the interim recruitment policy. Among the rest, 30 percent, i.e., 185 posts were to fall under the quota reserved for freedom fighter candidates. The Public Service (First) Commission floated a major advertisement on 23 June 1972 (*Appendix D*) about an impending recruitment of a big number of officers. The Government made the PSC to conduct a special *viva voce* test for freedom fighter candidates for 350 superior posts. As many as 1,597 candidates took part in it and 1,013 were declared qualified. They were recruited in 1973 to different superior posts including 220 as Deputy Magistrate and Deputy Collector (DM-DC), the entry-level Grade-V post in the administrative service. This was clearly in contravention of the Government's reservation of stipulated quota for freedom fighter candidates. Six of the successful candidates were recruited as Assistant Director of BDR, the country's para-military force. But they were subsequently returned to the civil authority and absorbed in 1974, again as DM-DC in the administrative service. Moreover, a new service was created on 1 August 1973, namely the Industrial Management Service (IMS), and 196 officers were recruited to it from the candidates qualified in the said special *viva voce* test. It may be stated with an amount of certainty that due procedures were not followed for the creation of the IMS. The PSC was not consulted and no rules or legal instruments were made for the creation of this service. The Government seemed to be in a hurry to create a team of officers to man and manage the industrial and commercial concerns nationalized in the wake of independence. It is to be noted that the Government made the recruitment rules for IMS in 1976, three years after officers had been recruited to it. These serious anomalies were to create lot of problems in the BCS (Administration) cadre in the

following years. Besides, the Government arranged interview of 958 candidates who had, in the last days of united Pakistan, appeared in the Central Superior Service examination and in the East Pakistan Civil Service (Special) examination. Those examinations had been conducted in 1970 respectively by Pakistan's Central Public Service Commission and the East Pakistan Provincial Public Service Commission. Bangladesh Public Service Commission recommended a total of 106 officers from those interviewed for recruitment to the superior service posts. The number was later on increased to 130. Some of them were recruited as DM-DC in the administrative service. However, as a scholar puts it, the number of officers selected through interview from the various sources of pre-Bangladesh recruitment process was not conclusive 'as the whole process of advertisement, selection by interview etc was vitiated by a non-transparent system and a lack of fairness on the part of the Government and the PSC. The integrity of the process was compromised' (Ali 2002:86). Another account shows that 1,314 persons were recruited in 1973 to various superior posts of Grades V and VI including those in banks (Shamsuddin 2002:114).

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The PSC advertised on 6 July 1972, for *non-freedom fighter* candidates, a special competitive examination for 150 superior positions (*Appendix E*). After a lengthy procrastination, the special examination was held in 1973 and the following year interview was arranged for those who were successful in the written examination. The medical test was offered after a gap of more than one year in late 1975. In 1976, the Government arranged a detailed three-month field study and six-month *pre-service training* at the National Institute of Public Administration (NIPA) and the Gazetted Officers' Training Academy (GOTA), after which the PSC conducted another round of written and viva voce examinations. On 21 January 1977, the Commission sent to the Government a final list of 317 successful candidates for recruitment to various superior posts. They got recruited to various positions including in the nationalized banks. Out of them, 60 got recruited as DM-DC in the administrative service posts. Moreover, 45 Section Officers were also recruited from among the list. These candidates had been waiting for the unusually too lengthy recruitment process to come to an end. Indeed, the political turn of events in the country in late 1975 paved the way for the process to attain fruition. The new regime was more inclined to distancing itself from some shoddy practices of the past. Indeed, these officers, popularly termed as 'the 1977 batch', were the product of the first serious, nay, possibly too much of a serious process of recruitment through competitive examination(s). Around that time, a long-overdue act was also done. On 17 September 1976, the Industrial Management Service



(Constitution and Recruitment) Rules 1976 (*Appendix F*) were promulgated with retrospective effect from 1 August 1973, the day when IMS officers had been recruited. These rules were the first formal instrument to straighten things in this respect. The rules specified the cadre strength of IMS to 200 officers to be recruited through a competitive examination conducted by the Public Service Commission from among 21-25 year old graduates of recognized universities. Provisions were made for probation, training, confirmation, discipline, etc of the new service. The Schedule appended to the rules provided that among the 200 officers of the IMS, nine state-owned corporations would get 125 officers, while 75 officers were not earmarked to any organization. The period between the date of recruitment of officers to a service and the date of the creation of the service itself was more than three years – a glaring instance of carelessness. The IMS officers had been recruited through the aforesaid special viva voce test for freedom fighters. It is alleged that the interview was not conducted in a proper manner and the PSC was not allowed to play its proper role. There was a breach of constitutional provisions too, since the Rules were promulgated without consulting the PSC, as discerned from a letter of the Public Service Commission (No. SER-2-15/82/2401 of 15 June 1982) (*Appendix G*), written to the Establishment Division, the body assigned with handling the service issues of the republic.

From the acts undertaken by the Government with regard to the recruitment of the first two batches of civil servants of independent Bangladesh, i.e., the 1973 and the 1977 batches, one may find a reflection of disarrayed and disconcerted mind of the ruling elite. There were also some perceptible differences of attitudes and a sign of negligent appreciation of the need for finesse in public business. On 23 June and 6 July 1972, Bangladesh Public Service Commission published its two notices (nos. 4 and 5 – attached herewith as *Appendix D* and *Appendix E* respectively) to advertise two separate Special Superior Service Competitive Examinations. The first was designed to recruit 350 officers from among freedom-fighter candidates, while the second one was meant for recruiting 150 officers from among the non-freedom-fighter candidates. In both instances, the prevailing principles were breached, if not violated altogether. The recruitment principles retained from the Pakistan time did not contain such provisions to allow inducting officers from any particular source of candidates. The interim policy which allowed 30 percent of the total vacancy at any time to be filled from among freedom-fighter candidates was promulgated in September 1972, i.e., several months after the publication of the notice for the first special examination. Again, the interim recruitment policy fixed the quota for the freedom-fighter category at 30 percent, not the whole of the vacancies created at any time.

The then government clearly performed an act of discrimination in favour of the freedom-fighter candidates. Around the same period, through the notice for the second special examination, the government performed another act of discrimination, this time negatively. For the second special examination, the freedom fighters were debarred from competing. The upcoming interim recruitment policy and the general principles of the rule of law did not allow such negative discrimination to happen, particularly if such candidates were otherwise considered eligible. Still, the government of the day went ahead with its plan of recruitment. On another count, the two special examinations reflected a clear disparity. For the same nature and designation of employment, separate modes of examinations were prescribed. The first special examination (meant for freedom-fighter candidates) was purported to be held in oral mode, supplemented, if necessary, by the services of psychologists. But, the second one would consist of both written and oral examinations. This was more striking, especially because the process began around the same time. Again, the age limit for the first examination was fixed at between 21 and 35 years as on the 1st day of June 1972, while the age limit for the second examination was between 21 and 27 years as on the 1st day of January 1972. The freedom-fighter candidates were given double advantage. Their upper age limit was far above that limit set for their counterparts, and the former also enjoyed a six months' edge because of the difference of dates on which computation of age was to take place. Next, successful candidates who would soon constitute respectively the 1973 batch and the 1977 batch were put variant financial obligations. The freedom-fighter candidates paid a fee of Taka 5.00 each before the examination, while their counterparts had to pay two rounds of fees amounting to Taka 5.00 and Taka 30.00. Moreover, the notices had it that each probationer of the freedom-fighter category would receive an allowance of Taka 300.00 per month during their probation period, while the corresponding amount allowed for each of the non-freedom-fighter probationers was fixed at Taka 250.00.

More substantively, both the notices spelt out that on the basis of the results of special examinations probationers would be selected and put to pre-service training before their appearing in another examination composed of written and oral parts. This provision was adhered to in respect of the 1977 batch. However, the officers of the 1973 batch, recruited only through a viva-voce test whose propriety remained subject to question, did not sit for the said written and oral examination as purported in the advertisement notice. Moreover, through its acts at different times, the government committed a feat of overacting. They recruited as many as 1,314 officers in the superior posts on the basis of the results of the special superior posts

examination held in 1972 for freedom-fighter candidates. All these officers were later on absorbed in various cadres of Bangladesh Civil Service. It may be mentioned again that the special examination had been announced with a view to recruiting 350 officers from freedom-fighter candidates. Quite interestingly, despite seven years' hard work since 1981 to 1988, the government could not manage to prepare an updated complete account of these huge number of freedom-fighter officers (*Appendix H*). There was no report about an eventual success in the following years either. Similarly, the process for the second special superior posts examination took four and a half years before it came to fruition in January 1977, that too when a different government was in power. After a protracted process, the Public service Commission recommended to the government for recruitment of 313 officers. Interestingly, they included 248 officers of superior posts in various services and 45 officers of various nationalized banks and Bangladesh Krishi Bank⁶. They were all placed in Grade-V, the entry level posts of different superior services. The list also contained the names of 16 government officers and 4 bank officers all of whom were placed in Grade-VI (PSC's No. D.O. 1E-1/76/222 dated 21 January 1977, i.e., *Appendix D*). The government complied with the recommendations. All these happened following an advertisement purported for the recruitment of 150 superior posts from among the non-freedom-fighter candidates. Thus, one cannot miss a host of disparity, discrimination, *ad-hocism* and callousness shown on the part of the governments in respect of the recruitment of superior officers in the public administration of Bangladesh, especially in the early years. Indeed, the recruitment in the superior services of the new republic began as if with an attitude of rule-breaking and subjectivity. In the event, BCS (Administration) had to bear the brunt since the senior-most positions of the government are occupied by the members of this cadre and since the largest single portions of these two streams of officers were subsequently brought into the cadre.

An extension of irregular practices of inducting officers in Administrative Service was found happening even in the later years. Soon after the 1977 batch of officers were recruited, the government made induction of another group of officers, when 50 officers were appointed on ad-hoc basis as Officers on Special Duty (OSD) and placed in different posts of field administration [Notification no. ED (JA1)-191/77-326 dated 21 May 1977 (*Appendix J*)]. The government order specified that those officers were appointed as OSD 'against the 163 temporary posts of Deputy Magistrate and Deputy Collector'. These posts belonged to BCS

⁶ The government-owned Agricultural Development Bank.

(Administration) cadre, and officers appointed thereto were drawn from diverse sources. Those officers included Section Officers of the Secretariat Service, Assistant Engineers of Water Development Board and Power Development Board, and other officers from specialized organizations like Port Authority, Inland Water Transport Authority, Jiban Bima Corporation⁷, Agricultural Development Corporation, different nationalized industrial units, etc. That was clearly a *pick and choose* rule, and there seemed no strict rationale on which the officers were selected. Some of them had been appointed to the Industrial Management Service which is discussed in sections 4.3.2 and 4.4.2. Through other orders, a number of officers from different sources were appointed as OSD against the sanctioned posts in the Administrative service. Through a subsequent order [No. ED (JA-II)/122/78-350 of 18 September 1980 (*Appendix K*)], 16 of those officers were absorbed as Assistant Commissioners in the newly created BCS (Administration) cadre. This act of absorption was not in full conformity with the provisions of Rule 3(2) of Bangladesh Civil Service (Administrative: Administrative) Composition and Cadre Rules 1980, which specified the sources of officers to draw in the cadre. However, the absorption was certainly felt necessary as these and other officers had been made to officiate in various posts of the cadre since different dates. It was done well after a widely acceptable process of recruitment had already been underway through the recruitment of the 1979 batch of officers on the basis of the Superior Posts Examinations. Thus, the legacy of a not-so-methodical recruitment process was allowed to continue in BCS (Administration) cadre, despite the introduction of a better system, which is discussed subsequently.

Following the installation of the new regime in late 1975, five Assistant Commissioners were recruited in the administrative service in 1976. Those officials had qualified for CSP in the last CSS examinations held in 1971 under the aegis of Pakistan's Central Public Service Commission. It may be noted that Assistant Commissioner was the entry-level post in former CSP. This new act reportedly incurred protest from the freedom-fighter officers recruited through the special viva voce test of 1972 and also a little whisperingly from the members of former provincial civil service. They maintained that since there was no more a central-provincial dichotomy, it was no point to go back to the elite designation in their service. They were possibly apprehensive of the prospective hegemony of a new group of officers. However, the government was undaunted and an advertisement was aired in November 1976 for a combined superior posts examination for 139 posts including those of Assistant Commissioner

⁷ Government-owned Life Insurance Corporation.

in the administrative service. That was the first regular superior posts examination of independent Bangladesh, reminiscent of the CSS examinations in Pakistan. Young university graduates aged between 21 and 25 years could sit for the examination in which the written part carried 1300 marks. Its *compulsory* portion carried 700 marks (200 marks each for Bangla, English and General Knowledge, and 100 for General Mathematics). In the *optional* portion, a candidate could choose three groups of subjects from eight such alternatives each carrying 200 marks. There was an unprecedented response from 8,711 persons of whom a total of 8,059 were called in. But only 2,439 appeared in the written examination, in which 45 percent of the total marks on each subject were fixed as pass marks. Only 140 candidates qualified in the written examination, and they were called in for the 300-mark interview and psychological test. In the mean time, on 8 April 1976, the Government amended the Interim Recruitment Policy of 1972 and raised the merit quota from 20 percent to 40 percent (Ali 2002:216). Despite covert maneuvers against the recruitment of meritorious young men in the administrative posts, 138 officers – later to be called as ‘the 1979 batch’ – were recruited in various services including 23 in the administrative posts (Morshed 1986:69). However, the designation of those recruited was made Deputy Magistrate and Deputy Collector, not Assistant Commissioner, which they had been promised with in the advertisement. Another 50 successful candidates were recruited as Section Officers. Two officers were recruited as Cantonment Executive Officer in the former Military Lands and Cantonment Service. It was like a new chapter in the country's bureaucracy.

For recruitment to the superior posts, a combined competitive examination was introduced with a clear bias for merit to be determined through written, oral, psychological and medical tests under a clearly spelt-out broad syllabus purported to be emulated in later recruitments too. The Services (Reorganisation and Conditions) Act of 1975 (*Appendix A*) enabled the Government to reconstitute the services and take any other appropriate measures to give effect to its provisions. A Pay and Services Commission was appointed in 1976 “to conduct fresh enquiry into the services and pay structure and suggest necessary reforms” (Obaidullah 1999:57). In its report in 1977, the Commission recommended the creation of 28 cadres or sub-cadres of a unified civil service along the functional lines. It also called for an apex cadre, where meritorious and experienced officers of different cadres could enter through an objective means. The Government accepted the second suggestion first and, in September 1979, created a Senior Policy Pool, which was soon renamed as Senior Services Pool (SSP) consisting of Deputy Secretaries, Joint Secretaries, Additional Secretaries and Secretaries. The Government could

appoint officers in it without much of a restriction up to the end of 1979, after which entry to the SSP would be only at the level of Deputy Secretary, and the PSC would conduct examination for encadrement in SSP. Such an examination was never held (Ali 2002:127). However, in this context principles and practices of recruitment to superior posts assumed an added importance.

4.4. Recruitment since 1980s

4.4.1. Recruitment to BCS. The 1980s were vibrant with activities in the administrative sector of the country. The promulgation, on 1 September 1980, of the Bangladesh Civil Service (Reorganisation) Order 1980 was a watershed in this respect. This Order created 14 cadres and 14 sub-cadres along the functional lines and brought them under a unified umbrella, Bangladesh Civil Service (BCS). The Order was amended in 1986 to declare each sub-cadre as an independent cadre and also to re-designate some cadres (*Appendix C*), and create a few new ones in order to raise the number of cadres to 30. The number was adjusted later on at 29, after Administration and Secretariat cadres were merged into a single Administration cadre in 1992 (GOB 1996:13). It has been discussed in some details at section 3.6.1. The Bangladesh Civil Service Recruitment Rules of 1981 were framed on 1 January 1981 to provide for two modes of recruitment to the service cadres – direct recruitment, and recruitment by promotion. The later category of recruitment was mostly for the purpose of promoting officers of all cadres along their respective hierarchical ladder and also in the top government positions. The rules also contained provisions for probation and confirmation etc. In this context, a new batch of civil servants was recruited in 1981 to different cadres of Bangladesh Civil Service. In January 1979, the PSC had advertised on the second superior posts examination, the written part of which was held during October-November of that year. The interview was conducted in May 1980 and 117 persons were recruited to various cadres in late January 1981. According to the provisions of the newly introduced recruitment rules, 56 officers were recruited as Assistant Commissioner in the Administration cadre and 17 as Section Officer in the Secretariat cadre. It may be noted that the entry-level post in the Administration cadre, like in the Pakistan times, was once again designated as Assistant Commissioner. Thus, the principles and practices established while recruiting the 1979 batch were thought to have been given a solid ground.

Bangladesh was very soon under another spell of martial law since 24 March 1982. Like all other similar regimes, the new martial law government sought to bring about changes in public administration. On 11 May 1982, the Bangladesh Civil Service (Age, Qualification and

Examination for Direct Recruitment) Rules 1982 were made by the government. These rules consolidated many of the principles already set in. In the backdrop of the creation of cadres under a unified BCS, unlike in the recent past, the role of PSC was now to hold *Bangladesh Civil Service Examination*, not the *Superior Posts Examinations* any more. The age-limits for candidates for the examination was fixed at between 21 and 25 years on the first day of the year the Commission was to invite applications for BCS examination. However, for the first examination after the commencement of the rules the upper limit was relaxed to 28 years and the Government reserved the right to relax the age-limits for certain categories of candidates like backward sections of citizens, freedom fighters and women. For candidates for appointment in a number of generalist cadres including Administration and Secretariat cadres, the structure of the BCS examination was like in the following:

a) Seven papers on compulsory subjects	700 marks
b) Six papers on optional subjects	600 marks
c) Viva-voce test	200 marks
d) Psychological and intelligence tests	<u>100 marks</u>
Total 1600 marks.	

There were restrictions on the choices of subjects to offer from among different groups of subjects. No candidate could choose subjects which in combination carry more than 400 marks from a single group. The minimum pass mark was fixed at 45 percent in the aggregate in the written examination and 40 percent in the viva voce test and the psychological and intelligence tests taken together. This provision was soon amended on 15 February 1983 to state that the pass marks for viva voce test and the psychological and intelligence test were 40 percent on each count (GOB 1996:56, 97). After the promulgation of the said rules, in 1982, the PSC conducted the first BCS Examinations. The advertisement was published in May 1982 and the 1300-mark written examination was held during August-November in the same year. The 200-mark viva voce test and the 100-mark psychological test followed by a medical test were completed by mid-1983. On the basis of their results, 281 candidates were recommended for recruitment to various cadres. Out of them, 91 officers were recruited as Assistant Commissioner and five as Section Officer during a period between October 1983 and January 1984. After a gap of several months, on the results of the same examination, 77 more candidates were recommended for recruitment as Section Officers in the Secretariat cadre. This move was purportedly taken to make for the lack of sufficient number of officers in the cadre. These officers, recruited on the basis of the results of 1600-mark examination for the third time in a row, were 'the 1982 batch'.

A significant phenomenon in respect of recruitment to the civil service since the 1980s was the huge number of candidates. Ali (2002) presents the picture on the basis of data, incomplete though, available with BPSC. There was a sharp rise in the interest to join different cadres of BCS. Growing numbers of graduates and absence of sufficient alternative avenues of employment made the situation like that. Table 4.08 contains the information.

Table 4.08. Ratio of Posts and Candidates of BCS Cadres since 1980s

Period	Average no. of Posts		Average no. of Candidates		Posts-Candidates Ratio	
	Total	General Cadres	Total	General Cadres	Total	General Cadres
1982-1990	1,953	367	25,924	25,454	1:13	1:69
1991-1995	1,503	249	38,471	43,424	1:26	1:174
1996-2000	1,829	406	83,721	74,190	1:46	1:183

Source: Adapted from A. M. M. Shawkat Ali (2002:196).

Here, 'general cadres' denote those cadres in which recruitment does not necessitate specialized education. In this respect, Sinha (1985:33-34) categorizes recruitment into two types – positive and negative. In the former, prospective employers approach the US universities which seldom recommend their best students for public service. Instead, they recommend them for business world who offer better and more remunerative avenues of employment. Negative recruitment is found where candidates flock in response to a newspaper advertisement or a few notices offering certain positions. Bangladesh's represents the later category. The PSC had to devise a preliminary test to handle growing number of candidates for BCS examinations.

4.4.2. The doldrums. Before the results of the first BCS examination were published, on 22 December 1982, the PSC invited applications for a special BCS examination for recruitment of 650 Magistrates to meet the urgent needs of the newly created upazila⁸ system. The martial law regime upgraded the existing thanas as upazilas and made them an important and powerful unit of local government. A mid-level BCS (Administration) cadre officer was placed there as Upazila Nirbahi Officer, or chief executive officer. A magistrate was posted there as head of the criminal judiciary at that level. Another entry-level officer of the cadre was posted in each Upazila Parishad as its Finance and Planning Officer. To man upazila criminal courts and also to cope with the demands upon creation of 41 new districts and 400-odd upazilas, a huge number of officers had to be recruited. This was made possible when, on 7 December 1982, the BCS recruitment rules were changed to allow university graduates of between 21 and 50 years of age to apply for a position. This elasticity of age limits heralded a significant departure in the

administrative history of the sub-continent, especially at peace time. Public administration was to experience a new phenomenon of inducting such a big number of officers in a service cadre at a time – that too from such a wide range of age-limits. The PSC conducted a 200-mark viva voce test and a 100-mark psychological and intelligence test in early 1983. Between April and December 1983, those 650 Magistrates got recruited and, by default, became part of the Administration cadre. It reminds a comment by a top Indian civil servant, “If there are large numbers of civil servants today, it is because of the need for a larger civil service, and also because larger numbers have become eligible to enter the civil service” (Alexander 1991:3). Although not cherished by many, the latter reason seems to have been prevailing in Bangladesh. Induction of so many officers at a time was to have a tremendous impact on the administration in terms of quality and individual promotional prospects. The amendment of the recruitment rules [Establishment Division notification no. SRO 409-L/82/ED(R-II)R-70/80(Pt.), i.e., *Appendix L*] stated that this clear deviation from regular recruitment process was only ‘for one time recruitment to the post of Magistrate’ (GOB 1996:25). However, the concomitant problems were not to be ‘for one time’, but to be faced in the public administration for long.

Examples of deviation from rules or accepted principles were not few and far between. Rule 3(2) of Bangladesh Civil Service (Administrative: Administrative) Composition and Cadre Rules 1980 (Notification no. SRO 288-L/80/Ed/SII-1/80-117, attached as *Appendix M*) specified that the BCS (Administration) cadre would consist of –

- (a) Persons who were members of the erstwhile Civil Service of Pakistan, East Pakistan Civil Service (Executive) Class I and Military Lands and Cantonment Service on or before the 25th day of March, 1971;
- (b) Persons appointed on or after the 26th day of March 1971 on the recommendation of the erstwhile Central Public Service Commission or the East Pakistan Public Service Commission, or the competent authority during the non-existence of the Commission or Commissions against posts which would have been included in the cadre of the service had any such posts not been treated as abolished after independence and whose terms and conditions are governed by the former cadre service rules and who were confirmed in a cadre post on or before the first day of January 1979; and
- (c) Persons to be appointed to the Service in accordance with these rules.

⁸ Sub-district, usually consisting of a few hundred thousand people in an average area of two-to-three hundred square kilometers.

The Schedule to the Rules specified five categories of posts in the cadre and fixed the total strength officers at 2,334.⁹ Again, the Rule 6 states:

The Service shall initially consist of the officers specified by rule 3(2) (a) and (b) and thereafter –

- (a) by direct recruitment on the recommendation of the Commission; and
- (b) by promotion from feeder posts in accordance with the provision, if any, in the recruitment rules on the recommendation of the Commission.

To turn to the principles of recruitment, the Schedule II of the BCS Recruitment Rules 1981 (*Appendix N*) stated that recruitment to the entry-level post in the Administration cadre, i.e., as Circle Officer or Magistrate or Section Officer, could be made in the following manner:

- (i) 90% by direct recruitment up to 1-1-1985, and 100% thereafter; and
- (ii) 10% by promotion from amongst the following groups in order of preference:-
 - (a) Lawyer Magistrate; and
 - (b) Election Officer, Circle Officer (Development), Thana Revenue Officer and Additional Land Acquisition Officer.

But, at least two other streams of induction were made into the Administration cadre in the 1980s without much regard for the provisions of these and other rules. The story of recruitment in and creation of the Industrial Management Service (IMS) has been discussed at some length in section 4.3.2 above. Now, on 4 November 1983, the martial law government promulgated the Industrial Management Service (Abolition, Absorption and Fixation of Seniority) Rules 1982 [*Appendix P*]. These rules allowed the government to dissolve the IMS and absorb the officers of this service so dissolved in six cadres of BCS including the Administration and Secretariat cadres. On the same day, the BCS Recruitment Rules were amended through SRO 374-L/82 (*Appendix Q*) to allow an absorption in the aforesaid six cadres of the officers of IMS in the event of the later being dissolved (GOB 1996:23). Through a notification on the same day (*Appendix R*), the Government announced the abolition of the Industrial Management Service. The Government, again on that very day, through an administrative order (*Appendix S*), absorbed 150 officers of the now-dissolved IMS into the administration cadre in the post of *Assistant Commissioner, on probation*. Another 6 officers from IMS were absorbed in the Secretariat cadre too. But the schedules in which the strength of respective cadres is specified were not changed. Nor were those officers declared *surplus* before such absorption, as required under relevant laws.

⁹ The strength is now re-fixed at 4,222 although there hasn't yet been any notification in this regard.

Another debatable induction into the cadre was made in a period between 1982 and 1984, when 50 Election Officers and 334 Circle Officers Class II of erstwhile East Pakistan Civil Service (Executive) were encadred as Assistant Commissioner in the Administration cadre. As is just seen above, the Circle Officer's and the Election Officer's posts had been declared as feeder posts for promotion as Assistant Commissioner. This provision for promotion was to remain valid till the end of 1985. However, this type of promotion was restricted to the 10 percent of the vacancies that existed at a given time. During the time when those Circle Officers were promoted, the number of posts vacant in the cadre stood at 174. As a result, a maximum of 17 of those officers could be promoted after observing due procedures like holding an examination to be conducted by the Public Service Commission. Such an examination or even a test was never held. Under special circumstances, it was within the Government's competence to promote more officers than what was generally permissible. But, in such cases, according to the General Principles of Seniority 1970 (*Appendix T*), applicable to all services and cadres, seniority of the officers so promoted in excess of the number allowed in the quota is determined from a future date when further vacancies would allow promotion of such excess number of officers if the quota had been properly followed (GOB 1996:656). These principles were not followed at all and many officers were inducted in the Administration cadre without any sort of examination, with serious consequences for public administration and for the country as a whole. Whatever expediency such acts could have brought to the authority, such irregularities created lasting effects. Numerous cases were instituted in different courts of law including in the Supreme Court to seek redress of grievances felt by various parties inside administration. The profound tradition of a 1600-mark BCS examination was done away with, and experimentations became rampant with different modes of recruitment. It is seen that during the first post-independence recruitment, merit as a universally acceptable concept was cold-shouldered while inducting officers in the civil service, especially in Administration cadre. Recruitment of officials on the basis of their intellectual ability to perform a job and past academic accomplishments is a universal practice. Although merit principle may not be fool-proof, it is still the most rational way of recruitment (Huque 1990:115). It improves competence in administration by ensuring that the most able are selected. The job security and opportunity for upward progression related with merit recruitment enable administrators to acquire necessary skills and expertise. Moreover, there is a potential conflict between patronage and administrative competence (Horn 1995:104). But, those who mattered in the country appeared to have ignored it many a time.

In the post-independence Bangladesh, several events occurred in respect of the recruitment to the Bangladesh Civil Service, especially in its Administration cadre. Some of them are discussed at length in the previous parts. The raising of merit quota in the recruitment of officials is another important event. The Interim Recruitment Policy of 1972 was made by the first government of the country and it fixed the quota for merit at 20 percent. For the rest, i.e., 80 percent, a district quota would incorporate categories like freedom fighters (30 percent), women (10 percent) and the like. That decision was clearly an outcome of political considerations. The merit quota was raised to 40 percent in 1976, when a martial law government was ruling the country. Complex calculations had to be made for the rest of the vacancies for distribution among different quota reservations like for freedom fighters, women affected by war or women in general, tribal people, orphans, etc. under an umbrella of district quota. In 1985, when the country was being ruled under another martial law government, the merit quota was further raised to 45 percent. As years went by, the Public Service Commission had been impatiently pressing for a decision regarding the adjustment of the quota reserved for freedom fighters, because candidates of that category were no more available for recruitment. Scholars and practitioners suggested the complete abolition, or reduction to a minimum, of all quota reservations and allowing merit to apply for the sake of efficiency. It is found that while recruiting 353 officials in a lot, the 1134th and 3205th candidates on the merit list had been given the job, while the 290th on the same list was excluded. Similar other aberrations were committed owing to the operation of different quota reservations. The only casualty in this regard was the principle of merit (Ali 2002:226-7). After a number of years of procrastination, there came a decision in 1997. It was promulgated that thenceforth the quota reserved for freedom fighters would be reallocated to the children of freedom fighters. It is another sure and serious blow to the concept of merit. The government made still another departure from the merit principle, though at a smaller scale, in October 2003, when the Prime Minister announced that thenceforth one percent of the existing vacancies, be it in cadre posts or any other streams of government service, would be filled from among the physically disabled or retarded persons. This announcement is not yet made into a formal arrangement. But, the process of formalizing this decision of the government is currently underway. This is most likely to complicate the scenario further, with a possibility of still more erosion of the confidence in the fairness and efficiency of the civil service of the country. It may be taken for granted that the more the infusion of extraneous criteria into a system, the more the chances for systems failure and

inefficiency of the structures and personnel of such systems. The following table reflects the present position of the quota system for recruitment in various posts in the public service:

Table 4.09. Prevailing Quota Reservations for Recruitment in the Public Service

<u>Different Types of Quota Reservation</u>	<u>Percentage of Reservation</u>	
	<u>For Classes I and II</u>	<u>For Classes III and IV</u>
1. Merit quota (outside district quota)	45	--
2. Inmates of orphanage and disabled (outside district quota)	--	10
3. District Quota (on the basis of population)		
(a) Freedom fighters, or children of freedom fighters	30	30
(b) Women	10	15
(c) Tribal people	5	5
(d) Members of Ansar and VDP	--	10
(e) Remainders (ordinary candidates)	10	30
Total (1+2+3)	100	100

Source: PARC (II) 2000:148.

The prevailing system, which is quite complex and based on many factors, has an anti-merit bias. The reservation of quota for freedom fighters' children may raise a question as to whether it infringes upon the constitutional right of every citizen to an absence of discrimination on count of birth. Curiously, in respect of introduction and revision of quota system, progressive acts were made by non-political regimes. Conversely, some retrograde acts were made during the rule of political governments. The Public Administration Reforms Commission (PARC) dealt with it and many other related issues. It recommended far-flung measures too. However, while recommending raising of the merit quota by 10 percent [actually through abolition of the *remainder's* share, i.e., entry 3(e) of Table 4.09 above], it suggested for the retention of the newly introduced quota for the children of freedom fighters [PARC (II) 2000:150]. It indeed created a feeling that it made a self-contradiction by eulogizing the principle of merit and at the same time calling for retaining a provision which was potentially very antithetical to it. These contradictions are omnipresent in the political systems of developing countries like Bangladesh.

Notwithstanding the appreciation of 'merits alone' principles, there seems an eerie complacency in the attitude of people. The issue of the importance of merit principles for recruitment in the BCS (Administration) cadre was raised in the opinion survey conducted for the study. The respondents were asked two questions. First, whether they thought that there should be any determinants other than merit for recruitment in BCS (Administration) cadre. The other question was whether the respondents were aware of any irregularities occurring in the past in matters

relating to the recruitment of officers in BCS (Administration) cadre. The results prepared on the basis of the replies received for 460 respondents are in the following two tables.

Table 4.10. Desirability of Retaining Determinants other than Merit for Recruitment in BCS (Administration) Cadre

<u>Respondents</u>	<u>Always</u>	<u>Often</u>	<u>Sometimes</u>	<u>Never</u>
Admn Officers [111]	31 (27.93)	30 (27.03)	4 (03.60)	46 (41.44)
Other Officers [198]	64 (32.32)	26 (13.13)	22 (11.11)	86 (43.43)
Free-lance [151]	47 (31.13)	25 (16.56)	17 (11.26)	62 (41.06)
Total [460]	142 (30.87)	81 (17.61)	43 (09.35)	194 (42.17)

Source: Researcher's survey. Figures in parentheses indicate percentage of row totals.

About a third of all respondents favour determinants other than merit. Another 17.61 percent hold that there may be other criteria as well. The rest, i.e., 52.52 percent remained either skeptical or opposed, while 42.17 percent did not support the idea at all. In a survey based on structured questionnaires, it was impossible to hear about the other possible means for it. Virtues of merit recruitment are missed by survey respondents and decision-makers. It is the meritorious that reap the benefits of training, a major investment in administration and a prerequisite for efficiency. Next, the expenditure on grooming officers is like insurance for government, which has a high stake at the officers' good behaviour. It has a most favourable return for the meritorious. Lastly, merit reduces the risks of partisan influence and strengthens the officers' incentives to concentrate on faithful and efficient execution of laws or policies (Horn 1995:112). The culture of persuasion may be a cause for only a feeble rejection of any other criteria except merit. The next table shows that people find not many instances of irregularities in recruitment.

Table 4.11. Perceived Irregularities in Recruitment in BCS (Administration) Cadre

<u>Respondents</u>	<u>Always</u>	<u>Often</u>	<u>Sometimes</u>	<u>Never</u>
Admn Officers [111]	23 (20.72)	24 (21.62)	31 (27.93)	33 (29.73)
Other Officers [198]	54 (27.27)	67 (33.84)	57 (28.79)	20 (10.10)
Free-lance [151]	50 (33.11)	38 (25.17)	38 (25.17)	25 (16.56)
Total [460]	127 (27.61)	129 (28.04)	126 (27.39)	78 (16.96)

Source: Researcher's survey. Figures in parentheses indicate percentage of row totals.

To more than one-fourth respondents, there are always some irregularities. A total of 55.65% find some irregularities. The history of the covenanted civil service speaks of the interference of upper strata gentlemen and nobles, the most difficult obstacle to the evolution of an efficient and impartial officialdom in India (Misra 1980:72). Despite an improvement, still there are instances of allegations of corruption in recruitment in BCS (Administration) posts.¹⁰

¹⁰ The researcher is personally confided by an insider that the holder of the highest position in the country's recruitment institution was denied a farewell reception for his alleged complicity in the recruitment of 38 candidates in BCS. Those candidates were said to have enjoyed the blessings of the ruling elite.

At this point, the pattern of recruitment in the cadre may be looked at. Table 4.12 reflects the administration cadre's periodical intakes in the years since independence.

Table 4.12. Recruitment in Administrative Service/Cadre since 1972.

<u>Year</u>	<u>Description</u>	<u>Number</u>	<u>Remarks</u>
1972	Promotion of COs (former EPCS Class II)	29	Circle Officers
1973	Direct recruitment of freedom fighters	259	
1974	Direct recruitment on EPSS Exam 1970	30	Provincial Superior Service
1975	Promotion of COs (former EPCS Class II)	13	
1976	Promotion of COs (former EPCS Class II)	180	
1976	Direct recruitment on CSS Exam 1970	5	Former CSP
1977	Direct recruitment of non-freedom fighters	105	Covers 45 in Secretariat
1977	Absorption from different bodies	16	
1978	Promotion of COs (former EPCS Class II)	57	
1979	Direct recruitment on Superior Posts Exam	75	Covers 50 in Secretariat
1981	Promotion of COs (former EPCS Class II)	74	
1981	Direct recruitment on Superior Posts Exam	77	Covers 17 in Secretariat
1982	Promotion of COs (former EPCS Class II)	142	
1982	Promotion of Election Officers	50	
1982	Absorption from IMS	156	Covers 6 in Secretariat
1983	Direct recruitment on first BCS Exam	167	Covers 72 in Secretariat
1983	Promotion of COs (former EPCS Class II)	20	
1983	Direct recruitment on Special BCS Exam	562	
1984	Promotion of COs (former EPCS Class II)	190	
1986	Direct recruitment on BCS Exam 1984	463	Covers 13 in Secretariat
1988	Direct recruitment on BCS Exam 1985	584	Covers 44 in Secretariat
1989	Direct recruitment on BCS Exam 1986	232	Covers 35 in Secretariat
1991	Direct recruitment on BCS Exam 1989	125	Covers 71 in Secretariat
1991	Direct recruitment on BCS Exam 1990	191	Covers 36 in Secretariat
1993	Direct recruitment on BCS Exam 1991	218	
1994	Direct recruitment on BCS Exam 1992	234	
1995	Direct recruitment on BCS Exam 1993	125	
1998	Direct recruitment on BCS Exam 1996	76	
1999	Direct recruitment on BCS Exam 1997	100	
2001	Direct recruitment on BCS Exam 1999	297	
2003	Direct recruitment on BCS Exam 2000	192	April
2003	Direct recruitment on BCS Exam 2000	285	November

Source: Junior Appointment (JA-I) Section of the Ministry of Establishment.

It is generally held that numbers and qualities do not always go hand in hand. In fact, the inter-relation between these two important factors is regarded as the main contradiction in public administration (Braibant 1996:170). However, while recruiting officers in BCS (Administration) cadre, time and again, this universal dichotomy appears to have been cold-shouldered. The tradition of recruiting *limited* number of officers on the basis of a wide and standard examination, established through the 1979 batch and reinforced during the recruitment of the

1981 batch, was somehow maintained while recruiting the 1982 batch. But, this was broken very soon. The Special BCS examination of 1983 for the recruitment of 650 Magistrates was the pace setter. The volume of intakes from 1986 onwards was to the tune of hundreds, not scores as it used to be for a few years from 1979 to 1982, not to speak of the handful of officers recruited in Pakistan days. It is true, the newly independent and a densely populated country like Bangladesh may have a necessity of recruiting a big number of educated young men and women for political or economic reasons. This has become all the more expedient due to the rapid spread of universities and burgeoning number of university graduates. An absence of a strong private sector may require such phenomenon to continue for a while more. However, that should be taken in a way so as not to compromise with the need for inducting qualified and competent candidates. Developing countries have to ensure the quality of their civil servants because of their very multidimensional development needs.

Bringing about changes in the format of the BCS examination was another important event. A preliminary test was introduced in 1989, mainly to reduce the number of candidates for the main written examination. Through this means, the huge number of applicants is now being drastically reduced. This was in response to a huge increase in the number of educated young people and consequent increases in the number of applicants for the BCS examinations. This screening method helped reduce the number of total competing candidates by as much as 30 to 70 percent (Ali 2002:130), through an objective manner. It has since been saving the Commission lot of time, money and other resources for the more substantial matters of selection of suitable candidates for different cadres of Bangladesh Civil Service. On 18 August 2003, for 4,594 posts in different cadres, the Commission published the list of 46,797 provisionally successful candidates out of a total of nearly 122,000 who appeared for the preliminary examination of the latest 24th BCS examination. The percentage of successful candidates in the preliminary examination was 38.36 and those who secured a minimum of 49 out of 100 marks were called in for the original examination¹¹. The Government also made changes in the volume of examination. The 1600-mark examination was transformed into a 900-mark one in the year 1984. Later on the total marks were re-fixed at 1000 marks. One other interesting episode had taken place in 1982, when women candidates were admitted for Administration cadre posts. Up to that year, choices for women candidates had been limited to a few other cadres or services

¹¹ For the 22nd and 23rd BCS, the 'pass marks' for the preliminary examinations were 65 and 69 respectively. *The Daily Prothom Alo*, 19 and 21 August 2003.

including the Secretariat, and the Audit and Accounts. On the results of the first BCS examination held in 1982, 12 women candidates were appointed as Assistant Commissioners, and thus the long overdue aspiration of women for recruitment to the administrative service became a reality. Four others were recruited at the same time as Section Officers in the Secretariat cadre and, along with their male peers in the cadre, they were all subsequently re-designated as Assistant Commissioners after the two cadres were merged into a single Administration cadre in 1992. In this context, it will be worthwhile to look at the number of recruits in the cadre and also in the service before the creation of the cadre.

Massive recruitment in a batch is not conducive to the principle of merit. If that is added with *ascriptive* or particularistic criteria like quota arrangements, the problems are compounded. The recruitment of hundreds of officers in the administrative service from freedom-fighter category in 1973 is a case in point. While recruiting in career positions, educational qualifications and grades secured in public examinations are the universal criteria of the worth of candidates. The average educational standards of officers so inducted in the administrative service in 1973, who were later on made members of BCS (Administration) cadre, from the freedom fighters, i.e., those recruited in the administrative service posts and those recruited in the IMS, absorbed in the cadre in 1982, were not very high. It appears from the academic records of 306 such officers still serving in BCS Administration cadre on 4 August 2002 that they fell far short of the standards traditionally set for such jobs.¹² For SSC, HSC, Bachelor's and Master's degrees, values of 3, 2 and 1 are put respectively for a first, second and third division in these public examinations. A third division or class is made coterminous with *pass* and *compartmental* grades. For the sake of clarity of computation and also for more rational comparative analysis, postgraduate diplomas and second Bachelor's and Master's degrees are not given any extra credit. Again, for the sake of convenience, 'BA' denotes its equivalent degrees like, e.g., B Sc, B S S and B Com. Similarly 'MA' covers M Sc, M S S and M Com etc. Then the picture is like in the following table.

Table 4.13. Educational Qualifications of BCS (Administration) Officers of 1973 Batch
Educational Qualifications of 1973 Batch Officers of BCS (Administration) Cadre

<u>BA</u>	<u>BA with Honours</u>	<u>MA</u>	<u>MA with BA Honours</u>	<u>Academic Scores</u>
113	10	106	77	Total 1925
(36.93%)	(3.27%)	(34.64%)	(25.16%)	(Average 6.29)

Source: Author's computation from data available with PACC, Dhaka.

¹² The date quoted here is not of particular relevance. The information was just collected on a typical day.

Generally speaking, candidates with a postgraduate degree are enrolled as members of the public bureaucracy, especially in its generalist part. So, for each individual officer, the maximum score can be 12 (i.e., 3 x 4), while the minimum is 4 (i.e., 1 x 4). However, simple graduates are not unwelcome in the BCS examinations. Hence, an individual score of 3 is not theoretically impossible. But, the PSC's instructions have it that if a candidate happens to secure a third division or third class in a public examination, he will have to secure a first division or first class in his career to make for this low score in the said other examination. Here in this case, the single largest majority group, i.e., 36.93 percent of the total, is composed of those who are simple pass course graduates without a post-graduate degree to their credit. More striking is the fact that 24 of them had a score of 'perfect 3' each. That means 24 of the 113 officers who were simple pass course graduates secured a third division or third class in all three of their public examinations. The next largest group (34.64%) is composed of those who got their Master's without an honours graduation. Out of these 106 officers, two had secured a third division or third class in all four of their public examinations. It can be noted that individual scores of these officers never exceeded 10, which was secured by only 10 officers – a meager 3.27 percent of the total. Of course, many of the officers of the freedom fighter batch had brilliant academic career. But, the overall scene was not worthy or encouraging. Huque (1990:17) comments correctly when he states that mediocrity is preferred over excellence as the latter may cause discomfort to the other mediocre administrators who have been accommodated in the system. Over a period of time, excellence gets exiled, quality of administration deteriorates and activities related to the recruitment of public officials are directed to the perpetuation of such or more serious irregularities. It can be compared with a corresponding position of the officers recruited in the BCS (Administration) cadre posts in different batches during a subsequent period from 1982 to 1986. The next table has the information to illustrate the point further.

Table 4.14. Educational Qualifications of BCS (Administration) Cadre Officers Recruited during 1982-86.

Period (Year)	Educational Qualifications (in percentage)				Number of Candidates Recommended
	BA	BA with Honours	MA	MA with BA Honours	
1982	9	29	4	58	100 ¹³
1983	22	10	29	39	650
1984	17	26	13	44	450
1985	11	50	6	30	550
1986	17	43	7	33	216

Source: Ali 2002:197.

The preceding two tables give very clear differences with regard to the educational standards of two streams of officers in the same cadre of Bangladesh Civil Service. In other words, the position of one stream becomes all the more evident and segregated from the average position of the whole lot of officers in the cadre. Doubts and criticism abound in any non-transparent selection process. It is alleged that the Public Service Commission was made into just a helpless pliant instrument at the hand of a powerful political coterie while recruiting the said officers in 1973. This is why many brilliant officers of this group were looked down in the aftermath of the ouster of the first regime in the mid-1970s (Mostakim 2001:52). However, this analysis by no means purports to belittle any section of public officials. Nor does it attempt to state that officers with a not-so-good academic posture perform necessarily badly in their career. This is rather an attempt to point to the lacunae in the practices adopted in the history of recruitment to the BCS (Administration) cadre. In return to the invaluable contributions to the cause of the motherland, it was not well nigh impossible to think of better or more acceptable alternatives to be awarded to these valiant sons of the nation. However, the men who mattered were favourably disposed towards what they created, of course, with a seemingly blind eye to its possible effects. In fact, a combination of two factors – sound recruitment procedure, and limited entry – may result in a better merit recruitment. The corresponding picture, as in April 2003, of the three batches of officers recruited on the basis of 1600-mark examinations from 1979 to 1982 may illustrate the point further. Table 4.15 contains the information regarding the educational qualifications of the three batches of officers recruited in the cadre through 1600-mark comprehensive examinations conducted by the Public Service Commission.

Table 4.15. Educational Qualifications of BCS (Administration) Officers Recruited through 1600-Mark Regular Examinations.

Batch	<u>Educational Qualifications of Incumbents of BCS (Administration) Cadre</u>				Total	Average Individual Score
	<u>B A</u>	<u>B A (Honours)</u>	<u>M A</u>	<u>M A with B A (Honours)</u>		
1979	-	2 (3.22%)	13 (20.97%)	47 (75.81%)	62	8.93
1981	2 (2.90%)	1 (1.45%)	6 (8.70%)	60 (86.96%)	69	9.46
1982	3 (1.95%)	8 (5.19%)	23 (14.95%)	120 (77.92%)	154	8.94

Source: Author's computation from PACC data.

The average individual academic scores for officers recruited in the 1979, 1981 and 1982 batches are 8.93, 9.46 and 8.94 respectively and these scores are all far above the individual

¹³ The figures may be looked into along with those of table 4.12.

average of 6.29 for the 1973 batch officers. Furthermore, among the 287 officers recruited through the similar pattern of examinations, none had an individual score of 4, or even 5; not to speak of a 'perfect 3'. In the last case, i.e., for the 1982 batch, subsequent recruitment of 67 officers on a supplementary recommendation of the PSC led to a substantial deterioration of the individual scores as well as batch-wise overall picture. This supplementary list recommended for recruitment in additional vacancies subsequently calculated in the Secretariat cadre posts was prepared by the Public Service Commission after their peers of the original merit list had already served more than one and a half years in their respective cadre posts on being originally recommended by the Commission. It may be recalled that the Secretariat cadre was subsequently merged with the Administration cadre in 1992. It may also be mentioned that the first BCS examination was a standard way of assessing the worth of competent candidates. Hence, it was not impossible in the beginning to have a comparatively longer list of successful candidates from such an examination. Still, one can say for sure that the longer the list of candidates prepared from a single competitive test, the higher the possibility of having a comparatively lower average individual record of performance and attainments. The information contained in Table 4.16 may press home the point that the recruitment of additional number of officers in the same 1982 batch led to a substantial lowering in the academic stature of the batch as a whole. This is a most likely consequence of creating a large group of personnel, no matter whatever category they belong to or whatever group they form. The picture may be seen here as in the following.

Table 4.16. Educational Qualifications of BCS (Administration) Officers of 1982 Batch.

Category of Lists	Educational Qualifications of Incumbents of 1982 Batch				Total	Average Individual Score
	BA	BA (Honours)	MA	MA with BA (Honours)		
Original	2 (2.20%)	4 (4.40%)	9 (9.89%)	76 (83.52%)	91	9.29
Supplementary ¹⁴	1 (1.59%)	4 (6.35%)	14 (22.22%)	44 (69.84%)	53	8.41
Overall	3 (1.95%)	8 (5.19%)	23 (14.95%)	120 (77.92%)	154	8.94

Source: Researcher's computation from data available with PACC.

That deterioration of the standards had a concomitant inverse relation with the increase of number of officers from the same lot. Simply speaking, if the volume of intake at a time is very big, the principle of merit tends to be more and more sidetracked. The BCS (Administration)

¹⁴ List made by PSC for recruitment to the Secretariat cadre after the other officers had joined their cadres.

cadre is quite ripe with this bitter experience. Largely owing to big numbers of intakes, the PSC could not act as the watchdog of merit, as highlighted by Khan (1980:83). However, this analysis has to face one caveat. Results of public examinations are not generally identical in different years. Some examinees may in some years get a wave of higher scores depending on a few extraneous factors too. For example, public examinations just after independence gave fabulously 'good' results for many. On the whole, the assessment of the merit on individual academic attainments is a workable analysis, especially since there is hardly any other better alternative analytical tool.

4.4.3. Recruitment by promotion. Promotion is at the same time a regular phenomenon of and an important incentive in a career service. It is a process for an officer's onward progression along the hierarchical ladder based on certain principles, primarily on account of seniority and merit. The jurisdictional powers of an officer are generally enhanced when he gets promoted. This process is almost everywhere found in the modern public administration. The covenanted civil service of the East India Company also had the practice of promoting their Writers as Factors, Junior Merchants, and so on. The seniority of officials was invariably looked into until 1834, when the Governor-General in Council passed a resolution stipulating that appointment to a vacant post would not be on the seniority alone and that a junior might supersede a senior in consideration of competence and qualifications. It led to the introduction of a performance evaluation system which ultimately evolved into the annual confidential reports (ACR) of officers (Ali 1993:3). The Company's substitution, in the early half of the 19th century, of seniority alone with seniority and merit simply demonstrates the perennial conflicts between seniority and competence as factors of promotion in career service. Morshed (1997:212) seems very correct when he states that seniority remains the cardinal guiding principle in the promotion system of the public administration in Bangladesh. However, the promotion procedures followed in the wake of the 21st century amply demonstrate that seniority cannot be counted on any more as the sole deciding fact. Here in this part, promotion is very briefly touched upon in so far as it relates to the BCS (Administration) cadre.

The cadre is composed of a few thousand posts of officers spread into several grades of pay and a number of jurisdictional domains, generally starting with the post of Assistant Commissioner in Grade-V. Three top-most positions are in Grade-II. In between these two, there are several other grades in which the cadre's posts are distributed. Outside the purview of the cadre, there

are government posts in which officers of all BCS cadres including those of the the Administration cadre are promoted. These are Secretary, Additional Secretary, Joint Secretary and Deputy Secretary to the government. However, BCS (Administration) cadre officers occupy a premier position in these high-level posts. Comparative postures of the officers of this cadre vis-à-vis all others as found in 1979 (prior to the creation of SSP and BCS) and 2003 are presented in the following table.

Table 4.17. Proportion of BCS (Administration) Officers in Top Government Positions

Name of Post	In 1979 (Prior to SSP and BCS)			As on 27 September 2003		
	Administration ¹⁵	All Others	Total	Administration	All Others	Total
Deputy Secretary	263 (87.67)	37 (12.33)	300	754 (83.22)	152 (16.78)	906
Joint Secretary	80 (71.43)	32 (28.57)	112	234 (82.98)	48 (17.02)	282
Addl. Secretary	16 (61.54)	10 (38.46)	26	94 (75.81)	30 (24.19)	124
Secretary	27 (64.29)	15 (35.71)	42	26 (70.27)	11 (29.73)	37
Total	386 (80.42)	94 (19.58)	480	1108 (82.13)	241 (17.87)	1349

Source: A. M. M. Shawkat Ali (1993:21-23) and author's computation from PACC data.

Figures in parentheses indicate percentage of row totals.

These are all promotion posts in the sense that these senior positions are filled by promotion from among officers of different cadres or, under rare and special circumstances, through lateral entry of officers of other services including from the armed forces¹⁶. Administration cadre officers are the preponderant group in the senior officialdom, and promotion becomes the most significant phenomenon for these officers who themselves constitute a very large cadre. Since there is very little scope for significant alternative avenues of promotion along the hierarchy of BCS (Administration) cadre, the importance of promotion in the government's top administrative positions becomes all the more evident for these officials. At the same time, it attracts lot of heats and acrimony from their colleagues in the other cadres and services, especially the functional-technical professionals who lay increasingly louder claims to a bigger share of the top posts in the public bureaucracy.

The Constitution of Bangladesh provides for the enactment of necessary laws to govern the services of the republic. It is also stipulated that in the period before making such statutory laws, the President will be exercising his authority of making rules in such matters. However, there

¹⁵ Administration cadre is drawn from several former services -- CSP, EPCS, CSS, EPSS and PMLCS.

¹⁶ Many armed forces officers were inducted into the civil administration in the 1980s amidst a growing disdain of civil officers. That phenomenon was discontinued later. However, induction of political functionaries in some of the senior positions has began, with a consternation in the civil bureaucracy.

has not been made any comprehensive law except on certain individual aspects¹⁷. In the absence of a Civil Service Act in Bangladesh, most of the service matters are governed by various rules and, in some cases, by *principles*. Recruitment and related issues are governed by rules, while promotion to the higher posts has long been governed by principles, which are a comparatively inferior type of legal instrument and which have a propensity to change every now and then. The complexity of the problem gets multiplied when, in the absence of transparency and objectivity of the procedures followed in the process of promotion to higher positions of the government, a strong criticism is leveled on the appropriateness of the procedures and on the propriety of many decisions taken in this regard. Two separate bodies had been assigned with the task of considering the cases for promotion to the top positions of public administration. A committee consisting of a number of Ministers and several senior government officials was responsible for considering cases for promotion to the post of Joint Secretary and above. Under a presidential form of government, the Vice-President was made the head of that committee in the 1980s. It was reconstituted in 1991 with a senior Minister as head of the committee in consonance with a cabinet form of government just reintroduced in the country. Another committee, headed by the Cabinet Secretary and composed with several high officers of the government, was responsible for affairs with regard to promotion to the post of Deputy Secretary. This was reconstituted in late 1991 with the State Minister for Establishment at its head. Section 6 of the notification for the formation of the SSB made it clear that cases for promotion to these senior positions would be considered on the basis of ACR and service records (regarding discipline, conduct, corruption etc) and it also categorically held that no separate examination or interview would be held for the purpose (GOB 1996:602). However, the next notification of the Ministry of Establishment on 4 December 1991 (ibid, p.609), which reconstituted the committee with a minister (i.e., a political functionary) as its head, got that provision deleted altogether. Thereafter the committee held interview of hundreds of officers and many of them got promoted in early 1992. Some officers were also promoted as Joint Secretary at the same time under the same procedure. The High Court Division of Bangladesh Supreme Court subsequently disapproved the procedure on the ground that, among others, the Public Service Commission had not been consulted before providing for the interview held on that occasion. In the event, the government changed the course and reconstituted the Superior Selection Board (SSB) and empowered it to consider cases

¹⁷ The Services (Reorganisation and Conditions) Act was enacted in 1975 to enable the government to reorganize the services of the republic and of public bodies and enterprises with the scope for variation and revocation of conditions of services. The Public Servants Retirement Act 1974 was to provide that a public servant stands retired on attaining the age of 57 years.

for promotion to Deputy Secretary and above under the provisions of laws framed from time to time. Thenceforth, an all-officer SSB has been in charge of considering relevant cases and recommending to the government for promotion of officers to the all four highest tiers of posts in the government.

The traditional method of promotion on the basis of seniority and ACR invited lot of questions largely on the ground that officers recruited in the services were on an equal footing despite the different modes of their recruitment. Morshed (1997:88) calls it a 'generation gap' in the sense that some of the officers had been recruited on the basis of a 100-mark oral test; some were inducted on the basis of a 1600-mark comprehensive examination; and still some others on 300-, 900- or 1000-mark examinations. All the acts relating to the promotion in the top echelon civil bureaucracy were done in line with the executive orders, and principles laid out for the purpose by the government, rather than according to the provisions of superior laws. It is only in 2002 when rules were framed for the purpose. However, the process of making the rules and the rules themselves were kept a closely guarded secret. As a result, scopes were created to raise criticism about alleged irregularities and flouting of the principles of fair play and justice on several occasions, with the big round of promotions in 2002 being no exception to the perennial complaints about possible wrong-doings. The following table shows some events when big numbers of officers were promoted to the top posts of the government.

Table 4.18. Promotion of BCS Officers in Large Lots to Top Government Positions

<u>Date</u>	<u>Level</u>	<u>Number</u>	<u>Remarks</u>
3 January 1985	Deputy Secretary	118	
8 February 1992	Deputy Secretary	421	In excess of number of vacancies.
15 January 2001	Deputy Secretary	237	Additional posts were created.
15 January 2001	Joint Secretary	85	
13 June 2002	Joint Secretary	170	Additional posts were calculated.
10 February 2003	Deputy Secretary	493	Additional posts were calculated.
27 August 2003	Joint Secretary	49	
27 August 2003	Additional Secretary	97	No. of sanctioned posts was 61.
15 June 2004	Joint Secretary	84	Vacancies and elevations tallied this time.

Source: Author's computation from data available with the Ministry of Establishment.

During the several years when the SSP was in operation, the Public Service Commission was not able to hold examinations as required under the law in order to test the suitability of officers due for promotion as Deputy Secretary. After the disbandment of the SSP, the government devised a precarious arrangement of reservation of senior positions from among the officers of

different cadres. More importantly, no efforts were made to make the Commission hold the examination. The void thus created was sought to be filled with the help of ad-hoc principles, not firmed-up laws or standing policy directives. These complex factors, intertwined with varying sizes of different batches of officers, pressures of various functional groups and subjective notions of successive regimes, led to frequent halt of the promotion process for quite long spells. As a result, promotions were more often than not given as periodic spurts and such acts created the impact of tremors in public administration. Notwithstanding the fact that a few instances of promotion in small numbers are not cited here, the above scenery is the reflection of an acute and chronic malaise in the public administration of Bangladesh. Promotions are *given* to large numbers of officers after pretty long gaps, when lots of subjective factors are allowed to intrude into these otherwise apolitical and purely administrative affairs. It is intriguing to note that in certain instances, the number of officers promoted was in excess of the vacancies, or even more than the total number of posts sanctioned at the level. This type of potentially destabilizing acts can hardly fit into any model of management. Instead, such acts have peculiarities intertwined with one another. Many officers get retired from their posts through the process of natural attrition with no scope for availing of a promotion due for them in the several years when the promotion process remains withheld. That is a kind of injustice for a deserving official. Secondly, when a promotion process gets underway after a long gap, some officers try to make it a bandwagon so that many could get a berth in it, lest they are left out for a considerable period. An IAS officer personally commented to the researcher that the probability of promoting 97 Additional Secretaries at a time is unthinkable in as big a country as India. In Bangladesh, promotion in lots has become a practice and the big numbers of officers so promoted find it hard to get suitable postings. So, many are placed as Officers on Special Duty (OSD), in which position they have to wait for a while before landing at suitable places. These waiting periods are varied – from a few days to several months, or even years. Third, in times when the prospects of promotion seem to be in sight, maneuverings are rampant without much regard for whatever scanty guidelines are there. Subjective factors tend to complicate the matter further and in a way lead to a parable of Gresham's law. It casts doubts on the propriety of the process itself.

As regards *principles*, promotions in the top echelon government positions in Bangladesh, to an extent, debunk the façade of an orderly public administration. Allegations of discriminations in promotion are not very rare. Different sets of principles have been followed at different times. For example, the government notified in late February 1992 that an interview would be held to

consider candidates for promotion to the posts of Deputy Secretary and Joint Secretary. Within a couple of days, the interview of hundreds of officers was held and hasty promotions were made. Interestingly enough, no interview was prescribed for promotion of officers as Additional Secretary and Secretary. It reflected discrimination and a breach of the principle of equality of opportunity. The PSC was not consulted on the matter. Several hundred officers were believed to be superseded in the process and, at the same time, quite a number of individuals were favoured with positive discrimination in the flurry of irregularities (Obaidullah 1999:16, 44). Under the intervention of the higher courts of law, the government subsequently did away with the interview system and reconstituted the SSB with the Cabinet Secretary at its head. However, questionable practices were not to end there, and in subsequent years too, such things continued to happen more or less in a similar manner even under different governments. The government, on 11 February 1998, announced the principles for promotion to the Deputy Secretary and above. It contained the provisions for promotion of officers on the basis of *satisfactory service records, seniority and merit*, and retained the general tenets of the prevailing system. On 31 July 2000, the government substituted it with another notification and introduced a relatively detailed marking system for promotion of officers¹⁸. It also incorporated a 15-mark interview for promotion as Deputy Secretary and Joint Secretary, and a 10-mark interview for Additional Secretary. No such interview was prescribed for the Secretary. However, probably sensing strong misgivings among the officers, the government almost immediately cancelled the latest notification and in a few months promoted hundreds of officers. Of late, there has been a new phenomenon of secretiveness in respect of principles on promotion. The notification canceling the July notification was never made public. The promotions in June 2002 and August 2003 were made in accordance with newly framed rules which were not made public, but which were allegedly tailor-made to suit specific interests. Newspaper reports had it that the principles had been changed several times without much care about the crucial factor of transparency¹⁹. Confusions were the natural consequences of this extremely confidential nature of public documents like the rules or principles on promotion to the top administrative positions, although those documents are supposed to be openly available on sale for a nominal price. The country's head of the civil service did not like to comment on the rationale of prohibiting the circulation of the gazette notification of the rules or principles on promotion to superior posts²⁰. The political

¹⁸ Establishment Ministry's Notification no. more/SA-1-1-2000-311 dated 31 July 2000, published in the official gazette on the same day, was unusually kept secret.

¹⁹ *The Daily Prothom Alo*, 28 and 31 August 2003. Other newspapers carried similar editorials and news.

²⁰ *The Daily Janakantha*, 1 September 2003.

considerations, if allowed to intrude, are bound to complicate the scenario – a fact duly considered in early 1990s while abandoning the involvement of political functionaries from the process of examining the cases of officers for promotion [PARC (I) 2000:36]. At the moment, suspicion is frequently aired about the possible reappearance of some elements of political factors in subjects like placement and promotion of public officials²¹.

The Bangladesh Civil Service (Administration) cadre has got its own posts spread from Grade-I in the top to Grade-IX at the bottom²². The strength of the cadre has undergone significant expansion on two occasions. The first was the creation of 45 new districts and establishment of upazila parishads as new local government units in early 1980s. The second event was the merger of two cadres – Administration and Secretariat – into a single unified Administration cadre in 1992. A bigger number of posts were created on the cadre's strength and officers of several tiers were placed at the district and upazila levels. It may be mentioned that despite the existence of provisions in the cadre's composition rules for filling several senior posts from among the officers of the cadre, those senior positions are now-a-days manned by the officers of the government, not by the cadre's listed officers. The only instance of promotion in the cadre is that in the senior scale posts, i.e., in Grade-VI. The incumbents of these senior scale posts are appointed to several positions in the service, e.g., Revenue Deputy Collector (RDC), Nezarat Deputy Collector (NDC)²³, Assistant Director of Local Government (ADLG), General Certificate Officer (GCO), Land Acquisition Officer (LAO), Senior Assistant Commissioner, and the like in the district collectorates and some similar positions in the Commissioners' offices and the Secretariat. As they attain seniority, they are posted as Upazila Nirbahi Officer (UNO) and Additional Deputy Commissioner (ADC). Even if vacancies are existent, promotion to senior scale posts is made contingent upon the passing a senior scale examination, introduced in 1988, conducted by the Public Service Commission. Officers could sit for that examination when their services are confirmed and they have completed four years of satisfactory services. Confirmation of services is made after the officer spends two years of satisfactory service and successfully undergoes all the training courses specified for the cadre officers – foundation, settlement, law and administration, and treasury trainings. There is little controversy in respect

²¹ On 2 September 2003, *The Daily Star* published a civil society comment that politicization in the recruitment, promotion and transfers lead to huge superceding and widespread corruption in the administration. *The Ittefaq*, on the same day, published another news item to the effect that the alliance of 26 cadres and services decried what they termed as manipulations and superceding competent officers.

²² The latest promotion rules of 11 June 2002 specified 3 Grade - In posts for Administration cadre.

²³ The officer responsible for common service and protocol functions.

of the promotion of administration cadre officers to the senior scale positions. However, several hundred officers got promoted at a time in the mid-1990s when the above-mentioned collectorate posts were upgraded as senior scale posts. It is believed that those several hundred posts were upgraded to satisfy a particular batch of officers and promotion of their senior colleagues had to be kept withheld for quite long so that most officers of both the batches could be promoted at a time. It created only very little murmurings in public bureaucracy largely because professionals of technical cadres or services were not affected by it.

4.4.4. Recruitment by contract. A novel phenomenon of recruiting officers in senior positions is the system of appointment by contract. This is a measure which affects Bangladesh Civil Service in general and its Administration cadre in particular. Since the officers of this cadre occupy most of the senior positions of bureaucracy, it has a tremendous bearing on the life and prospects of the cadre. The Public Servants Retirement Act of 1974 provided that a public servant stands retired on attaining the age of 57 years. However, necessity was felt for retaining some officers in service after the stipulated age to make for the problems resulting from rapid disappearance of some expert personnel. Hence, it was decided by an executive order that retired officers might be reappointed on contract in such places only where it was very hard to find experts of comparable competence and efficiency for such technical fields. The same order contained a strong caveat that in other places, i.e., where personnel of comparable competence were available, it was undesirable to liberally apply the principle of appointment by contract. Time and again, the government categorically voiced its displeasure about the flurry of such proposals for contractual reappointments and cautioned against an indiscriminate use of this principle (GOB 1996:504). Later on, the quantum of cases of reappointment in this manner was limited to 10 percent of the posts at any level. This method was generally termed as President's quota, since the decisions were taken by the President under the presidential form of government. The practice persisted even under the reintroduced cabinet form of government. Soon after assumption of powers in late 2001, the new government is unmistakably believed to have waived the limits and created a scope for contractual appointment of as many officers as they deigned. At the level of Secretary to the government the situation turned to be like that most of the incumbents were those on contract in September 2003²⁴. It has led to an inconceivable situation. As one contractual appointment at the level of Secretary effectually

blocks the onward progression of six other officers at other levels, contractual appointment in senior posts is a very unwelcome incidence for officers other than those who are so appointed and those who look for their own contractual appointment in future. Indeed, by the recurrent acts of appointment on contract the principle of retaining the services of extremely needed experts is belied now-a-days, and it has been made into a tool for doling favour for the favourites. The government of the day reportedly looked forward to dispensing with massive contractual appointment and as a means to that end they recently promoted an awfully large number of officers as Additional Secretary²⁵. However, one may throw attention to one other, though miniscule, arena of contractual appointment. The government in recent days appointed several political functionaries as executive heads of some public corporations and utilities²⁶. These acts may spectacularly reduce the scopes for promotion of officers of Bangladesh Civil Service, especially those of BCS (Administration) cadre.

Another tenet of irregular induction in the civil service is found in the recruitment of military officials in civil posts – in BCS (Administration) cadre and other cadres as well as non-cadre posts. Both serving and retired armed forces personnel have been recruited in the civil posts at different times. In course of the evolution of the administrative system of Bangladesh, a number of army officers were absorbed in 1976-77 in the police department. There was a martial law regime at that time ruling in the country. Some other similar cases of recruitment took place around the period. However, the process found an impetus during the reign of the next martial law regime installed in 1982. In the beginning of the following year the regime promulgated the Defence Services Officers (Appointment and Fixation of Seniority) Rules 1983 (*Appendix U*) to make for the ways and means to bring in further number of military officers in the civil posts. Moreover, the said rules allowed seniority in civil posts to such armed forces officer with effect from their being commissioned in their respective branches of the armed forces. The martial law government, in issuing these rules, very naturally quoted the source of its authority in the proclamation of 24 March 1982 made to clamp military rule in the country. It did not make any reference to the Article 133 of the Constitution, which empowers the president to enact laws in

²⁴ On 3 September 2003, *The Daily Star* reported that 37 out of the 47 Secretaries had been on contract. As reported in the Parliament, the four-party government had contracted in 195 officers in a two-year period till November 2003; see *The Daily Star*, 19 November.

²⁵ *The Prothom Alo*, 28 August 2003. The number of officers so promoted exceeds the sanctioned strength at that level.

²⁶ These organizations include the Road Transport Corporation, Inland Water Transport Corporation, Dhaka Water and Sewerage Authority, etc.

absence of a corresponding statute. There was indeed an ample scope for the high civil-military bureaucrats to regain some of their lost glories of the Pakistan days. In July 1982, a few months after the proclamation of martial law, the council of minister comprised 7 military officers, 3 retired civil officers and 7 technocrats. By the middle of 1985, more than a dozen retired military officers were holding the posts of Secretary, Additional Secretary or Joint Secretary. Moreover, 17 of the 36 public corporations were being headed by armed forces officers. Most of the police officers of the rank of Superintendent and above were from the former armed forces' ranks. Many other officers from the armed forces background were also serving in the overseas diplomatic missions (Hoque 2002:79). These posts did not strictly belong to the Administration cadre. But, the BCS (Administration) cadre officers had a natural reason for concern in the induction of armed forces officers in some important civil posts. Besides, their excessive advantage of seniority over their civilian peers in comparable posts, in a way, acted as a most serious bogey over the Administration cadre officers.

4.5. Concluding remarks

A theoretically appropriate civil service structure may be of little use when those who man it are found incompetent or apathetic. The so-called human-ware is the most important factor for a public administration apparatus if it has to remain true to the principles of good governance. Recruitment is vitally important for the administrative structure, since it largely determines the tone and caliber of the public services and on it rests the usefulness and relevance of the machinery of government to the society (Sapru 1985:238). There is no factual ground to hold that things are better now than ever in the field of public administration in Bangladesh. Debates abound on in the vital sphere of its recruitment. Hundreds of people have been inducted into the fold of the administrative services and particularly in the BCS (Administration) cadre after the latter was created in 1980. Putting aside the issue of promotion to the higher posts, confusions were created and debates were invited, by default, on the propriety of the modalities of these large-scale inductions. Indecision and erratic acts took place in the early years of independent Bangladesh. Political factors were given wide latitude behind many inconsiderate acts in the early years when large numbers of officials were recruited to superior administrative positions of the country's public administration and quasi-administrative posts in the numerous nationalized establishments and public enterprises. It was followed by a short period of sensibility when relatively planned activities were beginning to be sighted. The 1980s again saw the euphoria of induction into the cadre – lateral entries, promotion and direct recruitment on various methods.

The demand of the context was the prime mover and subjectivity was pretty easy to discern in the process. The recruitment process had to undergo lot of trials and errors. Innovations took place in recruitment as well as the administrative system. The cadre was made into a huge bandwagon, and it somehow became a heterogeneous administrative tool in a homogeneous country. The *merit quota* was enhanced in the process, but not to the optimum level, despite repeated recommendations of bodies like the Public Service Commission and the Public Administration Reforms Commission [PARC (I) 2000:30]. Contrarily, a controversial decision was taken regarding a large portion of recruitment being reserved for the children of freedom fighters, thereby inflicting a further blow on the principle of merit. Appointment of public officials based on their intellectual ability to perform a job and past accomplishments in academic studies is an almost universal practice. This need for recruiting efficient personnel in the public service is greater in the developing countries, where they have to perform a number of essential functions. Despite its possible limitations, recruitment on the principle of merit is still the most rational way of inducting people in public administration (Huque 1990:115). However, the rulers sat on it and officers of multifarious sources could find a place in this conglomerate, with the resultant need for containing the effects of clear under-currents of various interests. Conflicting interests surface on special occasions like at the time of the change of government and during when a promotion processes are in the offing. Promotion has not been allowed to remain purely a routine administrative affair. Rather, it is usually made into a great event, calling for maneuverings of distinct interests. All bickering and jockeying for enhanced opportunities tend to enhance a feeling of animosity and mistrust among the fellow officers. Promotion of many officers paralleled with supercession of quite a few and sudden termination of some others is likely to cause a sense of artificiality and shakiness in the mind of officers, especially at the top. A big number of contractual appointments in senior positions remain as a sore too. If orderliness, rationality, farsightedness and permanence in the sphere of recruitment, placement and promotion in public administration are restored, including in BCS (Administration) cadre, things are likely to improve. That may also lead to a more conducive administrative system geared to the challenging needs of the new century.

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5. TRAINING

5.1. Training as a tool of public administration

5.1.1. The concept. The image of government largely depends on the performance of public administration and the achievements of the government considerably depend on the conduct and effectiveness of civil servants. Ability is a prerequisite to achievement, which is possible only when this ability is built-in, motivated, schooled and properly guided towards specific objectives. Training is a process by which an individual acquires ability and is made fit to perform certain functions. It is a set of purposeful efforts aimed at human resource development, which is a crucial attribute of modern public administration. The basic objective of training in public administration is to provide professional knowledge, broader vision, appropriate management skills, correct behaviour patterns and positive problem-solving attitudes. Training is expected to boost a civil servant's efficiency and effectiveness to the highest possible level (Sapru 1985:338). On the other hand, as a purposeful institutional endeavour, training is surprisingly little understood. To many public servants, it is wastage of time, money and manpower. To others, it is a panacea, a magic answer to the problems of an inefficient administration. Actually it is neither. It is, indeed, one of several means of developing a sound and effective administrative system. However, training in civil service, particularly the higher civil service, aims at something beyond just effectiveness and efficiency of the administrative system. It carries on a vital task – maintenance of the sustainability of the process of development, a crucial factor for the developing countries keen for development but at the same time beset with multifaceted challenges. This is the reason why civil service training has to maintain its vitality, and improve its efficiency and quality to provide its own increased input in terms of better trained and more efficient administrative manpower (Alam 1990:3, 71). The objective of training is to instill a positive impact on the participant's knowledge, skill and attitude. The euphoria for good governance largely depends on the building of an appropriate mind in all shades of functionaries (Husain 2002:140). Training is an important mover of attitudes, behaviour and output of public functionaries. As a function of teaching and learning, training tries to reduce the gap between expectations and performance (Bhatnagar 1987:2). On this count, training is an important process of teaching skills to an individual, and also a crucial process of acquisition of ability for that individual, so that he may improve his performance on a particular job.

5.1.2. Types. Civil service training is a tool for increasing the value of civil servants as human capital through a process of teaching and learning. Training denotes specialized instructions for vocational purposes (Sapru 1985:338). Thus, participants of training courses can have the opportunity to improve performance in their administrative roles through the acquisition of cognitive knowledge, skills, rules, concepts and attitudes. In the sense, Alam (1990:6) speaks of three possible parties relevant with or responsible for training – the participant's organization, the participant, and the training institution. However, another important party cannot be lost sight of. That is the clientele of the administrative system itself, i.e., populace, because they are the ultimate beneficiary of the process. Again, a training programme may be designed according to the specific needs of individual organization. Hence, objectives and target groups are important determinants for categorization of training.

There may be either general or expert training, on the basis of the nature of its participants. In the former type of training, an organization's common concepts, principles, objectives, rules, practices and targets are made its main theme. These objects are required for all functionaries in an organization without much regard for their ranks and status. On the other hand, expert training is contrived for the special category of functionaries who handle special and generally technical expertise in the attainment of the organization's goals. Again, the participants may be categorized on the basis of their levels of jurisdictions. For example, training courses are arranged for officials of national, regional or local levels. Moreover, depending on the hierarchical echelons of participants, training courses may be viewed as those for higher officials, mid-level officers or lower ranks. Different kinds of training may also be organized for officials at their different stages of career. On this count, there may be *pre-service*, *induction* or *foundation*, *on-the-job* and *in-service* training. In the history of civil service, pre-service training was imparted to the nominees for the covenanted civil service of the East India Company during the 18th and early 19th centuries. Now-a-days, this type of training is rarely conducted for civil service positions. However, such a training programme was materialized for a group of civil servants during 1975-77, when the 'non-freedom fighter batch' of officials had to undergo different training components before their joining in the service in 1977. The matter was discussed in detail at section 4.3.2 above. The induction or foundation training is usually of a short duration and it is meant to instill in the new recruits job information and orient them with their new working environment. This sort of training is conducted quite often in Bangladesh; although a portion of the BCS officials are reportedly serving without undergoing it. The on-the-

job or in-service training programmes are actually carried out in a regular and ongoing fashion. This is indeed a continuous and periodically intensified process of advice. These kinds of training are often arranged for the BSC (Administration) cadre officials in their work units or in the academies. For example, training on treasury rules and procedures are a precondition for confirmation of service in the cadre. This training is conducted for the young officials in a doing-by-learning method under the supervision of a serving expert officer. Likewise, trainings of technical nature are organized for officials periodically in an officer's career. Training on survey and settlement, and on office and financial management are examples of this sort. Organizations which are more particularly interested in acquiring progressively enriched manpower often go for availing of this type of training courses for their officials. Similarly, in-service training is arranged periodically in the work organizations or specialized institutions for officials who have already established their career. Through such training, new scientific and technical developments are introduced to the participating officials (Alam 1990:7). All these varieties of training activities are useful tools for any organization or its role players in order for them to keep abreast and remain efficacious in their functions.

5.1.3. Importance. Training is essential because no matter how well qualified an individual may be at the time of entry, he lacks certain qualities which he need to acquire for efficient discharge of his duties in a specific post (Sapru 1985:353). It is particularly important for the public administration of the newly independent developing countries in the light of the increasing responsibilities imposed on their public administration by the extension of the government activities in all possible fields (Chaudhuri 1969:169). These emerging nations, at the same time, have to embark upon the difficult task of system maintenance and cope up with the ever-appearing new and new challenges of development. Keeping in view the astronomical progress achieved in the industrialized modern states, more and more tasks and challenges are thrown on the administrative systems of the developing countries since they have to launch vigorous programmes for progress in many sectors like physical infrastructure, socio-economic development and cultural upliftment. In these countries, public servants need to get and remain prepared for a smooth transition to modernity, and training of public administration remains a very propitious means towards that end. Many countries paid due attention to this aspect. But the impact of all the attention and investment on improving the capabilities of the administrative system and capacities of civil servants has been just mixed. Some countries have reaped profound results, while some others lagged behind largely because of their lack of adequate

focus on it (Rahman 2001:168). The state of training in Bangladesh reflects mixed performance, where the inhibiting factors natural for any environment are complicated further by the haphazard measures introduced in its administrative system. An attempt may be made in this place to take stock in brief of the developments that took place in the evolution of the Bangladesh Civil Service (Administration) cadre.

5.2. The British days

5.2.1. Beginning. The English merchants came to India in quest of commercial fortunes and at the outset mercantile profits seemed to be the only pronounced motive. The first young recruits to the service of the East India Company received training on commercial practices only at the Christ's Hospital (Sapru 1985:339). The lust for fortunes was the sole motive behind the advent in India by the British merchants, who were allowed to retain the control of India until the prospects for continued profiteering were met with a serious threat by the mutiny in the mid-19th century (Myrdal 1985:112). The geopolitical rivalry among the western trading nations, realities of local situations and the prospects for a lasting source of unexpected bounties led them to establish their own rule in India. After an era of ups and downs in its history of warfare with local rulers, the British merchants' intellect, sense of purpose and their military might were proved clearly superior to those of the local rulers. Largely with a view to retaining whatever they had acquired, the Company officials now sought to establish their rule in India and began building the edifice of governance, in which the newly devised covenanted civil service was an instrumental component. For many functionaries of the Company, India was an unknown place in a far-flung corner of the world. The incumbents and future recruits to its various positions had to be made acquainted with and prepared for the Indian work environment. For a long time, there was little institutional and functional infrastructure for training of the members of the covenanted service in British India. As Myrdal (1985:140) suggests, some of the servants of the company were put to learn Sanskrit and other oriental languages with a view to maintaining a more convenient rule over India through acquaintance with Indian laws and culture. The British Indian realm was in the offing and a concrete vision for this was yet to evolve. In his Minutes of 10 July 1800, Governor-General Wellesley implored his bosses in London to consider the rule of India as a "duty, policy and honour" and accept it that the Indian realm must be considered as a permanent possession. He was alive to the need for devising an effective means for training of the British officials to enable them to shoulder the stupendous task of ruling the vast expanses of India. So, he did not even wait for the clearance of his bosses in London before setting up a

college at the Fort William in Calcutta to teach the civilians humanities, general science and Indian subjects. Oriental languages were also taught. However, the Court of Directors soon got the College closed and established their own tailor-made college at Hertford and later shifted it to Haileybury.

The new college generally followed the subjects and methods of its predecessor at the Fort William. This state of affairs persisted till the middle of 1850s when, in the wake of the introduction of open competitive system, young graduates of distinguished educational institutions of Britain could vie for the coveted positions in India. By this time, the rulers became intent upon creating in India a class of interpreters who would be Indians in blood, but British in culture and habits. The Civil Service Commission, to which were devolved the powers of the Board of Control and the Court of Directors, started conducting competitive examinations for the Indian Civil Service since July 1858. The examinations were taken in two parts separated by a year's interval. For the first part, a number of subjects carrying a total of 4375 marks were offered in the examinations. There were no restrictions regarding choices of subjects for a candidate. The successful candidates took special courses in universities during the year between the two parts. The university courses put emphasis on Indian languages as well as Muslim and Hindu laws. Based on the performance in the programme, there was a system of awarding lucrative prizes (Reader 1981:12), in addition to placing the officer at an appropriate position. However, this type of short specialized training was not enough for an officer to handle the tasks reposed on him. He was equipped with a highly trained intelligence and a grasp of general principles. The real training of a civilian lay in India in the practical work in different branches and locations. Detailed training schedules were framed after a civil servant joined his new post in a district. However, it was generally held that a recruit had acquired sufficient knowledge and acumen from the educational institutions before their joining in the service. So, formal training was not greatly highlighted until around the last decades of British rule (Sapru 1985:339). After a brief attachment with a civil service senior, the new recruit officiated in various positions, tried petty cases and prepared for higher magisterial powers, wrote reports and sat for departmental examinations. At a young age the officer attained a treasure of knowledge, intelligence and confidence. The successful negotiation of 24-year old Charles Metcalfe with Ranjit Singh is a testimony (O'Malley 1931:255). Indeed, the young civil servants in British India defied the limits of expectations of any training. The service desperately needed the young men and, when it got them, they won't fail the *service*; no matter whether or howsoever they damaged the

interests of the huge number of people whom they ruled with an impressive degree of efficiency (Penner and McLean 1983:27). The process of grooming of the civil servants bore two distinct features. The first was the Oxbridge-driven insistence on education (not vocational training) with arts being given a higher rank over science and a sure notion that colonial administration was not a science. The other was the preference for a gifted amateur and a winning-with-modesty all-rounder, along with concomitant disdain for the professional. The officers learnt the art of administration by instinct and practice, not by rote. The grass-root colonial administration was a classic case of the Aristotelian precept that the best way to learn to play flute was to play the flute (Kirk-Greene 1999:510). On the whole, their training was effective in the academy and practical fields alike. Hence, the *steel-frame* of British Indian Empire gained such a prominence.

5.2.2. The exit. The local situation including India's history, culture and demography was increasingly familiar with English officers. Again, young civil service recruits became more and more fortunate to avail of the progressively enriched experiences and wisdom of their seniors, sharing with whom was a principal chapter of in-service training. Land survey and settlement was a rich field to which the English civilians contributed to a historical proportion. They very aptly carried out the geographical survey and mapping of the subcontinent by great toils and painstaking care. An urge for accomplishments and a keen sense of finesse earned them these great feats. They learnt this art largely by doing. The on-the-job learning process intermixed with a unique system of *furlough* strengthened the mind of the civilians to always rise to the occasion. Furlough was a privilege of the English top officials to enjoy several months' vacation back home when to reinvigorate their mind through interactions with fellow Britons and a leisurely way of self-assessment of their own performance. The situation remained more or less similar during the last decades of British rein. Indians were now being increasingly inducted in the services and the in-service *practical* training went on. But, the pace was broken during the 1930s, when political activities got momentum. Soon, the statecraft was entirely geared to war efforts during the War, and training as part of an administrative life was denied its due importance (Sapru 1985:340). Things moved fast after that and, in 1947, India was partitioned into two independent states – Pakistan and India. When the British left India, they also left a legacy of a generalist bureaucracy, which was a self-trained, self-confident and efficient public administration. Pakistan found in it a benign refuge, which was extremely useful in the following years when the statecraft's other actors visibly drowned under selfish bickering.

5.3. Experiences under Pakistan

5.3.1. The Civil Service Academy. The country began with its administrative system from something of a shambles. Officials of the higher ranks were very few in numbers while the lower ranks were quite many. Pakistan was to undertake so many tasks to build a new nation – a mission which needed a reorientation of its officialdom. At the same time, Pakistan had to beseech a good number of officers of other nationalities to join its services to make for the acute shortage of higher echelon manpower. In 1948, twenty-six officers were recruited to the Pakistan Administrative Service and they were given *foundation training* at the Pakistan Administrative Service Academy in Lahore. The Civil Service Academy (CSA) was established in a splendid vice-regal house in 1949 and the elitist generalist service was renamed as the Civil Service of Pakistan in the following year. The training of the civil servants was considered as a vital step in the development of an efficient public administration (Chaudhuri 1969:170). The Academy, under the charge of the Establishment Division of the President's Secretariat, was assigned with the responsibility of grooming a new band of officers in the new country. It was headed from 1951 to 1960 by a Director, Mr. Geoffrey Burgess, himself a widely respected member of the former ICS, who had served in India since 1928 and retired in 1947. He served in the UK civil service for four years before accepting an invitation to serve in his new capacity in Pakistan. As Director of the Academy, he wielded great influence in the public administration and the administrators of Pakistan. Under his guidance, the objectives of the Academy's training programme were stated as:–

- (a) Developing probationers into well-rounded individuals and developing in them the necessary qualities of the officers of a welfare state;
- (b) Imparting them basic knowledge of Law and Administration which will enable them to function as members of the district staff; and
- (c) Providing them an intellectual foundation which will enable them to fill jobs of higher responsibilities later in their career (GOEP 1965:161).

Through the Director and the objectives and training courses under his direct supervision, the tradition of the ICS were sought to be passed on to the CSP recruits (Goodnow 1969:165). The principle of welfare state was ingrained and an important place was earmarked in it for *well-rounded individuals*, i.e., generalist officials of public administration. Next, district administration was retained as the system's focal point. Lastly, civil servants were looked upon as the future leaders of administration. The Academy was expected to make these officers worthy of these ideals and objectives.

Keeping in mind its mission, the Academy launched its extensive programme for remolding the bright young university graduates into able successors to a stubborn steel frame British ICS. The formal training of the Academy included the following subjects:–

- (1) Development Economics;
- (2) Pakistan Penal Code;
- (3) Criminal Procedure Code;
- (4) Civil Procedure Code;
- (5) Evidence Act;
- (6) Jurisprudence;
- (7) Revenue Systems of East and West Pakistan;
- (8) Public Administration (two papers);
- (9) Current Affairs;
- (10) Islamiyat¹;
- (11) Required Reading;
- (12) Riding;
- (13) Objectives of National Development;
- (14) Human Relations and Mass Psychology;
- (15) Elements of Social Administration; and
- (16) Report Writing.

Besides, the new recruits to the CSP were termed as probationers, to indicate that they were still not full-fledged members of the service. The probationers had to participate in many social, cultural and sports activities and also undergo study tour programmes in different areas of the country. The Academy's training course lasted for nine months divided into three terms. Detailed schedules were spread into the morning sessions and afternoon events. While the afternoons were largely used for light activities like, e.g., sports, type-writing and reading exercises, there was a detailed programme for the morning classroom time. The following table indicates the pattern.

Table 5.01. Distribution of Morning Classroom Sessions at Civil Service Academy

<u>Sl. No.</u>	<u>Subjects Covered under Training</u>	<u>Time per Week</u>
1	Criminal and Civil Procedure Codes, Penal Code, and Evidence Act	9 hours
2	Revenue Law and Administration	4.5 hours
3	Languages	5 hours
4	Administrative and Constitutional Structure of Pakistan	3 hours
5	History, Legal System, and Islamic Philosophy	2 hours
	Total	23.5 hours

Source: Henry Frank Goodnow (1969:167).

¹ Elementary teachings of Islamic religion.

The above scheme shows the preponderance of a generalist bias for training curriculum for civil service officers who also put a great emphasis on practical aspects of land survey and settlement operations. The trainee officers used to go for an attachment with the military establishments for a little more than one month during the second term at the Academy. In the last term, which was in the midst of a hot summer, the probationers shed many of their outdoor activities and spent a big part of their time for the examination held in mid-June. The examination carried the following distribution of marks.

Table 5.02. Distribution of Marks in Final Examination for CSP Probationers at CSA.

<u>Sl. No.</u>	<u>Subjects/Fields of Evaluation</u>	<u>Marks Allotted</u>
1	Legal subjects and elementary surveying	270
2	Islamic studies, current events, and reading list (of eight select books)	120
3	Languages	60
4	Horsemanship	50
Total		500

Source: Henry Frank Goodnow (1969:168).

The Director of the Academy sent two confidential reports on each probationer to the Cabinet Secretariat in Karachi in February and June. The performance in the examination and the Director's reports were crucial for a probationer's career prospects.

While arranging for civil servants' training, the Government of Pakistan paid some attention to Assheton Committee's recommendations of 1944. The *Committee on the Training of the Civil Servants* had stated the formidable disadvantages inherent in the policy of leaving the recruit to learn his job by trial and error (Chaudhuri 1969:171). The Academy had a great impact in building an officer's mental frame. When the probationer left the Academy, he was often a changed man – rich in acquaintance with important people, exuberant with confidence, armed with adequate authority, vibrant with an urge to embark on something significant and anxious to prove worth for his new related position. The Academy developed in the young officers a sense of public service, emphasized the essential virtues of objectivity and integrity which they must possess, and put them on their guard against the dangers and temptations they were to encounter soon. A corporate spirit was generated among them and petty antagonism disappeared. By its training programme, the Academy could inject a 'national' element in the governing process of Pakistan, a country conspicuous for its multifaceted heterogeneity (Rahman 1980:147n). After the examination at CSA, the probationers started a six-month training programme in East Pakistan and stayed alternately in the Academy for Rural Development at Comilla or at various districts for practical attachment. At the end, the probationer sat in another examination of 1000

marks conducted by the Federal Public Service Commission. The results of these two examinations and those of the competitive examination on the basis of which probationers had been selected, along with the Director's evaluation, determined the future of the officers (Goodnow 1969:169). The Academy thus effectively helped emerge a band of smart civil servants. Certain other institutes like the Administrative Staff College (ASC), three National Institutes of Public Administration (NIPA) and two Academies for Rural Developments (PARAD) in the two wings of Pakistan were involved in the process. The first-named institute was responsible for senior officials while the later two trained the mid-level and entry-level officers. Probationers were required to attend one-year courses in western universities up to the year 1959, when it was discontinued. Under the formal charge of the Academy, since 1962, a probationer spent seven months in the Academy, five and a half months in Pakistan Military Academy, then returned to the Academy to pass another six months there. Moreover, agreements were made with a number of reputed educational institutions in the west, where CSP officers were sent for higher and specialized training under an executive development programme.

5.3.2. Other institutes. The Secretariat Training Institute (STI) was established in 1956 initially to impart training to ministerial staff. But, subsequently its scope was widened to organize probationary and in-service training to the Section Officers, since these new officers were inducted after 1960. The Government reposed on the curriculum as many as 19 relevant subjects ranging from the Constitution and the Rules of Business to shorthand and English grammar (GOEP 1965:166). The Government of East Pakistan arranged probationary and in-service training for probationary officers of the provincial Civil Service in the Gazetted² Officers' Training Academy (GOTA) in Dhaka. The GOTA established links with other institutions and arranged a comprehensive programme that included the following:–

(1) Theoretical training at GOTA	4 months
(2) Practical field training including visits of tahsils ³ , etc	6 weeks
(3) Training at PARAD	1.5 months
(4) Training at Police Training College including Thana ⁴ attachment	4 weeks
(5) Settlement training	3 months
(6) Field training	1 month
(7) Army training	2 months.

² Officers whose appointment, posting, leave and other important personal events are notified in official gazette, i.e., regular bulletins.

³ Tahsil is the lowest unit of spatial jurisdiction relevant with land management. Now-a-days it roughly corresponds with the jurisdiction of a Union Parishad.

⁴ Thana, a Persian term, was generally understood as a Police Station (P.S.). It was subsequently made coterminous with an administrative jurisdiction generally held in common with a number of officers belonging to various departments and agencies. It now largely corresponds with the Upazila.

According to the provisions of the East Pakistan Secretariat Service (Composition, Cadre and Recruitment) Rules 1964, the officers of the provincial Secretariat Service too were sent to GOTA for reorientation training for a period of three months. In addition, they were required to undergo a training course, which was in effect an on-the-job training, in the offices of the Deputy Commissioners of various districts (GOEP 1965:170). Little is known about the institutional arrangements for training of a small-sized Pakistan Military Lands and Cantonment Service (PMLCS). It is presumed that there was no training institute separately established or earmarked for this service. By and large, the Government of Pakistan paid adequate attention to the needs for training, which was made a condition for promotion and retention of rank in the career service (GOEP 1965:153; Panandikar 1985:146). However, the infrastructure built for training of officials was not very comprehensive and its scopes were not made equally accessible for all shades of civil servants. Occasional and sporadic efforts were made to utilize the available opportunities for internal and overseas training.

5.4. Post-independence situation

5.4.1. Initial ambivalence. Immediately after independence, the public administration of Bangladesh was in a chaotic and uncertain situation. Moreover, the political philosophy of the new nation was perceptively different from that of Pakistan. There were widespread suggestions that the materialization of the new country's goals was not possible at the hands of bureaucracy and that political cadres should take up from them. The salaried officers of public administration were even dubbed as simply unfit for the country's development needs (GOB 1973:8). It was also demanded by the leaders of ruling political party that an appropriate training programme be adopted for political cadres as well (Rahman 1980:139). The ASRC appreciated it and, mindful of the needs for proper arrangements for training of civil servants, it recommended, among other things, a revamping of the training paraphernalia geared to the realization of the new country's fundamental principles of state policy – nationalism, socialism, democracy and secularism. The Committee went far ahead and maintained that training of socialistic principles for new entrants was not enough, if the high echelon civil servants remained what they were [ASRC (I) 1973:75]. These officers were associated with policymaking and they had a great impact on the administrative system. Putting great stress on this aspect, the ASRC recommended creation of a high-powered *Review Committee* to scrutinize the impact of training imparted to the public servants and report thereon. Fate of many officers would depend on the reports of the Committee to be constituted with a Judge of the Appellate Division of the Supreme Court as its

chairman. The other members of the Committee were to be two Members of Parliament, the Chairman of the Public Service (First) Commission⁵, and an eminent person from outside the Government service. That was obviously too strong a suggestion; but at the same time it reflected the importance the Committee put on proper training of public servants. The ASRC also recommended setting up of a National Academy of Administration and an Administrative Staff College. Utilization of the facilities of NIPA and Bangladesh Academy for Rural Development (BARD) was also recommended.

The government at that time was not very receptive of the ASRC's recommendations. No tangible step was taken about the Academy. Only GOTA and NIPA, the two institutions inherited from Pakistan days, were being used for training of public servants, and that too not in a concerted manner. The first government seemed to have begun rethinking about administrative affairs. Many of the officers of former CSP were gradually reinstated and were placed in top positions. This phenomenon was largely attributed to the fact that they were among the very few administrators the country at that time had (Rahman 1980:122). However, things really started moving only after the turn of events in 1975, when series of bloody coups were followed by a spell of extra-constitutional rule participated by civil-military administrators. At this backdrop, the Bangladesh Administrative Staff College (BASC) was established in 1977 with a mandate to impart training to senior public servants holding the status of Joint Secretary and above. Policymaking and administrative leadership were the main tenets of the BASC courses. That was a time when officers of several services – combinedly called the 1979 batch – had just been recruited on the basis a 1600-mark superior posts examination, introduced for the first time in Bangladesh. The services of the republic were indeed in a state of flux at that time and the report of the first Pay and Services Commission had just been submitted to the government. The new regime seemed willing to take various measures. The Senior Services Pool (SSP) was created and a unified Bangladesh Civil Service was in the offing with various cadres underneath it. The GOTA was renamed as Civil Officers' Training Academy (COTA) to conduct foundation training courses for new officers. Till March 1984, COTA could hold four foundation courses each of four months' duration for the new entrants of various services and of various cadres of BCS after they were created in 1980.

⁵ The former Central and Provincial Public Service Commissions (PSCs) of the Pakistan time were transformed into two separate PSCs in post-independence Bangladesh. The *First* Commission was entrusted with the task relating to the gazetted officers, while the *Second* Commission dealt with the affairs relating to the non-gazetted staff. The two Commissions were merged into one Bangladesh Public Service Commission in 1977.

5.4.2. Institutional arrangements. Training of civil servants became a main focus and object for external support and assistance after World War II. In this regard, various donor countries and agencies arranged various modalities, such as the supply of outside trained staff, provision of training facilities like institutes and centres, provision for fellowships for external training, and for project-related training (Rahman 2001:68). Bangladesh was not an exception to this phenomenon. Under the auspices of a foreign-aided development project, in 1984, the four training institutions under the charge of the Ministry of Establishment were merged into a new institution – Bangladesh Public Administration Training Centre (BPATC) at Savar, the sub-urb of Dhaka. The now-defunct four institutions were the BASC, the NIPA, the COTA and the Staff Training Institutes (STIs). The BASC used to impart the regular Senior Staff Courses and other periodic courses for top officials, while the NIPA had been conducting its regular Advanced Course on Administration and Development (ACAD) and periodic other courses and workshops. The ACAD was meant for the mid-level officials of the rank of Deputy Secretary. COTA had been responsible for foundation training of new recruits to various cadres of BCS. The four STIs in four Divisions had been functioning as the training institute primarily for the non-cadre and lower officials on matters like office management, records keeping, filing, shorthand, etc. The BPATC started conducting various programmes and training courses hitherto carried out by its now-defunct constituent institutes. The foundation training course was envisaged for the new entrants of various Bangladesh Civil Service cadres with a number of objectives: (a) promotion of an *esprit de corps* among officers of the civil service, (b) an enhancement of theoretical and practical knowledge about administration, (c) familiarizing the participants with administrative conduct, norms and etiquette, (d) enhancement of the analytical and decision-making capacities, (e) habituating participants with hard physical and intellectual activities, (f) development of a well-rounded personality, and (g) imparting instructions in Bangladesh studies, development economics and public administration (Khan and Hossain 1986:12). The duration of the foundation course was initially fixed at four months and it was subsequently extended to five months. Owing to the dearth of adequate physical facilities, there were also several special courses of shorter durations meant for officials of education and health cadres arranged in different institutions other than BPATC, largely to make amend to the huge training backlog in those cadres. On the whole, activities relating to the foundation training for young entrants have been steady and regular in the BPATC. Officials of most of the cadres are now in a position to avail of this course in the first few years of their career, if not in the very first year.

Despite the establishment of a number of training institutions in the country, no separate body was left to look after the training of Administration cadre officers, especially young officers requiring specialized courses on management, administration and development. The BPATC used to impart foundation training to the new recruits. However, recruitment of soaring numbers of officer in the cadre in the 1980s left the situation in a worse situation. It became simply impossible for BPATC to ensure for all such officers a regular course of foundation training, not to speak of specialized courses, and *training backlog* became a common term in the parlance of public administration. This void was filled in 1987, when Bangladesh Civil Service (Administration) Academy was established in the Dhaka premises previously used for the now-defunct COTA. In course of time, its 50th regular Law and Administration (L&A) course was in progress in July 2004. The initial four-month duration was later extended to five months. Completion of this training is made a condition for confirmation of service of a BCS (Administration) cadre officer. It also conducted a number of special courses on law and development for the then Secretariat cadre officers and the now-absorbed former IMS officers. The Academy also conducted several advanced courses to impart training to cadre officers of several years' experience, e.g., for Additional Deputy Commissioners, Upazila Nirbahi Officers (UNOs) and similar other functionaries. Recently a number of short orientation courses have been conducted for the so-called *fit-listed* lower mid-level BCS (Administration) cadre officials tipped for UNO. The Academy conducted 136 various courses for 4,219 officers up to August 2003 (Academy 2003:18). Apart from the L&A courses and Advanced L&A courses, officers of the cadre undergo Settlement training courses in the Department of Land Records and Survey (DLRS), under the Ministry of Land. The Advanced L&A course being an irregular event, the L&A and the Settlement courses are their core courses. The Settlement training is conducted by DLRS, not under the auspices of BCS Administration Academy, unlike in Pakistan, where it was held under CSA's supervision.

The Academy's Law and Administration course is the premier training programme for the young officers of BCS Administration cadre. The course contents cover philosophies, principles, concepts, laws, interactions and practices relating to the functions of the officials of the cadre. Since its inception in October 1987, the Academy has conducted 49 such courses up to June 2004. The primary emphasis of these courses is on laws and their application. Bulk of the instructional sessions are devoted to criminal and civil procedure codes, penal code, laws on evidence, constitutional laws, land laws and various Minor Acts that may come under the

functional purview of these officers. The guidelines of the 47th L&A training course show the following scheme for the evaluation of performance of each participating officer:

1) Jurisprudence and constitution (19 sessions)	100 marks
2) Criminal procedure code (38 sessions)	100 marks
3) Practical administrative and magisterial responsibilities (40 sessions)	100 marks
4) Penal code (45 sessions)	100 marks
5) Laws on evidence (35 sessions)	100 marks
6) Land laws including reform measures (31 sessions)	100 marks
7) Land management (32 sessions)	100 marks
8) Civil laws (26 sessions)	100 marks
9) Miscellaneous laws and rules (45 sessions)	100 marks
10) Good governance and administrative ethics (40 sessions)	100 marks
11) Modern management and development administration (55 sessions)	100 marks
12) Micro-computer application (41 sessions)	100 marks
13) Communicative English (40 sessions)	100 marks
14) Project study and field attachment (165 sessions or equivalents)	100 marks
15) Foreign language: English and Arabic (41 sessions)	100 marks
16) Performance in instructional sessions	100 marks
17) Director-General's evaluation	100 marks
	Total (693 sessions) 1700 marks.

Source: BCS (Administration) Academy (2003:12).

Out of this scheme, each of the entries 1 through 14 is made into a module and the rest three are special areas for performance evaluation. A scrutiny of similar guidelines for other courses in the series reveals that there have been several significant changes in the curriculum of the training programme. For example, the 30th Law and Administration course had an evaluation of 1500 marks and under its content greater emphasis was placed on the crucial laws of magistracy. Penal Code and Criminal Procedure Code had been covered under two modules each carrying 100 marks, and land laws and land management placed under a single module. Similarly, miscellaneous laws and communicative English were covered under another one. Guidelines for the 47th course seem alive to various contemporary issues of management and good governance. In the 47th course, a total of 16 sessions have been added to those of the 45th course. This is a great improvement over the previous guidelines devised for courses conducted during the Academy's early years. However, changes in guidelines are not known to have been made on any objective procedure. They reflect different perspectives held by persons who headed the Academy or by different officials involved in the process at different times. The Government is used to giving little directives, because it is alleged that the government gives training a very low priority and even when people are trained in a particular skill they often get posted to perform unrelated duties (World Bank 1996:130).

The Settlement Training is another core course for Administration cadre officers; although some officers of a few other cadres like Police, Judicial, Forestry and Railway Engineering too undergo this course. The history and operation of land survey and records are the main thrust of this training. Its another important tenet is the practical survey work by officers under training, who themselves take part in the real life survey operation – placing of traverse points, measurement and mapping of land plots, categorization of land topography, preparation of provisional documents as records of rights, receipt and hearing of appeals, attestation of the provisional records of rights, verification of records and the final publication of the records of rights and mouza⁶ maps. Land settlement and land management engage a good number of officials of the cadre, whose primary tasks include these two vital subjects. Moreover, interests in landed property are believed to be behind many of the cases of litigation in criminal as well as civil courts and doubtful title papers on the ownership of lands cause a huge number of disputes (Arafunnesa 1990:78). Hence, the Settlement Training constitutes one main plank of the cadre officials' training package since it enlightens the participants about the intricacy of the issues relating to land which is so close to the heart of the people. In a related field, young and mid-level members of the cadre undergo another training course from another institute. The Ministry of Land has in recent years set up a new institute, Land Administration Training Centre (LATC), where land management and land reforms are made into the main thrust of a training programme for functionaries in the related field. Through these courses, new concepts and practices of the subject are introduced and the existing laws, rules and responsibilities are also reinvented for them. Various reforms introduced or envisaged in the land system of the country are propagated through these programmes. One other training programme for young officers of Administration cadre is on local government management. This is carried out in the National Institute of Local Government (NILG), a separate body under the Local Government Division of the Ministry of Local Government, Rural Development and Cooperatives. History, laws, operational issues and prospects of the local government institutions are the main subjects of training programmes executed in this institute. The young officers of the cadre also undergo a five-week orientation programme in Bangladesh Military Academy (BMA), where history, concepts and functions of the military forces become the main theme of training. BMA also deals at length with civil-military relations. Under this training, civil officers handle some small arms and take part in some simulation exercises like night-time map-reading, physical training, etc.

⁶ Revenue village.

The BPATC is the country's apex training institution and, in addition to organizing foundation training courses for officers of all cadres, it conducts two core training courses for mid-level and senior officers. The Advanced Course on Administration and Development (ACAD) and the Senior Staff Course (SSC) respectively for Deputy Secretaries and Joint Secretaries are of 75 days' duration. The express objective of ACAD is to instill strength of leadership in the mid-level managers to suit them to a changing national and global environment. The foremost objective of SSC is to acquaint the participants with the current concepts and issues of national development in order to sharpen their problem-solving and decision-making skills in the context of a rapidly changing national and global environment. In both these courses, bulk of the participants is from the Administration cadre as the members of this cadre occupy the largest share of these top posts. The scheme of evaluation along with the principal themes of curricula in these two courses may be seen from the table presented in the following.

Table 5.03. Scheme of Evaluation of the ACAD and SSC at BPATC

<u>Serial No.</u>	<u>Subjects of Evaluation</u>	<u>Marks Allotted</u>	
		<u>ACAD</u>	<u>SSC</u>
1	Public Administration	300	200
2	Development Economics	300	200
3	Skill Development Activities	200	100
4	Seminar Paper	100	100
5	Course Administration's Evaluation	100	100
	Total	1000	700

Source: Course Guidelines of BPATC.

These two courses are designed for officers of two distinct tiers of government – Deputy Secretary and Joint Secretary. But, despite the slightly dissimilar weights for the two courses, their scheme of evaluation suggests that they bear the same contents. Since the SSC is designed to inculcate administrative leadership, the evaluation of this course could have reflected it. The scenario does not fully conform to the expected curriculum based on a well-defined national awareness, understanding of the world situation, critical capability and technical skills. Such a curriculum may be evolved through a three-stage phenomenon. Firstly, administration and politics are taken as sciences, and civil servants are given broad overview of development, role of government and administration. Next, technical tools of political decision making and administration are highlighted. Lastly, the theoretical and technical knowledge gained in the previous stages is tuned to bear on the knowledge about national reality and developmental conditions (Alam 1990:148). There may be some scopes for improvement of the curricula for these courses, especially as regards their evaluation system.

5.4.3. Foreign training. Overseas training is an important part in an official's career. It enables the participants to acquaint themselves with the prevailing or emerging concepts and techniques of advanced countries. They can also have the opportunity of sharing comparative experiences of similar or comparable work environments. This is all the more important now-a-days for the increasing globalization of knowledge, ideas and practices. As seen earlier, the members of the erstwhile Civil Service of Pakistan used to get a one-year training course in a British university up to the year 1957, when the system was discontinued. But, under generous assistance programmes received for Pakistan from bilateral and multilateral development partners, the elite CSP officers continued to avail of the foreign training facilities in Europe, North America and Australia. Both academic higher study programmes and specialized diploma or short courses were offered under various executive development programmes or bilateral arrangements between Pakistan and other countries. There was a comparative lull in this respect immediately after independence of Bangladesh. But, the socialist countries soon came forward to fill the void and the government of the new country, keen on pursuing a socialistic line of development, sent a big number of officers of the then Industrial Management Service (IMS) to undergo management training in those countries. In the process, a few other officers too were sent for foreign training. However, international agencies and individual western donor countries did not take long before offering different courses to the public officials of Bangladesh. In this regard, the rules have it that an officer may avail of a foreign training course or he may be nominated by the government for such a foreign training after he successfully completes the various in-country training programmes, which are made a precondition for confirmation of his services (GOB 2003:9). For that matter, the Foundation training at BPATC and the Law and Administration training at BCS Administration Academy have to be completed before an officer's services are confirmed and only then he becomes entitled to a foreign training. However, these provisions are not always observed. There are instances when officials are allowed to undergo foreign training before they underwent some of the basic in-country training courses. Moreover, in recent years, the government has been allowing laxity in respect of foreign training courses because it is increasingly felt that exposure to new ideas and innovative techniques is crucial for any modern administrative system. It may not be out of context here to mention that a weakness in the proficiency in foreign languages has become a major challenge for public officials of Bangladesh to undergo foreign training.

5.4.4. Current state of affairs. Against the backdrop of demands for good governance, there is a great urge for acquisition of proper management capability. People love to apply techniques which they mastered well, i.e., in which they have a comparative advantage. On the other hand, they shy away from problems that require tools and techniques they do not confidently handle (Husain 2002:142). Keeping this in view, the government shows a greater interest in the subject of training in public administration. The flurry of activities and progress in the field of information technology has greatly contributed to the process. There has been an increasing conviction that training creates the opportunities not only for improved individual performance, but it also has a great potential for organizational development (Alam 1990:69). In Bangladesh, 25 institutions impart training to Class I officers, who constitute about 8 percent of the total officialdom, but from whom come almost all the top echelon decision-makers and important functionaries. But a study reveals that only 50 percent of the Class I officers get a training whatsoever in their career [PARC (I) 2000:39]. Interestingly enough, half of the officers in different cadres of the BCS have not undergone foundation training although it is made compulsory for confirmation of their service and eventual promotion. It is also found that many officials in the training institutes consider themselves as having been dumped and less than half of the trainers themselves in these institutions have undergone a Training of Trainers (TOT). There is hardly any assessment of the training needs. Similarly, an evaluation of the impact of training is also a rarity. PARC (ibid, p. 39) finds that half of the capacity of almost all training institutes in the country remains unutilized. It speaks of the state of the training institutions in particular, and the subject of training in the country in general. The newly adopted Public Administration Training Policy 2003 has enunciated profound concepts and principles of training and calls for evolving an effective training system geared to the achievement of an efficient public administration in Bangladesh (GOB 2003:2). The Policy has its objectives written in a neatly fashion. But, the crucial question remains as to how these noble goals are to be materialized in the context of the existing apathy towards such a vital subject.

In Bangladesh, more than one hundred training institutions worthy of its name are believed to be in operation in the field of management and administration, excluding the degree awarding academic institutions (Husain 2002:144). The proliferation of separate government training institutions is largely ascribed to the *ivory tower outlook* of the universities which keep aloof from the mainstream of national life even in activities related to applied disciplines like public administration and management. They rely heavily on the foreign textbooks which have hardly

any relevance with the problems and issues of their countries (Panandikar 1985:146). However, the sheer number of institutions is not the sole determinant of a successful and efficient training regimen. It requires a suitable environment to work in. Training in its turn may transform the environment, a process that requires the involvement of all or at least the most important segments in the process. But, in most cases, training activities are confined to junior and mid-level manpower, and the top level personnel generally show resistance to the idea of involving them in the process. As Panandikar (ibid, p. 145) finds, the South Asian region has a generally held opinion that trainability is linked to age and status and those who have crossed certain levels do not require to be trained. Consequently, people in the higher management tend to become increasingly obsolescent in their knowledge, understanding and perspectives, even more in their attitudes to change and adaptation. Their subordinates often find in these seniors an *active roadblock* on their way to applying their newly acquired ideas and skills. This unhappy situation is reflected in organizational imbalance and increased frustration among the juniors and it generates a sense of stagnation and administrative decay. Under the circumstance, training in Bangladesh is stated to be in a state of disequilibrium. The supply side is beset with poor infrastructure and under-prepared human resources, while the demand side too is plagued by erratic measures and a lack of perspectives. Unless the gaps in the process of formulation of training programmes are removed, there are little hopes for an effective administrative training system in Bangladesh (Khan and Hossain 1986:26). There are also inevitable worldwide tensions between politics and private economic interests on the one hand and the administrative system and civil servants on the other. However, these tensions may be fortunately less prominent in South Asian countries (Alam 1990:139). In Bangladesh, politicians were rarely found to be concerned about the routine or special types of civil service training. In fact, political functionaries in Bangladesh were almost always apathetic towards administrative issues including training matters, except probably in the wake of independence, when they showed signs of some kind of antipathy. In fact, the political leadership of Bangladesh is traditionally believed to be far from actively interested in matters of constitutional and administrative implications⁷. Alam (ibid, p.143) supports such a proper distance of training from the political and private economic interests. An extent of autonomy is expected to evolve under such circumstances, given the will and capacity of the administrative system of the country.

⁷ A leading litterateur involved with the framing of the country's Constitution and the first Education Policy gives a dismal account of the poor interest of the politically active people. See, Anisuzzaman, *Bipula Prithibi*, in *The Daily Protam Alo*, 2 July 2004.

5.5. Concluding Remarks.

5.5.1. Preparation for changing roles. An appropriate training regime suited to the rapidly changing needs of the environment could be of immense help for the administrative apparatus. This has become a necessity at the present context. But, this could not be evolved to the optimal level of satisfaction. Training is often looked down as an activity to be shunned and it is still regarded as an avocation of low priority for many professional trainers and administrators alike. Although individual trainers have commendably played the *lost roles* of the higher academic institutions (Husain 2002:145), training institutions are yet to prepare themselves to fully make good the losses and vacuums created by the deteriorating standards of education in the overall context of Bangladesh. The public servants' job is likely to change significantly in the years to come, and public administration does not afford to play blind to this inevitable phenomenon. Therefore, training of these public servants is an essential preparatory step for them to cope with the task of adopting modern knowledge and management techniques [PARC 2000(1):38]. Efforts are on, and hopefully they may reach the end to see the light of accomplishment. An efficient public administration is still possible in the country with well-conceived reforms and a better set of system and institutions for training. Almost all the reforms committees and commissions of the country in its three decades of existence have called for a vigorous stride in respect of training in public administration. The latest of the reform bodies, i.e., PARC has identified in its report (ibid) three major drawbacks: (a) lack of interest for in-service training largely owing to the absence of due incentives, (b) lack of scope for recognizing or rewarding better performers, and (c) officers' interest for foreign training in preference to in-country training largely due to monetary considerations. The government has recently adopted and published the policy on training. The outcome of such endeavours is yet to be seen. However, the state of training in Bangladesh is not different from the overall scenario prevailing in South Asian region, where formal training is often an isolated activity, not organically linked to on-the-job training, placement, rotation, effective supervision etc which go to develop government personnel (Panandikar 1985:147). It is held that many officials are not well informed of their duties and responsibilities, and also that poor accountability for their performance is attributable to insufficient training. Moreover, there seems to be no comprehensive training plan for the probationers in most of the cadres and consequently foundation training and departmental professional training are seldom integrated and coordinated. Another big obstacle to a congenial training regimen is that many senior and mid-level officers are not particularly keen on training either for themselves or for their juniors. Again, the affairs relating to foreign training are not

free from criticism. Often it is not need-based, well-defined and oriented towards career development. It is also alleged that neither merit nor seniority is often considered in selecting candidates for foreign training (Morshed 1997:95). A sense of comprehensiveness is understandably absent from the system.

5.5.2. Part of a system. Training cannot be viewed, or be allowed to remain, as an isolated activity. It is supposed to be linked to organizational problem solving, but officials often do not know how to handle difficult situations (Younis and Mostafa 2000:91). Hence, none is held accountable for decisions which are frequently taken without regard to prevailing rules and procedure. However, such decisions are often required in view of the pressing needs of the country in its quest for development. The public officials have to brace for changes which are due to take place in many tenets of their field, i.e., in their attitude, environment, rules and clientele. The sooner they are prepared to embrace these changes, the better for the country's future in terms of its public administration attaining capability of directing those changes to the advantage of the country itself. As a systemic component of the overall administrative system, training can empower public officials to face predictable challenges. It can also lead to identification of further challenges and discovery of their unique solutions too. However, one must also keep it in mind that training is not the solution of all problems. Standardized quality of recruitment is an important element for organizing an effective training programme. Training can have the desired results only when the participating officials are trainable. Again, it is pretty difficult to devise a quality training programme, especially for high-ranking officials, when the trainees form a heterogeneous group (Husain 2002:147). In Bangladesh, despite very little ethnic and demographic divergences among officials, their differences become great at times when their educational attainments, attitudes and possession of skills are taken into account. In an effort at putting a wholesome training regime in place, the country will really need to squarely grasp with some related issues including the recruitment in public administration. The other issues that deserve an urgent attention include suitable processes of performance evaluation, placement and attractive salary packages for competent administrators. Finally, in field administration, book-based classroom training is hardly of any use. As the veterans cherish to tell it, field administration is an art to acquire, rather than a science to emulate. To them, district administration is primarily a crisis management and it involves public relations, personal image building and management, etc. Field administration is essentially a matter of leadership, which

can seldom be acquired through books and lectures⁸. However, this sort of practical training at field administration through learning by doing necessitates among other things a ton of self-confidence of the incumbents, which again depends on a truly positive educational environment, a properly merit-based arrangement for recruitment to civil service and an apolitical problem-solving political system. Once these prerequisites are set, or at least approached with an amount of earnestness, the field administrators, and for that matter all well-trained and self-tutored public servants would rise to the occasion in order to accomplish the goals of their organizations.

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⁸ See A H M Mofazzal Karim, I am Governor Speaking, in *The Daily Ittefaq*, 12 and 13 August 2003. Karim, a former field administrator, retired as a top bureaucrat of the government.

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6. FUNCTIONS AND FORCES

6.1. Functions of Cadre Officers

6.1.1. Changing functions of district administration. Officials of Bangladesh Civil Service (Administration) cadre and their precursors in the preceding services have been traditionally entrusted with the responsibility of managing the general administration of countries in which they served – British India, Pakistan and Bangladesh. In the initial years when the nomenclature *civil service* was coined in the late 18th century, there were little variations in the functions of the civil servants of East India Company. Until the 1920s, when a tentative kind of representative governing system was introduced in India, the civil servants, especially top echelon bureaucrats in the central and provincial administrative set-ups, did not have to experience an element of political control over them. The first one hundred and fifty years of the British reign in India was characterized with an absolute administrative rule over the populace. During these years, civil servants were almost completely free to do whatever they considered best for areas they were placed to administer. In fact, the district was the image of the total government *writ small* and it was so instrumental that there was little reason to develop a new organization upon the exit of the British (Sharma 1990:97). In India, the concept of welfare state was not as prominent as in Europe during the time, although civil servants maintained a *mai-bap* (paternalistic) administration most often akin to a benevolent dictatorship of the District Officers (DOs), who were considered as king-pins of the *steel-frame* administrative system in India. They were in the overall charge of the districts each of which had roughly an area of 5,000 square miles and a population of two millions to three and a half millions¹. The district was the most important unit of British rule in India, and the DOs, held as the *pillars, sentinels* or *symbols of empire* (Kirk-Greene 1999:507), and the quintessence of the proverbial *steel-frame* colonial administration, were above everything and everybody else in their territories. In the eyes of the rulers and the ruled alike, the District Officer was the government and the government was the DO, whose work never lent itself to general description. Attempts at generalization of the activities are confronted sooner or later with the infinite diversification which was one of the job's chief attractions. An element of uncertainty and indefinite borders of responsibilities bestowed a novel and challenging character on this post.

¹ The number of districts was on the increase, though quite slowly. Alongside the population growth, it led to constant changes in size and population of the districts in India.

The colonial administration was too varied, too un-anticipatable, too parochial and too particular in its range of problems for it to be conveniently reduced to a theory condensed into a textbook. It was looked at an art to be developed, not a science to be applied (Kirk-Greene 1999:508). He was aware of and responsible for everything that went on in his district. He wielded huge powers and influences and there were little restraints other than the scanty legal frameworks and erratic dictates of their own sense of conscientiousness. His functions whatsoever were required to maintain the rationale of the British rule in India – law and order and revenue collection, and whatever he considered useful for consolidating the hold of the *raj*. His interest was in the survival through stability and he took upon himself the responsibility of *civilizing the poor and benighted native souls* (Wolpert 1989:208). Under the prevailing system, the *New Mughals*, i.e., District Magistrates and Collectors, incarnated in the same persons, constituted what is called the *administrative elite*. A few words are pertinent here to look into the genesis of this important institution. It involved the acceptance of the hierarchical idea, a scholastic system that creates and favours the “educated non-specialist” and a recruiting system that selects him, the acceptance of merit as the criterion of selection, and the existence of a condition that such a group possesses *the prestige of elite* (Huque 1990:137). Based on a skeleton laid by Hastings and nourished in subsequent decades by Cornwallis, Wellesley and Bentinck, the office of the District Magistrate became a position that drew attention of the government and of the young recruits to the civil service, from their respective points of view. The government wanted the incumbents of this position for getting things done on its behalf. The members of the civil service, on the other hand, coveted the office for its unique position in the whole system. About a hundred years after the British took it as a mission to rule India in the early years of the 19th century, the sermons of the Secretary of State Lord Morley to the recruits of the covenanted civil service echoed the dominant mood, “That is the mission with which we have to charge you, and it is as momentous a mission as was ever confided to any great Military Commander or Admiral of the Fleet. This mission is to place yourself in touch with *the people you have to govern*” (Anderson 1988:47). Dalhousie accepted the scheme of a unitary system of district administration in which the collectors possessed of judicial, executive and revenue powers (Sharma 1990:97). He separated the technical functions but vested the DO with a degree of controlling authority necessary for the unity of action and coordination.

In Bengal, Governor George Campbell strengthened the DM’s position in 1872 by investing in him a general controlling authority over all departments in his district and thus he became the district’s chief executive and administrator. The Royal Commission upon Decentralization

(1907-1909) recommended for recognizing the DM's position as administrative head of the district. It also suggested that he could call for information from any department which should furnish it spontaneously and his views on any matter of general concern should receive the fullest consideration (Ali 1978:5). His functions included those of police, jails, education, municipal bodies, roads, sanitation, dispensaries, local taxation and imperial revenues. 'He should be a lawyer, an accountant, a financier, and a ready-writer of state papers. He ought also to procure no mean knowledge of agriculture, political economy and engineering' (Anderson 1988:51). It is worthwhile to briefly touch upon a district officer's day-to-day routine functions during the British *raj* in India. The predominant emphases of colonial rule were periodically shifting – tax-gathering before 1914, economic development after 1935, social and political development after 1945 – but, underpinning all colonial administration was the imperative of the DO's responsibilities for maintaining law and order, without which nothing was possible (Kirk-Greene 1999:509). For many decades of 19th century, the offices of the district's civil judge and police-magistrate were, with few exceptions, held by the same individuals. Campbell successfully made him 'supreme over everyone and everything except the proceedings of the courts of justice' (Muhith 1968:8). Frederick John Shore's chronicles give a vivid account of a judge-magistrate's perplexingly huge and multifarious daily functions:

At daybreak, he undertakes a horse ride when to investigate some dispute or to inspect the construction or repairs of a road or a canal or to oversee the works of convicts. On return to his bungalow, he holds hearing of the personal accounts of and disposal of businesses received from several police officials, spies and others gathered to give some information relevant to the discharge of his duties as a system maintainer. On his way to office, he has to drive past the crowd flocked to seek an audience calling for justice – without venturing to listen to even one of them, lest they devour all his daytime on the wayside, although some of them may have spent even months in vain to submit their plight and seek a redress of their grievances, and in the process three-fourths of such applicants find no chance of redress.

Upon assuming his seat in the court, he starts hearing reports of police officers and dictating various orders. He now hears different cases of felony in which apprehended perpetrators, witnesses and stolen properties are sent in by police. Such cases are seldom heard personally and disposed on the same day they arrive, and such reports, things and persons are handed in at an adjoining room to different natives who question them, record depositions and later on send the prepared cases to the judge-magistrate who will dispose them at a convenient time. Now he hears cases prepared some days or weeks ago and

prisoners are placed and prosecutors and witnesses are pushed or dragged into the room. The judge-magistrate takes deposition and decides either to commit the cases for trial, or, if the offence is of petty nature and within his cognizance, award punishment. The accused or convicts, prosecutors and witnesses are just driven out of the court to make room for the next batches without even caring to tell that their presence was no more required. In the deafening noises, even convicts rarely have a chance to comprehend what has been awarded to him. He cannot pass even five minutes in undivided attention because some official of the civil court demands his right ear while the criminal court assistant begs the left. When an attorney beseeches an order to save his client from ruin. In reality, he hears what he prefers, but occasionally shouts, "Stop, I could not hear ..." to a clerk who reads a deposition. Meanwhile, another assistant comes and seeks advice how to reply to a letter of the Commissioner or an officer requires his signature on a two-pice bill for a witness who had come from fifty miles afar. Every few minutes, a stack of papers is brought for his signature which he mechanically puts without caring to read them, since that is simply impossible, and several notes are politely placed by clerks who know it well that he feels embarrassed to face influential people's improper requests contained in them.

The judge-magistrate also receives a number of visitors, dispose of files, make orders for several routine and maintenance works, inspect prisons and police stations, write notes and reports for superiors in capitals and divisions, send police officials to look into some disturbing reports from a fur-flung area, oversee land survey operations in an area and carry on numerous other tasks. Whenever he gets a gap time, he orders with dexterity, "Bring me a civil case"² (Penner and McLean 1983:97-100).

However, the above description is not the end. It states what and how a district officer used to do in a typical day. Books were inadequate to prepare his mind and rules often of little use. That was the *steel-frame* administration for which the framers boasted, no matter how much of propriety and justice was there. He was the chief of his domain and everybody else was sure of it. Higher authorities in central and provincial capitals would not take a decision on his jurisdiction without considering an opinion from him. With a view to evolving a system of supervision and advice, the office of the Commissioner was established in 1829. Similarly, to lessen the stupendous aerial jurisdiction, the post of Sub-Divisional Officer (SDO) was created in 1866 (Sharma 1990:97). The government was largely an administrative government, where

² He was relieved of the civil court functions in 1869, when District Judges were posted in many districts.

district officers were supervised from afar by their service superiors, and the SDOs worked under the direct supervision and control of the District Magistrates. Any sort of popular or representative edifice was lacking, and the District Officer remained the sole arbiter of people's welfare. Any extension of the government's functions would add to the list of his duties. So, when income tax was introduced, it was he who first collected it. He had to devise and run a wartime system of distribution and price control of essentials (Muhith 1968:11). He was also to decide on a dispute as to where an educational institute or a local government body should be located or where the bridgehead or a sluice gate be constructed. Under such circumstances, the notion of administration being taught as a subject was simply unrealistic and unrealized.

Only slow changes took place during the 1920s when, under the Montague-Chelmsford reforms, a Legislative Council was established and political bosses now began to question the stands of the hitherto omnipotent civil servants. In a way Indian society started becoming complex in the sense used by Bottomore (1964:359), because the administrative elite now became part – nay, an important part – of a governing elite, which is a minority that effectively rules a society. During the turn of the century, political organizations began to gain strength and the government had to reckon with their views. The District Magistrates were expected to work in cooperation with the district organizations of the parties that ran provincial governments. A small group of politicians, either in close collaboration or stiff competition with the administrative top brass, started trying to sway. However, the Simon Commission (1930) suggested that the Collector must remain “the embodiment of effective authority and head of district administration over the heads of technical departments and also the superintendent of police” (Ali 1978:5). The administrative elite in the last days of British India, and later in Pakistan, was a relatively small, well-defined, homogeneous and cohesive group involved in the exercise of administrative functions and elements of political powers. On partition, East Pakistan had 17 districts and the new country retained the façade of the colonial administrative clout. Despite an ever-heightening expectation for the supremacy of political organizations and persons, the bureaucracy could maintain its ascendancy, primarily owing to the weaknesses of political forces in Pakistan. With it was retained the pivotal position of district administration in which the district officer, in his widely known nomenclature of Deputy Commissioner (DC) since 1959, held the key. The DC remained at the same time District Magistrate and Collector. He was the eye, ear and hand of the government in the district and he administered almost all statutes and executed most of the government orders. He also coordinated the work of all the government officers in the district.

In Pakistan, the Deputy Commissioner was made the leader of all government officers in a district and he was the agency to administer all such laws and orders which had anything to do with common men. Muhith (1968:11-15) enumerates six general groups of functions in the Deputy Commissioner's office: (a) collection of revenue and administration of land laws; (b) maintenance of law and order; (c) administration of criminal justice; (d) coordination of development works; (e) fostering of local government institutions and supervision of their works; and (f) administration of laws and conditions having bearing on people's day-to-day life. This may be compared with a list of six clusters of functions duly contained in Chapman's Report of 1938: (a) general department; (b) judicial munshikhana³; (c) revenue munshikhana; (d) touzi⁴ and nezarat⁵; (e) record room; and finally (f) treasury and accounts. The Bengal Administration Enquiry Committee (Rowlands Committee) of 1944-45 listed just five groups of functions for the District Magistrates: (1) law and order, (2) collection of revenue and government dues, (3) civil supplies, (4) development, and (5) activities on behalf of any department or the district itself including of the treasury (Ali 1995:84). The post-war developments may be taken into account for a new entry, the increasingly important functions of civil supply. With the emergence of Pakistan, the orientation of governance was purportedly changed from revenue collection to the creation of a welfare state, and the District Magistrates' functions were increased manifold. In 1960, the Government of East Pakistan's Report of the Implementation Sub-Committee on Reorganization of District Administration listed nine sections and six offices under the Deputy Commissioner. The nine sections were: (1) Administration, (2) Licensing, (3) treasury and accounts, (4) judicial munshikhana, (5) basic democracies⁶, (6) development and coordination, (7) state acquisition, (8) certificate, and (9) land acquisition. The six offices were (1) Excise Office, (2) Registration Office, (3) Armed Services Board, (4) Publicity Office, (5) Civil Defense Office, and (6) Ansar⁷ Adjutant's office. After independence of Bangladesh, the Basic Democracies system was gone and, as time passed, the aforesaid offices were gradually dissected from the DC's office although the DC still holds a thin shade of advisory role on some of those offices. For example, the excise functions are now looked after by a departmental officer under the National Board of Revenue. Similarly, posts of a District Information Officer and a District Registrar have been created in the districts. Again, although the District Magistrate remains the figurehead chief of the voluntary force – the Ansar

³ Branch of the office where numbers, descriptions, accounts, developments, etc. of cases are recorded and followed.

⁴ Business accounts.

⁵ Protocol and common service.

⁶ Indirectly elected and pretty weak local government system introduced by the martial law regime.

and Village Defense Party – the authority of embodying the members of these forces is no more with him. In an age of increasing pressure for departmentalization, new and new offices have been created, with a concomitant decrease in the DC's role on corresponding fields.

The Deputy Commissioner (DC) works under the control of Cabinet Division, which coordinates the functions of all Ministries and offices of the government. The DC's functions generally fall under four categories – magistracy, land management, development coordination, and miscellaneous. As District Magistrate (DM), he is responsible for the functioning of the lower courts of his district. Criminal cases, instituted in the courts of cognizance run under his charge, get investigated upon generally by the police officials and are either disposed off outright or considered appropriate for trial by competent courts and sent to such courts – the magistrates' courts or the sessions courts, as the case may be, depending on the provisions of the laws in question – in accordance with the procedures prescribed under the law. Assisted by an Additional District Magistrate (ADM), the DM exercises control on the lower criminal judiciary and with the powers conferred on him by legal instruments including the Criminal Procedure Code (CrPC) and the Police Regulations of Bengal (PRB), he maintains some sort of influence on the enforcement and prosecution of the law and peace functions. He deploys Magistrates, police and voluntary forces and may also call in the military or paramilitary forces to deal with problems of law and order. Secondly, as Collector of a district, he collects land revenues, maintains and updates land records of individuals and public bodies and is also responsible for the upkeep of the state's landed interests. An Additional Deputy Commissioner (Revenue), and in a few districts an ADC (Land Acquisition), assist the DC in maintaining a somewhat large set-up of land management. He also looks after the affairs relating to acquisition, requisition, retention and disposal of lands meant for use by different government agencies and other corporate public bodies. He has to take measures for eviction of unauthorized occupants from public lands. He is responsible for the protection of the state's interests when these are questioned through litigation in the higher courts of law as well as the civil courts in his district. In this respect, he supervises the functions of the Government Pleaders. Next, the Deputy Commissioner in a large way coordinates the development activities carried out in the district. He is the chairman of the District Development Coordination Committee (DDCC) which discusses and decides on the overall state of development efforts of different government, autonomous and local government bodies. His involvement and opinion are sought for almost

⁷ Largest voluntary force, raised from among able-bodied people mainly for law and order duties.

every big development project and upliftment programme contemplated in a district. Various authorities require him to pass opinion regarding their local programmes and they usually put him as the head of committees responsible for implementation of such activities. He heads the district agricultural credit committee and dozens of similar other bodies. He has got an indirect but important role on the development activities of the Zila Parishad, now a non-representative body responsible for socio-cultural as well as physical development of the district. Previously he had long been the powerful head of that institution. In his functions of development coordination, he is assisted by an ADC (General and Development) and a host of other officers.

Fourthly, under the heading *miscellaneous*, the DC has a great supervisory role on the educational institutions. He and his deputies act as head on the management committees of schools and colleges. He elicits and conveys to the government information on education and educational institutions in the district. He is the chief manager in respect of literacy and mass education programmes. The DC tries to act as the patron of proper education and takes the most effective role in ensuring proper conduct of public examinations. In the larger districts, an ADC (Education) is posted to assist the DC, thus lessening the burden of the ADC (General and Development). Virtually as the government's chief protocol officer in the district, the Deputy Commissioner coordinates the tour of state and foreign dignitaries and also arranges ceremonial state functions including the observance of national days and occasions. He is also responsible for disaster management and rehabilitation of the distressed. The District Relief and Rehabilitation Officer (DRRO) works directly under his supervision. Similarly, he is in charge of the affairs relating to the elections to the Parliament and to the local bodies, for which the District Election Officer acts under his direct control. The Deputy Commissioner holds a guardian's role over the local government institutions. In this respect, he reports to the government on their activities and also acts as the delimitation officer for different local government bodies. The situation of Bangladesh in this regard is compared with that in India, where the District Magistrate holds and enjoys a premier position in almost all public affairs in his district. In some respects, the DMs in the Indian context wield far more powers. For example, in Orissa, a District Development Board and a District Development Committee are put in place. The Board is the higher body and it consists of official and non-official members including the Members of [Union] Parliament and the Members of [State] Legislative Assemblies elected from the district, and the Chairmen of the Panchayet Samities. The Committee, on the other hand, is responsible for implementation and monitoring of the programmes, and it consists of the official members only. Both these bodies are headed by the

Collector (Padhi 1990:84). The corresponding position of the Deputy Commissioner and his service fellows in Pakistan, in both formal and informal channels, declined after the reforms in the 1970s, when the scope of functions and access of District Management Group (DMG) of the Civil Service of Pakistan (CSP) were significantly reduced (Kennedy 1987:224). In Bangladesh, the Deputy Commissioner still holds and enjoys a premier position in the district where he works. However, at times, the preeminent position he holds appears precarious, an aspect which is due to be discussed in a subsequent part.

Under the heading *miscellaneous*, one can cite so many functions of the Deputy Commissioner in so many fields, a few of which may be readily mentioned in brief for an easy understanding. The District Magistrate is chairman of the District Anti-Smuggling Coordination Committee, which orchestrates the activities of different organizations like Police, Bangladesh Rifles (BDR), the NBR branches of Customs, Excise and VAT, and the Department of Narcotics Control. Again, the DC keeps himself informed of the political developments in the district and keeps the government abreast of them. As the chairman of the District Review Committee (DRC), he holds a big role in respect of the fate of people placed under detention under the provisions of deterrent laws like the Special Powers Act 1974. As the head of jail visitors he has to make a routine of mandatory visits of prisons in his jurisdiction by the designated visitors. The DM issues licenses to cinema halls, permits the display of public entertainment items, allows events of public amusements and makes inspection of such places of amusements. He also authenticates and issues declarations for newspapers, periodicals and printing presses. He issues, updates and cancels licenses for firearms and also maintains the War Book and cipher books, and supervises the security arrangements for Key-Point Installations (KPIs). He is in charge of the government treasury, stamps etc and issues licenses for vending of stamps. The functions of the Ansar and Village Defense Party (VDP) and the Fire Service and Civil Defense are guided and supervised by him. The Collector becomes the custodian of vested and abandoned properties and also looks after the properties placed under various forms of endowments like waqf, debottar⁸ and trusts. He is the repository of public documents and records, copies of which are issued under his authority. The Deputy Commissioner is appointed as Delimitation Officer for different electoral areas and also as Returning Officer for election to the Parliament and for different other elections. As chairman of the Regional Transport Authority (RTA), he looks after the matters relating to the issuance of licenses for vehicles and drivers and also those of road

⁸ Endowments for the cause of the Creator or for humanity or service to deities made by pious Muslims and Hindus.

safety, route permit, regulation of public transport, and the like. He has got the responsibility to monitor and evaluate the activities of local government bodies like Union Parishad and municipalities and report to the government. The DC is the chairman of the district's Food Procurement Committee and the Steering Committee for works undertaken with foodgrains allocation. Again, he heads the District Disaster Preparedness Committee, District Red Crescent Committee and various other bodies. On cultural, educational and social life and sports, he is head of the district's public bodies – and even many private ones too. The Deputy Commissioner also heads different bodies involved in the fields of social welfare, institutional credits and activities of non-government organizations. He is the government's chief grievance disposal officer of the district. To cite one last item, the DC has to shoulder the innumerable tasks relating to the protocol functions which defy all limits contained in books. Wherever there occurs an event which has a bearing on the public life and which demands special attention of the Government, it is most likely that the DC would be called upon to do something about it or at least have an eye on that (Ali 1995:159-167). This account is by no means exhaustive, but it may well give an impression about the multitude of activities a Deputy Commissioner usually undertakes. He has got quite a good number of deputies of various ranks, including many of his cadre colleagues, who have specific areas of responsibilities under his overall supervision.

6.1.2. Other spheres. The districts in the present-day Bangladesh are quite different in size. The older districts have been divided into a number of districts now. For example, the old district of Mymensingh has now been fragmented into six independent districts including an emaciated Mymensingh and the former district of Dhaka into another six including one retaining the same name. Bangladesh has now 64 districts with an average size of 2,250 square kilometers and roughly an average population of 2.2 million. In the 1980s, the districts were considered too large a unit for effective coordination of development campaign. In the result, a smaller local government unit was created in the then thana, and it was renamed as upazila with a pretty stronger package of powers and responsibilities. A greater devolution of powers was brought about in the new system and it improved the environment for implementation of development projects (Ali 1986:10). The government posted comparatively senior officials of various departments and placed their services under the Upazila Parishad (UZP), headed by a popularly elected Chairman and composed by the elected chairmen of Union Parishads (UPs) and Municipalities in the upazila. There were some official and nominated members too in the UZP. The government categorized its own functions as *retained* and *transferred* subjects and delegated the later to the UZP. An Upazila Nirbahi Officer (UNO), a lower mid-level officer of

the Administration cadre of BCS was posted there with both sets of functions. On the one hand, as chief executive officer and staff officer to the UZP, he was largely responsible for development activities in the upazila. Again, he looked after the transferred subjects like land management, and the magisterial and enforcement functions of the government. In the early 1990s, the post of the elected Chairman of the UZP was dispensed with and in its place a system was evolved where the meetings of the Upazila Development Coordination Committee would be presided by one or the other UP Chairman in rotation. The UNO remains the premier officer at the level and, like the Deputy Commissioner in the district, he heads the general administration and takes care of the government's interests and coordinates development activities in the upazila. The post of the Upazila Magistrate is no more there in the system. But the UNO has got certain powers conferred under the CrPC, like issuing orders restricting the convergence of crowds or dismantling of unauthorized structures. He heads numerous committees at that level and has to handle so many public issues like those handled by the Deputy Commissioner at the district level. The UNO is assisted by an Assistant Commissioner (Land), a young officer of Administration cadre with two to three years' experiences, primarily responsible for land management. The present scenario does not tally with the scene of the 1980s, when the system was introduced and allowed to run with enough vigour and the Government paid considerable attention to the success of the new institution. This is interesting to note that successive governments created a number of new upazilas after late 1992, when the post of UZP Chairman was defunct. At the moment, there are 469 upazilas in the country, albeit without a very clearly spelt direction as to whether there should be an elected Chairman with the flurry of activities reminiscent of the days in the better part of 1980s. However, the expectation of the local populace has been heightened to a large extent and directed to this unit of local government, and the Upazila Nirbahi Officers are just in a role of filling a hiatus, as if in a proxy role.

Officers of the Administration cadre are engaged in some other roles too, especially kept separated for such officers. To make a brief mention, the Board of Land Reforms, the Board of Land Appeals, the Department of Land Records and Survey (DLRS), the Zila Parishad, and the Office of the Administrator of Waqf are some examples in this regard. Almost all top positions and most mid-level executive posts of these offices are manned by BCS (Administration) cadre officers. The two Boards referred to above are responsible for resolving disputes on the titles to and ownership of land, and they function in a somewhat quasi-judicial manner. The first Board has got its divisional level officers designated as Deputy Land Reforms Commissioners (DLRC) posted in the field to examine and prepare cases to be decided on by the Board. The Additional

Commissioners of divisions too look after some of these cases and their decisions may be appealed against in the Board. The DLRS inherits a legacy of English civilians, who took painstaking efforts for surveying and mapping of India's vast tracks of land including dangerous terrains and river systems. This department is responsible for on-the-field survey and establishment of records of rights on innumerable pieces of lands in the country – belonging to private individuals, corporate bodies, and semi-public and public organizations. After lengthy periodic survey operations, the DLRS publishes mouza maps and records of rights, which are among the most important and useful documents in the Record Room maintained by the Deputy Commissioner. The DLRS maintains a zonal office for a number of districts and an officer of the rank of Deputy Secretary to the Government is posted there as Zonal Settlement Officer (ZSO), who is responsible for the administration of his zone's survey operation. The ZSO, a mid-level officer of the Administration cadre, prepares provisional records of rights after observing due procedures prescribed in relevant laws and sends them to DLRS for final publication. In this task he is assisted by one or two Charge Officers drawn from the same cadre and a good number of other junior officials. The survey and settlement operation is vitally important in Bangladesh, since possession and ownership of land is pretty close to the heart of its people. One other field where the cadre's officials play an important role is the Zila Parishad (ZP). This local body had traditionally been run under the direct control of the Deputy Commissioner until 1989, when a new short-lived law sought to reform it under the political control of an appointed Chairman. Out of the 61 plain-land districts, sitting MPs from the ruling party were appointed as Chairmen of 60 ZPs, while in the remaining one ZP, a non-MP politician was appointed (Rashid 1990:31). The ZP did not get an opportunity and time to grow into its expected shape, but it effectively segregated the institution from the direct control of the DC. The episode is discussed at section 3.6.3 above. In absence of a Chairman in the present-day ZP, a Chief Executive Officer (CEO) of the rank of Deputy Secretary runs the day-to-day functions, while the question of real control remains perplexing as there is hardly any legal cover for its institutional affairs. The CEO is assisted in his task by a Secretary, himself a lower mid-level officer of the cadre. The Minister in charge of the district and MPs elected from the district, however, have a decisive influence as to how and where the ZP funds are spent, despite the existence of a project selection committee composed of, among others, the UNOs of the district. The CEO and the Secretary very often seek informal advice from the Deputy Commissioner and his colleagues about the goings of this otherwise rich local government body. In its turn, the Office of the Administrator of Waqf is responsible for managing the vast properties given in endowment by numerous people. The Administrator and his principal deputies are drawn from the Administration cadre. From an

interview with the Administrator, it appears that out of an estimated 150,553 sizable waqf estates of different sizes, up to May 2003, as many as 19,221 were enlisted and taken under their charge. Many of these estates are big and have significant financial value, while the rest are smaller ones like numerous mosques and congregation fields having little financial worth and scattered throughout the vast expanses of the countryside.

Officers of the cadre work in various other spheres too, including in higher ranks. They closely bear the characteristics of *administrative elite* – officials at or near the top levels of civil service, recruited through open competitive examinations on the basis of merit, who, through advancement within the service, reach levels where one can play crucial role in societal system (Huque 1990:139). Some of the presently top civil servants may not necessarily have fulfilled the criterion of merit. But, otherwise, they resemble the general features of the elite. In recent decades, the expansion of the administrative arm of governments into a variety of fields has resulted in an unprecedented surge in the number of administrative agencies and personnel. Bangladesh is not an exception. For instance, in 1972, there were 21 Ministries including several new ones befitting a just-independent country. Next year, 25 Ministries and 29 Divisions were in place (Ali 1993:53, 58). The corresponding figures were 24 and 39 in 1976, 17 and 23 on the imposition of 1982 martial law, and 36 and 52 in 2001 (Maniruzzaman 1980a:210; GOB 2002:31). A new Ministry was created in 2003, following another two in 2001.⁹ There has been an increase in the number of top ranking public officials too. So is the case with officials of Administration cadre, whose strength rose from 2,334 in 1980 to 3,863 in 1988 (Ali 1995:211), and further to 4,222 in 1992, and whose position in the top echelon government positions is a testimony to it, as evident from the following table:

Table 6.01. Proportion of Administration Cadre Officers in Top Government Positions*

Rank	Number of Posts			Existing Strength			Admin's** Share of Existing Total	
	Duty	Deputation	Total	Fresh	Contract	Total		
Secretary	47	17	64	14	23	37	26	(70.27%)
Addl. Secretary	21	40	61	19	14	33	27	(81.89%)
Joint Secretary	122	215	337	335	3	338	272	(80.47%)
Deputy Secretary	264	563	827	922	-	922	802	(86.98%)
Total	454	835	1289	1290	40	1330	1127	(84.74%)

Source: Ministry of Establishment. *Figures, computed on 19 May 2003, may be compared with those at Table 4.17. ** 'Admin' stands for 'Administration cadre'.

The above figures indicate a predominance of generalist bureaucrats. In fact, such a preeminence of the officers of BCS (Administration) cadre in the country's administrative system is unique, as far as their numerical strength is concerned. The figures are comparable only with the

predominance of similar generalist officers in the then East Pakistan provincial secretariat on the eve of independence. It is already stated that the tributaries to BCS (Administration) Cadre are the several formerly all-Pakistan, central and provincial services including the CSP, EPCS, CSS, EPSS and PMLCS. Hence respective strengths of those services during the period may be construed as the corresponding combined strength of the Administration cadre. The situation of the then provincial secretariat of East Pakistan on the eve of independence was as follows:

Table 6.02. Generalist Administrators in Top Provincial Government Positions

Rank	Total	CSP	EPCS	Secretariat Service	Total's Share
Secretary and					
Addl. Secretary	17	9	6	2	100
Joint Secretary	7	2	3	2	100
Deputy Secretary	59	15	14	14	72.88
Total	83	26	23	18	80.72

Source: Adapted from Obaidullah (1999:51).

From another account, the preeminence of the present-day generalist administrators in the bureaucratic set-up is found to be more spectacular than in the Pakistan period as far as their occupancy in the central secretariat posts was concerned. The figures of the Pakistan-day situation may be reproduced in the following table for comparison.

Table 6.03. Generalist Administrators in Top Central Secretariat Positions

Rank	Total	CSP	PCS*	CSS	Total's Share
Secretary and					
Additional Secretary	19	13	1	-	73.68%
Joint Secretary	39	18	-	3	53.85%
Deputy Secretary	114	28	20	10	50.88%
Total	172	59	21	13	54.07%

Source: Adapted from Obaidullah (1999:52). PCS means [East Pakistan and West Pakistan] Provincial Civil Services.

This should, however, be analyzed carefully not to forget that it was not the numerical strength alone, but their built-in predominance in the politico-administrative system of Pakistan which made the important CSP and its cohorts so powerful. The situation as such may be explained like that elitism of the BCS (Administration) cadre has substituted for super-elitism of the then Civil Service of Pakistan and its lesser companions in combination (Obaidullah 1999:68). In the present setting, top officers of the three highest echelons as detailed in Tables 4.17 and 6.01 and some 100-odd other top officers of different corporations and various government agencies, if they do not already fall in any of those denominations, constitute the administrative elite. These top echelon positions are generally government posts and officers of different cadres may

⁹ In April 2004, the Government merged four Ministries into two.

occupy them although appropriate background, training and skills may be checked for placement in particular positions. These members of the elite, especially incumbents of first three tiers, in conjunction with political executives, make major decisions and put them to implementation. Functions of these top brass bureaucrats can hardly be spelt out in minute detail. However, they do play a significant role in the formulation of policies and making of important decisions, in addition to taking the task of implementation of the same. The relative strengths and weaknesses of career officials, including those of the top-notch, depend on their respective positions in the ruling elite.

6.2. The cadre and political forces

6.2.1. Political dominance. The office of the District Officer has undergone lot of changes in functions and stature. The size and status of its jurisdiction have been substantially reduced over the years. Largely on the skeletal and subdued structure left by Pathan and Mughal rulers in the district level, the British imperialists reintroduced the district administration in the late 18th century in a glorified fashion. It quickly became an all-purpose instrument in the hands of the rulers. It was authoritarian too, since the omnipotent civilian incumbents of administrative positions had neither the superiors nor the competing peers other than from among their own to oversee their performance. Even after the introduction of local government institutions in 1885, the District Magistrates retained their supremacy since they continued to function as Chairmen of District Boards. They experienced a serious drain on their authority as a system of accountability to the legislative councils composed of political functionaries was introduced under the reforms in the 1920s, when the DM had to leave the position of chairman to an elected official. With the growth of representative government, the DM had to work alongside the politicians, whose dislikes for him often bordered on hostility and contempt. The tendency in the last days of the Indian freedom movement was to damage his power and influence as head of the district and as the coordinating authority over all other district officers, each of whom was engaged in his own field of specialization (Rai 1965:654). The subsequent developments led to a situation which compelled the Bengal Administrative Enquiry Committee of 1944-45 (Rowlands Committee) to dub the District Magistrate as '*a comic opera police man, who could coax and cajole but had little authority to impose his will on others*' (Ali 1993:80). Hence, it can be argued that the British rulers themselves chose to impose a serious diminution in status and power on their own protégé. The corresponding rise of the political elite was both a significant cause for and effect of such a phenomenon. The first years of independent Pakistan saw very little changes, except in the central capital, where the politicians were engaged in strife and the

civilians gained importance through their role of system maintenance. Under the Basic Democracies scheme, introduced by the Martial Law regime in 1959, the District Magistrate, more prominently pronounced as Deputy Commissioner, was made Chairman of the District Council. He was also made coordinator of the multifarious development works pursued in the district. Other district level officers were made members of the Council. Similarly, the Sub-Divisional Magistrate, generally called Sub-Divisional Officer (SDO) was made Chairman of Thana Councils, in which all thana level officers were members. In Pakistan, an *administrative state* was reintroduced since the regime depended mainly on the civil and military bureaucracy, while Ministers were appointed and removed only at the will of the President. It is held that the DCs used to directly send reports and opinions even to the all-powerful President, who called the DCs and their colleagues as 'natural leaders of the people' (Nazir 1993:155). The political leadership was not very formidable, especially vis-à-vis the administrative elite in Pakistan. This was possible largely because the basic democracy was not a democracy at all and the rulers, as well as the people, were aware of it.

At the dawn of independence, the government showed disdain for administration and announced the intention for replacing the regular district administration with a Zonal Administration (ZA), composed of leaders of ruling Awami League. They soon changed their mind and instead went for restoring the authority of district administration. The Civil Administration Restoration Committee (CARC)'s recommendations were accepted and the previous administrative system was brought back. The CARC suggested that the DC be appointed as interim Chairman of the District Council, renamed as Zila Parishad (ZP), pending introduction of an all-pervasive Village Panchayet system. But, the government authorized the Members of the Constituent Assembly (MCAs) to nominate Chairmen of Thana Development Committees (TDC) and reserved the right to appoint from among the MCAs Chairmen and Members of the ZPs. Very soon, these measures were withdrawn and the DC and the SDO were appointed as Chairmen of ZPs and TDCs (Ali 1993:82). However, the political leadership was keen enough to make the administration just an instrument in its hand and working under its tutelage. The preference for political forces over bureaucracy was voiced by political bosses, often in uncanny styles. The important Planning Commission, all Members of which had been drawn from academicians, and which was headed by the Prime Minister himself, overtly called for an end to an elitist civil service and opined that political cadres replace bureaucrats, '*who had proved unfit for development needs*' (GOB 1973:8; Hasnath 1987:62). The President's

Order No. 9 of 1972 was also a case in point. It authorized the Government to remove any government servant without assigning any reason for doing so. The political elite further consolidated its hold vis-à-vis administrative functionaries in 1975. Sixty-one sub-divisions were elevated to 61 districts, and the President appointed 61 District Governors, among whom 13 were from civil service and one from the army. The rest were from Bangladesh Krishak Sramik Awami League (BAKSAL)¹⁰, the ruling party under a just-introduced one-party system (Maniruzzaman 1980:182). The District Governor was declared as 'the chief officer in charge of the general and revenue administration of the district' (Ali 1993:83). Sweeping changes were made in the Constitution to confer on the executive absolute powers including that to appoint and remove the Chief Justice and other judges. The administration's age-old tradition of neutrality was gone and public servants were allowed, or in effect cajoled, to join, BAKSAL. Political forces reigned supreme and there seemed an end to the incessant battles of nerves between a Weberian model of civil service and a dogmatic politics. These changes were short-lived as the scheme was abandoned later in the same year by a new regime installed by a military coup d'état. The administrative elite found in it an opportunity to re-occupy some of their lost grounds. In fact, some top civil servants, who had lost their job in previous years, were reinstated and even placed in strategic positions. From 1975 to 1979, the martial law government successfully enlisted the assistance of administrative elite. In such cases, public administrators almost habitually reciprocate not only because of their obedience to governments in power, *legitimate* or *illegitimate*, but also because they take it as their 'duty to continue serving the state and the public' (Huque 1990:143). Bangladesh had the same experience and the public servants provided the republic with valuable services for system maintenance.

The martial law government took a gigantic people-oriented mass mobilization and development programme. The new President's frequent meet-the-people walking trips to the countryside were unprecedented, and the field administrators were always beside him on such occasions. Some Deputy Commissioners acted as vanguards in the government's mammoth canal digging drive. Senior government officers were assigned with the responsibility of supervising the development activities carried out in the areas of their choice. A close collaboration was visible between the ruling elite and the administrative elite in their joint attempt to spearhead the nation-

¹⁰ Bangladesh Peasants and Workers Awami League, the new version of the ruling party, which abolished itself and took its extended name while forming a national party. Practically, it was the same party, albeit joined by some more people – from other parties that stood defunct forthwith, and from other walks of life, including from civil and military bureaucracy, academia and a subjugated press.

building programmes. However, there appeared an irritant in 1980, when an MP was appointed as District Development Coordinator (DDC) for each district. The DDC was accorded the status of a Deputy Minister. At the same time, the pay scale of the DC was reduced vis-à-vis some other district level officers. As a result, his role was substantially dwarfed as coordinator of development in the district (Ali 1993:84). The DDC scheme did not last long as another spell of martial law was brought about in 1982. After the Parliament was elected and the martial law withdrawn in 1986, the new government took another measure, which further diminished the status of the DC. For each district, the President designated a Minister as the 'Minister in charge' of that district. The 'charge minister', as he was popularly known, began seeing to it that the affairs of the district run according to the wishes of the ruling elite. This was covertly designed to impose a political control on the public administration at the district level. All subsequent governments followed suit on the plea that the government was to remain accountable to the Parliament for public affairs. This was more conspicuous after 1991, when the cabinet form of government was reintroduced. After installation of a new government in the wake of the October 2001 general elections, the Ministry of Home Affairs, on 27 November 2001, directed that the meetings of the District Law and Order Committee would be chaired by the charge minister. These meetings had always been presided over by the District Magistrate, who is the Chairman of the Committee. The Superintendent of Police and the Additional District Magistrate are its Vice-Chairman and Member-Secretary respectively, and their positions are kept intact under the latest arrangements. However, the government kept mum about the status of the DM in those meetings. Subsequently, the government directed the DM to send to the charge minister copies of reports on his inspections of police stations. That is also a departure from the traditions and it may undermine the position of the district administration and the police. Again, in his capacity as Collector, the DC used to function virtually independently, through his deputies in the district and thanas till the 1980s, when greater involvement of public representatives was introduced in respect of matters like settlement of *khas*¹¹ lands to the landless. The Members of Parliament (MPs) are now the most important members on the committees responsible for relevant affairs. To give a unique instance, the Government directed in 2002 that the DC would seek [and, of course, *accept*] the charge minister's advice to select land offices where to spend government funds and undertake repair works. This is a very significant development in the sense that even petty repair works too are no more a discretionary affair of this age-old institution.

¹¹ Purely owned by the government under the direct custodianship and management of the Collector.

In another aspect, the Collector's principal law officer, the Government Pleader (GP), is supposed to function under the DC's directives, to protect landed interests in various courts of law. However, GPs and Public Prosecutors (PPs), the former's peers in the criminal side, are appointed now-a-days mostly on political considerations. These law officers are often made subject of allegations of neglect of duties – both inadvertent and willful. Their political attributes may be ascribed to it and it rather speaks of the rationale for a stronger position of the DC, who previously had decisive powers, in consultation with the District and Sessions Judge, while appointing such law officers without bothering much about their political affiliation. Again, the Minister's and respective MPs' recommendations are now needed for launching any project under the Food for Work (FFW) or similar programmes. Things become particularly sensitive when concerned MPs are elected from the ticket of opposition political parties. In that case, the local administrator, i.e., the DC or the UNO finds himself in a serious dilemma. In the conflict between the established traditions of bureaucratic culture and the new democratic political culture the bureaucrats are thrown into a problem pit. The bureaucrats, most prominent among them being the DCs, are now compelled 'to play politics with politicians' (Sharma 1990:24). Most other agencies, which are generally called as development departments including the Zila Parishads¹², find the same predicament. The whole system was put to question in the Supreme Court. One MP, who happened to be a former charge minister of a district, filed a writ petition asking for declaring the so-called *district minister* system unlawful. It was alleged that the charge ministers tended to negate the views of other MPs from the district even if they were Ministers themselves. Moreover, it was maintained, the Constitution or the Rules of Business does not call for such responsibilities for ministers. The verdict is being awaited. It reflects feuds among the ruling elite, rather than any explicit objection of the administrative elite. The government subsequently made a kind of retreat. On 31 July 2003, a fresh notification mentioned that the government reposed on 58 persons the responsibilities for observation and monitoring of different activities of the government pursued in 63 different districts¹³. However, there remained further possible questions on moral, political and legal grounds and on the principles of local government management. Half of the ministers or political functionaries designated for different districts were not elected as MPs from those districts. Secondly, a number of Whips in the parliament were also included in the list. Next, a number of non-MP ministers were given the assignment. Again, several Advisors, holding the status of ministers,

¹² Literally means a consultative body. Governments have long been undecided about this local govt. body.

¹³ One district, Bogra, was excluded from the list. No explanation was cited. Besides, the government-owned electronic media seems ignorant of the change of nomenclature. *News at Ten*, 8 November 2003.

but not ministers by designation, were given the task. Last, but not the least, the list included three city corporation Mayors, two of whom were given charge for districts far away from their mayoral jurisdictions¹⁴. Besides, political supervision of administrative functions centre on several issues: a) identification of the points of contact for political and administrative processes, b) areas and aspects where political officials should take controlling decisions, c) how to protect civil servants from influence and interference from various pressure groups in the performance of their work, and d) how to ensure public accountability for administrative actions which affect individuals and groups (Rahman 2001:101). These issues are not resolved in Bangladesh, and nowhere else are they fully resolved either. In India too, there was 'no constraint on politicians on how not to pressurize a bureaucrat when law is not available' (Sharma 1990:104). In such situations, bureaucrats too play politics, and in this game of wit and wisdom nothing is moral. Opportunism and self-aggrandizement necessarily follow.¹⁵

The Ministers have now been designated as the official head of ministries or divisions. These political functionaries have a very close contact with top civil servants, i.e., the Secretaries and their senior aides. To varying extents, they contribute to the enunciation of various public policies. Once a particular policy or a programme is adopted, the task of its implementation is left to agencies responsible for relevant subjects. Here in the process of implementation too, the political officials, i.e., ministers, etc have a supervisory role in which the boundaries of political and administrative functionaries are often blurred. In the regional and local levels too, there are points where political and administrative functionaries act in close interaction with each other. Points of contact and political control are found in national and local levels. Especially at the district level, at present, the charge ministers exercise a constant influence on the activities of government officials. At the district level, and particularly at upazila level, the MPs also, more so if they belong to the ruling party, seek to exert a decisive influence on officials' discharge of duties. In addition, various parliamentary standing committees exercise control on the activities of individual ministries through periodical review of their performance. The ministers are accountable to the parliament for the performance of their respective ministries. In this way, a political and legislative control is established on the work of the country's public administration. In this respect, politicians constitute the most prominent pressure groups and they do very often

¹⁴ The Mayor of Rajshahi was made responsible for Chapai Nawabganj. The Mayor of Khulna, not an MP himself, originally assigned for Barguna, was subsequently assigned for Khulna.

¹⁵ The field administration officials are now placed in a serious predicament since they are often expected to strike a balance in favour of this or that side in the intra-party and inter-party politicking. This becomes singularly difficult when laws specifically stand against the informal but conclusive authoritative dictates from powerful quarters.

exert their influence on the public servants. These influences often tend to transgress the borders between political and administrative domains, and lead to acts which would not generally take place had the principles of fair play prevailed. Political act of influencing is mostly in the form of informal coaxing rather than a formal-legal mode of interactions. Thus, many irregular acts are perpetrated in the administrative sphere for which not the politicians, but the bureaucrats are often at blame. It results in misrule and a serious diminution of the status of civil servants in the eye of people. Clear-cut boundary lines need to be drawn so that political influence is limited to a reasonable extent. Legal safeguards against undue influence may be thought of for upright public servants, especially those officers of administration and police, who have to bear most of the brunt. However, there can be a broader frame of reference under which all public officers would be held accountable for their performance of duty and conducts. People's representatives and distinguished members of civil society may have a greater role in evolving a more formal-legal system of accountability.

The tension between political and executive functionaries is incessant and very natural in any given setting. In the British period, the balance was almost unilaterally in favour of the bureaucrats. In the United Kingdom, senior civil servants were groomed not with the learning in public administration – nor did they have particular ideas about local government or nationalized industries. Caution, conservatism and elitism were the characteristics of their time. As partners with politicians, they were indeed the 'statesmen in disguise' or 'political administrators'. But, with politicians, they had a symbiotic relationship where they maintained *separate and distinct personae*; the politician visible, committed, publicly accountable and temporary, while the civil servants anonymous, disinterested, internally accountable and permanent. The model was devised on the Indian Civil Service. The rise of the two-party system in the late Victorian period contributed to the rise of neutral and non-political administrative elite (Greenaway 1995:359). The observation stands valid for the best part of the British rule in India. The balance in Pakistan days too clearly tilted towards the civil servants, largely owing to the politicians' weaknesses. Occasionally giving a share to their counterparts in the military and few other segments of the gentry, it is the CSP officers who held sway. Compared to the overall position, however, the CSP officers did not enjoy comparable influence in East Pakistan, whose lesser representation in the services and a generally perceived lack of sympathy of West Pakistani officers for the Bangalees may have caused it. The periodic eruptions of political unrest led to strong actions from governments, and each action used to be followed by an increase in the power of the CSP. The shortcoming of politicians was very striking and the President and the Governors found

good reason to intervene and impose bureaucratic rule. 'Eventually intervention became a habit, until finally it seemed unnecessary or undesirable to interrupt bureaucratic rule' (Goodnow 1969:86, 97). An independent Bangladesh sought to handle the issue of relationships between politicians and civil servants, represented by Ministers and Secretaries respectively. Article 55(6) of the Constitution empowers the President to frame the Rules of Business, containing a set of rules which govern the relationship between Ministers and Secretaries, procedures for disposal of cases on which government's decisions are required and manners of taking such decisions (Ali 1993:117). Framed in 1975, these Rules were subsequently amended in line with the changes in the form of government. A protracted battle of arguments was waged on the positions of the Minister and the Secretary in a Ministry or Division.

Following a tradition set after the Government of India Act 1935, the Ministers were supposed to aid and advise the chief executive – be it a Governor-General, or a President, or a Governor. On the other hand, Secretaries were made executive heads on their respective charges. In independent Bangladesh, when these Rules of Business were framed for the first time in 1975, a presidential form of government was in place. Hence, there were little legal problems with that position. In Rule 4(iii) it was said about the Minister, "It shall be the duty of a Minister to aid and advise the President in the formulation of policy." To the contrary, the Secretary was described as being 'in-charge of a Division or a Ministry' [Rule 2(i)(j)], 'the official head' [Rule 4(vii)], and 'the Principal Accounting Officer' [Rule 4(viii)]. Under the Rules, he was competent to organize his Ministry and single-handedly control the administrative management. The Ministers questioned the propriety of these provisions on count of superiority of political forces and on the question of their accountability to the Parliament and the people. A slightly reframed clause [Rule 4(ix)] was introduced in 1989 which read, "The Secretary shall keep the Minister-in-charge informed of the working of the Ministry/Division and shall work under his supervision." It was not enough to settle the dispute. Several years after the cabinet form of government was reintroduced in 1991, the Rules were framed anew in 1996, although most of the provisions were retained as they had been in the 1975 Rules. However, important changes were made on the status of the Secretary, who was now made 'the administrative head of a Division or a Ministry' [Rules 2(i)(j) and 4(v)], and 'the Principal Accounting Officer of the Ministry/Division' [Rule 4(vi)]. The provision inserted in 1989 stipulating that the Secretary would keep the Minister informed of the working of the Ministry/Division was incorporated in Rule 4(v). The discord is seemingly gone, at least for the time being. However, it does not mean that inter-personal differences have disappeared altogether. Differences are natural, and to some

extent it is expected too. Conflict-resolution is a vital task of governance, and the best a government resolves conflicts, the best are its prospects for achieving development goals. If such differences are not resolved in a healthy and conducive manner, the situation is aggravated. Then the bureaucracy enters into collusion with political executives in search of power, shares the booty of development programmes, and makes itself subservient to political executives. This sort of political control is undesirable (Verma 1990:196), because the expertise of bureaucracy and experience of politicians may lead to selfish plunders and drains of resources. Hence, both the extreme possibilities – stalemate and selfish collusion cause damage to the mission of government. On the other hand, mutual disrespect and mistrust characterize the interaction in many developing countries. where politicians publicly blame the bureaucracy for government failures and bureaucrats too accuse the politicians, generally not so publicly, for misrule and partisanship, abusing political power and practicing indiscriminate corruption¹⁶. These countries need a positive framework of interaction that clarifies the roles of politicians and civil servants and motivates them to work together for a larger goal (Rahman 2001:149). Although there are very few instances of the uneasy relationships between these two sets of important functionaries, Bangladesh needs to put in place such a framework so as to structurally resolve any possible tensions prevailing therein. Political bosses are accountable to people and oath-bound under the constitution to serve and run the country¹⁷. Hence, they have to maintain a control, albeit a rational and formal-legal one.

6.3. The Cadre and other professional forces

6.3.1. Generalist-specialist dichotomy. During the nineteenth century, the functions of the state marked a significant expansion and consequently its functional arms had to be extended both in their numbers and scopes. The trend was bolstered in the following century and it has not receded in a big way even at the outset of the twenty-first century. The philosophy of welfare state on the one hand and technological innovations and ideological changes on the other contributed to this phenomenon. The British Indian administration is a good testimony to it. When the East India Company got a foothold in Bengal, the emergent rulers paid attention to only one motto – collection of revenue – and they appointed the Collectors. They quickly realized that the success of their objective largely depended on a crucial factor – law and peace.

¹⁶ A sitting Minister was quoted in *The Daily Prothom Alo*, 9 September 2003, where he said, “Ninety percent of those who are in politics are touts, self-seekers and cronies”.

¹⁷ The Constitution contains provision for oath-taking by the holders of constitutional posts. They have to affirm their commitment to refraining from doing unlawful and discriminatory deeds. It has a strong bearing on their relationships with civil servants, through whom the former get things done.

Thence, Collectors assumed the role of judge-magistrate and got the added epithet of District Magistrate (DM). A Superintendent of Police was posted in the district to assist him in this regard. Now, they got a feeling that revenue collection, peace and the service-worthiness of the ruling officials too were contingent upon a tolerable standard of health in the country. The post of the Civil Surgeon was thus created. It was being evidently difficult for the DM to handle in a high degree of success the executive, judicial and other multifarious subjects. In course of time, a District and Sessions Judge was placed in the district to dispose of civil and serious criminal cases. The rulers again felt that construction of infrastructure like roads, buildings and different other establishments was needed for furthering the interests of the colonial rulers. Hence, the Public Works Department (PWD) came into being. Again, devastating floods showed the need for taking special and enduring protection measures in many places. So, an Irrigation Branch was to be created to handle similar problems in the realm. The story goes on and on, and there seems hardly any sign of an end to it, although bumps and stale are occasionally experienced in the process. The British rulers made the DM leader in his district over all other officials. There evolved unique patterns of interactions among different role players, almost all of whom worked in unison under his leadership (Sindhu 1990:148). The need for coordination became all the more evident with almost every year passed, since the parties to the whole game of governance gained in number, size and complexity. As the contexts and the needs of the parties changed over time, the patterns of actions too changed. The District Magistrate gradually assumed the role of coordination, which necessarily invited both conflicts and cooperation. Conflict is present in any pattern of relationships, and the nature and degree of such conflict often determine the quality of a relationship. In fact, some amount of conflict is said to be necessary to sustain and improve relationships between organizations. The coordinator then has to acquire and show his capacity of conflict resolution. Unresolved conflicts only enhance the feelings of mistrust, a sense of powerlessness and strong elements of transferring blame on others (Chaturvedi 1988:54). But, as time passed, an urge for specialization began to gain current, and the task of coordination and conflict resolution became more and more complex. Different dimensions of the subject surfaced in the scene. The generalist-specialist dichotomy is the fore-ranker among them.

At the outset, the generalist civil servants were nurtured in UK, where the responsibilities for administration were vested in well-educated officials, who had not undergone specialized training in a narrow and restricted field, and who mostly belonged to the rural aristocracy. The examinations for recruitment were designed 'to produce generalist administrators – *intelligent*,

broad-gauged men free of parochial professional perspectives. It was logical, since the major concern of administration lied in the area of policy advice and lesser emphases were placed on internal management' (Huque 1990:6). The generalist civil servant was equipped with liberal arts education augmented by some personal qualities of character, poise and leadership, good intuitive judgement, right feelings, and a broad background, rather than a narrowly specialized knowledge and skills. He combined high competence in professional or administrative skills with training in the substantive area he administered (Dey 1978:109). He is also prepared to probe into policy as well as operating issues and to convert findings into recommendations for action. This trait draws consciously on cultural orientations gained at universities. The ideals of administrative institutions of France also hinge on the same tenets. By comparison, the higher civil servants of the USA tended to remain specialists in the administrative process. They knew how to put a policy into effect but they were seldom its initiators (Marx 1957:113-4). In a simplistic description, a specialist is a person who has devoted time and study to a special branch of learning and who has acquired specialized expertise in tackling problems of particular subjects or areas. Officials recruited to posts for which specific technical qualifications are essential are called the specialists in the government (Dey 1978:111). In British India, district administration was the pivotal institution and the highest-paid District Magistrate or Collector was the unquestioned leader, with the highest status conferred on him. He used to evaluate the performance of other officers including the heads of technical departments and confidentially report thereon to the government. He even exercised a control on their travels outside the headquarters. An increasing involvement of government in the development of economic infrastructure ultimately led to the creation of a number of technical departments. As these departments grew, they began to report to their own technical chiefs with a consequent loosening of the DM's control over their operations in each district. The fact was strongly made home in 1854 when, only 10 years after the creation of PWD, its chief engineer was made a secretary to the government. The Munro school began to give way to the Cornwallis school whose supporters had preferred a system of *checks and balances* while the supporters of the former had strongly advocated for a Mughal tradition of the district officer as the *ruler* of a district (Chaturvedi 1988:63).

With the increase of the number of other departments, and with the passage of every regime, the district administration's position was allowed to weaken further. Likewise, the education system attracted relatively bright students to technical education, e.g., engineering, medicine, and agricultural and other scientific subjects. In 1959, the dominance of the District Magistrate was

effectively ended with the dispensation of the system of DM writing an annual confidential report on the Superintendent of Police. At the same time, the DM was more exponentially pronounced as Deputy Commissioner and the officials of technical departments began to receive increasing prominence, as development works of various kinds gained more importance over traditional law and order administration (Ali 1995:123). However, despite serious relative weaknesses compared to its position in the past, the DM's premier position in the district was still being recognized. It was largely based on the governments' sense of expediency and on the strength of recommendations made by the Royal Commission upon Decentralization (1907-09), described in section 6.1.1 above. The Deputy Commissioner was still seen as the general representative of the government in the district, who exercised influence on the operation of the other departments in his area of jurisdiction. In the national perspectives, for successful implementation of its development Plans, the government of Pakistan required the services of a great number of qualified personnel thoroughly trained in technical fields – doctors, engineers, agriculturists, accountants, etc. But, the number of such specialists under public employment remained small. The engineers comprised the strongest group among them and there was a separate Central Engineering Service, which was described by the government as 'in no sense inferior to the Central Superior Services'. However, the higher secretariat posts were mostly closed to them and they were accorded lower pay levels too. Only rarely did any of them head his department. Nor did they have an easy access to the Ministers. The technocrats seldom participated in the formulation of policies and constituted no immediate threat to the dominant CSP. The Cabinet Secretariat was never in a mood to accept recommendations that the situation be changed (Goodnow 1969:113). The generalists made use, among other things, of the arguments of Tomlin Commission (Royal Commission on the Civil Service 1929-31), which refused to recommend for the technocrat officials a status necessarily equal to that of the generalist top-rankers. Another Commission of a similar title (Priestley Commission) in 1955 gave almost an identical view and commented that it was opposed to the concept of creating a *hydra-headed control system* (Chaudhuri 1969:88). Hence, the united Pakistan continued with the hegemony of the generalist public administrators.

The age-old generalist-specialist conflict assumed a new turn in the wake of the independence of Bangladesh. Immediately after assuming the charge of the country, the new government found a shattered administrative system beset with strife of many shades. There was an element of uncertainty too in the political front regarding the system of administration the new country should choose. The need for reorganization of public administration was being earnestly felt and

the government appointed the Administrative and Services Reorganization Committee (ASRC), which invited suggestions from organizations and persons. The Committee reviewed 107 such memoranda received from different sources. Many service associations too submitted their suggestions. Among them were a number of associations of the specialists like engineers, livestock personnel, veterinarians, fisheries officers, soil scientists, medical personnel, and agriculturists. Out of these bodies, interestingly, only the veterinarians and the soil scientists placed suggestions that had a bearing on their professions. The memoranda of all other bodies for specialists contained vituperative statements against the generalist civil servants and called for an end to this elite group's *rule*. Almost all of them called for a unification of generalist administrative services and segregation of functional specialist services. A leading proponent, *Association of Government Engineers*, even went as far as identifying 24 top positions for salaried executives in the government including 14 Secretaries to the government, and maintained that six of them should be manned by engineers, and that only one such post (Director of the Civil Service Academy) might be filled by a generalist administrative service officer [ASRC (iv) 1975:72]. The medical association called for an independent health service, which, in their opinion, should be completely free even to create positions without an iota of interference by the finance department (*ibid*, p. 202). The agricultural association, while subscribing to the general tenets of the other associations of fellow technocrats, made out detailed suggestions for the agricultural sector (*ibid*, pp. 348-445). The mainstream demands of the specialists were that the administrative services should be merged into a single service stripped of its hegemony over all other services, that specialist services should be created in big numbers along the functional lines, and that the specialists be accorded better scopes for climbing the top positions of the government. Many of them urged to create a single Civil Service, under which various functional groups might operate with a better access to the senior-most positions. To press home the demand for their better berth in the governmental system, the engineers even incorporated in their memorandum some sentences from the manifesto of the ruling political party (*ibid*, p. 70). The environment was indeed favourable for raising such points, because many politicians also nurtured grudge as they had long suffered at the hands of some bureaucrats who had been made very powerful under the undemocratic rule in Pakistan. Moreover, during the nine months of sanguinary liberation war in 1971, only a façade of governance could be maintained by Pakistan's oppressive occupation forces. Despite the participation of many generalist civil service officers and specialists in the liberation war, many of their colleagues continued to serve, or just remain in offices, while the country was smarting under the occupation forces. However, governance during the occupation months was largely

limited to mere retention of the semblance of authority, not its essence. No mentionable development efforts or provisions of services were perceived during the time, when one could just discern the presence of some administrative service personnel and police officials in office. Hence, members the administrative services (former CSP and EPCS) and some police officials became the *bete noire* in the new country, and it was felt easier for the hitherto subdued specialist professionals to demand an end to the heyday of generalist public administrators, whose position had hitherto been generally unassailable.

The generalists included officers of a number of services like the administrative services, police, foreign affairs, several branches of audit and accounts, taxation, education, customs and the like. However, the main plank of top generalist civil servants belonged to the erstwhile CSP and EPCS, and the specialist officers considered them to have occupied disproportionately huge chunk of all the vital positions in the government. Indeed, the other generalist services were not regarded as members of the elite proper. Hence, these two services were now to bear the brunt of the wrath of specialists. Interestingly enough, two other generalist services, which less than 10 years later were to merge in the Administration cadre under a unified Civil Service scheme, very often spoke against the administrative service. These were the central and provincial versions of the Secretariat Service (CSS and EPSS) and the Military Lands and Cantonment Service (PMLCS). It was more significant that at the initial months of the newly independent country, the 950 or so formerly EPCS officers demanded that they be made the mainstream of the new state's public administration while the officers of CSP should be considered as displaced and be absorbed through fresh placement. They also held that since their job requirements and educational qualifications were same as those of the CSP officers, their status and promotion should be on the basis of the length of service. The CSP, instead, put stress on merit. However, the officers of former CSP and the EPCS were united in their stand not to allow the technocrats to enter the secretariat (Maniruzzaman 1980:201). Thus a common and united front of the dominant generalist officers was found vis-à-vis the technocrats in public administration since the early days of the country. The Administrative and Services Reorganisation Committee (ASRC), first of its kind in Bangladesh, gave a considerable attention on the issue and suggested certain measures. Putting great stress on economy, efficiency, delegation, control, coordination and accountability, the ASRC called for a minimum number of Divisions or Ministries having homogeneous functions under their charge. The ASRC deplored the hapless conditions of the officials working in the development departments having technical functions and called for greater opportunities for their brighter status and career prospects. It also recommended that the

agencies involved in development activities should be fully strengthened in organization, personnel and status (Obaidullah 1999:5, 37). At the same time, it recommended the dispensation of the system of reservation of posts for CSP, a cardinal instrument in operation since 1861 for the continuation of the preeminence of generalist civil servants (Ali 1993:18). However, the government at the time was not in a position to seriously consider the recommendations and they preferred just shelving the ASRC report as a classified document, without working on it.

Another important body looked into the matter and gave its prescription for remedying the ills. The first Pay and Services Commission (Rashid Commission), in its report in 1977, recommended that the civil service be organized into 28 separate cadres of a unified civil service. Moreover, it called for the formation of an apex cadre, to be named as the Superior Policy Pool, consisting of posts requiring all-round experience, administrative leadership and high level coordination. Officers of proven competence from all cadres could be recruited in that apex cadre through prescribed means. These were all purported to considerably alleviate the hard feelings of the technocrat-specialist functionaries about the predominance of the generalists in the highest positions, to the exclusion of the specialists. The newly installed government duly considered the recommendations and, in 1979, created the 625-member Senior Policy Pool, later renamed as the Senior Services Pool (SSP). The government encadred many officers and kept provisions for further encadrement of officers from various services. However, the SSP could not satisfy the specialists as they maintained that it rather consolidated the grip of the generalists, through the automatic absorption of the serving officers in the ranks of Deputy Secretary and above, who had been overwhelmingly from the administrative service. However, the arbitrary criteria used for inclusion of officers in SSP and a clear disavowal of officers of technical services owing to better promotion prospects in their own services were partly responsible for their small representation in it (Ali 1993:20). It may be recalled here that the second important recommendation of the Pay and services Commission was acted on in 1980, through the creation of 14 cadres and 28 sub-cadres under a unified Bangladesh Civil Service. Those sub-cadres were later on converted into independent cadres along the functional lines. Before long, the country was put under another martial law regime, which established a significant local government institution at the upazila level, namely the Upazila Parishad (UZP). It was to face the sudden outbursts of the temporarily dormant generalist-specialist conflicts. The UZP became the hotbed for the age-old subtle game. The Upazila Nirbahi Officer (UNO), a mid-level BCS (Administration) cadre officer was made chief coordinator of the UZP with

enough authority to oversee and evaluate the activities of upazila level officers of various cadres. The specialists took serious exception to it and they waged a successful campaign to compel the government to budge on this point. In this regard, Ali (1986:45-49) gives a detailed description of the events, in which important people in the government including members of the powerful National Implementation Committee for the Implementation of Administrative Reforms (NICAR) were intensely involved. The UNO's authority was considerably reduced on the face of stiff opposition of the specialists and his legally allowed supervisory role on the performance of other officials was almost totally dispensed with. There were both a vertical and a horizontal resistance to the scheme. Various departments were very reluctant to loosen their grip from their officers placed at the upazila. At the same time, officers of those departments, especially those of the technical ones, were not interested to remain any way accountable to the Upazila Nirbahi Officer, a generalist official. Interestingly, the UNO was not a member of the Upazila Parishad. He was the staff officer of the Parishad, although he was made the acting chairman till the election of a regular chairman. Hence, it was not illogical, on this count, for the specialist officials, almost all of whom were members of the Upazila Parishad, to protest a controlling role of a non-member on their activities.

Officials of three largest and most powerful technical services – prokousholi, krishibid and chikitsak, i.e., engineers, agriculturists, and doctors respectively – and other professionals in those technical lines formed PROKRICHI, a platform of technocrats to champion their causes. They immediately created a tense situation at the district and upazila levels (Ali 1995:158). Later on, they formed a PROKRICHI-BCS Coordination Committee to make a common front against the generalists, especially BCS (Administration) cadre officials. Thus, a platform of technically educated government servants, private sector employees and self-employed professionals was poised against an entrenched hegemony of the generalist civil servants. This conglomerate reaped the fruits of a typical predicament of the martial law regime, since the latter had been faced with stiff opposition in the political front. On the upazila scheme, in order to avert collision in still another front, the regime gave in to their demands (Ali 1986:99). On numerous occasions, usually in the wake of one round of promotion in the top positions, they voice their strong opinion to criticize the government for not paying heed to their demand for a greater share of such positions. After a few years of agitation including several rounds of strikes and work-stoppage waged by the technocrat-specialist functionaries, the government ultimately gave way. The Superior Services Pool was abolished with effect from 12 July 1989. The government's notification to this effect [SRO 261-Law/89/MOE (Reg-2)/SSP-1/89, dated 17

July 1989] stated that thenceforth there would be no more quota reservations for the posts of Additional Secretary and Secretary to the government and that these posts would be open for competent officers of all cadres. However, it made the following scheme of quota reservations for different cadres for the posts of Joint Secretary and Deputy Secretary:

Table 6.04. Quota Reservation for Various Cadres after Abolition of SSP

<u>Sl. No.</u>	<u>Name of Cadre</u>	<u>Joint Secretary</u>	<u>Deputy Secretary</u>
1	Administration	95	245
2	Secretariat	16	57
3	Agriculture	4	6
4	Forest	1	2
5	Fisheries	1	2
6	Livestock	2	4
7	General Education	2	3
8	Technical Education	2	2
9	Economic	1	1
10	Trade	1	1
11	Statistics	1	2
12	Public Works	4	6
13	Public Health Engineering	2	2
14	Roads and Highway	3	4
15	Telecommunication	2	2
16	Audit and Accounts	2	3
17	Customs and Excise	1	1
18	Taxation	2	3
19	Health	5	8
20	Family Planning	3	4
21	Railway Engineering	1	2
22	Railway transport	0	1
23	Police	3	6
24	Ansar	1	2
25	Cooperatives	1	2
26	Information	1	2
27	Postal	1	2
28	Food	1	2
	Total	159	377

Source: Government of Bangladesh (1995:145).

The notification further stated that these posts would be treated as the 'own posts for these individual cadres'. It was like the charting of an uncertain course, because the incumbents of these two important posts were no more regarded as a distinct entity and it lacked clarity in respect of whether these officers belonged to the government, or whether they would remain on the strength of respective cadres. The notification added that in the event of any changes in the number of these two posts on the strength of an individual cadre, they would reflect automatic changes in the quota earmarked for the cadre. Taking the then administration and secretariat cadres for the combined administration cadre of present time, when the scheme came into

operation, its shares in the posts of Joint Secretary and Deputy Secretary were fixed at 69.81 percent and 80.11 percent respectively. These measures were adopted on recommendations of Matin Committee, a cabinet sub-committee constituted with the then Deputy Prime Minister with a view to considering the views of various cadres. However, the technical-specialist civil servants were not to be satisfied, since their promotion prospects did not mark any improvement through such measures. It is evident that the authority 'to create, amalgamate and unite the services' as provided in the Services Reorganization Act of 1975 began to be utilized in the 1980s. The unified Civil Service was created to do away with the concept of elitism in particular services. Another important objective of creating equal opportunities for promotion to top government positions was sought to be fulfilled through the creation of SSP. But, it could not succeed. Nor could the scheme that took its place since the newly introduced quota reservations were contrary to any concept on merit-based promotion system (Ali 1993:34). Hence, the generalist-specialist dichotomy, far from being buried, remained as strong as ever. The specialists maintained that they were still discriminated and that elitism of generalist administration cadre officials was being retained on a purposive manner (Obaidullah 1999:43). The situation has not yet marked any substantial change.

6.3.2. Other streams and administration cadre. The Administration cadre has also undergone periodic encounters with some other forces that came into the administrative arena of the country. However, in terms of number and intensity of the inroads from these other sources, they may be considered to be of minor nature. For example, at several points of time, a number of officers from the armed forces were inducted into the civil bureaucracy and some of them were absorbed in the administration cadre. Before the BCS recruitment rules were framed in January 1981, the government arranged to induct a number of ex-military officers and ex-cadre civil officers into several cadres of BCS. Some of these officers were subsequently absorbed in the SSP at the level of Joint Secretary (Ali 1993:27), to the detriment of the prospects for regular officers of those cadres. The martial law regime promulgated the Defence Services Officers (Appointment and Fixation of Seniority in Civil Post) Rules 1983 (*Appendix U*), in which it was provided, among others, that defence service officers could be appointed to civil posts *after obtaining clearance from the concerned service headquarters*. The text actually reflected a truism; since it erroneously sounded like that the civil authorities were very enthusiastic about the appointment of such officers to the civil posts. Rule 5 of the said Rules provided that the seniority of a defence service officer so appointed to a civil post would be counted from the date of his being commissioned in the defence service. That was a grossly discriminatory provision

since an armed forces officer usually gets commissioned at an age of 20 vis-à-vis a civil officer's appointment at 28 to 30 years. In this manner, an armed forces officer gets an abnormally big edge over a regularly appointed civil officer. Again, sub-rule 2 of Rule 6 stipulates that if an armed forces officer so appointed to a civil post finds that he should rank senior to a regularly appointed civil officer and the latter hold a higher position, the former shall be promoted to similar position with effect from the date on which the latter got it (GOB 1995:174). These provisions had very serious connotations for civil officers, but there could not be any express resentment owing to the prevalence of military rule in the country. These rules are still in force, but seldom resorted to.

Moreover, after the Thana Parishads, later to be renamed as Upazila Parishads, were established, the military-dominated NICAR recommended appointing armed forces officers as Thana Commissioners, who would act as Chairmen till the election of the regular Chairmen. The recommendation possibly did not carry favour of the Armed Forces Headquarters, and no such officer was appointed there (Ali 1986:45). Thus, a possible intrusion of other streams of officers into the domain of BCS Administration cadre officers was averted. Another element of similar nature was sought to be introduced in 1987, when the Zila Parishad Act kept provisions to nominate a military officer to Zila Parishad as one of its members. The civil officers felt threatened with this provision. However, the opposition political organizations took the matter at an earnest and, amidst a tumultuous agitation against the proposed law, the President was constrained to return the Bill to the Parliament, which passed a new Zila Parishad Act 1988 without a similar provision (Ali 1995:52). The new Act, as well as the aborted Bill of the preceding year, installed a nominated Chairman as head of the Zila Parishad. It may also be recalled that the aborted *District Governor scheme* of 1975 also contained a strong element of involving representatives of the military and paramilitary forces. It was an unprecedented measure in the administrative system of the sub-continent and it created a sense of apprehension in the mind of the civil servants.

One other notable instance of induction into the fold of administrative service or cadre was also a bid which was taken on political considerations. This is the case of absorption in the administrative service of a number of employees of different categories of the government-in-exile. Generally called the Mujibnagar employees, they had worked under the government which led the war of liberation in 1971. A number of such employees were later on absorbed in the commensurate positions in the administrative and other services. Some of them were

subsequently elevated to further higher positions. The acts of absorbing and promoting such officials seemed not to have followed any statutory or clear-cut principles. The government paid attention to the matter very late in November 1980, when the Mujibnagar Employees (Conditions of Service) Rules 1980 were made. These rules laid down procedures for fixation of seniority of such employees absorbed, reabsorbed or promoted in different posts (GOB 1995:171). It may be recalled that numerous cadres of Bangladesh Civil Service had been created by that time. However, they constituted a very small portion of the administration cadre's strength and, hence, they were not regarded as a significant threat to the prospects of the officers of the cadre. This is no wonder that there are very few words written about the impact created by the absorption of this small number of officers in any service cadre.

6.4. Possible Future Relationships

6.4.1. The trend. The modern public administration in India was introduced by the bosses of a monopolistic trading company with the primary objective of collecting as much revenue as possible. This is why the English traders availed of their first real opportunity to secure *Diwani*, the right to revenue collection for Bengal, Bihar and Orissa from the decaying Moghul dynasty in Delhi. The first administrative experiments of the Diwani-holder East India Company too – appointment of Dewan or Nazim and Naib Nazim¹⁸, and lastly that of the Collector, and changes in the tenure in land ownership, for example – were made around this same task. In course of time, the post of Collector assumed a significance of astronomical proportion, and it became the kingpin of the British Indian Empire's *steel-frame administration*. The administrative structures above and beneath the Collector was erected in subsequent decades to suit the purposes of contemporary times. There was very little development in the other important institutional sphere of legislative practices. Politics was nourished or withstood only as a tool of either self-seeking or fiery negation of the establishment. Bureaucracy was the most instrumental institution under the system. In the whole period of British rule in India, the executive was never made accountable to the people (Younis and Mostafa 2000:53). If there was at all any sort of accountability of the civil servants, it was to their service superiors and the heads of the governments – the Viceroy at the centre and the Governors at the provinces. The administration was solely concerned with the maintenance of law and order and the collection of revenues. The British paid little attention to developing administration as an instrument of economic and social change (Jain and Chaudhuri 1982:3). Apart from the emergence of a good number of technical and specialized departments that reduced the direct jurisdictions of generalist civilian

administrators, the situation did not feature any significant change until 1944, when all the 14 members of the Viceroy's Council were Indians who represented different political parties and sections of people. Only at that time, a clear sign of bureaucratic accountability to political bosses was looming large. Many an English civilian made haste at the time to quit the job rather than conceding to the concept of accountability to politicians. Prospects of an imminent transfer of power to Indians were also responsible for the phenomenon, however. On the whole, the bureaucracy in British India maintained an almost absolute autonomy – nay, independence – in governing the vast colony. Only the distantly located service superiors and their own conscientiousness were their boundaries. Many of these administrators became legends in themselves by dint of their good feats and finesse under such a working environment.

Pakistan was created through an intense game of politics, and for that reason, political leaders were to gain a superior position in the governance of the country. But, the intrinsically selfish and narrow visions of political functionaries and their internecine rivalry after the early demise of the country's two leading proponents – Jinnah and Liaquat – led to a virtual reemergence of an administrative state. The politicians had little or no time to consider serious things like reforms including in public administration (Khan 1980:128). However, the absolute autonomy enjoyed by the administrators during the British time did not recur, since the overall principles of governance had undergone fundamental changes and improvement in people's life became a cardinal motive throughout the newly independent countries. After years of trial and errors, Pakistan experienced a short period of stability only during the undemocratic rule in 1961. The huge US economic assistance, to the tune of 28 percent of the central government's expenditure, considerably bolstered the regime's political strength. Though not fully able to change the country's elitist and introspective generalism, this huge aid package could instill a sort of ideological radiation in favour of greater mantle for technical works and personnel as in the United States (Sattar 1982:118). However, after a decade of control, the regime faced political upheaval that led to a quick demise of united Pakistan. There was no institutional phenomenon in which the executive –administrators in particular – could learn to live under a legislative and ministerial control. The only significant development that signaled a departure from the British days was the increasing claims of the technocrat-specialists for a greater share of the top government positions. The government's lackluster approach did not solve the problem of this tricky divide (Chaudhuri 1969:90).

¹⁸ Tax collector and assistant tax collector respectively.

Before the administrative things could be sorted out, Pakistan was dismembered and Bangladesh came into being. Public administration in the new country was in tatters, a fact commonly found in countries that gained independence through wars of liberation or where revolutions or people's uprisings took place. Even after the initial anarchic days were passed, the various measures taken by the government continued to undermine the morale and efficiency of administration (Huque 1986:571). Negation of the concept of statutory protection for services against discrimination, recruitment of a huge number of officers on questionable grounds, and many public utterances and statements went against the traditional ethos of administration. Although the euphoric suggestions of substituting political cadres for civil servants did not get much of a current, the strong political influence on the activities of administrators has always been the case, except for the initial months following the imposition of martial law rules on two occasions. Articles 9 and 59 of the Constitution of Bangladesh enunciated a decentralized administrative system built around elected local government institutions at all levels of administration. The Administrative and Services Reorganisation Committee (ASRC) strove a balance between a decentralized local government structure under popular control and a possibility of rejuvenating the traditional district officer system (Ali 1986:2). The attempt at a complete political control on administration through the *district governor scheme* was aborted in 1975. But, endeavours to introduce political influence, in one form or the other, persisted. In 1979, an MP was appointed in each district as District Development Coordinators (DDC), purportedly to oversee and orchestrate the development works. He enjoyed the status of a Deputy Minister, and was made the Chairman of the District Agricultural Development Coordination Committee. The position of the Deputy Commissioner again became ineffective through such acts (Ali 1995:214). The scheme was gone with the then government, which was replaced by a martial law regime in 1982. Since 1986, following the transfer of power to an elected government, a *district minister system* has been in force, in which every district has a minister responsible for its affairs. But, there are hardly any statutory supports for this scheme. As a result, the role of the district minister partially assumes an informal character, often leading to clandestine political coaxing and a lack of transparency in certain activities of public administration, which is indeed a modern form of rational-legal societal structure. The scheme gives rise to concerns in many respects including on administrative, political and ethical considerations, some of which are touched upon at section 6.2.1 above¹⁹. Since public

¹⁹ Some of the district ministers are MPs elected from constituencies outside the districts for which they are made in-charge. The principle of establishing popular local leadership being kept aside, it often leads to factional politics. Administration is generally undisturbed when decisions and advice of ministers emanate in a formal-legal manner.

administration entails essentially transparent and formal sets of activities, the civil servants may have to do the hard housekeeping works on numerous occasions in order to give a formal status to many informally made decisions. Consequently, at times, the district minister scheme may look like an authority without responsibility, particularly in the eye of the minister's political opponents and some administrative functionaries.

The age-old generalist-specialist dichotomy prevails in its wide ramifications in the public administration of Bangladesh. Since inception, representative bodies of the country's technical functionaries started raising points in favour of their demands for a greater status and share in the top administrative domain. The relative strengths of the generalists and the technical-specialist officials have been variedly evidenced. The generalists in the guise of former CSP officers were in their heyday in a brief period when a military government assumed the reins after a series of coups in 1975 (Ahmed 1980:149). Since then, the generalists somehow maintained their grip in the national level, although their field-level younger compatriots suffered deterioration in status and powers. The field administrators had to simultaneously face two fronts – beginning with military officers and technocrats, and then politicians and technocrats. After the imposition of military rule in March 1982, the Deputy Commissioners, and to some extent the Superintendents of Police, were particularly faced with an awry relationship with the local martial law administrators, who were prone to exercise their new-found superiority by dint of martial law. The strongest position of the technocrat-specialists vis-à-vis the generalist administrators was seen in the early 1980s, when a generally stubborn-looking martial law regime had to budge from its grandiose decentralization scheme in the form of a powerful upazila parishad. The function of control and coordination – so essential for any effective organization – was left to uncertainties, owing to the intense pressures from the technocrats who were opposed to a major role of the Upazila Nirbahi Officer in the affairs of the Upazila Parishad (Ali 1986:45-49). In continuation of their opposition to the generalists, and probably encouraged by the initial successes in the upazila front, the technical-specialist heads of some departments resorted to an unusual act. They stopped *sending files* to the Secretaries in their respective ministries or divisions, and instead began sending the files to the ministers. However, this act of protest created little impact, since it is letters or proposals, not files, which is sent to ministries or divisions. And, the ministers got them processed through the established channels on top of which was the Secretary. Moreover, the incumbency of a few technocrat

But, as personally experienced by the researcher, things come to a head when covert and less-than-legal suggestions

secretaries dilated the situation and the agitation did not make much of headway. For a while in the mid-1990s, the technocrat members remained absent from the meetings of the District Development Coordination Committees (DDCC) headed by the Deputy Commissioners. This act also could not make a serious dent in the system and shortly afterwards they resumed their seats in the meetings. The latest acts of specialists are primarily geared to securing a better prospect for reaching the top government positions.

6.4.2. Possibilities. An account of the trendy relationships among different role players in the administrative arena of Bangladesh may help one contemplate several possibilities in their pattern of intricate interactions. One hypothetical possibility is the reemergence of generalists at the helm of affairs, where technical departments led by specialist officers perform their duties under an effective supervision, control and coordination of a generalist administrator at each operational level. The latter would be equipped with sufficient authority to exercise his control on the specialists, who will have commensurate autonomy over the technical issues of the subject. This may take more or less the same or similar form of governance prevalent in the British Indian realm. However, such a phenomenon is most likely not to conform to present-day realities characterized by the added importance of specialists on account of technological innovations and specialized management. The nature of tasks undertaken by modern governments and the sheer numbers of organizations and personnel engaged in technical fields necessitate a greater status for specialist officers. Moreover, in an age of modern technology, politics takes into its fold lot many issues which were previously outside its purview. If the politicians, who are indeed the masters, and the generalist bureaucrats take to running the affairs in close collaboration, there may arise the possibilities of either of the two alternative scenarios (Chaturvedi 1988: 54). The first is a state of unscrupulous plundering by these two sets of important people where there is little or no obstacle to their absolute control on public affairs. The second alternative is the emergence of a precarious stalemate owing to a stiff opposition of each other in the management of public administration and coordination of development programmes. As found by Jain and Chaudhuri (1982:201), an unhindered supremacy of bureaucrats is next to impossible in the present context. On the whole, the nature of modern statecraft is hardly likely to make for such a phenomenon to occur in its pristine form.

or decisions have to be acted upon.

The other hypothetical possibility is the introduction of a purely technical-specialist public administration, where the executing organizations would be largely technical in nature and there is no control over their performance. This is very much like a conjectured form of *technical state*. Under this form, various kinds of functions are performed by different executing agencies, most of which would be technical in nature, with not much of resources being spent on the subjects of external supervision and coordination. Such a state of affairs may be a welcome scenario for the marauding crusaders among the specialist-technocrat functionaries. However, on several counts, this would be adroitly challenged. For example, functions of the government are necessarily linked with the life of people. Science and technology is not the only thing, or even not the most relevant thing in many people's life. Socio-economic realities of individual and gregarious life necessitate the operation of different tools of social science, in which the concepts of public administration, supervision, control, coordination, and the like take a prominent place. Secondly, there may be self-contained symbiotic relationships among different units of any system in very few instances, that too only in the field of physics, not in any social setting. Thirdly, politics is the most predominant socio-economic phenomenon in the modern time, especially the developing countries. Politics, again, is essentially a function of generalism and it encompasses almost all tenets of contemporary life. Hence, the overbearing nature of this most important socio-economic dynamics may forestall such things. Politicians cannot shed off their authority over state institutions, as they believe that they are essential for development (Jain and Chaudhuri 1982:264). Lastly, the pressure of generalists, faint and subtle though, will not wither altogether. This is also a factor why the technocrat-specialists cannot probably become the sole master of public administration, to the exclusion of generalist BCS Administration cadre officials.

Another possible eventuality is an absolute take-over by the political bosses, who are to subjugate the civil servants, no matter whether they belong to the generalist BCS Administration cadre or are specialists of technical departments. It may take the form of a dogmatic bureaucracy as found in the former socialist countries and the short-lived Taliban regime in Afghanistan or may be an overtly politicised but ostensibly neutral bureaucracy as seen in a number of African countries, where administrative neutrality is not accorded a high importance. Bangladesh does not professedly subscribe to either of these two modes. There exists a clear preference for neutral bureaucracy in the country. However, politics is the dominant game in society and those who triumph in this game, i.e., those who constitute the ruling elite, may hope to enjoy a control on the affairs of public importance. Successful politicians, or more particularly the ministers,

often demand 'of their officials that they depart from their duties'. This means that, at times, they expect the permanent officers to flout rules and regulations in order to comply with the former's unlawful or irregular demands. This is generally resisted by a strict adherence to the normal conventions of official accountability (Younis and Mostafa 2000:18). But, there are rising concerns that the bureaucracy continues to fail in arresting its further politicisation, which combines with gross corruption and inefficiency to lead to a lack of good governance. Recently, leaders of different walks of life – politics, bureaucracy, research, social work and business, for example – reached a consensus that the country's bureaucracy was 'being totally out of tune with the need of the globalised world and its highly competitive environment. Many bureaucrats succumbed to political pressures or indulge in partisan politics to hide their inefficiency and corruption'²⁰. It seems to reflect the general mood of people. An absolute take-over by politicians seems more implausible owing to the dynamics of politics itself, which entails continuous interactions of different factors of and parties to it. One group of politicians is necessarily subjected to challenge of the other group. Equilibrium is possible only temporarily and at a point. The unpartisan bureaucracy, or less participant comparatively less-partisan version of it, is the most likely consequence of such a state of incessant conflicts. The concept of non-partisan neutral *caretaker government* in Bangladesh is a unique case of what may turn out in the process of an absolute control of politics on administration. This is an example of how politicians had to abdicate their reign, though temporarily, primarily with a view to giving credence to periodically held general elections to the members of parliament, a vitally important phenomenon in institutional democracy²¹. By default, the political bosses denied themselves the charge of running the country, at specific times when the people of the country exercise their voting rights to choose the set of people who would be in charge of the government. This may also be construed as an admission of their alleged ineptitude to manage certain important affairs in an appropriate manner. Given such a turn of events, it is almost impossible for people of the country to allow the political bosses an absolute take-over of the public administration.

²⁰ *The Daily Star*, 19 September 2003. Acclaimed leaders of civil society, in a roundtable discussion on "Our Changing Bureaucracy: The Last 12 Years", identified maladies of a sick administrative system – large number of recruits, recruitment on the wrong criteria, absence of proper conditions of service, poor remuneration package, inadequate training facilities, inefficiency and corruption, political pressures, etc. All were concerned about the increasing partisan behaviour of civil servants, at the behest of politicians.

²¹ Dr. M Y Akhtar, a professor of political science, termed the neutral caretaker government as an antithesis of the constitutional principles of democracy and a manifest blotch of the country's political parties. He compared it with an antibiotic for an infant and considered it useful till when politicians would be able to attain mutual trusts and build democratic political culture. See, 'Pondering over the Caretaker Government' in *The Prothom Alo*, 16 September 2003.

6.5. Concluding Remarks.

6.5.1. Work with others. The BCS (Administration) cadre is constituted with officers who are usually assigned with generalist nature of work, both at the central and field levels. Moreover, some of them are made Secretaries and Additional Secretaries, who, in collaboration with and under the supervision of ministers and other similar political functionaries, are in a position to play a significant role in the formulation and implementation of public policy. Officials groomed in technical education and appointed to technical posts have a special bearing in the administrative system, inasmuch as they continue to clamour for a greater share of the top government positions and particularly a heightened status in the governmental decision system. Among these major parties to the game of governance, there evolve various types of relationships at different times – congenial and cooperative, indifferent and autonomous, or bitter and competitive. The first of the three patterns is the most worthy one, while the last is an anathema. The present scenario in Bangladesh resembles the second pattern of relationships, which is tantamount to a stalemate and stagnation in the public administration. Every organization or set of officials functions in its water-tight compartment, while the general goals of people's welfare remain far from being materialized, and all sectors are said to be deteriorating in standards²². Among different sets of functionaries – politicians, generalist civil servants, military officers, technocratic officials, and the like – there seems very little understanding or just an inadequate appreciation of the functions outside their own spheres of responsibilities. Again, there are instances where one group ventures to transgress its boundaries with the others' domain. The technocrats resent what they term as the generalists' aggrandizement, while the generalists have a feeling that the politicians do infringe upon their rights to and opportunities for diligent performance of their duties.

For the two sets role players, i.e., politicians and civil servants, there may be the blue, red and purple zones of performance. The prerogatives and accountabilities of elected parliamentarians constitute the blue zone and the responsibilities and behaviour expected of a studiously apolitical public service being the red zone. What is expected is not an attempt to rid the system of shared responsibilities. To the contrary, traits like keen consciences, a deeper understanding of shared responsibilities, and the capacity to explain the subtleties of the situation need to be looked into. Success depends upon an effective working relationship between the minister and the secretary. Good governance depends on the partnership, mutual respect and trust wielded under the

²² Comments of the leader-speakers at the roundtable discussion; see *The Daily Star*, 19 September 2003.

discipline of parliamentary and public scrutiny (Elliott 1988:81). Thus, under an overall suzerainty of the democratically evolved representative institutions, permanent civil servants are expected to discharge their responsibilities. The roles of these two groups are complementary to each others', and for that matter both have to be developed properly with a sense of mutual respect and trust. Both of these two sets of people need to appreciate that bureaucracy's role in the developing countries is not confined to the strengthening of the preconditions of development, but it has also to 'supply a long-run and broad time horizon and development objectives to be realized through input transformation in both public and private sectors' (Morshed 1997:8). The relatively weak and undeveloped political institutions are largely responsible for it. On the other hand, the bureaucracy has to understand that the politicians have to face a revolution of rising expectations in a constrained environment, and hence, some of their acts may look like wayward. A mutual understanding of the predicaments of each other is of great help in this respect.

Technology has been undergoing rapid transformation and the socio-political institutions have to keep pace with them. Ignorance of this crucial phenomenon is potentially fatal for any society. A more proactive role and greater involvement of the specialists in the public affairs are all the more necessitated by the technological advances and freer transnational information transformation, which allow one to grasp the global phenomena. These reformative phenomena are economic liberalization, free trade, public indignation against corruption, increased popular participation and a steady march to democracy in developing countries (Rahman 2001:3). Bangladesh is supposedly set for launching long and fast strides for overall development on all those counts. In this drive, sidetracking of technocrats is bound to bring about stagnation in many fields, a fact which may not serve the purpose. Experts in technical subjects may not be necessarily deficient in and unsuited to policy matters in their respective fields (Obaidullah 1999:26). If a lawyer is considered to be competent of running the affairs in all fronts, it is not pertinent to take it for granted that the agricultural economist or the public health engineer is invariably inept for a role in formulating public policies in their field of operation. The science of public administration, as developed in northern America, encompassed the European tradition of discipline and order, efficiency, skills and specialization on the one hand, and the newly acquired values of freedom, innovation, flexibility and new work ethics of the new world. Specialization has got its distinct place in public administration although this useful administrative tool may affect the practice of unity of command (Huque 1990:41, 148). This latter allegation is often resorted to by the generalist civil servants, who apprehend a dent in their

authority from the progressive rise of the specialists. Since this dichotomy is poised for an enduring stay, the public administration of Bangladesh has better to live with it and contain it in a way that still begets good results. Excessive forms of both generalism and compartmentalization have to be cast off.

6.5.2. Preparedness for change. Social science is a subject which deals with constant changes in the world context. The public administration of Bangladesh also undergoes transformation on many points. One needs to keep in mind that it is not immune to the universal phenomena like privatization and decentralization etc. Privatization indeed has recently taken faster strides in the developing countries including Bangladesh. The other trend of decentralization has somehow floundered here since the successive governments in the past one decade showed uniqueness of almost an identical hesitation on their stands on the now-defunct upazila parishad (UZP), which thrived for a few years in the 1980s. The government leaders at the time (2003) are reportedly deeply divided among themselves on the question of a probable revival of UZP, which was prominently on the election manifesto of BNP, the main component of the ruling coalition. One faction seeks an instant revival in line with their express political commitment, while the other refutes it on the ground that it is bound to damage the status and powers of the MPs. The latter group maintains that the MPs would just look dwarf vis-à-vis the Upazila Parishad Chairmen, who will be able to attract the public gaze with their resources to embark on development works. This is an important symptom of the country's sick political system, where many legislators have a habitual propensity to engage themselves in affairs, other than legislative business for which they are elected to the parliament. The malignancy of the disease is evidently demonstrated by the fact that a compromise formula was mooted, according to which large sums of money would be placed at the disposal of the MP for development works to be carried out in each constituency in the event of the reintroduction of the UZP with an elected Chairman as its head. It may be mentioned that the upazila parishad was very much a prototype of what the Constitution ordained. But, it cannot also be forgotten that it was created by an extra-constitutional government. Again, at that time, there was no spectacular demand for such an institution. Eventually it was able to create sufficient enthusiasm in the public. It is the contradictions among the ruling elite which made an unceremonious abeyance for the institution. The dynamics of politics and public administration are likely to put in place a suitable substitute for the UZP, or possibly similar other bodies at other levels also. The members of BCS (Administration) cadre have to prepare themselves for such a development. The other segments of public administration functionaries, i.e., the specialists and technocrats too.

Public administration is necessarily a function of various types and levels of functionaries. Under its comprehensive fold, every stratum and component has got its distinct – though constantly changing – sets of roles to play. In a lively vibrant system, these roles have a symbiotic character rather than a mutually exclusive value. On the other hand, unresolved conflicts among the component units in a system lead to its decay and dismantling, causing harms for its clients as well as its constituents or clients. Sooner or later, this is to attract the attention of policymakers and some sorts of changes are due to take place in the public administration. The officers of BCS (Administration) cadre are most likely to be affected in the performance of duties. Sporadic attempts of changes, particularly if they are contrived without due regard for their possible ramifications on various institutions, can bring about further problems in the system. Disproportionate strengthening of single instruments may cause undesirable consequences²³. What is needed is a calculated implementation of a well-thought perspectives plan of reforms, keeping in view the present and future needs of the country.

²³ A case in point is the recently reported move of the Ministry of Home Affairs to upgrade the posts of police department. According to the scheme, the Superintendent of Police would be placed at Grade III (of course, without any reference to the District Magistrate, who is in Grade V) and his superiors would be placed in further higher grades. As a rationale of the plan it is said that this move will improve the country's poor law and order situation, a poor logic indeed! See, *The Daily Jugantar*, 23 June 2004.

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7. Utility and Performance

7.1. Perceptions of Utility

7.1.1. Utility. The origin and evolution of all socio-economic institutions is essentially governed by the sheer test of utility, which is the very rationale for their existence. Authorities on the subject have it that the administrative apparatuses are always required for the very purpose of application of the policies and laws adopted by their superior bodies, e.g., the legislature and the cabinet (Laski 1966:368). The utilitarian school regarded that kind of government as the best one which secured the happiness of the greatest number. It was also held that institutions and laws were generally created and replaced by the logic of reason and justice, and that only utility should be the test of any system (Wanlass 1970:281). Three most widely used synonyms of the term 'utility' – 'usefulness', 'effectiveness' and 'efficacy' directly pertain to public administration. As long as the public administrators deliver goods, the utility of the system is believed to be alright. On the other hand, a system incapable of doing the job in a right manner is often subjected to criticism and public disdain. A recent comment of the Public Administration Reform Commission (PARC) deserved attention when it commented that the government seemed to clearly lack the managerial capability and dynamism to face its tasks and fulfill the expectation of the people [PARC (1) 2000:1]. Similar other bodies and individuals too had long been telling about the inadequacies of the country's public administration and some of them put forth serious suggestions too. But the successive governments were showed almost an identical apathy in the subject and allowed the public administration or, to be more precise, the civil services to remain as what they are now (Ali 2002:10). About a score of bodies have so far studied the system or some parts of it, but very few of their recommendations have been acted upon. Against such a backdrop, more and more comments are likely to be made about the public administration system of Bangladesh. The more such understandings of the system are based on informed appreciation of facts, the better for the eventual transformation of the system. In order to ascertain the place BCS (Administration) cadre holds in the country's socio-economic system, the utility of the cadre has to be assessed in that light. The cadre's performance of duties is also to be evaluated in order to adjudge its standing in society as well as the governmental system.

With the need for ascertaining the true perspectives in view, and to supplement the body of available information, an opinion survey was conducted by using structured questionnaires. Six districts – Chandpur, Dinajpur, Khulna, Pirojpur, Sunamganj and Tangail – were selected as sample areas for the survey. However, information collected from adjoining Panchagar district was incorporated into and shown as the information from Dinajpur. During the selection of

districts, due care was taken to ensure a fair representation of most possible categories. For example, along with Khulna, a metropolitan district, two old districts of Dinajpur and Tangail, and three newly created far-flung districts of Chandpur, Pirojpur and Sunamganj were chosen. Again, these six districts were chosen from six administrative divisions – one district from each division. It was initially planned to get the questionnaires filled up by about 100 respondents from each sample district. It was also thought to interview a fair number of Administration cadre incumbents, officials of other shades and other informed persons in those districts, so that a reasonable representation of educated gentry could be found. However, for practical constraints, that target could not be achieved and a comparatively lesser number of respondents could be reached. The actual number and description of the sample population is presented in Table 7.01.

Table 7.01. Category-wise and District-wise Number of Respondents in Sample Opinion Survey

<u>District/Category</u>	<u>Admn Officers</u>		<u>Other Officers</u>		<u>Free-lance</u>		<u>Total</u>
Chandpur	10	(16.39)	25	(40.98)	26	(42.62)	61
Dinajpur	30	(37.97)	30	(37.97)	19	(24.05)	79
Khulna	12	(14.63)	30	(36.59)	40	(48.78)	82
Pirojpur	11	(12.09)	49	(53.85)	31	(34.07)	91
Sunamganj	29	(49.15)	7	(11.86)	23	(38.98)	59
Tangail	19	(21.59)	57	(64.77)	12	(13.64)	88
Total	111	(24.13)	198	(43.04)	151	(32.83)	460

Source: Survey conducted by the researcher. Figures in the parentheses indicate the percentage of the total of sums in each row.

Here, 'Admn officers' refer to BCS (Administration) Cadre officers, the 'other officers' mean officers including those belonging to other cadres and officials of educational institutions of secondary and higher secondary and university levels, who do not fall in the preceding category, and the 'free-lance' include various shades of people like political leaders, lawyers, journalists, university-level students, UP Chairmen, NGO officials, social workers, and the like. The number of BCS (Administration) cadre officials is carefully kept below the one-fourth mark of the total number of respondents, while 'other officers' are 43.04 percent and free-lance respondents constitute about one-third of the total. In only two instances, the 50 percent mark is exceeded, that too for the 'other officers' category in Pirojpur and Tangail (53.85 and 64.77 percent respectively). In two other instances (Admn officers from Sunamganj and 'Free-lance' respondents from Khulna) the individual proportions approximate the half-way mark – respectively 49.15 percent and 48.78 percent. On the whole, there was no scope for any one category of respondents to dramatically offset the overall texture of opinions solicited in the opinion survey.

A few demographic characteristics of the respondents were gathered in the survey. Among them, only two – educational qualifications and income ranges may be seen in this context. The educational qualifications of the respondents were like in the following table.

Table 7.02. Educational Qualifications of Respondents in the Opinion Survey

Respondents	Post-graduate	Honours Graduate	Graduate	Under-graduate	No Response
Admn Officers [111]	89 (80.18)	13 (11.71)	9 (08.11)	--	--
Other Officers [198]	94 (47.47)	15 (07.58)	46 (23.23)	38 (19.19)	5 (2.53)
Free-lance [151]	14 (09.27)	27 (17.88)	27 (17.88)	80 (52.98)	3 (1.99)
Total [460]	197 (42.83)	55 (11.96)	82 (17.83)	118 (25.65)	8 (1.74)

Source: Researcher's survey. Figures in parentheses indicate percentage of row totals.

The overwhelming majority (80.18 percent) of respondent officers of Administration cadre hold a post-graduate degree, while a handful of them have just a graduation degree with or without honours. Nearly half of the responding 'other officers' hold a post-graduate degree and another third a graduation degree with or without honours. It may be relevant here to note that a university graduate with a requisite level of proficiency in his or her academic career is entitled to sit for the BCS examinations under the existing laws. But, most of the candidates for BCS examinations are generally found to be holding a post-graduate degree or graduation with honours degrees (Ali 2002:197-8). The inclusion of a number of university-level undergraduate students among the free-lance respondents leads to a preponderance (52.98 percent) of undergraduate respondents in that category. In the survey, the respondents' income positions were also looked into. With a view to distributing the prospective respondents into four groups, a thumb-rule categorization of income ranges was made for the purpose. In terms of income ranges with which the respondents identified themselves, their position was as follows –

Table 7.03. Distribution of Respondents by Income Range *(Income in Taka)*

Respondents	Up to 100,000	100,001 – 200,000	200,001 – 300,000	Above 300,001	Not Responded
Admn Officers [111]	52 (46.85)	55 (49.55)	3 (2.70)	--	1 (00.90)
Other Officers [198]	126 (63.64)	63 (31.82)	3 (1.52)	--	6 (03.03)
Free-lance [151]	66 (43.71)	21 (13.91)	12 (7.95)	8 (5.30)	44 (29.14)
Total [460]	244 (53.04)	139 (30.22)	18 (3.91)	8 (1.74)	51 (11.09)

Source: Researcher's survey. Figures in parentheses indicate percentage of row totals.

It is seen that 11.09 percent respondents declined to divulge their relevant positions, a common problem very often faced while conducting academic surveys. In this respect, the average yearly

income of the single largest group (53.04 percent) of the total respondents is up to Taka 100,000. Out of a total of 409 respondents who entered their particulars, 244 (i.e., 59.66 percent) fall into this category. The next largest group, earmarked for income ranges of between Taka 100,001 and Taka 200,000 a year, constitutes 30.22 percent of the total respondents and 33.99 of the 409 active respondents. Hence, it may be construed as a truly middle-class sample. However, there was no conscious attempt in the study to find any correlation between the income range and the respective groups' pattern(s) of opinion in the given issues of the survey.

7.1.2. Attachment with people. Weber differentiated the administrative behaviour from human behaviour. The officials' behaviour was overtly influenced by his rationalistic interpretations of bureaucracy. But, the latter-day scholars, prominent among whom was Herbert Simon, sought to project administrative behaviour as a product of different patterns of behaviour and interactions of officials with superiors, peers, subordinates and the public. As opposed to Weber's rational-comprehensive decision-making, Simon presented his theory of bounded rationality or *satisficing model*, where people intend to be rational and after checking the alternative solutions to a problem choose the best possible one, rather than searching for an unattainable best or perfect solution (Huque 1990:58). One of the natural consequences of such acts of *bounded rationality* is the varied patterns of the officials' behaviour with the people and people's different perceptions about the attitude of officials. One of the most prominent and frequently labeled accusations against public bureaucracy as a whole is its purported apathy towards and distance from its clientele, i.e., the members of the public. In this regard, Jain and Chaudhuri (1982:196-9) term the general feature as some sort of 'confidence gap' which is very often existent in the developing countries. Based on their survey they found that ordinary villagers' perceptions about the alleged aloofness of officials from the people were squarely distributed among the 'yes', 'perhaps' and 'no' cohorts. Younis and Mostafa (2000:44) hold that cross-cultural understandings may be conducted to have a comprehensive picture on the perceptions about the closeness of public officials. They refer to some environmental traps, which can well be offset by the use of appropriate skills and technology. In the present survey, it was sought to find out the relative positions of BCS (Administration) cadre as perceived by different respondent groups. Respondents were asked as to whether they thought BCS (Administration) officers were aloof from people and unaware of their expectations. The results received in the survey were as presented in Table 7.04.

Table 7.04. Extents of Detachment of BCS (Administration) Officers from People as

Perceived by Respondents

<u>Respondents</u>	<u>Extremely Detached</u>	<u>Moderately Detached</u>	<u>Negligibly Detached</u>	<u>Not Detached</u>
Admn Officers [111]	7 (06.31)	29 (26.13)	23 (20.72)	52 (46.85)
Other Officers [198]	16 (08.08)	69 (34.85)	43 (21.72)	70 (35.35)
Free-lance [151]	34 (22.52)	58 (38.41)	30 (19.87)	29 (19.21)
Total [460]	57 (12.39)	156 (33.91)	96 (20.87)	151 (32.83)

Source: Researcher's survey. Figures in parentheses indicate percentage of row totals.

Nearly half (46.30 percent) of the total respondents thought that BCS (Administration) officers were detached from people. However, among the Admn officers, only 32.44 percent respondents held a similar appreciation. To view it from a different angle, had there been no respondents from BCS (Administration) cadre, there would have been a total of 349 respondents, and the proportions of *extreme*, *moderate*, *negligible* and *none* would have been 14.33 percent, 36.39 percent, 20.92 percent and 28.37 percent respectively. Compared to the extent of aloofness from people they think of themselves, BCS (Administration) officers are perceived by others as substantially more detached. The free-lance respondents' views are significantly opposite vis-à-vis those of BCS (Administration) respondents, while the 'other officers' hold a middle-course view. The historically demonstrated elitist character of its illustrious predecessors – ICS and CSP – may not have been burnt down altogether in the psyche of this band of public officials. It reminds the situation in Pakistan, where administrators in the district 'became more and more aloof from the general population and maintained contact with a notable few. Attitudes of the public and of public servants toward each other were enmeshed in a complex tangle of awe and artificiality, distrust and disdain' (Khan 1980:119). The scene may be compared with the results of another study which showed that out of a total of 500 respondents of cross section of people, the single largest group – 213 persons, i.e., 42.6 percent – perceived the civil servants in general as thinking of themselves as 'separated from people' (UNDP 1993:62). In the same study, the proportions favouring the other epithets were 22.4 percent for 'servants of people', 15.2 percent for 'friends of people', and 13.2 percent for 'lords of people', while 6.6 percent gave no opinion. The administration cadre officials are among the most prominent field officers of BCS and they have a wide scope for interaction with people in general. Hence, it is no wonder that people have a favourable impression of these officials. The contemporary contexts can hardly allow an absolute detachment of public officials from the members of the public especially because the administrators have to work under a wide public gaze. Moreover, people's representatives have phenomenally gained in terms of formal and informal influences during the recent decades.

On a related issue, the respondents were approached with a question as to whether they felt that BCS (Administration) cadre officers have an aptitude for serving the people. The results are reproduced in Table 7.05.

Table 7.05. Degree of Service Attitude of BCS (Administration) Officers toward People as Perceived by Respondents

<u>Respondents</u>	<u>Extraordinary</u>	<u>Good</u>	<u>Average</u>	<u>Not Good</u>
Admn Officers [111]	89 (80.18)	17 (15.32)	5 (4.50)	--
Other Officers [198]	86 (43.43)	70 (35.35)	37 (18.69)	5 (2.53)
Free-lance [151]	47 (31.13)	66 (43.71)	30 (19.87)	8 (5.30)
Total [460]	222 (48.26)	153 (33.26)	72 (15.65)	13 (2.83)

Source: Researcher's survey. Figures in parentheses indicate percentage of row totals.

On this count, the overall response looks quite heartening for BCS (Administration) officers, as nearly half (48.26 percent) of the respondents viewed them with extreme favour. Another one-third expressed satisfaction with the level of service attitude for the people. Again, the intensities of satisfaction as expressed by respective respondent categories are quite variant. The proportion of respondents registering their appreciation of extraordinary service attitudes of Administration cadre officers for people are four-fifths in case of BCS (Administration) officers, nearly a half in case of 'other officers' and just below one-third in case of the free-lance respondents. None of the respondents from BCS (Administration) officers and a very few of the other respondents repudiated BCS (Administration) cadre officers on count of service attitude. If one took the sample size at 349 by excluding the 111 respondents from BCS (Administration) cadre, the *extraordinary*, *good*, *average* and *not good* categories would have carried 38.11 percent, 38.97 percent, 19.20 percent and 3.72 percent respectively. Although a big proportion of free-lance respondents are satisfied with the service attitude, they are not willing to give the latter an extraordinary credit. Huque (1990:58) has an explanation to offer on the behaviour of the administrators in developing countries, who often tend to create inducements for themselves through manipulating rules when organizational provisions appear to them as inadequate. In such situations, inducements outweigh the contributions of administrators, and the officials gradually develop the idea and a belief that they are doing the society a favour by serving in administrative system. This is somewhat heartening to note that such a despondent view is not found in the study, although an amount of uneasiness is fathomed in the fold of common folks. As another study reveals, civil servants have a service mentality, and only with a few exceptions, they are used to seeing how quickly they could render a service to people (Younis and Mostafa 2000:94). Under the context, the BCS (Administration) cadre officers may have to think and strive to win over different strata of the common people by showing exponential signs of service attitude.

Given the premier position of the Deputy Commissioner (DC) in the public administration in general and the BCS (Administration) cadre in particular, the same issue was examined in a different way by asking for views regarding the accessibility of the DCs to common people. A tabular presentation of the responses is in Table 7.06.

Table 7.06. Accessibility of Deputy Commissioners to Common People as Perceived by Respondents

<u>Respondents</u>	<u>Maximum</u>	<u>Moderate</u>	<u>Negligible</u>	<u>Nil</u>
Admn Officers [111]	62 (55.86)	33 (29.73)	12 (10.81)	4 (3.60)
Other Officers [198]	89 (44.95)	38 (19.19)	44 (22.22)	27 (13.64)
Free-lance [151]	54 (35.76)	40 (26.49)	34 (22.52)	23 (15.23)
Total [460]	205 (44.57)	111 (24.13)	90 (19.57)	54 (11.74)

Source: Researcher's survey. Figures in parentheses indicate percentage of row totals.

In this case too, on an overall basis, the single largest majority (44.57 percent of total respondents) commented that the DCs are accessible to a maximum extent and nearly one-fourth (24.13 percent) held that DCs are moderately accessible. Similarly, the patterns of responses of different categories of respondents demonstrated extents of variation on this issue also. The respondents who express their indifference (*negligible*) and disdain (*nil*) constitute a total of 14.41 percent of 'Admn officers', 35.86 percent of 'other officers' and 37.75 percent of 'free-lance' respondents. By deducing the BCS (Administration) officer-respondents and by taking the sample size at 349, one might have found the overall clusters at 40.97 percent, 22.35 percent, 22.35 percent and 14.33 percent respectively for *maximum*, *moderate*, *negligible* and *nil* categories. It means that a rosy picture presented by BCS (Administration) officer-respondents in this respect leads to a comparatively brighter scenario. Conversely, it also means that the BCS (Administration) cadre officers, particularly the Deputy Commissioners, have something to do in order to improve their standing among people. Members of the public very much look for seeing the government officials, especially officers like Deputy Commissioners and their service colleagues, for redress of their grievances. In the process, if the former feel that they have been let down at the hand of public servants, it may be very difficult to portray those civil servants as pro-people officials. Indeed, there seems a better prospect for a brighter rapport with commoners, partly because the demographical tie between higher civil servants and military officers on the one hand and the big landowning political ruling elites (Ahamed 1980:70-1), does not hold good any more in Bangladesh. It is easier for the bureaucrats to serve the people with ties with particular group or groups. The commoners should be having more and more access to officers like the Deputy Commissioners.

7.1.3. Fairness. The acceptability of the administrative system of a country is largely dependent upon fairness, which is not merely practiced, but, more importantly, which is internalized by the system. The manifestations of fairness are noticed by the administrators themselves as well as the prospective clientele and the people at large. The more the public administration is fair in its dealings with people and discharge of its responsibilities, the more it achieves in terms of effectiveness. Fairness necessarily implies a constant course of even-handedness, an unstinting allegiance to principles, an unconditional disavowal of partisanship and an inherent propensity on the part of the holders of public officer to help people. The BCS (Administration) cadre inherits a legacy of totalitarian rule exercised in a grandiose manner by its historical predecessor, the Indian Civil Service (ICS), and to a relatively lesser extent by the Civil Service of Pakistan (CSP). In their multifarious tasks, the BCS (Administration) cadre officers need to interact with divergent varieties of people both inside and beyond the official and political systems. Their interactions are observed by all and the perceptions made through such observations leave significant impressions about its fairness – and, with that, its acceptability and effectiveness. With a view to assessing the impressions held by the BCS (Administration) cadre officers, a number of questions were framed in the questionnaire. It was sought to discover how their dealings and demeanours were rated in terms of the importance, neutrality and strictness to laws as exercised by the officers of BCS (Administration) cadre. The respondents were requested to give their impression of BCS (Administration) cadre officers' degree of neutrality while discharging their duties as well as dealing with others, especially the politicians. The responses may be seen in Table 7.07.

Table 7.07. Perceived Degree of Neutrality of BCS (Administration) Cadre Officers

<u>Respondents</u>	<u>Fully</u>	<u>Moderately</u>	<u>Negligibly</u>	<u>Not Neutral</u>
	<u>Neutral</u>	<u>Neutral</u>	<u>Neutral</u>	
Admn Officers [111]	29 (26.13)	64 (57.66)	17 (15.32)	1 (0.90)
Other Officers [198]	62 (31.31)	58 (29.29)	45 (22.73)	33 (16.67)
Free-lance [151]	19 (12.58)	44 (29.14)	48 (31.79)	40 (26.49)
Total [460]	110 (23.91)	166 (36.09)	110 (23.91)	74 (16.09)

Source: Researcher's survey. Figures in parentheses indicate percentage of row totals.

Three-fifths of all respondents hold that BCS (Administration) cadre officers have and show full or moderate extent of neutrality, and the rest, i.e., 40 percent of them maintain that the neutrality of BCS (Administration) cadre officers is hardly worth-mentioning. One interesting finding is that only 26.13 percent of the Admn officer-respondents believe that BCS (Administration) cadre officers are fully neutral, although more than half (57.66 percent) say that they are moderately neutral. Although the views of 'other officers' in this respect are more evenly

distributed, interestingly a larger proportion of them (31.31 percent) express their satisfaction with the highest degree of neutrality of BCS (Administration) cadre officers. In this case, the views of the 'free-lance' respondents are quite negatively poised against BCS (Administration) cadre officers since only 12.58 percent and 29.14 percent of them have registered their votes respectively for the highest and moderate degrees of neutrality of such officers. A total of 58.28 percent express their very poor impression about the neutral character of BCS (Administration) officers. It means, the people – albeit only the educated ones, who do not nor, who cannot maintain a very regular and close proximity with administrators – have a largely negative portrayal of BCS (Administration) officers in terms of neutrality, a trait which was in the essence of a Weberian model of legal-rational bureaucracy¹. It may have an undesirable impact on the acceptability and effectiveness of the public administration of Bangladesh as a whole and the BCS (Administration) cadre in particular. In the result, the prospects for it being a useful tool for advancement may eventually be questioned.

The respondents were given a comparable question framed in a roundabout fashion to determine whether they expect BCS (Administration) officers to remain strict even in difficult professional situations. In Bangladesh, like any other developing country, there are pressure groups some of which are quite formidable when they exert formal and informal leverage to get things done to their liking, no matter whether such acts are in conformity with laws and good reasons. Younis and Mostafa (2000:178) maintain that such groups tend to provide valuable information and advice to the governments in the developed countries. As the political organizations and political leaders are the most conspicuous and powerful pressure groups in Bangladesh, the administrators here face most pressures from them. At times, there arise difficult situations when the tenacity and strictness of BCS (Administration) officers are put to acid test. The results of the opinion survey are presented in Table 7.08.

Table 7.08. Expectation on Strictness of BCS (Administration) Cadre Officers in Difficult Professional Situations

<u>Respondents</u>	<u>Maximum</u>	<u>Moderate</u>	<u>Negligible</u>	<u>Nil</u>
Admn Officers [111]	93 (83.78)	14 (12.61)	2 (01.80)	2 (01.80)
Other Officers [198]	161 (81.31)	28 (14.14)	6 (03.03)	3 (01.52)
Free-lance [151]	132 (87.42)	16 (10.60)	--	3 (01.99)
Total [460]	386 (83.91)	58 (12.61)	8 (01.74)	8 (01.74)

Source: Researcher's survey. Figures in parentheses indicate percentage of row totals.

¹ Some of the respondents in this category may however be not so remote from administration.

There appears a near-unanimity when the respondents place sublime expectations on the BCS (Administration) officers. Neutrality is often contingent on the strictness of service providers and dispensers of justice, who are the BCS (Administration) officers in this case. Hence, when one proceeds to cross-examine this picture with the information contained in Table 7.07, an air of frustration may be inevitable. Everybody expects the BCS (Administration) officers to remain strict and display an utmost degree of neutrality. But, as it turns out, the latter are found to be able to give what falls far short of that expectation. This kind of situation may eventually lead to a serious *system lag*, when a system fails to deliver the results expected of it. Neutrality of the civil service is ensured through accountability, which is protected by ministerial responsibility. Where neutrality is protected, administrative behaviour towards the public is supposed to remain the same, and the civil servants are able to serve ministers and governments of different political lines with the same spirit, motivation and responsiveness (Younis and Mostafa 2000:17).

Keeping in mind the need for neutrality of public officials, especially the officers of BCS (Administration) cadre, the respondents were given a question with a kind of negative note. The post of Deputy Commissioner was duly held to be of paramount importance and the posture of its incumbents was sought to be elicited. The importance of politicians, especially of those who throng the platforms of ruling elites, was also given due consideration. With an eye on the significance of the pattern of interaction between these two sets of important people, the respondents were asked whether they perceive a degree of subservience on the part of the Deputy Commissioners towards politicians of the ruling parties. The next table holds the information based on the responses received from various categories of respondents.

Table 7.09. Perceived Subservience of Deputy Commissioners to Politicians of Ruling Parties

<u>Respondents</u>	<u>Maximum</u>	<u>Moderate</u>	<u>Negligible</u>	<u>Nil</u>
Admn Officers [111]	25 (22.52)	50 (45.05)	28 (25.23)	8 (7.21)
Other Officers [198]	76 (38.38)	61 (30.81)	46 (23.23)	15 (7.58)
Free-lance [151]	92 (60.93)	45 (29.80)	8 (5.30)	6 (3.97)
Total [460]	193 (41.96)	156 (33.91)	82 (17.83)	29 (6.30)

Source: Researcher's survey. Figures in parentheses indicate percentage of row totals.

The results conspicuously reflect a sense of deep frustration. To begin with the opinion of the BCS (Administration) officer-respondents, nearly a quarter (22.52 percent) of these officers is of the opinion that the Deputy Commissioners are extremely subservient to the ruling politicians. A still larger proportion (another 45.05 percent) of them finds moderate subservience on the part of the Deputy Commissioners. It means 67.57 percent of this category of respondents is seriously

skeptical about the incumbent Deputy Commissioner in respect of their stature vis-à-vis the political leaders of ruling parties. Only less than a third (32.44 percent) of them speak of negligible or no subservience at all. In a way, this is also a reflection of a seriously debased morale of BCS (Administration) cadre officers. The responses of the 'other officers' are not materially much different from those of the BCS (Administration) officer-respondents, except for the fact that comparatively higher proportions (38.38 percent) of them ascribe a total subservience to ruling party politicians. However, the most striking revelation is made by the free-lance respondents, 60.93 percent of whom do not find any other thing but a complete surrender of the Deputy Commissioners to the leaders of ruling political parties. About a third (29.80 percent) speaks of a moderate degree of subservience, while a paltry 9.27 percent feel that there are negligible or no traces of subservience of those officers to the ruling party influentials. The absence of responsible politics and politicians may be partly responsible for this hapless situation. The best interest of public officials lies in the establishment of democracy, which itself fosters administrative neutrality (Younis and Mostafa 2000:17). Bangladesh lacks this condition. However, the worst weaknesses are in the concerned officials themselves, who do not intend to, or have the dexterity to, stand erect before their influential political counterparts, clients and bosses. If the Deputy Commissioner, who is head of district administration and supervisor to a big number of BCS (Administration) cadre officers, hold impressions of a dwarf tool at the hand of influential political leaders and other functionaries, there is little left to expect a neutrality and fairness of them.

In yet another question, the respondents were asked whether, in their opinion, officers of BCS (Administration) cadre compromise with laws and principles. This was intended to assess the standing of the group under reference on count of their perceived strictness against the odds they are often faced with. It may be recollected that there has been an overwhelming and almost-absolute expectation that the administrators will always maintain fairness through the exercise of strictness and unquestionable neutrality (see Table 7.08 above). In fact, the philosophy of a politically neutral and legal-rational bureaucracy necessarily demands such strictness to laws and principles, without which there could have been no fair administrative system anywhere. However, compromises, or maybe more appropriately termed, 'adjustments' have now-a-days become very commonplace². The responses summarized in the following table also tend to testify to this contention.

² Indeed, when officers are not ready for such acts of 'adjustments' their superiors often snub them as 'tactless', especially if the former are placed in some kind of trouble for their 'intransigence'.

Table 7.10. Incidences of Perceived Compromises with Laws and Principles by BCS (Administration) Officers in Professional Functions

<u>Respondents</u>	<u>Always</u>	<u>Sometimes</u>	<u>Rarely</u>	<u>Never</u>
Admn Officers [111]	6 (05.41)	46 (41.44)	29 (26.13)	30 (27.03)
Other Officers [198]	36 (18.18)	81 (40.91)	42 (21.21)	39 (19.70)
Free-lance [151]	38 (25.17)	41 (27.15)	47 (31.13)	25 (16.56)
Total [460]	80 (17.39)	168 (36.52)	118 (25.65)	94 (20.43)

Source: Researcher's survey. Figures in parentheses indicate percentage of row totals.

Just one in five (20.43 percent) respondents feel there was no incidence at all to mark a compromise with laws and principles. Another one-fourth (25.65 percent) recollect rare cases when compromises were committed. In total, less than half (a total of 46.08 percent) of the respondents feel that there was little or no incidences of compromises. On the other hand, more than half (i.e., 53.92 percent) of respondents ascribe regular or frequent practices of compromise on the part of BCS (Administration) officers. The BCS (Administration) officer-respondents almost unanimously ruled out a suggestion that BCS (Administration) officers may be indulging in constant act of compromises. Only 6 respondents (5.41 percent) among them admitted of the possibility of so happening. However, the single largest group of respondents in this table (41.44 percent) is composed of BCS (Administration) officers, who maintain that officer of BCS (Administration) cadre often resort to compromises in their professional domain. The second largest respondent group too – 40.91 percent of the 'other officers' – hold a similar view that BCS (Administration) cadre officers frequently compromise while discharging professional responsibilities³. Many of the 'other officers' are traditionally critical of the BCS (Administration) cadre officers. However, on this count they appear in a strikingly similar posture in testifying to the incidences of frequent breaches of norms. Thus, it becomes clear that BCS (Administration) cadre officers are perceived to be often compromising with the stipulated norms in their professional spheres. This impression reflects at least a moderate sense of frustration about the presumed fairness on the part of a so important component of the country's public administration.

7.2. Perceptions of Performance

7.2.1. Performance. The term 'performance' denotes several things, the most prominent among which relates to playing of certain roles assigned to specific actors in a game. In this regard, role players are taken as if like the actors in a theatrical event. But, unlike theatrical play, which has premeditated sequences of events and destinations, public administration is like a perennial game

³ On this count, the free-lance respondents seem less critical.

of the public management of largely unpredictable public affairs, where *performance* has got a very important place in the sense that the responsible civil servants are expected to perform their assigned tasks with a reasonably acceptable standard. When these standards are compromised, development is impeded. Individual performance of officials in public administration in countries like Bangladesh becomes quite hard for evaluation partly because of the extremely quick job rotation (Rahman 2001:60). Hence, evaluation of a more generalized performance of officials may serve the purpose. On the whole, M. P. Todaro, an expert in public sector productivity, views the civil service performance in a low esteem when he comments that civil servants and other trained personnel are often poorly utilized, badly motivated, and in most respects less productive than they should be (Younis and Mostafa 2000:123). Given the unique position the public administration enjoys in the developing countries, a healthy relationship between people and public officials is necessary for optimum returns in development activities. At the same time, people are the true judge of the performance of public administration (Jain and Chaudhuri 1982:181). Hence, opinions of clientele as well as officials themselves and their peers were sought in the survey. This was an attempt to reach a comprehensive position regarding the performance of the cadre as a whole with particular eye on some unique functions of BCS (Administration) officers. Perceptions of respondents on the roles of BCS (Administration) officers in comparison with other streams of officers and political functionaries were sought and the results are henceforth analyzed. Here again, cross-sections of respondents were approached with certain questions so as not allow any uniquely biased opinion to sway the study results. On another front, it may also be kept in mind that the public administration of Bangladesh has got a quite unreliable performance evaluation system for individual officers, which is often marred with procrastination and subjectivity of the superiors (Arafunnesa and Rashid 1994:106). As a result, only a collective position of officers is possible to be investigated upon in the present study, where opinions of the specific respondents are solicited about a few professional functions the officers of BCS (Administration) cadre are required to perform as a matter of routine.

Land management is a preserve for the officers of BCS (Administration) cadre officials. Alive to the importance of land management in the mind of the countrymen, the government created a post of Assistant Commissioner (Land) as head of the Upazila Land Office. The AC (Land), as he is commonly called in the public administration parlance, replaced the former Thana Revenue Officers or Circle Officers (Revenue) in the 1980s. It was expected that a BCS (Administration) cadre officer with three or so years of service to his credit would infuse new blood and a reinvigorated sense of purpose in the country's land management system. The impact of this

innovation was sought to be assessed through a question posed to the respondents as to whether they perceive any improvement in the system in the preceding 20 years. The responses are not very promising as just a little over one-third respondents tell they find significant improvements in the sphere. The pattern of responses to the question may be seen in the following table.

Table 7.11. Perception on Possible Improvement in Land Management System

<u>Respondents</u>	<u>Extraordinary</u>	<u>Moderate</u>	<u>Negligible</u>	<u>None</u>
Admn Officers [111]	6 (5.41)	36 (32.43)	50 (45.05)	19 (17.12)
Other Officers [198]	17 (8.59)	45 (22.73)	97 (48.99)	39 (19.70)
Free-lance [151]	12 (7.95)	48 (31.79)	59 (39.07)	32 (21.19)
Total [460]	35 (7.61)	129 (28.04)	206 (44.78)	90 (19.57)

Source: Researcher's survey. Figures in parentheses indicate percentage of row totals.

All categories of respondents show a similar pattern of responses. Only 5.41 percent of the BCS (Administration) officer-respondents claim to have found extra-ordinary improvements in the land management system. Another 32.43 percent of them think that there has been only moderate improvement. To view the matter from a converse angle, 62.17 percent of BCS (Administration) officer-respondents find only negligible or no improvement at all in land management. It speaks of a disappointing posture, as the appointment of officers of BCS (Administration) cadre to head upazila land offices possibly did not result in any significant development, or the positive changes brought about by it could not be made public. Both these phenomena are antithetical to the concepts of an informed public and an innovative change in administration. The situation will probably require a thorough evaluation. Quoting similar instances in other developing countries, Rahman (2001:41) prescribes, among other things, office automation in land management too. Such a measure may lead to a more informed people and considerable reduction, if not a complete elimination, of irritants related with the keeping and updating of landed interests in Bangladesh⁴. If such automation is brought about in the land management system, it is the very officers of BCS (Administration) cadre who have to operationalise the innovation and improve it further on the basis of experiences and reactions of the clientele.

7.2.2. Law and order. Public order and security often becomes the index of a country's general state of health. A country is regarded unhealthy if its public order does not allow its citizens and inhabitants a life without excessive worries about personal security. One major traditional task of BCS (Administration) cadre is the enforcement of law and order. In the administrative tradition of South Asia, district is the locus of relevant activities relating to law and order (Chaturvedi

⁴ The government is experimentally introducing a system of receipt of land taxes through banks. The introduction of computerized land transfer deeds and bringing the three separate bodies in the subject under single roofs is also in the offing. *Land Minister's interview with BBC Bengali Service, 27 October 2003.*

1988:62). The situation is largely unchanged, except for that (1) the present-day districts have shrunk into fractions of the districts which were created and run in the British colonial days, and (2) at present people have gained more significance vis-à-vis administrators who undergo constant losses of power. Spread of education, strengthening of democracy, empowerment of people under an egalitarian environment, technological innovations and development in communication system and physical infrastructure have contributed to this process. However, districts remain as the seats for developmental activities and activities related with law and order. As Obaidullah (1999:97) points out, the structure of field administration and the behaviour of key field officials are not wholly explicable apart from the total pattern of legislative-political-administrative interrelations. Field administration has been variedly used as a tool of centralization, and rarely as a tool of decentralization. The importance of district administration has stayed as it used to be, albeit in a changed context. While taking up the issue of the performance of law and order functions of BCS (Administration) officers, district administration is made the main focus here. In this regard, the police department has got the most direct role. The duties of prevention of crime and bringing the perpetrators to justice are primarily reposed on the hand of this enforcement department. Hence, a very high level of expectation is pinned on the police too. However, as a recent study conducted for the Global Competitiveness Index of World Economic Forum (WEF) suggests, 89 percent of business units in Bangladesh hold that police protection for business is just untrustworthy. The Index also holds that 95.6 percent respondents were 'most emphatic about the absence of public trust in the honesty of politicians'. The corresponding proportion was 91.1 percent during the preceding year's survey, the WEF study says. The competence of public sector officials is held by 82.87 percent respondents to be inferior to that of the private sector. Again, 66 percent held the country's judiciary to be far from independent.⁵ These things are not entirely unusual in countries like Bangladesh. Countries like Malaysia have successfully overcome similar situations through well-planned measures that included the introduction of better client service scheme, a *Client Charter*, movement for total quality management, improvements in processes and procedures, behavioural changes, and the like (Rahman 2001:42). South Africa experienced a similar, or more deplorable, situation in the 1990s after the end of apartheid. With painstaking care, the country has shaken off much of that havoc and started to become an engine-house for Africa's regeneration. Bangladesh can think about similar means. A quick breakthrough is required so that the morass cannot inhibit the future improvements of its personal and institutional life.

⁵ The Daily Star, 31 October 2003.

Politicians, BCS (Administration) officers and police officials are the three most important sets of functionaries having a direct role in public order. It was thought rational to elicit impression of these three groups of personnel in the mind of the respondents. Law and order being a most common issue of public debate, the respondents were asked to give out their views on the role these parties have been playing in this regard. The questionnaires for the opinion survey contained a question as to how the respondents would rate the levels of responsibility of each of those three most relevant sets of people for a deteriorating law and order situation. They were required to express their views in the form of a close-ended response, without going for elaboration of their opinions. As a result, a more detailed texture of such patterns of answers could not be discovered. Only notional rating of the performance of the respective role players could be laid bare by the responses which are now presented in the following table.

Table 7.12. Perceived Extents Responsibilities of Different Role Players for Deterioration of Law and Order Situation in Bangladesh


<u>Respondents</u>	<u>Role Players</u>	<u>Fully</u>	<u>Partially</u>	<u>Negligibly</u>	<u>Not At All</u>
<i>Perception of BCS (Admn) officers [111]</i>	Politicians	85 (76.58)	20 (18.02)	5 (04.50)	1 (00.90)
	BCS (Admn)	14 (12.61)	24 (21.62)	35 (31.53)	38 (34.23)
	Officers	56 (50.45)	35 (31.53)	17 (15.32)	3 (02.70)
	Police Officers				
<i>Perception of other officers [198]</i>	Politicians	145 (73.23)	37 (18.69)	10 (05.05)	6 (03.03)
	BCS (Admn)	27 (13.64)	63 (31.82)	58 (29.29)	50 (25.25)
	Officers	90 (45.45)	77 (38.89)	27 (13.64)	4 (02.02)
	Police Officers				
<i>Perception of free-lance respondents [151]</i>	Politicians	107 (70.86)	31 (20.53)	5 (03.31)	8 (05.30)
	BCS (Admn)	32 (21.19)	67 (44.37)	39 (25.83)	13 (08.61)
	Officers	77 (50.99)	45 (29.80)	21 (13.91)	8 (05.30)
	Police Officers				
Total (460)	Politicians	337 (73.26)	88 (19.13)	20 (04.35)	15 (03.26)
	BCS (Admn) Officers	73 (15.87)	154 (33.48)	132 (28.70)	101 (21.96)
	Police Officers	223 (48.48)	157 (34.13)	65 (14.13)	15 (03.26)

Source: Researcher's survey. Figures in parentheses indicate percentage of row totals.

The survey results collated in the preceding table reveal that the political functionaries of the country are profusely exposed to criticism from all shades of respondents. This is evidently clear that the politicians constitute the largest body to shoulder the most of the huge blame for their part played in the declining law and order situation of Bangladesh. Since this is a presentation of information on the opinion about three different sets of functionaries as passed by three different

groups of respondents, the results of the opinion survey in this regard may give a clearer instant view if they are presented in a pictorial form like the following bar diagram.

Graph-2 : Extents of Responsibilities of Different Role Players for Deterioration of Law and Order Situation



Source: Researcher's survey.

On the whole, 73.26 percent respondents hold that politicians are fully responsible for the deterioration of law and order situation. From BCS (Admn) officers, other officers and free-lance categories of respondents, the corresponding figures are 76.58 percent, 73.23 percent and 70.86 percent respectively. It shows quite a bit of near-uniformity of the pattern of responses regarding the responsibility of the political functionaries in the currently deplorable law and order situation. The responses received from respondents who entered their choices for holding the politicians as 'partially responsible' reflect an overall 19.13 percent mark, while the

individual proportions for the three categories stand at 18.02 percent, 18.69 percent and 20.53 percent respectively. In another way, a total of $(73.26 + 19.13 =) 92.39$ percent respondents maintain that politicians are either fully or partially responsible for the plummeting social order in Bangladesh. This view actually conforms to contemporary public opinion. For example, on 5 September 2003, the Minister for Foreign Affairs told the reporters that politicians were making the crime control difficult by harbouring crimes and making advantages of the spree of criminal activities, despite their express verbosity against crime and criminals⁶. Again, on 8 September 2003, the Federation of Bangladesh Chambers of Commerce and Industries (FBCCI), apex body for the country's entrepreneurs, expressed its concern for the deteriorating law and order situation. Terming 'a nexus' as deterrent to business and investment, the business community leaders called for *breaking the nexus between politicians, police and the criminals*⁷. In yet another instance, the headline of the city edition of a leading daily ran as "Crimes thrive behind political shield". It quoted some city police officials as saying, "We have to stop politicians in power patronizing and influencing criminals before we can do something in the field." Officials said that whenever they arrested a person there were undue interferences from different political quarters and also from top police officials. The feature also narrated that huge amounts of money is spent by individual police officers for the purpose of securing a posting in the lucrative police stations⁸. This tie between criminals, police and politicians is not a situation peculiar to Bangladesh. Nor is it a new phenomenon. But, as the Indian political scientist Rajni Kothari terms it, criminals have turned into politicians (Hardgrave 1984:53). Such a situation calls for an urgent treatment of the political system – a sphere not covered under the scope of present study.

About the responsibility of police officers in the country's dwindling law and order problems, the respondents hold not a very bright opinion. The just-quoted accusation of buying lucrative placements, in which there may be a number of parties including politicians and officials of the department itself, is just a symptom of the malaise. Under this kind of situation, the survey results show that, on an overall basis, nearly a half (48.48 percent) of the respondents maintain that police officers are fully responsible, while another 34.13 percent hold them partially responsible for the deterioration. Thus, more than four-fifths (i.e., $48.48 + 34.13 = 82.61$ percent) of the total respondents label some sort of criticism of police officers for their perceived inability of containing the law and order problems. To give a category-wise break-up, 50.45 percent of the

⁶ *The Daily Star*, 6 September 2003.

⁷ *The Daily Star*, 9 September 2003.

⁸ *The Daily Star*, 22 September 2003.

BCS (Administration) officer-respondents, 45.45 percent of the other officer-respondents and 50.99 percent of the free-lance respondents hold this view. The percentage points of these three categories of respondents, who ascribe partial responsibility to police officers for the current law and order scenario, are 31.53, 38.89 and 29.80 respectively. If one adds the percentage points which each respondent group has put on police officers the 'full' and 'partial' shares of responsibility in this regard, another striking near-uniformity of opinion emerges from the survey results. These are 81.98 percent from BCS (Administration) officer-respondents, 84.34 percent from other officers and 80.79 percent from free-lance respondents. The proportions of these three categories of respondents who find 'negligible' and 'no' shares of responsibility of police officers are 15.32 percent and 2.70 percent of BCS (Administration) officer-respondents, 13.64 percent and 2.02 percent of other officers, and 13.91 percent and 5.30 percent of free-lance respondents respectively. These results definitely necessitate a serious attention from those who matter in the decision-making as well as policy-making system of Bangladesh. Some sort of socio-psychological study also may help reveal the substantive causes of such a hapless public posture of such an important public body. The scenario is not singularly relevant for Bangladesh only. This sort of situation is found almost everywhere. The police in India too are held in generally low esteem and they, in turn, are said to be demoralized, unreliable and increasingly militant. As early as 1979, the National Police Commission reported on the police's 'politically-oriented partisan performance of duties, brutality, corruption and inefficiency'. A survey on the 'image of police in India' conducted by the Bureau of Police Research and Development revealed that 77 percent of the cross-sections of respondents blamed the police for 'protecting or shielding the criminal elements' and for 'malpractices like putting up false cases, non-registration of complaints, use of third-degree methods, high-handedness and illegal detention at police stations'. The study also blamed political interference as the principal cause of police malpractices (Hardgrave 1984:54). The same or similar things are also found in other parts of the world including the developed countries (Rao 1999:118). Bangladesh faces the same type of predicament and there is an increasingly loud outcry in this respect. Once some causes for the evils are revealed and made public, possible remedies may also result under a transparent system.

The survey results in this regard show a mixed form of appreciation of the share of responsibility which is perceptively ascribed by respondents on the officers of BCS (Administration) cadre. On an overall basis, 15.87 percent and 33.48 percent respondents attribute 'full' and 'partial' responsibility on the BCS (Administration) cadre officials for the country's worsening law and

order situation. These two groups which assign substantial responsibility on BCS (Administration) officers constitute just below half (i.e., 49.35 percent) of the total respondents and the rest (i.e., 51.65 percent) find 'negligible' or 'no' responsibility at all for the officers of BCS (Administration) cadre for the decline in the country's tranquility. To view the scenario from a category-wise break-up, the proportions of BCS (Administration) officer-respondents who ascribed 'full' and 'partial' responsibilities on the officers of BCS (Administration) cadre are 12.61 percent and 21.62 percent respectively. The total percentage point of these two entries is 34.23, which falls far short of the corresponding overall position, i.e., 49.35 percent. In this respect, BCS (Administration) officer-respondents appear to be understandably generous toward their peers. The proportions of 'other officers' who marked their choices for tagging 'full' and 'partial' responsibilities on the officers of BCS (Administration) cadre are 13.64 percent and 31.82 percent respectively, which are well below the average marks. Given the administrative relationships among different streams of public officials, these respondents are not generally expected to give extra credits to the officers of BCS (Administration) cadre or to overlook any of their possible lapses. Hence, this depiction seems to be based on a sound reasoning. However, the free-lance respondents' views are a little strong against the officers of BCS (Administration) cadre in this regard; as 21.19 percent and 44.37 percent of them hold that the officers of BCS (Administration) cadre are 'fully' and 'partially' responsible for the currently available negative law and order posture of Bangladesh. The combined percentage point of these two choices (65.56) is quite above the overall combined figure on these two entries. The free-lance respondents look unlikely to understate the share of responsibility which is due for the officers of BCS (Administration) cadre for the declining discipline situation. Indeed, the country's internal and external image does not leave any scope for absolving its important sectors of the burden they helped stockpile. The responses, including those of the free-lance respondents, have to be taken in this light without unduly trying to exonerate any group of officials or personnel, or without trying to vilify any important functionaries. Therefore, despite a relatively better posture of BCS (Administration) cadre vis-à-vis the two other groups in terms of their responsibilities in the unpleasant law and order situation, there remains a stigma on its performance too. With that, there unfolds a need for appropriate remedies for its manifested shortcomings.

Since long, the Deputy Commissioner (DC), in his capacity as the District Magistrate (DM), has been playing a central role in law and order functions. In the initial years, when these institutions were created, the DM supervised the function of the police force of the district. Through the passage of decades, now-a-days the DMs do not directly control the activities of the police

department. However, as the head of lower-tier criminal judiciary and as the chief agent of the national government, the DC s still retains considerable influence on the related affairs. With the above picture in the background, the competence of the DC in discharging his law and order responsibilities may be analyzed on the basis of the responses received in the survey. The responses to the question as to how the respondents perceive the competence of DCs in the subject under reference are presented in the next table.

Table 7.13. Competence of Deputy Commissioners in Law and Order Functions as Perceived by Respondents

<u>Respondents</u>	<u>Maximum</u>	<u>Moderate</u>	<u>Negligible</u>	<u>Nil</u>
Admn Officers [111]	57 (51.35)	37 (33.33)	17 (15.32)	--
Other Officers [198]	82 (41.41)	68 (34.34)	36 (18.18)	12 (6.06)
Free-lance [151]	43 (28.48)	64 (42.38)	24 (15.89)	20 (13.25)
Total [460]	182 (39.57)	169 (36.74)	77 (16.74)	32 (6.96)

Source: Researcher's survey. Figures in parentheses indicate percentage of row totals.

The table shows that 39.57 percent of all respondents on an overall basis maintain that the Deputy Commissioners are competent to a maximum extent, while another 36.74 percent hold them as moderately competent in their functions relating to law and order. The rest of the respondents, i.e., 23.70 percent feel that the DCs have little or no competence at all in this respect. It is not irrelevant that unlike 13.25 percent of the free-lance respondents who find no competence at all in the DCs in their discharge of law and order functions, none of BCS (Administration) officer-respondents called the DCs as utterly incompetent. Among the 'other officer-respondents' 6.06 percent tend to support the view of those free-lance respondents. Those respondents who view the Deputy Commissioners as most competent are 51.35 percent of BCS (Administration) officer-respondents, 41.41 percent of 'other officers' and 28.48 percent of free-lance respondents. It is understandable that more than half of BCS (Administration) officer-respondents may have felt a psychological affinity when they discover maximum competence in their service compatriots. The proportions of respondents who recognize 'maximum' and 'moderate' competence of the DCs in their discharge of responsibilities relating to law and order are 84.68 percent of BCS (Administration) officers, 75.75 percent of other officers and 70.86 percent of free-lance persons. The overall entries in combination in those two choices amount to 76.31 percent. It means more than three-fourths of all respondents have enough confidence in the competence of Deputy Commissioners as far as the performance of their law and order functions are concerned. This gives rise to an expectation that improvement of things is still possible through a suitable reframing of their roles, in combination with a few other factors. These

possibilities are in need for nurturing through care and patience, with due regard to the opinion of the people and their representatives.

A recent event of significance merits a brief mention here. That is the current euphoria for the separation of judiciary from the executive. It is generally believed and stated that judiciary is not independent enough in Bangladesh⁹, and as a remedial measure it is often demanded that it be made separate from the controlling influence of the executive. A milestone judgment of the Supreme Court of Bangladesh in the Civil Writ Case No. 2424 of 1999, the directives of the higher court were unequivocal in the matter. The Supreme Court directed the government to give effect to the concepts on the separation of judiciary through a body of multi-point instructions (Salam 2002:78). The process, indeed a thorny and cumbersome process as it has been, of the due implementation of the court's order has since been on and a number of instructions have been complied with, while the rest are being looked into. In the mean time, the government had to seek an extension of the deadline for implementation of the same for 15 times¹⁰, and cause the innumerable sittings of its senior officers to prepared and promulgate legal documents that carried broad support of all stakeholders. However, the drafts prepared by the Ministry of Law, Justice and Parliamentary Affairs have it that the government could appoint an Assistant Sessions Judge as Chief Judicial Magistrate and as Chief Metropolitan Magistrate as head of criminal judiciary at their respective jurisdictions. Such measures, along with certain other things, cause quite a bit of concern among the officers of BCS (Administration) cadre since these contemplated changes might substantially affect them in psychological as well as material aspects. They maintain that these measures might improve the material prospects of the members of the presently BCS (Judicial) cadre rather than introducing the long-awaited separation of judiciary. They also hold a view that whatever irritant in terms of adverse placement etc are there, these are borne by themselves, not the members of the BCS (Judicial) cadre, whose placements and other personnel matters are governed under the Supreme Court's direct supervision (Salam 2002:92). Taking magisterial powers and responsibilities as an important variable in the sphere of law and order, a question was raised in the present survey to elicit respondents' opinion as to whether they favoured the retention of magisterial powers with the Deputy Commissioner and his cadre colleagues. There was no reference in the question to the issue of the separation of judiciary from the executive, however. The question was presented in

⁹ The WEF Report, op. cit, *The Daily Star*, 31 October 2003.

¹⁰ The Awami League government got 7 extensions, the Caretaker govt. 3 and the present BNP-led four-party alliance govt 5 extensions, since 1999. *The Daily Star*, 19 November 2003.

the context as the respondents experience it in their knowledge. The responses are presented in the next table.

Table 7.14. Perceived Desirability of Retaining Magisterial Powers with Deputy Commissioners and other Officers of BCS (Administration) Cadre

<u>Respondents</u>	<u>Strongly Agree</u>	<u>Agree</u>	<u>Doubtful</u>	<u>Disagree</u>
Admn Officers [111]	98 (88.29)	11 (09.91)	1 (00.90)	1 (00.90)
Other Officers [198]	110 (55.56)	41 (20.71)	23 (11.62)	24 (12.12)
Free-lance [151]	96 (63.58)	29 (19.21)	13 (08.61)	13 (08.61)
Total [460]	304 (66.09)	81 (17.61)	37 (08.04)	38 (08.26)

Source: Researcher's survey. Figures in parentheses indicate percentage of row totals.

It is found that about two-thirds (66.09 percent) of all respondents give their strong preference for retaining such powers, while another 17.61 percent moderately agree with that view. It means, 83.70 percent of all respondents have a favourable opinion about it. To make a further break-up, the proportions of respondents who strongly favour retaining magisterial powers with the DC and his colleagues are 88.29 percent of BCS (Administration) officer-respondents, 55.56 percent of 'other officers' and 63.58 percent of free-lance respondents. In this respect, views expressed by the respondents of 'other officers' category are also positive, although a little less spectacular than the views of BCS (Administration) officer-respondents. By adding the entries of choices in two positive boxes, one may find that almost all (98.20 percent) of BCS (Administration) officer-respondents, just above three-fourths (76.27 percent) of 'other officers' and more than four-fifths (82.79 percent) of free-lance respondents either strongly agreed or agreed with the proposition for retaining magisterial powers with the Deputy Commissioners and their cadre colleagues. These revelations need to be taken with a word of warning that, although a few judicial and police officers were among the respondents of the survey, they did not form a distinctly identified group as a matter of planned choice, and hence their specific views may have been lacking here.

7.2.3. Coordination. Officers of BCS (Administration) cadre have been traditionally responsible for coordination of different public activities including the ever-increasing development programmes of the government. In fact, in the early days, all government functions at that level used to be executed under the direct control and personal supervision of the District Magistrates (DMs) or Collectors. Later on, correspondingly with the creation of other necessary departments and agencies for specific functional responsibilities, the DMs or Collectors began to be divested of various functions. However, the DMs and Collectors, subsequently assuming a more exponential designation of Deputy Commissioner (DC) retained a coordinating role on the

activities of different departments and agencies operating in the districts. Despite continual shrinkage of the DC's powers and mantle in course of time, and in face of the constant criticism of technical professionals, her still retains and exercises much of this role as coordinator. After the introduction of upazila system and its subsequent modifications, the UNO too exercises substantial amount of coordination functions at that level. The authority of these two officers is subjected to continual challenge from politicians and technocrats. Keeping all these in mind, the survey sought to draw out the opinion of respondents regarding the coordinating role of the DC and the UNO at their respective jurisdictions. They were given a question as to how they feel about the desirability of retaining the DC's coordinating role. The responses were as follows.

Table 7.15. Desirability of Retaining Functions of Development Coordination with Deputy Commissioners

<u>Respondents</u>	<u>Strongly Agree</u>	<u>Moderately Agree</u>	<u>Doubtful</u>	<u>Disagree</u>
Admn Officers [111]	98 (88.29)	8 (07.21)	2 (01.80)	3 (2.70)
Other Officers [198]	151 (76.26)	32 (16.16)	11 (05.56)	4 (2.02)
Free-lance [151]	117 (77.48)	27 (17.88)	4 (02.65)	3 (1.99)
Total [460]	366 (79.57)	67 (14.57)	17 (03.70)	10 (2.17)

Source: Researcher's survey. Figures in parentheses indicate percentage of row totals.

It is found that about four-fifths of all respondents strongly agree with the proposition. Category-wise, 88.29 percent of BCS (Administration) officer-respondents, 76.26 percent of 'other officers' and 77.48 percent of free-lance respondents contributed to this group. The next largest opinion group, which is in moderate agreement with the proposition, constitutes 14.57 percent of all respondents, where proportions of the three specific categories are 7.21 percent, 16.16 percent and 17.88 percent respectively. In all, 94.14 percent, i.e., more than nine-tenths of the total number of respondents either strongly or moderately favours the proposed continuation of the role of development coordination in the hand of the Deputy Commissioners in a district. It is interesting to note that the proportion of 'other officers' too favouring this proposition for retaining the development coordination role with the Deputy Commissioner is a spectacularly high 92.42 percent. This goes against the general tenets of arguments put forward by various associations of technocratic-functional officials.¹¹

Regarding the coordination of development functions, there arises one other important factor. The short-lived experience with the appointment of a nominated Chairman of the Zila Parishad in the late 1980s opened a big question for local government bodies and democratic governance of a representative type. The Chairman was meant to coordinate at district level all activities of

¹¹ The technocrats, as they are called, are almost always against the premier role of the DC in a district.

the government and non-government institutions and agencies. All government departments and officers were under his direct supervision. However, like the aborted district governor scheme in 1975, this too was abandoned before it got a reasonable scope for trial, error and evaluation. The Zila Parishad, traditionally headed by the DC with the exception of a few short intervening periods, still embarks on a considerable volume of development works in the socio-economic, cultural and infrastructure sectors. But, the Zila Parishad, an institution of considerable resources and development potentials, is now put to a haphazard state as there has been no designated head on it, except for a senior government officer appointed as its Chief Executive Officer (CEO)¹². This important local government body needs to shy off its present image of becoming a propitious ground for skirmishes among influentials. With that in view, the survey questionnaire contained a question about the desirability of the Deputy Commissioner assuming the affairs of the Zila Parishad in absence of an elected Chairman. The responses are as follows.

Table 7.16. Desirability of Assumption of Zila Parishad Affairs by Deputy Commissioner in Absence of Elected ZP Chairman

<u>Respondents</u>	<u>Strongly Agree</u>	<u>Moderately Agree</u>	<u>Doubtful</u>	<u>Disagree</u>
Admn Officers [111]	78 (70.27)	16 (14.41)	5 (04.50)	12 (10.81)
Other Officers [198]	109 (55.05)	49 (24.74)	17 (08.59)	23 (11.62)
Free-lance [151]	93 (61.59)	25 (16.56)	13 (08.61)	20 (13.25)
Total [460]	280 (60.87)	90 (19.57)	35 (07.61)	55 (11.96)

Source: Researcher's survey. Figures in parentheses indicate percentage of row totals.

The responses show a strong public opinion in favour of reposing on the DC the Zila Parishad affairs in absence of the elected Chairman. An absolute majority (60.87 percent) of all respondents strongly agree with the proposition. The proportions of the component categories of respondents holding this view are more than two-thirds (70.27 percent) of the BCS (Administration) officers, well over half (55.05 percent) of 'other officers' and above three-fifths (61.59 percent) of free-lance respondents. Since another 19.57 percent of all respondents give their moderate agreement, the total number of respondents categorically agreeing to the suggestion for DCs assuming Zila Parishad affairs in absence of an elected chairman stands at 80.44 percent.

A similar question was mooted about the desirability of retaining the functions of development on the Upazila Nirbahi Officer at upazila level. The results were on the whole similar to those analyzed just above about the DC's role. The next table contains the responses to that question.

¹² Each Municipality has a CEO too, who just heads the officials under the Chairman.

Table 7.17. Desirability of Upazila Nirbahi Officer's Development Coordination Functions as Perceived by Respondents

<u>Respondents</u>	<u>Fully Agree</u>	<u>Moderately Agree</u>	<u>Doubtful</u>	<u>Disagree</u>
Admn Officers [111]	98 (88.29)	10 (09.01)	1 (0.90)	2 (1.80)
Other Officers [198]	155 (78.28)	26 (13.13)	14 (7.07)	3 (1.52)
Free-lance [151]	120 (79.47)	23 (15.23)	4 (2.65)	4 (2.65)
Total [460]	373 (81.09)	59 (12.83)	19 (4.13)	9 (1.96)

Source: Researcher's survey. Figures in parentheses indicate percentage of row totals.

The overwhelming majority (81.09 percent) of all respondents enter their full agreement with the proposition, while another 12.83 percent express their moderate agreement. On the other hand, only a total of 5.09 percent respondents are doubtful about their opinion or are opposed to the suggestion. Comparatively speaking, the BCS (Administration) officer-respondents have the largest proportion (97.30 percent) to speak for retention of coordinating role of UNOs in development. For the 'other officers' and the free-lance respondents, these proportions are 91.41 percent and 94.70 percent respectively. It looks like that there is a near-absolute confidence on the competence of Upazila Nirbahi Officers as far as their functions in development coordination are concerned. In fact, there has been a serious void owing to the departure of the elected Chairman of the Upazila Parishad, who had been bestowed with the responsibility of not only coordinating, but also launching of development works in the 10 years or so when the system was introduced and allowed to thrive. The role and character of the Chairmen of various Upazila Parishads were not equal. It is believed that if the innovation were given a little longer time, there could evolve a salubrious environment for development coordination where popular leaders and salaried officials would keep invaluable contributions. However, things were not to be like that, presumably for political reasons. The system was put to an unannounced demise without putting in its place any alternative mentionable measure. Under such a context, the respondents of the opinion survey were asked about their views regarding the desirability of having an elected chairman in the Upazila Parishad. The responses may be seen in Table 7.18.

Table 7.18. Desirability of Having Elected Chairmen in Upazila Parishads

<u>Respondents</u>	<u>Utmost</u>	<u>Moderate</u>	<u>Doubtful</u>	<u>Disagree</u>
Admn Officers [111]	21 (18.92)	25 (22.52)	23 (20.72)	42 (37.84)
Other Officers [198]	81 (40.91)	27 (13.64)	36 (18.18)	54 (27.27)
Free-lance [151]	95 (62.91)	20 (13.25)	15 (09.93)	21 (13.91)
Total [460]	197 (42.83)	72 (15.65)	74 (16.09)	117 (25.43)

Source: Researcher's survey. Figures in parentheses indicate percentage of row totals.

The responses are not unmixed. The single largest majority (42.83 percent) of all respondents favour the proposition by expressing their vote for 'utmost' agreement. In this regard, the opinion of the BSC (Administration) officer-respondents and, to some extent, that of the 'other officers', have considerably influenced the overall position. Only less than one-fifth (18.92 percent) of the

BSC (Administration) officer-respondents strongly favour the return of an elected UZP Chairman, while another 22.52 percent among their peers register a 'modest' agreement. Conversely, 20.72 percent are skeptical about the utility of a possible return of the elected UZP chairman, and another 37.84 percent totally disagreed. Thus, a total of 60.36 percent, i.e., more than three-fifths of the BCS (Administration) officer-respondents give a negative opinion in this regard. Among the 'other officers', 40.91 percent strongly favoured an elected chairman, while another 13.64 percent in their fold were moderately agreeable. As against these 54.45 percent respondents of 'other officers' category favouring a return of elected chairman, 45.45 percent are skeptic of or against their possible return. On the other hand, the free-lance respondents are overtly favourable towards having an elected chairman of Upazila Parishad, as 62.91 percent of them strongly support it, and another 13.25 percent register their moderate vote for it. Thus, as against the 76.16 percent of free-lance respondents who are positive about the proposition, there are only 23.84 percent who are skeptical or who oppose it outright. It means, the free-lance respondents are more favourably disposed towards an elected Chairman of the Upazila Parishad. The survey results show that officers of the BCS (Administration) cadre are uninterested about an elected chairman. It may be a manifestation of their longing for unfettered powers that were their privilege during the olden days. Moreover, in the event of coronation of an elected UZP Chairman, the UNOs or the prospective UNOs, i.e., the younger officers of the cadre may have a feeling that their privileges and perks would be compromised. Such an opinion held by a particular section of officials should not be allowed to forestall the natural evolution of a representative and popular local government institution. A stronger bond is needed between the people and the public servants of the country, for which the elected Chairmen of Upazila Parishads are a very appropriate medium.

In this context, the functions of the country's local government bodies come into the purview of the present study. The Zila Parishads now-a-days have virtually lost an orderly institutional life and the Upazila Parishads are devoid of its essence as a local government institution. Much of the development works of Bangladesh are carried out by or under the direct supervision of the local government institutions. In this respect, the Union Parishads (UPs) in the countryside and the Municipalities and City Corporations in the towns and cities are the implementing body. In these local government bodies, considerable amount of resources are allocated for implementation of various development programmes and projects. This becomes pretty difficult for the national government to monitor and control the functioning of several thousand UPs and hundreds of Municipalities. Previously the Deputy Commissioners used to be designated as the

prescribed authority over those local government institutions, a system dispensed with in the last twenty years or so. In 2002, the government introduced a system of performance evaluation of the municipalities by the DC. However, mere performance evaluation may be inadequate for transforming a local government body into an effective vibrating institution as an engine geared to the task of development. A supervisory role may be thought of in order to make these bodies more development-worthy. This is all the more important because of the absence of a tradition of local self-government institutions in most parts of the sub-continent. The natural expectations for leadership training to be made in these local government bodies too were not fulfilled in Bangladesh. With that in view, the respondents were asked a question as to how they felt about the desirability of conferring on the Deputy Commissioner enhanced authority to supervise the functions of the local government bodies under his jurisdiction. The responses are on the whole favourable, albeit in a relatively subdued mode compared to what was discerned in Table 7.15 regarding the desirability of the Deputy Commissioners' assumption of a role of development coordination. Table 7.19 contains the information collated from the opinions received as responses from the survey respondents on the present question.

Table 7.19. Desirability of Giving Enhanced Authority to Deputy Commissioner for Supervising Functions of Local Government Bodies

<u>Respondents</u>	<u>Strongly Agree</u>	<u>Moderately Agree</u>	<u>Doubtful</u>	<u>Disagree</u>
Admn Officers [111]	85 (76.58)	17 (15.32)	5 (04.50)	4 (03.60)
Other Officers [198]	115 (58.08)	37 (18.69)	26 (13.13)	20 (10.10)
Free-lance [151]	97 (64.24)	36 (23.84)	5 (03.31)	13 (08.61)
Total [460]	297 (64.57)	90 (19.57)	36 (07.83)	37 (08.04)

Source: Researcher's survey. Figures in parentheses indicate percentage of row totals.

Nearly two-thirds of all respondents strongly agree with this option, while another 19.57 percent register their agreement. It means that a total of 84.14 percent respondents offer a clear favour for a possible enhancement of authority for the Deputy Commissioner to supervise the functions of local government institutions under his jurisdiction. One cannot miss an element of character-bias in this pattern of responses, as above three-fourths (76.58 percent) of BCS (Administration) officer-respondents have preferred the enhancement of authority. Contrarily, just 58.08 percent of the respondents of 'other officers' category express their preference for it. However, the free-lance respondents, including a good number of UP Chairmen, maintain a median line, since 64.24 percent of them strongly favour the proposition and another 23.84 percent express their agreement, thus a total of 88.08 percent free-lance respondents favouring it. Indeed, some form of supervision, monitoring and inspiration provide a kind of vigour in local government bodies. Moreover, some form of official care help these bodies chart a regular course, rather than

occasional veering of popularly elected officials, who otherwise would easily fall prey to home-town caprices and parochial ties.


7.2.4. Miscellaneous functions. The officers of BCS (Administration) cadre are traditionally found to be doing multifarious functions other than their core duties relating to magistracy, law and order, land management, development coordination and the like. The Deputy Commissioner becomes the centerpiece of attraction and activities insofar as the other miscellaneous works are concerned. These miscellaneous functions include an inexhaustive list of activities among which only a few may be mentioned in this context. These are conducting national and local level general elections, disaster management, management of public examinations, protocol functions and observance of national days and events. Under the present system, the Deputy Commissioner is held responsible for the smooth and orderly execution of these public acts. The survey questionnaire contained a question about the desirability of retaining with the DC these miscellaneous functions. The results are presented in the next table.

Table 7.20. Desirability of Retaining with Deputy Commissioners' different Functions of Coordination

<u>Respondents</u>	<u>Functions</u>	<u>Strongly Agree</u>	<u>Agree</u>	<u>Doubtful</u>	<u>Disagree</u>
<i>Perception of BCS (Admn) officers [111]</i>	Elections	99 (89.19)	8 (7.21)	--	4 (3.60)
	Disaster Management	102 (91.89)	7 (6.31)	--	2 (1.80)
	Public Examinations	101 (90.99)	6 (5.41)	1 (0.90)	3 (2.70)
	Protocol	80 (72.07)	15 (13.51)	9 (8.11)	7 (6.31)
	National Days/Events	100 (90.09)	10 (9.01)	--	1 (0.90)
<i>Perception of other officers [198]</i>	Elections	156 (78.79)	29 (14.65)	3 (1.52)	10 (5.05)
	Disaster Management	168 (84.85)	28 (14.14)	2 (1.01)	--
	Public Examinations	157 (79.29)	24 (12.12)	11 (5.56)	6 (3.03)
	Protocol	124 (62.63)	49 (24.75)	19 (9.60)	6 (3.03)
	National Days/Events	143 (72.22)	35 (17.68)	15 (7.58)	5 (2.53)
<i>Perception of free-lance respondents [151]</i>	Elections	135 (89.40)	10 (6.62)	4 (2.65)	2 (1.32)
	Disaster Management	132 (87.42)	12 (7.95)	5 (3.31)	2 (1.32)
	Public Examinations	118 (78.15)	25 (16.56)	6 (3.97)	2 (1.32)
	Protocol	102 (67.55)	25 (16.56)	15 (9.93)	9 (5.96)
	National Days/Events	110 (72.82)	26 (17.22)	9 (5.96)	6 (3.97)
Total [460]	Elections	390 (84.78)	47 (10.22)	7 (1.52)	16 (3.48)
	Disaster Management	402 (87.39)	47 (10.22)	7 (1.52)	4 (0.87)
	Public Examinations	376 (81.74)	55 (11.96)	18 (3.91)	11 (2.39)
	Protocol	306 (66.52)	89 (19.35)	43 (9.35)	22 (4.78)
	National Days/Events	353 (76.74)	71 (15.43)	24 (5.22)	12 (2.61)

Source: Researcher's survey. Figures in parentheses indicate percentage of row totals.

The results of the survey on this question suggest that an overwhelming majority (more than two-thirds) of respondents express their strong opinion in favour of retaining with Deputy Commissioners all the above functions. These results too may be looked at in a more convenient way if they are presented in a pictorial form like in the following bar diagram.



Source: Researcher's Opinion Survey.

On only one count, i.e., the protocol functions, this strong vote (of 66.52 percent respondents) happens to have narrowly slipped off the two-thirds mark, although sufficient support. In total, 14.13 percent of all respondents have a clear apathy or opposition to Deputy Commissioners performing the protocol functions. This slight decline of support for retaining this function is interestingly shared by all categories of respondents. On other counts too, despite a subtle moderating trends of agreement by the 'other officer' respondents, all the three categories of respondents show a remarkably similar pattern. Hence, it may be taken for granted that these miscellaneous functions are likely to stay as they remain, at least for the near future.

In this connection, if these myriad functions are allowed to continue being performed by the Deputy Commissioner, there comes the question of his standing in the national government. If the DC proceeds to accord due importance on all these functions along with the traditional functions tagged with his office, he may at times find himself in delicate situations and might be in need for interventions from the highest level, besides his professional channels of communication. In simple terms, the DC may at times, though possibly rarely, need to communicate directly to the head of government and seek orders from the latter when, for

example, some officers are rendered unable to perform their functions for extraneous reasons. The use of such a communication may not only ensure a healthy working environment, but it also symbolizes the premier position of the officer at his level. A question was put to the respondent asking for their opinion about the desirability of restoring a system of direct communication by the Deputy Commissioner with the head of government on important issues. The responses may be perused in the following table.

Table 7.21. Desirability of Providing for a System of Direct Communication with Head of Government by Deputy Commissioners on Certain Important Matters

<u>Respondents</u>	<u>Strongly Agree</u>	<u>Moderately Agree</u>	<u>Doubtful</u>	<u>Disagree</u>
Admn Officers [111]	100 (90.09)	7 (6.31)	3 (2.07)	1 (0.90)
Other Officers [198]	153 (77.27)	30 (15.15)	13 (6.57)	2 (1.01)
Free-lance [151]	134 (88.74)	6 (3.77)	5 (3.31)	6 (3.97)
Total [460]	397 (84.13)	43 (9.35)	21 (4.57)	9 (1.96)

Source: Researcher's survey. Figures in parentheses indicate percentage of row totals.

The responses suggest that there is almost a consensus situation on the issue as 94.13 percent of all respondents strongly agree with the proposition and another 9.35 percent register their support. In total, 93.49 percent respondents agree with the suggestion and the differences of degrees in the opinion among the three categories are not materially significant. However, among the 'other officers', there is a miniscule increase in the number of respondents who expresses their moderate agreement with the proposition – 15.15 percent as against the total average of 9.35 percent on that count. On the whole, it appears, there is a broad consensus that in times of urgent necessity, the Deputy Commissioner may make direct communication with the head of government on important issues. But, such a conclusion has got a bearing on the political front, which is beyond the scope of this study. However, against a backdrop of a recent propensity for some political functionaries to directly keep in touch with, and thereby influence, administrative affairs, this type of involvement may attract a brief attention.

7.2.5. Involvement of politicians. In a democratic society, people's representatives are supposed to keep in close contact with public administration in their bid to protect the interests of the people whom they represent. They are also expected to see to it that the administrative system run according to the policies, principles, laws and rules framed by the statesmen, lawmakers and rule framers. However, things take an uneasy turn when these notional contacts transform into serious fighting between the two sides – politicians and the public administrators. The views of the Ministers and the Members of Parliament often do not tally with those of the officers of public administration. Consequently, there arise undesirable tensions in public administration.

The present-day scenario contains many such tales – both real and contemplated – in which the perennial drama of zero-sum game is performed, where one's win necessarily entails another's corresponding loss. Without going into the inner dynamics and relative strengths of the arguments of both sides, it was sought to discern opinion regarding the desirability of politicians' involvement in routine administrative matters at district and upazila levels. In response to a question in the survey, the respondents gave the following patterns of opinion.

Table 7.22. Desirability of Involvement of Ministers and Members of Parliament in Routine Local Administration

<u>Respondents</u>	<u>Strongly Agree</u>	<u>Moderately Agree</u>	<u>Doubtful</u>	<u>Disagree</u>
Admn Officers (111)	14 (12.61)	15 (13.51)	27 (24.32)	55 (49.55)
Other Officers (198)	56 (28.28)	37 (18.69)	44 (22.22)	61 (30.81)
Free-lance (151)	69 (45.70)	29 (19.21)	23 (15.23)	30 (19.87)
Total (460)	139 (30.22)	81 (17.61)	94 (20.43)	146 (31.74)

Source: Researcher's survey. Figures in parentheses indicate percentage of row totals.

In this regard, the survey results show a category-specific pattern, where the 'other officers' category of respondents are found to be following a median line, while the other two groups present mutually exclusive patterns. The proportion of respondents registering their strong agreement with the suggestion for involvement of Ministers and MPs in routine administrative affairs stands at 30.22 percent of total respondents. The 45.70 percent-mark on the count from among the free-lance respondents has been largely offset by a low 12.61 percent-strong backing from the BCS (Administration) officer-respondents. The survey results also show that 17.61 percent of all respondents express their agreement with the proposition. On this count too, the three categories of respondent reflect the same trend as they showed it on the 'strong agreement' count. On the whole, 47.83 percent respondents supported the stand, while 52.17 percent prefer their disapproval of or skepticism about the desirability of the political functionaries' involvement in day-to-day administrative affairs. To view the issue from the opposite angle, 73.87 percent of the BCS (Administration) officer-respondents, 53.03 percent of the 'other officers' and 35.10 percent of the free-lance respondents express their negative views on the issue. These figures may reflect the concomitant reaction to the relative influence they feel they receive from these sorts of political functionaries. Nonetheless, one may notice that there is not an absolute support, even not a majority support, for political functionaries' influence in routine administrative affairs. Hence, such involvements needs to be very limited and orchestrated in a formal and structured manner, so that their coming into contact with regular public administration does not create any unwarranted fissure or twist of things. In this regard, one other thing may be taken into account. Had there been a chairman at the head of the Upazila

Parishad, such involvement, not to speak of alleged interference, might have been much reduced in numbers and tolerable in character.

One of the tricky issues that haunt the present-day public administration of Bangladesh is the system of retaining a Minister in charge of each district. This system was introduced in the 1980s, when a martial law regime ruled in the country. Various successive governments (of course, except those installed as interim and caretaker governments) followed the practice since 2003, when the government changed the wording of the arrangement. Now-a-days, the Minister is now assigned with the responsibilities for observation and monitoring of different activities of the government going on in the district, not as the Minister in charge of the district like in the past. A case instituted in the Supreme Court challenging the legality of the system has prompted the government to take the latest measure of changing the mandate of such political official, just in black and white. The change-over does not signify any material departure from the previous practices, however. Against such a backdrop, the respondents were asked a question about the desirability of continuing with the currently maintained system of keeping a Minister in charge of the district. The responses are presented in the following table.

Table 7.23. Desirability of Continuing a System of Keeping Ministers in Charge of Districts as Perceived by Respondents

<u>Respondents</u>	<u>Strongly Agree</u>	<u>Moderately Agree</u>	<u>Doubtful</u>	<u>Disagree</u>
Admn Officers [111]	15 (13.51)	23 (20.72)	23 (20.72)	50 (45.05)
Other Officers [198]	47 (23.74)	35 (17.68)	36 (18.18)	80 (40.40)
Free-lance [151]	38 (25.17)	22 (14.57)	18 (11.92)	73 (48.34)
Total [460]	100 (21.74)	80 (17.39)	77 (16.74)	203 (44.13)

Source: Researcher's survey. Figures in parentheses indicate percentage of row totals.

The results are of mixed connotations, as opinions are passed on both sides of the divide. The group that expresses its 'strong agreement' with the system (21.74 percent of the total respondents) is not much larger than one-fifth, while another 17.39 percent making their mild agreement. However, the single largest opinion group (44.13 percent of all respondents) is clearly against the system, and the rest, i.e., 16.74 percent of all respondents are quite skeptical about the system of having a minister in charge of a district. This issue has been discussed at length at section 6.2.1, where various ramifications of the system are amply exposed. Since good governance primarily rests on the principle that each organ of the statecraft diligently exercises its functions according to the set principles and in compliance with laid down rules, any kind of monitoring or supervision should better be introduced in a formal manner. A notional arrangement does not hold good unless it is based on statutory provisions and if it lacks

transparency in its function. Instead, it may result into a system of non-formal influencing, where one set of functionaries might feel that they are made subjected to 'undue' pressure tactics of another important group of influentials. They may also get an unpleasant feeling that the age-old principles of administrative neutrality are likely to be compromised through this measure. The ministers too may be disturbed by their inability to drive things according to their scheme in the absence of a formal clout. Thus, while introducing or retaining a system of 'observation and monitoring' of governmental activities in the districts, or an outright 'district minister' scheme, these matters and the pattern of public opinion should bettered be taken into consideration.

Democracy, development and public administration are by no means antithetical to one another. They all may thrive together provided a wholesome relationship is maintained between the political bosses and top echelon public administration. To the contrary, a mutual distrust between these two important functionaries is most likely to lead to stalemates and eventual crumbling of all institutions. The mutual relationships of the country's political leadership and the administrative institutions may be the lively subject for a separate academic pursuit. The scope of the present study does not allow a detailed analysis of such a wide issue. However, with a view to fathoming the depth of relationship between the political leadership and administrative leadership, as perceived by a cross section of people, the respondents were requested to give their opinion as to whether the distance was widening between the two sides. The results may be found in the following table.

Table 7.24. Perception on the Distance between Political and Administrative Leadership as Perceived by Respondents

<u>Respondents</u>	<u>Widening Fast</u>	<u>Widening Slowly</u>	<u>Static</u>	<u>Narrowing</u>
Admn Officers [111]	37 (33.33)	39 (35.14)	26 (23.42)	9 (8.10)
Other Officers [198]	80 (40.40)	66 (33.33)	41 (20.71)	11 (5.56)
Free-lance [151]	59 (39.07)	37 (24.50)	38 (25.17)	17 (11.26)
Total [460]	176 (38.26)	149 (30.87)	105 (22.83)	37 (8.04)

Source: Researcher's survey. Figures in parentheses indicate percentage of row totals.

The survey results demonstrate a widening gap between these two streams of public functionaries. As many as 38.26 percent respondents hold that the distance is rapidly widening, while another 30.87 percent believe that the gap widens, but at a slower pace. Thus a total of 69.13 percent of all respondents speak of a phenomenon where political and administrative fronts drift apart from each other. Only less than one-fourth (22.83 percent) respondents feel that the space between the two remains static, while a paltry 8.04 percent speaking of a narrowing down of the gap. Since there are no wide category-wise variations of opinions, it may be a

reflection of common perceptions. The causes for such a widening of gaps, not within the limited scope of the study, may be laid bare through separate studies for the sake of evolving a decent relationship between these two tools of statecraft and national development¹³.

7.3. Prevalent impressions

7.3.1. Functional importance. The officers of BCS (Administration) cadre decidedly constitute an elite body of public officials in Bangladesh. Their varied professional domains are spread all over the country's public administration. It was sought to determine in the opinion survey the impressions of respondents about the functional importance of these officials. In order to get a view of the popular impression, a question was put to the respondents asking for their opinion regarding the degree of functional importance of BCS (Administration) cadre officers as against the general body of officers in public administration in Bangladesh. This should better be kept in mind that this is simply an opinion survey, not a fool-proof conclusion, although a fair judgement of the position of BCS (Administration) cadre is not an impossible task altogether from such a venture. The responses are presented in Table 7.25.

Table 7.25. Respondents' Perceptions of Functional Importance of Officers of BCS (Administration) Cadre vis-à-vis Officers in General

<u>Respondents</u>	<u>Far More Important</u>	<u>More Important</u>	<u>Equally Important</u>	<u>Less Important</u>
Admn Officers [111]	88 (79.28)	20 (18.02)	2 (01.80)	1 (00.90)
Other Officers [198]	108 (54.55)	40 (20.20)	37 (18.69)	13 (06.57)
Free-lance [151]	96 (63.58)	46 (30.46)	7 (04.64)	2 (01.32)
Total [460]	292 (63.48)	106 (23.04)	46 (10.00)	16 (03.48)

Source: Researcher's survey. Figures in parentheses indicate percentage of row totals.

It conforms to a general perception about civil service elitism, especially of its Administration cadre (Obaidullah 1999:60; Morshed 1997:130). Nearly two-thirds of all respondents hold that the officers of BCS (Administration) cadre are functionally far more important compared to the officers in general. Another 23.04 percent respondents believe that the former are functionally just more important than their other peers. Thus, a total of 86.52 percent respondents intend to place the officers of BCS (Administration) cadre at a place which is functionally above the average level. Contrarily, only one respondent in ten (i.e., 10 percent) suggests that these officers are at par with all other officers, while another 3.48 percent intend to think of an inferior place compared to other officers'. Even if one subtracts the entries for the BCS (Administration)

¹³ There are also occasional references about a nexus of top brasses of such functionaries. Such alliances of politicians, administrators and businessmen may result in the losses for the country. See Kamal Hossain, Glimpses of Hope Amidst the Darkness of Night, *The Prothom Alo*, 4 November 2003.

officer-respondents for the sake of eliminating a possibility of biased opinion, still there remains a bright posture. In that case, the first two opinion groups would form 58.45 percent and 24.64 percent respectively, without seriously altering the general pattern. This is indicative of a high estimation in which the officers of BCS (Administration) cadre are held about their functional importance. It also indicates pretty high popular expectations pinned on these high officials.

Given the high esteem enjoyed by the officers of BCS (Administration) cadre in the country's public administration, a question naturally comes regarding whether this public acclamation is duly matched with satisfactory performance of their duties. This is particularly important, because success or otherwise of any plan or programme largely depends on the performance of these officials. The respondents were asked about their level of satisfaction with the performance of professional responsibilities by the officers of BCS (Administration) cadre. The next table contains the information compiled on the basis of their responses.

Table 7.26. Level of Satisfaction with Performance of Professional Responsibilities by BCS (Administration) Cadre Officers

<u>Respondents</u>	<u>Outstanding</u>	<u>Good</u>	<u>Average</u>	<u>Not Good</u>
Admn Officers [111]	35 (31.53)	58 (52.25)	14 (12.61)	4 (03.60)
Other Officers [198]	53 (26.77)	84 (42.42)	39 (19.70)	22 (11.11)
Free-lance [151]	28 (18.54)	58 (38.41)	36 (23.84)	29 (19.21)
Total [460]	116 (25.22)	200 (43.48)	89 (19.35)	55 (11.96)

Source: Researcher's survey. Figures in parentheses indicate percentage of row totals.

The results are not as bright as they should have been in consonance with the high place of functional importance accorded to the officers of BCS (Administration) cadre which is found at Table 7.25 just above. Only a little above one in every four (i.e., 25.22 percent) respondents expresses his opinion that these officers' performance is outstanding. Another 43.48 percent term the performance as just good. That too is largely conditioned by larger chunks of BCS (Administration) officer-respondents, who aligned in these groups. Among this category of respondents, 31.53 percent votes for 'outstanding' and 52.25 percent for 'good'. Considering the possibility of subjectivity, a different analysis may discount the views of BCS (Administration) officers-respondents. Then, proportions of respondents expressing their 'outstanding' and 'good' levels of satisfaction would stand at 23.21 percent and 40.69 percent respectively. Conversely, the section of respondents who hold 'average' and 'not good' impressions might be 21.49 percent and 14.61 percent respectively on an overall basis taking a total of 349 respondents. That means the impression about the level of satisfaction of people at the performance of duties by officers of BCS (Administration) cadre is not as rosy as people's high-held estimation of such officers. It may provide a threshold for these officers, many of whom tend to think very big of them.

Because of their elitist nature and sense of pride, many civil servants believe that the nation cannot run without them (Younis and Mostafa 2000:94). This sort of pride is outlandish and unsuitable to a democratic environment. Attitudinal changes of officers, along with other reforms by the government may usher in a brighter scenario for the officers of BCS (Administration).

Against the above, and notwithstanding the limitations of such an opinion survey which should be kept in mind, the responses to a question regarding the relative positions of three streams of important public functionaries in upholding people's interests may be seen in the following table.

Table 7.27. Relative Positions of different Functionaries in Upholding People's Interests as Perceived by Respondents

Respondents	Role Players	Outstanding	Good	Average	Poor
<i>Perception of BCS (Admn) officers [111]</i>	Ministers/MPs	16 (14.41)	48 (43.24)	29 (26.13)	18 (16.22)
	Other Officers	7 (6.31)	58 (52.25)	42 (37.84)	4 (3.60)
	BCS (Admn) Officers	62 (55.86)	43 (38.74)	6 (5.41)	--
<i>Perception of other officers [198]</i>	Ministers/MPs	35 (17.68)	60 (30.30)	71 (35.86)	32 (16.16)
	Other Officers	20 (10.10)	100 (50.50)	65 (32.83)	13 (6.57)
	BCS (Admn) Officers	74 (37.37)	74 (37.37)	38 (19.19)	12 (6.06)
<i>Perception of free-lance respondents [151]</i>	Ministers/MPs	41 (27.15)	30 (19.87)	40 (26.49)	40 (26.49)
	Other Officers	5 (3.31)	76 (50.33)	57 (37.75)	13 (8.61)
	BCS (Admn) Officers	31 (20.53)	82 (54.30)	33 (21.85)	5 (3.31)
Total (460)	Ministers/MPs	92 (20.00)	138 (30.00)	140 (30.43)	90 (19.57)
	Other Officers	32 (6.96)	234 (50.87)	164 (35.65)	30 (6.52)
	BCS (Admn) Officers	167 (36.30)	199 (43.26)	77 (16.74)	17 (3.70)


Source: Researcher's survey. Figures in parentheses indicate percentage of row totals.

A nation's decent life is possible when its popular representatives and officials perform their functions in concert. The current scenarios in Bangladesh do not reflect such a condition. Respondents were asked to express their impressions about how these key functionaries are faring to cater for the welfare needs of the people. The Ministers/MPs, 'other officers' and BCS (Administration) officers get 'outstanding' votes respectively from 20 percent, 6.96 percent and 36.30 percent of all respondents. These three groups of functionaries also receive 'good' certificates from all respondents to the tune of 30 percent, 50.87 percent and 43.26 percent. Just half of all respondents accord the Ministers and MPs outstanding and good certificates for their upholding the people's interests, and 30.43 percent give them 'average' marks and another 19.57 percent would not offer any credit at all. Here, BCS (Administration) officer-respondents seem

generous to the politicians, as 57.65 percent of them gave them marks of the first two slabs, i.e., 'outstanding' and 'good'. The proportions of respondents from 'other officers' and 'free-lance' respondents giving politicians similar scores are 57.98 percent and 47.02 percent. Politicians get an extra favour only from BCS (Administration) officers. They are quite negatively projected by free-lance respondents, although quite a few UP Chairmen and politicians were among them.

These results may give a more instantly comprehensible and convenient depiction if they are presented in a pictorial form like the following bar diagram.

Graph 4. Relative Positions of different Functionaries in Upholding People's Interests as Perceived by Respondents in the Opinion Survey.



Source : Researcher's Survey

The posture of 'other officers' is a little brighter than politicians', as 58.83 percent respondents voted them either 'outstanding' or 'good'. But, they get 'outstanding' views from only 6.96 percent of all respondents. Both BCS (Administration) officer-respondents and free-lance respondents offer miserly marks to the other officers, while only 10.10 percent of 'other officer-respondents' vote these 'other officers' as 'outstanding'. However, compared to the 30 percent figure for

Ministers/MPs, these officers earned 'good' marks from 50.87 percent of all respondents. On 'average' counts, politicians and other officers carried the votes of 30.43 and 35.65 percent respectively. On 'poor' count, these proportions are 19.57 and 6.52 percent. As compared to the critics of politicians, a fewer respondents denigrated the role of other officers for protection of people's interests. Publicization of these technical functionaries' valuable services may bring still better services and also lead to a closer scrutiny, understanding and appreciation of their role.

Compared to both politicians and other officers, the Administration cadre officers enjoy a rosier accolade. More than one-third (36.30 percent) of all respondents voted them outstanding, while another 43.26 percent respondents gave a 'good' certificate. Just 16.74 percent terms the relevant posture of the officers of BCS (Administration) cadre as 'average', while only 3.70 percent respondents rule out any credit for them. On the whole, BCS (Administration) officers enjoy significant confidence of people on count of the protection of their interest. However, since there are many BCS (Administration) cadre officer-respondents, the figures may be reviewed with votes from these respondents being subtracted. In that case the 'outstanding, 'good', 'average' and 'poor' votes for BCS (Administration) cadre officers would stand at 30.09 percent, 44.70 percent, 20.34 percent and 4.87 percent respectively. This configuration too – slightly less bright than original picture – would have given them a wide edge on the Ministers/MPs and other officers. It signifies a high degree of acceptance and confidence people hold about the potentials of BCS (Administration) officials to better uphold people's interests. However, a higher rating of their standings in an opinion survey does not necessarily ensure a better performance by BCS (Administration) officers. An appropriate attitude to their clientele and determination to achieve a breakthrough may help them rise to the occasion.

7.3.2. Standing of Deputy Commissioners. In the administrative system of Bangladesh, especially as far as the professional life of the BCS (Administration) cadre is concerned, the office of the Deputy Commissioner is of vital interest. The success or failure of field administration largely depends on the performance of the office of the Deputy Commissioner. This office had traditionally been termed as the king-pin of the steel-frame British Indian imperial administration. However, the absolute worth of the institution of the Deputy Commissioner has tremendously eroded in the many years since the institution was created more than two hundred years ago. The spread of education, development of communication and physical infrastructure, progressive march of democracy, and sublimation of earthly caprices

have all contributed to a gradual decline in the stature of this office. At the same time, a simultaneous loss of standards on the part of later day incumbents themselves also may have aggravated the scene. Many people, especially the veterans, are found to be privately confiding that there has been a rapid deterioration in the level of efficiency of the Deputy Commissioners in specific periods since independence. With a view to verifying the myth, respondents were requested to pass their opinion regarding the perceived deterioration in the specific four 10-year slots since 1971. This was also a ploy to gauge the subjective opinion of respondents regarding the state of this important institution of the country's public administration. The responses are processed in Table 7.28.

Table 7.28. Trend of Perceived Deterioration of Level of Efficiency of Deputy Commissioners in Specific Post-Independence Periods

<u>Respondents</u>	<u>Periods</u>	<u>Maximum</u>	<u>Moderate</u>	<u>Negligible</u>	<u>Nil</u>	<u>No Response</u>
<i>Perception of</i>	1971-1980	30 (27.03)	43 (38.74)	18 (16.22)	18 (16.22)	2 (1.80)
<i>BCS (Admn) officers [111]</i>	1981-1990	17 (15.32)	58 (52.25)	27 (24.32)	7 (6.31)	2 (1.80)
	1991-2000	16 (14.41)	44 (39.64)	35 (31.53)	14 (12.61)	2 (1.80)
	2001 --	26 (23.42)	25 (22.52)	36 (32.43)	22 (19.82)	2 (1.80)
<i>Perception of other officers [198]</i>	1971-1980	54 (27.27)	69 (34.85)	44 (22.22)	23 (11.62)	8 (4.04)
	1981-1990	32 (16.16)	92 (46.46)	56 (28.28)	10 (5.05)	8 (4.04)
	1991-2000	33 (16.67)	83 (41.92)	62 (31.31)	12 (6.06)	8 (4.04)
	2001 --	44 (22.22)	68 (34.34)	59 (29.80)	19 (9.60)	8 (4.04)
<i>Perception of free-lance respondents [151]</i>	1971-1980	33 (21.85)	37 (24.50)	56 (37.09)	17 (11.26)	8 (4.04)
	1981-1990	20 (13.25)	60 (39.74)	58 (38.41)	5 (3.31)	8 (4.04)
	1991-2000	21 (13.91)	68 (45.03)	48 (31.79)	6 (3.97)	8 (4.04)
	2001 --	32 (21.19)	46 (30.46)	35 (23.18)	30 (19.87)	8 (4.04)
<i>Total [460]</i>	1971-1980	117 (25.43)	149 (32.39)	118 (25.65)	58 (12.61)	18 (3.91)
	1981-1990	69 (15.00)	210 (45.65)	141 (30.65)	22 (4.78)	18 (3.91)
	1991-2000	70 (15.22)	195 (42.39)	145 (31.52)	32 (6.96)	18 (3.91)
	2001 --	102 (22.17)	139 (30.22)	130 (28.26)	71 (15.43)	18 (3.91)

Source: Researcher's survey. Figures in parentheses indicate percentage of row totals.

This has become evident that the responses to this question have not succeeded in bringing in much of substantially conclusive information. Rather, a nearly evenly divided pattern of opinions may be comprehended from the table. For example, almost equal proportions (25.43 percent and 25.65 percent) of respondents maintain that there were 'maximum' and 'negligible' extents of such deterioration in the level of efficiency of the Deputy Commissioners in Bangladesh during 1971-1980. However, the single largest respondent group (32.39 percent) feels that there was a moderate deterioration during the time. Another two almost identical numbers of respondents speak of a rapid deterioration of the level of efficiency in the 1981-1990 and 1991-2000 periods, although a sudden negative spurt of efficiency level is reported by 22.17 percent respondents for the period since 2001. The level of efficiency shows either a rapid decline or a moderate fall

according to the opinions of 57.82 percent, 60.65 percent, 57.61 percent and 52.39 percent of all respondents in the four consecutive 10-year periods since independence. One other remarkable pattern discerned in the table amplifies a perceptively worst scenario in the decade from 1981 to 1990. This period is exactly the same when the political system of the country experienced unconstitutional jolts. During the most parts of the decade, Bangladesh smarted under a martial law regime, which was succeeded by a government that originated from the strengths of martial law regime itself. This coincidence of an aberration from democratic system and a conspicuous fall in the level of efficiency in the most important office in field administration is probably not accidental, since administrative development is most likely to happen under democratic governance, rather than under any other form. The other remarkable feature distinguished from the above information is the slight improvement in the scenario in the period since 2001 as opined by the respondents. Two things may be pertinent here for reference. The first is the fact that sufficient time has not elapsed since 2001 to formulate a complete understanding of the issue. The other possible factor may be the placement of a new generation of officers as Deputy Commissioners in the districts. Their other colleagues too in the field administration represent a new generation of officers of Bangladesh Civil Service¹⁴. It may be possible in near future to reach a conclusive decision whether there is a causal relationship between these two events.

With the impressions the Deputy Commissioners and their colleagues left in the four 10-year periods since independence in the mind of the respondents having been indicated about, one may now go for viewing the current impressions about the respectability the incumbent Deputy Commissioners enjoy from their fellow officers. This was considered useful because an effective role of coordination necessitates the presence of a reasonable degree of acceptability in the person who is designated for this vitally important management function. Acceptability follows from two other traits – authority and respectability. The question of commonly acceptable authority is the headache of the government and academics alike, while respectability depends primarily on the persons themselves, although the cultural-psychological and other environmental issues may also be at play. The generalist officials are traditionally groomed, through appropriate training and orientation, for such roles. But, their lawful authority and all the training become worthless in the event of their lack of personal worth that commands respect from others. The responses received from the respondents in reply to a question on the respectability of the Deputy Commissioners are produced below in a tabular form.

¹⁴ In November 2003, all officers serving in the field administration at district and upazila levels are encadred after 1980, when the unified Bangladesh Civil Service was constituted with various cadres.

Table 7.29. Level of Respectability of Deputy Commissioners with Fellow Officers as Perceived by Survey Respondents

<u>Respondents</u>	<u>Maximum</u>	<u>Moderate</u>	<u>Negligible</u>	<u>Nil</u>
Admn Officers (111)	61 (54.95)	40 (36.04)	9 (8.11)	1 (0.90)
Other Officers (198)	108 (54.55)	62 (31.31)	26 (13.13)	2 (1.01)
Free-lance (151)	67 (44.37)	63 (41.72)	20 (13.25)	1 (0.67)
Total (460)	236 (51.30)	165 (35.87)	55 (11.96)	4 (0.87)

Source: Researcher's survey. Figures in parentheses indicate percentage of row totals.

The survey results show a good amount of respectability enjoyed by the Deputy Commissioners (DCs) from other officers at the district level. The respondents who opine that the DCs enjoy maximum respect from other officers constitute 51.30 percent of the total. On this count, 54.95 percent of BCS (Administration) officer-respondents, 54.55 percent of 'other officers' and 44.37 percent of free-lance respondents hold the same view. The BCS (Administration) officer-respondents and 'other officers' in amazingly similar proportions express an equally bright posture for the DCs. An absolute majority from each of these two categories of respondents speak of a maximum respectability of these important field officers. On the other hand, the free-lance respondents appear to be not so enthusiastic about it, although the single largest chunk among them subscribes to the same satisfactory view. Another 41.72 percent free-lance respondents, however, maintain that the DCs are just respectable in the eye of the other officers working at the district level. On this count they (free-lance respondents) run ahead of BCS (Administration) officer-respondents (36.04 percent) and the 'other officers' (31.31 percent). On the whole, as one may add up the readings on the first two counts, a total of 87.17 percent of all respondents in the survey give the Deputy Commissioners convincing pass marks as regards their standings in the eye of the officers of various streams working at district and other field levels. The survey results do not get a very big proportion of respondents to speak of a negative portrayal of the DCs¹⁵. It appears from the above survey results that there is still a great amount of respect for the Deputy Commissioner, who continues to remain as the incarnation of the traditions of the prestigious cadre of Bangladesh Civil Service. It may also be inferred that the office of the DC may still expect to achieve important things.

7.3.3. Problems identified. Like all other socio-economic institutions, administrative systems undergo constant changes in appearance and essence. This is because no administrative system has yet matched the configurations of an all-perfect institution hypothesized by men of ideas. Numerous research and reflections on public administration act as a pointer to the enormous imperfections and limitations of this institution, which is so vital for the future of humanity. All

¹⁵ The researcher's personal experiences testify that situations in this regard vary in accordance with varying levels of managerial efficiency and personal characteristics of the incumbents.

three phenomena of momentum – i.e., impetus, inertia and regression – are discerned in the history of public administration (Braibant 1996:165). An administrative system which undergoes changes in response to the changing demands of the environment is a lively one. Most administrative systems are required to have a self-correcting or self-adjusting device to cope with their changing imperatives. On the other hand, serious malfunctioning becomes a regularly disturbing phenomenon if a system plays blind to the oft-varying claims of various factors of governance. Again, if a system keeps on passing its life, even after discovering its irritants, there may be a risk of the total break-down of the system. Civil service is such an institution which undergoes constant changes. It is also always subjected to conflicting and varying demands made by different stakeholders. Hence, it hardly affords to ignore its known deficiencies and limitations. Many developing countries experience the predicament of adapting modern public administration and, at the same time, avoiding the ills generally associated with it. Although the civil service is believed to be oriental in birth and development (Sinha 1985:1), this instrument of modern statecraft was taken to the present finesse in the western world. Under the British colonial rule in India, the Indian Civil Service was given the accolade of an efficient *steel-frame* administration. After the British rule came to an end in 1947, the three successor states retained its general framework. However, the sub-continent was far from the western democracies, whose philosophy of governance, culture and institutional preconditions were yet to be ingrained in these countries, Thus, South Asia presented a mosaic of artificial administrative entities left by a departing power (Ray 1999:268). As a constituent part of the sub-continent, Bangladesh also experiences some problems related with the administrative system bequeathed by the departing British. The contemporary high ideals of democratic governance and global wave of egalitarian inclinations are not very compatible with the abject poverty, sheer selfishness, political instability and lack of vision in the country's elite. The country's poor image too constitutes an obstacle to the attainment of a set of appropriate governing institutions. It also fails it to frame the people's loyalties and chart its destiny, since the elite seem incapable of meeting the challenges facing the new nation (Kalam 2001:29).

The members of the bureaucracy in a generic sense, and those of the BCS (Administration) cadre in particular, are among the best known segments of elite in Bangladesh. The way these officials discharge their functions and the esteem they hold in the eye of people and scholars are important for any kind of reforms or modifications in their objective situations. With this fact in mind, an opinion survey was conducted for the research. The views so gathered have been analyzed in Chapter 7. The survey results also contained a detailed list of causes for a

deteriorating standard of public administration as identified by the respondents. Likewise, a list of suggestions emerged from the opinion of respondents. The questionnaire contained only two open-ended questions – one about the respondents' opinion about the reasons for administrative decline, and the other about their probable remedies. The two lists prepared on the basis of their responses were not, however, presented in that part. They may be seen now with a view to verifying the respondents' opinion on affairs of BCS (Administration) cadre with those of the experts in the subject. The respondents, selected from different walks of life, were again distributed in different parts of the country. Some of them were members of the subject cadre, while some others had a direct link with their performance. Still there were others who rarely had a direct interaction with BCS (Administration) functionaries. By and large, they were aware of the position occupied by the members of this cadre in the administrative and public affairs of Bangladesh. As is the case, the respondents passed their opinion on the performance of these officers and also gave their impressions about the cultural, political and administrative ethos obtaining in the country. In this respect, references were made on some other groups of functionaries too. But, these other references were made just to highlight the unique position enjoyed and/or suffered by the officers of Bangladesh Civil Service (Administration) cadre in the public life of the country. The respondents' impressions about the reasons for presumed deterioration of standards of the performance of BCS (Administration) cadre are presented in Table 9.01. The statements on deteriorating administrative standards are so often voiced in various forums that there can be little doubt about the authenticity of the statement, although an element of subjectivity is possible in it. The question may be raised about the degree, not substance, of such deterioration.

Table 7.30. Causes for Deterioration of Standards of Public Administration in Bangladesh

Cited Causes→ Category of Respondents↓	Political Inter- vention	Corrup- tion	Moral Degrada- tion	Defective Recruitment, Placement and Promotion System*	Inadequate Salaries and Incentives	Nepotism and Absence of Neutrality	Political Instability	Involvement of Officers in Politics	Inhibitive Attitude and Lack of Training	Miscella- neous**	Total***
Admn [111]	60 (19.61)	36 (11.76)	12 (3.92)	42 (13.73)	27 (8.82)	7 (2.29)	6 (1.96)	25 (8.17)	17 (5.56)	61 (19.93)	306 [2.76 issues per respondent]
Other [198]	86 (20.05)	64 (14.92)	34 (7.93)	13 (3.03)	28 (6.53)	24 (5.59)	22 (5.13)	10 (2.33)	11 (2.56)	106 (24.71)	429 [2.18 issues per respondent]
Free-lance	70	83	31	18	10	26	25	15	15	94	433 [2.87 issues per respondent]
Respondents [151]	216 (16.17)	183 (19.17)	77 (7.16)	73 (4.16)	65 (2.31)	57 (6.00)	53 (5.77)	50 (3.46)	43 (3.46)	261 (21.71)	1,168 [2.71 issues per respondent]
Total [460]	183 (18.49)	156 (15.67)	65 (6.59)	73 (6.25)	65 (5.57)	57 (4.88)	53 (4.54)	50 (4.28)	43 (3.68)	261 (22.35)	

Source: Researcher's survey.

Figures in parentheses indicate percentage of row totals.

* Recruitment in bulks is cited many a time as a major irritant for the administrative system of the country.

** Cited Miscellaneous Causes include (1) discords between politicians and administrators, (2) inter-cadre rivalries and lack of coordination, (3) lack of accountability and transparency, (4) misuse of power, (5) absence of well-defined policies, (6) breach of policies, laws and principles, (7) red-tapism, (8) apathy toward people, (9) lack of monitoring, (10) lack of logistic support, (11) people's indifference, (12) low level of merit, (13) low standards of education and creativity, (14) absence of control on police, (15) absence of patriotism, (16) complexity of laws, (17) abject poverty, (18) inertia, (19) incompetent and corrupt politicians, (20) lack of career planning, (21) devaluation of the honest and efficient, (22) lack of efficient manpower, (23) neglect of local government institutions, and (24) wastage.

*** Entries are individually cited when their frequencies occurred more than 40 times for each.

The respondents' opinions show that *political intervention* in administrative affairs is regarded as the single-most serious irritant in the public administration. It is quoted for the highest number (18.49 percent) of times by the respondents. Out of a total of 1,168 citations of problems quoted by the respondents, as many as 216 were about this hazard faced in administration. Overall, 46.96 percent respondents cited this problem. There are insignificant variations in the patterns of opinion expressed by the three categories of respondents. More interesting is the fact that the 'other officers' category was slightly more vocal on this issue. Indeed, political interference is among the most serious problems the public administration of Bangladesh is faced with. It is the BCS (Administration) cadre whose officers are most exposed to political interference. These officers' field-level functions about development coordination, protocol, and management of elections and local government affairs often induce them to have interaction with political functionaries. It is not only the Administration cadre officials or in Bangladesh alone, officers of other departments and in other countries too suffer from the same kind of interference.¹⁶ This is a necessary ramification of the conflicting relationships between politics and administration, since the acceptance of a Weberian model of politically neutral bureaucracy. As an important instrument of modern political system, public administration carries out the task of authoritative allocation of goods and services and values (Almond and Powel 1978:10). In this task, the officers of BCS (Administration) cadre have most often to come into touch with politicians, who are not always interested in strict observance of laws and express policies. Many politicians in effect expect BCS (Administration) officers to compromise with political neutrality in their discharge of administrative responsibilities, a cardinal feature of the Weberian bureaucracy of the country. This may not possibly be assumed as a very unnatural phenomenon, since the modern age has taken the dominance of political authority over all others. However, this axiomatic dominance becomes a problem when civil servants are compelled to give in by flouting the canons of law. Such a situation tends to portend politicization of the civil service, which is preferred by many ministers and politicians, especially of the ruling cliché. The later are likely to resort to intervention rather than detachment 'as long as there is an equation between a strong ministerial profile and political process' (Woodhouse 1994:252). The stark reality in the developing countries including those in the subcontinent is that ministers and politicians carry

¹⁶ One may find similar situations in India, a country with more deep-rooted democratic practices, where Ministers go with blatant misdemeanours. See Kuldip Nayar, Crime sans Punishment, *The Daily Star*, 22 November 2003. Similar instances are often cited in Bangladesh. See Mujibur Huq (former Cabinet Secretary), "Keeping on Kindling the Candle of Hope," in *The Prothom Alo*, 4 November 2993, and Syed Noor Hosain (former Secretary), "Politics is Heating Up: What's Next?" in *The Daily Star*, 19 November 2003.

the days when they are in power.¹⁷ Their conduct while in office is very rarely investigated upon, although their fates often experience vicissitude after every political turn of events. The political-administrative culture of Bangladesh rather has got a propensity to stand an extent of interference.¹⁸ But, in the process, administrative neutrality is sacrificed, and with it goes much of efficiency and accountability (Younis and Mostafa 2000:158). Hence, some thought may be required to overcome its impact on both politics and civil service.

Corruption was referred to as another major bureaucratic ill in public administration. In the responses of the opinion survey, it appeared as a problem for 183 times, i.e., in 15.67 percent frequencies. In simple terms, this is a problem quoted by the second-highest number (i.e., 39.78 percent) of respondents. It may sound interesting that among the BCS (Administration) officer-respondents, 32.43 percent raised this issue of corruption as a major irritant in public administration. On the other hand, the corresponding proportion of the 'other officer-respondents' was 32.32 percent, or just around the average. But, the free-lance respondents are quite harsh on the corruption in public administration. Among them, 54.97 percent respondents told about this problem. This is a reflection of a very poor image the civil servants carry in an increasingly open society, where corruption is said to be institutionalized as a most dominant component of bureaucratic culture. People have ceased to deny the existence of corrupt practices. Globalization marginalizes ethical considerations in politics, economics, culture and social relationships. By legitimizing and institutionalizing the pursuit of power and the lust for wealth, globalization has transformed the very meaning of morality. It has become moral to acquire as much wealth as possible in the most avaricious and exploitative manner and then donate part of one's ill-gotten riches to charity – in order to be draped in saintly garb. Differences of opinion are just in terms of nature, level and extent of corruption (Theobald 1990:79; Khan 1998:35). This is by no means peculiar to officials of any particular cadre, since corruption has become an all-pervasive phenomenon in Bangladesh Society (Jahan 2000:41). The ascendancy of the unscrupulous greed for ill-gotten wealth has probably intruded into almost all segments of society. This led Sobhan (2000:344) to call it 'the crisis of democracy' in Bangladesh, where its illiberal version introduces a winner-take-all phenomenon. Corruption cannot be arrested unless a determined resistance is made by the society. Corruption is sustained by an absence of accountability and transparency in Bangladesh. It is also reinforced by the inflow of foreign aids (Hancock 1996:174; Younis and

¹⁷ See Kuldip Nayar, *op. cit.*

¹⁸ Boundaries for any tenable extents of interferences may hardly be prescribed. But, on the whole, those in the past had been in tolerable limits. Any transgression would surely create uproar. Now-a-days, the situation seems to be heading for blind compliance, with further lowering of administration's capacity.

Mostafa 2000:16, 92). Corruption brews when public transactions take place in a subtle behind-the-screen manner, a mode favoured by undemocratic governments.¹⁹ The officers who choose a different course are often sidelined. The next most-frequently quoted reason for deteriorating standards of the administrative system is the *moral degradation*. It is inextricably linked with corruption, since they have a symbiotic relationship. Among the respondents, 77 persons, i.e., 16.74 percent attributed the deteriorating administrative standards to this problem. Taken together, corruption and moral degradation are the most severe reason for a poor image of public administration. Bureaucratic corruption cannot exist in isolation. As a reflection of prevailing behavioural patterns and cultural mores in a society, it is sustained only by the participation of many people. The tendency to view corruption as a personal misdeed leads to an excessive reliance on punishment, which has some deterrent effect. But, that does not address the root of the problem. Powerful politicians and bureaucrats are never prosecuted while in office. Corruption among public servants may be curbed if the scope for graft-raising is reduced, and the level of ethical standards is raised through an *esprit de corps* based on improved service practice and an increased compensation package.²⁰ In the opinion survey, 14.13 percent respondents quoted *low salaries* as a reason for a diminutive administrative stature. The remunerations of civil servants are not enough to ward off temptation of acquiring a personal fortune by robbing of the public purse (Braibant 1996:172). The UNDP (1993:77) shows a phenomenal fall in the real wage value for the salaries of higher civil servants. The 'bad equilibrium' in the service factor market leads to short-run adjustments in the forms of shirking and corruption and long-run adjustments in the apathy of bright and meritorious people from civil service. If civil service compensation levels are that low, a part of the public employee's total compensation may be derived from engagement in outside activities, resulting in an increased corruption and an exodus from public service (Rahman 2001:65). Most intervention schemes of states create rents that are usually competed for through a political process. Paying bribes to civil servants, who are not strong enough to resist temptation, has become an important method to compete for these rents (Goodman 1990). However, low income is not the only reason for bureaucratic corruption. The patron-client relationship has got an overbearing influence in corruption. Professional advancement and even placement are dependent upon it. Very often,

¹⁹ Many senior officers often speak in confidence about the subterranean way of doling out cash – through the officers of armed forces and field-level administration officials – to the lumpen politicians who were willing to collaborate with autocratic regimes.

²⁰ ABMS Zahur, 'Attaining Good Governance Needed Enhancement of Accountability', in *The Daily Star*, Dhaka, 22 November 2003.

economic necessities are less important than other factors. Those who are economically better-off may increasingly resort to corruption, since they can take risk and use money to buy their way (Sharma 2002:221). Corrupt officials are able to twist the existing laws and regulations to suit their ends.

Another major reason for a deteriorating standard in administration, as found in the survey respondents' opinions, is the *defective system of recruitment, placement and promotion*. This is not surprising that the proportion of BCS (Administration) officer-respondents (37.84 percent), who quoted this problem, far outweighs those in the 'other officers' (6.57 percent) and the free-lance respondents (11.92 percent). Indeed, this is a major cause for a plummeting stature of the civil service in Bangladesh.²¹ In the recruitment process, *merit* is just among the many considerations with a specific quota. It combines with a low remuneration package and professional hazards to make a combined repulsive effect on many bright young men and women who find BCS (Administration) cadre quite unattractive. The principles of representative selection and a diffused nature of merit considerations have an anti-merit disposition in civil service (Rahman et al 1993:2). The government's various decisions on the quota arrangements for recruitment to civil service positions showed a lack of farsightedness and went against expert opinions (Ali 2002:223). The large numbers of recruits at single instances too worked as a deterrent to a meritorious BCS (Administration) cadre.²² Likewise, the practices of placement of officers in various positions indicate no signs of thoughtfulness on the part of the government. Studies show that the cadre officials' transfers are often with little sound rationale and they adversely affect the morale and efficiency of BCS (Administration) cadre (UNDP 1993:71). However, this sort of problem, by no means peculiar to Bangladesh, also occurs in India too, where some officers enjoy limelight, while many others have to continue with uninspiring assignments (Agnihorti 1996:134). However, the promotion system has been an issue of extraordinary contentions in Bangladesh Civil Service. The system lacks in competitiveness and objectivity [PARC (I) 2000:36]. The aimless and anomalous promotion system does not follow any well conceived rational process. Rules and regulations are arbitrarily framed by the government when it deems that time has come to promote a few individuals. There are no annual promotional rounds and often officers have to wait for years before they are considered for advancement (Zafarullah et al 1997). Many a time, the government has been sued in the courts of

²¹ Mahbub Hossain Khan quoted it, among others, as a major obstacle to effective public administration, in his serials 'One Hundred Years of Civil Service in Bangladesh' in *The Holiday* in April-May 1993.

²² Discussion at Section 4.4.2 may be perused. Many survey respondents too raised the issue.

law by officials aggrieved by the former's decisions of awarding or not-awarding promotion to officers. The prospects for impending promotions too cause consternation among different sections of civil servants, many of whom think of obstructing events they consider as not in their favour. The absence of or conflicts about gradation lists in respective cadre services contributes to this undesirable phenomenon. Here too, mindless acts of recruitment in various cadres are to blame. For example, the officers of BCS (Administration) cadre occupy the best of the senior positions in the system. Still, this cadre does not have an updated gradation list.²³ Moreover, the subterfuge and secrecy surrounding promotion of officers raise questions about the principles and criteria of promotion.²⁴ The infiltration of political considerations tends to compound the problem further (Obaidullah 1999:17, 44). Hence, promotion in BCS (Administration) has somehow becomes more of a problems than a conducive process. The contradictions and interplay of factors like efficiency, merit, seniority, performance evaluation, political leanings etc. make the subject even more complex.

Some respondents quoted as reasons for deteriorating administrative standards various incidences of *nepotism and absence of neutrality, political instability, involvement of officers in partisan politics and inhibitive attitudes* held by officers. The same characteristics may prevail in other countries too (Theobald 1990:125; Rahman 2001:49). The administrative systems of many developing countries are highly susceptible to such problems. However, the involvement of civil officers in partisan politics has been a major aberration from the normal administrative practices in Bangladesh. This is particularly so because so far there has not been any express renunciation of the Weberian model of a politically neutral civil service system. Covert political activities of civil servants were not altogether unknown in the country. During the last years of united Pakistan, some sort of clandestine communication was maintained between political leaders and civil servants. A short-lived experimentation of the politicization of civil servants through the post-independence BKSAL system was aborted. Various development programmes pursued by different governments necessitate a close liaison of civil officers, especially the DCs and top bureaucrats at national secretariat, with political functionaries. However, a trend of politicization seems to be in the offing in this part of the world (Younis and Mostafa 2000:160). In 1996, some civil servants of Bangladesh also indulged in activities that were clearly tuned to suit the

²³ The last gradation list of the cadre, provisionally circulated in 1997, did not contain the names of thousands of officers inducted in the cadre after 1981. It was clearly for the government's intention of averting serious conflicts among different batches and streams of officers who were victims of the government's haphazard acts in many years.

²⁴ The latest principles on promotion to the top posts, framed and amended in 2002 and 2003, were kept secret, thereby giving rise to further consternation and litigation. See Section 4.4.3.

objectives of particular political forces. After the change of government during the middle of that year, some of the officers who had participated in the aforesaid partisan activities were given prize postings. It had a demoralizing effect.²⁵ Again, after further turn of events in late 2001, another group of officers entered into the limelight. The last few rounds of promotions in the top positions appear to corroborate allegations that undue politicking pays more than undue dividend in administration. All these dysfunctional factors are accompanied by an inhibitive attitude in public officials, who do not always cater to the needs of their clientele. Their detachment from the people is then combined with *inefficiency* and *lack of training* to produce an artificial boundary line between the people and their civil servants. This statement may tally with the results of a public opinion poll conducted by *Democracywatch* on the image of the public servants of Bangladesh. On a 1-10 scale, the respondents awarded public servants a score of 4.07 for sincerity, 3.89 for fairness, 3.36 for honesty, 3.89 for trustworthiness, 4.9 for competence, and 4 for dedication. These results show that public servants have to go a long way to reverse their tarnished image. Inefficiency is an innate feature in many poor countries. A weak political leadership and an absence of accountability sustain this cycle of inefficiency in these countries (Rahman 2001:97). Bangladesh is no exception.

The survey results showed a host of miscellaneous irritants. Both structural and attitudinal factors are in the long list of possible reasons for a perceived deterioration of civil service standards. These miscellaneous reasons numbered 261, i.e., 22.35 percent of the total 1,168 citations. This may not be an exhaustive list of such reasons. However, the long list of miscellaneous causes for a degrading public administration contains quite a few important points. These include politician-administrator discords, inter-cadre rifts, lack of monitoring, accountability and transparency, abuse of power, absence or breach of policies, red-tapism, apathy to people, lack of logistics, indifferent people, low level of merit, education and creativity, absence of control on police, absence of patriotism, complex laws, abject poverty, inertia, incompetent and corrupt politicians, devaluation of the honest and efficient, lack of efficient manpower and career planning, neglect of local government, and wastage. All these are indeed present in Bangladesh and they may contribute to the current administrative performance. A key problem is political leadership's inertia. Despite its huge limitations, in Bangladesh, issues and institutions are increasingly coming up to demand a freer and more democratic polity

²⁵ The officers who were active in the *Janatar Mancha* (people's platform), during the tumultuous days in early 1996 subsequently turned into very powerful and some of them, in later days, joined politics too. That had a demoralizing effect on the civil service. See Amir Khasru, *Bureaucracy Uneasy about Future*, *The Holiday*, 20 August 1999.

characterized by the principles of good governance. Politicians have not been very successful in adapting to these new demands of the time. They have rather shown a proclivity to clinging to traditional politics. The philosophy of good governance necessarily enjoins the political leadership to embrace changes and reforms of the structures in national interest. The civil service is not the whole thing in good governance. But, by keeping a very feeble civil service, the political masters – no matter how much democratic they are – at least partially fail in their prospective role in contributing to political development (Gamer 1976:226). The political leadership's relative inaction in respect of administrative reforms leads to a form of non-performing obstinacy on the part of public administration. Among the substantive reasons, the first one is the sheer scope of administrative reforms. In the last several decades, the civil service assumed a gargantuan size with linkages of various kinds all around. Administrative reform has to involve very vital sections of society. The political leadership shows caution while contemplating any changes in its structures as they affect many stakeholders. Moreover, reform is a complex and intellectual task as it involves fundamental issues. Political leaders have no leisure or inclination to indulge in such pursuits. Lastly, in modern states, politicians carry out administrative reforms under the democratic competitive politics. Reforms are not easily attainable (1999). It is not surprising that the administrative system in Bangladesh has been as it is. All are convinced of the need for its improvement.

7.3.4. Remedies as suggested by respondents. The survey could elicit opinions of individual respondents who suggested a number of possible remedies for the deteriorating standards of public administration. They are presented in Table 7.31 for the sake of appreciation of their merit and a comparative analysis with others' views.

Table 7.31. Remedies for Ills in Public Administration of Bangladesh with Special Reference to BCS (Administration) Cadre

Cited Remedies→	Merit-based Recruitment, Placement and Promotion System	Eradication of Political Pressure	Updated and Effective Training	Social and Moral Regeneration	Package of Adequate Salaries and Incentives	Ruthless Suppression of Terror and Corruption	Suppression of Partisan Conduct of Officers	Introduction of Rewards and Punishment	Re-empowerment of BCS (Admn) Cadre	Miscellaneous*	Total**
Admn Officers [111]	81 (22.44)	42 (11.63)	53 (14.68)	19 (5.26)	29 (8.03)	16 (4.43)	21 (5.82)	13 (3.60)	15 (4.16)	72 (19.94)	361 (on average 3.25 remedies per respondent)
Other Officers [198]	77 (19.15)	60 (14.93)	59 (14.68)	34 (8.46)	32 (7.96)	22 (5.47)	12 (2.99)	7 (1.74)	3 (0.75)	96 (23.88)	402 (on average 2.03 remedies per respondent)
Free-lance Respondents [151]	84 (22.40)	59 (15.73)	39 (10.40)	32 (8.53)	22 (5.87)	42 (11.20)	13 (3.47)	6 (1.60)	5 (1.33)	73 (19.47)	375 (on average 2.48 remedies per respondent)
Total [460]	242 (21.27)	161 (14.15)	151 (13.27)	85 (7.47)	83 (7.29)	80 (7.03)	46 (4.04)	26 (2.28)	23 (2.02)	241 (21.18)	1,138 (on average 2.47 remedies per respondent)

Source: Researcher's survey.

Figures in parentheses indicate percentage of row totals.

* Cited Miscellaneous remedies include (1) accountability, (2) loyalty to laws, (3) provisions for family welfare, (4) proper policies and principles, (5) career planning, (6) coordination, (7) control on police, (8) congenial relationships between politicians and salaried administrators, (9) education, (10) socio-economic development, (11) orderliness and fairness in PSC's functioning, (12) adequate logistic support, (13) decentralization, (14) end to contractual appointments, (15) law reforms, (16) administrative reforms, (17) end to red-tapism, (18) appointment of more officers with social science background, (19) looking into ancestral background, (20) healthy political culture and sensible politicians, (21) political stability, (22) separation of judiciary, (23) neutrality, (24) job specification, and (25) filling of vacant posts.

** Entries are individually cited when their frequencies occurred more than 20 times for each.

This is visible from the above table that the need for a *merit-based recruitment, placement and promotion system* is identified for the highest number of times – 242 times, i.e., 21.27 percent of a total of 1,138 entries – as an urgently needed remedy for the current desolation in BCS (Administration) cadre. In another word, 52.61 percent respondents are in favour of introducing a merit-based administration. For the sake of efficiency, merit is important for any public institution (Braibant 1996:173; Dubhashi 1986:179). It has been duly stressed in the Weberian discourses on the ideal type of bureaucracy and also in a reformed UK civil service system under public choice philosophy (Greenaway 1995:362). The need for merit in public administration cannot be overemphasized in Bangladesh, which needs greater merit-based recruitment.²⁶ But, so far, the other political and demographical considerations keep merit as just one of many factors. It has led to mediocrity and corruptions of different sorts (Ali 2002:275). The latest eulogy of merit came from the cabinet committee on administrative reforms and good governance. In a meeting on 11 January 2004, it unequivocally called for a purely merit-based recruitment and promotion system.²⁷ Earlier, UNDP had described the process of recruitment, placement and promotion in the country's civil service as having no reference with merit (1993:68). The conglomerate of technocrat officers has been criticizing the personnel policy by terming it as anti-merit and pro-administration.²⁸ Maybe they had their own agenda – a greater role in administration. In fact, as a global phenomenon, the generalist-specialist dichotomy perplexes the politico-administrative domain of many countries.²⁹ Earlier, Khan (1998:170) advocated not only a merit-based initial induction, but also a two-track process, where the meritorious could have accelerated promotion.³⁰ It reminds the olden practice where all-Pakistan and central services enjoyed a quicker promotion compared to provincial services. It remains to be seen who takes what action to give effect to these suggestions. It may be said with some confidence that courageous adjustments, as a first step towards an ultimate abolition, of the various quota arrangements are the hour's need. At the same token, placements and promotion should be made

²⁶ Syed Noor Hossain, 'Politics is Heating Up: What Next?' in *The Daily Star*, 19 November 2003.

²⁷ *The New Age*, 12 January 2004.

²⁸ The Prokrichi-BCS Coordination Council, in their numerous memoranda and press releases, uttered its serious reservation against what they termed as gravely biased for generalist. They also maintained that this faulty policy was detrimental to the national interests. Their memoranda to the Prime Minister on 26 October 1998 and 13 August 2002 were just two cases in point.

²⁹ The all-pervasiveness of the problem constrained the great Indian leader, Jayaprakash Narayan, to distinguish specialist subjects into two groups – one for generalist officers especially trained and the other exclusively for technically educated officers. See, Jayaprakash Narayan. 1978. *Towards Total Revolution: India and Her Problems*. Bombay; Popular Prakashan.

³⁰ After his five years' tenure as a Member of Bangladesh Public Service Commission, Professor M. Mohabbat Khan may have found the task pretty more difficult to be accomplished. Ali too (2002:282) laments the failure of introducing a two-track promotion system largely owing to technocrats' obduracy.

as rationally as possible. It may also be noted that unlike recruitment and promotion for which there are rules and guidelines, there are no policies or rules on placement, leaving little room for objectivity. Subjectivity has to be reduced as much as possible in the interest of an efficient administration, which is an essential precondition for the country's forward march. Some positive features like administrative innovations and specialization may be encouraged as in South Korea. Its added administrative mettle is an integral feature of a transformed Korea (Ro 1993:138). In order to contemplate a similar administrative system, Bangladesh has to build hers on the principle of merit. Notably, the lack of a merit-based recruitment and placement system was rated in the survey at serial 4 in the list of civil service problems. But, it has topped the list of possible remedies, just to show the stress people put on merit in administration.

It is noted that political intervention was regarded as the foremost reason for a deteriorating standard of civil service performance. The respondents equally stressed the need for *removal of political pressure*. It constitutes over 14 percent of total entries made by individual respondents. It means, to 35 percent respondents, removal of political pressure is crucial. Indeed, it is critical to strike a balance between the supremacy of political functionaries and an administrative autonomy. In democracies, leadership carries the political system in line with its philosophy as endorsed by people through periodic elections. In this respect, bureaucracy preceded the party system. When political leadership, party organization, electoral system and legislatures are in a state of flux, bureaucracy provides leadership in the administration (Bhambri 1971:56). It metes out uniform and impartial treatment to clientele. It is an inevitable tool of modern democracy as one major concern of the latter in the reduction of socio-economic differences (Quah 1985:82). Thus, civil servants are engaged in some authoritative political acts. After the Weberian treatises, political neutrality was considered a key to efficient public administration. One inherent purpose of establishing Public Service Commissions in new countries was to keep politics out of civil service. One criterion of recruitment of Commission members was detachment from politics (Quah 1985a:118). However, politicians often made interventions in administration. It just assumes a staggering proportion in developing countries characterized by an enormously complex demand side, an ill-prepared support side and all-pervading resource constraints.³¹

³¹ The politicians' keen interest in the supervision of the publicly funded local development works is a case in point. The scrambles for such roles by the ruling party stalwarts are remarkably conspicuous in areas where the legislators belong to opposition parties.

A dichotomous relationship persists between these two sets of functionaries, where civil servants would obtain dominance by means of their organization of information and efficiency of its executive hierarchy unless it were balanced by a body of responsible elected political leaders. The ideal politician was the man of principle and action. The ideal official was the man prepared to execute conscientiously and efficiently whatever his political superiors legislated, regardless of his own political convictions (Parry 1977:81; Singh 1993:61). Democracy enshrines the principle that popularly elected leaders need to keep civil servants under their supervision. A better way of maintaining that supervision is through a system of *control*, not *intervention* in public administration. Bhambri (1971:85) shows the ample scopes for democratic control on the activities of civil servants, for which various ways and means of parliamentary business are enough. He quotes Hugh Gaitskell as saying, "... if there is one major thing which leads civil servants to be excessively cautious, timid and careful and to keep records which outside the civil service would be unnecessary, it is the fear of the parliamentary question."³² Civil servants have *powers* for discharging their responsibilities. A residual mistrust of those who hold these powers is probably necessary and desirable, since officials of government, like all other human beings, find it easier to remember their powers than their obligations. But, it is not to assume that the only way to prevent the abuse of power is to make sure that power does not exist (Bundy 1968:30). Interference of ministers in administration has some healthy effects too, since it checks administrative excess and corruption, and sometimes compels the civil servants to be responsible to people's elected representatives. But, its excessive use makes administration powerless and reduces its neutrality (Panda 1978:138). Politicians and civil servants are partners in a game, where they maintain *separate and distinct personae*; the politician visible, committed, publicly accountable and temporary, while the civil servants anonymous, disinterested, internally accountable and permanent (Greenaway 1995:359). The survey respondents' concerns about the political intervention in civil service functions are well-founded. If officers are inducted in civil service on merit and properly motivated, if there are institutional arrangements for the ideals of a pluralist democracy, and if the political functionaries share with the officers a sense of state, there may be few problems in routine interactions between them. The two sides would have to make amend in their respective spheres.³³ Administrators who respect democracy and the

³² In Bangladesh too, the utmost care and thoughtfulness of civil servants are remarkable on the eve of the meetings of parliamentary committees they are supposed to be appearing in.

³³ Mujibul Huq expressed it aptly by saying that the task of bringing in political transparency does not belong to civil servants. He only urges the government to notify to civil servants that giving in to political pressures would tantamount to misconduct on their part. *The Protham Alo*, 4 November 2003.

majority party's legitimacy to determine public policy will be more responsive to popular demands and interests and to the direction of political bodies. But even goodwill on all sides and administrators' responsiveness to political bodies are not enough. The art of modern political leadership consists not only in the prudent search for appropriate goals and policies, but also in learning how to interact with a massive and complex bureaucracy – knowing how and when to press and coerce it, flatter and reward it, teach it, and be taught by it (Almond 1974:127). Public administration must be responsible to political institutions – government, parliament, political parties. Politicians may also take the spirit of Lloyd George, who said, "There is one institution we will not interfere with, or we will not cripple, or will not deprive of its functions and privileges. It is the British Civil Service in India" (O'Malley 1931:151). Mutual understandings of both institutions are dearly needed.

Out of a total of 460 respondents, 151, i.e., 32.83 percent referred to *training* as an urgent imperative. It means 13.27 percent of the total suggestions concerned this issue. Civil service training is a vital tool for administrative management. It was made a painstaking task during the dawn of the civil service system in India. The creation and subsequent abolition of Fort William College in Calcutta and the triumphant existence for a half century of the Hailebury College at Hertford are a testimony to that (Khan 1998:22). In the recent decades various universities and the Civil Service College at Sunningdale are imparting civil service training. In post-War France, Ecole Nationale d'Administration and Ecole des Sciences Politiques supplied many civil service luminaries (Parry 1977:83). One foremost principle of good administration is the acquisition of professional competence which is impossible without proper training (Braibant 1996:174). Since independence, the donors had a great influence on the developing countries which sought to put in place many training institutes. However, the impact of all attention and investment was not bright in all cases. Training was not integrated with promotion and placement (Rahman 2001:69). A few countries could overcome the many problems, while such training programmes could very slowly produce their benefits in some others. Its efficiency and effectiveness are enhanced if training is integrated with other administrative aspects. In any organization, the most important means to its efficiency is the human resource. Motivation of this resource becomes crucial to the attainment of their objectives. When an organization has to be run efficiently, it can do so if those manning its different positions are sufficiently motivated (Banerjea and Sekhon 1996:127). It has a significant impact on the accountability too, since the officials' presumed failure to be accountable for their performance is often ascribed to insufficient training (Younis

and Mostafa 2000:91). Similarly, officers are seldom held accountable for many officials' unlawful acts perpetrated under ignorance. Performance feats of different officials of same peer groups are not of comparable standards largely owing to the inadequacy of training. In India too, many officers are believed to be without training to enhance their understanding of the nation's problems, not to speak of their lagging behind in the adoption of new administrative and management techniques (Jain and Chaudhuri 1982:271). However, the training of IAS somehow gets attention. The course layout for the IAS is purported to a) sensitize the participants to the economic, political and social environments at national and international levels; b) apprise participants of the emerging concepts and management practices; c) equip them with analytical aids for decision-making; and d) provide development opportunities, problem-solving skills, and contribution to organizational performance (Dubhashi 1986:190). These issues are of topical significance for a democratic pluralist country like India. To the contrary, the inadequacy of training facilities and the performance of this sector are further aggravated by the sharply declining standards of public education system in Bangladesh. Training receives very scanty attention from the rulers, while efforts for improving the quality and effectiveness of training are almost always in limbo (Khan 1998:62). Training institutions were often considered as a dumping ground for those officers who do not curry favour of the government. However, the Public Administration Training Policy of 2003, while filling a long-felt void in the country, announced attractive incentives for a stint in training institutions.³⁴ Therefore, training may soon become a valued and attractive administrative act to enhance the efficiency and motivational state of the civil officers.³⁵

In the survey, 85 (i.e., 18.48 percent) respondents called for *social and moral regeneration* for an improvement in the stature of BCS (Administration) cadre officers. It is again linked with motivation. An all-round inclination, attitude and outlook are required of officers if a country takes a course to modernity (Dubhashi 1986:179). But, if these officers instead are lacking in proper attitudinal traits, all good efforts are to end up with failures. Moreover, ideals of rule of law, accountability, responsiveness and good governance are lost if the state functionaries are devoid of moral strength. Maybe the spread of temporal precepts in modern world, to the relative

³⁴ The civil servants are now entitled to an allowance amounting to 30 percent of their basic pay. Moreover, the Policy offered preferential benefits in terms of scopes for professional development through internal and overseas training.

³⁵ The National Training Policy, as framed in 2003, highlighted the need for and promises of training in public administration. It has also sought to establish a link between training and on-the-job realities.

exclusion of moral and ethical norms, has done a disservice. Huge resources have to be expended for maintaining the façade. When a society is engulfed with hedonistic thoughts and practices, it tends to lose much of its intellectual self. Then a state of selfishness may set in and the rational-legal and social institutions are exposed to serious threats from discordant forces. Public administration is affected by such disharmonious phenomena, thereby losing people's confidence and trust. Laws become either inoperative or instruments of coercion at the hand of the powerful. Bangladesh is currently approaching such helplessness for its public institutions. The lack of a settled self-image for the country is swelled in size and gravity. The country also finds it more and more difficult to frame the people's loyalties and chart its destiny (Kalam 2001:29). Parallel governments emerge at the behest of criminals, tainted officials and politicians lacking integrity.³⁶ Though the shell of Bangladesh looks to be collective, its core is rather inflicted with high individualism, dominantly characterized by self-interests and enrichment. It is partly owing to scarce resources – a fact which turns the competition for resources into cynical conflicts and factionalism. All these have a derogatory effect on the functioning of government organizations (Rahman 2002:77). Fear for the wrath of the powerful moulds the orientation of institutions and men. In order to turn the events in a positive direction, it has to have a great deal of determination and take considerable risks. Civil servants may regain some lost confidence if they have enough moral and intellectual strength. Training of entry-level officers is singularly important, as the young recruits come of an educational system which does not always have an educative academic and moral environment.³⁷

Nearly an equal number of respondents opined that officials should get a package of *adequate salaries and incentives* for an improvement in the performance of BCS (Administration) cadre. This opinion constitutes 7.29 percent of the total number of suggestions. In another account, 18.04 percent respondents made this observation. Indeed, BCS (Administration) cadre officials,

³⁶ Kuldip Nayar, *op. cit.*, narrated how, in India, individual ministers were busy with illegal gratifications, how fake stamp papers worth about US \$ 9 billion under the seal of India, how several ministers were documented while taking bribe. Almost all of these misdeeds went with elements of impunity.

³⁷ To quote a few of hundreds of such events to demonstrate the absence of sane academic environment, some news headlines of just one day had it that none but those of a particular student party were allowed to participate in the tender process for erection of stalls for traditional *Ekushey Book Fair*. Again, probe of the alleged embezzlement of a million taka from the fund of the largest college in Comilla was stalled because of the intervention of the same organization. A few days earlier, the journalists of Barisal had been severely beaten by the activists of the same party. Lastly, activists of the same organization were reportedly terrorizing most students who had been opposed to running a commercial canteen in an Institute of Dhaka University. Besides, the same group reportedly ransacked and vandalized the institute and put it under lock because the authority did not concede their demand to condone the deficiencies of some students. Such un-academic and non-moral pursuits seem to have overtaken the academic activities in the educational institutions. *The New Age*, 15 January, and *The Prothom Alo*, 23 January 2004.

or for that matter any other officers, are not volunteers and they need to get a reasonable amount of remuneration for their services. Soon after independence, Bangladesh reduced about 2,200 separate pay scales for its public servants into only ten, and later on raised it to 20 (Khan 1998:94). Over and above the myriad contentions regarding the adjustment points, the most substantive reality was the 'denial of a living wage by the government' (Obaidullah 1999:88). In general, the 21-scale pay structure in Bangladesh offers the public servants very meager salaries (*Appendix W*). These amounts are insignificant for the minimum needs of a decent life. The officers of all cadres may get salaries from its 9th to the 1st slabs of pay. An entry level officer draws in a month a basic pay of taka 4,300 plus its 40-45 percent as house rent allowance and taka 200 as medical allowance. Moreover, in each year, he receives two months' basic pay as festival allowance. The officers are entitled to a yearly increment of 185 to 195 taka. Subject to observance of detailed procedures, and as years go, the officers move up to the 6th grade and then to 5th grades (taka 9,500 – 12,100), when some of them become Deputy Secretary. Then they have chances of getting promoted to the ranks of Joint Secretary, Additional Secretary and Secretary respectively with 3rd, 2nd and 1st grades of pay. These last-named grades carry pays to the tune of taka 11,700 – 13,500, taka 12,900 – 14,300 and taka 15,000 (consolidated). The 3rd and 2nd grades have provisions for yearly increments (amounting to 300 and 350 taka respectively). There are some fringe benefits like allotment of government houses – house rent allowances are not admissible in such cases – and a government transport (in lieu of a payment of taka 200 per month). Compared to the salaries of employees in other countries, these are just like pittance. But, when compared to the nation's per capita income and especially with reference to the number of public employees vis-à-vis the service they render, these may look otherwise. Initially, the East India Company paid little heed to the salary issues for their civil servants. For example, in 1744, at such an importance place as Dacca, the annual salaries for a Chief, a Junior Merchant, a Factor and a Writer were £40, £30, £15 and £5 respectively. Service in a distant country, so precarious and so poorly remunerated, was made tolerable only by the trade which the staff conducted on their own account (O'Malley 1931:9). Those trading activities included shipping Indian goods from port to ports in India and exporting them overseas. The Company had to take painstaking measures to combat rampant corruption which was about to ruin all institutional authority. The simultaneous objectives of a cheap and an efficient government are not always compatible. The governments of UK in the 19th century felt it dearly when they had to do away with sinecures and introduce salaries and pensions for public servants (Theobald 1990:27). After the crown assumption in 1859, the government began consolidating the

administrative structure and looked into the issues which had seldom attracted the Company's attention. The right to private trade had earlier been stopped and civil servants were given 'reasonable salaries and a consciousness of responsibility' (O'Malley 1931:106). A Divisional Commissioner (an officer of the status of Joint Secretary) used to draw taka 2,750 per month during 1859–1947. Similarly, a Deputy Commissioner drew taka 1,500 per month during that period.³⁸ The situation was more or less intact up to the dismemberment of Pakistan in 1971. Afterwards, the salary situation of the civil servants in its real connotation marked a sharp decline in relation to the consumer price index (CPI). The following table may illustrate it.

Table 7.32. Relative Change of Nominal and Real Basic Salaries of Top Civil Servants in Bangladesh.

Year	CPI 1969/70 = 100	Secretary		Additional Secretary		Joint Secretary	
		Nominal	Real	Nominal	Real	Nominal	Real
1972	182	3,000	3,000	2,750	2,750	2,300	2,300
1977	441	3,000	1,238	2,850	1,176	2,350	970
1985	1014	6,000	1,077	5,700	1,023	4,750	853
1991	1671	10,000	1,089	8,600	936	7,800	850
1993	1740	10,000	1,046	8,600	900	7,800	816

Source: UNDP, 1993, p.77.

Despite the nominal increase in the personal salaries of top civil servants by about 333 percent, their real basic salaries in 1993 were about one-third of what they received in 1971. There has been no reason or indication to think that the position has improved since 1993. At the same time, the rising standards of living have been progressively demanding on the purchasing powers of these middle-class gentry, who find it hard to cope with the effects of modernity and globalization. Moreover, the existence of three distinct pay structures – international, NGO and private, and government – has worsened the predicament of the government officials, since theirs is the worst of the three. It destabilizes job equilibrium, forces staffers to succumb to the corrupting forces, and leads to a scene where 'the government pretends to pay and we pretend to work'. Few things can be more harmful for national interests than giving low pay to top civil servants. Salary structures may get the first thrust of administrative reform. A 'more than parity' principle may help reverse the deterioration of quality of new civil service entrants. Serving in government should not in the social eye get equated with living on bribery.

In the opinion survey, 80 respondents, i.e., 17.39 percent of the total, recommended a *ruthless suppression of corruption and terror* as a means to improving the stature of BCS

³⁸ See M. H. Khan, One Hundred Years of Civil Service of Bangladesh, *The Holiday*, 30 April 1993.

(Administration) cadre. Likewise, another 46 respondents, i.e., 10 percent, called for the *suppression of the partisan conduct* on the part of civil officers as another means. These two entries together make for a total of 11.07 percent of total entries given by the survey respondents. It seems a rational proposition in view of the grave impacts created by these unpalatable phenomena. It is already noted that in terms of a global corruption prevalence index, Bangladesh ranked lowest in the world for three consecutive years. It is impossible to reform the administrative system while retaining such a tarnished image, which invites public diatribes from many mouths.³⁹ In order to shed off this handicap for a nation's sense of pride, self-respect and development, one has to look into the general conditions that may encourage or deter corruption among officials. The three most common factors in this respect are *opportunities, salaries, and policing*. No one of them should be considered in isolation; it is the relationship among them all that matters (Palmier 1985:273). Corruption of public servants may be curbed if the scope for graft-raising is reduced, and the level of ethical standards is raised through an esprit de corps based on improved service practice and an increased compensation package (Zahur 2003). The Pay Commissions in India and Bangladesh, ostensibly with a pro-poor political orientation, made it a point to reduce the senior officers' pay to a level below their market worth. This is in contrast with the position taken by Lord Cornwallis, who laid the foundations of modern administration in India. He wrote, '... if the principle of withholding all concealed sources of emoluments from the Company's servants be a right one, it is no less necessary to make their avowed salaries and allowances liberal and handsome' (Palmier 1985:274). The tendency to view corruption as a personal misdeed leads to an excessive reliance on punishment, but it does not address the root of the problem. Moreover, the legal deterrents are not very effective. The process is extremely protracted when the courts require very high standards of proof, which is hard to find. Again, the courts' 'not guilty' verdict is often mistaken as a certificate of innocence. It is necessary that people in general refrain from corrupt practices on their own and would not allow public officials to indulge in such acts. Bureaucratic corruption may be a survival mechanism for private enterprises faced with ruinous regulations (Goodman 1990:647). O'Malley (1931:10-12) shows how the Company's servants were allowed lucrative private trade and how the local traders also took the advantage by trading in the name of English staff. In the process, the Company servants got their share of the bounty. In the second place, salaries need to be compatible with market realities. Appropriate training, positive motivation and a vigilant public

³⁹ The latest of the sermons came from a visiting Member of the US Congress, who naively told that 'being at the lowest in a ranking of honesty is not good for country.' The visiting EU Trade Commissioner too told the same thing. *The Prothom Alo*, 15 January 2004.

are also required to ward off this menace. Not only the legal avenues, the public media and education system too have to be taken into a comprehensive anti-corruption process. The civil society's involvement in a corruption-combating drive is very important because bureaucratic corruption cannot be eliminated without removing the more formidable corruption in political sphere. The bureaucrats, businessmen and politicians make a corruption nexus. The inflow of foreign aid sustains this plunder game where the men at the top gain and the masses lose (Hancock 1996:183). It is important to distinguish between political and bureaucratic corruption. While the latter involves efforts by civil servants to enrich themselves through illegal means, the former is used by political coalitions to capture the apparatus of state or maintain a monopoly on power. The latter includes vote-rigging, registration of unqualified, dead, or non-existent voters, purchase and sale of votes, and falsification of poll results (Goodman 1990:649). In a round-table meeting, the politicians admitted that it is they who are to blame for the tarnished image of Bangladesh. Some of them pointed out that the problem starts with different parties' system of nomination of candidates for general elections.⁴⁰ Corruption in Bangladesh, accompanied by terror and awe, has become a household term and portends on a near-collapse decline in the authorities of legal and public institutions. Terror destroys the sense of security in society. A well-calculated and comprehensive solution to it should follow the stick and carrot tactics. However, if force is necessary, its use should be ruthless, leaving no lacunae to allow safe conduit to a perpetrator. Political will and determination, accompanied by bureaucratic support may produce the result. Lastly, politicking by civil servants is a clear violation of service norms and ethics. This should be uprooted in the interest of the nation. In this respect too, the politicians are to take the lead since it is these beneficiaries who may like to see this continue in their own parochial interest. They should understand that the civil servants' neutral character is a blessing for all.

The opinion survey also suggested for the introduction of a *system of rewards and punishment*. It is a necessary precondition for a vibrating institution. Public administration deals with countless issues and takes even more countless decisions and measures. If there is no system of appreciation and reprimand for its good and bad deeds, an urge for making good performance and avoiding aberrations would not exist. Lord Cornwallis arranged handsome salaries and privileges for his administrators, whom he expected to be selfless enough to unstintingly carry

⁴⁰ *The New Age*, on 22 January 2004, carried a news item titled "*Politicians blame peers for corruption*" on the proceedings of the meeting organized by Campaign for Good Governance.

out their assignments. At the same time, some measures introduced to clamp checks on their possible greed, caprices and aggrandizement led to a remarkable improvement in efficiency and honesty. 'There were more honesty, principle and humanity in India than in England, and in no country of the world the officers of the government devoted more time and attention to public business. The inconceivably laborious Official duties were performed with zeal and assiduity' (O'Malley 1931:41). Now-a-days, a civil servant is asked to become more of an entrepreneur than a Weberian bureaucrat, more customer-friendly than an office clerk working on files, more of a person with a warm and humane face than an anonymous person with no name and identity (Rahman 2001:96). Reward or punishment depends on their success or failure in these expectations. Rahman (ibid) also shows that monetary incentives in the form of enhanced pay and bonuses are not always valued much. Instead, the successful officials in the west relish other characteristics like challenging job opportunities, a sense of accomplishment, recognition of one's achievements and respect and fair treatment from one's colleagues. Contrarily, many officials quit before being implicated in instances of malpractices or major failures. In Bangladesh public administration, the system of reward and punishment has somehow become impaired in absence of a rational system of performance evaluation. Good feats of civil servants are seldom publicly appreciated and acknowledged. Ironically, many of their irregular acts or malpractices are not taken into account either. When some of these acts are taken notice of at all, it is only in a small fraction of such cases that the perpetrators land in where they should really belong, i.e., in a possibly demoted or underrated position, or out of the service, or even behind the bar. While in office, powerful politicians and bureaucrats are never prosecuted for their corruption (Zahur 2003). The need for higher authority's sanction for investigation and a second sanction for indictment often results in futile exercises even if initiatives are taken to probe into malpractices. Younis and Mostafa (2000:92) adopt Lewis's contention that had there been no foreign aid, people would have been subjected to direct plunder. Now, they hold, public servants make the people deprived of the *prospective goods*, rather than *actual goods*. However, despite these eerie sayings and their wide acceptance, few serious and concrete measures are being taken to stop this malfeasance.⁴¹ At the last instance, 23 respondents, i.e., just one in 20, spoke for *re-empowerment*, or reviving the olden glories of BCS (Administration) cadre. But, one must not

⁴¹ The procrastination and politicking about an independent anti-corruption commission is a case in point. All major political parties included it in their election manifestos in 2001. Nothing came out in the six months since a bill to this end was tabled in parliament on 10 July 2003. There is no headway in evolving an independent human rights commission, an office of the ombudsman or a local government institution, and for independence of judiciary. *The Daily Star*, 19 January 2004.

forget that, 'entirely without restraint or responsibility, uncontrolled either by public opinion or legal liabilities, for there were no laws during the Company's heyday, those illustrious civilians ruled India with ease and moderation primarily according to their own ideas, manners and prejudice' (O'Malley 1931:11, 26). The reintroduction of a personalized rule by any particular section of officers may sound outrageous in an age of accountability, responsiveness, transparency and democratic good governance.

The survey brought in a number of suggestions, which were relatively fewer in number. Hence, rather than describing them individually, they are placed under the *miscellaneous* head. Notable among them are: accountability, congenial relationship between politicians and administrators, coordination, control on police, good education, decentralization, orderliness and fairness in PSC, career planning, end to contractual appointments, legal and administrative reforms, appointment of more officers with social science backgrounds, verification of ancestry, sensible politicians and political stability, separation of judiciary, and job specification. These are all necessary for an effective and responsive civil service system worthy of its name. None in a democratic age can even think of a civil service which is not accountable. The principles of the rule of law necessitate an accountability of civil servants and other public functionaries. During the British era, the civil servants were accountable to their service superiors only – an obdurate legacy in Bangladesh (Khan 1998:41). The other suggestions too may complement other factors for an orderly public administration system, since they are useful prerequisites for good governance in any environment. The more a society approximates these ideals, the more are the chances of it being under good governance. Even if successful, reforms in merely one sphere – civil service – are not enough, if they are not complemented by similar endeavours in other sectors. Civil service reforms are just a part of the greater arena of governance, which, in a modern world, needs to be 'good' with regard to acceptability, efficiency, effectiveness, responsiveness and sustainability. When a civil service can meet these standards, it may face the prevailing and emergent challenges. Under such a situation, civil servants do not necessarily possess their traditional anonymity. For the success of public administration, they have to put their best into the job at hand. Their success or failure in winning the public confidence will determine whether they will be remembered or forgotten as 'good riddance to bad rubbish' (Sinha and Sharan 1996:211). Under this environment, civil servants of today may ponder what they want to make of themselves. Some of the abominable vices of the administrative system include illegal gratification, nepotism, outside influence in official appointments, abuse of power,

secrecy, and the like. The top civil servants should not only refrain from such misconducts, but also should maintain high standards of conduct, efficiency and zeal in discharging public service. They have to follow rules and regulations. They would also discharge their responsibilities without fear or favour (Dubhashi 1994:61). If these characteristics of sound administration are emulated, they may help reach important elements of good governance. Despite the possible question about the propriety of rules and regulations, civil servants should act on them unless they are changed – in the process of which they too have a very important role. The hour's need is to inculcate in the administrators the courage and interest for doing the job and for doing it without any undue influence whatsoever. Again, when political leadership is weak, the administrators show a tendency of self-aggrandizement in the absence of popular government. The bureaucracy sometimes acts like an autocrat, becomes a power centre and resists the growth of democratic institutions (Panda 1978:138). Under good governance, civil servants would refrain from such activities, and try to help evolve those institutions in the national interest. In this regard, civil servants, especially those at the top, would try to instill a sense of purpose among the officers. A brighter image for these civil servants can help their standing and acceptability in society, and particularly among his peers. Then, under the aegis of an enlightened political leadership, the civil servants imbued with the ideals of good governance would produce the desired results.

7.4. Concluding Remarks. The sample survey conducted as part of the study draw out certain features that may have some bearing on the direction of the conclusions of the study itself. Despite commendable extents of service attitudes of the officers of BCS (Administration) cadre towards the people, a sizable number of people feel that these officers are considerably detached from the people. Apparently the officers of BCS (Administration) cadre have a need to improve the extent of fairness and neutrality in their performance of duty. As centerpieces of attention in their fold, the Deputy Commissioners also fare a little short of the commoners' expectations for access to him. It is interesting to note that the people are quite disturbed with the subservient posture of the officials towards the political functionaries of a particular hue. But, at the same time they appreciate the level of strictness shown by these officers when many of the latter demonstrate stubbornness in adhering to the letters and spirit of law. However, a severe irritant in this regard is the Deputy Commissioners' tendency of compromises with laws and principles, which they do presumably under political pressures or the compulsions of their own earthly caprices. This is clearly not in harmony with the near-absolute trust of people placed in the

officers of BCS (Administration) cadre regarding their unwavering strictness even in difficult professional situations. The survey results reveal that the Deputy Commissioner and his colleagues are also responsible to an extent for the deteriorating law and order situation of the country. However, people attribute a higher level of responsibility for the same on the police officers, and a still higher level of blame on the political leaders for this imbroglio. Despite a little weariness, on the whole, the people seem satisfied with the competence shown by the Deputy Commissioners and the former have an overwhelming support for retaining magisterial functions with the District Magistrate and his colleagues.

This is found that most people intend to find a coordinating role for development activities in the Deputy Commissioners and the Upazila Nirbahi Officers at district and upazila levels. Most people also like to see the DC assume the Zila Parishad affairs in the absence of an elected Chairman in that body. They also believe that an enhanced authority in the hand of the DC to supervise the functions of the local government bodies may brighten their performance scenario. However, people are conspicuously divided on the issue of (re)installing an elected Chairman in the would-be reconstituted Upazila Parishad. The Deputy Commissioners are traditionally well known in their respective jurisdictions not only for their regular statutory duties. They are also known for their multifarious, but crucial, stints like conducting national and local level general elections, disaster management, management of public examinations, protocol functions and observance of national days and events. People are overwhelmingly in favour of retaining these functions with the DC and his colleagues, although there is an indicative disillusionment in the protocol functions of these officers. The survey also demonstrates that direct communication by the Deputy Commissioner with the head of government on important issues is a welcome proposition in the eye of almost all. Again, the people are interestingly divided on the issue of involvement of Ministers and MPs in the day-to-day administrative affairs, although a majority is clearly opposed to it. Similarly, most people are reluctant to have a Minister in charge of a district. In this respect, there unveils a widening gap between the political and administrative leaderships. This is also found from the survey that an overwhelming proportion of people have confidence in the professional competence of BCS (Administration) cadre officials. They also assume these officers as a distinguished group of officers capable of best serving the interests of people. In this respect, people feel, they excel over the political functionaries and other officers of the country. But many in the people are interested to find an improvement in the level of performance of these officers of BCS (Administration) officers. There is pretty little to find a

distinct trend in the deterioration in the level of efficiency of the DCs in the specific post-independence periods, although there seems a glimmer of indication that the pace of deterioration may have slowed a little bit in the recent few years. Lastly, people have a clear belief that the Deputy Commissioners enjoy an enviable level of respectability among their fellow colleagues of other streams. This is an achievement of their predecessors who enjoin them to retain it through the good feats of deeds they are assigned to discharge.

A veteran observer quipped, 'At what point does an opinion evolve into a fact? An opinion poll is what it says it is, a measure of opinion. It is not a result; otherwise we would not need campaigning and a voting day. An opinion poll is illuminating not because it is a mirror, but because it is an arc light. The metaphor is relevant because an arc light also leaves shadows and you have to search in them for the contours of the larger truth.'⁴² These observations and questions are likely to continue casting a shadow on all opinion surveys like this. The results of a sample survey are by no means the fool-proof information on which one can reach conclusive judgments. This is also because some respondents might be holding particular bias or biases, which call for particular care of researchers not to allow them to offset the possibility of reaching a reasonably fair conclusion. However, surveys are a reliable indicator of things under investigation, especially in a social science subject. Here in the survey, opinions were received from 460 respondents, whose selection was made on careful considerations for the needs for their representativeness of the possible population for the study. Hence, the opinions received in the survey and the information made on their basis may be taken, by and large, as the opinion of informed people. Some of the information reinforces the prevailing perceptions, while some others may have dispelled a few myths. But, the most likely and common consequence of such sample surveys is the creation of a productive confusion with an inquisitive bent. This survey too may have opened the related issues further to the viewers and invites further works of larger vectors. The most patent message emanating from the results of the present survey is that people still hold very high hopes in the institutions created with the officers of an enigmatic band of officials who inherit a great and raucous legacy. The other notes coming out of the survey results give a call for an improvement of the performance of these officials in order to rise to the occasion to keep up with popular expectations and herald a new and regenerated nation. It is the turn of the officers of BCS (Administration) cadre to choose which course to take to give effect to these expectations.

⁴² M. J. Akbar, "Sonia is the Problem, not the solution," in *The Daily Star*, 8 November 2003.

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8. Prospects

8.1. Trends of administrative reforms

8.1.1. Competent and motivated staff. Reform in public administration as an activity has been in existence since time immemorial. But, the theoretical and conceptual focuses on the phenomenon date only from the end of the 19th century. At that time, the growing complexity of governmental activity prompted men of ideas to feel that some new approaches – increasingly used with some amount of success in the management of business and industry – could be gainfully adapted and adopted to the running of government (Mutahaba 1989:23). The term 'administrative reform' denotes various meanings and it appears to assume changing forms in different contexts. It is often equated with administrative modernization, which reflects a) increases in the amount of information and energy bureaucracy uses, b) increased ability to absorb new demands, and also c) structural differentiation for performance of systemic functions. Administrative modernization would ensure a full-blossomed representative government with all institutions – elaborate constitution, competitive elections, complex legislatures and executives, and numerous interest groups (Haider 1968:189). Besides, several characteristics are generally thought to be attached with an improved administrative system. It has an institutional apparatus capable of converting valid expressions of popular will into predictable and consistent actions in line with the fundamental state policies. It also ensures an expansion of popular and qualitative participation in the political process. An improved administrative system is capable of bringing about national integration through orderly and just accommodation of divisive forces. Lastly, it demonstrates the capacity to blend popular wills into the neutrally imposed canons of equity and justice. Under these considerations, even the USA, with its centuries-old elaborate administrative system, is sometimes derided as *alarmingly weak* in relation to its present and future tasks. Bundy (1968:29) speaks of the state apparatuses' need for a double dose of reinforcement. The first is to meet the present responsibilities and the second to meet the new ones to come. He also speaks of the need for a strong government which, he says, is not inconsistent with strong private institutions and strong personal freedom. Instead, many free institutions are contingent upon the strength of the government. Haider correctly says that all these characteristics are heavily dependent on political development. But he more rightly doubts the wisdom of waiting for political maturation before embarking on reforms in the administrative affairs (ibid, p. 190). In just over one century of discourses on the subject, administrative reform has assumed some other meanings too. Some people take it for administrative change, which describes important revisions of administrative practices, organization, procedures and processes that all

administrative organizations engage in on a regular basis (Mutahaba 1989:23). This characterization is quite free in the sense that there are no time frame, no limitations on the scope and direction, and no normative implications. However, Caiden goes on to distinguish administrative change and administrative reforms. The former is viewed as just a self-adjusting response to fluctuating conditions, while the administrative reform is the artificial inducement of administrative transformation against resistance (Caiden 1969:15). The need for reform is occasioned by malfunctioning of the self-adjusting process of administrative change. Since the very concept of *good administration* brings in a normative tenet, *administrative reform* refers to the consciously induced and directed reorganization in the machinery of government (Mutahaba 1989:26).

There arose a movement for administrative reforms in various countries and it took different shapes. However, there were certain common factors and some generalized patterns too. Administrative reforms and civil service reforms are almost always integrally linked, and they often fall under a comprehensive reform initiative. There are strong links between the civil service reforms and an all-inclusive framework for good governance. Again, they are contingent upon a number of factors, which include (a) the recruitment of competent and motivated staff, (b) rationalization of the structures of government, (c) occasional contracting out to private sectors, market institutions and NGOs, (d) improvement of legal and policy frameworks, (e) a more intensive participation of civil society in the public affairs, and (f) introduction of an effective and transparent system of control and accountability of government actions. Thus, comprehensive reforms programmes, which involve three elements, i.e., governance, civil service and civil society, generally assume too complex a form. When attempted, they often lead to unmanageable changes and dislocations, requiring a sustained commitment of political and administrative leaders – a crucial factor absent from most developing countries (Rahman 2001:13). In the continual endeavour of administrative reforms, different countries face different kinds of situations. However, the only one commonly operational factor in all the countries is the human factor – the question of putting in place a properly motivated and competent staff. Good employees may show considerable excellence in meeting the environment's demands even if the mandates of their organizations do not particularly suit such demands. Again, the superb mission statements of important organizations may be frustrated if these are manned by inferior and ill-motivated stock of personnel. On this count, the issue of recruitment in the civil services has assumed so paramount importance in the present context. The issue is all the more significant in the developing countries where the civil servants are required to participate in the daunting tasks

of both nation-building and state-building at the same time (Braibant 1996:167). Around 50 years ago there were about 50 or so nation-states. But the present-day world has four times that number. The new states have to undergo a transformation from a colonial past to modernizing nation-states. In Bangladesh, recruitment in the civil service takes an added importance since civil servants face the traditional administrative tasks amidst many obstacles to long-term stability: inequality (between rich and poor, men and women, Bangalees and non-Bangalees, and the like), low economic growth, and political instability (Van Schendel 2000:100). Reform issues are also important because the civil servants are expected to perform an uphill task of correcting a tarnished image of the country¹, for which they too had their share of responsibility.

Bangladesh inherits the legacy of a politically neutral bureaucracy, recruited primarily on the basis of academic competence. After recruitment, the civil servants are traditionally put through an unbiased and formal training system. Though the members of this important state instrument had undergone occasional trauma from the onslaught of self-aggrandizing politicians, by and large, a semblance of political neutrality is traditionally maintained. Except for the short intervening periods, like in the period from 1972 to 1975, when they experienced a precarious situation as their neutral postures were not always welcomed, members of the public bureaucracy have been able to maintain their neutrality. So, motivation was strong enough to enable them to carry forward their stupendous tasks without caring much for political whims. They were expected to strictly follow the letter and spirit of laws. Neutrality of civil servants is an important value to preserve, particularly in a democracy, where periodic changes of political leaders are a certainty and the need for bureaucratic continuity is a necessity (Rahman 2001:21). However, there are signs of perceived cracks of hitherto sustained neutrality in recent days. In recruitment, the concocted importance of representative bureaucracy and a concomitant prevalence of different quota reservations constitute a formidable obstacle to a merit-based bureaucracy (Ali 2002:223; Morshed 1997:84). The spectres of placement and promotion are also somehow touched by this kind of phenomenon. Allegations are often labeled against the propriety of some practices. This contemporary problem is not peculiar to civil service cadres alone. Almost all spheres of public life are in a way affected by this organizational disease². It must have a serious

¹ None can miss that Bangladesh has been placed at the lowest in the world in terms of corruption for three successive years.

² The 17 November 2003 edition of the Bangla daily, *The Prothom Alo*, lamented the widespread politicization of recruitment in universities, and called for an immediate end to such things everywhere. It followed a series of detailed news features published in the same daily and in *The Daily Star* during 12-16 November 2003.

³ Mujibul Huq, former Cabinet Secretary, 'Keeping on Kindling the Candle of Hope', in *The Daily Prothom Alo*, 4 November 2003. See also the post-editorial of a leading Dhaka daily, Hafeezul Alam, 'Politicization of Bureaucracy Impedes Good Governance', *The Daily Star*, 24 November 2003.

impact on the motivation of officials of all strata, particularly at the middle and junior levels. This is especially relevant in Bangladesh, where lower rank employees are dependent on higher rankers, as the latter are connected to higher authority and have more access to organizational information. The less efficient the lower rank employees, the more dependent they would be on the higher rank employees, who are their real controllers. The way the controller uses different types of powers on the controlled determines the relationship between the controller and the controlled. Again, this relationship has an impact on the employees' orientation toward their organizations and their jobs (Jahangir 2003:57). The country's public administration seems poignant with possible adverse ramifications of such dwindling orientations of employees, particularly at the turn of events when governments are changed in line with democratic practices. In the worst case scenario, the neutral character of the bureaucracy is likely to be damaged if the top echelon bureaucracy ideologically aligns with the political leaderships, without much regard for their own time-tested ethos. The contradictions likely to follow such a situation may be very serious because the lower rankers would have to toe the lines of their superiors – a hypothetical proposition which is very unlikely to refrain from leaving serious consequences in a pluralistic society. This is the society's sane expectation that the public servants do not indulge in politics. In order that the public administration of the country traverses the traditional line of political neutrality, political indulgence of administrators, especially at the top, is discouraged from an informed civil society. Many senior bureaucrats themselves may be now inclined to get political colour to get short and long-term favours – good postings and perks, rapid promotions, extension of services, and such aspirations as induction in the party politics leading to influential positions in the cabinet or similar bounties. There is no doubt that such self-seeking stances on the part of the senior bureaucrats seriously tell upon their accountability to the laws of the land and, at the same time, to the causes of the republic. Administrative offices then tend to be transformed into organizations for profit and materialization of caprices for particular coteries.

Once the officers of public administration are put in place through a reasonably fair process of recruitment, there comes the question of instilling proper motivation in them. The training institutions then come into the fore. Provided that they pass through an appropriate training regimen, the country is blessed with a corps of well-prepared civil servants. Now, they are traditionally expected to be functioning without any regard for political biases, although they may be holding an open eye on the happenings all around them. In different settings, there comes in a question on the neutrality of civil servants. There are several countries, the United States of

America being the fore-ranker among them, where many top public officials are recruited through a political process. In countries like Bangladesh, such things are seldom thought of. However, the subject may be looked at from a different angle, wherein the public administrators have a scope of being non-neutral. They should rather be committed to both good management and social equity as values – things to be achieved or rationales to guide. A fundamental commitment to social equity means that new public administration is anxiously engaged in change. It seeks to change those policies and structures that inhibit social equity (Anisuzzaman 1979:37). Broadly speaking, this concept still takes the state as the most instrumental factor for justice and social equity. Thus, since the public administration in Bangladesh too may be expected to become an instrument for good governance, social equity and justice, there is a surge for the currently eulogized principles and practices of modern management, where efficiency and value-for-money become catchwords for administrative reforms. The behavioral aspect of motivation occupies a key place in administrative reforms, which is an effort to apply new ideas or combination of ideas to administrative system with a conscious view to improving the system for positive goals of development (Morshed 1997:115). It aims to change or redirect the characteristic or conventional ways by which people in the government think and act vis-à-vis each other, toward the organization they represent and toward individual citizens or segments of public. The alteration of behavioral patterns of personnel is thus a major tenet in administrative reforms. Morshed (ibid, p 116) rightly accepts Leemans's argument that administrative reforms is generally identified with the creation of good administration and that it has consequently acquired a normative taint. It is unlikely that reform efforts will affect any organization in the absence of the support of personnel who have a good deal of influence. Administrative reforms is changing the behaviour of those involved, rather than merely changing the names and structures of organizations. However, since supports of bureaucracy are not always won for administrative reforms, high-level political interventions are often required. By and large, with or without reforms, success or failure of any administrative system depends on the motivation of personnel who run its organizations. The morale of the officers of BCS (Administration) cadre or that of the officers of Bangladesh public administration as a whole is arguably at a low ebb now for many reasons. Hence, a motivational resurgence may be a need of the time. The act of coming out of a political cobweb and embarking on a step to bring about positive development in the sphere of responsibilities is surely a demanding task, which will require huge strengths of mind.

8.1.2. Rationalization of structures. The other important tenet of current administrative reforms is the rationalization of public administration apparatuses. It is noted that government

paraphernalia was progressively on the increase for more than one hundred years since the philosophy of welfare state was well ingrained in statecraft during the mid-nineteenth century. The expansion of executive organs of governments was also necessitated by the failure of two vitally important institutions of government – political executive and legislature – to cope with changes in environments for making and implementation of policies (Peters and Savoie 1994:24). The welfare state is characteristically operated by a large bureaucratic apparatus which has been increasingly attacked as inefficient – because of its size, immunity to competition and the ever-increasing demands for a drive to universalism (Johnston 1993:139). Throughout the modern world, many countries strive to invite accountable governance. But problems with inefficiency, secrecy, corruption, unresponsiveness, lack of responsibility, politicization and centralization constitute serious obstacles to attaining an accountable management. It leads successive regimes to undertake administrative reforms (Younis and Mostafa 2000:37). Governments and public administration grew despite many politicians' pre-election promises of reducing the role and size of governmental structures. However, when two conservative governments were installed in UK and USA in the 1980s, they gave out loud propositions for roll-back of state functions and rationalization of governmental structures. Some of their steps in governmental structures and civil service matters proved promising and many others quickly sought to emulate them. Since Bangladesh inherits the British Indian administrative legacy, the UK experience may be relevant here. The Thatcher Governments embraced economic liberalism and reduced the scale of State activity, not merely cutting the size of civil service by over a third. Despite the doubts about the successes of the expenditure control measures in the UK, a series of piecemeal pragmatic measures – justified by economy and efficiency – gradually changed the parameters of state action and challenged expectations about the role of government (Self 1993:87). They also brought major changes in the management structure and its culture so that it more closely resembled that of private sector management. 'Value for money improvement' was the main tenet of the reforms brought about through market-testing of the in-house operation of public enterprises against external competition and possible contracting out (Govt. of UK 1997:22; 1998:13). The scale of change taking place up to 1990 was radical by Fulton standards. Its implementation led not only to radical change in the structure of government departments as a consequence of 'agentification', but also in the Civil Service itself, through the differentiation of tenure arrangements to the detriment of the career concept. In addition, privatization initiatives made inroads into the traditional Civil Service work (Fry 1997:17). The quasi-autonomous status of bureaucratic apparatuses had been allowed to devise their own strategic plans which were not necessarily consistent with the reasons for their

8. Prospects

8.1. Trends of administrative reforms

8.1.1. Competent and motivated staff. Reform in public administration as an activity has been in existence since time immemorial. But, the theoretical and conceptual focuses on the phenomenon date only from the end of the 19th century. At that time, the growing complexity of governmental activity prompted men of ideas to feel that some new approaches – increasingly used with some amount of success in the management of business and industry – could be gainfully adapted and adopted to the running of government (Mutahaba 1989:23). The term 'administrative reform' denotes various meanings and it appears to assume changing forms in different contexts. It is often equated with administrative modernization, which reflects a) increases in the amount of information and energy bureaucracy uses, b) increased ability to absorb new demands, and also c) structural differentiation for performance of systemic functions. Administrative modernization would ensure a full-blossomed representative government with all institutions – elaborate constitution, competitive elections, complex legislatures and executives, and numerous interest groups (Haider 1968:189). Besides, several characteristics are generally thought to be attached with an improved administrative system. It has an institutional apparatus capable of converting valid expressions of popular will into predictable and consistent actions in line with the fundamental state policies. It also ensures an expansion of popular and qualitative participation in the political process. An improved administrative system is capable of bringing about national integration through orderly and just accommodation of divisive forces. Lastly, it demonstrates the capacity to blend popular wills into the neutrally imposed canons of equity and justice. Under these considerations, even the USA, with its centuries-old elaborate administrative system, is sometimes derided as *alarmingly weak* in relation to its present and future tasks. Bundy (1968:29) speaks of the state apparatuses' need for a double dose of reinforcement. The first is to meet the present responsibilities and the second to meet the new ones to come. He also speaks of the need for a strong government which, he says, is not inconsistent with strong private institutions and strong personal freedom. Instead, many free institutions are contingent upon the strength of the government. Haider correctly says that all these characteristics are heavily dependent on political development. But he more rightly doubts the wisdom of waiting for political maturation before embarking on reforms in the administrative affairs (ibid, p. 190). In just over one century of discourses on the subject, administrative reform has assumed some other meanings too. Some people take it for administrative change, which describes important revisions of administrative practices, organization, procedures and processes that all

administrative organizations engage in on a regular basis (Mutahaba 1989:23). This characterization is quite free in the sense that there are no time frame, no limitations on the scope and direction, and no normative implications. However, Caiden goes on to distinguish administrative change and administrative reforms. The former is viewed as just a self-adjusting response to fluctuating conditions, while the administrative reform is the artificial inducement of administrative transformation against resistance (Caiden 1969:15). The need for reform is occasioned by malfunctioning of the self-adjusting process of administrative change. Since the very concept of *good administration* brings in a normative tenet, *administrative reform* refers to the consciously induced and directed reorganization in the machinery of government (Mutahaba 1989:26).

There arose a movement for administrative reforms in various countries and it took different shapes. However, there were certain common factors and some generalized patterns too. Administrative reforms and civil service reforms are almost always integrally linked, and they often fall under a comprehensive reform initiative. There are strong links between the civil service reforms and an all-inclusive framework for good governance. Again, they are contingent upon a number of factors, which include (a) the recruitment of competent and motivated staff, (b) rationalization of the structures of government, (c) occasional contracting out to private sectors, market institutions and NGOs, (d) improvement of legal and policy frameworks, (e) a more intensive participation of civil society in the public affairs, and (f) introduction of an effective and transparent system of control and accountability of government actions. Thus, comprehensive reforms programmes, which involve three elements, i.e., governance, civil service and civil society, generally assume too complex a form. When attempted, they often lead to unmanageable changes and dislocations, requiring a sustained commitment of political and administrative leaders – a crucial factor absent from most developing countries (Rahman 2001:13). In the continual endeavour of administrative reforms, different countries face different kinds of situations. However, the only one commonly operational factor in all the countries is the human factor – the question of putting in place a properly motivated and competent staff. Good employees may show considerable excellence in meeting the environment's demands even if the mandates of their organizations do not particularly suit such demands. Again, the superb mission statements of important organizations may be frustrated if these are manned by inferior and ill-motivated stock of personnel. On this count, the issue of recruitment in the civil services has assumed so paramount importance in the present context. The issue is all the more significant in the developing countries where the civil servants are required to participate in the daunting tasks

of both nation-building and state-building at the same time (Braibant 1996:167). Around 50 years ago there were about 50 or so nation-states. But the present-day world has four times that number. The new states have to undergo a transformation from a colonial past to modernizing nation-states. In Bangladesh, recruitment in the civil service takes an added importance since civil servants face the traditional administrative tasks amidst many obstacles to long-term stability: inequality (between rich and poor, men and women, Bangalees and non-Bangalees, and the like), low economic growth, and political instability (Van Schendel 2000:100). Reform issues are also important because the civil servants are expected to perform an uphill task of correcting a tarnished image of the country¹, for which they too had their share of responsibility.

Bangladesh inherits the legacy of a politically neutral bureaucracy, recruited primarily on the basis of academic competence. After recruitment, the civil servants are traditionally put through an unbiased and formal training system. Though the members of this important state instrument had undergone occasional trauma from the onslaught of self-aggrandizing politicians, by and large, a semblance of political neutrality is traditionally maintained. Except for the short intervening periods, like in the period from 1972 to 1975, when they experienced a precarious situation as their neutral postures were not always welcomed, members of the public bureaucracy have been able to maintain their neutrality. So, motivation was strong enough to enable them to carry forward their stupendous tasks without caring much for political whims. They were expected to strictly follow the letter and spirit of laws. Neutrality of civil servants is an important value to preserve, particularly in a democracy, where periodic changes of political leaders are a certainty and the need for bureaucratic continuity is a necessity (Rahman 2001:21). However, there are signs of perceived cracks of hitherto sustained neutrality in recent days. In recruitment, the concocted importance of representative bureaucracy and a concomitant prevalence of different quota reservations constitute a formidable obstacle to a merit-based bureaucracy (Ali 2002:223; Morshed 1997:84). The spectres of placement and promotion are also somehow touched by this kind of phenomenon. Allegations are often labeled against the propriety of some practices. This contemporary problem is not peculiar to civil service cadres alone. Almost all spheres of public life are in a way affected by this organizational disease². It must have a serious

¹ None can miss that Bangladesh has been placed at the lowest in the world in terms of corruption for three successive years.

² The 17 November 2003 edition of the Bangla daily, *The Prothom Alo*, lamented the widespread politicization of recruitment in universities, and called for an immediate end to such things everywhere. It followed a series of detailed news features published in the same daily and in *The Daily Star* during 12-16 November 2003.

³ Mujibul Huq, former Cabinet Secretary, 'Keeping on Kindling the Candle of Hope', in *The Daily Prothom Alo*, 4 November 2003. See also the post-editorial of a leading Dhaka daily, Hafeejul Alam, Politicization of Bureaucracy Impedes Good Governance, *The Daily Star*, 24 November 2003.

impact on the motivation of officials of all strata, particularly at the middle and junior levels. This is especially relevant in Bangladesh, where lower rank employees are dependent on higher rankers, as the latter are connected to higher authority and have more access to organizational information. The less efficient the lower rank employees, the more dependent they would be on the higher rank employees, who are their real controllers. The way the controller uses different types of powers on the controlled determines the relationship between the controller and the controlled. Again, this relationship has an impact on the employees' orientation toward their organizations and their jobs (Jahangir 2003:57). The country's public administration seems poignant with possible adverse ramifications of such dwindling orientations of employees, particularly at the turn of events when governments are changed in line with democratic practices. In the worst case scenario, the neutral character of the bureaucracy is likely to be damaged if the top echelon bureaucracy ideologically aligns with the political leaderships, without much regard for their own time-tested ethos. The contradictions likely to follow such a situation may be very serious because the lower rankers would have to toe the lines of their superiors – a hypothetical proposition which is very unlikely to refrain from leaving serious consequences in a pluralistic society. This is the society's sane expectation that the public servants do not indulge in politics. In order that the public administration of the country traverses the traditional line of political neutrality, political indulgence of administrators, especially at the top, is discouraged from an informed civil society. Many senior bureaucrats themselves may be now inclined to get political colour to get short and long-term favours – good postings and perks, rapid promotions, extension of services, and such aspirations as induction in the party politics leading to influential positions in the cabinet or similar bounties. There is no doubt that such self-seeking stances on the part of the senior bureaucrats seriously tell upon their accountability to the laws of the land and, at the same time, to the causes of the republic. Administrative offices then tend to be transformed into organizations for profit and materialization of caprices for particular coteries.

Once the officers of public administration are put in place through a reasonably fair process of recruitment, there comes the question of instilling proper motivation in them. The training institutions then come into the fore. Provided that they pass through an appropriate training regimen, the country is blessed with a corps of well-prepared civil servants. Now, they are traditionally expected to be functioning without any regard for political biases, although they may be holding an open eye on the happenings all around them. In different settings, there comes in a question on the neutrality of civil servants. There are several countries, the United States of

America being the fore-ranker among them, where many top public officials are recruited through a political process. In countries like Bangladesh, such things are seldom thought of. However, the subject may be looked at from a different angle, wherein the public administrators have a scope of being non-neutral. They should rather be committed to both good management and social equity as values – things to be achieved or rationales to guide. A fundamental commitment to social equity means that new public administration is anxiously engaged in change. It seeks to change those policies and structures that inhibit social equity (Anisuzzaman 1979:37). Broadly speaking, this concept still takes the state as the most instrumental factor for justice and social equity. Thus, since the public administration in Bangladesh too may be expected to become an instrument for good governance, social equity and justice, there is a surge for the currently eulogized principles and practices of modern management, where efficiency and value-for-money become catchwords for administrative reforms. The behavioral aspect of motivation occupies a key place in administrative reforms, which is an effort to apply new ideas or combination of ideas to administrative system with a conscious view to improving the system for positive goals of development (Morshed 1997:115). It aims to change or redirect the characteristic or conventional ways by which people in the government think and act vis-à-vis each other, toward the organization they represent and toward individual citizens or segments of public. The alteration of behavioral patterns of personnel is thus a major tenet in administrative reforms. Morshed (ibid, p 116) rightly accepts Leemans's argument that administrative reforms is generally identified with the creation of good administration and that it has consequently acquired a normative taint. It is unlikely that reform efforts will affect any organization in the absence of the support of personnel who have a good deal of influence. Administrative reforms is changing the behaviour of those involved, rather than merely changing the names and structures of organizations. However, since supports of bureaucracy are not always won for administrative reforms, high-level political interventions are often required. By and large, with or without reforms, success or failure of any administrative system depends on the motivation of personnel who run its organizations. The morale of the officers of BCS (Administration) cadre or that of the officers of Bangladesh public administration as a whole is arguably at a low ebb now for many reasons. Hence, a motivational resurgence may be a need of the time. The act of coming out of a political cobweb and embarking on a step to bring about positive development in the sphere of responsibilities is surely a demanding task, which will require huge strengths of mind.

8.1.2. Rationalization of structures. The other important tenet of current administrative reforms is the rationalization of public administration apparatuses. It is noted that government

paraphernalia was progressively on the increase for more than one hundred years since the philosophy of welfare state was well ingrained in statecraft during the mid-nineteenth century. The expansion of executive organs of governments was also necessitated by the failure of two vitally important institutions of government – political executive and legislature – to cope with changes in environments for making and implementation of policies (Peters and Savoie 1994:24). The welfare state is characteristically operated by a large bureaucratic apparatus which has been increasingly attacked as inefficient – because of its size, immunity to competition and the ever-increasing demands for a drive to universalism (Johnston 1993:139). Throughout the modern world, many countries strive to invite accountable governance. But problems with inefficiency, secrecy, corruption, unresponsiveness, lack of responsibility, politicization and centralization constitute serious obstacles to attaining an accountable management. It leads successive regimes to undertake administrative reforms (Younis and Mostafa 2000:37). Governments and public administration grew despite many politicians' pre-election promises of reducing the role and size of governmental structures. However, when two conservative governments were installed in UK and USA in the 1980s, they gave out loud propositions for roll-back of state functions and rationalization of governmental structures. Some of their steps in governmental structures and civil service matters proved promising and many others quickly sought to emulate them. Since Bangladesh inherits the British Indian administrative legacy, the UK experience may be relevant here. The Thatcher Governments embraced economic liberalism and reduced the scale of State activity, not merely cutting the size of civil service by over a third. Despite the doubts about the successes of the expenditure control measures in the UK, a series of piecemeal pragmatic measures – justified by economy and efficiency – gradually changed the parameters of state action and challenged expectations about the role of government (Self 1993:87). They also brought major changes in the management structure and its culture so that it more closely resembled that of private sector management. 'Value for money improvement' was the main tenet of the reforms brought about through market-testing of the in-house operation of public enterprises against external competition and possible contracting out (Govt. of UK 1997:22; 1998:13). The scale of change taking place up to 1990 was radical by Fulton standards. Its implementation led not only to radical change in the structure of government departments as a consequence of 'agentification', but also in the Civil Service itself, through the differentiation of tenure arrangements to the detriment of the career concept. In addition, privatization initiatives made inroads into the traditional Civil Service work (Fry 1997:17). The quasi-autonomous status of bureaucratic apparatuses had been allowed to devise their own strategic plans which were not necessarily consistent with the reasons for their

creation. It was also advanced that, unlike a private organization which aims to maximize profits, the goal of bureaucracies had been to maximize their own size and budget. An enhancement of the organizations' and their personnel's perks, privileges and influences became the rationale for overbearing public organizations (Johnston 1993:139). In this context, rationalization often took the form of downsizing of the government. The influence of donors and lenders was directed toward developing countries to induce them to carry forward the tenets of reforms initiated in the west (Khan 1994:15). Different countries had different driving forces behind their action in this regard. For example, the developed countries' motivation for civil service reforms was the realities in global economic and financial pressures. For the emerging democracies in Near East, it was made a precondition for their membership of the European Union. Changes were prescribed in those countries on an argument that they had to enhance their administrative capacity commensurate with their nascent democracies' demands. For the poor countries in general, the crucial factor was the influence of donors and lenders who attached conditions of reforms in the public bureaucracy and public sector management with most of their major aid packages. However, the task was not very easy and smooth in most of the developing countries. It was found a most difficult undertaking to introduce changes, especially their first steps, in the functions and structures of their governments and bureaucracy in many less developed countries like Bangladesh where, ironically, the needs for such rationalization are the greatest (Rahman 2001:11). Since its birth, Bangladesh has been seeking to bring about reforms in its administrative system. The results of such endeavours have been mixed.

An added interest in administrative reforms in Bangladesh like any other countries is a feature common to all governments irrespective of their ideological differences, if any. There is hardly any country in the contemporary world which is fully satisfied with the efficiency and effectiveness of its administrative system. The civil service constitutes one of the largest homogeneous organizations of office workers and it consumes a very high proportion of intelligent manpower in these countries. The major burden of achieving all-round progress of the nation has fallen on the shoulders of the civil service (Bhatnagar 1984:7). The need for reform is more urgent and compelling in the developing countries like Bangladesh, where changes in the functions and structures of government obviously have to be fundamental. This is especially because its desire for economic and social progress is greater and more directly related to the establishment and survival of a nation. Public administration in Bangladesh carries with it a popular expectation that, in its best interest, it would better serve the people instead of merely

looking for preserving their own status and privileges. This is contingent upon administrative reforms, the extents of whose success depend on strength and commitment of political leadership and adoption of a pragmatic strategy in response to the gravity of a given situation (Obaidullah 1999:3, 6). On the other hand, reform efforts may be frustrated by several factors like colonial legacy, public indifference and political uncertainty. Bangladesh has experienced the interactions of many of these intricate factors in its administrative domain. The country's governmental structure and its public administration apparatuses is a direct descendant of the British colonial and the Pakistani semi-colonial system. Despite heaving off part of its structures of government and ethos of public administration, the system of governance still largely retains the characteristics of its colonial precursor. In the next place, the members of the public are squarely indifferent or complacent with the happenings all around. Or, at least, they have taken it for granted that things have to be what they are. They seem least bothered about the inadequate performance or even non-performance of the governmental structures and their personnel. Most of them maintain stoic unconcern even at the most serious instances of malpractices.³ Again, many countries have to live with continual instability, violence and uncertainties about political transition. For example, Bolivia experienced a tumultuous turn of events in late 2003, when President Hugo Sanchez's highly authoritarian rule came to an end by a popular upheaval. However, despite serious problems all around, the governmental structure could withstand the shock. It was possible largely because of the impressive administrative reforms of the early 1990s in which a three-pronged restructuring was introduced. At the first place, the public sector was downsized by determining the ideal size of the public sector organizational structure and staff according to the state's redefined roles. Secondly, the public sector's operations were modernized by the introduction of current standards of transparency, accountability, performance evaluation and modern technologies. Lastly, there was a successful attempt at restructuring the public service employment system through the introduction and operation of professional standards and clear regimen on hiring, promotion, salary determination, delineation of responsibilities and performance evaluation (World Bank 1994:162). In about the same time, another popular uprising toppled the personalized rule of President Sheverdnadze of Georgia. But, immediately after the event, the interim President of the republic announced that the country was on the brink of financial collapse⁴. The reforms introduced in the wake of the dismantling of socialist rule in the early 1990s apparently did not hold solid ground there. Had the administrative system been developed with an optimum level of efficiency and motivation, the

³ Kuldip Nayar, *Crime sans Punishment*, in *The Daily Star*, 22 November 2003.

⁴ *The Independent*, 25 November 2003.

situation would not have probably reached such a point⁵. The high hope created in the wake of the dismantling of Soviet Union looked to have been shattered by mindless act of misrule and administrative misdemeanour.

Restructuring or rightsizing almost always denotes downsizing of governmental organizations, because the state, in its course of evolution, has accumulated huge flesh, largely owing to various welfare obligations. Approaches to the rightsizing in particular and civil service in general entail attempts to reduce the number of personnel in public employment – a stupendous task that can earn both successes and failures. Initiatives for administrative reforms in Africa were met with mixed results. Some countries like Ghana and Uganda achieved remarkable results, although many others could not draw similar successes. The World Bank made the countries embark upon a two-phased civil service reforms programme. The first phase was about achieving macroeconomic stability through reducing the human overhead cost. So, they attempted at measures like ministerial restructuring, decentralization, downsizing, rationalization of wages and pay structures, etc. These were followed by attempts to achieve qualitative improvement in the efficiency of civil servants and the service delivery system. Intensive training programmes were adopted. It was also tried to strengthen core functions to improve civil service management. However, there were few successes in the improvements in organizational culture, work attitudes and ethics that could lead to a more efficient civil service. The salary cuts were mainly in low-paid jobs, while the effects in fiscal and efficiency aspects fell short of expectations. In Kenya, although ghost workers were reduced to a great extent, the total wage bills were not reduced significantly since the costs for early retirement and hiring new recruits were substantially high. Planning, studies and proposals sapped most efforts, while implementation remained neglected. Macroeconomic decline, corruption and lack of political commitment were responsible for a total mismatch evident in the overall activities (Halvers 1998:14). Conversely, the World Bank (*ibid*, p. 138) shows that a carefully planned exercise on downsizing of governmental organizations could achieve wonderful results as in Spain, where a multiple-choice frame of options was made to work for a four-year period from 1985. The employees got enough time to seek alternative jobs and the market got ample scope to absorb new entrants and newly unemployed as well. The remaining staff too had to be sufficiently motivated through measures like training and attractive perks to bear the additional workload left by their retrenched colleagues. However, as against remarkable successes in some countries in Africa and Latin America as also in the Anglo-Saxon democracies, the corresponding picture is less than impressive in the countries of a politically

⁵ The collapse was averted largely through massive infusion of assistance given by the West and Russia.

volatile South Asia (Rahman 2001:66). For many historical and cultural reasons, it has been pretty difficult for governments in the sub-continent to carry on measures that need determined courage. For instance, in Bangladesh, as far as the expressed public opinion goes, there seems to be a consensus that the size of the government as well as the size of the cabinet should be kept as low as possible. The lately introduced constitutional provisions for the neutral caretaker government have also put an upper limit on the number of Advisors in that government. But, the number of Ministries seems constantly on the increase and retrenchment is rarely adopted as a serious option in public employment.⁶ The demands for increasing opportunities for employment and a comparable obligation for accommodating more of the political and administrative functionaries in the power structure may have an equal contribution to this process of organizational proliferation.

The post-independence public administration made a major policy shift from its regulatory activities to massive rehabilitation and development roles, leading to a huge expansion in the number of organizations and manpower. The haphazard and unplanned fashion of such expansion led to problems like duplication of work, overlapping and misuse of state resources. Combined with the gap between required and available levels of skills, they resulted in inefficiency, poor performance and a weak service delivery in the public administration of Bangladesh [PARC (I) 2000:51]. At present, there are 39 Ministries, 52 Divisions, 2 Offices, 1 Secretariat, 254 Departments or Directorates, and 173 Autonomous Bodies and Corporations.⁷ Many Ministries and Divisions have field offices and agencies and some of them oversee the functions of state-owned or state-controlled enterprises and establishments. There are practically no differences between a Ministry and a Division except that a Ministry may have one or more Divisions under it. As its administrative chief and principal accounting officer, a Secretary heads a Ministry or Division. Though all bureaucracies respond to changing priorities, the changes in Bangladesh are unidirectional, the usual practice being creation of new offices (World Bank 1996:18). Only in two short periods in 1975 and 1982, the respective one-party and martial law regimes reduced the number of Ministries or Divisions to a minimum. It may well indicate that

⁶ The only remarkable exception was the closure in 2002 of the Adamjee Jute Mills, a big public sector enterprise considered for long as the symbol of draining out of public resources. The BNP government in its 1991-96 term also demonstrated its commitment to golden handshake programmes in establishments like Railways, Agricultural Development Corporation (BADC) etc.

⁷ Number of such organizations seems always changing. A comparative position is put at section 6.1.2.2.

political regimes find it hard to reduce the spectre of government. The PARC makes out the following pattern of changes in the number of Ministries in Bangladesh during 1972- 2000.

Table 8.01. Number of Ministries in Bangladesh during 1972 - 2000.

<u>Year</u>	<u>Number</u>	<u>Remarks</u>
1972	21	
1974	26	
1975	13	Following adoption of 4th amendment to the Constitution
1977	33	
1978	24	
1980	30	
1982	19	After clamping of martial law
1991	33	After reintroducing parliamentary system of government
1995	35	
2000	36	

Source: PARC (I) 2000:52.

Three more Ministries were created in subsequent years, more plausibly to suit political purposes. Hence, it was again proved that rationality does not always prevail over political expediency. Duplicity and parochial departmentalism may become an order of the day under such a condition. This may also suit the interests of the rulers, who seem to prefer big government to a small one, often denigrating the need for efficiency⁸.

Most committees and commissions appointed in the recent years to analyze the administrative issues of Bangladesh put up various recommendations for right-sizing the governmental structure. In the outside world, there had already started a major policy shift in which public administration was expected to focus more on output rather than its traditional emphases on inputs and due process (Halligan 1997:21). However, the experience of Bangladesh did not contain much about the outcome side of the game. Since the style and culture are rarely transformed in the many years of independent Bangladesh, the changes occurring in the public administration are dubbed as merely of cosmetic character (Khan 1998:79). PARC's recommendations [PARC (I) 2000:62] for reducing the number of Ministries to 25 with an additional 17 Divisions or Offices were not followed. Nor were those of the UNDP (1993:34) acted upon. The UNDP had called for clustering the ministries and divisions into five functional groups. Instead, whatever was introduced by the way of reform was at best in the form of reduction of the staff. It lacked an attempt to restructure the system or to transform the thought-process and work ethos of public organizations. The trend of suggesting for downsizing of the government, noticeably started in Bangladesh with the recommendations of the Martial Law Committee for Examining Organizational Set-up of Ministries/Divisions, Departments and other

⁸ A 60-strong cabinet only spoke of a rationale of accommodating more politicians in power structures.

Organizations, which was commonly known in administrative parlance as the Enam Committee, named after its head, Brigadier Enamul Haque. It submitted its report in three volumes in a period from 1982 to 1984, and forthwith, the government accepted the recommendations contained in those volumes – a fact which falls among the rarest episodes in administrative history of nations. The existence of an extra-constitutional martial law regime in the country might be the prime reason for such acceptance of recommendations of a committee, whose mandate was about administrative reforms. This is generally held that democratically elected political governments find it pretty difficult to act on such recommendations if the same purport to bring about the probable reduction in the number of public officials. The latest recommendation is reported to have come from the parliamentary committee on the ministry of establishment in the first week of 2004. They have proposed to reduce the number of ministries to between 20 and 22.⁹ It remains to be seen how this is going to be taken. The recommendations of the Enam Committee were accepted and acted on and it remained as a watershed in the administrative history of Bangladesh, with particular regard to the number of personnel under the public employment. For the future deliberations and activities relating to the number of personnel in government organizations, the Enam Committee was to be consulted as a vital reference point. However, the positions of manpower sanctioned in the pre- and post-Enam Committee periods may be seen from Table 8.02 in which all employees are, for the sake of computational convenience, divided into two categories – the Class I and other classes.

Table 8.02. Number of Posts Sanctioned in Government Organizations before and after Enam Committee Report

<u>Organizations</u>	<u>Class I Posts</u>		<u>Posts of Other Classes</u>		<u>Total Posts</u>	
	<u>Pre-Enam</u>	<u>Post-Enam</u>	<u>Pre-Enam</u>	<u>Post-Enam</u>	<u>Pre-Enam</u>	<u>Post-Enam</u>
Ministries/Divisions (19)	2,007	1,531	9,299	5,228	11,306	6,759
Constitutional Bodies, etc (9)	636	515	2,619	2,358	3,255	2,873
Departments/Directorates/Offices(181)	42,313	49,915	671,983	685,446	714,296	735,361
Statutory Corporations/ Allied Organizations(109)	39,087	37,567	455,974	428,754	495,061	466,321
Total	84,043	89,528	1,139,875	1,121,786	1,223,918	1,211,314

Source: Government of Bangladesh (GOB), Enam Committee's Report, 1982-4 (3 volumes)

This has become pretty clear from the information contained in Table 8.02 that the martial law regime sought to restrict the proliferating tendency of the volume of public employees in Bangladesh and they were largely successful. The present study is essentially about the officers of the Class I category of public servants, especially a distinguished band of officials known as

⁹ *The New Age*, 5 January 2004.

the BCS (Administration) cadre officers. The above information demonstrates an actual increase in the total number of these very Class I officers. It is largely due to the creation of several thousand new posts in the Administration, Agriculture and Health cadres of Bangladesh Civil Service in the wake of the up-gradation of subdivisions and thanas into districts and upazilas respectively under the martial law government's new scheme of public administration [GOB 1982-4 (ii):242, 248, 258]. In 1982, the number of officers of BCS (Administration) cadre earmarked for district administration was raised from an existing 921 to 3,149. Similarly, the posts in the Agriculture cadre (both in the directorate and at the field level) were increased from 1,594 to 2,322. The number of similar posts in the Health cadre reached at 7,970 from 6,424. A number of adjustments were made on the sanctioned strength of officials, but the essential thrust was on reducing the existing manpower on the government's pay-roll. The increment in the number of BCS (administration) cadre officers was subsequently spurred by further rise in their number due to the addition of several hundred new posts which fall under the charge of Ministry of Land and the Local Government Division¹⁰. Hence, it may be held that now the attention of the government began to be drawn on the issue of the size of the government. It is also seen that the number of personnel employed in the government marked a slight reduction, although it did not any way make a complete halt on the subsequent continual increase of the number of organizations and their manpower. Considering the levels of accuracy and availability of official statistics in Bangladesh, one can hardly make a definite conclusion about the position of official manpower under the government. However, one account shows that the Administrative Reorganization Committee (ARC) – popularly known as Nurunnabi Committee – which submitted its report in 1996, recommended a reduction of 116,170 employees from the then sanctioned strength of 676,999 personnel (i.e., a reduction to the tune of 17.16 percent) in the 231 government organizations. The recommendations were not acted upon, however, and the next body – the Public Administration Reforms Commission (PARC) – in its report four years later, called for retrenching 122,223 posts (i.e., a reduction of 18.05%) from the just-quoted 676,999-strong government organizations [PARC (I) 2000:57]. Little is known to have been done about this. The contemporary government, like most others, appears to be very lukewarm to act on the substantive sides of administrative reforms, although some tertiary aspects are often looked into with considerable zeal¹¹. To the World Bank, the ratio of manpower employed in

¹⁰ The Assistant Commissioner (Land) under the Ministry of Land, and the Assistant Director of Local Government (ADLG), Secretary of the Zila Parishad, Chief Executive Officer of Municipality and that of the Zila Parishad in later days under the Local Government Division.

¹¹ For example, the Cabinet Committee on Administrative Reforms and Good Governance, in its meeting on 7 December 2003, decided on issues like rates of provident fund subscriptions, but indefinitely deferred the discussion of administrative reforms for a later time. *The Daily Star*, 8 November 2003.

public organizations and the GDP-wise expenditure incurred on them are not dissimilar from those in countries like Singapore and South Korea. However, it terms the efficiency and quality of those two states as far superior to those of Bangladesh (1996:18). These two areas deserve immediate attention.

Another major recommendation of PARC was about the reduction of the number of Ministries and Divisions. It opined that the number of Ministries be reduced to 25, among which 11 would have 2 or more Divisions under them. Taking the President's Office and the Prime Minister's Office into account, there would then be as many as 42 Ministries and/Divisions of the government [PARC (I) 2000:62]. It called for merging a number of Ministries into others and suggested for renaming some others. However, things did not follow that path and the next government, after its coronation through an impressive election victory in October 2001, created still new ministries. One new Ministry was made by renaming the previously existing Primary and Mass Education Division, and two others – those of Liberation War Affairs and Overseas Employment and Expatriates' Welfare – were created afresh. Indeed, it may be expedient to accommodate more politicians and bureaucrats in the power structure, but contemporary global preferences for a more efficient government to a big government are thus negated. There is hardly any concrete sign of a trimming down of government in the country. Nor does it sound plausible that emaciation is going to take place in near future. In the sphere of personnel structure of BCS (Administration) cadre, the scenario is not better either. The numerical strength of the cadre was abruptly bolstered in 1982 in the wake of the introduction of upazila system and creation of 42 new districts. A total of 460 Assistant Commissioners and similar number of Upazila Magistrates were posted in the upazilas. A post of Trying Magistrate was also created in each of the 42 new districts, to hold the trial of serious incidences of crimes triable by especially empowered magistrates. These posts soon became redundant. Again, even a decade after the upazila system was abolished in the 1990s, 460 posts of Assistant Commissioner (Upazila Finance and Planning Officers) are not taken off the BCS (Administration) cadre. Similarly, the posts of Upazila Magistrate were rendered redundant after the criminal courts were withdrawn from upazilas. These posts are retained by a slipshod arrangement under which several cognizance courts are manned by just a few of officers so displaced¹². Thus, downsizing does not appear a welcome option, where accrual, not retrenchment, is the norm. No serious attention is paid to the standing rules that if a post lies vacant for a substantial period, the government may consider it as abolished.

¹² For cognizance of cases, for instance, in Tangail, which had 11 upazila courts till 1992, there are now three courts of general nature, one court for forestry related cases and another for other serious offences. So, at least six of the 11 posts are rendered defunct. But, they are not dissected from the cadre's strength. A comparable scenario is prevalent in all districts.

The contemporary endeavours for rationalizing the governmental structures include decentralization of administration. This has become an established fact that democracy, decentralization and development go together and they have a symbiotic relationship. Democratic decentralization is often termed as a *sine qua non* of development in a pluralist society (Verma 1990:4). An optimum level of devolution and de-concentration of the government's planning, implementation and revenue sharing functions is required for decentralization. It also entails an amount of abdication on the part of national government, since they have to stand the diminution of the central government's authority and responsibilities. Not a phenomenon of *giving* something, decentralization is an institutional arrangement for mutually apportioning the assets, liabilities, responsibilities and authorities among different strata of governmental units. This apportionment is possible only when leaders institutionally agree to put in place appropriate structures, policies, resources and legal framework. Now-a-days, many countries embark on ambitious programmes of decentralization. Despite the mixed kind of results emanating from this process, there are some common lessons. The foremost among them is the need for strong commitment from central and local political leadership. Next comes the question of coordination of activities undertaken by various ministries and agencies. Capacity building in local levels is also important. Lastly, there should be a realistic phasing programme lest an abrupt change becomes less welcome for key stakeholders (Rahman 2001:112). The experiment of decentralization has not been very promising in Bangladesh. The political elite are undecided on the issue and a quick breakthrough is unlikely at a time when the concept of local self-government has virtually been subordinated under the national government (Khan 2000:121). Bureaucracy in general and BCS (Administration) cadre in particular has a stake in decentralization. Civil servants tend to abhor attempts at curtailing their powers (Morshed 1997:117). Moreover, in Bangladesh, the cultural and social behaviour of two groups of people differing in rank and status are not similar. Often skeptic about the taste, temperament and capability of juniors, senior officers are generally averse to delegation of authorities (Alam 1996:57). It is antithetical to decentralization. At such points, interventions are required from political leaders, most of whom are just uninterested in an effective local government system. Some even maintain that a decentralized government reminiscent of the now-defunct upazila system is antithetical to parliamentary democracy¹³.

¹³ The feuds are inconclusive among the influential ministers some of whom even profess to ignore their own election pledges in this regard.

8.1.3. Big role in the service sector. Despite a globally declining government involvement in the service delivery systems, it is still predominantly in the public sector in Bangladesh. The state looks after the vital affairs of health, electricity, telephone, gas, education, railway and the like. Even most banking functions are run under the public sector. The state is still the single largest employer. Only recently, some elementary forms of contracting out took place in some of these sectors, although the government retains an effective control. Almost by default, a big number of private institutions have in the recent years started providing health and medicare services to the people, that too for a high price. Absence of a suitable insurance coverage and a disorderly public health scenario produce a hapless situation for the poor (Khan 2000:252). In the power sector, out of a total effective demand of 3,235 MW of electricity in the country, the installed generation capacities in the public and private sectors at present stand at 3,420 MW and 1,290 MW respectively. Out of this 4,710 MW of installed capacity, the firm capacity including that of the independent power plants is 3,424 MW, and the nationwide coverage is still a meager 34 percent¹⁴. The pilferage in the name of system loss amounts to 40 percent of the total power transmitted (Sobhan 1993:265). Private sector power generation is a very recent phenomenon, while transmission is still in the hand of the government. The distribution functions in the rural areas are delegated to the users' cooperatives in the form of Palli Bidyut Samities (Rural Electricity Associations) and the commercial side is contracted out to private sector operatives at a few pockets, largely due to donor pressures. In the telephone sector, till the end of November 2003, as against the 764,078 or so field telephone connections and 209,840 additional effective demands from a public sector monopoly, Bangladesh Telegraph and Telephone (BT&T) Board, there have been close to 1,600,000 mobile phone connections provided by individual service providers¹⁵. These private utility companies have indulged in their business by hiring the microwave slot of the BT&T Board in only ten years or so. The capacity of the Board is low in terms of expansion of their coverage and quality of service. However, the government is often in the dilemma of donor pressure for withdrawal from this sector on the one hand and political pressure to leave the affairs to the indifferent staff members on the other. Given the poor capacity of the public sector's expansion, and had there been no private mobile phone companies operating their business in the country, the demand-supply mismatch would have reached an unbearable proportion.

¹⁴ The information is collected on 9 December 2003 from Power Cell of the Power Division.

¹⁵ Information collected from the Ministry of Post and Telecommunications, Govt. of Bangladesh. The current capacity of BT&T Board in 934,515 lines.

The private sector has been progressively gaining ground, possibly with substantive state assistance. The exploration, extraction and transmission of gas are monopolized in the private sector. Although the issue of gas export has become important in the country's contemporary politics, the coverage of the domestic gas supply network is still below 20 percent of its population. The education sector too has its peculiarities. The majority of students are schooled in non-government institutions, where the government bears the lion's share of the teachers' salaries. Moreover, there are a large number of government institutions in the secondary and higher levels, while the primary level is almost wholly run under direct government management. In the last thirty years, there has been a trendy pattern of government expenditure in education sector. Recent increases of allocations in this sector are not often matched with an enhancement in the standard and reputation of education (Sen 2000:288). This sector is rife with problems emanating from the interactions of public and private sector interests. There is also an increasing trend of commercialization in the higher education arena, and a good number of private universities are run to make good the limited capacity of public institutions. Lastly, although its coverage is not very widespread, the railway remains a significant avenue for service to the people. The government in recent days has leased out some of the routes and functions of Bangladesh Railway in an apparent bid to pacify donors. Moreover, around thirty thousand of its staffers were given a golden handshake in the 1990s. In the social sector, the rise and ascendancy of non-government organizations (NGOs) is a testimony to the government organizations' inadequacy to meet the current socio-economic demands. This was also a dictum of international donors' increasing wariness about the dwindling conditions of the poor on the one hand and the inadequacy of the government institutions to provide assistance to the poor (Feldman 2000:223). On the whole, the service sectors in Bangladesh still find a big role of the state. A big role necessitates big paraphernalia of personnel, no matter whether it is in Bangladesh or elsewhere. Changes are often sought in many aspects. Many are at the behest of donors, who too have their curses. For example, more than 80 percent of the money passing through the UN system is spent on its 50,000 staff. The recipient countries need to be skeptic of the suitability of donor propositions, since even the World Bank found that 106 of its 189 projects either had 'serious shortcomings' or were 'complete failures' (Hancock 1996:112). Management and development have become a complex gamble in which many internal and international actors make respective contributions that suit their particular interests. It is not sure who will win, and when, and how. In a jungle-like situation, it is no wonder if none wins.

8.1.4. Legal and policy framework. Bangladesh is among the most critically placed countries in terms of its present state of development and its imperatives for institutional reforms. Many socio-economic factors have a complex interplay in the making of the country, which maintains considerable obstinacy in retaining its structures without much transformation. Like most other countries with similar settings, Bangladesh has to grapple with the fact that, on its own, economic growth – a basic condition for improving human living and ensuring their survival – is an insufficient guarantee of peace and democracy. To echo an African economist's pronouncements for Africa, what people confront in Bangladesh is primarily a political crisis, albeit with devastating economic consequences. More than ever, Bangladesh needs to evolve good governance, a composite term that covers the pursuit of a democratic process, the strengthening of institutions and legal framework, respect for human rights and the rule of law (Mayor and Binde 2001:390). These are necessary for a qualitative existence in a sane world. The subject of evolving a democratic process does not fit into the ambit of the present study. In Bangladesh, democracy may be smarting for a secured footing. Many ills like poverty, natural calamities, lack of education, and the absence of a democratic culture are responsible for the predicament. The institutions and legal framework currently in operation, as well as the conduct of different functionaries, are not often conducive to good governance. Despite their periodic changes, adjustments or innovations, many antiquated or traditional notions are still at play in the institutional functioning of the government. Things are often conceived of from the perspective of those who administer them, rather than from that of their beneficiaries. The administrators' behaviour complicate the problems further, since the country's philosophy of governance is highly bureaucracy-centred, almost linear and less friendly to constructive pluralism (Huque 1990:25). Its governance paradigm is yet to recover fully from the colonial mindset, and its affinity towards the country's bureaucracy may be limiting its governance choices. The continuance of the perception in the country's governance is legitimized and political parties' dependence on bureaucracy is heightened (Haq 2003). The absence of institutionalized interests calls for a greater role of legislators and bureaucrats. There seems to be a balance in the latter's favour, since the interest and capabilities of legislators do not often match the requirements for an effective and proactive policy regimen. A committee comprising three distinguished MPs narrated how in 1993 public officials denigrated an innovative policy of the government.¹⁶

¹⁶ Mr. L. K. Siddiqi MP, Mrs Matia Chowdhuri MP and Mr Ebadur Rahman Chowdhury MP visited the UK to observe the British parliamentary system and compared the two countries' scenarios in this regard.

Again, as it transpires from different accounts, some vital institutions are not made or allowed to play their expected role to act as the watchdog of public interests. For instance, the legislature, which is popularly elected every few years on the basis of universal adult suffrage, is known for remaining preoccupied more with issues relating to political or personal squabbling, rather than evolving more effective institutions and laws to better serve the interests of the people. During its entire history, the parliament has not ever been successful as the main national forum for holding dialogue, debate and negotiations to resolve policy differences among political parties (Jahan 2000:28). It has not as yet succeeded in turning into a productive synthesizer of conflicting ideas and ways for building the country. Instead, it has assumed a propensity to become a veritable battlefield for the protégés and mentors of garrulous political organizations. The really substantive parliamentary businesses often miss the sight of the parliamentarians, a substantial number of whom are found to be abstaining themselves from the proceedings of the legislature on these or those different pretexts. The following account prepared on the business of the first three sessions of the eighth Parliament may shed a little light on the style in which the business of the legislature is conducted in Bangladesh.

Table 8.03. Business Conducted in the First Three Sessions of Eighth Parliament

<u>Duration</u>		<u>President's Address</u>		<u>Ministers' Speeches*</u>	<u>Notices' Disposal</u>		<u>Legislation</u>		<u>Unscheduled Talking</u>	
<u>Days</u>	<u>Time</u>	<u>Speech</u>	<u>Discussion</u>		<u>No.</u>	<u>Time</u>	<u>Bills</u>	<u>Time</u>	<u>Duration</u>	<u>Irrelevant</u>
80**	259H	89 M	38 H	58H 36M	144	70H 24M	24	35H	16H	591***
									30M	Members

*Note: * Ministers' speeches include those of the Prime Minister. ** There were double sittings on 7 days of the third session. *** Many members indulged in irrelevant lectures for more than once.*

Source: Transparency International Bangladesh (TIB), 2002.

The just-quoted statistics give an impression of how important state organs are run in Bangladesh. The TIB report also states that 86 of the Parliament's 87 sittings in the first three sessions began late owing to the problems of not having quorum and a total of 47 hour 49 minutes was lost.¹⁷ The Members used vituperative language against their political opponents on 658 occasions, while they eulogized their own leadership for 505 times. Most elected representatives concentrated their attention on party-political issues, instead of engaging themselves in policy issues, legislation or monitoring of the functioning of government organs. A subsequent TIB report released in 2003 did not speak of a better scene. It rather laid bare the practice of convening periodic sessions of parliament only to observe a constitutional obligation to the effect that the gap between the end of a session and commencement of the next one shall

¹⁷ Article 75(2) of the Constitution ordains that no sitting of the Parliament can take place unless a minimum of 60 Members are present in the floor.

not be more than sixty days.¹⁸ The main plank of parliamentary opposition often sustains a peculiar political culture of boycotting the legislature. The Speaker of the Parliament reportedly decried the TIB for not consulting him or his officers before publishing the report. He termed the quorum crisis and astray talks as just usual and also refuted the allegation of his partisan stand by saying that he had been playing his role as per relevant laws.¹⁹ The response from the head of legislature is typical of political functionaries in Bangladesh, where politicians find fault with even constructive criticism and seldom takes the essence of an objective assessment. This is more evident from the fact that the latest *Parliamentwatch* report was linked with the ongoing debates about an alternative to the dominant political culture of Bangladesh. The periodic publication of such reports is possibly missed while responding to the report's findings. In parliamentary business, legislation is largely left on the civil servants in most countries. They monopolize much of the information of shortcomings of existing policies and the technical expertise necessary to design practical alternatives. They also outnumber and outlast the elected executives in modern political systems which are essentially bureaucratic, characterized by the 'rule of officials' (Almond 1974:123). However, the scene is worse in Bangladesh, where legislators have very little say in parliamentary business except for haranguing, often abusively, in line with their parties' stance. To give a concrete example, the political party which carried a two-third majority in the last general elections held only two meetings of its parliamentary party in 27 months. The first one was to 'elect' their leader after the general elections in October 2001, and the last was held in June 2002 to denounce the President, whom they themselves had elected a few months back. Bills are not placed before the parliamentary party for eliciting opinion. The custom of convening pre-session parliamentary party meetings is often not observed²⁰. Under such situations, there are possibilities of domination of the executive organ over the legislature (Younis and Mostafa 2000:206). Even if it does not occur, the combination of a parliament ill-prepared for facing the real issues of governance on the one hand and a trained, but insufficiently motivated, bureaucracy on the other may lead to more anarchy and selfishness in an already problem-ridden country like Bangladesh.

The situation on the rule of law befitting of a civilized developing country is not promising, when newspapers speak of 56 people being killed by law enforcers and 61 other having died in police and jail custody in the first nine months of 2003.²¹ Macabre lynching of 38 alleged

¹⁸ *The Daily Star*, 18 December 2003.

¹⁹ *The Daily Star*, 21 December 2003.

²⁰ *The Daily Star*, 13 December 2003.

²¹ *Ibid.*

robbers in the alluvial lands of Noakhali in one week of December 2003 also reflects a dearth of popular confidence in the legal system. It was also reported in the national media that in the first 11 months of 2003, politically triggered violence claimed as many as 389 lives in the country. The number of injured was 5,711.²² The head of the republic's judiciary is quoted in two consecutive days when he lamented the plight of the state of affairs. The Chief Justice lamented the fact that the poor did not have an access to the seats of justice. The next day he decried a system where corruption and ill-gotten wealth were given impunity with the resultant effect of lawlessness in the political system.²³ The ongoing investigation carried out by the republic's Supreme Judicial Council into the alleged bribery in the higher judiciary portended very ominously. The ascendancy of the powers of money and muscle led to such disturbing expressions of the highest judicial functionary of Bangladesh. The needs and arguments for legal and administrative reforms get all the more amplified by such facts. Given the disposition of legislative and top bureaucratic functionaries, policymaking portends on a stage of darkness. In parliamentary democracies, a secretary of the ministry acts as the main advisor to his minister and thus gets involved in discussing, sharing and advising on political matters too. As a senior permanent official, he is morally and professionally obliged to provide his political boss with the best policy alternatives based on sound arguments, relevant precedents and sustainability to changing environment (Rahman 2001:21). The expectation that he will render such rich advises from a nonpartisan perspective is the pinnacle of his unique position. However, the contemporary Bangladesh scenario does not always allow these professional factors to be duly considered while formulating policies. There is little parliamentary debate on policy and legislation, while most policies are formulated in secret. So, it is no wonder that policies have little public understanding and are often implemented half-heartedly (World Bank 1996:51). In public administration and civil service, for example, two small but significantly interesting events happened in recent years. The government in early 1997 suddenly announced with immediate effect a two-day weekend in public offices. It took even some senior cabinet members by surprise since it had not been discussed at any point and they reportedly came to know about it through news media.²⁴ The ramifications of this departure from the previous practices were not duly considered. The subsequent adjustments and ultimate rescinding of the decision speak for the unsoundness of the decision. Similarly, a while later, the government reallocated the 30 percent quota reservation for the civil service vacancies. The prevailing quota reservation for the

²² *The Daily Star*, 30 December 2003.

²³ *The Prothom Alo*, 19 and 20 December 2003. Such uttering was in effect the reflection of disillusionment with the prevailing legal and institutional arrangements for rule of law.

²⁴ The researcher's personal memory of a senior minister's conversation with the head of government.

freedom fighters being ineffective owing to the natural age factors, the government transferred this reservation to the wards of the freedom fighters. This decision seemed to have gone against the realistic assessment of the prevailing and future situations. However, little consultation took place among the policy makers and stakeholders before adopting such a policy decision. The relevant authorities and recommendatory bodies indeed had suggested otherwise (Ali 2002:22). It speaks of the haphazard manner of the governing art of policy-making in the country where decisions are often made on the fiat of important persons, not always with due regards for opinions and interests of all stakeholders. Unlike other countries where objective situations are assessed under institutional arrangements, the concept of rational incrementalism does not often hold good in Bangladesh, a country where there has not yet been a consensus on many fundamental public issues. Instead, an aura of antagonism seems to prevail among the different groups and organizations in the political front. At the present context, it is unlikely that some sort of understanding and consensus would soon emerge from within. As a first step, donors may actively support activities that enhance the capacity of individual legislators and the legislature as an institution in understanding governance and policy processes and the working of the administrative organizations (Rahman 2001:146). This external intervention is required particularly because the dominant political culture of the developing countries does not generally welcome an instructional regime for the high-profile political functionaries.²⁵ The prospective arrival at a consensus on the administrative issue as well as the other ones becomes all the more difficult in Bangladesh, because the country's political culture so far has not sustained democratic values (Younis and Mostafa 2000:188). A change in political culture has become a need of the time, when legislative, political and administrative institutions have to cater for the pressing demands of a changing environment. Such changes in political culture may also enable public administration to perform its duties under a watchful parliamentary gaze, without bothering about the whims and caprices in the political arena.

8.1.5. Civil society. Any kind of effective reforms in the political-administrative milieu in Bangladesh would essentially entail a greater involvement of the civil society. In political science, 'civil society' is a comparatively new concept which is yet to assume an agreed definition. Blair (2000:183) takes a workable definition although he admits of an element of arbitrariness in it. To him, civil society is the broad arena of organized human activity that exists between the family and the state. The traditional formal organizations like the chambers of

²⁵ The study tour mentioned at 16n above seems highly educative and the MPs recommended farfetched measures for making the parliament more effective and rendering the government more responsive.

business and industry and the informal cultural organizations like the guilds of writers are important categories of civil society bodies. In the recent years, largely at the behest of international donors, there has emerged a new group of civil society institutions in the form of non-governmental organizations (NGOs). Civil society is also conceptualized as a network of organizations or a structure of classes, which emerge at certain historical junctures as articulate political and social groups to advocate common interests. The development of civil society is critical to the formation of a political system based on widespread consensus, rather than force (Choi 1993:14). Civil society is again taken as an integral feature of capitalist economy. Its concept is stated to be more of a West European notion shaped by the twin influences of capitalism and the French Revolution (Koo 1993:238). The civil society bodies play an important role in different junctures of individual countries' history. For example, the combined movements of the cultural and lawyers' organizations for democratization of polity in the early 1980s led to a softening of the autocratic military regime in Bangladesh. Similarly, some civil society organizations spearheaded a spontaneous popular uprising in Indonesia to topple the Suharto regime in 1998. However, Blair (ibid, p.197) finds only a limited and *episodic* contribution, rather than a regular role, of civil society in shaping Bangladesh as it stands now. Most organized associations (e.g., those of doctors, lawyers, journalists, academics, engineers, etc) tend to be so strongly identified with different political parties that they can be regarded to have been co-opted by the parties. A leading daily of Dhaka quoted the outgoing president of the Dhaka University Teachers Association (DUTA) who had expressed that they took the impending end-of-the-year DUTA election very seriously. He rationalized his statement by saying that it was necessary in view of the 'national political perspective'. His opponent was also quoted as saying that the DUTA election was very much a political affair.²⁶ Moreover, there are allegations of political maneuverings about recruiting in academic positions of different public universities. One other instance of abuse of formal and informal political power was vivified in the form of a kind of spoils system when several hundreds of medical and other staff were recruited in the only medical university of the country, and allegedly almost all of them found a berth for their allegiance to the coterie aligned with the ruling political party. The distribution of favours on political consideration was so blatant that some of the departments got almost double the manpower of what they sought. In one department, there were now some 30 doctors against a

²⁶ *The Bangladesh Observer*, 30 December 2003. Elections in DUTA, like all other elective body of all public universities, had been being contested simply along the party lines. Different panels are known to have been aligned with major political parties of the country, thereby denying the teaching community an independent and universally acceptable existence.

sanctioned strength of 16 patients for the same.²⁷ It shows the general state of abuse of political forces – no matter who the actors are, ordinary politicians or technocratic politicians. With the exception of engineers so far, these professionals are pretty divided into so-called panels, which have little or no autonomy from the political parties with which they are aligned. As a result, they enjoy only a sectarian influence on their clientele.

However, human rights organizations and various national and international watchdog bodies exert an active influence on the governance of the country. They have been considerably influencing the government's thought process on many important legal and institutional issues. The reports and assessments made by international organizations like Amnesty International, Red Cross and Red Crescent, Medicine sans Frontiers, Reporters sans Frontiers, Transparency International, and the like carry great weights in the making of policies and events in the developing countries including Bangladesh. The local civic rights groups and other civil society organizations too have been assuming an increasing sway in the body politic. For example, largely due to the pressure of various such organizations, in early 2003, the government tabled in the Parliament a bill for establishing an independent anti-corruption commission. But, the bill contained provisions for retaining, among others, a number of ministers on the panel which was to choose its Commissioners. It invited serious misgivings in the civil society as well as opposition political quarters who felt that the involvement of ministers would shatter the prospect of a neutral functioning of the proposed commission. The government reportedly conceded to the reasoning and ultimately dropped the provision.²⁸ In the strict sense, political parties too may be thought of as part of civil society. But, their inherently partisan and dogmatic interpretation of issues gives rise to an obvious cynicism about their ingenuity and objectivity in the mind of people. That is why political parties are seldom considered as part of the civil society. In Bangladesh, a body namely, Local Government Support Group, comprising a number of eminent personalities has been propagating for a local government system capable of building local leadership and carrying out local level development planning and their implementation. A reasonably strong public opinion is thus created. Similarly, the influence of civil society organizations like Bangladesh Paribesh Andolan (BAPA) – Bangladesh Environmental Movement – and Bangladesh Environmental Lawyers Association (BELA) was instrumental in the government's reinvigorated drive for reclaiming rivers and public water bodies from illegal grabbers. The banning from the streets of Dhaka of scooters with high pollutant-emitting two-

²⁷ *The Daily Star*, 22 October 2003.

²⁸ *The Daily Star*, 16 December 2003.

stroke engines and virtual elimination of polypropylene bags also testifies to the growing influence and wider acceptability of such organizations. One may also cite the beneficial effect of the increasingly vociferous groups who keenly watch the electoral process. Their raucous vigilance deserves share of credit for an impressive way of conducting the last several general elections. However, the role of civil society has so far remained minimal on the governmental structures. They rarely looked into the structural issues of public administration and civil service, although their efforts are quite notable on subjects like decentralization. In order to come out of a cobweb of inertia and episodic gains, the civil society has to be more committed to civic involvement and take advocacy as a fulltime exercise, not merely contingent upon donor assistance. They have to be more democratic, accountable and transparent themselves with a view to being able to summon mass appeals on important issues (Sobhan 2000:384). A more proactive civil society means a prospect for the transparent structures of the government and the practices where laws and public resources are directed to the benefit of people, not those of particular coteries.

8.1.6. Accountability. The modern democratic polities are characterized by the important aspect of their being run under the open gaze of taxpayers and observers. Accountability is the dividing line between a democratic polity and others which are otherwise disposed of. In the simplest sense, accountability is answerability for the discharge of duties or conduct. In the administrative parlance, accountability denotes the enforcement of responsiveness and responsibility to administrative decisions, and it refers to the formal or legal locus of responsibility. Accountability is at the same time the foundation of any governing process and also a check on power and authority. As a political concept, accountability is younger than organized government, and it too underwent different connotations at different phases of history. The concept of accountability makes the political leadership of a country discharge its duties through ministers and public officials who have to account for their actions and inactions. It frees the government of the challenges to its authority, helps public officials avoid potential mistakes and protects public interests. The interdependent and fundamental elements of accountability are public interests, formulation and implementation of public policies, role of political leadership, role of administrators, and the exercise of power and authority. The government fulfills public interests through the outputs of the administrators, and is accountable to the people through the holding of regular, free and competitive elections. Accountability is a means to check a possible danger of the abuse of power at the hand of politicians and administrators. It is also a protection against possible inaction on the part of those responsible for discharging respective public duties.

Younis and Mostafa (2000:5-7) have delineated different models of accountability – Athenian, feudal, transitional, simple modern and complex modern – which roughly corresponded to various periods of time. The last of those models recognizes the interplay of different actors in the game of governance at the central government level – people, parties, parliament, ministers, ombudsman, civil servants, audit, professional bodies, service delivery tools, and the like. At local government level too, there has been a complex accountability system where people, ministers, councillors, officers, audit, professional bodies and service delivery organizations perform their respective roles. These actors, while maintaining a complex framework of accountability, have got particular modes of relationships with one another. Once these relationships are adversely affected at some points, malfunctioning symptoms erupt and then the system is exposed to critical challenge. John Acton's immortal dictum that power tends to corrupt and absolute power corrupts absolutely has got a universal applicability. Hence some sort of control is necessary to ensure democratic and responsive governance. Accountability is such a brake on the absolute authority of the executive in public interest. But the chain of accountability from the highest to the lowest levels in Bangladesh is believed to be weak and fuzzy. The absence of accountability has been a significant reason for delayed decisions in public offices (World Bank 1996:50). It seems that there is little accountability for procrastination of functions and for not doing official duties at all. File move up and down, back and forth for minor decisions. Decisions are often moved upward to the highest level and 'officials with responsibility to take decisions are behaving like clerks' (UNDP 1993:49). Fear for reprisals if something goes wrong may be a prime reason for such a state of affairs. However, had there been a reasonably effective domain of accountability with unfettered flow of information, things would have been much better than these.

Accountability, at the same token, necessitates openness in the process of administrative decision-making, which has to be visible to the electorate in order for it to look fair. It is about effective scrutiny and effective access to information, without which those in power can hardly be answerable. In the absence of open and reliable information, control and accountability become hazardous. Such a situation controverts a transparent democratic political system. This is because it has to have multiple checks and points of access with many guardians at different points. In fact, the complexity of modern governance continues to pose ever-increasing questions about the quality governance in the present-day world. This phenomenon is given high current by the current information revolution (Panandiker 2000:451). Transparency also puts the system to tests in terms of the cost of business and the dedication, loyalty and moral or ethical standards

of the performance of public officials. Accountability determines the best position of an individual or organization in explaining how and why specific outcomes occur. The administrative system of Bangladesh is generally accountable to the ministers who themselves are accountable to the parliament and through it to the people, who give their judgment through periodical elections on this or that group of politicians to run the affairs of the republic. However, the system is characterized with an amount of discreetness and confidentiality. In Bangladesh, there is an absence of performance standards set for public officials. The citizens too have little access to information about government processes and decisions. There is also a lack of means of obtaining redress of officials' abuse of power. There are serious obstacles for the executive's accountability to the parliament too. The legislators are not always trained; their facilities are not adequate for their obligations; they are not provided with sufficient logistics and staff; and their inadequate access to information and research data constrains their ability to participate knowledgeably in debates and committee discussions. An incomplete adjustment from a presidential to a parliamentary system is also responsible for a scanty accountability since the balance tilts heavily in favour of the executive in the person of the Prime Minister who assumes almost a full clout of a President of the previous system. Under the Constitution, the Prime Minister is in an extremely powerful position reminiscent of the President in earlier days and similar to the situation in many other developing countries who have been trying hard to assume a form of democratic governance (World Bank 1996:51). This particular feature coalesces with another important aspect of unduly excessive secrecy in government business to clamp a brake on the process of accountability of public administration. The new era of governance in the UK recognized the importance of the openness of administrative process. Hence, the steps adopted during the premiership of two consecutive Conservative Prime Ministers were on the whole sustained by the Labour government installed in the late 1990s. The election manifesto of the Labour Party before the 1997 elections reflected their vows in these words, "Labour is committed to democratic renewal of our country through decentralization and the elimination of excessive government secrecy. Unnecessary secrecy in government leads to arrogance in government and defective policy decisions. We are pledged to a Freedom of Information Act, leading to a more open government." The government, after winning the elections, quickly implemented the commitment (Govt of UK 1998:16). The accountability of the executive to the parliament in the UK is sustained through a system in which a group of government departments has to answer parliamentary questions on each day. Each week, the Prime Minister faces questions on one day. Enquiries are also made by departmental select committees and the Public Accounts Committee, in which Ministers and senior bureaucrats may

be summoned to attend and explain their conduct. In Bangladesh, such procedures are not developed to a full and constructive extent. The parliamentary standing committees, like the select committees in the UK, have just started emerging as influential bodies to scrutiny the affairs of individual ministries and organizations. A sound accountability system would require an end to the presently felt apathy, narrow vision, a lack of commitment and inexperience in operating within a democratic system of government (UNDP 1993:98). The UNDP study (ibid, p. 28) quotes another study in which 45 percent and 26 percent respondents ascribed the civil officers' weaknesses in policy decisions to 'risk aversion' and 'interference of politicians' respectively. A transparent work environment with access of people to public information may contribute to improvement in this regard. In that event, officials would feel more confident in discharging their responsibilities and political functionaries too would act more responsibly. The Official Secrets Act of 1923 is a barrier to the free flow of such public information.²⁹ Most of the serious mistakes attributed the higher bureaucracy in Pakistan were believed to be due to the failure to assemble the facts (Haider 1968:195). The country also failed to make use of the research institutes and universities to countervail these shortcomings.

8.2. Possible directions

8.2.1. Cross-country experience. Since public administration is an old art, and since this institution has been in place in all human habitats in some form or other, it is subjected to perennial changes. The major administrative systems underwent significant modifications in course of time. However, they have by now assumed particular characters suited to their own environments ingrained through long years of evolution. Many of these characters resemble those of BCS (Administration) cadre – the premier cadre in Bangladesh. Bangladesh and the United Kingdom (UK) have some common administrative legacy although their ancient and medieval administrative histories are different. Bangladesh still retains the façade of the primacy of a generalist bureaucracy, although there have recently been quite a few substantial changes in the UK system. In the United Kingdom, a small number of members of the 'Administrative Group', created in 1971 on Fulton Committee's recommendation, as part of a system of occupational groupings, continue to hold senior responsibilities. They are often regarded as the elite of the service. However, the most prominent trend in the contemporary UK public administration has been the assimilation in the governmental structures of the market management principles of cost-effectiveness with regard to services provided by the state. In

²⁹ The law strictly restricts the divulging of official information, of course, on pain of reprisals for non-conforming public officials.

France, a similar band of elite officers, like the Administrative Group of the UK, are collectively called *grand corps*, which occupies top administrative positions. It is constituted with both technical and non-technical posts at top levels. These officials discharge their responsibilities under a functional autonomy enjoyed under the watchful eye of the Council d'Etat. In Germany too, the higher class of the permanent civil servants – Beamten – generally occupy the top positions of general administration. These officials by and large maintain their politically neutral character, although there is a slightly advancing propensity towards a politically biased top echelon bureaucracy. However, a greater propensity is towards evolving an administration which can stand on an equal footing vis-à-vis the private sector institutions in terms of their level of efficiency and cost-effectiveness. Correspondingly, officers of the Senior Executive Services of the United States constitute an elite group of managers and professionals, who, under the aegis of the politically appointed agency chiefs, continue to function in a manner so as to ensure accountability and responsiveness to agency leadership. In contrast with the UK, the US system manifests a preference for staffing with specialized capacity (GOB 1989:45-9). The US public administration, typical of a federal type of governance intertwined with a pretty effective local government system, is characterized with a strong tenet of legislative control and also with a less-planned career advancement programmes in comparison to the UK system. In this connection, mention may be made of the extreme cases of political control on the bureaucracy in some Commonwealth countries like Kenya, Tanzania and Zambia. In these countries, politicians felt it inadequate when the normative provisions were put in place for institutional arrangement for rational control. Bureaucracies of these countries, on their gaining independence in the early 1960s, started with liberal ideas, but they were put to a process of draconian politicization by the year 1975. It resulted in disastrous consequences on the ability of services to shoulder both traditional responsibilities of the state and, more so, the new development responsibilities (Mutahaba 1989:124).

The scenario in South Asia is quite interesting and more or less comparably poised like the administrative system of Bangladesh. In India, which shares a common administrative heritage like Bangladesh, the sphere of civil servants' work is very wide and it extends to the manning of most civil posts below the ministers in the secretariats and field organizations. Merit and equal opportunity principles are the prominent feature of the yearly intake of young officers by direct recruitment under the auspices of the Union Public Service Commission. The civil service of India, in its function and career, enjoys a protection under the provisions of the Constitution. Like in India, Pakistan too retains an administrative system in which the secretariat is the citadel

of power and authority. For long years it protected the sacrosanct position of the administrators, who showed extra-sensitiveness to criticism and became defensive in response to outside advice, let alone criticism (Haider 1968:191). As the non-political head of a ministry, the secretary is responsible for efficient administration and discipline under his ministry. The Federal and Provincial Public Service Commissions and the Establishment Division look after the personnel affairs of public administrators. The Commissions test and select the candidates for the entry-level posts in various services which constitute the higher civil service of the republic. Pakistan enacted its Civil Service Act in 1973 to put in place the detailed principles and procedures for the top echelon bureaucracy whose incumbents are generically termed as the civil servants. The Act also provides for statutory protection of the civil servants and under its coverage the top generalist civil servants are divided into several functional groups. In another important country, Sri Lanka, similar provisions exist to provide for a political control over the permanent civil service. The Public Service Commission plays a vital role in recruitment of officers and the government keeps enough scopes for pre-service and in-service training programmes to groom the officials (GOB 1989:53). Like the just-quoted three neighbours, Bangladesh inherits the British Indian administrative tradition and enshrines in its administrative system a politically neutral officialdom. Although there has not as yet been any consolidated Civil Service Act in the country, some other relevant Acts and a number of prevailing rules framed by the President according to the provisions of the Constitution govern the various aspects of the civil services. The introduction of the unified multi-cadre civil service with provisions for the representation of various cadres in the top government positions is the most prominent feature of the current administrative system. However, the system currently suffers from a credibility gap in terms of transparency as well as efficiency and effectiveness. The administrative system of Bangladesh has not yet undergone an exercise like in the UK on its compatibility with the principles of business type management. It is highly likely that, in the foreseeable future, some forms of change are to take place in the public administration of Bangladesh. It is to be observed as to which form such changes assume and which the likely repercussions are.

8.2.2. Uncharted course. The administrative system of Bangladesh has traditionally attracted much debates and discussion in academic and political spheres, where there seem to be an unanimity in identifying some common malaise including a diluted accountability, overcentralisation, complex operating procedures, a weak support system and inadequate human resources (GOB 1989:3). These broad headings of administrative illness incorporate many more symptoms of a malfunctioning public administration. Moreover, issues relating to personnel

affairs like recruitment, placement and promotion in the service and in top government positions, reservation of positions for various groups of public officials, perks and privileges, contractual appointment, etc. have added to the complexity of the subject. Extraneous factors like corruption, demoralizing environment and interface with political forces too have significant influence on the functioning of public administration in general and the BCS (Administration) cadre in particular. In this regard, most discussions end up with something akin to a ruling that some changes are earnestly required on the prevailing system. The introduction of a unified civil service structure in 1980 transformed the administrative scenario in a particular shape. However, the Administration cadre of a unified Bangladesh Civil Service managed to assume or retain a primacy in it. On certain counts, it has further consolidated its hold, since most top echelon administrative positions are held by the officials of this cadre, in which the former Secretariat cadre officers too possess a spectacular height of ascendancy.³⁰ The outcry of other streams of public officials in general and technical-functionalists in particular against a generalist BCS (Administration) cadre is present in all the times. While studying the subject, several bodies and scholars voiced similar stands and called for reforms which were, among other things, directed to reduce the latter's position in the administrative system of Bangladesh. The names of such recommendatory bodies and their main foci are contained in *Appendix V*. The donor community has shown an increasing interest in reforming the administrative system, for instilling a better level of efficiency, so that resources are better used for improving life in Bangladesh (Khan 1994:2). It has a particular reference to the poor performance of government agencies in project implementation characterized by a cost overrun by 35 percent and a time lag by above 60 percent (GOB 1989:23). The donors may also have the reasons of self-interest in maintaining the prevailing structures. However, in the wake of the launch in the 1960s of a new academic pursuit of comparative public administration, successive governments met with repeated failures (Ahmed and Azizuddin 1995:52). No individual country is left unscathed amidst a global trend of changes in the administrative system. Bangladesh is touched by this global phenomenon of change. Modifications have taken place and further transformation is most likely to occur in near future. The generalist administrators being well-entrenched in the pivotal administrative positions, any change or reform in public administration would affect the prospect of BCS (Administration) cadre officers. But, in the absence of a uniform pattern of change in the bureaucracy of Bangladesh, it is not sure which course such possible changes might take. Despite the apparent inevitability of changes, the unstable political system and a decaying standing of

³⁰ They have got more than double the number of Deputy Secretary and Joint Secretary as reserved by the government on recommendations of Matin Committee. See Table 6.04.

public institutions make the prospects more unpredictable.³¹ That is why the reforms in the administrative system in general and in the BCS (Administration) cadre look to be a journey in an uncharted course. In the yet-to-be-launched serious endeavours for a positive and deliberate improvement in the administrative system, the goals as well as the means have to be considered and consensus on them has to be found by most important stakeholders.

The most prominent suggestions in respect of the country's administrative system are those which called for reduction of manpower in government organizations. The most conspicuous among these suggestions were put forward by the Enam Committee in 1982 (a reduction of 12,504 staff), again by the Muyeed Committee in 1989 (a further reduction of a minimum of 7,650 staff), and by the PARC in 2000 (an impressive reduction of 122,223 personnel). However, it is interesting to note that none of these three review bodies recommended a reduction of personnel from the sanctioned strength of the BCS (Administration) cadre. The Enam Committee, rather than calling for a reduction in the cadre's ranks, actually recommended an enhancement of its strength. That was the only natural course for the peculiarity of the situation when 450-odd Upazila Parishads and 42 new districts were created simultaneously. These two measures in the country's public administration necessitated a greater involvement of Administration cadre officers. A few years later, the Secretariat cadre was merged with the Administration cadre, thereby raising the numerical strength of the unified Administration cadre. There could have been necessary readjustments in the cadre strength when the upazila parishads were put to an end in 1992. But such steps were not taken. As a result, the cadre assumed a bulky, unwieldy and unmanageable bearing. A cadre, considered as the elite of the elite, can no way maintain or improve upon the conceived elitism if its size does not tally with the needs of the time. The cadre, nay, the entire edifice of public administration in South Asian countries faces another vital problem. The administrative capabilities in the sub-continent are so thin that these countries could not attend to the basic and core functions of governance, thereby leading to a poor performance. These states possibly have been misled by what the state can do well and what it cannot. They may have a blurred vision about the civil administration's vital sovereign functions vis-à-vis the peripheral non-vital functions, with which they have unnecessarily burdened themselves. Redefining the role of the state is therefore a vital task for developing

³¹ The editorial column of *The Daily Star* on 21 December 2003, somehow reflecting a capitulating tone, expressed the civil society's hope that since a person no less than the Chief Justice himself had uttered the miserable weaknesses of the legal-institutional framework of the country, the government would now go for correcting the wrongs now found all around. The Chief Justice sounded despondent when he spoke of the captivity of the system in the hand of money and muscle. The editorial also said that the Chief Justice's expressions reaffirmed the civil society's warnings, which, it opined, had gone unheeded.

countries in South Asia (Panandiker 2000:450). It is in actual practice redefining the role and character of the public administration. In Bangladesh, the role and character of BCS (Administration) cadre need to be taken into foremost consideration while thinking about reforms in the administrative system. However, these vital aspects are not yet given adequate attention. Such an important cadre has been without an updated schedule of posts and without clear charters of responsibilities for its individual members. There should indeed be prompt changes in both its character and appearance. But, there are no indications about the courses the cadre might be taking while embracing such changes.

8.3. Concluding Remarks.

Far from being static, all institutions and structures are created and shaped by creative men mostly under compelling circumstances. Changes are contingent on contexts and transformation of relationships the institutions and structures. When such relationships undergo fundamental and massive changes, and when they involve the life of many people, the shape and character of such institutions and structures undergo a process of rethinking. Readjustments occur corresponding with the pressures on institutions – both in the form of gradual evolution and watershed events. When, despite propitious circumstances and opportunities obtaining at a given time, required changes are not brought about, those institutions face serious pressures to obviate their expected performance of proper roles. A non-performing institution then becomes a burden itself on the system and generally goes on to disturb the performance of other institutions as well, thus leading to a complementariness of dysfunctions. If not arrested with well-calculated measures, the whole system may fall asunder. In general, the developed countries have successfully averted such catastrophe through the built-in methods of self-adjustment. They do not confront metamorphic challenges since an element of incremental adjustment is ingrained in their systems. Affluence and higher standards of life make a salubrious contribution to it. But, the developing countries are not necessarily blessed with similar opportunities of self-adjusting instruments. Hence, they experience periodic challenges and system lag in terms of the expectation and public performance. Shifting emphases of governments, political instability and people's varying perceptions of administration further complicate the problem. Here again, the characteristic poverty and underdevelopment play an important role in stalling improvement in their administrative systems. They find it hard to reap the management innovations brought about in the developed countries. Therefore, the administrative problems in these poor countries persist in the clout of a misgoverned polity (Sobhan 2000:349). Bangladesh is among these countries that admit of the necessity of change in many of its institutions including in public

administration. It is also among the countries that lag far behind others in transforming its governing tools. A poor administrative performance generate a lack of development in terms of economic growth and also in respect of the qualitative index of life. The reasons for poor administrative performance include lack of interest, lack of commitment, narrow vision and inexperience which lead to low productivity, inefficiency and low per capita income (Younis and Mostafa 2000:123). The BCS (Administration) cadre has a pivotal responsibility in running the public affairs, and hence shares the strongest criticism against a poor performance of public institutions of Bangladesh. Continuance of the symptoms of the lack of good governance presses home the points for reforming the administrative system of the country. The BCS (Administration) cadre being in the position of the elite of the elites in public administration, there is a stark necessity for changes in this cadre.

The prevalent administration cannot deliver the goods and services expected of it. While looking for changes in the system, psychosomatic and structural aspects of public administration in general and BCS (Administration) cadre in particular are to be addressed. One should look at the cadre's present and future configurations and also reckon with the expectations on these important functionaries. It is not rational to expect of the members of BCS (Administration) cadre a role reminiscent of the days during British or even Pakistan times. In the British Indian days, there was little regard for democratic values. The collection of revenue and the maintenance of public order being the principal objective of an alien group of rulers, democratic practices could hardly take hold in a typically underdeveloped subcontinent. In their own interest, the British rulers sought to prolong an autocratic colonial rule, in which the precursor of BCS (Administration) cadre were the king-pin. Their hold on the society was absolute and comprehensive. The character of the governing system repudiated the chances of a challenge to the authority of ICS officers. It is only during the last years of the British raj, that the principles of representative governance began to gain a foothold. Afterwards, Pakistan failed to nourish the initial tempo of a representative parliamentary democracy in its 23 years of united existence. The people of the country almost always conspicuously felt the supremacy of the civil and military officers. Among them the civil servants – foremost among them the officers of the Civil Service of Pakistan – were in the ascendancy of the day-to-day affairs of governance. Most political leaders and functionaries looked belittled vis-à-vis civil servants, especially officers of the CSP. Things underwent a material transformation in the wake of the independence of Bangladesh in 1972. The initial euphoria was marked with signs of disdain for officers of the country's public administration, and a preference for political cadres was visible. However, in the history of

Bangladesh, a democratic system looks well-saddled although democratic culture may need to be nurtured in more earnest for a comparatively longer time. The demands of democracy, development, and civil society issues like environmental sustenance, good governance and human rights have started coming into play in an increasing valor. Under these changed circumstances, the officers of BCS (Administration) cadre are required to function in ways which do not go identical with those of their illustrious predecessors. Responding to the heavy demands of democracy and development, they have also to overcome the ills of the petrifying effects of the criminalization of politics (Rahman 2001:14). They have to undertake changes, which may give them more efficiency and at the same time make them more responsive to popular expectations.

The administrative system of Bangladesh braces for a transformation. Under the current enthusiasm for the high ideals of good governance – with tantalizing concepts of decentralization, transparency, openness, free flow of public information, responsiveness, accountability and the like – an administrative system cannot sit tight-fisted. The traditional grandeur and positions of height are no guarantee for anybody's continued ascendancy. A change in attitude is thus necessary in the BCS (Administration) officers, since they dominate the public administration of Bangladesh. Training and motivation require an added attention since these officers have to simultaneously undertake the tasks of general administration and development in an obstinate and demoralized political culture. A proper training regimen may allow officials to be acquainted with new ideas and methods of public administration. They can thus look for improved public administration practices in other countries and also be allowed to emulate them in their job environments. About the recruitment process of the cadre too, certain things merit immediate and serious attention. The criterion of merit has an absolute worth and time has arrived when to apply this as an inviolable principle. Again, the number of intakes at a time has to be determined in a rational manner. These issues involve the reorientation of other important segments of the elite who may have their own stakes in the system. All these indicate about the desirability of a change in the posture and ethos of BCS (Administration). Officers of this cadre are an important part of the support side in a political system, and all such political systems experience a deteriorating performance or an increasing cost of performance when they 'overdraw' from this important 'fund of support' (Almond and Powel 1978:356). In these cases, there is a need for changes in the system – comprising of inputs, outputs and a feedback. Some changes may come from within, while many have to be brought by a conscious effort of the ruling elite. Political culture may be changed by the changes in the performance of the political

system in which BCS (Administration) occupies preeminence. In view of the inadequate performance of public administration, changes in its structure and ethos are overdue. It is important when the ruling elite would find time to embark on this, and how things would be remoulded, and how this would be taken by the incumbents of the cadre.

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Opinion Survey on the Efficacy of BCS (Administration) Cadre

[Questionnaire for Leaders of Society, BCS (Administration) Officers, and Cross-Section of People]

Note: I. The survey is meant for an academic research under the Department of Political Science, University of Dhaka. Views of individual respondents shall remain strictly confidential.

- II. Answers to objective questions correspond to numbers in a band spread from 4 to 1, where-
- (a) 4 stands for 'excellent', 'sure', 'strongly agree', 'always', 'utmost' and the like.
 - (b) 3 for 'good', 'likely', 'somewhat agree', 'sometimes', 'somehow' and the like.
 - (c) 2 for 'average', 'unlikely', 'no comment', 'seldom', 'not very much' and the like.
 - (d) 1 for 'bad', 'no', 'disagree', 'never', 'not at all' and the like.

III. Each objective question has four alternative choices in four boxes placed to its right. Please put tick [✓] mark in one of the four, in reply to each question.

1 (a) Name [optional] and age:

(b) Profession and position:

(c) Length(s) in profession and position [in completed year(s)]:

(d) Maximum stay in life's first 20 years: Village Upazila town District town Metro city Capital city

(e) Educational level: Undergraduate Graduate (Pass) Graduate (Hons) Master's M Phil/ Ph D

(f) Yearly income in Taka: - 100,000 100,001 - 200,000 200,001 - 300,000 300,001+

(g) Main profession of -

(i) Father:

(ii) Mother:

(iii) Spouse:

2 Has your profession or job matched with your aim in life?

4	3	2	1
---	---	---	---

3 Do you feel that govt. officers are in general cut off from people and ignorant of their expectations?

4	3	2	1
---	---	---	---

4 Are BCS (Administration) officers helpful to people?

4	3	2	1
---	---	---	---

5 Do you think the following are to blame for the deterioration, if any, of law and order?

(a) Politicians

4	3	2	1
---	---	---	---

(b) DC and his service colleagues

4	3	2	1
---	---	---	---

(c) SP and his colleagues

4	3	2	1
---	---	---	---

- | | | | | | |
|----|--|---|---|---|---|
| 6 | Has there been any improvement in land management in the last 20 years? | 4 | 3 | 2 | 1 |
| 7 | Do you think that the Upazila Nirbahi Officer should have a coordinating role for development? | 4 | 3 | 2 | 1 |
| 8 | Do you think that there should be an elected Upazila Parishad Chairman? | 4 | 3 | 2 | 1 |
| 9 | Is the Deputy Commissioner (DC) accessible to common people? | 4 | 3 | 2 | 1 |
| 10 | Do you agree that the Deputy Commissioner is too subservient to the leaders of ruling political parties? | 4 | 3 | 2 | 1 |
| 11 | Does the Deputy Commissioner act neutrally? | 4 | 3 | 2 | 1 |
| 12 | Is the Deputy Commissioner effective in his law and order functions? | 4 | 3 | 2 | 1 |
| 13 | Does the Deputy Commissioner command respect from other officers? | 4 | 3 | 2 | 1 |
| 14 | Should the magisterial functions be withdrawn from the Deputy Commissioner and his colleagues? | 4 | 3 | 2 | 1 |
| 15 | In absence of an elected Chairman, should the Deputy Commissioner be in charge of the Zilla Parishad? | 4 | 3 | 2 | 1 |
| 16 | Do you think that the charge minister system is good? | 4 | 3 | 2 | 1 |
| 17 | Should the Deputy Commissioner have greater supervisory roles on local government bodies? | 4 | 3 | 2 | 1 |
| 18 | Do you think that the DC should continue to have a coordinating role in the following? | | | | |
| | (a) Management of elections | 4 | 3 | 2 | 1 |
| | (b) Disaster management | 4 | 3 | 2 | 1 |
| | (c) Management of public examinations | 4 | 3 | 2 | 1 |
| | (d) Handling of protocol functions | 4 | 3 | 2 | 1 |
| | (e) Observance of national days and special events | 4 | 3 | 2 | 1 |
| | (f) Overseeing of development programmes/projects | 4 | 3 | 2 | 1 |
| 19 | Can the Deputy Commissioner serve the interest of the government better than any other district level officer? | 4 | 3 | 2 | 1 |
| 20 | Should the Deputy Commissioner report direct to the head of government on important matters? | 4 | 3 | 2 | 1 |

- 21 In your opinion, how do the following take care of people's interests? –
- (a) Ministers/MPs

4	3	2	1
---	---	---	---
- (b) Other politicians

4	3	2	1
---	---	---	---
- (c) BCS (Administration) officers

4	3	2	1
---	---	---	---
- (d) Other officers (*Please specify one*)

4	3	2	1
---	---	---	---
- 22 Do BCS (Administration) officers discharge duties which are more important than the duties of most other officers?

4	3	2	1
---	---	---	---
- 23 Do you expect BCS (Administration) officers to remain strict even in difficult situations?

4	3	2	1
---	---	---	---
- 24 Should there be any criterion other than merit for recruitment to BCS (Administration) posts?

4	3	2	1
---	---	---	---
- 25 Do you think that there were ever any irregularities in the recruitment to BCS (Administration) posts?

4	3	2	1
---	---	---	---
- 26 Do you think that BCS (Administration) officers do compromise with principles?

4	3	2	1
---	---	---	---
- 27 Are you satisfied with the performance of BCS (Administration) cadre officers?

4	3	2	1
---	---	---	---
- 28 Do you think that BCS (Administration) officers are alive to the needs of the people?

4	3	2	1
---	---	---	---
- 29 It is stated that Deputy Commissioners' efficiency roughly reflects BCS (Administration) cadre's efficiency. It is also held that their efficiency considerably dropped in the recent past. Taking it as true, how would you rate the pace of deterioration in the following phases?
- (a) 1971 – 1980

4	3	2	1
---	---	---	---
- (b) 1981 – 1990

4	3	2	1
---	---	---	---
- (c) 1991 – 2000

4	3	2	1
---	---	---	---
- (d) 2001 –

4	3	2	1
---	---	---	---
- 30 Should the Charge Minister and MPs have direct involvement in regular administrative matters at local levels?

4	3	2	1
---	---	---	---
- 31 Should the Deputy Commissioner and the Upazila Nirbahi Officer continue to look after development coordination at their levels?

4	3	2	1
---	---	---	---
- 32 Do you think that there is a widening gap between the political and the administrative leaderships?

4	3	2	1
---	---	---	---
- 33 In your opinion, what are the causes for the fall of the standards of public administration in the country? Please use catch words.
- 34 Which measures do you like to suggest for an overall improvement of BCS (Administration) cadre? Please use catch words.

Signature of Respondent/Interviewer
(Optional for respondent)

The Services (Reorganisation and Conditions) Act, 1975
(ACT No. XXXII of 1975)

An Act to provide for the reorganisation of the services of the Republic and of public bodies and nationalised enterprises and for prescribing unified grades and scales of pay and other terms and conditions of service for persons employed in such services.

Whereas it is expedient to provide for the reorganisation of the services of the Republic and of public bodies and nationalised enterprises and for prescribing unified grades and scales of pay and other terms and conditions of service for persons employed in such services:

It is hereby enacted as follows :-

1. **Short title and commencement.** (1) This Act may be called the Services (Reorganisation and Conditions) Act, 1975.

(2) It shall be deemed to have come into force on the first day of July, 1973.

2. **Definitions.** In this Act, unless there is anything repugnant in the subject or context:-

(a) "Nationalised Enterprise" includes any industrial or commercial concern which is owned, controlled or managed by, or vested in the Government or any public body;

(b) "Pay" includes salary, allowance and any other emoluments by whatever name called;

(c) "Public body" means any body, authority, corporation or institution constituted or established by or under any law and includes any other body, authority or institution owned, controlled, managed or set up by the Government;

(d) "Service" includes any post or office.

3. **Act to override all other laws, etc.** The provisions of this Act or any order made thereunder shall have effect notwithstanding anything inconsistent therewith contained in any other law or in any rule, regulation, by-law, agreement, award, settlement or terms or conditions of services.

4. **Power of Government to reorganise services of the Republic and of public bodies and nationalised enterprises.** The Government may, by order notified in the official gazette, reorganise the services of the Republic and of public bodies and nationalised enterprises and for that purpose create new services or amalgamate or unify existing services.

5. **Power of Government to prescribe unified grades and scales of pay, etc.** (1) The Government may, with a view to bringing uniformity in the grades and scales of pay of different persons or classes of persons employed in the service of the Republic or of any public body or nationalised enterprise, by order notified in the official gazette, prescribe grades and scales of pay and other terms and conditions of service for all or any such persons or classes of persons.

(2) No persons whose grade or scale of pay is prescribed under sub-section (1) shall receive, and no person shall allow such person, any benefit of a grade or scale of pay which is higher than the grade or scale of pay prescribed for him.

6. *Retrospective effect to order.* (1) An order under section 4 or 5 may be made so as to be retrospective to any date not earlier than the date of commencement of this Act.

(2) Nothing in this section shall have the effect of creating any offence retrospectively.

7. *Variation and revocation of conditions of service permitted.* An order made under section 4 or 5 may vary or revoke any condition of service of a person employed in the service of the Republic or of any public body or nationalised enterprise, and no such person shall be entitled to any compensation for such variation or revocation of any condition of his service to his disadvantage.

8. *Indemnity.* No order made under section 4 or 5 shall be called in question in any court, and no suit or other legal proceeding shall lie against the Government or any person for anything done or intended to be done in pursuance of this Act or any order made thereunder.

9. *Penalty.* Whoever contravenes any provision of section 5(2) shall be punishable with fine which may extend to five thousand taka, and with a further fine which may extend to five hundred taka for each month after the first during which such contravention continues.

10. *Cognizance of offence.* No court shall take cognizance of an offence punishable under this Act except on a complaint in writing made by the Government or by a person authorised by it in this behalf.

11. *Repeal and savings.* (1) Services (Reorganisation and Conditions) Ordinance, 1975 (Ordinance XXII of 1975), is hereby repealed.

(2) Notwithstanding such repeal, anything done or any action taken or any order made under the said Ordinance shall be deemed to have been done, taken or made, as the case may be, under the corresponding provision of this Act.

Government of the People's Republic of Bangladesh
Cabinet Secretariat
Establishment Division
(Implementation Cell)

ORDER

Dacca, the 1st September, 1980

No. S.R.O. 286-L/80/ED(IC)SII-92/80-98. WHEREAS the need to reorganise the Civil Services in this newly Independent Country suitable for a free and sovereign State has become imperative:

WHEREAS in order to create a sound administrative system to ensure implementation of the Government policies as rapidly and efficiently as possible, the Government has decided that the structure of the Civil Services should be remodelled;

AND WHEREAS Article 136 of the Constitution of the People's Republic of Bangladesh provides for making law for the reorganisation of the Service of the Republic by the creation, amalgamation or unification of services;

NOW, THEREFORE, in exercise of the powers conferred by section 4 of the Services (Reorganisation and Conditions) Act, 1975 (XXXII of 1975), the Government is pleased to make the following Order, namely:-

1. **Short Title.** This Order may be called the Bangladesh Civil Services (Reorganisation) Order, 1980.

2. There shall be the following service cadres, namely:-

- | | |
|-------------------------------------|--|
| (i) B. C. S. (Administration): | (vi) B. C. S. (Finance): |
| (a) Administrative | (a) Audit and Accounts |
| (b) Food | (b) Customs and Excise |
| (ii) B. C. S. (Agriculture): | (c) Taxation |
| (a) Agriculture | (vii) B.C.S. (Foreign Affairs) |
| (b) Forest | (viii) B.C.S. (Health and Family Planning) |
| (c) Fisheries | (ix) B.C.S. (Information) |
| (d) Livestock | (x) B.C.S. (Judicial) |
| (iii) B. C. S. (Education): | (xi) B.C.S. (Postal) |
| (a) General Education | (xii) B.C.S. (Enforcement) |
| (b) Technical Education | (a) Police |
| (iv) B. C. S. (Economic and Trade): | (b) Ansar |
| (a) Economic | (xiii) B.C.S. (Railway) |
| (b) Trade | (a) Transportation and Commercial |
| (c) Statistical | (b) Engineering |
| (v) B. C. S. (Engineering): | (xiv) B.C.S. (Secretariat) |
| (a) Public Works | |
| (b) Public Health | |
| (c) Roads and Highways | |
| (d) Telecommunication | |

By order of the President
FAYEZUDDIN AHMED
Secretary

Government of the People's Republic of Bangladesh
Ministry of Establishment
Implementation Cell

ORDER

Dacca, the 31st August, 1986

No. S.R.O. 347/L/86/ME/IC-4/85. in exercise of the powers conferred by section 4 of the Services (Reorganisation and Conditions) Act, 1975 (XXXII of 1975), the Government is pleased to make the following further amendment in the Bangladesh Civil Service (Reorganisation) Order, 1980, namely:-

In the aforesaid Order, for paragraph 2 the following shall be substituted, namely:-

2. There shall be the following Service Cadres, namely:-

- (1) Bangladesh Civil Service (Administration)
- (2) Bangladesh Civil Service (Agriculture)
- (3) Bangladesh Civil Service (Ansar)
- (4) Bangladesh Civil Service (Audit and Accounts)
- (5) Bangladesh Civil Service (Cooperatives)
- (6) Bangladesh Civil Service (Customs and Excise)
- (7) Bangladesh Civil Service (Economic)
- (8) Bangladesh Civil Service (Family Planning)
- (9) Bangladesh Civil Service (Fisheries)
- (10) Bangladesh Civil Service (Food)
- (11) Bangladesh Civil Service (Foreign Affairs)
- (12) Bangladesh Civil Service (Forest)
- (13) Bangladesh Civil Service (General Education)
- (14) Bangladesh Civil Service (Health)
- (15) Bangladesh Civil Service (Information)
- (16) Bangladesh Civil Service (Judicial)
- (17) Bangladesh Civil Service (Livestock)
- (18) Bangladesh Civil Service (Police)
- (19) Bangladesh Civil Service (Postal)
- (20) Bangladesh Civil Service (Public Health Engineering)
- (21) Bangladesh Civil Service (Public Works)
- (22) Bangladesh Civil Service (Railway Engineering)
- (23) Bangladesh Civil Service (Railway Transportation and Commercial)
- (24) Bangladesh Civil Service (Roads and Highways)
- (25) Bangladesh Civil Service (Secretariat)
- (26) Bangladesh Civil Service (Statistical)
- (27) Bangladesh Civil Service (Taxation)
- (28) Bangladesh Civil Service (Technical Education)
- (29) Bangladesh Civil Service (Tele-communication)
- (30) Bangladesh Civil Service (Trade)

By order of the President
MD. SHAMSUL HAQUE CHISHTY
Secretary

Public Service Commission's Advertisement for Recruitment of Freedom-Fighter Candidates

বাংলাদেশ পাবলিক সার্ভিস (১ম) কমিশন
বিজ্ঞপ্তি

নং ৪, তারিখ ২৩শে জুন, ১৯৭২ইং।

মুক্তিযোদ্ধাদের মধ্য হইতে ৩৫০টি শিক্ষানবীশ অফিসারের পদ পূরণের জন্য প্রতিযোগিতামূলক উর্ধ্বতন কর্মচারী নিয়োগ (বিশেষ) পরীক্ষা (Special Superior Service Competitive Examination) অনুষ্ঠিত হইবে, তাহার জন্য মুক্তিযোদ্ধাদের নিকট হইতে দরখাস্ত আহবান করা যাইতেছে।

এই পরীক্ষা মৌখিক পদ্ধতিতে গৃহীত হইবে এবং প্রয়োজন হইলে পরীক্ষা কার্যে মনস্ত্ববিদের সাহায্য গ্রহণ করা হইবে।

প্রার্থীদের নিম্নতম যোগ্যতা :

- ১। বাংলাদেশের কিংবা অন্য কোন দেশের অনুমোদিত বিশ্ববিদ্যালয়ের স্নাতক উপাধি।
- ২। মুক্তিযুদ্ধে সক্রিয় অংশ গ্রহণ। (ইহার নিদর্শন স্বরূপ বাংলাদেশ সরকারের সশস্ত্র বাহিনীর অধিনায়ক কিংবা স্বরাষ্ট্র মন্ত্রণালয়ের সচিবের নিকট হইতে সার্টিফিকেট অবশ্যই দাখিল করিতে হইবে)।
- ৩। বাংলাদেশের নাগরিক এবং স্থায়ী বাসিন্দা। বয়সসীমা ১লা জুন, ১৯৭২ তারিখে ২১ হইতে ৩৫ বৎসর।

প্রার্থীদিগকে কমিশনের নির্দিষ্ট ফরমে দরখাস্তের ফিস বাবদ XXX1 Misc. Application Fee for Special Superior Service Examination প্রদত্ত ৫ (পাঁচ) টাকার চালান সহ দরখাস্ত করিতে হইবে।

দরখাস্তের ফরম কমিশনের অফিস হইতে ডাকযোগে পাইতে হইলে শিরোনামা লিখিত এক টাকা বিশ পয়সার ডাক টিকিট যুক্ত বড় লেফাফা পাঠাইতে হইবে। দরখাস্ত গ্রহণের শেষ তারিখ ২৫শে জুলাই, ১৯৭২।

মৌখিক পরীক্ষার পর শিক্ষানবীশ হিসাবে নির্বাচিত হইলে প্রার্থীকে ১২ সপ্তাহকাল প্রশিক্ষণ গ্রহণ করিতে হইবে। প্রশিক্ষণকালে তাঁহাকে মাসিক ৩০০ (তিনশত) টাকা ভাতা এবং পোষাকের জন্য একালীন ২৫০ (দুই শত পঞ্চাশ) টাকা দেওয়া হইবে।

প্রশিক্ষণকাল শেষ হইলে আরেকটি লিখিত ও মৌখিক পরীক্ষা অনুষ্ঠিত হইবে। এই পরীক্ষায় পাঠক্রম যথাসময়ে শিক্ষানবীশদিগকে জানানো হইবে। শিক্ষানবীশদের মধ্যে যাঁহারা এই পরীক্ষায় কৃতকার্য হইবেন তাঁহাদিগকে স্ব স্ব উপযুক্ততা অনুসারে বিভিন্ন পদে নিয়োগ করা হইবে। এইভাবে কোন কোন পদ পূরণ করা হইবে তাহা তখনই স্থির করা হইবে।

সানোয়ার হোসেন খান
সচিব

[Advertisement for Recruitment of 1977 Batch (Non-Freedom Fighter officer)]

বাংলাদেশ পাবলিক সার্ভিস (প্রথম) কমিশন

বিজ্ঞপ্তি

নং- ৫, তারিখ ৬ই জুলাই, ১৯৭২ ইং।

মুক্তিযোদ্ধা নহেন এইরূপ প্রার্থীদের মধ্যে হইতে ১৫০টি শিক্ষানবীশ অফিসারের পদ পূরণের জন্য একটি প্রতিযোগিতামূলক উর্দ্ধতন কর্মচারী নিয়োগ (বিশেষ) পরীক্ষা (Special Superior Service Competitive Examination) অনুষ্ঠিত হইবে। ইহার জন্য প্রার্থীদের নিকট হইতে দরখাস্ত আহ্বান করা যাইতেছে।

এই পরীক্ষা লিখিত এবং মৌখিক উভয় পদ্ধতিতে গৃহীত হইবে। পরীক্ষার পাঠ্যক্রম নিম্নরূপ হইবে :

লিখিত পরীক্ষা

প্রথম পত্র { সময়ঃ ৩ ঘণ্টা; পূর্ণমান : ২০০ নম্বর }

বিষয়	পরীক্ষার মান	নম্বর
(ক) বাংলা রচনাসমূহ (Essays in Bengali)	স্নাতক উপাধি (পাশ) (Bachelor's Degree Pass)	১০০
(খ) বাংলায় মর্ম বা সারাংশ লেখ (Precis Writing in Bengali)	- ঐ -	৫০
(গ) ইংরেজী হইতে বাংলায় অনুবাদ (Translation from English into Bengali)	উচ্চ মাধ্যমিক সার্টিফিকেট	৫০

দ্বিতীয় পত্র { সময়ঃ ২ঘণ্টা; পূর্ণমান : ১৫০ নম্বর }

- (ক) বিবিধ বিষয়ে সাধারণ জ্ঞান
(General Knowledge)
- (খ) প্রাথমিক বিজ্ঞান
(Elementary Science)
- (গ) বিশ্বের বিশেষতঃ বাংলাদেশ,
ভারত এবং রাশিয়ার চলতি
ঘটনা ও চিন্তা প্রবাহ
(Current World
Affairs with Special
reference to Bangladesh
India and Russia)

কোন নির্দিষ্ট বিষয়ে
বিশেষজ্ঞ না হইতেও
কোন স্নাতক উপাধি-
প্রাপ্ত ব্যক্তির নিকট
হইতে য মান আশা
করা যায়।

মৌখিক পরীক্ষা { পূর্ণমান : ১৫০ নম্বর }

সাধারণ বুদ্ধিমত্তা, প্রত্যুৎপন্নমতিত্ব, ইত্যাদি এবং সরকারী চাকুরীতে অফিসার শ্রেণীতে নিয়োগের জন্য প্রার্থীর বিশেষ যোগ্যতা সম্বন্ধে পরীক্ষা গৃহীত হইবে।

প্রার্থীদের নিম্নতম যোগ্যতা :

- ১। বাংলাদেশের কিংবা অন্য কোন দেশের অনুমোদিত বিশ্ববিদ্যালয়ের স্নাতক উপাধি।
- ২। বাংলাদেশের নাগরিক এবং স্থায়ী বাসিন্দা।

বয়ঃ সীমা

১লা জানুয়ারী ১৯৭২, তারিখে ২১ হইতে ২৭ বৎসর। উপজাতীয় প্রার্থীদের বেলায় উর্দ্ধতন বয়ঃসীমা : ঐ তারিখে ৩০ বৎসর

প্রার্থীদের কমিশনের নির্দিষ্ট ফর্মে দরখাস্তের ফিস বাবদ "XXXVI- Misc. Application Fee for Special Superior Service Examination" খাতে প্রদত্ত ৫ (পাঁচ) টাকার চালানসহ দরখাস্ত করিতে হইবে। প্রার্থী পরীক্ষা দিবার যোগ্য বলিয়া জানান হইলে তাঁহাকে পরীক্ষার ফিস বাবদ ৩০ (ত্রিশ) টাকা উক্ত (XXXVI- Misc. Application Fee for Special Superior Service Examination) খাতে জমা দিতে হইবে। উপ-জাতীয় প্রার্থীদের বেলা পরীক্ষা ফিস এই ত্রিশ টাকার স্থলে পনের টাকার।

দরখাস্তের ফর্ম কমিশনের অফিস হইতে ডাকযোগে পাইতে হইলে শিরোনাম লিখিত এক টাকা বিশ পয়সার ডাক টিকিটযুক্ত লেফাফা পাঠাইতে হইবে। দরখাস্ত গ্রহণের শেষ তারিখ ১৪ই আগস্ট, ১৯৭২।

লিখিত এবং মৌখিক পরীক্ষার পর শিক্ষানবীশ হিসাবে নির্বাচিত হইলে প্রার্থীকে অন্যান্য ছয় মাসকাল প্রশিক্ষণ গ্রহণ করিতে হইবে। প্রশিক্ষণের জন্য একটি বিশেষ পাঠ্যক্রম প্রণয়ন করা হইবে। প্রশিক্ষণকালে তাঁহাকে মাসিক দুই শত পঞ্চাশ টাকা ভাতা এবং পোষাকের জন্য এককালীন দুইশত টাকা দেওয়া হইবে।

প্রশিক্ষণকাল শেষ হইলে আরেকটি লিখিত ও মৌখিক পরীক্ষা অনুষ্ঠিত হইবে। এই পরীক্ষার পাঠ্যক্রম যথাসময়ে শিক্ষানবীশদিগকে জানান হইবে। শিক্ষানবীশদের মধ্যে যাহারা এই পরীক্ষায় কৃতকার্য হইবেন তাহাদিগকে স্ব-স্ব উপযুক্ততা অনুসারে বিভিন্ন পদে নিয়োজিত করা হইবে। এইভাবে কোন কোন পদ পূরণ করা হইবে তাহা যথাসময়ে জানান হইবে।

সানওয়ার হোসেন খান

সচিব

[Creation of the Industrial Management Service]
The Bangladesh Gazette Extraordinary, Dated 17 September 1976.
Ministry of Industries
Notification
Dacca, The 16th September, 1976.

No. S.R.O. 318-1/76/NID(Estb)-146/74- In exercise of the powers conferred by the proviso to the Article 133 of the Constitution of the People's Republic of Bangladesh, the President is pleased to make the following rules, namely :-

1. Short title.— These rules may be called the Industrial Management Service (Constitution and Recruitment) Rules, 1976.

2. Commencement.— These Rules shall come into force at once and be deemed to have taken effect on the 1st August, 1973.

3. Definition.— In these rules, unless there is anything repugnant in the subject or context :

- (a) "Commission" means the Bangladesh Public Service (First) Commission;
- (b) "Corporation" means a Corporation specified in the Schedule appended to the rules;
- (c) "Foreign Service" means service in which a Government servant receives his substantive pay with the sanction of the Government from any source other than the revenues of the Republic;
- (d) "Recognized University" means a university established by or under any law for the time being in force and include any other university declared by the Government to be a recognized university for the purpose of these rules;
- (e) "Service" means the Industrial Management Service constituted under these rules.

4. Constitution of Service.— (1) On the commencement of these rules, a service to be called the Industrial Management Service shall be constituted.

(2) The cadre strength of the service shall be two hundred.

(3) The President may, by order notified in the Official Gazette, vary the cadre strength from time to time.

5. Scale of Pay.— Persons appointed in the service shall be appointed on the Scale of Taka 475-35-685-EB-40-1005-45-1275.

6. Procedure for recruitment.— (1) Appointment to the Service shall be made by direct recruitment on the basis of competitive examination to be conducted by the Commission.

(2) No person shall be appointed in the Service unless he has the requisite qualification.

7. Qualification.— The Qualification for appointment to the Service shall be a minimum of bachelor's degree from a recognized university.

8. Age.— No person shall be appointed in the Service unless he has attained the age of 21 years and has not exceeded the age of 23 years;

Provided that this age limit shall not be applicable in the case of persons appointed to the Industrial Management Service on the recommendation of the Commission before the regular constitution of the Service under these rules.

9. Eligibility.— No person shall be eligible for appointment to the Service unless :-

(1) He is a citizen of Bangladesh.

(2) He has been declared medically fit by a Medical Board set up for the purpose.

(3) His antecedents have been verified by the Ministry of Home Affairs and found satisfactory.

10. Appointing Authority.— Appointment in the Service shall be made by the President.

11. Probation and Training.— (1) The persons selected for appointment in the Service shall be appointed on probation for a period of two years.

(2) During the period of probation, the persons appointed to the Service shall undergo such training for one year immediately after their appointment as may be prescribed by the Government.

(3) After completion of the training the persons appointed to the Service shall be assigned to any of the corporations specified in the Schedule as the Government may decide and the persons so assigned to the corporations shall work in the corporation for one year.

12. Confirmation.— After satisfactory completion of two years of probation the persons appointed to the Service shall be confirmed;

Provided that the Government may extend the period of probation for a further period of one year.

13. Discharge.— The persons appointed to the Service shall be liable to be discharged from service if their performance during the period of probation is found unsatisfactory.

14. Regular assignment.— (1) After confirmation, the persons appointed to the Service shall be given regular assignments to the various Corporations and they shall serve under the Corporations on conditions as are applicable to Government servants serving on deputation to foreign service.

(2) The number of posts in each Corporation against which the persons appointed to the Service shall be assigned will be such as are shown in the Schedule.

(3) The remaining posts of the cadre shall be kept reserved for further assignment to any Corporation as the Government may direct.

15. Eligibility for promotion.— The persons appointed to the Service shall be eligible for promotion to superior posts of the Corporations.

16. Efficiency Bar and Bar to Promotion.— No person appointed to the Service shall be allowed to cross Efficiency Bar in the scale of pay of the Service nor shall he be eligible for promotion to the next higher post unless he has successfully passed such departmental examination as may be prescribed by the Government.

17. Control and Administration.— The control and administration of the Service shall vest in the Ministry of Industries.

18. Amendment of the Schedule.— The Government may at any time, by order notified in the Official Gazette, amend the Schedule.

19. Repeal.— Ministry of Industries, Nationalized Industries Division Resolution No. NID(Estb)-69/73-2538, dated 1st August 1973 is hereby repealed.

By order of the President
C. S. CHAUDHURY
Joint Secretary.

SCHEDULE

<u>Sr. No.</u>	<u>Name of Corporation</u>	<u>Number of Posts</u>
1	Bangladesh Jute Mills Corporation	35
2	Bangladesh Textile Industries Corporation	25
3	Fertilizer, Chemical and Pharmaceutical Corporation	20
4	Engineering and Shipbuilding Corporation	15
5	Food and Allied Products Corporation	5
6	Paper and Board	10
7	Sugar Mills Corporation	5
8	Bangladesh Steel Mills Corporation	5
9	Minerals, Oils and Gas Corporation	5
10	The remaining posts of the cadre	75
	Total	200

বাংলাদেশ পাবলিক সার্ভিস কমিশন
৯৭, তোপখানা বোড
(চামেলী হাউস)
ঢাকা-২

নং- এস,ই আর-২-১৫/৮২/২৪০১ পিএসসি

তারিখ : ১৫-৬-১৯৮২

প্রেরক : শেখ আনওয়ার আহমদ
সচিব
বাংলাদেশ পাবলিক সার্ভিস কমিশন

প্রাপক : সচিব
সংস্থাপন বিভাগ
বাংলাদেশ সচিবালয়
ঢাকা।
(দৃষ্টি আকর্ষণ : রিজুটম্যান্ট শাখা)

বিষয় : আই এম এস ক্যাডার বিলুপ্ত করিয়া ক্যাডারতুক্ত অফিসারদের অন্যান্য ক্যাডারে আন্তর্করণ প্রসঙ্গে।

জনাব,

আদিষ্ট হইয়া উপরোক্ত বিষয়ে বাংলাদেশ পাবলিক সার্ভিস কমিশনের ২৪-০৫-৮২ তারিখে লিখিত এস এ আর ২-১৫/৮২/২০৯৩-পিএসসি নং চিঠির প্রতি দৃষ্টি আকর্ষণপূর্বক জানাইতেছি যে, বিগত ১০-৬-৮২ তারিখ এবং ১৪-৬-৮২ তারিখে সংস্থাপন বিভাগ, শিল্প বিভাগ এবং আইন ও সংসদ বিষয়ক বিভাগের প্রতিনিধিদের সহিত কমিশনের এই বিষয়ে বিশদ আলোচনা হইয়াছে। আলোচনার সময় আই এম এস সঠন সংক্রান্ত ১৯৭৩ সালের রেগুলেশন, ১৯৭৬ সালে জারীকৃত ইহার গঠন ও নিয়োগবিধি এবং অন্যান্য যে সব কাগজপত্র সংস্থাপন বিভাগ এবং শিল্প বিভাগ হইতে সরবরাহ করা হইয়াছে সেইগুলি পরীক্ষা করিয়া দেখা হয়। এই পরীক্ষার সময় দেখা যায় যে, ১৯৭৬ সালে আইএমএস গঠন ও নিয়োগবিধি জারী করা হয় অথচ তাহার ৩ বৎসর আগে অর্থাৎ ১৯৭৩ সালেই আলোচ্য সার্ভিসে লোক নিয়োগ করা হয়। ইহাও প্রতীয়মান হয় যে, উক্ত নিয়োগবিধি পাবলিক সার্ভিস কমিশনের সহিত আলোচনা ব্যতীতই জারী করা হইয়াছে যদিও সংবিধানের ১৪০(২) অনুচ্ছেদ অনুযায়ী কমিশনের সহিত আলোচনার পরই নিয়োগবিধি জারী করা প্রয়োজন ছিল।

২। কোন সম্মিলিত পরীক্ষার মাধ্যমে যখন কোন ক্যাডারে লোক নিয়োগ করা হয় তখন মেধা, বিভিন্ন ক্যাডার/পদের জন্য প্রার্থীর পছন্দ এবং সরকারী নিয়ম অনুযায়ী কোটার ভিত্তিতে কমিশন বিভিন্ন পদ/ক্যাডার/সার্ভিসে প্রার্থী মনোনয়ন করিয়া থাকেন। কিন্তু আলোচ্য ক্ষেত্রে কমিশন শুধুমাত্র মৌখিক পরীক্ষা গ্রহণ করিয়া মেধা তালিকা প্রণয়ন করিয়াছিলেন। কমিশনকে উক্ত দুই দিনের আলোচনার সময় বলা হয় যে, একটি সেক্রেটারীস কমিটি বিভিন্ন ক্যাডার সার্ভিস ও পদে নিয়োগের জন্য প্রার্থী মনোনয়ন করিয়াছিলেন। কোন বিধি এবং কি পদ্ধতি অনুযায়ী আলোচ্য কমিটি প্রার্থী মনোনয়ন করিয়াছেন তাহা বুঝা যাইতেছে না। এইভাবে প্রার্থী মনোনয়ন এবং নিয়োগ নিশ্চিতভাবে ব্যক্তিক্রমধর্মী ও অস্বাভাবিক। ইহাকে প্রজাতন্ত্রের চাকুরীতে প্রার্থী নির্বাচন সংক্রান্ত সংবিধানের ধারা ৩ লংঘিত হইয়াছে। রাষ্ট্রপতির বিশেষ ক্ষমতা আইনে এই সকল পদকে কমিশনের আওতাভূক্ত করা হইয়াছে কিনা তাহাও কমিশনের জানা নেই।

৩। কমিশন এখানে উল্লেখ করিতে চান যে, যখনই এই রকম অনিয়মিত নিয়োগ করা হয় তখনই বিব্রতকর অবস্থায় সৃষ্টি হয় এবং প্রশাসনের বিভিন্ন স্তরে নানাবিধ জটিলতা দেখা দেয়। পরবর্তীকালে এই জটিলতার নিরসন দুরূহ হইয়া পড়ে।

৪। ১৯৭৩ সালের রেগুলেশন, ১৯৭৬ সালের নিয়োগবিধি এবং নিয়োগপত্র পরীক্ষা করে আরো দেখা যায় যে, এইগুলিতে পরস্পরবিরোধী নিয়মাদি রহিয়াছে। আইএমএস-এ নিযুক্ত কর্মকর্তাগণ ব্যক্তিগতভাবে স্থায়ী হইয়াছেন এবং বিভিন্ন সময়ে কিভাবে তাহাদের সরকারী চাকুরীতে নিযুক্ত করা হইয়াছে এবং বেতন বৃদ্ধি করা হইয়াছে তাহা স্পষ্ট নয়। এইএমএস কর্মকর্তারা সরকারী কর্মকর্তা কিনা সে সম্পর্কেও আলোচনা হয়। কারণ বিধিগুলির কোন কোন জায়গায় এমন সব বক্তব্য রহিয়াছে যাহা নিয়মিত ক্যাডার বা যে কোন সরকারী চাকুরীর বিধিতে কখনই সংযোজিত থাকে না। যেমন- (১)

১৯৭৩ সালের রেভুলেশনে উল্লেখ করা হইয়াছে যে সকল বাস্তব কারণে তাহারা সরকারী কর্মকর্তা বলিয়া গণ্য হইবেন (to all interdis and purposes)। সরকারী কর্মচারীদের বেলায় এইরূপ উল্লেখ থাকে না, (২) ১৯৭৬ সালের নিয়োগবিধি অনুযায়ী তাহাদিগকে শুধুমাত্র কর্পোরেশনের নিয়োগ করা হইবে এবং কর্পোরেশনের উচ্চতর পদে পদোন্নতির জন্য তাহারা যোগ্য হইবেন। আইএমএস-এ নিযুক্ত কর্মকর্তারা যে প্রকৃতিই সর্ব অর্থে সরকারী কর্মচারী সেই বিষয়ে সুস্পষ্ট সিদ্ধান্ত নেওয়ার প্রয়োজন অবশ্য সরকার যদি তাহাদিগকে নিয়মিত সরকারী চাকুরে বলিয়া গ্রহণ করিতে চান।

৫। সংশ্লিষ্ট কাগজপত্র পরীক্ষাণ্ডে মনে হয় যে কর্পোরেশনগুলির সূচু পরিচালনার জন্য সরকার একটি বিশেষ স্বতন্ত্র সার্ভিস গঠন করিয়াছিলেন। এই সার্ভিসে নিযুক্ত ব্যক্তিদের শুধুমাত্র কর্পোরেশনে নিয়োগ করা হইবে। তবে মাত্র একবারই এই সার্ভিসে লোক নিয়োগ করা হইয়াছিল এবং তাহাও নিয়োগবিধি প্রণয়নের অনেক পূর্বে। ১৯৭৩-এর পরে এই সার্ভিসে কোন নিয়োগ করা হয় নাই। দীর্ঘকাল আলোচনার পর সরকার বিভিন্ন ক্যাডার সার্ভিস একত্রীকরণের সিদ্ধান্ত গ্রহণ করেন এবং ১৯৮০ সালের সেপ্টেম্বর নতুন বিসিএস ক্যাডার গঠন করা হয়। পরবর্তীকালের উহার নিয়মাবলী প্রণয়ন ও সমাণ্ড করা হইয়াছে। এই দীর্ঘকালের মধ্যে কখনই আইএমএস নামক সার্ভিসের বিষয় কখনও আলোচনায় উত্থাপিত হইয়াছে বলিয়া কমিশন অবগত নহেন এবং আইএমএস সমন্বিত বিসিএস-এর অর্ন্তভুক্ত নহে। সুতরাং অন্যান্য ক্যাডার সার্ভিসের ন্যায় আইএমএসকে নিয়মিত ক্যাডার সার্ভিস হিসাবে গণ্য করা যায় না।

৬। কি কারণে এখন আইএমএস বিলুপ্ত করার প্রস্তা উঠিয়াছে তাহা কমিশন অবগত নহেন। আইএমএস অফিসারদের অভিমত ভিন্ন ধরনের। বি সি এস-এর বিভিন্ন ক্যাডারে তাহাদের আত্মীকরণ করিলে সংশ্লিষ্ট বিসিএস ক্যাডারের চাকুরীর মান হ্রাস পাইবে এবং ঙ্রসব ক্যাডারে যাহারা নিয়োজিত আছেন তাহাদের মধ্যে অসন্তোষ সৃষ্টি হইবে। সূচু প্রশাসন ব্যবস্থার খাতিরে এইরূপ ব্যবস্থা গ্রহণ করা সমীচীন হইবে না।

৭। উল্লেখ করা যাইতে পারে যে, আই এম এস ক্যাডারের কর্মকর্তাদের বিভিন্ন বিসিএস ক্যাডারে আত্মীকরণ করা হইলে এইরূপ আত্মীকরণের দাবী অন্যান্য চাকুরীতে নিযুক্ত ব্যক্তিদের তরফ হইতেও উঠিতে পারে। ১৯৭৩ সালে অনুষ্ঠিত সম্মিলিত সুপেরিয়ার পদ পরীক্ষার ফলাফলের ভিত্তিতে বিভিন্ন বাণিজ্যিক ব্যাংকে নিয়োগের জন্যও প্রার্থী মনোনয়ন করা হয়েছে। জানা যাইতেছে যে, তাহাদের তরফ হইতেও বিভিন্ন ক্যাডার সার্ভিসে আত্মীকরণের দাবী উঠিয়াছে। কাজেই বিভিন্ন বিসিএস ক্যাডারে আইএমএস কর্মকর্তাদের আত্মীকরণের ফলে অন্যত্র ইহার কি বিরূপ প্রতিক্রিয়া দেখা দিবে তাহা দেখা দরকার।

৮। উপরের বিশ্লেষণের পরিপ্রেক্ষিতে কমিশন এই অভিমত ব্যক্ত করিয়াছেন যে, আলোচ্য সমস্যা সমাধানকল্পে সরকার নিম্নে বর্ণিত যে কোন একটি পদক্ষেপ গ্রহণ করিতে পারেন :

- (১) যে কারণে আইএমএস গঠন করা হইয়াছিল সে কারণ এখনও বলবৎ থাকিলে কর্পোরেশনসমূহে নিম্নতর হইতে উচ্চতর পর্যায়ে পদ সৃষ্টির মাধ্যমে এইরূপ একটি স্বতন্ত্র সার্ভিস তাহাদের জন্য চালু রাখা এবং ইহাতে নিয়মিত নিয়োগ অব্যাহত রাখা।
- (২) সরকার যদি মনে করেন যে, কর্পোরেশনগুলির জন্য একটি স্বতন্ত্র সার্ভিস বহাল রাখার প্রয়োজন নাই তবে আইএমএস-এ নিয়োজিত ১৯৬ জন কর্মকর্তাকে এককালীন ভিত্তিতে বিভিন্ন কর্পোরেশনে আত্মীকরণ করা। আইএমএস-এর কর্মকর্তারা যদি সরকারী কর্মচারী হিসেবে স্বীকৃত হন তবে তাহারা সরকারী কর্মচারীর মর্যাদায় তথায় নিয়োজিত থাকিবেন এবং কর্পোরেশনের উচ্চতর পদে পদোন্নতিরও সুযোগ পাইবেন। পানি উন্নয়ন বোর্ড/ বিদ্যুৎ উন্নয়ন বোর্ডে বিলুপ্ত বিদ্যুৎ ও সেচ পরিদপ্তরের কর্মকর্তারা নিয়োজিত আছেন এবং তাহারা অদ্যাবধি সরকারী কর্মচারী হিসাবে বিবেচিত হইতেছেন। এই ব্যবস্থার ফলে আইএমএস কর্মকর্তাগণ যে অভিজ্ঞতাও প্রশিক্ষণ লাভ করিয়াছেন তাহারও সূচু প্রয়োগ সম্ভব হইবে।
- (৩) যদি সরকার সিদ্ধান্ত গ্রহণ করেন যে, আইএমএস ক্যাডার বিলুপ্ত করিয়া বিসিএস ক্যাডারে তাহাদের আত্মীকরণ করা হইবে তবে বিসিএস (ইকনমিক এ্যান্ড ট্রেড) ক্যাডারের অধীনে (ইন্ডাস্ট্রিয়াল ম্যানেজমেন্ট) নামে একটি সাব ক্যাডার সৃষ্টি করিয়া উক্ত ক্যাডারে তাহাদের আত্মীকরণ করা যাইতে পারে।

বিনীত,
স্বাঃ/জা. আহমদ
সচিব

[Dismay at Inability of Preparing Directory of Freedom-Fighter Officers]

গণপ্রজাতন্ত্রী বাংলাদেশ সরকার
সংস্থাপন মন্ত্রণালয়
উদ্বৃত্ত কর্মচারী অধিশাখা

নং- এমই(এসপি)-৯২/৮৩-২৯৭(২৫০)

তারিখ : ৮-২-৯৫ বাং

২২-৫-৮৮ ইং

বিষয় : প্রকৃত মুক্তিযোদ্ধা কর্মকর্তাদের পূর্ণাঙ্গ তালিকা প্রণয়ন।

উপরোক্ত বিষয়ে নিম্নস্বাক্ষরকারী আদিষ্ট হইয়া জানাইতেছে যে, বাংলাদেশের প্রকৃত মুক্তিযোদ্ধাদের একটি পূর্ণাঙ্গ তালিকা প্রণয়নের উদ্দেশ্যে মহামান্য রাষ্ট্রপতিকে সভাপতি করিয়া একটি উচ্চ পর্যায়ের জাতীয় কমিটি গঠিত হইয়াছে। এই কমিটি বহু পূর্বেই তালিকা প্রস্তুতির কার্যক্রম গ্রহণ করিয়াছে। ১৯৭২/৭৩ সালে বাংলাদেশ পাবলিক সার্ভিস কমিশন কর্তৃক গৃহীত সুপিরীয়ার সার্ভিসেস পরীক্ষায় (মৌখিক) মুক্তিযোদ্ধা কোটায় অংশগ্রহণকারী মনোনীত ও বিসিএস (প্রশাসন) ও বিসিএস (সচিবালয়) ক্যাডারসহ অন্যান্য ক্যাডারে চাকুরীরত ১৩১৪ জন মুক্তিযোদ্ধা কর্মকর্তাদের নাম, পিতার নামসহ বিস্তারিত ঠিকানা সম্বলিত একটি পূর্ণাঙ্গ তালিকা সংস্থাপন মন্ত্রণালয় কর্তৃক উক্ত জাতীয় কমিটিতে প্রেরণ করিতে হইবে। এই উদ্দেশ্যে ১৯৮১ সন হইতে আজ পর্যন্ত সেই তালিকা সংগ্রহের জন্য তাঁহার দফতরসহ সকলের নিকট বিভিন্ন সময়ে পত্র প্রেরণ করা হয়। ১৯৮৬ সনের ১৩ই অক্টোবর সংস্থাপন সচিবের তরফ হইতে তাঁর বরাবরে একটি আধাসরকারী পত্র প্রেরিত হয়। সর্বশেষ পত্রটি প্রেরণ করা হয়েছিল ১৭-১১-১৯৮৬ তারিখে। কিন্তু খুব কম সংখ্যক স্থান হইতেই পূর্ণাঙ্গ তালিকা পাওয়া গিয়েছে। অধিকাংশ দফতর হইতে তালিকা প্রেরিত হয় নাই এবং যাহা প্রেরিত হইয়াছে তাহা ক্রটিপূর্ণ। ফলে ১৩১৪ জন মুক্তিযোদ্ধা কর্মকর্তাদের বিসিএস (প্রশাসন) ক্যাডারের ৩৭৮ জন, বিসিএস (সচিবালয়) ক্যাডারের ৪২ জন, বাকী ৮৯৪ জন আই এম এ স সহ অন্যান্য ক্যাডারের পূর্ণাঙ্গ তালিকা প্রস্তুত করিয়া তাহা প্রতিরক্ষা মন্ত্রণালয়ের জাতীয় কমিটিতে প্রেরণ করা এখনও সম্ভব হয় নাই। ফলে জাতীয় পর্যায়ে প্রকৃত মুক্তিযোদ্ধাদের পূর্ণাঙ্গ তালিকা প্রণয়ণ অস্বাভাবিকভাবে ব্যাহত হইতেছে।

২। বর্ণিত অবস্থার প্রেক্ষিতে আর বিলম্ব না করিয়া তাঁহার দপ্তর বা ঐ দপ্তরের অধীনস্থ সকল অফিসে (দপ্তর, পরিদপ্তর, সংস্থা এবং মাঠ পর্যায়ে উপজেলা পরিষদ (অফিস) ১৯৭২/৭৩ সনের বিসিএস (মৌখিক) পরীক্ষায় উত্তীর্ণ ও মনোনীত হইয়া বিভিন্ন ক্যাডারভুক্ত মুক্তিযোদ্ধা কর্মকর্তা কর্মরত থাকিলে অথবা পূর্বে কর্মরত ছিলেন কিন্তু বর্তমানে বিভিন্ন কারণে (অবসর, পদত্যাগ, মৃত্যু, চাকুরীচ্যুতি ইত্যাদি) কর্মরত নাই তাহার পূর্ণ তথ্য এতদসংগে প্রেরিত ছক পূরণের মাধ্যমে প্রতিরক্ষা মন্ত্রণালয়ের সংশ্লিষ্ট উপ-সচিব ও প্রকৃত মুক্তিযোদ্ধা তালিকা প্রণয়ন জাতীয় কমিটির সদস্য সচিব জনাব মোহাম্মদ সারোয়ার-ই-আলম (ফোন-২৩৮৪২৭) এর নিকট প্রেরণ করিয়া ঐ তালিকার এক প্রস্থ অনুলিপি নিম্নস্বাক্ষরকারীর নিকট প্রেরণ করিতে তাঁহাকে বিশেষভাবে অনুরোধ করা যাইতেছে। যদি এমন কোন মুক্তিযোদ্ধা কর্মকর্তা তাঁহার দপ্তর বা অধীনস্থ অফিসে কর্মরত না থাকেন (অথবা) পূর্বে চাকুরীরত ছিলেন না) তাহা হইলে একটি শূন্য প্রতিবেদন পাঠানো যাইতে পারে।

৩। বিষয়টি বিশেষ গুরুত্বপূর্ণ এবং অতি জরুরী।

সংযুক্ত : একটি ছক।

স্বাঃ/-
(কাজী খলিলুর রহমান)
উপসচিব
ফোন- ২৪১৮৩০, ২৪৬৫।

বিতরণ :-

- ১। সচিব (সকল) মন্ত্রণালয়/বিভাগ।
- ২। জেলা প্রশাসক, সকল জেলা।

[Recruitment of the (Non-Freedom Fighter) Officers of 1977 Batch]

গণপ্রজাতন্ত্রী বাংলাদেশ সরকার
বাংলাদেশ সরকারী (১ম) কর্ম কমিশন
ঢাকা।

ডি.ও.নং- ১ই-১৪/৭৬/২২২

তারিখ : ২১-১-১৯৭৭

প্রেরক : খোন্দকার শরিফ উল ইসলাম
সচিব

প্রাপক : সচিব
মন্ত্রিপরিষদ সচিবালয়
সংস্থাপন বিভাগ
শাখা-পি,
গণপ্রজাতন্ত্রী বাংলাদেশ সরকার

বিষয় : অমুক্তিযোদ্ধা বিশেষ সুপিরিয়র সার্ভিস পরীক্ষায় উত্তীর্ণ প্রার্থীদের মধ্যে যাহারা ১৯৭৬ সনে গৃহীত প্রশিক্ষণোত্তর পরীক্ষায় উত্তীর্ণ হইয়াছেন তাহাদের বিভিন্ন পদে নিয়োগ।

মহোদয়,

উপরোক্ত বিষয়ে সংস্থাপন বিভাগের ১০-১-৭৭ তারিখের ডিওইডি/আর-১/আর-১০০/৭৬-৪ নং পত্রের সূত্রে কমিশন কর্তৃক আদিষ্ট হইয়া জানাইতেছি যে, উক্ত পরীক্ষায় মোট ৩৯৩ জন প্রার্থী অংশগ্রহণ করিয়াছিলেন। তাহাদের মধ্যে ৩৬৩ জন প্রার্থী পরীক্ষায় উত্তীর্ণ হইয়াছেন। উত্তীর্ণ প্রার্থীদের মধ্যে হইতে ২৯৩ জন প্রার্থীকে ৫ম গ্রেডের এবং ২০ জন প্রার্থীকে ৬ষ্ঠ গ্রেডের বিভিন্ন পদে নিয়োগের জন্য কমিশন সুপারিশ করিতেছেন। কমিশন কর্তৃক সুপারিশকৃত মোট ৩৯৩ (২৯৩+২০) জন প্রার্থীর একটি তালিকা অত্র পত্রের সংঙ্গে সংযুক্ত করা হইল (ক-চিহ্নিত)। উপরোক্ত সুপারিশের পরিপ্রেক্ষিতে তাঁদের সম্পর্কে কমিশনের ১০/১১/৭৬ তারিখের ১ই-১৪/৭৬/২৯৭৯ নং পত্রে সুপারিশ বাতিল বলিয়া গণ্য হইবে।

২। উত্তীর্ণ প্রার্থীদের মধ্যে ৫০ জন প্রার্থী কম সংখ্যক পদের অগ্রাধিকার দেওয়ার ফলে তাহাদিগকে কোন পদের জন্যই সুপারিশ করা সম্ভব হয় নাই। তাহাদের নামের একটি তালিকা মেধানুসারে এতদসংঙ্গে প্রেরিত হইল (গ-চিহ্নিত)।

৩। প্রার্থীর সংখ্যা কম থাকার দাবী উপরোক্ত সুপারিশে বিভিন্ন গ্রেডের নির্ধারিত মোট ৫১৮ টি পদের মধ্যে রাষ্ট্রায়ত্ন ব্যাংকে ৬ষ্ঠ গ্রেডভুক্ত প্রবেশগারী অফিসার ২০৫টি পদ পূরণ করার জন্য সুপারিশ করা সম্ভব হয় নাই।

৪। সুপারিশকৃত প্রার্থীদের ডাক্তারী পরীক্ষার, রাজনৈতিক কার্যকলাপ কমিশন কর্তৃক তদন্ত করা হয় নাই।

৫। কমিশনের সুপারিশ সম্পর্কে গৃহীত ব্যবস্থা যথাসময়ে কমিশনকে অবহিত করার জন্য আপনাকে অনুরোধ করা যাইতেছে।

বিনীত,
স্বাক্ষরিত/-
(খোন্দকার শরিফ উল ইসলাম)
সচিব

তালিকা -ক

অমুক্তিযোদ্ধা বিশেষ সুপিরিয়র সার্ভিস পরীক্ষায় উত্তীর্ণ প্রার্থীদের মধ্যে যাহারা ১৯৭৬ সালে অনুষ্ঠিত প্রশিক্ষণোত্তর পরীক্ষায় উত্তীর্ণ হইয়াছেন তাহাদের মধ্যে হইতে বিভিন্ন পদে নিয়োগের জন্য কমিশন কর্তৃক সুপারিশকৃত প্রার্থীর তালিকা (উদ্ধৃতাংশ)

৫ম শ্রেণীভুক্ত পদ

ক্রমিক নং	মেধানুসারে ক্রমিক নং	রোল নং	নাম	সুপারিশকৃত পদের নাম	নিয়োগের ভিত্তি
১	২	৩	৪	৫	৬
১।	১	৪৩৯৫	শেখ হাফিজুল কবীর	কাষ্টমস এন্ড এন্ড্রাইজ অফিসার	মেধা ভিত্তিক
২।	২	৭৩৯	বেনু গোপাল দে	ডেপুটি ম্যাজিস্ট্রেট এন্ড ডেপুটি কালেক্টর	-ঐ-
৫।	-	-	-	-	-
৬।	-	-	-	-	-
৩১।	৩১	১০৩৮	ইকবাল উদ্দিন আহমেদ চৌধুরী	ডেপুটি ম্যাজিস্ট্রেট এন্ড ডেপুটি কালেক্টর	-ঐ-
৩২।	৩২	১৬০৬	মোহাম্মদ আব্দুর রব	-ঐ-	-ঐ-
-	-	-	-	-	-
১৫৮।	১৬৯	১১৮১	কেশব আচার্য	সেকশন অফিসার, সচিবালয়	জেলা ভিত্তিক
১৫৯।	১৭০	৩২৬৩	মোঃ শফিকুল ইসলাম	পোস্টাল সুপারিনটেন্ডেন্ট	বিভাগ ভিত্তিক
-	-	-	-	-	-
-	-	-	-	-	-
৩১২।	৩৪৬	৬১৩	এ, কে, এম, ফজলুল হক	প্রঃ অফিসার, রাষ্ট্রায়াত্ ব্যাংক ৬ষ্ঠ শ্রেণী	মেধাভিত্তিক
৩১৩।	৩৬২	২৭৫৪	মজিবুর রহমান খান	প্রঃ অফিসার, রাষ্ট্রায়াত্ ব্যাংক ৬ষ্ঠ শ্রেণী	মেধাভিত্তিক

[Further Recruitment of Officers in the Administrative Service in 1977 from Multiple Sources]

Government of the People's Republic of Bangladesh
Cabinet Secretariat
Establishment Division
Section JAI

No. ED(JAI)-191/77-326

Dated Dacca, the 21st May, 1977

Officers named below in column-I are appointed temporarily until further orders and on ad-hoc basis as Officers on Special Duty to the Districts mentioned in column-II and posted to the stations mentioned in column-III below :-

<u>Column-I</u>	<u>Column-II</u>	<u>Column-III</u>
1. Mr. Abul Kalam Mohd. Shamsuddin, Section Officer, Establishment Division	Patuakhali	Patuakhali Collectorate.
2. Mr. Md. Hossain Serniabat, Section Officer, M/O Agriculture	Faridpur	Faridpur Sadar.
---	---	---
13. Mr. Abdur Rashid, Assistant Engineer, W.D.B. Chandpur	Chittagong Hill Tracts	Chittagong Hill Tracts Sadar.
14. Mr. Abdul Malek Fakir, Project Procurement Officer, M/O Agriculture	Khulna	Khulna Sadar
---	---	---
36. Mr. Md. Rezaul Karim, Senior Administrative Officer, Bengal Textiles Mills Ltd.	Rajshahi	Rajshahi Collectorate
37. Mr. A. Shakur, Assistant Director, Department of Shipping, Dacca.	Rajshahi	Rajshahi Collectorate
---	---	---
49. Mr. Abdul Wahed, Manager, B. C. S. C.	Bakerganj	Bakerganj Sadar (North)
50. Mr. Md. Moshiul Kabir, Manager, B. S. C.	Dacca	Munshiganj

By order of the President,

Abdur Rahim
Secretary.

No. ED(JAI)-191/77-326/1(10)

Dated Dacca, the 21st May, 1977

Copy forwarded to the Secretary, Ministry/Division _____ for information and for communication to the Officer(s) concerned. He/they may kindly be released and directed to join his/their place(s) of posting immediately.

2. The appointment is made in the interest of public service.
3. The officers are appointed against the 163 temporary posts of Deputy Magistrates and Deputy Collectors created in this Division's G. O. No. ED(JAI)/135/76-192 dated 16.5.77.
4. The appointments are made on a purely temporary basis and subject to any subsequent Government decision on the recommendations of the Pay and Services Commission or otherwise.

Sd/-
(Abdul Jalil Khan)
Deputy Secretary

[Absorption of Officers in the Administrative Service in 1980]

Government of the People's Republic of Bangladesh
Cabinet Secretariat
Establishment Division
Section JA - II

NOTIFICATION

No. ED(JA-II)-122/78-350

Dated Dacca, the 18th September, 1980

The officers named below are absorbed temporarily in the posts of Assistant Commissioner with effect from the date of their joining as Officer on Special Duty, on the terms and conditions mentioned in this Division's letter no. ED(JA-II)/122/78-310, dated 22-8-80. They shall be required to pass the usual departmental examinations and undergo other prescribed training before confirmation :-

1. Mr. A.K.M. Shamsuddin, O.S.D., Patuakhali Collectorate
2. Mr. Md. Osman Ghani, O.S.D., Noakhali Collectorate

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15. Mr. Prabin Chandra Barua, O.S.D., Rangpur Collectorate
16. Mr. Samir Kumar Mallick, O.S.D., Pirojpur, Barisal.

By order of the President,

Saadat Hussain
Joint Secretary
Establishment Division

[Recruitment of Magistrates in Contravention of Existing Rules in 1983]

GOVERNMENT OF THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF BANGLADESH
CHIEF MARTIAL LAW ADMINISTRATOR'S SECRETARIAT

Establishment Division

Regulation Branch

Section - II

NOTIFICATION

Dhaka, the 7th December, 1982

No. S.R.O. 409-L/82/ED(R-II)R-70/80(Pt.)- In pursuance of the Proclamation of the 24th March, 1982, and in exercise of all powers enabling him in that behalf, the Chief Martial Law Administrator, after consultation with the Bangladesh Public Service Commission, is pleased to make the following further amendments in the Bangladesh Civil Service Recruitment Rules, 1981, namely :-

"In the aforesaid Rules, after rule 10, the following new rule shall be added, namely :-

11. Recruitment of the Magistrate to meet urgent situation.- (1) Notwithstanding anything contained in these rules or in any other rules for the time being in force, the Government may, in order to meet urgent situation due to creation of upgraded thanas, make recruitment to the Bangladesh Civil Service (Administrative: Administrative) for one-time recruitment to the post of Magistrate specified in the Schedule on the basis of test in the following :-

(a) Viva Voce test	..	200 marks
(b) Psychological and intelligence test	..	<u>100 marks</u>
	Total	300 marks.

(2) The age limit of the candidates for appointment under sub-rule (1) shall be between 21 and 50 years.

(3) The minimum qualification of the candidates for appointment under sub-rule (1) shall be a degree from a recognized University with at least two Second Class or, as the case may be, Second Division in academic career. Preference shall be given to candidates having a degree in Law or Jurisprudence or equivalent degree from a recognized University.

(4) All rules for appointment by direct recruitment to the Bangladesh Civil Service (Administrative: Administrative) shall, so far as they are not inconsistent with this rule, apply to such appointment."

By order of the
Chief Martial Law Administrator

FAYEZUDDIN AHMED
Secretary.

CABINET SECRETARIAT

Establishment Division

Implementation Cell

NOTIFICATION

Dacca, the 1st September, 1980

No. S.R.O. 288-L/80/ED/IC/511-1/80-117 – In exercise of the powers conferred by the proviso to Article 133 of the Constitution of the People's Republic of Bangladesh, the President, after consultation with the Bangladesh Public Service Commission as required by clause (2) of Article 140 of that Constitution, is pleased to make the following rules, namely –

1. Short title.– These rules may be called the Bangladesh Civil Service (Administrative: Administrative) Composition and Cadre Rules, 1980.

2. Definitions.– In these rules, unless there is anything repugnant in the subject or context –

- (a) "Cadre post" means a post included in the Schedule;
- (b) "Commission" means the Bangladesh Public Service Commission;
- (c) "Probationer" means a person appointed on probation to a cadre post;
- (d) "Schedule" means the Schedule annexed to these rules;
- (e) "Service" means the Bangladesh Civil Service (Administrative: Administrative).

3. Constitution of Service.– (1) There shall be constituted a service to be called the Bangladesh Civil Service (Administrative: Administrative).

(2) The Service shall consist of –

(a) Persons who were members of the erstwhile Civil Service of Pakistan, East Pakistan Civil Service (Executive) Class I and Military Lands and Cantonment Service on or before the 25th day of March, 1971;

(b) Persons appointed on or after the 26th day of March 1971 on the recommendation of the erstwhile Central Public Service Commission or the East Pakistan Public Service Commission, or the competent authority during the non-existence of the Commission or Commissions against posts which would have been included in the cadre of the service had any such posts not been treated as abolished after independence and whose terms and conditions are governed by the former cadre service rules and who were confirmed in a cadre post on or before the first day of January 1979; and

(c) Persons to be appointed to the Service in accordance with these rules.

4. Posts borne in the Cadre.– (1) The posts specified in the Schedule shall be borne in the cadre of the Service.

(2) The initial cadre strength of the Service shall be as shown in the Schedule and such cadre strength may be varied by the Government with the concurrence of the Ministry of Finance.

5. Appointing Authority.– Appointment in the Service shall be made by the President or an officer authorized by him.

6. Procedure for Recruitment.– (1) The Service shall initially consist of the officers specified by rule 3(2) (a) and (b) and thereafter –

(a) by direct recruitment on the recommendation of the Commission; and

(b) by promotion from feeder posts in accordance with the provision, if any, in the recruitment rules on the recommendation of the Commission.

(2) No member of the Service shall be promoted to a post in the New National Scale of Taka 1400 – 2225 and Taka 2100 – 2600 unless he has passed the tests or examinations conducted in the manner prescribed in the recruitment rules.

(3) No member of the Service should be allowed pay in the New National Scale of Taka 1400 – 2225 unless he has completed seven years in the initial stage of the service and subject to availability of sanctioned cadre post in the service.

(4) Members of the Services promoted to the New National Scale of Taka 2350 – 2750 shall be required to complete successfully the regular course at the Administrative Staff College.

7. Eligibility.– The minimum qualifications and other requirements for appointments to the Service shall be as prescribed in the recruitment rules.

8. Probation and confirmation.– (1) A person initially appointed to the Service against a substantive vacancy shall remain on probation for –

(a) a period of two years if he is appointed by direct recruitment to the Service on the recommendation of the Commission;

(b) a period of one year if he is appointed on promotion.

The period of probation may be extended by the Government for a further period not exceeding two years.

Explanation.– If no order is made by the day following the completion of the probation period, the period of probation shall be deemed to have been extended.

(2) A person appointed to the Service on probation shall, during the period of probation, undergo such training under such terms and conditions as may be determined by the Government in this behalf.

(3) During the period of probation, appointment of a probationer may be terminated without consultation with the Commission if he is found unsuitable for retention in the Service.

The Rest of the Rules Have to be Collected Afresh

[Civil Service Recruitment Rules]
GOVERNMENT OF THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF BANGLADESH
Cabinet Secretariat
Establishment Division
Regulation Wing
Section - Reg. II
NOTIFICATION

Dacca, the 1st January, 1981.

No. S.R.O. 1-L/81/ED (R-II) R-70/80 – In exercise of the powers conferred by the proviso to Article 133 of the Constitution of the People's Republic of Bangladesh, the President, after consultation with the Bangladesh Public Service Commission as required by clause (2) of Article 140 of that Constitution, is pleased to make the following rules, namely –

1. Short title.– These rules may be called the Bangladesh Civil Service Recruitment Rules, 1981.

2. Definitions.– In these rules, unless there is anything repugnant in the subject or context –

- (a) "Commission" means the Bangladesh Public Service Commission;
- (b) "probationer" means a person appointed on probation to a Service;
- (c) "recognized university" means a university established by or under any law for the time being in force and includes any other university declared by the Government, after consultation with the Commission, to be a recognized university for the purposes of these rules;
- (d) "Schedule" means a Schedule annexed to these rules;
- (e) "Service" means a Service specified in Schedule I; and
- (f) "specified post" means a post of the Service specified in Schedule II.

3. Procedure for recruitment.– Subject to the instructions relating to reservation for the purpose of clause (3) of Article 29 of the Constitution of the People's Republic of Bangladesh, appointment to a Service shall be made in accordance with the provisions of Schedule II.

4. Appointment by direct recruitment.– (1) No appointment to a Service by direct recruitment shall be made except upon the recommendation of the Commission.

(2) No person shall be eligible for appointment to a Service by direct recruitment, if he –

- (a) is not a citizen of Bangladesh, or a permanent resident of, or domiciled in, Bangladesh; or
- (b) is married to, or has entered into a promise of marriage with, a person who is not a citizen of Bangladesh.

(3) No appointment to a Service by direct recruitment shall be made until –

- (a) the person selected for appointment is certified by a Medical Board set up for the purpose by the Director General of Health Services to be medically fit for such appointment and that he does not suffer from any such organic defect as is likely to interfere with the discharge of the duties of Services; and
- (b) the antecedents of the person so selected have been verified through appropriate agencies and found to be such as do not render him unfit for appointment in the service of the Republic.

(4) No person shall be recommended for appointment to a Service unless –

- (a) he applied in such form, accompanied by such fee and before such date, as was notified by the Commission while inviting applications for a Service; and
- (b) in the case of a person already in Government service or in the service of a local authority, applied through his official superior.

5. Appointment by promotion.- Subject to the provisions of Schedule II, appointment by promotion to a specified post of a Service shall be made on the recommendation of the Council Committee on Promotion, Superior Selection Board or the Special Promotion Committee, as the case may be, constituted by the Government in this behalf:

Provided that –

(a) appointment by promotion to the New National Scale of Taka 750-1470 from a post of lower class shall be made on the recommendation of the Commission;

(b) no person shall be promoted to the New National Scale of Taka 1400-2225 unless he is found fit in a test or examination conducted by the Special Promotion Committee;

(c) no person shall be promoted to the New National Scale of Taka 1850-2375 and Taka 2100-2600 unless he is found fit in a test or examination conducted by the Superior Selection Board;

(d) no person shall be promoted to the New National Scale of Taka 2350-2750 and above unless he is found fit Council Committee on Promotion;

(e) no person shall be eligible for promotion if he has unsatisfactory service records; and

(f) a person on promotion to a specified post shall have to qualify in such training course as may be prescribed by the Government failing which he will be reverted to the post from which he was promoted.

6. Probation.- (1) A person initially appointed to a Service against a substantive vacancy shall remain on probation for –

(a) a period of two years if is appointed by direct recruitment; and

(b) a period of one year if is appointed on promotion:

Provided that the period of promotion may be extended by the Government for a period not exceeding two years.

Explanation – If no order is made by the day following the completion of the probation period, the period of probation shall be deemed to have been extended.

(2) Where, during the period of probation, a probationer is found unsuitable for retention in the concerned Service, the Government may, without consultation with the Commission, –

(a) in the case of direct recruitment, terminate his appointment; and

(b) in the case of promotion, revert him to the post from which he was promoted.

7. Confirmation.- (1) A person initially appointed to a Service shall be required to undergo –

(a) foundational training for a period of not less than 4 months at the Civil Officers' Training Academy in the fields of Agriculture, Fisheries, Livestock and Mass Mobilization and also in such other fields as may be determined from time to time by the Government; and

(b) after the completion of the aforesaid foundational training, such professional and specialized training as may be determined by the Government, to be imparted by the respective institution for a Service.

(2) No person shall be confirmed in the concerned Service unless he has successfully completed the training under sub-rule (1), passed such departmental examination as may be prescribed by order, by the Government and also has served the period of probation under Rule 6.

8. Relaxation.- (1) Notwithstanding anything contained in these Rules, –

(a) the President may, on the recommendation of the Council Committee on Promotion constituted by the Government relax in exceptional cases the condition of length of experience for promotion specified in Schedule II.

(b) a person holding a specified post in a Service may be appointed by the Government to a specified post in another Service on deputation.

SCHEDULE - I

[(See rule 2(e))]

- 1) Bangladesh Civil Service (Administrative: Administrative)
- 2) Bangladesh Civil Service (Administrative: Food)
- 3) Bangladesh Civil Service (Agriculture: Agriculture)
- 4) Bangladesh Civil Service (Agriculture: Forest)
- 5) Bangladesh Civil Service (Agriculture: Fisheries)
- 6) Bangladesh Civil Service (Agriculture: Livestock)
- 7) Bangladesh Civil Service (Education: General Education)
- 8) Bangladesh Civil Service (Education: Technical Education)
- 9) Bangladesh Civil Service (Economic and Trade: Economic)
- 10) Bangladesh Civil Service (Economic and Trade: Commercial)
- 11) Bangladesh Civil Service (Economic and Trade: Statistical)
- 12) Bangladesh Civil Service (Engineering: Public Works)
- 13) Bangladesh Civil Service (Engineering: Public Health)
- 14) Bangladesh Civil Service (Engineering: Roads and Highways)
- 15) Bangladesh Civil Service (Engineering: Telecommunication)
- 16) Bangladesh Civil Service (Finance: Audit and Accounts)
- 17) Bangladesh Civil Service (Finance: Customs and Excise)
- 18) Bangladesh Civil Service (Finance: Taxation)
- 19) Bangladesh Civil Service (Foreign Affairs)
- 20) Bangladesh Civil Service (Health and Family Planning)
- 21) Bangladesh Civil Service (Information)
- 22) Bangladesh Civil Service (Judicial)
- 23) Bangladesh Civil Service (Postal)
- 24) Bangladesh Civil Service (Enforcement: Police)
- 25) Bangladesh Civil Service (Enforcement: Ansar)
- 26) Bangladesh Civil Service (Railway: Transport and Commercial)
- 27) Bangladesh Civil Service (Railway: Engineering)
- 28) Bangladesh Civil Service (Secretariat).

SCHEDULE - II

[(See rule 2(f)]

PART - I

Bangladesh Civil Service (Administrative: Administrative)

Sl. No.	Name of the Specified post of the Service	Age limit for direct recruitment	Method of recruitment	Qualifications
1	Commissioner	---	(i) By promotion from amongst the Additional Commissioners and Deputy Commissioners; and (ii) By transfers of officers not below the rank of Joint Secretary, who are encadred in the Senior Services Pool from Bangladesh Civil Service (Administrative: Administrative).	<i>For promotion</i> – 18 years' experience in the concerned Service.
2	Additional Commissioner	---	(i) By promotion from amongst the Deputy Commissioners; and (ii) By transfers of officers not below the rank of Deputy Secretary, who are encadred in the Senior Services Pool from Bangladesh Civil Service (Administrative: Administrative).	<i>For promotion</i> – 12 years' experience in the concerned Service.
3	Deputy Commissioner	---	(i) By appointment of Additional Deputy Commissioners; and (ii) By transfers of officers not below the rank of Deputy Secretary, who are encadred in the Senior Services Pool from Bangladesh Civil Service (Administrative: Administrative).	
4	Additional Deputy Commissioner	---	(i) By promotion from amongst the Sub-Divisional Officers and other officers of the Service in the New National Scale of Taka 1150-1300; and (ii) By appointment of officers of the concerned Service in the New National Scale of Taka 1400-2225.	<i>For promotion</i> – 7 years' experience in the concerned Service.
5	Sub-Divisional Officers and other officers in the New National Scale of Taka 1150-1300	---	(i) By promotion from amongst the Circle Officer, Magistrate and Section Officer; and (ii) By appointment of officers of the concerned Service in the New National Scale of Taka 1150-1300.	<i>For promotion</i> – 4 years' experience in the concerned Service.
6	Circle Officer, Magistrate and Section Officer	As per rules to be prescribed by the Government.	(i) 90% by direct recruitment up to 1-1-1985 and 100% thereafter; and (ii) 10% by promotion from amongst the following groups in order of preference :- (a) Lawyer Magistrate; and (b) Election Officer, Circle Officer (Development), Thana Revenue Officer and Additional Land Acquisition Officer.	<i>For direct recruitment</i> – As per rules to be prescribed by the Government. <i>For promotion</i> – 3 years' experience in a feede post or posts specified in column 4.

GOVERNMENT OF THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF BANGLADESH
Cabinet Secretariat
Establishment Division
Recruitment Section
NOTIFICATION

No. S.R.O. 375-L/82/ED/Rectt./1-2/78,— In pursuance of the Proclamation of the 24th March, 1982, and in exercise of all powers enabling him in that behalf, the Chief Martial Law Administrator is pleased to make the following rules, namely :-

1. Short title.— These rules may be called the Industrial Management Service (Abolition, Absorption and Fixation of Seniority) Rules, 1982.

2. Rules to override other rules, etc.— These rules shall have effect notwithstanding anything contained in any other rules, orders or instructions relating to seniority or other conditions of service of Government servant for the time being in force.

3. Definitions.— In these rules, unless there is anything repugnant in the subject or context, —

- (a) "absorbed officer" means an officer absorbed under these rules;
- (b) "cadre post" means a post in a cadre Service;
- (c) "examination" means the examination conducted by the erstwhile Bangladesh Public Service (First) Commission for recruitment to the Service and also to a cadre post in the year 1973; and
- (d) "Service" means the Industrial Management Service constituted under the Industrial Management Service (Constitution and Recruitment) Rules, 1976.

4. Abolition of Service and absorption of the members thereof.— (1) As soon as may be, after the commencement of these rules, the Government may, by order, notified in the official Gazette, abolish the Industrial Management Service constituted under the Industrial Management Service (Constitution and Recruitment) Rules, 1976.

(2) Upon the abolition of the Service under sub-rule (1), a member thereof shall be absorbed in a cadre Service considering his merit position in the examination and also his preference, if any, and shall be appointed to the entry post of the cadre Service for which he has been considered eligible:

Provided that an absorbed officer shall be entitled to such pay as he has been drawing immediately before the absorption.

(3) An absorbed officer shall remain on probation for such period and shall undergo such training and pass such departmental examination as are necessary for direct recruits under the rules of the cadre Service to which he has been absorbed.

5. Fixation of Seniority.— The seniority *inter se* of an absorbed officer shall, in relation to an officer appointed to a cadre post on the result of the examination, be determined on the result of the examination and position secured by him in the examination:

Provided that no officer in a cadre post, who has since been promoted to a higher post, shall be reverted to a lower post as a result of fixation of seniority under these rules:

Provided further that no absorbed officer shall be eligible to hold the post carrying pay in the New National Scale of Taka 1150 – 1800 until he completes three years' service including the period of probation and training and passes departmental examination required under sub-rule (3) of rule 4, and, on promotion, he shall take seniority in the promoted post over his juniors, if any, already promoted to the post, but shall not be entitled to any arrear financial benefit:

Provided further that no absorbed officer shall be eligible for promotion to any post carrying the New National Scale of Taka 1400 – 2225 unless he completes at least two years' of service in a post in the New National Scale of Taka 1150 – 1800.

6. First service to be counted for time-scale, etc.— Notwithstanding anything contained in these rules, the services of an absorbed officer in the cadre in which he belonged before his absorption under sub-rule (2) of rule 4 shall be counted for the purpose of his –

- (a) entitlement to the benefit of time-scale as per Government order; and
- (b) encadrement as Pool Officer under the Senior Service Pool Order, 1979.

7. Repeal.— The Industrial Management Service (Constitution and Recruitment) Rules, 1976, is hereby repealed.

THE SCHEDULE

[See clause (c) of rule 3]

1. Bangladesh Civil Service (Administrative : Administrative);
2. Bangladesh Civil Service (Foreign Affairs);
3. Bangladesh Civil Service (Postal);
4. Bangladesh Civil Service (Enforcement : Police);
5. Bangladesh Civil Service (Railway : Transportation and Commercial); and
6. Bangladesh Civil Service (Secretariat).

By order of the
Chief Martial Law Administrator
FAYEZUDDIN AHMED
Secretary.

[Provision for Absorbing Erstwhile IMS Officers in various Service Cadres]

GOVERNMENT OF THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF BANGLADESH
CHIEF MARTIAL LAW ADMINISTRATOR'S SECRETARIAT

Establishment Division

Regulation Wing

NOTIFICATION

Dhaka, the 4th December, 1982.

No. S.R.O. 374-L/82.- In pursuance of the Proclamation of the 24th March, 1982, and in exercise of all powers enabling him in that behalf, the Chief Martial Law Administrator, after consultation with the Bangladesh Public Service Commission, is pleased to make the following further amendment in the Bangladesh Civil Service Recruitment Rules, 1981, namely :-

In the aforesaid Rules, in rule 8, after clause (b), the following new clause (c) shall be added, namely :

"(c) a member of the Industrial Management Service created under the Industrial Management Service (Constitution and Recruitment) Rules, 1976, may be absorbed in a specified post at entry level in the Services mentioned at serial numbers 1, 19, 23, 24, 26 and 28 of Schedule In to these rules."

By order of the
Chief Martial Law Administrator

FAYEZUDDIN AHMED
Secretary.

Published in the Bangladesh Gazette Extraordinary, 4 November 1982.

[Provision for Abolition of the Industrial Management Service]

ORDER

Dhaka, the 4th November, 1982.

No. S.R.O. 376-L/82/ED/Rectt/1-2/78.— In exercise of the powers conferred by sub-rule (1) of rule 4 of the Industrial Management Service (Abolition, Absorption and Fixation of Seniority) Rules, 1982, the Government is pleased to abolish the Industrial Management Service constituted under the Industrial Management Service (Constitution and Recruitment) Rules, 1976.

By order of the
Chief Martial Law Administrator

FAYEZUDDIN AHMED
Secretary.

[Absorption of Erstwhile IMS Officers in various Service Cadres]
 GOVERNMENT OF THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF BANGLADESH
 CHIEF MARTIAL LAW ADMINISTRATOR'S SECRETARIAT
 ESTABLISHMENT DIVISION
 SECTION - JA I
NOTIFICATION

No. ED/JAI-132/82-295

Dated the 4th November, 1982.

Consequent upon the abolition of IMS cadre the following officers of the Industrial Management Services are absorbed as Assistant Commissioner, on probationer, in the B.C.S. (Administrative: Administrative) Cadre and posted to the Civil Officers' Training Academy for training for four weeks with effect from the 14th November, 1982.

<u>Sl. No.</u>	<u>Name of the Officer</u>	<u>Present Address</u>
1.	Mr. Md. Serajul Islam	Section Officer, Petroleum and Mineral Resources Division
2.	Mr. Md. Hafizul Alam	Section Officer, Ministry of Foreign Affairs
-----	-----	-----
149.	Mr. Asad Ahmed	B.F.I.D.C.
150.	Md. Ruhul Amin Khandaker	Senior Administrative Officer, Khulna Textile Mills Ltd, Boyra Main Road, Khulna.

By order of the
Chief Martial Law Administrator

FAYEZUDDIN AHMED
Secretary.

No. ED/JAI-132/82-295/1(150)

Dated, 4/11/82.

Copy forwarded to Mr. _____ for information.

2. The terms and conditions of his appointment are as follows:

(i) He will be appointed on probation for two years and will be governed by the existing service rules until further orders.

(ii) He will be required to undergo Foundation training in Civil Officers' Training Academy, Shahbagh, Dhaka, hereinafter referred to as the Academy, for such period as may be prescribed. Schedule of the training programme and other pre-requisites relating to the programme, will be communicated to him separately by the Principal of the Academy. During training he will be required to abide by the rules of the Academy.

(iii) In the event of his failure to complete the training for reason not acceptable to the Government or resigning the service on any ground during the training period, he will be required to pay the Government all expenses incurred in connection with his training.

(iv) His confirmation in service will depend on his successful completion of the probationary period which include Final Passing Out Examination, prescribed Departmental Examination and such other examinations as may be prescribed by the Government. In the event of his failure to successfully complete the probationary period, he will be liable to be discharged from service.

3. His seniority, promotion, pay etc, will be guided according to the Industrial Management Service (Abolition, Absorption and Fixation of Seniority) Rules, 1982.

4. He will submit a declaration of property as required under rule 13 of the Government Servants (Conduct) Rules, 1979.

(Md. Nowab Ali)
Section Officer
Establishment Division.

[General Principles of Seniority]
Government of Pakistan
Cabinet Secretariat
(Establishment Division)
No. 1/16/69-DII, Rawalpindi, December 31st, 1970

OFFICE MEMORANDUM

Subject: General Principles of Seniority

Certain general principles for determination of seniority were communicated to Ministries/Divisions in Establishment Division O.M. No. 1/2/56-DII, dated 19th November, 1962 and No. 7/35-62-DII, dated 6th November, 1964. Experience has shown that these principles require to be elaborated, particularly the expression 'regular promotion' is required to be clearly defined. Accordingly, a revised version of the principles of seniority of general applicability in cases of all Government Servants (Classes In, II & III) which has been drawn up in consultation with the CPSC, is published as in the annexure to this office memorandum.

2. The above principles are of general applicability for all class I, II & III posts except where any rules, principles or instructions on seniority duly approved by Establishment Division already exist specially for a particular service or cadre in which case seniority shall continue to be determined in accordance with those specific rules, principles or instructions.

3. It is added that fixation of seniority in individual cases is the responsibility of the Ministries and Divisions concerned. However, all doubtful cases where seniority cannot be determined under a general or specific principle already settled shall continue to be referred to Establishment Division for decision. It is necessary, however, that references in all cases are drawn up properly to bring out the point of doubt clearly and as far as possible in general terms, so that one decision given in consultation with the Central Public Service Commission, where necessary is in the form of general ruling. Such general ruling shall be notified by Establishment Division to all Ministries/Divisions as and when they are given.

ABDUL AZIZ
Deputy Secretary.

Annexure to Establishment Division O.M. No. 1/16/69-DII, dated 31-12-1970.

GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF SENIORITY

1. DIRECT RECRUITS THROUGH THE PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION.

(i) Officers recruited directly by the CPSC through an earlier open advertisement would rank senior to those recruited through a subsequent open advertisement.

(ii) If two or more persons are recommended in open advertisement by the CPSC, their inter-se seniority would be determined in the order of merit assigned by the CPSC.

(iii) If only one candidate is recommended in open advertisement by the CPSC, , whichever is later.

(a) If the person was already holding the same post on ad-hoc basis he would count his seniority from the date of recommendation by the CPSC.

(b) If the person was not already holding the same post, he would count his seniority from the date of joining the post after being recommended by the CPSC.

B. DEPARTMENTAL PROMOTEEES:

(i) Officers who were approved by the Selection Board/DPC/CPSC for promotion to the higher grade on an earlier date shall rank senior to those who are approved on a later date, provided that

(a) an officer eligible for promotion who is inadvertently omitted from consideration in the original reference and is superseded, when he is subsequently considered and approved for promotion, he will take his seniority with the original batch.

(b) when in a single reference, the Selection Board/DPC/CPSC are asked to recommend more than one person and recommendation of the CPSC or the Selection Board/DPC is held up in respect of one or more such persons for want of complete papers etc. for reasons beyond the control of the persons concerned, the recommendation of the Selection Board/DPC/CPSC in respect of such persons then made subsequently will be deemed to have been made on the date when the recommendation in respect of the original batch was made.

(ii) Officers approved by the competent authority, on regular basis for promotion to higher posts in the same batch shall retain the same seniority on promotion as they were enjoying in the lower grade. In case the date of continuous appointment of two or more officers in the lower grade is the same, and there is no specific rule whereby their inter-se seniority in the lower grade can be determined, the officer older in age shall be treated senior.

(iii) The seniority of departmental promotees to the higher grade shall count from the date of their regular promotion to the higher grade. The word 'regular' implies:

(a) that the promotions to higher grades were made in vacancies reserved for departmental promotion in accordance with the prescribed roster; and

(b) that the promotions to higher grades were made in accordance with the prescribed Recruitment Rules, i.e., on the recommendation of the Departmental Promotion Committee or the Selection Board and in consultation with the CPSC where such consultation was necessary under the Consultation Regulation and with the approval of the authority competent to make those appointment;

(c) the promotion to higher grade were kept within the maximum quota prescribed in the recruitment rules for departmental promotion. In the event of the prescribed departmental promotion quota being exceeded in any particular case or cases, the seniority of the person or persons promoted in excess of that quota shall not count from the date from which the promotion or promotions were actually made, but from the date from which they would have been made, if the quota had been properly followed.

C. DEPARTMENTAL PROMOTEEES VIS-À-VIS DIRECT RECRUITS :

Officers promoted to the higher grade in a continuous arrangement and as a regular measure in a particular year shall as a class be senior to those appointed by direct recruitment in the same year.

[Provision for Absorbing Defence Services Officers in Civil Posts]
GOVERNMENT OF THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF BANGLADESH
CHIEF MARTIAL LAW ADMINISTRATOR'S SECRETARIAT
Establishment Division
Section Regulation - II
NOTIFICATION
Dhaka, the 27th January, 1983

No. S.R.O. 33-L/83/ED/(R-II)S-48/82.- In pursuance of the Proclamation of the 24th March, 1982, and in exercise of all powers enabling him in that behalf, the Chief Martial Law Administrator is pleased to make the following rules, namely :-

1. Short title. – These rules may be called the Defence Services Officers (Appointment and Fixation of Seniority) Rules, 1983.

2. Definitions. – In these rules, unless there is anything repugnant in the subject or context, –

- (a) "appointing authority" means the Government and includes any officer authorized by the Government in this behalf;
- (b) "competent authority" means the authority competent to recommend appointment to a civil post;
- (c) "civil post" means any post or office in civil administration, the pay and remuneration of which is charged from the civil budget estimates and includes any post or office in any authority, corporation or body the activities or the principal activities of which are authorized by any Act, Ordinance or instrument having the force of law in Bangladesh;
- (d) "Secondment" means making the services of the members of the Defence Services available on loan for appointment to the civil posts;
- (e) "defence services officer" means a commissioned officer including a released or retired officer, from Bangladesh Army, Bangladesh Navy or Bangladesh Air Force; and
- (f) "service headquarters" means the headquarters of Bangladesh Army, Bangladesh Navy or Bangladesh Air Force, as the case may be.

3. Appointment of defence service officers to a civil posts.– (1) A defence service officer may be appointed by the appointing authority to a civil post after obtaining clearance from the concerned service headquarters through the Ministry of Defence:

Provided that no appointment shall be made to a civil post under this rule except upon the recommendation of the competent authority.

(2) Subject to the provision of sub-rule (1), a defence service officer shall be appointed to such civil post which is commensurate with the rank held by him in the defence service immediately before his release or retirement.

(3) A defence service officer appointed to a civil post under this rule shall be subject to such rules, regulations or terms and conditions of service as are applicable to other incumbents of the civil post.

4. Secondment of defence service officer to civil post.– (1) A defence service officer may, on the recommendation of the concerned service headquarters, be seconded to such a civil post which is commensurate with the rank held by him in the defence service.

(2) A defence service officer seconded to a civil post shall be appointed on such terms and conditions as may be determined by the Government.

5. Fixation of seniority of defence service officer appointed to a civil post.— (1) Subject to sub-rule (2), a defence service officer appointed to a civil post shall take his seniority inter se with effect from the date of his commission in the defence service.

(2) The period of break of service of a defence service officer, if any, between the period of his release or retirement and appointment to a civil post, shall not be counted towards seniority in the civil post.

(3) Notwithstanding anything contained in sub-rules (1) and (2), a prematurely or compulsorily released or retired defence service officer shall lose such period of their commissioned service as may be fixed by the concerned service headquarters and intimated to the Establishment Division through the Ministry of Defence.

6. Promotion not to be effected, etc.— (1) Any person promoted to a higher post before the commencement of these rules shall not, on account of the fixation of seniority of defence service officer, be effected.

(2) A defence service officer found senior, due to application of these rules, to a person promoted to a higher post shall be promoted to such post as and when vacancy occurs and, on such promotion, he shall take seniority with effect from the date of promotion of junior officer.

7. Seniority of defence service officer appointed to civil post prior to commencement of rules.— The seniority inter se of defence service officer appointed to civil posts prior to commencement of these rules shall be reviewed and their seniority inter se shall be fixed according to these rules.

8. Application of general principles of seniority.— A general principle of seniority shall be made applicable in cases where seniority inter se cannot be determined in accordance with these rules.

By order of the
Chief Martial Law Administrator

D.S. YUSUF HYDER
Additional Secretary in-charge

Committees/Commissions formed in Post-independence Bangladesh to Recommend Measures in the Administrative System of the Country.

<u>Sl. No.</u>	<u>Year</u>	<u>Names of Committees/Commissions</u>	<u>Main Focus</u>
1	1971	Committee on Administrative Reorganization	Organizational set-up of Bangladesh in the wake of independence.
2	1972	Administrative and Services Reorganization Committee	Service structure.
3	1972	National Pay Commission	Issues relating to salaries.
4	1977	Pay and Services Commission	Service structure and Issues relating to salaries.
5	1982	Martial Law Committee for examining organizational set-up of Ministries/ Divisions/Directorates and other organizations	Rationalization of manpower in public sector organizations.
6	1982	Committee for Administrative Reform and Reorganization	Reorganization of district/ upazila and field level administration.
7	1984	National Pay Commission	Issues relating to salaries
8	1985	Secretaries' Committee on Administrative Development	Promotion in civil service.
9	1985	Special Committee to Review the Structure of Senior Services Pool (SSP)	Structure of the Senior Services Pool.
10	1987	Cabinet Sub-committee	Review of issues relating to SSP and promotion.
11	1989	Committee to re-examine the necessity of keeping certain Government offices in the changed circumstances	Necessity or otherwise of keeping certain Government offices.
12	1989	National Pay Commission	Issues relating to salaries.
13	1991	Commission for Review of Structure of the Local Government	Structure of local government.
14	1996	National Pay Commission	Issues relating to salaries.
15	1996	Administrative Reorganization Committee	Structure and rationalization of manpower across Ministries/ Departments/Directorates, etc.
16	1997	Local Government Commission	Strengthening of local government institutions.
17	2000	Public Administration Reforms Commissions	Scrutiny of the entire gamut of public administration and governance in general.
18	2002	Committee to review the recommendations of various commissions and committees on administrative reforms	Scrutiny of previous committees' recommendations.

Source: Adapted from PARC Report, Volume I, p. 5.

[The Pay Scales Obtaining in the Government Services since July 1997]

<u>Scales</u> or <u>Grades</u>	<u>Basic Pay per Month</u>	<u>Remarks</u>
I	Taka 15,000 (Fixed)	For Secretary to the Government.
II	Taka 12,900 - 350 x 4 - 14,300	For Additional Secretary to the Government.
III	Taka 11,700 - 300 x 6 - 13,500	For Joint Secretary to the Government.
IV	Taka 10,700 - 300 x 8 - 13,100	
V	Taka 9,500 - 260 x 10 - 12,100	For Deputy Secretary to the Government.
VI	Taka 7,200 - 260 x 14 - 10,840	For Senior Assistant Secretary.
VII	Taka 6,150 - 225 x 16 - 9,750	
VIII	Taka 4,800 - 210 x 16 - 8,160	
IX	Taka 4,300 -185 x 7 - 5,595-EB-195x11 - 7,740	For Assistant Secretary/Assistant Commissioner.
X	Taka 3,400 -170 x 7 - 4,590-EB-185x11 - 6,625	For Assistant Secretary/Assistant Commissioner.
XI	Taka 2,550 -155 x 7 - 3,635-EB-170x11 - 5,505	For Assistant Secretary/Assistant Commissioner.
XII	Taka 2,375 -150 x 7 - 3,425-EB-155x11 - 5,130	For Assistant Secretary/Assistant Commissioner.
XIII	Taka 2,250 -135 x 7 - 3,195-EB-140x11 - 4,735	For Assistant Secretary/Assistant Commissioner.
XIV	Taka 2,100 -120 x 7 - 2,940-EB-125x11 - 4,315	For Assistant Secretary/Assistant Commissioner.
XV	Taka 1,975 -105 x 7 - 2,710-EB-110x11 - 3,920	For Assistant Secretary/Assistant Commissioner.
XVI	Taka 1,875 -90 x 7 - 2,505-EB-100x11 - 3,605	For Assistant Secretary/Assistant Commissioner.
XVII	Taka 1,750 -80 x 7 - 2,310-EB-90x11 - 3,330	For Assistant Secretary/Assistant Commissioner.
XVIII	Taka 1,625 -65 x 7 - 2,080-EB-75x11 - 2,905	For Assistant Secretary/Assistant Commissioner.
XIX	Taka 1,560 -60 x 7 - 1,980-EB-65x11 - 2,695	For Assistant Secretary/Assistant Commissioner.
XX	Taka 1,500 -50 x 18 - 2,400	For Assistant Secretary/Assistant Commissioner.

Source: Government Order No. SRO 242-Law/97/MoF/FD(Impl)-1/NSP-1/97/217 issued by the Ministry of Finance on 21 October 1997.