

**POWER POLITICS IN THE
ASIA-PACIFIC REGION:
THE CASE OF CHINESE MODERNIZATION**



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Mohd Aminul Karim

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A thesis submitted for the degree of Ph.D in Political
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Ataur Rahman


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ABSTRACT

POWER POLITICS IN THE ASIA-PACIFIC REGION: THE CASE OF CHINESE MODERNIZATION

- Mohd Aminul Karim


The world has witnessed epoch-making changes in the late 1980s and early 1990s. The end of the Cold War ushered in a new era and marked a distinct phase in the history of human civilization. It was not the end of the history. The intensity and suddenness of the changes had shaken the whole world. The pre Cold War political and security equations have become obsolete. The dormant nationalistic and religious aspirations are finding expressions often accompanied by violence. There has been a triumph of market based economics, nationalism and pluralistic democracy. The dominant regional powers have now become more assertive. All these changes have naturally affected the politico-strategic equations in the Asia-Pacific region. And the game of *power politics* lingers on.

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This study would evaluate the likely post Cold War politico security developments around the Asia-Pacific region showing basically the interactions of the players and specially the projected role to be played by China. The Dissertation shows how the Chinese military modernization fits into or impinges the *power politics* game in the Asia-Pacific region specially centering around Taiwan and South China Sea. The key question is: why is China going for massive military modernization? Implicit in it is the role of the regional powers of the South and Southeast Asia and, to some extent, Russia whose inputs that impinge on the scenario would also be delineated. The role of the only superpower i.e. the United States in the area would also be adequately focused showing action-reaction cycle. The end product would boil down to an understanding of the implications of the *power politics* between the two military and economic giants in the region. The findings of the study would help us

understand vividly the likely implications/ fall outs or the action reaction cycle of the *power politics* basically between the two military and economic giants i.e. China and the United States in the region. However, Chinese military modernization drive would be the core area of the study. As outcome of the research, some confidence building measures, and multi level cooperation etc may be suggested.

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ACRONYMS

Abbreviations

AAW

AEW&C

APEC

ASEAN

ARF

BISS

BMD

CAC

CMBs

CMC

C4ISR

C3IRS

CCP

CIA

CTBT

DDGs

DPRI

DOD

EU

FSU

Meaning

Anti Air Warfare

Airborne Early Warning and Control

Asia Pacific Economic Community

Association for Southeast Asian Nations

ASEAN Regional Forum

Bangladesh Institute of International and
Strategic Studies

Ballistic Missile Defense

Chengdu Aircraft Corporation

Confidence Building Measures

Central Military Commission

Command, Control, Communication,
Computer, Intelligence, Surveillance
and Reconnaissance

Command, Control, Communication,
Intelligence, Reconnaissance and
Surveillance

Chinese Communist Party

Central Intelligence Agency

Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty

Guided Missile Destroyers

Defense Policy Review Initiative

Department of Defense

European Union

Former Soviet Union

Abbreviations

Meaning

GMD	Guided Missile Destroyer
GDP	Gross Domestic Product
GLONASS	Global Navigation Satellite System
GNP	Gross National Product
GPS	Ground Positioning System
GSD	General Staff Department
IRBM	Intermediate Range Ballistic Missile
IT	Information Technology
ICBM	Inter Continental Ballistic Missile
IMF	International Monetary Fund
LACM	Land Attack Cruise Missiles
MAD	Mutual Assured Destruction
MIRV	Multiple Independently Targeted Reentry Vehicle
MND	Ministry of National Defense
MRV	Multiple Re-entry Vehicle
MRBM	Medium Range Ballistic Missile
MR	Military Region
NIC	National Intelligence Council
NSSP	National Security Strategy Paper
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NMD	National Missile Defence
NPC	National People's Congress
OSCE	Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe
PLA	People's Liberation Army
PLAN	People's Liberation Army (Navy)
PLAAF	PLAN Air Force

Abbreviations

PPP

PRC

PWUMC

PW

RMA

R&D

SCO

SAC

SAM

SLOC

SMF

SLBM

SSBN

SWOT

SMF

TMD

USAF

UN

UNSC

USSR

UNCLOS

WMD

WTO

Meaning

Purchasing Power Parity

People's Republic of China

Peoples War Under Modern Conditions

People's War

Revolution in Military Affairs

Research and Development

Shanghai Cooperation Organization

Shenyang Aircraft Corporation

Surface to Air Missile

Sea Lines of Communication

Strategic Missile Force

Submarine Launched Ballistic Missile

Nuclear -Powered and Nuclear Missile
Equipped Submarine

Strength, Weakness, Opportunity and
Threat

Strategic Missile Force

Theatre Missile Defense

United States Air Force

United Nations

United Nations Security Council

United States of Soviet Russia

United Nations Conventions on the Law of the
Sea

Weapons of Mass Destruction

World Trade Organization

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CHAPTER-1

INTRODUCTION

The Concept of Power Politics

Abstract

Power politics is an age old practice in the human civilization. In the Chapter it has been argued that *power politics*, over and above liberalism or idealism, ultimately prevails in the inter-state relations. Power has different components out of which military is a vital one. However, it is buttressed by economic power which is shown in the later Chapter. Ideas of different strategists, coming across different periods of human civilization, have been focused in the Chapter that clearly bring home the point that *power politics* is the order of the day. This conclusion is further substantiated by different events, wars, preparations for war, nature of human beings and systemic constraint of international political system. Anarchy and imbalance in power distribution system forewarn the states to go for crafting viable foreign and defense policies that serve their interests best. Related to such prevailing international anarchic scenario and as an extrapolation, the terms like Action - Reaction Model, Balance of Power, Engagement, Containment, Deterrence Theory have been theorized in the Chapter which would find their relevance and use by the actors in the subsequent Chapters. In the Chapter, the rationale of the study, its methodology and limitations have also been delineated.

Power as an Ingredient of *Power politics*

1.1. Power is a universal component that is necessary in any transaction. There is a universal craze to get more power, be it economic, military or in power over opinion. This is true in any facet of social life, economic life or political life. Power is essential to survive as an individual, as a social group or as a political group. Every individual, any social or economic unit or a nation - state hankers after power in order to survive as an independent, functional entity. Realists say, "Power is the currency of politics". Power is the basis of interaction between states. Power is an essential element of politics, for there can be no politics without power. Power and politics go hand in hand; they inhabit together to radiate vibrance, vitality and potency. This potency is also essential in international political transactions. Power aspect of international politics is often characterized as evil, since international cooperation gets affected, as claimed by the liberal school of thought. Power cannot be secluded from the concept of *power politics*, since that is the stark reality and dictate of the history. Morgenthau says, "The struggle for power is universal in time and space and is an undeniable fact of experience"ⁱ. Reinhold Niebuhr points out there is "no possibility of drawing a sharp line between the will-to-live and the will to power"ⁱⁱ. As there is always the possibility of misuse of power by some states, therefore, the rationale stands out: other states must have power. "State Power", as Herman Heller points out, "towers over the smaller pluralistic groupings in that it controls the system of law which is set up and perpetuated by state organs"ⁱⁱⁱ. As an extrapolation of the internal dynamics of a state, the external security aspect of a state would need power that would tower over the power of the states that would

assail it. Bertrand Russell, one may say in a crude way remarks in his masterpiece *Power*, “nothing but lack of military force limits the power of one state over another”.^{iv} Chris Brown sees power as a multifaceted and complex notion which can be described under three headings, namely, as an attribute, a relationship and as a property of a structure. Power as an attribute, “is something that people or groups or states possess or have access to, have at hand to deploy in the world.” Traditional accounts offer a list of components of national power, features of which entitle a country to be labelled, as a ‘great’ power, a ‘Middle Power’ or a ‘Super Power’. The attributes may include:

The size and quality of the armed forces; its resource base measured in terms of raw materials; its geographical position and extent; its productive base and infrastructure; the size and skill of its population; the efficiency of its governmental institutions, and the quality of its leadership.

In international relations one is interested more in relational aspect than power as an attribute of a state. Attributes have meaning when placed in a relational context like “whether a country has a ‘large’ or a ‘small’ population is a judgement that only makes sense in relation to some other country.” Robert Dahl offers a classic formulation of relational power when he suggested that power is the ability to get another actor to do what it would not otherwise have done or not to do what it would otherwise have done; the first of these relationships we could call compellence, the second deterrence. “Either way, as can be deduced, power can be measured, not as attribute, only in action, in effect one state has on another. The third dimension of power as Brown highlights, “as a property of a structure is less easily incorporated into realist accounts of the world,

at least in so far as these accounts rely on the notion that power can only be exercised by an actor or agent.” “George Schwarzenberger defines power as the “capacity to impose one’s will on others by reliance on effective sanctions in case of non-compliance”.^{vi}

1.2. Palmer and Perkins, quoting E.H. Carr points out, in its essence, power is an indivisible whole; it should be realized that “it is difficult in practice to imagine a country for any length of time possessing one kind of power in isolation from others”. Examples are obvious like economic power breeds military power. Military power is the ultimate and the most violent form of power, its application results in weakening an adversary’s economy, morale or turn third states against him. Palmer and Perkins, again quoting E.H. Carr, divides power into three categories: military power, economic power and power over opinion. Military power is the end-state, last word, the final court of appeal. “Every act of the state, in its power aspect, is directed to war, not as a desirable weapon but as a weapon, which it may require in the last resort to use.” Palmer and Perkins, like typical realists, opines national power, in the final analysis, is the military power but the military power is the complex outcome of many powers. “Economic power is inseparable from military power, for it is one of its basic components; to say that under conditions of modern warfare economic power is military power is only a slight exaggeration”. Power over opinion is also inseparable from other forms of national power, “for it is always used to stimulate domestic production, fighting spirit and the willingness to sacrifice; and it is used abroad to recruit allies and weaken the enemy.”^{vii} To surmise and to put things in correct perspective as dictated by present day geopolitics, power does not mean only military

power; it is a mixture of capabilities derived from both domestic sources and international activities. As already lime-lighted power is highly relational, dynamic and variable in action and domain. Realists, however, which is the order of the day, would tend to measure and aggregate different elements of power of various states. In order to be an aspiring powerful state, it has to have a strong economy, a modern technologically advanced military and a motivated patriotic manpower. However, to broaden it further, power grows out of capabilities like military strength, demographic size, economic production, resources bases and geographic position. Even geostrategic position of a country in a particular region or sub-region provides certain advantages or disadvantages compared to its neighbours, which can be seen from relational point of view. As a case in point Bangladesh being placed disadvantageously geostrategically, suffers from 'defence vulnerability' or 'tyranny of geography' as the experts call it. It becomes difficult for Bangladesh to overcome this vulnerability through the aggregate of other elements of power. Given the theoretical understanding of what power is all about, let us subsequently see the present politico-security scenario followed by a further theoretical understanding of the concept of *real politic* or *power politics* as has been practised in different cycles of human civilization. Such theoretical concepts would be followed by their application or relatedness by the Chinese in their historical evolution, both through nationalism or ideologically.

Power Politics

1.3. Post Cold War world politico-security scenario has been undergoing phenomenal changes. It has already ended the overriding two-block

power balancing relation of the world. *Power politics*, however, probably never ends as exemplified in the history, although, at this juncture, the economic market forces and democratic pluralism concepts are taking roots almost universally. While rising trends of globalisation are welcome on the one hand; ethnic, religious, localised wars, economic blackmail, diplomacy backed by military means and then outright and naked use of brute military force unilaterally without UN sanction by the rich and super/big powers call for concern on the other. Given the changed *power politics* and economic interaction profile, a question arises: is there any change in the basic *real politicking* posture? Because of the change of some of the actors, due mainly to their economic bankruptcy and power preponderance of the United States, resulting in the loss of balance, there still does not seem to be a change in the basic urge of a nation-state to build a credible and potent military power structure when supported by its economy. This is all the more vivid in the recent occupation of Iraq under the pretext of regime change and destruction of weapons of mass destruction. This *power politics* has taken such a turn that the credibility or the relevance of the United Nations has been put to serious questions. One never knows it may also degenerate like the League of Nations. Such developments are also bound to affect the politico strategic equations in other parts of the world like the Asia- Pacific region. All such developments in the international security environment lead us to gloss over the concept of realism or *real politics* as opposed to idealism or liberalism. It, would, therefore be pertinent here to further delve into a theoretical understanding of the concept of *real politics*. This is definitely the predominant concept which overtakes the concepts of idealism or liberalism time and again in handling the geopolitics, geo-strategy or even

geo-economics as exemplified in different cycles of human civilizations and as clearly articulated by great strategic thinkers like Sun Tzu, Machievelli, Morgenthau, Hartmann, Henry Kissinger, McInder, Mahan, Spykman Mao Tse Tung, Deng Tsia Peng etc. It does not, however, necessarily imply that idealism and liberalism concepts do not impact on the inter state relations. They definitely do: like the value system, international law, democracy, human rights, feminism, ethics etc. These values or standards, although time and again are violated or flouted, they definitely put a kind of moralistic facade to contain the aggressive or aggrandizement posture of the powerful nations. These values are definitely valued by the saner sections of the decision-making apparatus. There is likely to be a balance between the hawkish and dovish elements of the apparatus. Having said so, realists' craze for security and pursuit of autonomy, as the central values of states may appear to be amoral or immoral.⁸ However, realists have a point: individual self interest in a state's behaviour will ensure a greater degree of systemic tranquillity and its citizen's security through power balancing (will be elaborated later in the Chapter) than probably by following the policies based on universalistic moral standards.

1.4. The famous political scientist Thomas Hobbes has talked about human nature being 'brutish and nasty' and national self-interests overtake any other considerations, *real-politics* ultimately come into play. Hobbes also observed power as crucial in human behaviour: Man has a "perpetual and restless desire of power after power that ceaseth only in death". Hobbes believed that "Covenants, without the sword, are but words and of no strength to secure a man at all". Without a strong

sovereign, chaos and violence follow: "If there be no power erected, or not great enough for our own security, man will and may lawfully rely on his own strength and art for caution against all other men".^{viii} Thucydides, may be called the spiritual father of realism, while giving an account of the Peloponnesian War (431-404 B.C.) fought between two Greek City-states wrote, "the strong do what they have the power to do and the weak accept what they have to accept"^{ix}. Ever since the Peloponnesian war, it has been the experiences of empires and nations that an imbalance in economic and political power between the states had resulted in causing wars. "What made war inevitable was the growth of Athenian power", Writes Thucydides about the Peloponnesian War, "the fear which this caused in Sparta". The end result was a clash of interests for power and domination of some states over others.^x ¹⁰ Sun Tzu, a Chinese *real politics* strategist showed rulers "how to use power to advance their interests and protect their survival". He advocated for dependence on oneself rather than any other states and powers. He advised the rulers how to survive in an era when war had become an instrument of power. In the first Chapter of Sun Tzu's masterpiece *The Art of War*, "Called the Strategic Assessments", he emphasizes, "War is a matter of vital importance to the state; a matter of life and death, the road either to survival or to ruin. Hence, it is imperative that it be thoroughly studied". Sun Tzu feels without preparation for war no state can ensure its existence or security. Sun Tzu in his writings means business to harness all facets that beef up the war preparation for the protection of the state. This is, indeed, *real politics* in the real sense of the term.

1.5. Chanakya, in his path breaking *Arthashastra*, formulates six principles of foreign policy out of which one is too pertinent to be mentioned here, "The king shall develop his state, and augment power and resources to embark on a campaign of conquest (not to do so, is to await conquest by another)". Scholars of the *realpolitik* affinity emphasize that the interest of the king, or the nation, is the first imperative of foreign policy.^{xi} Chanakya's formulation about waging *vigraha* or war is quite interesting; it is unambiguous, 'whoever is superior will wage war'. He considered war as an instrument of policy and a power hungry king shall wage war. ^{xii} In the present day world scenario, this assumption may, apparently, appear irrelevant but the second Gulf War, where American military preponderance gobbled up a relatively weaker state Iraq without UN mandate or general international agreement, amply bears relevance to the formulation. In a similar vein, Niccolo Machiavelli, in Renaissance Italy, advised the Italian Princes to meet the ends by any means especially to stay in power and pay attention to war above anything else. Machiavellian, as a jargon in today's political discourse, refers to excessively manipulative power manoeuvres^{xiii}. The infamous advice that Machiavelli gave to his prince substantiates early realist thought as amoral, "[A Prince is] oftentimes necessitated, for the preservation of his state, to do things inhuman, uncharitable, and irregular."^{xiv} German military strategist Karl Von Clausewitz, in the nineteenth century said, "War is a continuation of politics by other means". US Admiral Mahan has highlighted the supremacy of naval power in dominating the world while another German strategist McIndar has limelighted the 'Heartland' theory meaning he who controls the 'Heartland' (Eurasia) would control the world. American geopolitical Spykman prescribed to keep the Old World

(Eastern hemisphere) divided and build alliances in order to dominate it, otherwise American supremacy worldwide would be challenged. It, therefore, boils down that *real politics* is neither time nor culture bound. It is the fact of life that probably can hardly be overshadowed by issues like morality, ideology, human rights, democracy etc as already indicated. This has even been amply exemplified in the recent occupation of Iraq by U.S. led coalition forces and Israel's 'couldn't care less' type attitude to all UN Resolutions calling for solution of Palestine-Israel problem along with military incursions in Palestine or Lebanon whenever it feels its interests are threatened or violated. Israel can afford to do so since it feels it has overwhelming military superiority.

1.6. Morgenthau sees political realism governed by the concept of interest defined as power. Interest is the essence of politics and is not affected by time, culture and place as already shown. Thucydides has corroborated this, gaining experiences of ancient Greece, by mentioning, "identity of interests is the surest of bonds whether between states or individuals". Morgenthau, quoting George Washington and Max Weber, elaborates the concept of political realism in the following way,

A small knowledge of human nature will convince us, that, with far the greatest part of mankind, interest is the governing principle; and that almost everyman is, more or less, under its influence. Motives of public virtue may for a time, or in particular instances, actuate men to the observance of a conduct purely disinterested; but they are not of themselves sufficient to produce preserving conformity to the refined dictates and obligations of social duty (George Washington).

Interests (material and ideal), not ideas dominate directly the actions of men. Yet the "images of the world" created by these ideas have

very often served as switches determining the tracks on which the dynamism of interests kept actions moving" (Max Weber).

Morgenthau concludes, "Power covers all social relationships which serve that end, from physical violence to the most subtle psychological ties by which one mind controls another". A political realist always asks how does any policy affect the power of the nation and he cannot but subordinate other standards or values to those of politics^{xv}.

17. Hartmann also talks about national 'interest' while outlining the concept of power. He defines national interests "as those things that states could or do seek to protect or achieve vis-à-vis other states". He cites the example of the United States which in 1850s-1860s was basically content to merely secure itself from foreign aggression but a hundred years later it found it necessary to fight a war half the world away from the American shores in the shores of Southeast Asia. Again in the twenty-first century it fulfils its vital national interest by fighting a war in the Middle East presumably to ensure the continuous flow of oil although many would argue it is the outcome of 'Clash of Civilization' as outlined by Huntington. Related to the concept of power is the concept of security. Security, as Hartman outlines, "is the sum total of the vital national interests of the state" and it is for national vital interests that a nation would risk war immediately or ultimately; the concept of national security will vary in proportion to the willingness of the nation to risk conflict or war at any given time. As such in international relations, to ensure security a nation either fights a war with the objective to be successful or a deterrence is built in such a manner that a potential enemy would think hundred times to launch an aggression. It, therefore, boils down to the

provisioning of power or lack of it vis-à-vis the states at odds that describes the security arrangements of a state. 'Each state has a power problem and it is fundamental. The power problem is at the core of international relations'.^{xvi}

1.8. Realists view that the basic units i.e. the states pursue national interests in an anarchical international system, by acquiring and exercising power. From this what follows are: (1) States formulate strategic force postures and develop capabilities to pursue their own interests and achieve predictability (that is, 'order') in an anarchic international environment; (2) states cannot be sure of each other's strategic interests; (3) their strategic capabilities are inherently offensive and thus dangerous to each other; but (4) states act rationally and 'defensively' on the basis of their instincts for survival (preserving their sovereignty). To further corroborate the concept of realism, 'six principles of political realism', as enunciated by Morgenthau may be listed here. Firstly, politics is governed which have their roots in human nature, as shown in the study quoting Hobbes. These laws give us the certainty in predicting rational political behaviour. Secondly, the concept of interest defined in terms of power, as already shown in the study, is key to understanding international politics.

There is no room for moral or ethical concerns, prejudice, political philosophy or individual preference in the determination of foreign policy because actions are constrained by the relative power of the state. The 'national interest' which ought to be the sole pursuit of statesmen, is always defined in terms of strategic and economic capability.

Thirdly, the concept of interest remains consistent although the forms and nature of state power will vary in time, place and context. “The political, cultural and strategic environment will largely determine the forms of power a state chooses to exercise”. Fourthly, it is the interest not the moral principles that guide the state behaviour, although a state’s behaviour may have certain moral and ethical implications. There is, however, a tension between moral action and the expedient requirements of political action. States are not moral agents. Fifthly, moral or ethical facade of state, while dealing international politics, is basically designed to confer advantage, legitimacy and further the national interest of the state. Interest is the perennial standard by which political action must be judged and directed. Sixthly, intellectually political realism is different from every other sphere of human concern, may be legal, moral or economic. How does any policy affect the power of the nation is central to this intellectual analysis.

1.9. **Neorealism.** Neorealism is added to the concept of realism; a cursory view about the concept of neo-realism may not be out of place here. Whereas the realists stress on the principles of human nature, the idea of national interest defined in terms of power, the behaviour of statesmen, the neo-realists like Waltz focuses on the systemic constraints of international politics. Waltz highlights the anarchial condition of international environment that imposes the accumulation of power as a systemic requirement on states. “The systemic forces homogenise foreign policy behaviour by interposing themselves between states and diplomatic behaviour.”^{xvii} As already highlighted, neorealism, as limelighted by Smith, drops the concept of human nature and places reliance on the main

features of the international politics on the structure of the international political system. Out of his twelve core assumptions on international politics some of them may be listed here: international anarchy shapes the behavior of the states, states would be penalized by the anarchical system if they fail to take care of their vital interests, states possess military forces to protect their most vital interests, states are preoccupied with survival, power and security, states co-exist in a security dilemma where it finds difficulties between defensive capability and not 'threatening one's adversaries, and states, being unsure about the motivations and intentions of other states, tend to be wary of international cooperation even when they have common interests'. In the traditional view of security, it is the realism, based on military dimension of security, where states are caught up in international power struggle. Notably the two features i.e. anarchy and power distribution that more or less determine the foreign and defense policies of states; you get them wrong and the state may not survive. ^{xviii} Neorealists have broadened their ambit to include the study of co-operation. They also analyze the implications of changes in systemic structure for interstate co-operation in different fields. This attention to co-operation tends, at times, to blur the lines between realism and liberalism.

1.10. **Realism vs Liberalism/Idealism.** Opposed to the concept of realism, liberalism or idealism schools of thought believe that the anarchic condition could be overcome by states cooperating to pursue absolute gains i.e. through collaboration the states gain more than they lose. They attempt to create such regimes or institutions that encourage "shared expectations between states, facilitate inter-state cooperation and provide a

basis for deriving mutually acceptable standards of behaviour".^{xix} Scott Burchill, quoting Fukuyama, posits that the spread of the liberal democratic credential, being the ideology of domestic political order, to the international political arena will eventually bring an end to the international conflict. He further deduces that the world made up of liberal democracies would have less incentive for war paving the way for reciprocating each others' legitimacy. Liberal thought focuses on the individual and protection of human rights in democracy, interaction and interdependence, and law and institutions etc. On the other hand, international scenario is anarchial, as believed by the realists; such scenario "homogenises foreign policy behaviour by socialising states into the system of power politics". It, therefore, brings to the fore the concept of strategic power and security in an insecure world. Liberals, on the other hand, believe that peace is the normal state of affairs. Kant believed peace can be perpetual. War is, therefore, unnatural and irrational. Liberals also believe in the progress and perfectibility of human nature. The so-called disease like war can be treated by the twin medicines of democracy and free trade. Schumpeter, a liberal protagonist, said "war was the product of the aggressive instincts of unrepresentative elites".^{xx} The deduction, that would be implied would show the security and the self-interest of the state lie ahead of morality, even though morality and justice are necessary to the life of the state. There is another aspect of looking at the outcome that comes out of 'hard power' and 'soft power', called the 'smart power', when applied together probably gives better dividend. America, at the moment, is only applying 'hard power' to realize its *power politics* objectives which, in fact, is faltering. Application of 'soft power', which is part of liberalism/idealism concepts, is also a necessity in order to realize

even its hegemonistic objectives, if at all. Dialogue, communication, diplomacy, institutional building and its adherence, value systems should also be upheld and applied in inter state relations, although however, hard power plays preponderant role in deciding the outcome.

Now in the following Table the assumptions that differentiate between the concept of Realism and Idealism are shown:

Table 1

Issue	Realism	Idealism
Human Nature	Selfish	Altruistic
Most Important Actors	States	States and others including individuals
Causes of State Behaviour	Rational pursuit of self-interest	Psychological motives of decision makers
Nature of International System	Anarchy	Community

Source: Goldstein, Joshua S., "International Relations", Third Edition, 1999, Longman, New York, p.55.

1.11. Related to the concept of power some of the terms like the Action-Reaction Model, Balance of Power, Engagement, Containment, Deterrence, etc. may be discussed here for the sake of clarity and focusing. In the game of *power politics* these methods or approaches are usually practised or engendered.

1.12. **The Action-Reaction Model**. The action-reaction cycle, as Bary Buzan concludes, creates a scenario where "states will arm themselves either to seek security against the threats posed by others or to increase their power to achieve political objectives against the interests of others". Bary Buzan, quoting Berghan, Herwig, Kennedy and others shows the definitive illustration of this Model in the study of naval arms race

between Britain and Germany before the First World War. When Germany decided to build a major navy, Britain followed suit in order to “preserve its position as the leading naval power”. Britain outmatched the German naval power by building better quality and more numbers of battleships called Dreadnaught. This model is basically designed due to the anarchic political structure of the international system; it is presumed that each state is a potential threat to others and so one has to take measures to ensure its survivability and well being,

Anarchy at the level of the international system is, therefore, a form of political relations that tends to produce military competition among states along action – reaction lines. Power struggles usually reflect an attempt by one or more states to increase their influence and control in the international system at the expense of others already well entrenched^{xxi}.

During the Cold War, an action - reaction cycle in superpower armaments competition emerged. If one power thought of deploying a ballistic missile defence, to protect its strategic missiles, the other side would, as a reaction, deploy multiple independently targeted re-entry vehicles (MIRVs), in order to compensate with augmented offensive power, and might actually overcompensate. This might prompt the first party both to speed up its strategic defence efforts and also to eventually develop MIRVs. Action-Reaction Cycle generally results in more sophistication, better penetrability, better refinement etc. on the part of both the contenders. This is even true for two developing countries of South Asia i.e. India and Pakistan who are embroiled in an almost never-ending nuclear sophistication game.

1.13. **Balance of Power.** Morgenthau shows 'Balance of Power' "creates a precarious stability in the relations between the perspective nations, a stability that is always in danger of being disturbed and, therefore is always in need of being restored". It may have two functions. One of them is supposed to fulfil the stability in the power relations among the nations which is always in state of flux; the other function is to insure the freedom of one nation from the domination by the other. Morgenthau further shows that independence of respective nations depend on the power of each individual nation to prevent the power of encroachment by other nations^{xxii}. J. Spanier explains that all states are concerned about their strength or power for survival. To offset an opposing power, a state must be, "as powerful as potential aggressors; a disproportion of power may tempt another state. A balance of power is thus a prerequisite for each other's security". Kissinger argues, "the balance of power serves to restrict the ability of states to dominate each other and to limit the scope of conflicts". One state can become so powerful that it dominates the other or else the "pretensions" of the most aggressive member of the international community are kept in check by a combination of the others; in other words, by the operation of a balance of power chosen by prudent leaders. Hartman, while highlighting the significance of power, asserts that, "prudent states do not amass more enemies than they can effectively counter or handle at any one time. If states must deal with two or three adversaries, it would be wiser to concentrate on the strongest one by isolating and separating it from the others"^{xxiii}. The concept of balance of power is associated with realism and has historically been used to explain the actions of states in an insecure environment. This concept was first operationalized among the city-states of ancient Greece and Renaissance

Italy. Chinese are the strong advocates of balance of power concept, although communist ideology is emotionally and rhetorically choked otherwise. This is borne out by Kissinger, while giving out his experience in negotiations with the Chinese,

The Chinese communist leaders coldly and unemotionally assessed the requirements of the balance of power little influenced by ideology or sentiment. They understand that the balance of power involved forces in constant flux that had to be continually adjusted to changing circumstances. Only one principle was inviolate: No nation could be permitted to be pre-eminent, however fleetingly, over the combination of forces that could be arrayed against it, for in that fleeting moment of neglect independence and identity could be irrevocably lost.

..... that in foreign policy national interest overrode ideological differences. Ideological slogans were a facade for considerations of balance of power. Each side would be expected to insist on its principles; but each had an obligation not to let them interfere with the imperatives of national interest – a classic definition of modern Machiavellianism.^{xxiv}

1.14. Palmer and Perkins provide certain characteristics to the concept of balance of power which needs a mention here for emphasis and clarity. **First** the concept is related to equilibrium theory. Only definite thing of history is disequilibrium i.e. it is subject to “constant, ceaseless change, to shifting political patterns and power relationship. The balance of power is concerned with international disequilibrium as well as equilibrium. **Second**, the balance of power systems have proved to be temporary, short-lived, and unstable. **Third**, quoting Nicholas J. Spykman, authors conclude, the balance of power is not “a gift of the Gods” but is achieved by “the active intervention of man”. One can not wait, as the authors deduce, till the balance happens, if the states have to survive. Spykman

said, “they must be willing to go to war to preserve a balance against the growing hegemonic power of the period”. **Fourth**, the balance of power concept generally favours the *status quo*, but to be effective, the balance of power policy “must be changing and dynamic”. **Fifth**, it is difficult to assess when the balance of power has been achieved. Overall comparison in power terms is rough at best, a real balance of power rarely exists, and it is difficult to determine whether the balance, if at all, did exist. **Sixth**, the balance of power concept offers both a subjective and objective view. Martin Wight, giving the example of a historian and a statesman, exemplify,

The historian will say there is a balance when the opposing groups seem to him to be equal in power. The statesman will say that there is a balance where he thinks that his side is stronger than the other. And he will say that his country holds the balance, when it has freedom to join one side or the other according to its own interests

The historian takes the objective view when the statesman takes the subjective. **Seventh**, the balance of power, primarily, is not a means for achieving peace, although due to its effect, for example, peace was preserved, with minor interruptions for a century following the Congress of Vienna. It has tended to increase tensions and precipitate wars. **Eighth**, the balance of power is generally for the great powers, the smaller states are generally the onlookers or the victims rather than players or actors. Spykman observed, “unless they (smaller states) can successfully combine together, “they” can only be weights in a balance used by others. Collectively they may be able to exert some influence upon even the most powerful state. **Ninth**, the authors point out, quoting many commentators, that balance of power is “largely inoperative under present condition”, it

functioned well when it was confined to European State System. The authors observe that there is some merit in the arguments but they insist that balance of power game continues to be played with nation-states as the chief actors.^{xxv} Having given characteristics of balance of power, which in an implied way shows a kind of its irrelevance in the present day state to state relations, it is palpable even in the present day world that power is not absolute but relative among states that affects balance and it is attainable by integration of natural, societal and man-made resources. Balance aims at not to eliminate but to control and manage power. Balance of power is, therefore, an analytical tool for understanding the effects of equilibrium, disequilibrium and paradigm shifts of world *power politics*. It is clearly discernible that with the collapse of the Soviet Union, the equilibrium has been disturbed and a unipolar world has emerged. This unipolarity may be destabilizing and it calls for balancing. In an uni-polar world, as it exists today, trends are clearly visible to tame the unquestionable super power of the world today i.e. America.

1.15. **Engagement.** Policy of engagement is the use of non-coercive means to enhance the *non - status quo* elements of a rising power's behaviour. Engagement seeks to ensure that the growing power is used in "ways that are consistent with peaceful changes in regional and global order". Its objective is to minimize conflict and avoid war without disturbing the existing international order. It is generally suggested that relatively weaker states should keep its stronger states in the neighbourhood engaged in dialogue and communication so that any dispute, irritants or misperceptions do not go beyond control that can

endanger the security of the smaller states. It is true for any geostrategic region or subregion across the board. As a case in point, in South Asian environment, smaller states should keep India, a formidable economic and military power, engaged in order to derive maximum benefits for their security and development. Schweller shows engagement serves three important goals,

First, it enables the status quo powers to gain a clearer picture of the real (as opposed to declared) intentions and ambitions of the rising, dissatisfied power. Second, it is a useful policy for buying time to rearm and gain allies in case the rising power cannot be satisfied and war becomes necessary. Third, it can be used to break up dangerous combinations or to prevent them from occurring in the first place. For these purposes engagement may be seen as an alternative to the formation of a counter balancing alliance that risks uniting the dissatisfied powers into a rival coalition^{xxvi}.

1.16. **Containment**. Containment is related to balancing. While balancing is more offensive in nature, containment seeks to prevent a rising power from further expansion. It is a strategy meant to maintain the balance, not to restore it, when the balance gets disturbed. It is as such, different from the Balance of Power strategy. John Gaddies, however, shows two styles of containment: symmetrical and asymmetrical response. Symmetrical response entails countering the enemy's provocation at the location, time, and in the manner of its original location. Examples are like the US fought the Korean and Vietnam wars and its Flexible Response Strategy. In asymmetrical response, it does not call for response in kind, the defender shifts the location and nature of reaction in a different environment specially targeting the adversary's weaknesses. U.S Cold-war strategies like the much hyped doctrine of 'massive retaliations, the Nixon

Doctrine and Kissinger's shuttle diplomacy and the use of linkages are some of the examples'.^{xxvii} George F. Kennan, the main exponent of containment strategy during the Cold War, basically outlined the U.S. policy for the containment of Soviet Union's expanding power. His writings in 1947 maintained that "the main element of any U.S. policy toward the Soviet Union must be that of a long term, patient but firm and vigilant containment of Russian expansive tendencies". Kennan strongly advocated for a "policy of firm containment, designed to confront the Russians with unalterable counterforce at every point where they show signs of encroaching upon the interest of a peaceful and stable world". Kennan suggested to "promote tendencies which must eventually find their outlet in either the breakup or the gradual mellowing of Soviet power."^{xxviii} Kennan viewed the relationship between Germany and Russia to be critical for European and transatlantic security. Kennan's customized and focused strategy to contain and wear down Soviet Union, whom he (Kennan) thought was an impotent power, served well for America's Cold War. Direction of the War was clear and unambiguous. In military jargon, it is called selection and maintenance of aim for the eventual victory of any war. It really worked marvels for the Americans.

1.17. **Deterrence Theory.** Deterrence theory persuades an adversary to the fact that the cost of his aggression will outweigh the gains he makes in such venture. Deterrence is, therefore "politically meaningful, militarily reasonable, and morally justified". Deterrence demands a credible and potent armed forces and the national will to use them in case of a crisis. The credible defence capability and will to use them in any eventuality are

the two determinants of a credible deterrence. The adversary must perceive it as credible and must never be allowed to interpret it as bluff. In strategic parlance, the nuclear and conventional forces are mutually complementary as are "the war value and peace value of armed forces".^{xxix} Henry Kissinger's ideas about deterrence may be pertinent here,

A gesture intended as a bluff but taken seriously is more useful as a deterrent than a bonafide threat interpreted as bluff. Deterrence requires a combination of power, the will to use it, and the assessment of these by the potential aggressor. Moreover, deterrence is a product of those factors and not a sum. If any one of them is zero, deterrence fails.^{xxx}

Deterrence is as much a psychological concept as a military concept. Its success greatly depends on the perception and assessment made by the potential aggressor. Credibility is always a principal requirement, as already pointed out. In order for the deterrence to be effective, a certain amount of knowledge of it must be communicated to the adversary. If a country develops or upgrades its arsenal in total secrecy, effectiveness of deterrence is not really upgraded. Again sharing too much intelligence might "weaken the deterrent if it were to facilitate planning an attack". Deterrence and defense are conceptually different; however, for practical planning purpose, they are inextricably related.

Deterrence theory is an age-old perception of *power politics* between the nations, but it has acquired a fundamentally new quality with the advent of nuclear weapons. However, a consensus seems to emerge in the opinions of American policy planners. On the futility of deterring a conventional exchange by using nuclear deterrence Morton H. Halperin (former Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Arms Control) says,

“Reliance on nuclear threats to deter conventional attacks lacks any credibility it may have had”.

Robert Mcnamara (former Secretary of Defense) says, “It appears to me to be weakly constructed, weakly argued that nuclear weapons can deter conventional military action by lesser powers - when modern conventional weapons hit targets precisely and overwhelm most opponents”.

General Colin Powell (former JCS Chair) says, “I think there is less utility to these (nuclear) weapons than some think because what they hope to do militarily I can increasingly do with conventional weapons, far more effectively”.

Lincon Wolfenstein (Member, National Academy of Sciences) says, “The argument that nuclear weapons have prevented global conventional wars is open to serious questions”.^{xxx1}

Be that as it may, the other side of the argument is : the principal purpose of nuclear weapons is not to wage but to obviate the occurrence of large - scale war among the major powers - not only nuclear war but also conventional war with the potential for escalation to the nuclear level. However, nuclear deterrence cannot be expected to prevent most forms of conflicts- like insurgencies, civil wars, local international wars or ethnic genocide where probably nuclear power has no vital interests or where its nuclear threat would lack credibility and relevance.

With the notion of nuclear deterrence or conventional deterrence the concept of mutual deterrence naturally comes in; and this concept of

mutual deterrence, in a sense, resembles the classical notion of balance of power in modern guise. Many writers like Bernard Brodie, Hedley Bull, Henry A. Kissinger, Robert Bowie, Robert Osgood, Donald G. Brennan, Thomas C. Schelling, and Herman "treated mutual deterrence, stable deterrence, balanced deterrence, and stable arms balance in terms remarkably reminiscent of earlier treatises on the balance of power" and their theories reflected the same difficulties that characterised the older theory. It is argued that the balance of power does not provide a good theoretical framework for foreign policy decision-making because it does not provide reliable and definite criteria for measuring comparative power and it seeks to achieve unreal balance i.e. it, in fact, seeks to achieve a margin of superiority or a unilaterally favourable balance of power.^{xxxii} It becomes therefore, well nigh difficult for the diplomats, military leaders or the politicians to determine whether a stable mutual deterrence exists and to prescribe a course that should be pursued. Patrick M. Morgan noted that "classic criticisms of deterrence theory turn on the charge that governments simply lack the necessary rationality to make it work, that they are particularly subject to irrationality in times of intense crisis or actual attack."^{xxxiii} Jervis criticized the deterrence theory on the grounds that "it says little about how to change.... .. an adversary or to determine whether changes have taken place". It practically guides the statesmen how to maintain a hostile, mutually dangerous relationship, but not how to alter the situation. The realists argue that the promises of rewards or inducements are less potent than threats of punishment in shaping the interactions of the states.

However, Paul Huth and Bruce Russell, taking the cue from Jervis, reiterated that positive offer of rewards or inducements constitute a logical part of rational deterrence theory and they lament that this aspect of deterrence theory has so long been neglected. This could also be considered as an alternative to deterrence theory as brought out by Richard Ned Lebow and Jamise Gross Stein.^{xxxiv} Again a difference can be made between general deterrence and immediate deterrence as articulated by Patrick M. Morgan. General deterrence "implies a policy stance of regulating an adversary relationship and balancing power over what may be a long period of time, through maintenance of a satisfactory level of forces". War is not, most of time, immediate or proximate. In contrast, the immediate deterrence "implies a specific situation in which one side is seriously considering mounting an attack, whereas the other side is preparing a threat of retaliation in order to prevent it, and both sides realize what is going on".^{xxxv}

The Cold War bipolar deterrence paradigm is gone and is now replaced by a group of states, and possibly also eventually by nonstate actors, having weapons of mass destruction or having programmes that may lead to acquisition of such weapons. Now if the conditions as applied during the Cold War could not be met then the deterrence as a basis for stability is going to be less reliable. The emerging international system, including the break up of several existing states, the resurgence of ethnic-sectarian conflict, religious fundamentalism, the possibility of acquisition of weapons of mass destruction by the non state actors pose a formidable challenge to deterrence. If the emerging paradigm contains a large number of states and non-state actors, the operational requirements for deterrence

would be more complex and the possibility increases that the deterrence as a system would fail.

Rationale of the Study

1.18. Security architecture, as obvious, of the world is undergoing changes. New power blocks or alignments are evolving. However, the United States continues to be the predominant military power even in the Asia Pacific/Indian Ocean region. It is finding its allies with Japan and India, other predominant economic and military powers. This paper's purview would basically be confined to the region of the Asia-Pacific.^{xxxvi}

MAP 1: Asia Pacific Region



Source : www.mapquest.com/asia-pacific

1.19. China-Taiwan relation is a complex issue that may be called the bone of contention for the major powers in the region. South China Sea is a major sea-lane where China, Japan and the United States have their stakes in the flow of oil from the Persian Gulf. It is also contentious because of the Paracel and Spratly island groups and the presence of oil and gas in the

archipelagos. Southeast Asian states are the other stakeholders. India is another rising power, both militarily and economically, which puts its inputs in the power equation of the region. Russia, a Eurasian land power with still tremendous power potentials has also its inputs in the *power politics* of the region. Russia's economic resurgence, due mainly to getting more earnings from export of oil and gas specially to EU, gives it a newer fillip to the *power politics* game of the region. The scenario is ripe for *power politics* to actuate international conduct of the actors. It, therefore, calls for a study of its likely implications. *Chinese power* (military) politics modernization drive is the hub of this research that also involves other powers as shown.

Research Objectives

1.20. Given such *power politics* development Chinese military modernization is to be analysed vis-à-vis the efforts put in by the United States, Russia, India, Japan, Taiwan and Southeast Asian states. The Dissertation basically analyses how the Chinese military modernization, being buttressed by its phenomenal economic power and its drive to attain a great power status stemming from its nationalistic fervour as rooted in its history, fits into the *power politics* or impinges on the security environment of the Asia - Pacific region specially centering around Taiwan and South China Sea. How the Chinese military modernization is changing the *status quo* and balance of power, enhancing China's deterrence and in the process actuating other actors' deterrence posture, giving rise to action - reaction cycle leading to unending arms race in the region etc are being examined in the Dissertation. The Dissertation, as a sequel, also attempts to make an objective analysis of the actors basically

as far as the security considerations and concomitant strategic reaction, alignments / alliance building, and military preparedness etc are concerned. An attempt would be made to satisfy some of the questions like:

- a. Is it evident that due to vibrant economic development China's military profile would continue to be elevated?
- b. Is China challenging the United States militarily including Japan at least to some degree?
- c. Does China mean business in capturing Taiwan as a last resort?
- d. Is China determined to dominate South China Sea?
- e. Is China a threat to the Southeast Asian States?
- f. How far would the military technical co-operation between China and Russia, to beef up Chinese military Modernization, would shape up the relations of two countries?
- g. How much China's military modernisation affects the Sino-Indian security environment, how this is affecting, if at all, India's alignment militarily with the United States in containing or encircling China?

The Dissertation would, in the final analysis, cover the basic objectives and issues of China's military modernization and show its *power politics* implications for the region.

Chapterization

1.21. The dissertation is divided into six Chapters. **Chapter 1** basically introduces the theoretical framework of the Study dealing with the power politics concept and the related terms like engagement, action-reaction model, balance of power, containment, deterrence theory etc. It also shows rationale and organization of the Dissertation. **Chapter 2** deals with modern Chinese history in brief followed by Chinese nationalism concept in its different dimensions including Taiwanese nationalism or sub-nationalism. **Chapter 3** provides a broad brush on the evolving security and strategic environment of the world mainly focusing on the strategic objectives of the two main actors in the region i.e. China and the United States of America. **Chapter 4** highlights the impact of Chinese economic growth in its modernization drive mainly the military modernization. The Chapter has also dealt with the concept of 'economics of defense'. **Chapter 5** highlights the rationale for Chinese military modernization, and different facets and components of military modernization. This is the substantive part of the Dissertation. **Chapter 6** shows the implications the Chinese military modernization would have on its relation with the US, Japan, Taiwan, India, Southeast Asia etc. It shows the action-reaction cycle, balance of power concept in an interactive and applied mode in the Asia-pacific region. It portrays the strategic, political, military etc, implications that may affect the region. **Chapter 7** concludes the dissertation by suggesting certain Confidence Building Measures (CBMs) for the region that may tame the *power politics* urge of the nations concerned.

Methodology

1.22. The Dissertation basically follows the archive analysis, both primary and secondary. Literature from both the Western and Eastern sources has been consulted to come out with balanced and objective deductions. Different scholars/experts have been interviewed by the author himself, as part of primary source, to add more credibility to the research. Authors' own military background coupled with training on strategic subjects in countries like China, Malaysia, India, the United States, and in the National Defense College and Defense Services Command and Staff College, Bangladesh has provided him some insights in making an objective analysis. There are, however, enough scope to carry out further research on the on-going development and changes that are constantly taking place in the Chinese military along with *power politics* of the region.

Limitations

1.23. The data used here may not be precise since Chinese detail official statistics on defense are difficult to be obtained from open sources. However, the deductions drawn are an attempt to get a balanced output of the data collected from variety of sources. However, a US defense analyst Michael Pillsbury's caution is relevant here. He finds difficulties in penetrating China's 'veil of secrecy' that surrounds its military culture influenced by Sun Tzu's emphasis on concealment and deception. It is easy to fall victim to either of the errors i.e. wildly overestimating or underestimating the PLA's capabilities. However, much caution has been taken to offset such limitations.

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- xxix International Military and Defence Encyclopaedia, Volume: 2 (C-F), Trevor N. Dupuy (ed.) pp. 755 - 757.

xxx Henry A. Kissinger, *Nuclear Weapons and Foreign Policy*, Harper and Row, New York, 1957, p. 12.

xxxi Donald C Whitmore "Revisiting Nuclear Deterrence Theory", - March 1998;
File:/Λ\cso 3 lib\share\Deterrence\ Revisiting Deterrence Theory.htm

xxxii Dougherty, James E. and Pfaltzgraff, Jr, *Contending Theories of International Relations - A Comprehensive Survey - Fourth Edition*, 1996, Longman, New York, pp. 374 - 376.

xxxiii Patrick Morgan, *Deterrence: A Conceptual Analysis*, 2nd Ed. (Beverly Hills, CA: Sage, 1983, p 13.

xxxiv Dougherty, James E and Pfaltzgraff, Jr, Robert L. op. cit., p. 383.

xxxv Patrick M. Morgan, quoted in Dougherty James E and Pfaltzgraff, Jr op. cit., p. 393.

xxxvi Paul Dibb describes 'Asia-Pacific'- an area that includes Northeast Asia, Southeast Asia, the Indian Sub-continent, as well as Australasia and the US. For details see Paul Dibb, "The Revolution in Military Affairs and Asian Security", *Survival*, Winter, 1997-98, p.93. On the other hand, J.N. Mak describes 'Asia-Pacific' an area that includes Northeast Asia, Southeast Asia, Russian northern periphery, the US on the eastern rim and Australia and New Zealand in the South. For details see J. N. Mak, "The Asia-Pacific Security Order", in *Asia-Pacific in the New World Order*, (Edited: Anthony McGraw and Christopher Brook), Routledge, London, 1998, p.90. However, the author, keeping in view the above descriptions and Bary Buzan's concept of a region having any of the three characteristics like ' shared characteristics, patterned interactions and shared perceptions', would like to study the areas as shown in para 1.5 of this paper. For details see Bary Buzan, "The Asia-Pacific: What sort of Region in what of sort of World?" in *Asia-Pacific in the New World Order*, (Edited: Anthony MacGraw and Christopher Brook, Routledge, London, 1998, pp.69-74.

Chapter-2

Dimensions of Chinese Nationalism

Abstract

In this Chapter, different dimensions of Chinese nationalism are explored wherein the historical events are deeply ingrained and have impacts on its evolution. It is a civilization by itself which suffered due to imperialist encroachment. However, in the Chapter, as argued, Chinese peculiarities, by and large, remained undisturbed. China has a sense of grandeur and greatness. Its 'Middle Kingdom' mindset is probably still at work. Different historical events dwindled its vitality specially the impact of the Opium War. China woke up, as shown in this Chapter, when Mao Tse Tung led a successful communist revolution. Although ideological rhetorics apparently overshadowed its nationalist fervour, China, as a nation, remains a steadfast adherent to *realpolitics* and truly nationalist. Chinese nationalism, as developed in this Chapter, would like to regain its preeminence through modernization drive. This drive would give it confidence. Chinese nationalism has different dimensions as could be true to others, like state nationalism, popular nationalism, ethno nationalism, super nationalism etc. The peculiar process of assimilation of Chinese nationalism is a play of *power politics* as would be shown in this Chapter. Chinese nationalism suffers a hiccup when it comes to Taiwan, the renegade province of China. Chinese nationalist psyche cannot accept Taiwan remaining separated from the mainland China. Chinese grandeur would suffer, which can be called the *real politics* or vital national interests, if Taiwan could not be united, even may be through a system of

confederation or federation. The Chapter argues it is the nationalism that works as a glue for its unification; and unification involves the other outlying areas of China also.

Chinese Modern History in Briefⁱ

2.1 China's civilization, which finds its roots as far back as 3500 years, has both state and nation centric ambience; the Chinese are proud of their civilization and historical heritage. This civilization is a product of its large territory, huge population, common language and Confucian cultural values that permeates to the entire social fabric of Chinese way of life. The term 'Chung Kuo' (China) itself stands for 'Middle Kingdom' where the barbarians (foreigners) would come, as Kissinger has described, and pay their tributes to the emperor and accept its central and superior position in the then apparent known universe. The military and cultural superiority and prosperity of the Han (206 BC - AD 189); Tang (AD 618-905); Ming (AD 1368 - 1644); and early Qing (AD 1644 - 1911) dynasties elevated further Chinese 'Middle Kingdom' status. China established around itself a system of tributary states and waged war in case of any insubordination. The upshot of China's historical legacy exercises a significant influence on China's post - 1949 strategic thought. Shared memories, beliefs and values, devolving through the historical chain like any other self - respecting nation, shape the international relations of China. It is a huge Asian landmass with rich resources potential. The 'Middle Kingdom' once again transmits its power accretion resolve. Of all the civilizations of pre modern times none appeared more advanced, as Paul Kennedy remarks, and more superior to that of China. In the fifteenth century, Ming Navy was one of the finest in the worldⁱⁱ. In 1420 the Ming Navy had 1350 combat vessels

including 400 large floating fortresses and 250 ships meant for long range cruising. Between 1405 and 1435, Admiral Cheng Ho's fleets 'consisting of hundreds of men and ships visited ports from Malacca and Ceylon to the Red Sea and Zanzibar'. Chinese were the first probably to invent true gunpowder and the Ming Dynasty used cannon to overthrow the Mongol rulers in the late fourteenth century. Emperor

MAP 2: China



Source: www.mapquest.com

Taizu of the Ming Dynasty who despatched the fleet of many ships, as already mentioned, was the "largest-scale and longest voyages in the world before the age of Columbus". The Ming Dynasty was followed by Qing Dynasty in 1644 whose best known emperor Kangxi (1661-1772) restored its rule over Taiwan and resisted the invasion by Tsarist Russia. However, the rapid decline of Qing Dynasty started in the 19th century when Britain smuggled opium into China which was, however, resisted by the Qing government. Britain, like a typical evil and colonial power

imposed opium war on China in 1840, in order to protect its opium trade. The Qing government succumbed to the British by signing the Treaty of Nanjing, called a treaty of national betrayal and humiliation that would be further elaborated in the subsequent paragraphsⁱⁱⁱ. In 1842, through the Treaty of Nanjing that concluded the Opium War, China ceded Hong Kong to Great Britain.

2.2. Chinese memory is still fresh with events like Mongol Invasion, Japanese Occupation, Defeat by the British in the Opium War and the Civil War in the mid twentieth century. Its Qing Dynasty was also defeated by the Japanese in the nineteenth century because China, at that time was 'economically backward, militarily weak and politically corrupt and degenerate', observes General Liu Huaqing, the reformer of present day Chinese military.^{iv} China's recent history i.e. the era between the first Opium War and the establishment of the People's Republic of China (1839 -1949A.D) can be called the period of "humiliation" of China by the imperialists power coming from almost all corners of the world. As a case in point, China was forced to allow the foreign missionaries to proselytise and import opium to drug addict the Chinese people; both were intended to cripple their self - confidence and self - respect and to make them psychologically dependent on the foreigners. This period of 'National Humiliation' had repeatedly witnessed the episodes of foreign barbarism like the Anglo - French burning of Beijing's beautiful summer palace in 1860. Towards the end of the nineteenth century, China was divided into bits and pieces in the form of informal sphere of influence, which were guarded by respective military might of the imperialists.

Britain's sphere of influence was the vast Yangtze valley. Japan's lay in Southern Manchuria and Fujian. Taiwan was ceded outright to Japan in 1895. France's sphere of influence was Southern Guangdong and Guanxi. Germany's was in Shandong, and Russia's in northern Manchuria, outer Manchuria, and Xinjiang. The United States used its influence to prevent the partition of China^v.

In 1900, following the Boxer uprising which manifested an outburst of anti foreign feeling, the imperial government was expelled from Beijing by a joint expeditionary force headed by a German general. The colonialist powers, however, revived the moribund Qing regime. The Chinese continued to fight doggedly all the 'evil powers' and got them-selves resurrected as an independent nation ultimately.

2.3. In 1911, a revolution, led by Dr. Sung Yat Sen, overthrew the 200 odd years old Qing Dynasty and established the Republic of China (1912-1949). In December 1911 Sun became the President of the Republic of China and promulgated a kind of vision of a modernized China called "Three People's Principles: nationalism, people's right, and people's livelihood, the latter usually understood to mean a diluted form of socialism." Sun is, however, revered in both China and Taiwan as the founding father of Republican China. Establishment of Republican China is considered as one of the greatest events of modern Chinese history. They had displayed their invincibility and highly nationalistic fervour. In 1913 Sun was overthrown by a military coup and the state of affairs continued to be in doldrums till Mao Tse Tung intervened with his socialist political philosophy and concomitant military (people's war) strategy. Mao Tse Tung had to fight the nationalist forces led by Chiang Kaishak and the Japanese occupation forces. Chiang became the President of the Republic of China in 1927 and remained so till he was forced to

retreat to Chongqing to escape the Japanese invasion in 1937. He survived the Second World War as an ally of USA and Britain; Chiang was, however, comprehensively defeated by the communists led by Mao Tse Tung between 1945 and 1949 and fled to the island of Taiwan. He ruled the island till his death in 1978, when he was succeeded by his son, Chiang Ching - Kuo; his son turned out to be a successful reformer. Mao Tse Tung who followed had awakened this nation from opium addiction and united them and gave them back their age-old identity. Mao took great pride in proclaiming himself as the great unifier of his country. Mao Tse Tung expressed these sentiments in September 1949 just before the establishment of the People's Republic of China,

The Chinese have always been a great, courageous, and industrious nation; it is only in modern times that they have fallen behind. And that was due entirely to oppression and exploitation by foreign imperialism and domestic reactionary governments. ---- Ours will no longer be a nation subject to insult and humiliation. We have stood up^{vi}.

Although Chinese way of life is evolving and taking care of one contradiction after another – even going to the extent of almost full market economy, much to the contrary to the Marxist socialism – Alan Lawrence argues that there is much commonality between the ‘traditional Chinese acceptance of Confucian authority and compliance with the demands of Communist State’. The author further shows there is a fine element in the politics of China which can be identified as Maoist which ‘emphasizes ideology and continuing revolution’. He tends to show it as ‘radical, fervent and the approach tends to show ‘faith before works’^{vii}. Mao strongly emphasized full harmony between theory and practice. He was, however, by any definition, a revolutionary and a strong believer in *power*

politics, although at times it got overshadowed by ideological rhetoric. Again, Deng is also a typical realist mostly, apparently, devoid of ideological jargons. However, in the historical process of waxing and waning, typical Chinese characteristics - its faith, its invincibility, its cohesiveness, its perseverance, its sense of grandeur never got distracted. Deng was a believer in modernization overtaking the tone and tenor of revolutionary zeal and enthusiasm and that is how he is branded a realist *per se*. The fine difference in the perceptions and realization of the Chinese way of life between these two great leaders is found in Kissinger's comments about Mao Tse Tung,

Until his death he was quintessentially Chinese in never doubting the cultural superiority of what he wrought. He resisted modernization because it would destroy China's uniqueness, and he fought institutionalization because it banked China's ideological zeal ^{viii}.

2.4. Deng Xiaoping had given them the vision and direction for a forward and outward looking, progressive modern nation. Deng's vision was thoroughly pragmatic taking care of the market forces, although socialism, as there inherited way of life, both in politics and economy, was not done away with. Deng emphasized on development and modernization; let the pragmatism not ideology guide the path. Deng's famous statement is relevant here, "It does not matter if it is a black cat or a white cat. As long as it can catch mice, it's a good cat". Since Deng's regime China has pursued a modernization drive that is ruthlessly pragmatic and nonideological. Deng was followed by Jiang Zemin in 1989 when China was discredited by the western world for suppressing its democracy chanting revolutionaries at Tiananmen Square in Beijing. Jiang Zemin continued to bolster the economic development although it restricted the

political freedom and the freedom of speech. Jiang Zemin's 13 years in power saw its "GDP jumped from tenth place in the world to sixth, and the dollar value of its exports rose to fourth largest in world^{ix}. Jiang Zemin exudes lots of confidence while formulating the Chinese strategy of coming out as a formidable power which is also substantiated in the *Foreign Affairs* as quoted in Chapter 4,

In the new century, China has entered a new stage of development whereby we will make an all out effort to build a society in which people will enjoy a comfortable life and speed up our socialist modernization drive. Our goals are to basically realise modernization by the middle of the century and build China into a rich, prosperous, strong, democratic, culturally advanced and modern socialist country. ^x

This modern outlook and development are picking up each and every day that is passing. More over, their economic development coupled with other development like agriculture, science and technology and defense is simply stupendous. "Strengthening national defense is a strategic task in China's modernization drive, and a key guarantee for safeguarding China's security and unity and building a well - off society in an all - round way"^{xi}. It is no more a sleeping giant as Napoleon once remarked. China in the twenty first century is a superpower in its own right, not in imitation or emulation of the 'Soviet Union' or the 'United States', but as reflection of Beijing's position in the global politics, observes Paul Kennedy.^{xii} Professor Fitzgerald also puts it that " The Chinese view of the world has not fundamentally changed as already pointed out; it has been adjusted to take account of the modern world, but only so far as to permit China to occupy, still, the central place in the picture"^{xiii}. China has, time and again, shown it could go alone; this resilience or confidence is the outcome of its size, large population, and, most importantly its endurance

as a nation over several thousand years. It is even borne out by the fact that during 1960s - when it had economic collapse following the Great Leap Forward and then the divisiveness of the society surfacing during the Cultural Revolution - it dared confronting the then two superpowers of the world i.e. the U.S. and the Soviet Union simultaneously. However, in '60s and '70s when the Chinese and the Americans were making moves towards normalizations of relations Kissinger provided the Chinese with olive branch towards rapprochement, which was, in fact, actuated by "the rapid and relentless Soviet military build up in the Far East". Kissinger, however, made it clear, in the game of triangular diplomacy, he was not playing the "China Card". His objective was the state of equilibrium with, of course, curbing Moscow's geopolitical ambitions where, however, America did not like to provoke China towards confrontation with the Soviet Union. America's geopolitical assessment was: if Moscow reduced China to impotence militarily, the whole Soviet military weight would be directed against the Americans.^{xiv} China once allied itself with the Soviet Union to challenge the United States and again later it allied itself with the United States to challenge the Soviet Union; today it is the No 1 contender of the United States in the Asia - Pacific. Now the course of history stands today in the perspective when Paul Dibb even goes to the extent of saying that China has the potentials to contend with the United States for leadership of the world in the twenty-first century. Chinese propensity to occupy a central position in the world politics profusely speaks of its deep ingrained nationalist fervor, its greatness as exemplified in historical evolution, and its predominant 'Han' ethnic chauvinism that has generally moulded the Chinese nationalism. However, Chinese also have a cultural civilization that embraces other ethnic groups both inside China and in its

periphery. So the concept of Chinese nationalism has a very wide connotation which would be explored in the subsequent paragraphs. Although the Chinese, suffered the 'Century of Humiliation' - a blot in their body politic - it plays the game of *power politics* in a coolheaded way so that its centrality as a nation is never compromised.

Chinese Nationalism in Perspective

2.5. Nation-states are still the vibrant units that determine the international relations of the day. The Westphalian concept, although under challenge by some - especially when stateless terrorist groups are operating and undermining the sovereign status of different nation-states- is very much in vogue. Its alternative is far from sight. A nation denotes somewhat a subjective tone. It presupposes the will of the people to live together under centralized control. The concept of 'will' is the most important factor determining the status of nation although other contributing factors like race, ethnicity, language, shared values, culture and history are also in play. There can be no pure race, or for that matter no single most important attribute that can pointedly show that the nation is there. Earnest Renan discarded the view that ethnographic considerations could play any part in forming a nation. He shows France is at once Celtic, Iberic, and Germanic. Similarly Germany is Germanic, Celtic and Slave. He says, "The truth is that there is no pure race and that to make politics depend upon ethnographic analysis is to surrender it to chimera. The noblest countries, England, France and Italy are those where the blood is the most mixed"^{xv}. In a similar vein, another author says, "How is it that Switzerland, which has three languages, two religions, and three or four

... races is a nation, when Tuscany, which is so homogenous, is not one?"^{xvi} His other definitions of nation merits due consideration and is fully to the context of this Dissertation. A nation according to him "Presupposes a common past, it is summarized however in the present by a tangible fact, namely consent, the clearly expressed desire, to continue a common life. A nation's existence is a daily plebiscite"^{xvii}. According to Renan, nations are not eternal entities for they will have their beginnings and they will have an end. The nation is 'a soul, a spiritual principle' like it is characterized by a deeply felt sense of being a 'community of shared destiny'. Hans Kohn and Hugh-Seton-Watson's definitions shown respectively are also relevant here: "The most essential element (in a nation) is a living and active corporate will." "A significant number of people in a community considers themselves to form a nation or behaved as if they formed one"^{xviii}.

2.6. Anthony Smith says, 'nationalism refers to the whole process of the growth of nations and nation states, sentiments of attachment to and pride in the nation, an ideology and language (or discourse) extolling the nation, and a movement with national aspirations and goals'^{xix}. Weber considers nation as a political concept. He defined it as 'a community of sentiment which would adequately manifest itself in a state of its own'. It, therefore, boils down to the fact that nations, as distinguished from other communities, have a urge for statehood. ^{xx} "The components of nationalism can be briefly shown: the world is divided into nations each with its own character and destiny, the nation is the sole source of political power and loyalty to it overrides all other loyalties; everyone must belong to a nation, if everyone is to be truly free; to realize themselves, nations

must be autonomous; and nations must be free and secure if there is to be peace and justice in the world. The goals of nationalist movements are national identity, national unity and national autonomy'^{xxi}.

2.7. Lucian Rye observes that 'China, is a civilization pretending to be state'; it however, plays down the fact that China has the history of pre-modern statehood. Joseph Levenson argued that China's move to modernity was a move from culturalism to nationalism; and it worked as the basis for organized political life. "Stretching back to ancient times, China has been a state that was centrally administered in accordance with an enduring civic ethos, laws, administrative hierarchy and so forth".^{xxii} Chinese civilization was, in fact, state centric. Lavenson's description of transition into modern era as that from culturalism to nationalism was, therefore, partially correct. Having pointed out so, the main aim of Chinese nationalism is not only to promote and protect the national interests of China but also to restore 'greatness' as highlighted by Kissinger in his book *The White House Years*. China wants to regain its pre-eminence as quickly as possible. Chinese nationalism aims to regain national confidence through modernization drives especially economic and acceptance of the concept of 'Greater China'. Snyder sees different forms of nationalism in different areas of the world like fissiparous nationalism in Europe, black nationalism in Africa, anti colonial nationalism in Asia, politico-religious nationalism in the Middle East, popular nationalism in Latin America, melting-pot nationalism in the U.S and Messianic nationalism in the former Soviet Union^{xxiii}. 'When it comes to Chinese perspective, to start with, we may correlate state versus popular

nationalism; and super versus ethno nationalism'. Let us first examine the state and popular nationalism. State nationalism, in Chinese context, refers to any doctrine, ideology or discourse in which Chinese Communist Party identifies itself parallel to the nation it self; its goal embody those of the nation and one essential to its nationhood. Another way of looking at it is: the state sponsors, controls and invents the content of patriotism and cultural symbols of the Chinese nation; interests of the nation are identical with those of the nation and therefore, the state represents and protects the national interests of China in international affairs.^{xxiv} On the other hand popular nationalism refers to popular national sentiments that generally are engendered from below. It grows naturally whereas state nationalism has to be nurtured and sustained by the state machineries. The desire of the people of Hong Kong, Taiwan, Macao, Tibet etc.- the issues where certain contradictions are in place over the interpretation of their status in international arena__ to live or not live together with the main land China, dominated by the Han nationals may be with 'one state, two systems' approach, can be branded as popular nationalism. The overall feeling of animosity of the cross section of the people of China against Japan mainly over colonization of China especially during the 'Century of Humiliation' or over the ownership of the disputed Diaoyu islands also represent the popular nationalism of China. It is generally believed that modern Chinese nationalism was blossomed by the defeat of China by Japan in 1895. It was at this point in time that the national psyche got a jolt that China - conceived both as a state and a nation - was close to its death trap.

2.8. Confucianism is a great impinging force to mould the Chinese popular nationalism. This can be also called cultural nationalism.

Confusian values like unity, morality, respect for authority, the importance of hierarchical relationships can be branded as the ingredients of this cultural nationalism. Confucianism can be called the "moral foundation" for China which can go a long way in creating a harmonious society, as the present day Chinese leadership is appealing to its people to strive for Chinese nationalism, as against Marxism and crony capitalism, may turn out to be double-edged weapon for it may give rise to anti- Japanese or anti - American populist slogans. Confucianism carries the message that it is also pacifist and non-threatening to other nations. Cultural nationalism emphasizes the ideological function of traditional Chinese culture in maintaining political order.^{xxv} One of the basic ingredients of Chinese political culture that survived till the late twentieth century was authoritarianism. It impinges heavily in shaping its political system.

Hierarchical values of superior-inferior and subordination, loyalty, and obedience prevailed over those of equality; and in which there was a historical predisposition towards official secrecy; a fear of officials and official power; and a traditional repugnance for courts, lawyers and formal laws that protected individual rights. Thus, when Western democratic values and institutions were introduced, China's political culture and institutions were ill prepared to embrace them^{xxvi}.

Another important component is: foreign values are always suspect in China, as foreigners had repeatedly declared war on China in order to advance their own national interest. China is inclined to view that the dissemination of Western liberal democratic values was just another effort to enhance the Western political power. Kissinger's opinion about Chinese

people may be worth mentioning here,

Chinese people have survived not by exaltation but by perseverance, not by spurts but by a steady pace. They have become great by a unique blend of culture, common sense, and self-discipline. Their greatest leaders find themselves assimilated sooner or later by this enduring mass of individualists who will suffer but not change their essential character and who understand, even when they cannot articulate, that in China ultimate stature goes to those who can reduce historic goals to the human scale. Chinese people are talented but also skeptical, aspiring but also conscious that no one man's institution, however tremendous, can provide the answer to the dilemmas of history.^{xxvii}

2.9. In the process of moving from 'Empire' concept - it is an age old ingrained and inherited concept-to nation-state concept, ethno-nationalism has emerged. It emphasizes on one ethnic nationality based on a unique culture and history and it also stresses identity difference, as in the now-familiar claim that 'we are different from the Han (Hanren)'. The rise of the ethno-nationalism and resurgence of different cultural identities of the minorities was a reaction to the assimilation process, undertaken by the state and the dominant Han nationality that occurred during the Cultural Revolution. Chinese super-nationalism on the other hand, relates to overseas Chinese nationalism or a borderless nationalism. Overseas Chinese are considered as a great force for China's economic development and taken as a bridge across Taiwan Strait which would ultimately lead to political reunification. Chinese all over the world tend to portray themselves more nationalistic as they protect the Chinese image and prestige abroad. However, the row over the unification with Taiwan having other connotations would be covered in the subsequent paragraphs. Before delving into the Taiwanese nationalism issue, let us

analyze the characters of national identity of China. As already shown, nationalism embraces within its spectrum the will of the people to live together, a sense of belonging and a sense of security, a feeling of national pride and so on and so forth. All these feelings or aspects are inextricably linked to national identity. Different conflicting views of Chinese national identity can be shown in the following Table:

Tabel-2

Characters of National Identity Constructs
Sources of National Identity

		Traditional	Modern
The Strengths of National Identity	Weak	Han national identity	Socialist national identity
	Strong	Confucian cultural national identities	Civic and Territorial national identity

Source. Baogang He and Yingjie Guo, "Nationalism, National identity and Democratization in China", Ashgate, Aldershot, Brookfield, 2000, P.7

Statist and socialist identity corroborates the Chinese nation, linked up with the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), state and socialism. This is an imposed construct which, however, has sustained for last more than fifty years. Chinese nationalism has to remain loyal to communist party-state institutions. Theoretically, as per political parlance, there is no substitute to socialism although in economic policies China is extensively following the open market system. According to an exclusivist 'Han' view of national identity the Chinese are taken to be belonging to 'Han' nationality which embraces the People's Republic of China (PRC) and the compatriots of

Taiwan, Hong Kong, and Macao. 'Han' is identified as 'the core' of the Chinese nation. Officially Han chauvinism is condemned and defines China as a poly-ethnic political community. Han identity is not defined in terms of race since the so-called 'yellow race' would include 'Japanese, Koreans and others also. Culturally, the Chinese are a community sharing the same culture specially the Confucianism, regardless of their ethnic origins and political beliefs. It includes the Chinese elsewhere in the world. In case of Chinese identity based on Civic and Territorial Identity, all the people living within PRC are shown as the citizens of China, regardless of their ethnic, cultural and racial background. Liang Qichao spoke about greater nationalism to bring within its ambit the Manchu, Mongols, Uighur and Tibetans into the nation; Sun Yat-Sen talked about rising above existing ethnic Chinese identities to create a new 'national people'; and Chiang Kai-Shek argued ethnic Chinese could not have separate identities since they resided in the peripheral areas which were part of greater Chinese race. With the collapse of communism in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe, the Chinese Communist leaders are redefining the communist ideology by supplementing it with more nationalistic fervor or characteristics in order to enhance the credibility and legitimacy of the government.^{xxviii} Fareed Zakaria's observations may also be pertinent here,

Having abandoned communism, the Communist Party has been using nationalism as the glue that keeps China together. And modern Chinese nationalism is defined in large part by its hostility towards Japan. Mao is still a hero in China despite his catastrophic policies because he unified the country and fought the Japanese. And as China advances economically, Chinese nationalism only gets more intense. Scratch a Shanghai Yuppie and you will find a virulent nationalist- on Taiwan, Japan and America^{xxix}.

The National Identity Question-The Case of Taiwan

2.10. Official claims to Taiwan, according to Christopher Hughes, waxed and waned in accordance with the ups and downs of nationalist or revolutionary fervour of CCP belief and governance. When the revolutionary ideological fervor rose, the Chinese claims to Taiwan faded but there was resurgence when there was a stronger emphasis on nationalism. Thus there was no specific mention of Taiwan in the Chinese 1954 and 1975 constitutions. 'Liberation' of Taiwan is mentioned for the first time in the preamble to the March 1978 constitution (during Hua Guofeng) and again as 'reunification' in the preamble to the 1983 constitution (under Deng Xiaoping).^{xxx} Be that as it may, both Mao Tse Tung and Chiang Kai-Shek believed that the Chinese nation state included both the mainland and Taiwan. Question of independence of Taiwan did not rise at all during the regime of Chiang Kai-Shek. However, since 1978 with the democratization process, the unification forces are gradually eroding while pro-independence forces have increasingly grown in Taiwan. The Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) has challenged the assumption that Taiwan is simply a province of China. It even dares proclaim Taiwan is one unique nation and is entitled to have its own independent state. People of Taiwan are divided into two groups: 'benshengren', the people from the province of Taiwan and 'waishengren', the people from the other provinces of China i.e. Mainlanders. The call for independence has more supporters with the Taiwanese than with the Mainlanders. The question of Taiwanese issue is more a political issue rather than a cultural or ethnic one. Taiwanese are Chinese or Hans but what matters is the will of people of Taiwan. China's territorial integrity,

however, involves not only securing present national unity but also reunification with Taiwan. Taiwan's independence move would encourage secessionism in other parts of China. An independent Taiwan will provide leverage to the separatists of Tibet and Xinjiang which China, keeping in view her long term security and territorial integrity objectives, can not afford to accommodate as would be true for any nation-state. Moreover there is no racial difference between Taiwan and Mainland which, however, exists between China and Xinjiang. China is trying, at the moment, keeping the military option always open as a last resort, for reunification by marginalizing Taiwan through economic and diplomatic maneuvers. When we take into consideration the nationalism concept theoretically what is of prime importance is the sentiments of the people of Taiwan, not probably Chinese state nationalism, argue two Australian experts Baogang He and Xingjie Guo^{xxx1}. KMT's old state nationalism concept linked to the project of unification, is waning when DPP's independence posture is gaining ground; it is, however, going short of outright declaration of independence.

2.11. Wang Pengling, a Chinese Philosopher in exile in Holland, proposes constructive nationalism which calls for the reunification of the Mainland with Taiwan through a constitutional democratic state.^{xxxii} Friedman calls for a super-national concept to tackle the national identity conflict. He says "Beijing can not insist on coercively imposing unification and Taipei can not insist on absolute independence. That is, democratic confederation is the projected content of a greater Chinese (*Zhonghua*) nationalism that can contain all of China's challenging diversity".^{xxxiii} Federalism with confederate characteristics could be one solution; this could be the

interpretation of Deng's Concept of 'One nation, two systems'. Deng proposed that Taiwan would enjoy a high degree of autonomy, the power to keep its own army and certain powers in foreign affairs such as signing commercial and cultural agreements with foreign countries.^{xxxiv} Taiwan would also have its own currency. PRC would represent China in the international arena and Taiwan would recognize the sovereignty of China and its (Taiwan's) military arm would not constitute a threat against China. Chinese commonwealth could be a model for a solution. Beijing is considering a federal system to unify China with Taiwan.^{xxxv} Although Beijing makes significant concessions in Deng's formula of 'one country, two systems' as shown, people of Taiwan are expecting, from the new generation of leaders in Beijing, if this could be taken a step further. They would like Taiwan to "have a more secure international status and room for manoeuvre". China's increasing of diplomatic stanglehold could fuel anti-Chinese resentment that might add strength to Taiwanese nationalism which so far has not been able to go to the grass root. After all young generation's experience about China is its threat posed by the missile tests and military manoeuvres.^{xxxvi} Anyway China is still trying the peaceful, gradual, sequential, diplomatic methods for reunification. May be the Chinese are following the famous dictum of their strategist Sun Tzu who said, "Subjugating the enemy's army without fighting is the true pinnacle of excellence". However, it keeps on sharpening its military wherewithal for a military campaign for a forced reunification. China, under any circumstance, would not tolerate full independence of Taiwan. Taiwanese nationalism, in whatever state it may be, is likely to surrender to Pan-Chinese or super nationalism of China.

- ⁱ As revealed the Xia Dynasty (2070-1600 B.C.) was the first to rule China whose activities, however, centred around western section of modern Henan province and southern section of modern Shanxi province. Xia Dynasty was overthrown by the Shang Dynasty (1600-1046 B.C.) whose written records are available. It was followed by the Western Zhou (1046-771 B.C.) Dynasty. Spring and Autumn (770-476 B.C.) and Warring States (475-221 B.C.) era advanced silk production and started steel production. These periods are also known as dynamic cultural periods that produced several of the world's greatest philosophers : Lo Zi, Confucius, Mencius, and Sun Tzu whose masterpiece *The Art of War* is one of the best sellers even today. Emperor Qin Shi Huang (259-210 B.C.), the first emperor of the Qin Dynasty, established the first centralized, unified multi-ethnic feudal state in Chinese history. He built the Great Wall that stretches far 5,000 km in northern China. Qin Dynasty was overthrown by Han Dynasty in 206 B.C. Emperor Wudi (140-87 B.C.) expanded the territory of the empire from central plains to the Western Regions (Present day Xinjiang and central Asia). The Emperor Pioneered the famous "Silk Road" from today's Xi'an, Shanxi Province, through Xinjiang and central Asia, and on to the east coast of Mediterranean Sea. Qin Dynasty was followed by the three kingdoms period (220-265), the Jin Dynasty (265-420) the Southern and Northern Dynasties (420-589 and the Sui Dynasty (581-618). Tang Dynasty was established in 618 when Buddhism flourished in China. In 960 Song Dynasty followed the Tang Dynasty when China made spectacular development in astronomy, science and technology. In 1206 Genghis Khan established the Mongolian Khanate when in 1271 Kublai Khan, a grandson of Genghis Khan founded the Yuan Dynasty (1271-1368) and made today's Beijing the capital. Kublai Khan formed a united country that brought Xinjiang, Tibet, and Yunnan under its firm control. During Song-Yuan period, the four great inventions of the ancient time i.e. papermaking, printing, the compass and gunpowder were further developed, and spread abroad (Source : China 2003, New Star Publishers, Beijing, 2003 (First Edition), pp. 37-43)
- ⁱⁱ Kennedy, Paul, *Rise and Fall of the Great Powers*, Army Education Press, Lahore, 1991, pp.5-7
- ⁱⁱⁱ *China, 2003*, New Star Publishers, Beijing, 2003 (First Edition), pp. 43-44
- ^{iv} Huaqing General Liu, "Defence Modernisation in Historical Perspective", in Michael Pillsbury eds. *Chinese Views of Future Warfare*, Lancer Publishers, New Delhi, 1997, pp.116-117
- ^v Garver, John W, *Foreign Relations of the People's Republic of China*, PRENTICE HALL, New Jersey, 1993, pp.1-5
- ^{vi} *Selected Works of Mao Tse Tung*, Vol-5, Foreign Language Press, Beijing 1977, pp.16-17
- ^{vii} Alan Lawrence, "China's Foreign Relations Since 1949 *World Studies Series*", Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1975, pp.8-9
- ^{viii} Kissinger, Henry, *The White House Years*, Vikas Publishing House, New Delhi, 1979, p. 1065
- ^{ix} *East Asian Strategic Review 2003*, The National Institute for Defense Studies, Japan, June, 2003, p. 160
- ^x Jiang Zemin's Message to the Sixth World Chinese Entrepreneurs Convention at Nanjing on September 2001. Available at Appendix D, China Report, volume 38, Number 1, January - March 2002.
- ^{xi} *China's National Defense in 2002*, Information Office of the State Council of the People's Republic of China, Beijing, December, 2002, p.11
- ^{xii} Kennedy, op. Cit., p.590
- ^{xiii} Quoted in Garver, John W., op. cit., p. 14
- ^{xiv} Kissinger, Henry, op. cit., pp. 763-764
- ^{xv} Renan, E. "What is a Nation ? " in *Nation and Narration*, in Homi K Bhabna ed., 1990, Routledge, London, p.14.
- ^{xvi} Umut Oz Kirmli, *Theories of Nationalism - A Critical Introduction*, Macmillan Press Ltd, London, 2000, p. 35
- ^{xvii} *Ibid*, p.19

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- xxviii Quoted in Amena Mohsin, *The Politics of Nationalism – The Case of the Chittagong Hill Tracts in Bangladesh*, UPL, Dhaka, 2002, P-8
- xxix Anthony D. Smith " The Problem of National Identity: Ancient, Medieval and Modern?" in *Ethnic and Racial Studies*, Volume 17, Number 3, July 1994, PP. 375-99
- xxx Cited in Umut Oz Kirimili, *op. cit*; pp. 34-35
- xxxi Ibid
- xxxii Quoted in Michael Yahuda, "The Changing faces of Chinese nationalism - The dimensions of statehood", in *Asian Nationalism*, Michael Leifer (Ed.), Rutledge, London, 2000, p.22
- xxxiii Louis L Snyder, *The New Nationalism*, Ithaca Cornell University Press, 1968
- xxxiv Li Xing 'On the Concept of State Nationalism', *Beijing daxue xuebao*, 1995, No 4, PP. 74-80.
- xxxv Chen x i, "Nationalism among Chinese Intelligent ", in *China Strategic Review*, Vol. 1 No 6, 1996, P-10.
- xxxvi "People's Republic of China Country Report", in *Global Studies-China*, Tenth Edition, McGraw Dushkin Company, Connecticut, p. 43
- xxxvii Henry Kissnger, *Years of Upheaval*, *op. cit*, p.64.
- xxxviii Baogang He and Yingjie Guo, *op cit*. pp. 5-10
- xxxix Fareed Zakaria, "Does the Future Belong to China?", *Newsweek*, May 9, 2005
- xxx Michael Yahuda, "The Changing faces of Chinese nationalism", in *Asian Nationalism*, Michael Leifer (Ed.) *op. cit.*, p. 30
- xxxii Baogang He and Xingjie Guo, *op cit.*, 108-122
- xxxii Wang Pengling, "Sources of Chinese Nationalism -On the Transformation from Revolutionary Nationalism to Constructive Nationalism," *Modern China Studies*, No.2, 1997, pp. 101-127
- xxxiii Edward Friedman, "A Democratic Chinese Nationalism" in J. Unger ed, "*Chinese Nationalism*, 1996, New York: ME Sharpe, Inc, p.180.
- xxxiv Chen Qimao " The Taiwan Strait Crisis: Its Crux and Solutions", *Asian Survey*, vol. XXXVI, No II November, 1996, P. 1056.
- xxxv *China's Constitutionalism News Letter*, No2, June 1994, p-24.
- xxxvi Christopher Hughes, "Post Nationalist Taiwan", in *Asian Nationalism*, Michael Leifer (Ed.), *op. cit*. p. 79

CHAPTER 3

SECURITY AND STRATEGIC ENVIRONMENT

Abstract

The Chapter basically gives an overview of the security and strategic environment of the Asia Pacific region. It shows the security issues and interests of two predominant powers i.e. U.S.A and China. How the role of the regional powers impact on the *power politics* of the predominant powers has also been explored. In the Chapter it is shown that Taiwan is the main bone of contention around which the security strategies of both the actors are hinged and crafted. There are, however, other flash points like South China sea and Spratly and Paracel island groups which have the potentials to draw the main actors or even the regional powers to get locked in the *power politics*. As a matter fact, China is actively beefing up its military wherewithal to take care of any eventual conflict in the area. As a matter of fact, China's military is being calibrated and upgraded in a way, as would be shown in the subsequent Chapter that could take care of launching offensives in Taiwan and in South China sea if the eventualities so demand. American military strategies are also being geared to take care of Chinese offensive specially in respect of Taiwan. The Chapter concludes that both the powers will get involved militarily in case there is a show - down over Taiwan. In a scenario like this Japan will definitely get involved since American and Japanese security interests are intricately interlinked. Southeast Asian countries are, however, trying to have a neutralist posture and also trying to maintain an equal distance from both the powers. Its efforts to engage the powers in dialogues are laudable. India's role is

getting tilted towards U. S. to contain or encircle China in the *power politics* game. India - U.S military cooperation is now a reality; on the other hand extensive military technical cooperation between China and Russia is going on for quite some time.

International and Regional Power Structure

3.1. The bipolarity during the Cold War was basically decided or vectored the *power politics* or the international relations of the day. Now with the demise the Cold War, there are positive moves towards market based economics, political pluralism, globalisation and a spurt in regionalism, and negative moves towards intensification of sub-national, ethnic and religious identities and the rise of locally dominant powers in many regions as already mentioned. On the international strategic arena, the powers are classified by geopolitical, demographic, economic, military, and traditional criteria in which geopolitics has significant importance. Keeping these criterions in mind, Huntington develops a power pattern of the world today in the following manner. He shows, following America, which is at the moment the "Lonely Super Power", there are six other major powers i.e. Russia, Japan, China, Germany, the UK and France. Following them are emerging powers of the third world of which India is currently the most predominant one¹. Huntington further argues that today's international relations are still changing along the crucial dimension of *power politics*. Cold War global power structure was bipolar but the emerging power structure is quite different. It is neither unipolar, as generally understood; nor bipolar that existed during the Cold War; nor multipolar, having several major powers of comparable strength. It is a hybrid, a uni-multipolar with one superpower and several major powers.

Huntington sees the pattern at three different levels, somewhat resembling 'the three-world theory', once outlined by Mao Tse Tung, although its perspective was different. At the peak is the United States followed by major regional powers that are pre-eminent in their respective areas. They are German - French condominium in Europe, Russia in Eurasia, China and potentially Japan in East Asia, India in South Asia, Iran in Southwest Asia, Brazil in Latin America and South Africa and Nigeria in Africa. At the third level, are the secondary regional powers whose interests often collide with the more powerful regional states. These are Britain in relation to German - French condominium, Ukraine in relation to Russia, Japan in relation to China, South Korea in relation to Japan, Pakistan in relation to India, Saudi Arabia in relation to Iran and Argentina in relation to Brazil.ⁱⁱ These classifications are, as obvious, the outcome of *power politics* considerations.

3.2. Another author, which has relevance to Huntington's classification, generally ranks the powers as Great Powers, Middle and Small Powers. The scope of interests and capability of intervention of the Great Powers reach out beyond their borders. Middle and Small Powers do not have such characteristics. The Great Powers have the roles to act, while the Middle and Small Powers are acted upon. In the Asia-Pacific region, pointing specifically, the classification can be shown, as the author describes, in the following manner. In the group of Great Powers fall the United States, China, Japan, Russia and India. The United States is the single super power having extra ordinary political, economic and military clout, and global influence. China is an emerging power with an

increasingly greater role in the regional and world economy and political influence in the Asia-Pacific. Japan is an extra ordinary economic power whose military and political influence do not match its economic vibrance. Next in the row is Russia which is still having a strong military force, including nuclear weapons. Lastly, India, although is mainly confined in the South Asian region, is viewed as a rising power. In the group of Middle Powers falls Indonesia, Korea, and Vietnam. Having occupied important geopolitical positions and being objects of great powers rivalries, these countries play an important role as balancing power. In the group of Small Powers falls Laos, Cambodia, Singapore, Brunei, and Marshall Islands. "These countries can only make worth-while stands when they are engaged in alliances or alignments with other actors".ⁱⁱⁱ

3.3 As a matter of fact, the major powers specially China, at this point in time, are increasingly asserting themselves to promote their interests, which in the long run, may conflict with those of the United States. David Murphy, in *Far Eastern Economic Review*, concludes both China and the EU share common concerns about the American unilateralist. He substantiates his argument by sharing the comments of EU Commission President Romano Prodi, "Both of us want a multi-polar world in which we have many active protagonists. This is a Chinese priority and it is a European interest." This is, however, more of an altruistic statement than that concerns the *real politics* which is borne out by the fact that China wants the EU arms embargo, imposed after the 1989 Tiananmen Massacre, be lifted; even if the embargo is lifted, European arms are unlikely to be sold to China because of separate restrictions imposed under an EU "Code of

Conduct.”^{iv} Given that this “Code of Conduct,” may be overruled specially by France - Chirac’s government decided to expand its economic cooperation with China, arms became an important component in that strategy - President Bush urged the European Union to reconsider plans to lift a 15 year old arms embargo on Beijing, and the leaders of Europe politely but clearly declined. Urging Europe to maintain the embargo, Bush spoke of Americans’ “deep concern” that resuming weapons sales “would change the balance of relations between China and Taiwan”. However, the scenario is more complicated than can be deduced straightway. China’s defense budget is a fraction of America’s \$ 500 billion; so European firms would not like to offend the Americans at the moment. In December 2005 European Council announced its decision to lift the embargo but it also stated that the result should be neither a “quantitative or qualitative” increase of arms exports to China. So why lift the ban if that has no impact”^v. British BAE systems, Europe’s largest defense company, EADS, the Franco - German Conglomerate and Dassault of France are not, at the moment, thinking of military sales to China. But the probability, however slim it could be, should not be ruled out in the long run. Both the options can be evaluated in the following way. In case EU decides to lift the ban, there would be retaliation from the U.S. Congress in the form of ban on the export of American sensitive technology to Europe. This would be good enough to keep some European firms like British BAE systems, UK’s largest defense company, to stay out of business with China. However, for other European firms, lure of China market is too strong to resist and “they will find specious justifications for their sales”. The most specious justification was offered by French Defense Minister who concludes that “European exports will stop China’s

development of its own capability in high-tech systems". Unless everybody is convinced that lifting of ban would result growth in the trade between E.U. and China, E.U. is unlikely to export anything really nasty. German Chancellor Gerhard Shroder declared that his nation "has no intensions whatsoever of delivering weapons to China".^{vi} Again an interesting development in Europe, created over a debate on US's involvement in Iraq and its unilateralism, could be the new polarization where French - Germany Condominium, with the support of Russia, may give rise to a new security understanding that may challenge the United States in the long run. However, it may be premature to come to such a conclusion at this time.

3.4. There are today three established schools on the relationship between wars and changing orders. The crux of the relationship boils down to the fact that with the change in the existing power equation, the possibility of war increases.^{vii} This brings to the fore the concept of Balance of Power as propounded by Morgenthau who posits Balance of Power operates successfully unless either the weaker yields to the stronger or war decides the issue. What Balance of Power is supposed to fulfil is stability in the power relations between two contending powers; but this power relation is always in a state of change which is essentially unstable as already elaborated in Chapter 1.^{viii} Menon, an Indian strategist mentions that the multipolarists view that if the powers are distributed equally (balancing) chances of war are diminished. Preponderance theorists view otherwise i.e. stability is not achieved with a number of states having equal power and it is achieved only when everyone knows who is the top dog. All these

postulations have been contradicted by Mansfield who posits that if the inequality or balance between powers was constant there would usually be international stability.

3.5. Huntington and Paul Kennedy's forecast that due to America's 'imperial overstretch', it might degenerate into a simple major power, is contradicted by Brzezinski who said, 'America will be the first, last and only global superpower'^{ix}. Is the preponderance environment going through changes? This is a big question. Is the sleeping giant like China waking to challenge of the formidable might of the United States? Paul Dibb identifies China as one power having potentials to contend with the United States for leadership in the twenty-first century.^x Tow also identifies China, along with Europe (including Russia) and United States, as "one of the three great centres of geopolitical influence and its economic and strategic weight, combined with its vast population and cultural influence, will affect the rest of Asia well into the twenty-first century."^{xi} 'China may well be the high Church of *real-politik* in the post-Cold War world'.^{xii} Asia - Pacific region is turning into an epicentre of world economics and strategic affairs. China is massively modernising at least by Asian standard. India is also moving ahead. Japan has the potentials even to overtake China. Southeast Asian nations are also picking up in military modernisation. America - Taiwanese military co-operation and recently US President's commitment to defend Taiwan militarily in case of Chinese invasion does not bode well for the geopolitical environment of the world at large and the Asia Pacific region in particular.

Geo-strategy of the Region

3.6. Geo-strategy, the main strand of classical geopolitical thought, links between political power and geographic space; it can also be seen, as Harkavy observes, as a body of thought on specific strategic prescriptions based on the relative importance of land power and sea power in world history.^{xiii} The key concept is the strategic geography that appreciates the factors of location and size and militarily important terrain, maritime choke points and areas containing critical resources. It differentiates the territories of one state from other, thereby selecting neighbours and more convincingly friends and foes. Geographical location may impose constraints while it may also provide opportunities that would have far-reaching implications on policy and strategy. Gray challenges the theories of MacInder and Mahan who have basically talked about the superiority between the land power and sea power; he argues it is the reflection of overall superiority of the elements of power that matters. He questions if technology, communications and culture, geo-economics and joint warfare have impacted on the traditional theories of geopolitics. Over here Grays' questions are quite pertinent and relevant. He is absolutely right in raising such questions. Gray further concludes that seemingly economic success may be more attractive, but it may turn out to be a fiasco in case of military failure.^{xiv} Geo-strategically, the region draws world attention. South China Sea and its island territories, East China Sea, China-- Taiwan Straits, border disputes between India and China, Tibetan status, Central Asian Republics (presumably rich in gas and oil) are some of the hotspots that have the potential for wider conflagration and involvement of the extra regional powers. America has already entered inside Afghanistan and other Central

Asian Republics apparently to eliminate terrorism but ultimately to control the oil and gas rich fields of the region. New polarization is taking place in Europe. Strategic competitions are visible. Issues are available and, therefore, *power politics* cannot be kept under lid. Geopolitics of the region gives rise to evolving strategic prescriptions of the actors. Geostrategy of the actors concerned are, therefore, geared to formulate the overall security strategy that may include diplomatic, economic and military options. Geographical constraints, as are in place, would be overcome by superior military wherewithal as argued by Gray. And the actors are moving at quite a fast pace to acquire a superior military arsenal as part of Balance of Power or Acton-Reaction cycle concepts.

Chinese Security Objectives

3.7. The traditional Chinese concept of security can be gleaned from the old Chinese aphorism, “The country that has no enemy in mind will perish”. The opening lines of volume one of the selected works of Mao-Tse Tung read like this: “Who are our enemies? Who are our friends? This is a question of the first importance for the revolution. The basic reason why all previous revolutionary struggles in China achieved so little was their failure to unite with real friends in order to attack real enemies”.^{xv} China’s pre-modern concept of security, as concluded by Johnston, was a “ product of superior military preparations, the application of violence and the destruction of the adversary”.^{xvi} The aftermath of the Century of Humiliation (1939-1945) had taught the Chinese of the importance of *power politics* in international relations and China could not be respected without power. This is aptly manifested in a statement, made by Mao Tse-tung on

Korean War in 1956, "If we are not to be bullied in the present day world, we can not do without the (atomic) bomb".^{xvii}

3.8. Paul Kennedy does not think China would continue to remain a strategic lightweight. Once China has more economic growth, there will be more resultant power political implications. This is evident when China is expanding its scientific/technological base and the impressive achievements it has already made in rocketry and nuclear weapons. He substantiates quoting *the Economist* that in 10 to 15 years down the line Chinese civilian economy should have picked up enough steam to haul the military sector along more rapidly. This then becomes the cause for concern for the China's army, its neighbours, and the big powers^{xviii}. Roy concludes, giving similar opinion, by saying that with rapid economic growth, China has the potential to become the superpower of the twenty first century. With more power China will behave more boldly, more inclined to force its will upon others and expected to attempt to shape the regional and international political systems to suit its interests^{xix}. Lucian Pye predicts, as the ideological overtones in China's nationalistic fervor recedes, China would be bent on acquiring the most sophisticated technology, with a desire to catch up with more technologically advanced nations.^{xx} Such conclusions give credence to Mao's famous saying that political powers come out of a barrel of a gun. However, they always show a façade of pursuing peace, five principles of peaceful coexistence and declared policy that China would never turn into a hegemon. Whatever may be its declared policy China is steadfast in *real politik*. However, Deng Xiaoping, the modern reformer of China, while outlining the security

concept, dismissed the old idea of merely seeking military power and instead suggested for the development of comprehensive power of the country. Crux of Deng Xiaoping's strategic thought consists of peace, development, stability, security and national revitalisation.^{xxi}

3.9. China's perception of security may be summed up like this: China's Security = Military Strength + Domestic Political Stability + National Unification + Prosperous Economy + World Peace. To reverse the formula, the world peace depends on a strong China: "the more China develops, the greater the restraint for war, the greater the assurance for (world) Peace". China's paramount Leader Deng Xiaoping also echoes the similar tone, "the stronger China grows, and the better the chances are for world peace"^{xxii}. This is substantiated by Medeiros and Taylor who conclude China, in recent years, "has begun to take a less confrontational, more sophisticated, more confident, and, at times, more constructive approach towards regional and global affairs." They further build on by commenting that China would like to 'come out of the Tiananmen isolation, revive its image, protect and promote Chinese economic interests, and beef up its security and develop a kind of hedge against American muscle flexing around the world'^{xxiii}. There is a kind of paradigm shift in China's Taiwan Policy - however use of military force remains the final objective - in that it would like to seduce Taiwan by offering economic opportunities^{xxiv}.

3.10. Although the subjective considerations of ideology and traditional Chinese thought are preponderant in Chinese rhetoric, the objective elements of nationalism and *power politics* are supreme in Chinese strategic

or foreign policy objectives. China's modern nationalism draws its inherent strength from the recollections of its ancient grandeur which, however, got badly mauled by the Century of Humiliation as already mentioned in Chapter 2. Modern Chinese leaders like Sun-Yat-Sen, Ching Kai Shek, Mao Tse Tung and Deng Xiaoping always wanted to blot out the humiliation and restore its rightful place in the comity of nations; they, however, never thought China to go back to the Middle Kingdom, although Kissinger has a hunch, when he expresses, that "perhaps the Chinese retained their self-image of being the Middle Kingdom to which the barbarians came to pay tribute"^{xxv}. Restoration of China's national grandeur is also the objective of Chinese nationalism. May be that the Chinese, at this point in time, need much-valued peace for the overall national development including military modernisation. Deng is prudent in considering the economic development --the prime mover for all other developments and has, therefore, geared the national machinery towards that goal. China is opening up economically. It has already got the membership of World Trade Organisation (WTO), but its internal political development is yet to make any stride. Western democracy or political pluralism is still a far-fetched idea. It is a somewhat dialectic scenario: would its economic market forces match well with a regimented, closed, inward looking and monolithic political system? This could be a challenge and an internal threat to Chinese security. This aspect is further examined in Chapter 4. Added to this, it has threat from national separatism and territorial disputes. The former points to separatist movements in Taiwan, Tibet and Xingiang while the later points to the numerous territorial disputes China has with its neighbour^{xxvi}. Pursuit of peace is the declared foreign policy objectives of China. It, however, perceives four major threats

to its security in 1990s. These are: the United States on the question of Taiwan; Japan on the question of Diaoyutal islands and the Japan - US renewal of security treaty in 1997 that enhanced the role of the Japanese forces in Taiwan Strait under 'certain circumstances'; Vietnam on the question of border dispute and South China Sea islands and finally, India on the question of the border dispute and its nuclear explosions in 1998 that have the effect of tilting the Asian balance of power^{xxvii}. Strategically and broadly speaking, Dreyer, taking the cue from Strategic Interaction School, feels China deals with at least four major power blocks; the United States, the Former Soviet Union (FSU), Japan, and Western Europe. Three of these power blocks come together in Northeast Asia which impact directly on Chinese security. Strategic International School would be interested in discerning the patterns of interaction among these blocks^{xxviii}. India, although not considered by Dreyer, is very much an active and predominant actor in the *power politics* that has a direct impact on Chinese security as already shown. Interaction of these power blocks is linked up in a complex network of relationship. Regional or local issues, that China has to confront, would involve either some or all of the power blocks as shown.

3.11. Be that as it may, China, presently, is looking for a peaceful environment around so that it can revitalise its economy and continue national reconstruction with emphasis on four modernizations. "Perhaps most importantly, Chinese leaders are now pursuing a conflict avoidance strategy that affords China the time it needs to modernize its economy, reconsolidate its political system and develop its military capabilities to a

level, commensurate with its national ambitions “^{xxix} Economic prosperity is required for massive military modernization. Military modernization, again would facilitate secure her economic and strategic resources and work as a deterrent for ensuring a peaceful surrounding. Having said so, China, in the final analysis, considers use of military force and the threat of using military force as instruments of foreign policy objectives. China’s strategic objectives are: strengthening national defense, remain all out prepared to meet any foreign aggression, unification of Taiwan with the mainland and establishing sovereignty over the Spratly islands and safeguarding national unity and security^{xxx}. However, China, at the moment, would tend to resolve the border disputes with India, Russia and some of the Central Asian Republics like Kurdistan, Kazakhstan, and Tajikistan, it has, in fact, moved quite a bit in this direction, and thereby ensure peaceful surrounding. China, again, has the declared policy that its military wherewithal is not directed against any country and, therefore, it does not pose any threat to any country. It would also never try to project itself as an imperial power but it calls the United States a *hegemon* that flexes muscle all around and trying to shape the global affairs in its favour.

Taiwan^{xxxi} Issue

3.12. Of the threats, unification of Taiwan by peaceful or military means and establishing sovereignty over the island groups in South China Sea are the overriding and immediate security objectives of China today. Taiwan is an extremely sensitive issue for China, which involves the vital national interest of China; on such issue no self-respecting nation like China, which has a glorious past, would like to compromise. The geopolitics of the Taiwan Strait is a delicate balancing act between Taiwan, China and the

U.S. Just to give a brief background to the problem, Taiwan is an integral part of China, stolen by Japan in 1895 but rightfully returned to China in December 1943 through Cairo Declaration. The United States, Britain and China were the parties to the Declaration; the United States was serious in returning the full sovereignty of Taiwan to China during 1945 and 1946. Moreso, immediately after the Second World War, the United States recognized that Taiwan was Chinese territory. The United States changed its attitude once the communist revolution was successful in mainland China and the nationalist forces led by Chiang Kai Sheik took shelter in Taiwan. America was also concerned about the domino effect when, during the Korean War, China and Soviet Union were determined to expand communism. Taiwan, Americans appreciated, could be a vital link in the chain of containment in the periphery of Sino-Soviet block; Taiwan became a militarily important staging/strategic area. It provided a bastion, which could be easily defended by U.S. air and naval forces, and from here espionage operations could be launched against the central China coast. But the Chinese were emphatic in making a firm precondition on the withdrawal of American military forces from the Taiwan and Taiwan Straits Area for the normalization of relations between America and the mainland China; it is borne out by the events of very special historical significance when hectic diplomatic manoeuvres were going on between

MAP 3: Taiwan and South China Sea

Source: www.mapquest.com

Henry Kissinger and Chou En Lai in late 70 and early '71 through the good offices of the then Pakistani President. Chou En Lai, in a handwritten message in April 1971, passed through President Yahya, meant for President Nixon made no bone in placing the precondition. "If the relations between China and the USA are to be restored fundamentally, the US must withdraw all its Armed Forces from China's Taiwan and Taiwan Straits Area"^{xxxii}. During those diplomatic parleys the Chinese even went to the extent of saying that if the United States were prepared to settle the Taiwan issue, an American special envoy would be welcome in Peking. Kissinger, however, like an astute diplomat had to place the American position, in order to placate the Chinese, in the following manner. "The United States acknowledges that all Chinese on either side

of the Taiwan Straits maintain there is but one China. The United States does not challenge that position”^{xxxiii}. Kissinger himself called it an ambiguous statement. This is how, however, the ice started melting that resulted in the signing of the historic Shanghai Communiqué. In the Communiqué, the United States accepted the one China principle implying Taiwan is a part of China; Taiwan however, was not called a province of China. America reiterated its interests in the peaceful settlement of Taiwan issue and declared, as its final objective, the final withdrawal of all U.S. and military installations from China subject to the prospect of the peaceful settlement of the issue. There was no mention of the 1955 mutual defense treaty between the U.S. and Taiwan in the Communiqué implying China did not object to it.

3.13. However, Chinese literature mentions that while establishing official diplomatic relations in January 1979, the United States formally accepted the “cessation of diplomatic relations” with the Taiwan authorities, the annulment of the “Mutual Defense Treaty” and the withdrawal of all its military personnel from Taiwan^{xxxiv}. However all may not be quiet in the front and Beijing sees the redefinition of Taiwan Relations Act – the legislation that has guided Washington – Taipei relations since 1979 – quiet alarming. *Newsweek* comments the redefinition calls for broader military ties between the United States and Taiwan that is heading for democracy as the United States sees it. The U.S. military offers on card are “training joint forces, setting up a hot line between Taipei and Pentagon and sharing satellite imagery”. Recently President Chen has been lobbying with Taiwan’s Parliament for an \$ 18.2 billion special budget for buying American weaponry. Some of the purchases may include six Patriot

Advanced Capability-3 anti-missile systems, eight diesel submarines and 12 P-3C Orion anti submarine aircraft which would greatly beef up the firepower of the Taiwanese forces. Sinologist David Sambaugh says, "I have been visiting China every year for 25 years and I have never sensed a higher level of anxiety over the Taiwan issue"^{xxxv}. Kissinger comments that the Taiwan paragraph in the Communiqué was not a victory by one side over the other. Ambiguities and complexities are clearly visible both from the historical perspective and the current developments that are taking place centering the Taiwan Strait. There has to be, indeed, a delicate balancing in order to maintain the *status quo*, as already indicated^{xxxvi}. However, China would, in no way, as already shown, compromise on the unification of Taiwan with the mainland, although militarily it is an almost impossible task at the moment especially when the United States got physically involved in thwarting the physical occupation of Taiwan and the developments taking place as shown. However, Allan Collins talks of 'Stick and Carrot' approach adopted by the Chinese in respect of Taiwan at least for the time being. Again the 'stick' approach was not intended to retake Taiwan by force but to avert war. His logic runs like this: "(1) China would have to wage war against Taiwan if the latter declared independence, so (2) military threats would reduce the likelihood of a declaration of independence, and so (3) military threats would make a war less likely"^{xxxvii}. However, China's firmness in its resolve to unify Taiwan with the mainland is borne out by the statement, "it will not forswear the use of force. China resolutely opposes arms sales to Taiwan or entering into a military alliance in any form with Taiwan by any country. China's armed forces will unswervingly defend the country's sovereignty and unity, and have the resolve as well as the capability to check any separatist


act”^{xxxviii}. China’s ‘Carrot and Stick’ approach is also corroborated by Prof Haroon A. Khan of Hendersen State University who thinks China would continue to follow this approach for the time being.^{xxxix} However, militarily, as already stated, it is at the moment an uphill task for the Chinese military to launch an amphibious operation in order to capture the island; it nonetheless is using its policy science to make a political bargain with Taiwan while at the same time China is sophisticating its Navy to extend its kill zone far into the East China Sea, thereby threatening the American ships. Chinese military strategy may turn out to be: to blockade Taiwan while keeping the American Navy at arms’ length. This would provide better political bargain for China and that bargain would aim for eventual political reunification of Taiwan with the mainland with, however, “One state, two systems” approach as that applied in case of Hong King and Macau and as already outlined in the study in the earlier Chapter.

South China Sea^{xl} and the Surrounding

3.14. Within the South China Sea, the Paracel islands and Macclesfield Bank have been the sources of dispute but the Spratly islands area, contested by six claimants, has been on the focus. Recent tensions between Korea and Japan over Tokdo / Takeshima island and the renewal of the long - standing / Diaoyutai island disputes between Japan, China and Taiwan demonstrate the complexity of sovereignty disputes along with underlying resource potential; they may work as sparks for future confrontation at a time when there is a global energy crunch or regional fishing stocks are being depleted. As a matter of fact in the South China Sea, both the Paracel and Spratly island groups have turned into dangerous flashpoints in the Asia-Pacific region. Around six states like

Brunei, China, Malaysia, the Philippines, Taiwan, and Vietnam claim jurisdiction over potentially oil-rich Spratly islands. China, Taiwan, and Vietnam claim the entire Spratly islands while Malaysia, the Philippines, and Brunei claim a portion of it. Geo-strategic and geo-economics aspects of the issue get more focused because the Paracel and Spratly island groups straddle the vital sea lanes of the Asia Pacific Region. China, Japan, and Taiwan are also locked in a dispute over the ownership of Diaoyu (Senkaku in Japanese) Islands farther north in the East China Sea. Five islands of the

Map 4: Spratly Claims and Disputes



So

ource: www.middlebury.edu/SouthChinaSea

group lying 166 km northeast of Taiwan, could provide any one of the stakeholders legal jurisdiction over about 21,645 square kilometres of the continental shelf; the area is believed to be one of the last unexplored hydrocarbon resource areas in the world.^{xli}


3.15. Chinese claim that almost the entire South China Sea belongs to Chinese territorial waters and its refusal to disavow the use of force to back up those claims raises alarm in a number of quarters. South China Sea's importance as a strategic passageway is unquestioned as it contains critical sea lanes through which oil and many other commercial resources flow from the middle East and Southeast Asia to Japan, Korea and China. South China Sea is important for several reasons. Firstly, it is one dispute, which involves more than two Southeast Asian States, and two outside powers i.e. China and Taiwan are also party to it. Secondly, its potential of being gas and oil reserves elevate its economic state. Lastly, any conflict in these critical sea-lanes would straightway jeopardize the interests of the United States, Japan and many other powers^{xlii}. Such hunch is also substantiated by Allan Collins who posits that China maintains its irredentist claims in the South China Sea and its has the propensity to use force; China is basically biding time till its military capabilities are in appropriate shape and then it would take care of Spratly, Senkaku/Diaoyu or even Taiwan^{xliii}. Safety of navigation and overflight and the freedom of sea lanes of communication are critical strategic interests to the United States, which uses the South China Sea as a transit point and operating area for the US Navy and Air Force in Asia - Pacific including Persian Gulf areas. Again South China Sea holds the prospect of

discovering and exploiting valuable natural resources, especially, oil and natural gas that would make great contribution in economic development of the nation. According to a 1995 study conducted by Russia's Research Institute of Geology of Foreign Countries, an equivalent of 6 billion barrels of oil may be available in the Spratly Islands area of which 70 percent would be natural gas. Chinese media has branded South China Sea as "the second Persian Gulf" and some Chinese specialists even assert that South China Sea could contain as much as 130 billion barrels of oil and natural gas.^{xliv} .

3.16. Should China succeed in establishing sovereignty over the South China Sea Islands, it would then extend its jurisdiction over some 1,000 nautical miles from the mainland? China would then command the maritime heart of Southeast Asia with far reaching consequences for the strategic environment^{xlv}. This covers the vital trade routes, as already highlighted, through which Japan brings most of its oil imports from the Middle East and Southeast Asia and its island groups specially the Spratlys would provide outposts for power projection into Southeast Asia. Spratly islands form the most important *terra irredenta* in the South China Sea and the Chinese claim that they have enough historical records to show that these islands are Chinese territories since ancient times^{xlvi}. Some of the strategists make an emphatic conclusion that in the theatre of Asia-Pacific maritime environment, there is every possibility of confrontation between China and other regional maritime power. "This is because China is determined to reclaim long-lost space, influence and resources at a time when after centuries of bloody struggle, land interests

and resources have been divided up and rigidly fixed, while competition over maritime interests (is) still in full swing.”xlvii

Map 5: Maritime Disputes in Pacific Asia



Source : www.middlebury.edu/SouthChinaSea

US Strategic Objectives in the Asia-Pacific

America's Doctrine of Pre-emption

3.17. Former American President Richard M. Nixon in his masterpiece *The Real War* emphatically mentions that the United States would not hesitate to use any means including the military forces whenever its vital national interests got threatened. Present American President Bush's 'Doctrine of Pre-emption' as the national security policy gives America the *Carte blanche* to attack any country, any time and anywhere if it is considered a perceived threat, even without consulting the allies. The right of pre-emptive attacks runs counter to Article 5 of the UN Charter which provides that the right to act in self-defence relates to an actual armed attack not to attack proactively. US National Security Strategy Paper (NSSP) released in September 2002 vows the US will actively intervene and use its resources to shape the political system of the country so as to conform to the U.S. concept of democracy and the so called free world. US, is, therefore, now obliged to shape the world including the internal dynamics of a state even extending to "Private Property". NSSP would also foster market based economic system apart from utilizing IMF and World Bank for furthering US goals, thus ensuring the political agendas for these institutions. Given the broad spectrum of the Doctrine, the world, by and large, turns out to be dangerously insecure. American doctrines are visible on two successive occasions like when Iraq conquered Kuwait and as a sequel the oil reserves in the Persian Gulf and its flow through the Indian Ocean was on the verge of being snapped. This was the state when American vital national interests got threatened and naturally United

States harnessed maximum possible and technologically most advanced weapons to undo the occupation of Kuwait by Iraq. The Doctrine of Pre-emption is implemented in case of American occupation, in total disregard to international law and opinion, of Iraq during the second Gulf War. There were rumours that America would also apply the Doctrine of Pre-emption for Iran and North Korea in case they did not give up their nuclear programmes. The Americans have branded Iraq, Iran and North Korea as 'Axis of Evil' probably with the ulterior motive of applying the Doctrine of Pre-emption. Is the Doctrine of Pre-emption applicable in case of China? Probably not.

China-Taiwan Imbrolio

3.18. However, in case of China, it is the concept of *real politics* - the Doctrine of Pre-emption may not apply - that is very much at work. With the demise of the Cold War American preoccupation with the erstwhile USSR is more or less gone but its commitment to tackle the Islamic terrorism, East Asian security environment or the Chinese power projection possibility in the region etc is visible. As a matter of fact, China is reasserting itself as the predominant Asian power. As rightly pointed out by Zbigniew Brzezinski that dealing with China should rank as one of Washington's four most important international relationships, alongside Europe, Japan and Russia. Peace in North and Southeast Asia is greatly dependent on the state of US - China relationship. He further asserts, "China is too big to be ignored, too old to be slighted, too weak to be appeased and too ambitious to be taken for granted". China is already a major regional player, though not yet strong enough to challenge America's preponderance^{xlvi}. Ross sees America's policy options could be

a choice between “containment” and “engagement”. His comment that “the Taiwan issue and US-Japan strategic cooperation is only the most salient of U.S.-China strategic conflicts in East Asia”. It is very much relevant in the East Asian environment. Ross further qualifies that America could accept Chinese hegemony over East Asia implying the smaller powers would bandwagon China and keep itself away from the East Asian affairs. American policy makers are loath to give away East Asia to China and contend with China for support of other East Asian countries. Balancing could be, as Ross proposes and also supported by a broad cross-section of American foreign policy specialists, the approach in tackling China. Critics of American containment policy say that America is not doing enough to put a check on Chinese military modernization, its arms sale to the Third World and its naval hobnobbing in the disputed territories of South China Sea. Engagement is the other policy option, as already shown, that is compatible with balancing strategy. United States may develop policy that can ‘balance the growing Chinese power, protect its interests and minimize the potential for global, regional instability and bilateral tension’. Engagement strategists argue that if you treat China as enemy it would turn into an enemy; on the other hand if you treat it as a partner, it would not turn into an enemy. For the better management of a rising power like China approaches like bilateral accommodation, societal entanglement, and multilateral accommodation can be mutually beneficial and reinforcing.^{xlix} It can be reasonably deduced America is taking care of all these approaches in tackling China. American diplomacy is quite deliberate in handling China. However, April 1, 2001-- the day when the incident of mid-air collision occurred, could be termed as the first day of a US - China Cold War. China’s handling of the collision so far, Shambaugh

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says "will strengthen the voice of those who want to sell a more robust package of arms to Taiwan".¹ Admiral Blair is reported to have told the Congress that the continuing Chinese missile build up across the Taiwan Strait could force the US to respond.¹¹ US Pacific Command makes no bone in articulating its commitment to Taiwan, "The US government opposes any attempt to unilaterally change the status quo in the Taiwan strait DoD (Department of Defense) has two obligations under the TRA (Taiwan Relations Act of 1979): Assist Taiwan in maintaining its self defense capacity to resist any use of force against Taiwan ...Until China renounces using force to resolve the Taiwan issue, we will maintain sufficient military capability in the region to successfully meet our obligations under the TRA"¹² Dr. Heike Hermanns of Australian National University, however, puts certain preconditions before America gets militarily involved in case China tries to forcefully occupy Taiwan. It would depend on whether America is involved elsewhere around the world and whether China attacks the American armada meant for Taiwan. Again, as she opines, American public is unlikely to accept heavy casualties for Taiwan. Her reasoning appears to be quite convincing. But the *power politics* or geopolitical compulsions of both America and Japan may also give it a different spin. This is borne out by the fact that militarily both America and Japan are well prepared to respond to China-Taiwan military engagement. But again Dr. Hermanns' preconditions, as shown, may also put a damper on such initiative.¹³

3.19 To see things more soberly, the US would not like Beijing use force to settle the PRC - Taiwan issue and it would also not like to give Taiwan's leaders *carte blanche* in their policy choices which will take China to a point

where it would be provoked to use force.^{lv} In the triangular relationship relating to Taiwan, America's position, as the *Time magazine* comments, is the most awkward. America has the declared "one China" policy but is again obligated, by the Taiwan Relations Act, to come to the aid of Taiwan in case China attempts its capture by military means.^{lv} Presently China and America have deep economic ties; China is supporting America's effort to fight the terror and contain North Korea. Added to these America has got deeply embroiled in Iraq and Afghanistan; as a matter of fact it is in quagmire from which it is trying hard to extricate. As obvious, at this juncture America would probably not like to shore up the tensed relations between China and Taiwan. It has to play the *Status Quo* card; it is exemplified that even a superpower has a limit to realize its geopolitical ambitions.

Status of Japan

3.20. Japan - American relation is also relevant here. Japan may be called America's anchor in its relation to China. America's strategic objectives to engage, compete or contain China would invariably be guided by the security considerations and geo-strategic locations of Japan and Taiwan. Just as United States could not have conducted its policy with the erstwhile Soviet Union without carefully 'calibrating' its relations with Europe, so America's policy toward China cannot be shaped without keeping Japan in consideration^{lvi}. As a matter of fact, Japan's security concerns get intermingled with America's. Still Japanese concerns are obvious when it sees China modernizing and expanding its military forces and its willingness to project powers beyond its immediate border. China, even with a small blue water naval capability, could disrupt Japan's SLOC.

Such apprehension is reinforced by China's territorial claim in South China Sea. China regularly despatches 'research ships' and warships into Japan's EEZs around the disputed Senkaku islands. China's test firing of ballistic missiles during 1996 Taiwan Strait crisis, landing within 60 kilometres of Japan's EEZ around Okinawa, cannot be taken in good grace by Japan. However, while continuing to maintain an effective alliance, Japan and the United States would strengthen mechanisms for multilateral security cooperation. Engaging China as a component of this multilateral security cooperation could be considered as a desirable option both for America and Japan. China is also likely to accept such engagement by U.S.-Japan alliance, provided it does not become a security threat to China. Events like 1996 Taiwan Straits Crisis, reaffirmation of US-Japan Alliance, and the dispute over the sovereignty of the Senkaku (Diaoyutai) islands have taken the Sino-Japanese relations to a downturn, from the *real politics* point of view. Japan's security policy at least in the foreseeable future would, however, be crafted within the United States' global strategy of containment. On February 19, 2005, Washington and Japan signed a new military agreement that identified security in the Taiwan Strait as a "common strategic objective". Japanese Ground Self Defense Force (GSDF) has operational plans for deployment in Okinawa prefecture in case of Taiwan Conflict to prevent the possibility of China invading the Island. ^{lvii}China got alarmed at the development that Japan came out of its six decades of "official pacifism" by reserving a right to intervene in the Taiwan Strait. ^{lviii} Presently the Defense Policy Review Initiative (DPRI) is on the card between America and Japan. The Initiative is aimed to "assess the security environment in the region and bilaterally determine the required roles, missions, capabilities and force structure. This will go a

long way to "strengthen the alliance, ensure the defense of Japan and maintain immediately deployable forces".^{lix} American and Japanese officials are considering a proposal of landing military flights in an island with a civilian landing strip, situated halfway between Okinawa, and Taiwan. Japan has also proposed for constructing a port that would be able to berth ships equipped with anti-missile batteries, on the island Shimoji Shima, about 160 km away from the disputed Senkaku island.^{lx} As already indicated this uninhabited archipelago is claimed both by China and Japan. It can be deduced that both Washington and Beijing mean business to go to war over Taiwan, if the threshold for *status quo* is compromised. "Japan will most likely be drawn into such a war, if it were to occur, for US military planning depends on the use of bases in Japan for that emergency".^{lxi} Green argues "Japan's approach to China has shifted from commercial liberalism to reluctant realism in relative rather than absolute terms". He further elucidates that Japan's response to China's growing military capabilities can be alluded closer to balance of threat theory. However, Green makes a somewhat sober conclusion when he says, "that a combination of commercial liberalism/engagement laced with realism/hedging has taken root and this pattern in Sino-Japanese relations will continue for the foreseeable future"^{lxii}. Japan's biggest business newspaper *Nihon Keizai* makes a more blunt report that an advisory team has suggested to Japanese Prime Minister that China be regarded as a potential military threat.^{lxiii} However, there is another side of looking at the scenario rather more practically, as argued by Prof Brij Khare, that as long as Japan is aligned with the U.S., it will not feel threatened by the PLA. This seems to be a very logical deduction drawn, since Japan's impressive military prowess, augmented by America's 'state of the art'

military armada would make PLA a no-match at least at this point in time. Geopolitically, China's immediate concern is Taiwan and South China Sea following; in fact this is the main direction of this Dissertation. ^{lxiv}

3.21. However, Chinese perception is also important here like China has a polygonal view of Japan. As Ian Wilson observes China sees Japan as, "a cruel invader, an economic model, a military threat, and an important source of aid, investment and technology."^{lxv} Given such contradictory perceptions, China has to be extra careful in handling Japan and vice versa. China would also find it difficult to drive a wedge between the U.S. and Japan; however, if Japan is allowed a free hand to decide its own security needs, it would go against the interests of China, since Japanese militarism would reinvigorate out of proportion as exemplified in history and given that the money and sophisticated technology it has readily available.

3.22. The United States wants like Japan to remain allied with it and take over some of its security commitments especially in and around Japanese mainland. The security strategies of the United States and Japan are reinforcing where the United States takes the sword meaning offensive mission and Japan the shield meaning defensive mission responsibilities^{lxvi}. There are historical and psychological animosities existing between China and Japan and the United States would naturally exploit this caveat to contain China. However, United States' relations with China would determine whether Japan remains primarily allied with the United States or arms itself and acts independently in Asia^{lxvii}. US would like to remain allied with South Korea, although eventual reunification of

two Koreas may turn the events differently. Theatre Missile Defense (TMD) concept of the United States has Japan, South Korea and Taiwan in mind. However David Shambaugh opines that both America and China “share common interests in a peaceful, WMD free, economically viable, socially stable and ultimately reunified Korean Peninsula; share a mutual desire for a peaceful resolution of the Taiwan problem and agree on the important “one China Principle”^{lxviii}. Again the other side of the coin is, as pointed out by Huntington, America has three principal strategic interests in the world today i.e. to remain the primary global power, to prevent the emergence of a politico-military hegemonic power in Eurasia and to protect concrete America interests in the Third World^{lxix}. Whatever contradictions that may emerge in the perceptions, the *real politics* dictate that America-Japan military alliance would continue to grow from strength to strength to checkmate the staggering political Chinese influence in the region, even if the common Japanese people would tend to favour more freedom in crafting its our security policy.

US Strategy

3.23. It is suggested that the United States should endeavour to limit Japanese and Chinese power; the first one can be done by continuing US-Japan alliance and second one by encouraging trends towards political pluralism and market economy in China^{lxx}. Another frontier where America has got interest, may be to encircle China, is to befriend India. A parallel can be drawn when America wanted to encircle Soviet Union through *rapprochement* with China during the Cold War; America’s present strategy to cast India in the same role of China of 70’s shows almost a similar analogy. China definitely feels encircled by the growing alliance in

defence among the U.S., India and Japan. 1995 US Department of Defence East Asia Strategy Report looks for balance of power amongst East Asian countries. It recommends forward presence of American forces; develop multi-lateral institutions; develop alliances especially with Japan on a firm footing and from a position of strength, encourage China to define its interests that could be compatible with the national interests of the United States.^{lxxi} In the final analysis, “within the security domain the USA remains deeply enmeshed in the regional military affairs and *power politics*.”^{lxxii} U.S. strategy on joint warfare and emphasis on “littoral” warfare makes it clear that the forces are organised to respond to any defense requirement anywhere in the world. What lies ahead when the U.S. spends around 500 billion-dollar for the defense despite its downsizing the numbers - although it can always call for the reservists as it has done in case of the latest Iraqi war - is anybody’s guess?^{lxxiii}

Role of the Regional Powers

India

3.24. India, by any standard, be it economic, military or technological, is definitely one of the power centres of the world today. Its predominance in South Asia is universally acknowledged; it, however, wants to outstretch beyond the orbits of South Asia - may be reaching out to Asia Pacific region. There are enough indications and manifestations, as also identified by the Americans, to conclude that India wants to be recognized as an Asian or an Asia - Pacific power. The subsequent paragraphs would clearly show that the Americans are going to go for a military alliance with India presumably to check - mate the rise of China. U.S. National Intelligence Council (NIC) that represents 15 spy agencies including CIA

makes a forecast that India would emerge as “unrivalled” regional power in 15 years time. “India will be the unrivalled regional power with a large military- including naval and nuclear capabilities- and a dynamic and growing economy”.

MAP 6: Regional Powers - Asia



Source: www.mapquest.com

“Whatever its degree of power, India’s rising ambition will further strain its relations with China, as well as complicate its ties with Russia, Japan and the West-and continue its nuclear stand-off with Pakistan”. The NIC also forecasts-which is less probable-that India, China and Russia could form a *de facto* geo-strategic alliance in an attempt to counter balance US and Western influence.^{lxxiv} US Presently wants to send the message across that India is its closest ally in this part of the world. Carnegie Endowment, a think tank, made recommendations to the State Department that

America should take five steps to align itself with India:

1) Help India's power to grow to prevent China's dominance; 2) End illusory idea of military balance between India and Pakistan; 3) Endorse India's membership in the UN Security Council, G-8, APEC and International Energy Agency; 4) Remove objections to the Iran - India gas pipeline; and 5) Allow sale of dual-use technology including nuclear safety equipment.

The CIA analysis also calls India a "swing state" that could tilt the balance between war and peace, between chaos and order. It cannot be in the interest of US to allow China to grow unchecked; and by beefing up India's strength US can contain China's influence in the Indian ocean rimlands and Chinese penetration in Myanmar.^{lxxv} US is offering 126 of its most advanced versatile warplanes a combination of F-16 Block 5 or the F-18 super hornet in a \$ 53.5 billion deal. There is already a proposal that the US is selling state of the art command and military satellite technology and equipment, and early warning missile defense system to India which is going to effect the military balance in South Asia.^{lxxvi} The just concluded "New Framework for the US-India Defense Relationship" promises enhanced military cooperation, including joint weapons production and development, further transfer of technology, expanded two - way defense trade, joint patrols of Asian sealanes, and enhanced intelligence exchanges and dual training programmes. Added and related to it is the American - India cooperation in civilian nuclear technology transfer. America knows it violates the Non-Proliferation Treaty whose cause America so long espoused and to which India is not a signatory. America also knows it pretty well this will accelerate nuclear arms race in the region. But America

needs to court India to act as a counter weight to China. So it could not care less whether it transgresses the moralistic stance it so long upheld; this was also the stance of India. All these can be called the most dramatic manifestation of US drive to move aggressively on "resurrecting its long - held desire to enhance presence in this region". Chinese are aware of what is happening. They appreciate that the influential figures in Bush Administration have identified China as a long - term major threat to the U.S. Washington is also pushing Australia to get more involved with Asian affairs, while reinforcing its commitments and linkages to South Korea and Taiwan. American foreign policy pundit Henry Kissinger's views may be pertinent here: "the centre of gravity is shifting from the Atlantic where it was lodged for the past three centuries, to the Pacific". He further observed, "Now India is, in effect, a strategic partner (of the US), not because of compatible domestic structures, but because of parallel security interests in Southeast Asia and the Indian Ocean, and vis-a-vis radical Islam."^{lxxvii} However, Proful Bidwai, a noted Indian journalist asks for scrapping the "framework" Pact with the U.S. He thinks the framework is unbalanced. "It spells India's cooperation as a junior partner or US client, and will erode India's autonomy, dignity, even security. India will make enemies out of its neighbors".^{lxxviii} US efforts to court India for strategic reasons is clear: to act as a counterweight to the rising power China as already highlighted. Washington's objectives are clear: to co-opt an emerging power like India, get access to its burgeoning market, develop it as a counter weight to China and Iran and integrate India into its global scheme of things as a junior partner. This is a clear manifestation of *power politics* in the region. India has apparently accepted such arrangement may be it serves its long-term objectives better.

3.25 In the long run, it, however, considers China to be the main threat to its security followed by Pakistan. China and Pakistan being allied together especially militarily make the scenario somewhat complicated. India thinks China is encircling India by arming Pakistan and other smaller neighbours specially Myanmar. By keeping India tied down to the South Asian scenario, India would, therefore, matter little to outsiders. “China is seeking to keep India strategically engaged through its neighbours” and “keep this country (India) ‘boxed-in’ in the sub-continent.^{lxxxix}”

3.26. India’s long term objective would be to come out, by overcoming its economic and political constraints, of the orbit of South Asia. It seeks to become a qualified regional power. Being aware of increased Chinese modernisation and presence in the region including the Indian Ocean, India has developed and refined its nuclear weapons capable of deterring China and continues to enhance its military cooperation with Russia. Again both from trade-investment and strategic perspectives a more intimate and stable relationship with the United States is inevitably most beneficial for India.^{lxxx} However with its 8-9 percent growth rate in GDP, India’s short and medium term objectives would be to establish non - frictional, normal to cordial relations with the neighbors, and look East, co-operating with the ASEAN countries and looking for a membership with the Asia Pacific Economic Community (APEC). One of the five elements of the much talked about Gujral Doctrine prescribes, “India must go East in search of an Asia-Pacific identity and of larger areas of collaboration with the tigers and dragons and with China and Japan.”^{lxxxii} Presently the relations between India and China are apparently improving although some of the outstanding, complex boundary issues are yet to be resolved.

Both the countries would, in all probability, at this point in time, go for normalization of relations keeping in view their long-term strategic and economic objectives. However, in *real politick* term, both countries are poised against each other both in nuclear and conventional military forces. Roy, therefore, rightly comments, "The Sino - Indian relationship is more cordial than a decade ago, but remains superficial."^{lxxxii} This cordiality-may be superficial-is substantiated by the recent signing of an agreement in Delhi by India and China, to resolve a long-standing dispute over the Himalayan border. India's National Security Adviser told that Indian and Chinese officials had worked out a roadmap for resolving the disputed 3550 Km border. He said "we are very hopeful that this document will be the starting point of a major process in the settlement of the boundary dispute between India and China "In the joint statement, signed between India and China during the visit of the Chinese Premier to India, certain "political parameters" and" guiding principles" were laid down for resolving the outstanding issues specially the border disputes. The outstanding issue on Sikkim has been settled; China has formally given up its claim to the state of Sikkim and the joint statement refers to the state as "the Sikkim State of the Republic of India." China, therefore, recognizes India's 1975 annexation of Sikkim. On the remaining issues of contention, the statement mentioned, the process of negotiation would continue adding "both sides are convinced that an early settlement of the boundary question will advance the basic interest of the two countries."^{lxxxiii} India's claim of China occupying territory in Kashmir while China's claim of India occupying territory in the *Arunachal Pradesh* remain unresolved.^{lxxxiv} However, a trend is very clear: both the major powers of Asia at least for the time being, want a peaceful surrounding, in order to beef up its

economic and strategic clout uninterrupted. Improvement of relations between these two countries may continue to grow which would, however, depend on the successful resolution of boundary and territorial issues.

Southeast Asian Countries

3.27. Apart from the territorial claims with some of the ASEAN countries, these countries generally suffer from the spectre of Chinese threat. From Southeast Asian perspective, it would like to see China remain preoccupied domestically. They apprehend the moment China “gets its domestic house in order, gains economic and military strength and is largely freed of its historic security concerns to the West (Russia) and the East (Japan), it will feel increasingly free to turn its energies southward”^{lxxxv}. As already shown in the paper some of the countries notably Vietnam, Malaysia, Philippines, Indonesia have strained relations over disputed island territories in the Spratlys and Paracel archipelagos. Vietnam had been a victim of Chinese aggression in the form of being taught a lesson in the recent past. Although most of the countries are now more prosperous and are better able to defend themselves, they still face the possibility that China will dominate this sub-region politically and economically. However, Japan would be a great countervailing force to such development. Both Japan’s and China’s economic and security interests are at stake in Southeast Asia specially centring South China Sea.

3.28. Beijing would probably want Southeast Asia to ‘bandwagon’ rather than balance. Bandwagon would involve the South East Asian states to befriend China and even to take orders in order to avoid being attacked.

ASEAN, in general, has taken an attitude of accommodation, even appeasement towards the prospect of a Chinese super power. "ASEAN states are reluctant to host US military installations in the area out of fear of Chinese displeasure".^{lxxxvi} ASEAN states have the options of selecting between engagement and containment. Engagement is, in the context of relation between Malaysia and China, as Amitav Acharya describes, a "deliberate policy of socialization of a rising power using non-coercive methods". Its aim is not to block the rise or growth of Chinese military or economic power but to let that change towards ascendancy, as observed in case of China, be peaceful. On the other hand, containment is the strategy pursued to contain a rising power through coercive means. From a realist point of view, as observed by Acharya, engagement is more pragmatic and prudent course because of weaker powers' lack of countervailing power against China. ASEAN cannot afford a containment policy nor will it be able to form into a military alliance because of well-known intra-ASEAN suspicions and conflicts.^{lxxxvii}

ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF)

3.29. Given such development, ASEAN states have also successfully got China involved in ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF), a regional multilateral security dialogue. It was intended to promote a structure of common security coupled with economic advantage. It reflects the experiences of East and Southeast Asia. Its approach to eventual security co-operation is gradual and focused on areas of common interest from which multilateral co-operation could be strengthened.^{lxxxviii} ARF has strategized three stages approach to regional security cooperation i.e. confidence building, preventive diplomacy and conflict resolution. Conflict resolution,

however, has been redefined as an “elaboration of approaches to conflicts” because of Chinese warning against rapid institutionalisation of ARF. As such ARF has to be seen differently from Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), because there is a difference between promoting dialogue and consultation and conflict resolution. Moreover, ARF may be, as construed by China, ‘ganging up on China and oppose its strategic interests’.^{lxxxix} It would essentially play a consultative role- not to impose any solution. The tangible results of ARF may be limited but the very fact that China has shown its willingness to engage in Confidence Building Measures (CBMs) discussions, and has agreed to put the South China Sea dispute on ARF’s agenda is definitely an encouraging development. China's branding of ARF as constructive and positive is amply reflected in its 2004 White Paper on National Defense when it says ARF to be the "most important official channel for multilateral security dialogue in the Asia - Pacific region" and it "plays a positive role in promoting security cooperation in the region". Such branding by China shows glimmer of hope of a forthcoming sober inter state relations in the region. Although diplomacy is very much a part of ~~normal relations~~, but its saner grain, if realized and accepted by the parties concerned, can provide unimaginable dividends in diffusing tensions and deactivating, a least to a certain extent, action - reaction cycle and balance of power game. And ARF has arguably provided a great vehicle for dialogue and consultation and has made contributions to those ends.

3.30. As a sequel to this development China has toned down its approach to the problems of South China Sea. It has accepted ‘the international law including the basic principle and rules of the United Nations Convention

on the Law of the Sea as a basis to settle the Spratly issue which, in fact, is a departure from the stand, based on the historical records, the Chinese had taken earlier. Mr. Farooq Sobhan substantiates the view that China has adopted a unique approach based on skilled diplomacy and trade. As a sequel the forums like ASEAN and ARF play a major role in enhancing diplomacy and have contributed greatly to the easing of tensions regarding the spratly Islands, among other territorial disputes.^{xc} Qian Qichen, the Chinese Foreign Minister in a meeting with his ASEAN counterparts had made further 'departure on the Spratly islands from the solely bilateral basis by indicating that China was willing to discuss the issue on a multilateral basis between Chinese and ASEAN officials. In May 1996, the standing committee of China's National People's Council announced the ratification of the United Nation's Convention on the Law of the Sea. (UNCLOS) "China's agreement not to settle the issue with force, and that it should instead be resolved on the basis of UNCLOS are important steps in reducing the ASEAN members suspicions of Chinese intentions"^{xc1}. Accordingly, baselines for the China's main land - which is challenged - and the Paracel islands - disputed with Vietnam - were spelt out but nothing has been mentioned about the Spratly islands towards which four ASEAN states have differing claims.^{xcii} Although contentious issues would linger there is a trend towards *rapprochement* between China and the ASEAN states. ASEAN is no longer seen as a compliant client of the West. It is asserting its autonomous status with self-image and agenda. In spite of the trend towards improvement of relations, given the strategic and security scenario, military modernization by both China and the ASEAN countries would probably continue unabated.

Russia

3.31. Russia provides reasonable input to this complex security environment which is still considered a formidable military power, although presently handicapped because of its economy. However, recently its economy has started picking up as already indicated. Professor Rukshana Kibria feels that there are “considerable prospects for strategic cooperation between China and Russia to redefine the balance of power in the Asia-Pacific region, but something that may occur in the long run, but not today”.^{xciii} A ‘strategic partnership’ for the 21st century has emerged. The key elements of this partnership relate to deeper political, security and economic ties. A ‘four plus - one’ demilitarization Agreement was reached in December 1992 between China, Russia, Kazakstan, Kyrgystan and Tajikistan to withdraw troops from a 100 kilometer wide stretch either side of the border and to reduce offensive weapons in the zone. In May 1994, Sino-Russian Border management system was signed. On 3 September 1994 they also pledged no first use and non-targeting of nuclear missiles.^{xciv} China, Russia and the Central Asian States have formed Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) that recently made a successful combined effort to drive US troops out of Uzbekistan. Washington viewed the move to undermine US stature as a reckonable Asia - Pacific power. Professor Rukhsana Kibria foresees Shanghai Cooperation Organization may someday turn into a fullfledged security alliance.^{xcv} Related to this geopolitical compulsion deep geoeconomic relations between Russia and China are also inevitable. Everything adds to the development of stronger bondage between these two giants. Colder says, “A deepening energy relationship between the two giants of Eurasia, China and Russia, is both

natural and virtually inevitable...^{xcvi} Apparently two former Communist rivals have also mended their fences and held their first ever joint military exercise in late August 2005 (code named Peace Mission 2005) that involved 10,000 Chinese and Russian troops from the army, navy, and air force. This may be construed as a reaction to the Indo - US alliance; the alliance has stepped up military cooperation to develop 'interoperability' for possible joint operations, ostensibly against terrorist targets, but the inner story suggests it is essentially to counteract Chinese influence in the region.

3.32. China supports the Russian policy in Chechnya, Russia's entry into the Asia Pacific Economic Community (APEC). Again, Russia agreed to avoid official ties with Taiwan, and declared Tibet to be an integral part of China. Both affirmed continued military co-operation, arms reductions and conventional and nuclear confidence - building measures (CBMs).^{xcvii} Over the course of regular visits, Chinese President Hu Jintao and Putin have taken common stand on many anti-US diplomatic issues ranging from Iraq to, most recently, how to deal with Iran's nuclear project. Chinese are likely to build on this common ground and lobby for increased Russian support for its claim to Taiwan. Having calmed the border on the Russian side, China is the net gainer by being also able to import the sophisticated Russian weaponry. Russia thinks military technical co-operation with foreign countries would help strengthen its military and political influence in the world and also help sustaining the people working in the military industrial complex.^{xcviii} Although this technical co-operation is one of the directions in the development of Sino-Russian relations, Russians have cautioned that their co-operation was not

intended to upset the balance of military forces in the region and do anything that could harm their national interests.^{xcix}

3.33. China probably still considers Russia as a perennial rival and potential foe that is presently in remission. However, their present united front, besides working as a counter weight to American power, is also directed to contain ethnic nationalism and Islamic fundamentalism in Central Asia.^c As a matter of fact, one of the other stated objectives of Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO), ---- apart from evicting the United States from its bases in Central Asia - is to control "terrorism" in the region, specifically, Islamic militants who threaten a Moscow - friendly regime in Uzbekistan and who have fomented unrest in China's Muslim - majority Xinjiang province. "Russia currently sells certain arms to China, but avoids exporting its most sophisticated systems, since Kremlin views China as a potential future threat."^dAs can be gleaned from the statements both the powers, due to *power politics* and geopolitical compulsions, are cooperating with each other up to certain extent in order basically to contain the predominant power of the world today i.e. United States; this collaboration is likely to fall apart the moment American preponderance and predominance are reduced at least in the Asia pacific region. However, given the cold war that is in the making in the Asia - Pacific, this collaboration is unlikely to fall apart in the foreseeable future. However, there is a hunch - due to overwhelming superiority of Chinese economy compared to Russian which gives rise to dependency syndrome for Russia - that Russia may turn out to be a junior partner to China. "Russia is shifting from being a junior partner of the United States to a junior partner of China", says Dmitry Trenin, Director of Moscow's Carnegie Fund. ^{cii}

Chinese economy, as would be shown in the later Chapter, is the fourth largest in the world today compared to Russian in the 12th place just ahead of Mexico. Chinese goods are everywhere in Siberia. Chinese companies are interested to buy some of the Russian oil companies but Russia, may be for strategic reasons, is not ready to welcome such deals. Russia needs Chinese money but it would not like to give control of its assets. However, in May 2004 Russia agreed to cede 120 kilometers of the 4,300 kilometer Russo - Chinese border to China which ended the long running border dispute. Russia, for strategic, economic and governance reasons, will have to tilt away from Western clubs towards China. This is probably the dictate of the present geopolitical and geo-economics realities. This is also, in an implied way, a course of the *power politics*.

Table :3

Comparison of Objectives-Matrix

	US	China	Russia	Japan	India
Global	*Status Quo as global hegemon. *Establish productive relation *Prevent and deter proliferation of WMD *War on global terrorism *Promote democracy	* Multi-polar system *No US hegemony *World peace through a Strong China *Strengthen economy *Military Modernization	*Multi-polar system *Contain proliferation of nuclear weapons. *Russian Prosperity *Regain influence in CIS & East Europe	*Maitain status Quo. *Stability in the region *Gain prestige as a donar	* Recognition as a regional power. *Co-operate with great powers.
US	X	*Trade	*Limit/reduce	*Strengthen	*Strategic

		/economic *Reduce dominance *Reduce coercive threat	strategic nuclear weapons *Contain US hegemony	multilateral security cooperation *Strengthen Alliance	partner *Economic cooperation
China	*Strategic competitor * Containment *Continue developing relationship *Prevent proliferation of WMD *Oversight human rights issues	X	*Enhance regional geopolitical relations *Economic interests *Military technical cooperation	*Constructive engagement reduces influence in the Asia-pacific region.	*Counter weight to China * Reduce border tensions *Influence to drift away from Pakistan.
Taiwan	*One China Policy * Trade Access * Security	* Reunification * Trade *Reduce US influence	X	* Trade *Appreciation in the military planning	X
Russia	*Support democracy & economic transition *Control sensitive technology *Keep engaged as a partner for peace *Maintain presence in CIS	*Strategic partner *Eliminate border threats * Build alliance (SCO)	X	*Maintain cooperation	*Maintain relations *Maintain access.
Japan	*Strengthen Alliance * Increase global reponses *Promote engagements to contain China	*Continue trade cooperation *Reduce East co-prosperity sphere intent.	*Northern Island resolutions	X	*Maintain trade relation
ASEAN	* Stable & secure region *Maintain Access *Maintain influence	*Earn recognition as a great power * Increased role in regional	*Maintain access	*Maintain access * Engagement *Economic cooperation	* Recognition as a major regional player. *Maintain access

	*Non-proliferation * Maintain trade (inter) dependence.	issues *Reduce western (US) influence * Stability *Promote economic and security interest			*Economic interest *Join co-operative security alliance.
India	*Strategic Partner *Enhance cooperation * Counterbalance China in South Asia	*Strategic encirclement * Reduce border disputes *Support Pakistan to balance regional hegemony.	*Continue cooperation *Build Military alliance	*Maintain trade relationship.	X

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- xxi Senior Colonel Peng Guangqian, "Deng Xiaoping's Strategic Thought", In Michael Pillsbury eds., *Chinese Views of Future Warfare*, Lancer Publishers, New Delhi, 1977, pp. 4-7.
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- xxiv An eight point formula, meant for the peaceful reunification of mainland with Taiwan, proposed by President Jiang Zemin on January 30, 1995 is worth mentioning. It emphasized on economic exchange and cooperation; it also proposed for the exchange of leaders of both sides; both sides should also jointly inherit and carry forward the five traditions of Chinese culture etc which may, in the long run, contribute in peaceful reunification. (Source: *China 2003*, *op.cit.*,P. 71).

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xxvi Wang, Jianwei, "Chinese Perspectives on Multilateral Security Co-operation", *Asian Perspective*, Institute for Far Eastern Studies, Kyungnam University, Seoul and Portland State University, USA, p.116.

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xl In antiquity, the South China Sea was also called "Chang Sea." "Chang" means a quantity of water so great that is about to overflow. Chinese called the South China Sea the "Chang Sea" because it was so large. The origin of the name "Chang Sea" is unclear, but it shows that the South China Sea was already of a great geographical significance in the later Han Dynasty. Subsequently, it became known by the name "Fei Sea," which means, "boiling sea". Because the South China Sea lies on the boundary between the sub-tropical and tropical regions, the water temperature is high. The waves are big, especially during the monsoon season. The big waves and bubbles look like boiling water, hence the name. The name "South China Sea" replaced "Chang Sea" and "Fei Sea" in the Tang Song Dynasty. This is the name by which the Sea is known today.

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xlvi William T. Tow, *op. cit.*, p.17

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- li Ibid. p. 19
- lii Statement of Admiral William J. Falcon, US Navy Commander, US Pacific Command before the Senate Armed Services Committee on U.S Pacific Command Posture, 8 March 2005; <http://russia.shaps.hawaii.edu/security/us/2005/20050308fallon.html>
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lxxxiii BBC News on 12 April, 2005. <http://news-vote.bbc.co.uk/mpapps/pagetools/print/news.bbc.co.uk./2/ni/south-asia/443129>.

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CHAPTER - 4

CHINA'S GROWING ECONOMY AND ITS IMPACT

Abstract

In this Chapter, impact of China's burgeoning economy is shown on the defense modernization of China. China's economy is growing by leaps and bounds. China's national objective, as shown in the earlier Chapter, is to go for massive economic modernization. China has gone for open market economy whose GDP output might overtake the giant economies of the world in not too distant a future. In the Chapter it is also shown that the economic development is linked up with the vast natural resources available in the South China Sea and its island groups. There are disputed territories, as already shown in the earlier Chapter, rich in natural resources, specially in gas and oil. So here the economic interests and *power politics* get interlinked. Implicit in the economic modernization defense modernization automatically comes in the focus since China's defense budget, given Purchasing Power Parity straddles around US \$ 100. This continued rise in the defense expenditure would result in phenomenal improvement of China's military.

China's Economy in General

4.1. China is making spectacular moves in its transition from command economy to a market economy since it started the process in 1979. China was successful, unlike most developing and post-communist countries that suffered painful recessions during transition, in restructuring and

liberalizing its economy without a fall in output. However Prof Minxin Pei accepts this unprecedented economic restructuring and liberalization with a pinch of salt when it comes to political reform,

China's impressive record of economic reform and development has been achieved at high political costs: continuation of authoritarian rule and repression of political dissent. Its leaders have persistently resisted democratising reforms and regarded such changes as a fatal threat to China's modernization.¹

Such outright observation may be little flawed as would be shown in this Chapter subsequently. Economic liberalization and political pluralism should go hand in hand, as the Western system would like to have it, the Chinese have their own peculiarities and system of political reform. This has also been shown in their traits of nationalism in the earlier Chapter. Chinese may prove to be a nation, without Western system of democracy being followed in toto, that can sustain with its own style of governance although it has gone all out to beef up its economy by following Western market - based liberalized economic system. Such dichotomy, if at all, is the Chinese way of doing things. Their present overarching national objective is to go for a robust economy which would ultimately take care of all other elements of national power specially the military modernization. Some kind of political liberalization process, due mainly to economic liberalization and interdependency is probably already underway. Having said so, China's military modernization would, as could be true to any other country, is contingent upon economic growth. And military modernization is an expensive game; poor nations cannot afford the cutting edge technologies as part of Revolutions in Military

Affairs (RMAs), as covered in the next Chapter. China is moving towards that end as part of its *power politics* game. Chinese are probably following the advice given by the great Chinese strategist Sun Tzu,

Generally a war operation requires one thousand light chariots, as many heavy chariots and a hundred thousand armored soldiers with provisions enough to carry them a thousand li, then the expenses at home and in the field, stipends for the entertainment of state guests and diplomatic envoys, the cost of materials such as glue and lacquer (tr: for maintenance of equipment) and sums spent for the maintenance of armor and chariots, the total expenditure will amount to one thousand pieces of gold a day. Only after all this money in hand can an army of one hundred thousand men be raised. "

This is also aptly articulated in China's present day official document,


The modernization of the national defense of a country requires the support of its economic and technological forces; and the modernization level of national defense can only be improved gradually along with the increase of the country's economic strength. While concentrating its efforts on economic construction, the state also endeavors to improve its national defense work and to promote a coordinated development of the two.ⁱⁱⁱ

A 16th National Congress report titled, "Build a well-off society in an All-Round Way and Create a New Situation by Building Socialism with Chinese Characteristics" aimed to quadruple its 2000 Gross Domestic Product (GDP) by 2020. China also aims to raise the per capita GDP to \$ 3,000 by 2020. A source, quoting Chinese government, also shows targets for development for China for next 50 years. The period is divided into three stages. In the first stage i.e. 2000 - 2010 total GDP is to be doubled. In the second stage, ending in 2020, total GDP is to be doubled again; in this stage China's per capita GDP is expected to reach US \$ 3,000 in the third

stage i.e. from 2020 to 2050, "China will continue to advance until it becomes a prosperous, democratic, and civilized socialist country. By that time, China will have shaken off underdevelopment and will be on a par with the middle rung of advanced nations".^{iv}

A World Bank source shows projected Chinese economic growth reaching almost 7 trillion US dollars by 2025.

Table 4
Chines Projected Economic Growth 1990-2025
(Projected Economic Growth (US \$))



Source: World Bank, World Development Report

4.2. Fareed Zakaria's comments, also, show China is doing spectacularly well in the economic field,

China's rise is no longer a prediction. It is a fact. It is already the world's fastest growing large economy, and the second largest holder of foreign-exchange reserves, mainly dollars. China has grown around a percent a year for more than 25 years, the fastest growth rate for a major economy in recorded history. In the same period it has moved 300 million people out of poverty and quadrupled the average Chinese person's income. All this has happened, so far, without catastrophic social upheavals. The Chinese leadership has to be given credit for this historic achievement.^v

China has now practically come out of the command economy of the communist era. Now it is almost following the market economy although there is still a lot of state owned enterprises. In order to give momentum to Chinese economy, China has to rely on technology transfer and direct investments from the industrialized countries like the U.S and EU. Foreign investments have increased manifold especially after 1980 when Deng Tsioping announced and implemented the open-door economic policy. China's GDP in 2005, as announced by its National Bureau of statistics, reached 2.3 trillion US dollars overtaking Italy. China became the 6th biggest economy in the world with 1700 US \$ per capita income. ^{vi} Another source claims that based on Purchasing Power Parity (PPP), China's economy is worth \$ 5 trillion which is the world's fourth largest economy after the U.S, Japan and Germany. China is also likely to turn out to be second largest economy, overtaking Japan and Germany, before the end of this decade. ^{vii} In 2005 China's GDP growth rate was 9.9 percent amid oil price hikes, trade disputes and frequent disasters. It appears that China

might cross 3,000 US \$ per capita mark projected for 2020 much before that if the present growth rate continues. China's foreign reserves are reaching US \$ 1 trillion. It also claims that China's economy would surpass U.S. and Japan's in the coming decades. "After sustaining 8 percent inflation-adjusted average economic growth for 25 years - with annual peaks thought to be up to 15 percent-it is destined to be the biggest economy in the world in future."^{viii} A Pakistani World Bank economist predicts by 2025 China's GDP would reach \$25 trillion in terms of Purchasing Power Parity, thereby becoming the world's largest economy. It would be followed by the United States and India at \$20 trillion and about \$13 trillion respectively. His prediction is based on a conservative estimate of China's 6% growth rate sustained over the next two decades.^{ix} Trade deficit is widening between the United States and China when Chinese imports to United States are soaring to US \$ 243.5 billion and US exports to China creeping to only US \$ 41.8 by the year 2005, creating a huge trade surplus of US \$ 200 billion in favor of China. China has become, along with Japan, the main financier of US' ballooning budget deficit. China is a developing country, which saves too much whereas United States is a developed country, which spends too much, as such this huge trade gap. ^x

4.3. China today is the world's largest importer of sugar and cooking oil; it might soon become the largest importer of wheat, corn, barely and cotton. Again China's quest for energy is driving its foreign policy. The factors like its burgeoning economy, rapid urbanization, increased export processing, "and the Chinese people's voracious appetite for cars" are reasons to country's demand for oil and natural gas, industrial and construction materials, foreign capital and technology. China, twenty years ago, was

East Asia's largest oil exporter; how it is world's second largest importer and it alone accounted for 31 percent of global growth in oil demand in 2004.^{xi} China's economy is opening up and is serving as a growing market, for the rest of the world. In 2004, China's imports from the members of ASEAN increased by 33.1 percent, from Japan by 27.3 percent, from India by 80 percent, from EU by 28 percent.^{xii} Again China's expanding economy could boost all the Asian economies that complement it including Taiwan whose substantial amount of exports also now go to China.^{xiii} China - Taiwan booming economic relations are pertinent to be mentioned here. Cross - Straits economic relations are accelerating although there are no direct transport links. Officially Taiwanese investments in China would range between US \$ 30-40 billion although unofficially it may even reach up to US \$ 100 to 150 billion. ^{xiv} The attraction for the Taiwanese investors is basically low costs of production and seemingly inexhaustible supply of cheap labor in China. But as it appears such deep economic ties could not lure Taiwan back to Chinese rule nor could end the diplomatic impasse that has existed for more than 50 years. Anyway such economic interdependence may have some political fallouts in the long run in the form of bridging the political gap; however, historically such presumptions are negated by some of the scholars. But it can always act as a restraining factor.

4.4. Before China makes into a modernized, medium - level developed country, may be by 2050, it will have to confront few challenges. As already shown, China will face shortage of resources mostly energy. The second, would be environmental which will pose as a major obstacle to sustainable development. The third could be the lack of coordination


between economic and social (including political) development. A kind of an optimistic view of this challenge is shown subsequently. The last challenge would be in the form of tensions that China will have to tackle because of its fast progressing modernization drive.

4.5. The tensions could be:

Between high GDP growth and social progress, between upgrading technology and increasing job opportunities, between keeping development momentum in the coastal areas and speeding up development in the interior, between fostering urbanization and nurturing agricultural areas, between narrowing the gap between the rich and the poor and maintaining economic vitality and efficiency, between attracting more foreign investment and enhancing the competitiveness of indigenous enterprises, between deepening reform and preserving social stability, between opening domestic markets and solidifying independence, between promoting market - oriented competition and taking care of disadvantaged people.^{xv}

4.6. There are again sovereignty disputes over the islands, rich in gas and oil resources as already shown, with some of the ASEAN and neighboring countries. Control over the resources of these countries and over the use of sea-lane through the South China Sea with Japan and the US could be the catalysts for future conflict. Tension between Beijing and Tokyo, is increasing over gas reserves they both claim in the East China Sea. Japanese media in late 2004 reported that Japan revised its security strategy partly on the assumption that conflicts over resources would escalate into war. There are worries over the long-term scarcities of energy and food. Who could ensure that China would not covet Natuna gas fields, which is claimed by China to have fallen within its territorial waters? There is the possibility that China might take it by force or might force Indonesia to sell it at 'friendship prices'.^{xvi}

MAP 7: Natuna Islands



MAP 8: Overlapping Resource Claim--- Vicinity Natuna Islands

Source: Greg Austin, *China's Ocean Frontier—International Law, Military force and National Development*, Allen and Unwin in collaboration with the Australian National University, Canberra, 1998, p. XXXI.

4.7. As evident, there are signs of interdependence between the economies and conflict over the resources in the region. It is widely believed that inter-dependence lessens the possibility of conflict. Historically the logic seems to be flawed. In 1930s high level of economic interdependence between the United States and Japan actually contributed to the outbreak of war because the United States controlled vital Japanese fuel supplies, as demonstrated also in the last Gulf War. When the energy security of any nation becomes vulnerable and precarious- it could now be true both for Japan and China- they become most dangerous. This was precisely the reason Japan attacked American naval base Pearl Harbar in December, 1941. Japan lacked a stable energy supply. This is also true for the United States in case of the recent Gulf Wars: It's implications in terms of Chinese naval build up is shown in Chapter 6. "Mature democracies don't go to war with each other but interdependent economies often do."^{xvii}

4.8. Global market economic forces are active in the Pacific Asia including very much in China. China's level of trade interdependency showing its interaction with the world economy has changed China's international role and the way the rest of the world looks at China. Its economy is one of the largest in the world and any instability in the trading pattern could pose major problem to international markets.^{xviii} However, now the moot question arises: will the market forces help create a pluralist democracy in the region especially in China? Economic interdependence alone does not ensure regional security; it also calls for pluralist political system and a robust balance of power. The market forces have its own liberating political effects like it changes the social fabric and political culture and thereby the rise of democratic politics. Under its impact, Maoism is already

on the wane. Although the communist party still monopolies political power, it is no longer in full control of social and economic life. Rowen predicts that China would be a representative democracy by around the year 2015. A democratic China would be lesser of a threat to its neighbor, as he sees it.^{xx} Professor Shahiduzzaman of the Department of International Relations, Dhaka University feels political liberalization may be gaining impetus at the behest of the new generation. Dr. Harmanns also gives a similar opinion, “ the push has to come from within China.” He (Prof Shahiduzzaman), however, thinks democratization may be difficult.^{xx} The author tends to agree more with Professor Shahiduzzaman. Western style democratic system is still a far cry for China. Prof Haroon A. Khan of Henderson State University opines that liberalization will take place in China under the present dispensation.^{xxi} Chinese will have their own style of governance with Chinese characteristics, which derive its roots in Chinese nationalism as highlighted in Chapter 2. What is, however, expected is more political liberalization, dissenting views, creative ideas in running the political system of the country like that of economic system. Dr. Harmanns gives an alarming scenario brewing when she sees it might be difficult for the party (CCP) to keep control on the (polity) if corruption and uneven economic development are not addressed. ^{xxii}

4.9. China is now a member of WTO. This would give China better trade bargaining standing and circumvent the imposition of American embargoes at will. “China now sees WTO membership as a major issue in the bilateral relationship with the US, since that country was able and perhaps willing to withhold benefits from economic interdependence. It is possible to see China’s national security concerns as less of a military kind

than 'resting on its economic and technological edge and that threats to that security would then come from the pressure that can be put on it on economic terms".^{xxiii} Given any scenario, America wants China to interact more openly with the international order and it would be in greater US interests. China's isolation would be counterproductive, unworkable and potentially dangerous to the United States.^{xxiv}

China's Economics of Defense

4.10. China's national economy has a direct bearing on its defense economics as already highlighted. Defense economics apart from other areas, also studies the impact of defense expenditures on economic growth. It, however, all depends on how much a country can afford for the defense; it is something related to the debate over gun versus butter. Chinese economy is emerging so robust that it can now spare relatively more for gun compared to butter. The trend is discernible if we observe the continued increase in defense expenditure over the years. And this trend is further propelled by its desire for military modernization which is a geopolitical necessity as part of its *power politics* game in the Asia - Pacific. Technology driven military would need exorbitantly more money compared to manpower intensive military. There is a paradigm shift, as would be shown in the next Chapter, in Chinese military like it is trimming its manpowers and going more for hi-technology weaponry. Defense expenditures vary from country to country but generally as a thumb rule it averages out to be 5 percent of GDP. An insight into what defense economics aims to achieve can be gleaned from the statement of Michael Intrilligator,

Defense economics is concerned with that part of the overall economy involving defense - related issues, including the level of defense spending, both in total and as a fraction of the overall economy; the impacts of defense expenditure, both domestically for output and employment and internationally for impacts on other nations; the reasons for the existence and size of the defense sector; the relation of defense spending to technical change; and the implications of defense spending and the defense sector for international stability or instability. ^{xxv}


The issue raised by Intrilligator like the impacts of defense expenditure both on domestic front, regionally and in the Asia - Pacific region, rationale for modernization of defense forces including hi-technology development and the dilemma, that may accrue, as to whether it provides stability or instability to the region would be explored in the subsequent Chapters.

4.11 There are controversial estimates over the size of Chinese GNP or GDP. Generally the Chinese official estimates are always less than the generally believed figures. Chinese official estimates of defense expenditure are shown to be US \$14.5 billion (2000) but at purchasing power parity (PPP) method including extra budgetary military expenditure it is 42 billion.^{xxvi} Assuming a modest economic growth, China's projected military expenditure, between 2000 and 2004, was supposed to average between US \$ 44 and \$ 70 billion (in constant 1988 dollars).^{xxvii} Pentagon now provides an official estimate of China's annual real military spending at US \$ 65 billion, the world's second largest. The magnitude of the Chinese military buildup remains contentious. Beyond the official figures, actual defense outlays are at least twice the official figure, in that government numbers do not count spending on research and development or the rather obscure funding devoted to PLA-run arms sales enterprises and other civilian businesses operated by the PLA. Taking these additional factors into account, different sources suggest various

contentious figures making any objective analysis quite daunting. The difference between the low and high estimates against the official figure is shown in following charts(Charts 1 & 2):

Chart -1


Chinese Defense Budget and Estimates of Total Defense-Related Expenditure



Source: 2006 Annual Report to Congress on Military Power of PRC, US Department of Defense.

Chart :2

Projected Rise in Chinese Defense Spending, 2003-2025



Source: www.cia.gov/nic/pdf/gif_2020_support

Fareed Zakaria, however, gives a somewhat different calculation: China has the world's largest army (2.5 million men) and the fourth largest defense budget that is growing at more than 10 percent annually.^{xxviii} Others estimate it exceeding US\$ 100 billion a year. US Defense Department May 2006 report estimates China's true military spending per year is something between \$70-105 billions.^{xxix} China's 2000 Defense White Paper mentions that Chinese defense procurement consumes one third of defense spending which implies China spends more than US\$ 20 billion; indeed it is a tall order in the Asian environment.^{xxx} It is, however, nothing compared to the US total military expenditure that is around US \$ 500 billion; but it is spending more than other regional countries. Again as a percentage of GNP, China is spending much more than that of Japan.

China's GNP is growing at a much faster rate than that of Japan. All such factors, therefore, call for serious rethinking. Prosperous China, as analysts believe, could be threatening to the regional countries, although China, always in its official pronouncements, makes it abundantly clear that it would never pose a threat or turn into a *hegemon* to any sovereign state. Roy comments, "Since military power stems from economic power, economic growth will enhance China's power projection capability"^{xxxi}.

ⁱ Minxin Pei, "Economic Reform and Civic Freedom in China", <http://www.cipe.org/publications/fs/ert/e14/China-4.htm>

ⁱⁱ Sun Zi: The Art of War; Sun Bin: The Art of War, Lin Wusun translated, People's China Publishing House, Beijing, 1995, p. 26.

ⁱⁱⁱ China's National Defence, Information Office of the State Council of the People's Republic of China, Beijing, July 1998, p.70.

^{iv} Bijian Zheng, "China's Peaceful Rise to Great Power Status", *Foreign Affairs*, September / October 2005, pp. 23-24.

^v Fareed Zakaria, "Does the Future Belong to China?", *Newsweek*, May 9, 2005.

^{vi} "China Economy soars 9.9 PC in 2005", *The Bangladesh Observer*, Dhaka, February 4, 2006.

^{vii} Mahmood Elahi, "India cannot Match U.S. - China Economic Relations", *The Daily Star*, Dhaka, March 24, 2005.

^{viii} Harun-Ur-Rashid, "Wen Jiabao visit to India: US-China Cold War in the Offing?", *The Daily Star*, Dhaka, April 27, 2005

^{ix} Chalmers Johnson, "No Longer the "Lone" Superpower - Coming to Terms with China," *Tom Dispatch. Com*, March 2005; <http://www.commondreams.org/views/05/0315-24.htm>

^x *The Daily Star*, Dhaka, March 24, 2005.

^{xi} Zweig, David and Finbai, Bi, "China's Global Hunt for Energy", *Foreign Affairs*, September / October 2005, p. 25.

^{xii} Bijian, Zhebg, "China's "peaceful Rise" to Great power status," *Foreign Affairs*, September / October 2005, p. 24.

^{xiii} Almonte, op. cit. p. 86.

^{xiv} Strategic and Security Environment in East Asia, *Asian Defense Year Book*, 2005, Kualalumpur, p. 8.

^{xv} Bijian, Zheng, of - cit., p. 21.

^{xvi} Segal, Gerald: "How insecure is Pacific Asia?" *International Affairs* The Royal Institute of International Affairs, UK, April 1997. p. 241

^{xvii} Ibid. p.240

^{xviii} Findlay-Christopher and Watson, Andrew, "Economic Growth and Trade Dependency in China", in David S. G. Goodman and Gerald Segal eds. *China Rising - Nationalism and Interdependence*, Routledge, London, 1997, p.107

^{xix} Almonte, op. cit. pp. 85-89

^{xx} Professor Shahiduzzaman, Department of International Relations, Dhaka University; interviewed by the author on 23 July 2006.

^{xxi} Professor Haroon A. Khan, Henderson State University, USA; interviewed by the author on August 18, 2006.

^{xxii} Dr. Heike Harmanns, Research School of Pacific and Asian Studies, The Australian National University; interviewed by the author on 11 July, 2006.

^{xxiii} Harris, Stuart "China's Role in the WTO and APEC", in David S.G. Goodman and Gerald Segal eds., *China Rising-Nationalism and Interdependence in China*, Routledge, London, 1997, p.151

^{xxiv} Mannan, Md Abdul, "the US Comprehensive Engagement Policy: Key Issues'. *BISS Journal*, Dhaka, January 2000, p. 66

^{xxv} Quoted in Todd Sandler and Keith Hartley, *The Economics of Defense*, Cambridge University Press, 1995, p. 6

^{xxvi} *The Military Balance*, IISS, 2001-2002

^{xxvii} "Proliferation: Threat and Response", Report of the Office of the Secretary of Defense, USA, January 2001, p.13

^{xxviii} Fareed Zakaria, op. cit

^{xxix} UK.biz.yahoo.com/060524/323/gefiz. Html-16k-28 May 2006.

^{xxx} *Asian Defense Yearbook 2001-2002*, p. 76.

^{xxxi} Roy, Denny, "Consequences of China's Development Threaten Asia - Pacific Security", *Security Dialogue*, no.1, vol. 24, 1993, p. 182.

CHAPTER 5

CHINA'S MILITARY MODERNIZATION AND ITS OBJECTIVES


Abstract

In the previous Chapters, the background, scenario and rationale have been argued for China to go for military modernization. *Power politics* continues to remain in focus for such modernization drive. China means business in the *power politics* game. In this Chapter, it would be shown that China's military modernization would go unabated with acquisition of latest technologies as far as sources and economy permit. China's defense policy and military doctrine have undergone paradigm shift like from people's war concept to fighting limited war in hi-technology conditions. China's geopolitical compulsions mostly entering around Taiwan and South - China Sea, power political game primarily with the United States and extraordinary technological strides made by the US Armed Forces, as exhibited specially in the last two Gulf Wars have given rise to China's such necessity. China's military is being reorganized, upgraded, groomed and trained to undertake offensive operations against Taiwan and South China sea in case the necessity demands so, keeping in view the realities of regional military environment. In the Chapter it has been logically deduced that different components of China's military is being refurbished with armaments and logistics to take care of the eventualities as mentioned. It is going for mobility, rapid - reactions units, special operations amphibious capability, extensive missile network, both conventional and, nuclear, air refuelling capability, nuclear powered and nuclear ballistic missile equipped submarines, anti submarine capabilities

and even aircraft-carrier, all poised to go for offensive in Taiwan and South - China Sea. The Chapter concludes that these were-withal has definite objectives that fulfill her geopolitical ambitions and power political desire. China would like to have a potent, credible and hi-technology driven military forces.

Why Military Modernization ?

5.1. Military modernization of any country is a function of her 'national aspirations' and the 'resources' available. A country with a global aspiration may not be able to modernize her military if it lacks resources, i.e. economic power. The reverse is true as well. However, one can visualize four possible scenarios (as depicted in figure -1, Page 131) of military modernization of any country based on the symbiotic relationship of military and economic power. Case 1 represents that if the economic power goes down, the military power will also go down due to their inter-relationship. In such a scenario countries are unlikely to pursue military modernization. The condition of Russia after the fall of Soviet Union exemplifies such a case. But if the economic power goes up, country may still choose not to modernize or expansion of its military (Case 2) and maintain a *status quo* because of the threat perception, aspirations, and the existing balance of power. The Japanese case somewhat fits into this scenario. In spite of being one of the world's largest economies, it has not gone for outright aggressive modernization of its military. Malaysian case could be another example.

Figure -1: Four Cases of Military Modernization

But perhaps the most common phenomenon in most countries is Case 3 which is, an increase in defence spending with the increasing economic growth of the country. Driven by factors like national aspiration, global balance of power and threat perception, countries are most likely to expand their military spending (i.e. the hard power) when they enjoy economic prosperity. Thus it is not surprising to see China and USA fitting into this scenario. Finally Case 4 depicts a situation where, if the economic condition is stagnant, the military power may increase or decrease within an acceptable limit based on various factors. An appropriate example of this would be France where a more or less stagnant economy has attributed to a less significant increase or decrease of her military power.

5.2 As indicated above, Case 3 fits in to the Chinese scenario. If we expand the scenario in light of the security objectives outlined in Chapter 3, the finding would aptly explain the reasons for the Chinese military modernization. Taking cue from the objectives outlined, we find that apart from the WMD and human rights issues, US views China as a strategic

competitor and wants to contain it. Such assessment of China by US is hedged by the Chinese policy that intends to reduce US dominance and coercive threat in the region and wants to have a multi polar world. However, China is yet to achieve that objective, arguably due to its huge deficit in military might vis-a-vis US. Thus it is nothing but inevitable for China to pour money for her military modernization and thereby reduce the deficit of military power with US. Such modernization, as examined, has already started and may continue unabated considering the Chinese understanding of the *power politics* and the importance of military power.

5.3 China's official version of the rationale for military modernization is candidly borne out in the statement,

Military factors still occupy an important position in state security. New international security environment, while stressing the settlement of disputes through political, economic and diplomatic means, most countries still regard military means and the reinforcement of military strength as important way to safeguard their own security and national interests. A profound reform in the military field led by the development of high-tech weapons is taking place throughout the world. This reform, which is developing rapidly, will exert an important and profound influence on weaponry, military system and set up, combat training and military theory. To adapt to the new situation and strive for their own advantages, many countries have readjusted their defence policies and military strategies, reduced the scale of armaments and paid more attention to improving the quality of their armed forces.¹

5.4 China according to its official policy, would like to have a balanced and cost sustainable development of economy and military modernization. Taking cue from Mao Tse Tung and Deng Xiaoping's thoughts on armed forces - called "Three Represents" - the Chinese would like to have a trimmer but better quality troops with Chinese characteristics, reforms to be carried out in accordance with the changes around the world and carry

out the historical tasks of mechanization and information Technology (IT) application. This process is, as the Chinese would like to call it, the leapfrog development in the modernization of the military.ⁱⁱ Chinese are aware and alive to the latest developments in the field of military technical revolution as exemplified in the Chinese official statements mentioned above. If China means business for Japan, Taiwan or India, American sophistication is the overriding factor that would determine the Chinese technological development and its military strategy and doctrines. Pfaltzgraff, Jr argues that if any nation wants to confront the United States in any future regional conflict, it would either have to develop equivalent high-technology system or develop nuclear weapons capability or other weapons of mass destruction.ⁱⁱⁱ Godwin argues Chinese military modernization programs are basically actuated by identifying the United State as China's most potential opponent and focusing on the Taiwan Strait as the most likely arena for confrontation.^{iv} Such argument is corroborated by Jane's Intelligence Review which brings home the point that PLA's seriousness in shortfall and its desire for modernization got a boost when they got a shock in "seeing how far Western military technology had advanced in terms of accuracy and swift tempo of the air assault on Iraq (in 1991)". This perception got further reinforced by subsequent wars in Kosovo, Afghanistan, and Iraq.^v Echoing the rhetoric, often used by the Americans when they mean preserving their vital national interests, the Chinese also make a similar official statement, "Every sovereign state has the right to use all means it thinks necessary, including military means, to safeguard its own sovereignty and territorial integrity".^{vi}

5.5 Kissinger emphatically observed that the Chinese were “cold-blooded practitioners of power politics”. It is the national interest, as Kissinger argues, that clicks the Chinese when to apply confrontation with determination or to practise cooperation with shrewdness.^{vii} One does not have to really quote Kissinger to propose a hypothesis like this. This is true across the board for any country during any period of time in history. Chinese did suffer the Period of Humiliation, they were opium addicted by the British, their economic and military power got degenerated during the Qing Dynasty, but their national grandeur and glory are always vivid in their national psyche. They are aware of the days of the Middle Kingdom when the supplicants/barbarians were required to pay their tribute to the centre of politics and culture. They may not revive the Middle Kingdom syndrome, but their desire to revive the central place, as already mentioned, in the history cannot be overlooked. Kissinger again argues that throughout history, political influence of a nation is directly proportional to the military power it wields. Apart from moral worth and the prestige of the institutions, as Kissinger substantiates the point, diplomatic skill may augment but can never substitute the military strength of a nation. His final message is: weakness tempts aggression on a nation and its impotence leads to abdication of national policy; however, few countries could sustain for sometime when working in an international equilibrium basically created by a balance of power concept.^{viii} Chinese are the great advocates of the balance of power concept. Chinese did not suffer the fate of colonization *per se* as happened in other parts of Asia and Africa, although they had undergone the torment of the Century of Humiliation. Even from the ancient times Chinese were vulnerable to powerful non-Chinese neighbours and

potential conquerors. Anytime threatened, Chinese are good at pitting one against the other. Kissinger asked Chou how China could manage this balancing act with such deft, he replied, "On the one hand it was because of the strong desire for unity. On the other so many countries were trying to get something out of China that other countries could not control it".^{ix} However, the message that is conveyed is that: in any balance of power act, own power potential and its vitality and potency have to be kept sharpened within the resources available. Chinese are always aware of it. Although the Chinese got swept by the concept of the people's war from 1930s through 70s - it indeed worked marvels in ejecting out the Japanese and the Nationalists supported by the Americans - they have gone for a paradigm shift in military technology since '80s and specially after the First Gulf War when the Chinese or for that matter the whole world got awestruck by the sophistication of American military technology. In the last two Gulf wars, the American forces have demonstrated their tremendous ability to use conventional forces to destroy fixed targets with fine accuracy. However, it can also be deduced that the relatively less tensed post Cold-War scenario is conducive for the Chinese to close the gap in military modernization with Russia and the United States. As put by two Chinese military strategists, "The relatively peaceful international climate and our friendly relations with our neighbours are providing fine external conditions for PLA weapons development."^x

5.6 American anti-ballistic missile defence system also threatens the deterrence capability of China's aging nuclear forces. China would, therefore, like to update its nuclear forces also, which would increase the

survivability of its nuclear deterrent. In the late 70s the Chinese embarked upon four-modernization programme of which defence is one; they desired its fulfilment by the turn of the 21st Century. Facts and events are indicative of the steady direction and development of their modernization drive. China has all the potentials of elements of power like huge landmasses including vast natural resources, a very hardworking educated (emerging) population, probably the fastest growing economy, a workable system of governance, national unity although sporadically disturbed by the democracy chanting minority and above all the desire to revive the central place in the world affairs reminiscent of the grandeur of the Middle Kingdom as already indicated. However, China is plagued by a political system which the western world, so characteristically call the 'democracy' or political pluralism. By the western standard it could be called a weakness; may be the Chinese have their own way of tackling their system of governance. However, when the market forces are working in full swing in China, when latest ideas are getting ingrained in the Chinese system, the time may not be afar for such concepts to take roots. Such hunch is substantiated by a new phrase "Political Civilization" used in the 16th National Congress. Although it is not clearly spelt out as to what it precisely implies, it nonetheless indicate to the activities related to politics, political system and political culture along with spiritual and materialistic development. Jiang Zemin, in an address to the party School of the CPC Central Committee emphasized ' the need to establish a socialist political civilization and developing "socialist democracy with Chinese Characteristics"^{xi} Chinese leadership is aware of the need of political liberalization and democratisation; the communist party, by any reasonable assessment would not tolerate a democracy based on the

separation of powers and a multi-party system based on the freedom of speech and freedom of association. It has to maintain a delicate balance between initiating some kind of political reform and overt western style democratic pluralism that may undermine the political and social stability of China. This may be called a mysterious arena, which the political scientist would really find it difficult to explore as also covered in Chapter 4. It would, indeed, be mind boggling, amazing and interesting. However their *power politics* reign supreme because of the geopolitical compulsions and balancing act in the Asia pacific region. And that basically calls for military modernization.

China's Defense Policy and Evolving Military Doctrine

Defense Policy

5.7. In an address to the PLA delegation in March 1999, Zhang Wannian, Vice-Chairman of the Central Military Commission cited Deng's prediction that China would be the next target to America's 'hegemonic strategy'. He, therefore, directed the PLA to 'fully' and comprehensively prepare for the possibility that the United States may launch military aggression against China, manipulate another country into starting a war, or provoke a war by fostering Taiwan independence forces.^{xii} Given this prediction, China's military reforms continue unabated that started during Deng Xiaoping's military reforms, till date. China has succeeded in inducting younger, better educated, better trained soldiers and officers with greater technical capabilities and modern weaponry. China's military is still the Party's Army rather than belonging to the state - a relation strongly advocated and practiced during Mao's regime. Mao valued

military as a means of bringing about revolution; he, however qualified further by mentioning that “the Party must always control the gun, the gun must never control the Party”. However in the present day context there are reasons to believe that such emphatic imposition might have got diluted in the sense that the state functionaries are getting more involved in the modernization programme and in formulating the defense policy; although however the operational command of the military forces remains with the Military Commission of Chinese Communist Party (CCP) as would be shown later.

5.8. China’s defense policy, as officially stated, is defensive in nature and is meant to guarantee the survival and development of the nation. China would like to step up modernization of its national defense and its armed forces; and along with safeguarding national security and unity it would like to build a moderately prosperous society in an all-round way.

xiii As, therefore, can be deduced Chinese defense policy is subordinated and contributory to country's development and development strategies. As is shown in other Chapters about the universal concept, specially espoused by American former secretary of state Robert McNamara, that defense and development are inseparable equally applies to Chinese strategic thinking. Official version of China’s basic goals and tasks of national security vis-à-vis defense policy are shown below:

To stop separation and promote reunification, guard against and resist aggression, and defend national sovereignty, territorial integrity and wartime rights and interests.

To safeguard the interests of national development, in an all round, coordinated and sustainable way and steadily increase the overall national strength.

To modernize China's national defense in line with both the national conditions of China and the trend of military development in the world by adhering to the policy of coordinating military and economic development, and improve the operational capabilities of self defense under the conditions of informationalization.

To safeguard the political, economic and cultural rights and interests of the Chinese people, crack down on criminal activities of all sorts and maintain public order and stability.

To pursue an independent foreign policy of peace and adhere to the new security concept featuring mutual trust, mutual benefit, equality and coordination with a view to securing a long-term and favorable international and surrounding environment.^{xiv}

5.9. As can be gleaned from above, China's defense/security policy is focused towards unification with Taiwan, maritime peripheral areas that basically covers the South China Sea and modernization of China's Military borrowing characteristics from Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA). It, however, shows military development as part of overall national development in all round manner. It can also be deduced and as also shown in this study economic development is the primary goal of the Chinese development policy; however along side economic development military modernization programme would continue. Internal security and stability is one of the concerns of China's security policy and there are reasons to believe that military is prepared, trained and motivated to take care of internal turmoils, secessionist tendencies, insurgencies etc also. Chinese are, overall, interested in developing a truly potent, credible, battle-worthy, modern, progressive military forces that would be capable of fighting a war under hi-tech conditions. China's over-arching modernization drive or reform programme can be divided as the "Three

Pillars”.

Pillar I: The development, procurement, acquisition, and fielding of new weapons systems, technologies, and combat capabilities.

Pillar II: The development of new operational concepts and war fighting doctrines for the employment of the new capabilities.

Pillar III: The vast array of institutional and systemic reforms necessary to support the first two.^{xv}

Out of the three pillars, the first pillar draws much of international media attention and plays into domestic politics both in Taipei and Washington. However, mere acquisitions may not be good enough, unless those are usefully utilized by evolving the suitable concept and doctrines that would apply both within and without. China’s evolving military doctrine is undergoing phenomenal changes specially after the first Gulf War as would be shown subsequently. Institutional developments are also in progress.

Military Doctrine

5.10. 'People’s War' (PW) doctrine was the order of the day during much of the Cold War. In late '70s 'Peoples War' concept was replaced by 'People’s War Under Modern Conditions' (PWUMC). Positional warfare concept began to replace the protracted guerilla warfare concept. Nuclear Warfare concept got ingrained in the doctrine which was basically meant to deter nuclear attack. The evolving doctrine called for denial of nuclear supremacy to any potential opponent so that PLA could ultimately prevail

through protracted conventional warfare. In 1985 China's Central Military Commission further revised the doctrine calling it an 'active defense' (jiji fangyu). Active Defense calls for waging small scale conflicts along its 'Peripheries', more emphasis on rapid force projection with the application of high technology and intense firepower and realization of military objectives over a relatively short period of time. Active Defense doctrine also emphasizes "the value of Pre-emptive strikes as an essential tactic"^{xvi}. To concretize further "the PLA takes as its objectives to win local wars under the conditions of informationalization and gives priority to developing weaponry and equipment, to building joint operational capabilities". As a matter of fact, the Gulf War further actuated the refinement of Den-gist strategy of fighting 'Peoples' War under modern conditions' to a high - tech strategy of achieving a quick, decisive military victory in a matter of days. Frankly speaking, as also pointed out elsewhere in the study, the first Gulf War had a galvanizing effect upon PLA. *Operation Desert Storm* made PLA realize it was 20 years behind most developed militaries and would even fall farther behind if it did not attempt to undertake a serious and long-term reform and modernization effort. China's concept of "Local Wars Under Modern High Tech-conditions", as spelt out by David M. Finkelstein, would have the following characteristics.

- *It is fought for limited political objectives.*
- *It is limited by geographic scope. In other words, it is not total war and nuclear war" (which described the most likely type of war Mao Zedong had told the PLA to prepare to fight).*
- *It is short in duration but decisive in strategic (political) outcome. A single campaign may decide the entire war.*

- *It demands a high-intensity operational tempo based on mobility, speed, and deep reach.*
- *It employs high lethality, high technology weapons causing high levels of destruction.*
- *It is logistics - intensive with high resource consumption rates. Success will be much a function of combat sustainability as the ability to inflict damage upon the enemy.*
- *It is information-intensive and critically dependent upon C4ISR and near total battle space awareness.*
- *It will entail simultaneous fighting in all of the battle space dimensions, to include outer space and electro-magnetic spectrum, and it will be fought on non-linear battle lines with highly vulnerable deep rear areas.*
- *And, notably, it will be characterized by joint service offensive campaigns.* ^{xvii}

5.11. China, as a major world power, would like to base its modernization drive on consideration that it would also have to fight beyond its borders or in South China Sea. PLA now calls for linking active defense with forward defense which implies fighting beyond country's land borders. Forward defense is the key to China's present strategy. It would like to go offensive; the digitized battlefield, electronic soft kill, and pinpoint elimination of the enemy's key targets, all indicate to the Chinese offensive posture as well. You Ji call it "adroit response based on a combination of offensive and defensive campaigns". However the doctrine is flexible enough to cater for different combat scenarios i.e. from all-out high-tech warfare to small-scale border disputes. In recent publications, PLA no longer differentiates between mobile and joint operations in any campaign

as part of its doctrine. They better term it mobile joint operations. Again the essence of mobile operations is offensive oriented (*Gongshi Zuozhan*). When the offensive posture is being practiced as part of its campaign, Taiwan is kept in view. Joint-ness is another key area of PLA's doctrine like units of tanks, artillery, engineering, tele-communications, anti-chemical warfare, and others, are brought together to execute a ground campaign.^{xviii}

Fighting limited war in high - technology conditions, putting emphasis on Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA) PLA has evolved a concept, as explained in Jane's Intelligence Review, called "the War Zone Campaign". The Doctrine aims at "securing a political victory rather than gaining territory". The aim would be to put the enemy decision makers under pressure to back down; "the War Zone Campaign concept emphasizes the use of special forces to disrupt enemy build up, the gaining of the initiative through pre-emptive strikes, and fighting a quick battle with mobile formations to force a rapid solution". The War Zone Concept requires mobility which PLA lacks; however, it is being addressed. It also emphasises on the development of rapid reaction units (RRU) or the fist units, the details of which would be shown subsequently.^{xix} As can be surmised, China's present military doctrine calls for disrupting enemy's combat forces and logistics but not to annihilate so as to bring him to the negotiating table or even to dictate terms, if possible. The doctrine, as can be foreseen, provides guidelines for the PLA to prepare for limited war scenarios like: limited military conflict with neighboring countries, military conflict arising over the ownership of territorial waters, to fight back the undeclared air attack by enemy

countries and the unambiguous full scale offensive inside Taiwan, in case it declares formal independence.

China's Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA)

5.12. The history reveals, as Barry Buzan observes, there is a long-standing relevance and importance of technology to military strategy. However what is of striking difference in today's military technology, as Buzan concludes, is defined more by recent changes than by any long-standing pattern of continuity; it can, therefore, be rightfully called a revolution. This revolution has changed the military strategy to 'permanent upheaval'. It has both quantitative and qualitative connotations. Quantitatively, firstly, the number and frequency of changes are large and, secondly, the ability to mass produce the new equipments/armaments increased 'dramatically'. Qualitative improvements have affected the technological capabilities for both 'civil and military purposes'. This revolution is both "the manifestations and movers of profound changes in human knowledge and social organization". As a sequel to this no new war, as Barry Buzan predicts, "Could be fought under same conditions as the previous one".^{xx} It would seriously affect the development of reliable strategic wisdom. Murray and Knox describes RMAs are "Periods of innovation in which armed forces develop novel concepts involving changes in doctrine, tactics, procedures and technology". Such innovations demand a culture of free thinking; its driving force, as the authors conclude, is rarely technology. RMAs take place at the operational level of war; they do not affect the outcome at strategic level. His nuanced deduction, however,

needs mention here,

Every major cluster of innovations during the interwar period that resulted in a revolution in military affairs-combined arms ground warfare, carrier warfare, and amphibious warfare-depended on the existence of concrete adversaries against which to frame innovation.^{xxi}

Different periods of military revolutions and associated and resultant RMAs are shown in the following Table:

Table - 5

Revolutions in Military Affairs and Military Revolutions

Anticipatory RMAs of the middle ages and early modern era –

Longbow, offensive-defensive strategy, gunpowder, new fortress architecture.

Military Revolution 1: the seventeenth-century creation of the modern state and of modern military institutions.

Associated and resultant RMAs:

-Dutch and Swedish tactical reforms, French tactical and organizational reforms, naval revolution, Britain's financial revolution'

-French military reforms following the Seven Years' War.

Military Revolutions 2 and 3: the French and Industrial Revolutions.

Associated and resultant RMAs:

-National political and economic mobilization, Napoleonic warfare (battlefield annihilation of the enemy's armed forces);

-Financial and economic power based on industrialization (Britain)

-Technological revolution in land warfare and transport (telegraph, railroads, steamships, quick-firing, smokeless-powder, small-arms and artillery; automatic weapons);

-the Fisher revolution in naval warfare: the all-big-gun battleship and battle fleet (1905 -14).

Military Revolution 4 : *the First World War irrevocably combines its three predecessors.*

Associated and resultant RMAs:

-Combined arms tactics and operations, Blitzkrieg operations, strategic bombing, carrier warfare, submarine warfare, amphibious warfare, radar, signals intelligence.

Military Revolution 5: *nuclear weapons and ballistic missile delivery systems.*

Associated and resultant RMAs:

-Precision reconnaissance and strike; stealth; computerization and computer networking of command and control; massively increased lethality of "conventional" munitions.

Source: Macgregor Knox and Williamson Murray, *The Dynamics of Military Revolution 1300-2050*; Cambridge University Press, 2001 p.13

China's present declared policy is to fight the future war under hi-tech conditions, a revolutionary departure from the people's war concept, propounded and practiced by Mao Tse Tung during different historical/revolutionary changes.

5.13. The military products of the technological revolution are readily available although the spread of nuclear weapons is restricted; however, the ability to produce the advanced weapons is also restricted. Japan, Germany, Italy should have been more prominent as arms producers, because of their strong industrial base; but conversely China, South Africa

and Israel, although do not have a strong industrial base, are more prominent as arms producers, mainly, as may be deduced, due to the reasons of *real politics*. Japan, as a case in point, given its industrial size and sophistication can fairly quickly reach the top-rank of arms producers; it may not turn out to be so because of its anti-military policy. Japan's anti-military policy is going through paradigm shift. However China's case is different and interesting as observed by Barry Buzan, "China, because of its weak industrial base, is not a candidate for top rank until some time well into the next century, although its size, location, pace of development and strong political will may give it apparent first rank status before then".^{xxii}

5.14. Much hyped RMA concept, being upgraded and already tested in the last Gulf Wars, is an eye opener for China. Pfaltzgraff, Jr has called the First Gulf War as *Sui generis* or as a glimpse into the future of warfare. China has learnt good lessons from fighting the Vietnamese, analyzing two asymmetric wars between Iraq and the United States in the Gulf and seemingly display of its outdated armaments during the Saber rattling with Taiwan in 1996. China is preparing to fight a 'limited war' under hi-tech conditions in the near future if the exigencies so demand especially as regards to Taiwan and the disputed island territories in the South China Sea. It calls for rethinking and restructuring and China, it is strongly believed, is therefore, relying on RMA concept, which is called 'a system of systems' (integration).^{xxiii} Pfaltzgraff, Jr terms it "Integrative Technology" implying the ability to handle and shift the useful informations from an unprecedented amount of information, the actor who can most effectively utilize this resource at the earliest possible stage of the war would hold the

key to success. The author even further integrates the collection and flow of information and communications with mobility of forces in keeping with the implications of “Third War” Civilization. There would be increased requirements for “communications, mobility and the synchronization of operations among physically separated, yet doctrinally unified, forces. RMA calls for unprecedented, volumes of firepower over great ranges.^{xxiv} However, Paul Dibb puts certain qualifications to the RMA concept when used in the Asian context. According to him, it could be a partial or hybrid RMA.^{xxv} As already highlighted, in the 90s stress has been put on information and the battle space. The objective is to achieve ‘Dominant Battle Space Knowledge, a capacity to process information as close to real time as possible.^{xxvi} Post-Deng strategy envisages fighting a future war under hi-tech conditions which also prescribes concrete measures for weapons programs, force organization, campaign tactics and research priorities on hi-tech.^{xxvii} Implicit in it is the shift from basically positional defensive posture to a combination of offensive and defensive capabilities, as the PLA strategists appreciate. PLA would like to enhance its rapid reaction capabilities thereby neutralize an imminent threat by pre-emptive offensive campaigns. PLA authorities are concerned about developing an offensive launching capability in case Taiwan declares independence. If the US co-ordinates the operational activities, as indications reveal, of the Taiwanese armed forces through its advanced C4ISR systems, the PLA will suffer greater human and material losses or if Taiwan is formed part of the (Theatre Missile Defense) TMD network, then the China’s missiles will have to be further improved. PLA’s C3IRS networks, computer systems, movement of Chinese warships in the international waters may be blocked. A no fly zone may be imposed in the

Taiwan Strait and some selective PLA command and control hubs may be targets for surgical strike.^{xxviii}

5.15. Keeping in mind these constraints and eventualities, Chinese are cautiously but steadily making strides in technological development. China is concentrating on potent technologies such as supersonic or stealthy subsonic cruise missiles. Pentagon says China is developing as it calls, "New Concept" weapons based on laser and high-power microwave technologies and anti-satellite devices such as interceptors and ground-based lasers. Chinese are developing these weapons, as the Americans see, basically to obviate its vulnerabilities to US military. China is developing Land-attack Cruise Missiles (LACMs) for medium to long-range missions by inducting technologies such as GPS/inertial mid-course guidance and, most critically, terrain contour matching to increase its accuracy. Fielding these cruise missiles by China would greatly erode Taiwan's military advantage.^{xxix} A 1998 Summer edition of Hong Kong based magazine claimed that PLA could cause U.S. F - 117 stealth fighters to malfunction and jam Taiwan's anti-ship missiles".^{xxx} However, the credibility and effectiveness of all these revolutions could be established only in actual combat; it has, although, taken a momentum which can keep the strategists and military planners awake and brooding. China emphasizes on hybrid systems like its next generation fighter J-10. It has a Chinese airframe, Israeli avionics and Russian engines.

5.16. Military surveillance satellites, airborne early warning and airborne refueling aircraft, relatively sophisticated surface to air missiles, air to air missiles with beyond visual ranges, unmanned aerial vehicles, advanced

radar, sonar, secure communications and crypto graphical equipment are the areas where China is going to make strides. It is believed that China is likely to launch, between 2006 and 2008, eight new surveillance satellites out of which four would be HJ I A/B electro-optical satellites and four H J I C radar satellites. China is building an extensive navigation satellite system. China is also believed to be developing 'smart' systems to counter any ballistic defense missile systems that Taiwan might deploy. China's *Shashoujian* weaponry would give it lead over US and its regional allies in missile technology. ^{xxx} China is going to put special emphasis on information warfare as already highlighted. China is even developing a strategic information warfare unit called "Net Force" to fight, through computer manipulations, enemy information systems which can have devastating effect on enemy's war fighting capability. It goes with Sun Tzu's famous saying, "By knowing the enemy and knowing yourself, you can fight a hundred battles and win them all". The RMA in China will accelerate the digitalization of the naval battlefield. Increased modes of communication will strengthen the capacity for information processing. China is exploring both defensive and offensive information operations; China's main focus is now on defensive measures including electronic counter measures. However, China, as yet, has not developed a coordinated and integrated information warfare doctrine although its theoretical aspects of information warfare is quite developed. On the other hand, China has now the capability to track satellites with accuracy sufficient for targeting. A nuclear-armed ballistic missile can damage a satellite; China is also exploring lasers as an anti-satellite weapon (ASAT). By 2010, PLA would, in all probability, be able to use the same as a component in a cross-sector scenario.^{xxxii} RMA will replace concentration

of force with concentration of firepower. Remote attack and underwater raids will be the major combat concept. Future naval wars will emphasize joint actions.^{xxxiii} PLA is considering the multiplication of conventional missiles of China's Strategic Missile Force (SMF) as part of RMA type of war to offset the imbalance in asymmetric warfare with a stronger military power. Research is on in improving its terminal accuracy. Missile units (conventional) had actively participated in March 1996 demonstration exercise codenamed, "Strait 96 Number one " against Taiwan at the level of Army groups.^{xxxiv}

MAP 9: Taiwan Strait: Chinese Military Exercise Areas and Missile Splashdown Zones, 1995 – 1996.



Source: Greg Austin, *China's Ocean Frontier—International Law, Military Force and National Development*, Allen and Unwin in collaboration with the Australian National University, Canberra, 1998.

A research report of the PLA National Defense University reads, “The PLA’s conventional missile will be used exclusively against the enemy’s key military targets which the weapons of other services can not reach. These targets include the communication hubs, weapons delivery platforms and most practically the aircraft carrier battle groups”^{xxxv}. Chinese believe its RMA is still in formative stage with the initial phase extended to 2030.^{xxxvi} It is substantiated by an American author who deduces, over the next 30 to 40 years, Beijing would develop a multidimensional force structure “capable of conducting joint military operations across a battle space spectrum embracing the electromagnetic, space, atmosphere, land and sea environments”.^{xxxvii} China is trying to catch up with the western technologies by making defense production collaboration with other countries especially with Russia.

Russia - China Military Technical Co-operation

5.17. Russia is the main supplier of military hardware to China along with being a regional security partner. Both the parties, through the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO), would like to limit American influence in Central Asia while at the same time increasing their influence as already indicated in Chapter 3. Given the restrictions imposed by the Western world specially by the US on the sale of sophisticated or normal weapons to China, it has no choice but to look to Russia - its number one enemy during the later part of the Cold War - for upgrading and modernising its military capabilities. Both the countries have entered into ‘strategic partnership’ switching from ‘constructive partnership’, covering, among

other areas 'security arrangements' possibly serving as a model in the Asia - Pacific region. Both the countries have ostensibly solved their long outstanding border problems and established many of the confidence building measures (CBMs) especially along their borders as already shown. However, there is a remote possibility of turning this military co-operation into an alliance. Arms trade between Russia and China are basically dictated by economic considerations as the Russians see it and the considerations of acquiring modern weapons and advanced military technologies at a low price as the Chinese see it. This *quid pro quo* scenario is actuated basically to counter arms sale to Taiwan by the US and Western Europe. China has, therefore, turned into number one market for Russian arms.^{xxxviii} The reality is: China is a rising military power, thanks in large part to the \$ 5 billion of high - tech Russian arms it buys every year. And Chinese economy has surpassed Russian economy long time back. Russia may be sloshing with petrodollars but China's huge surplus of trade capital is even bigger. China has to get the state of the art military hardware from any source for which, apparantly, money is no constraint.

5.18. Military co-operation figured prominently in the talks between Russian President Yeltsin and Chinese President Jiang Zemin in December 1992 when they signed the joint declaration on the Basic Principles governing their Bilateral Relations. China purchased US \$ 1.8 billion worth of weapons and parts from Russia in 1992 that include 24 Su-27 jet fighters plus S-300 air defense missile systems (SAM). Agreement on the licensed production of SU-27 aircraft was reached during Vice - Chairman of China's Central Military Commission Lin Huaqing's visit to Russia in December 1995.^{xxxix} In the first half of the 90s Soviet Union/Russia sold

weapons worth between US \$ 2.9 billion and 6 billion to China and, in 1996 alone 'Russian exports to China reportedly exceeded \$2.1 billion, amounting to nearly 70% of China's total arms imports'.^{xi} Some of other important Russian military exports to China during 1990s are, apart from SU-27 and S-300 SAMS, *Kilo*-type submarines, *Sovremenny* class destroyers and T-80U main battle tanks. China is more interested to acquire the technologies so that it could manufacture the advanced systems domestically. By 1997, there were more than 100 Sino-Russian defense technology projects and it is reported that up-to 70% of each SU-27 will ultimately be manufactured in China. Russia is also likely to transfer the production technology of SU-30 aircraft to China. In 1995, the US cautioned Russia not to sell SS-18 intercontinental ballistic missiles to China, and in 1997 US Secretary of defense labelled China's acquisition of *Sovremenny*- class ships armed with SS-N-22 missiles as a threat to US forces. US is concerned that the Russian transfer of technology could propel China to develop long range ballistic missiles, cruise missiles and nuclear powered submarines. However, in early 1990's Russia blocked the sale of TU-22 M *Backfire* long-range bombers on the ground that it would introduce a potentially destabilising offensive weapon in the region.^{xii} Probably Russia still considers China as a potential threat and it would not like China overtake Russia technologically and be its competitor in the long run. Such apprehension by Russia is quite understandable since China is growing quite fast both economically and militarily. However, in 2002, China decided to purchase two more *Sovremenny* - class destroyers, 40 SU-30MKK fighter-bombers, additional S300 PMU MKK anti-aircraft missiles and eight more project 636 *Kilo*-class submarines from Russia. It is

expected that the delivery of these weapons would take about four to five years.^{xlii}

5.19. 'Russia, as a part of joint venture is building a gas centrifuge uranium enrichment plant in Central China. The centrifuge is designed to produce enriched uranium for nuclear power plants. In August 1999, Hong Kong press published a report of a deal, between Russia and China, on the sale of two *typhoon* class nuclear-powered submarines. These submarines are, as reported, capable of launching nuclear warheads to deter the US Seventh Fleet that may intervene in any cross-Strait clash between China and Taiwan. Russia wants China to become a co-owner of GLONASS, Russia's navigational satellite system which would provide China useful information in precision bombing of targets, manoeuvring of ships in coastal zones including carrying out landing operations in conditions of minefields, guiding rocket and artillery attacks and movement of troops in land warfare. It would also make the nuclear attacks on the objects of the adversary more effective.

5.20. Related to this development, as visible by the fact that China is the third nation in the world to send people into space, there is substantial Russian space technology transfer to China. Chinese *Shenzhou* spacecraft is a slightly bigger version of Russian Soyuz vessel, although as the experts conclude, it is technologically superior to the Soyuz. It gives China the international image, and it also stimulates advances in the country's aerospace, computer and electronics industries. China is likely to utilize the space craft navigation, propulsion, life support and other subsystems for "dual-use military/civilian projects. Chinese space plans are no secrets

as far as technology transfers are concerned and as made public in Xinhua News Agency's magazine in 2002, "After China and Russia signed a space cooperation agreement in 1996, the two countries carried out very fruitful cooperation in docking system installations, model spaceships, flight control, and means of life support and other areas of manned space flight. Russia's experience in space technology development was and is of momentous significance as enlightenment to China".^{xliii} The Hong Kong based newspaper Tai Yang Pao reported in its November 1999 Issue that between the years 2000-2004, China may purchase from Russia or cooperate in producing high-tech naval and air weapons worth \$ 20 billion'. Again a 2006 Pentagon report singles out Russia as the source of 95 percent of China's \$ 13 billion in foreign weapons purchases from 2000 through 2005.^{xliiv}


An Outline Organization and Arsenal of China's Military Forces

China's Defense Hierarchy in Outline

5.21. The Red Army founded in 1927 by the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), was basically a ragtag group; it was still able to wrest power from Kuomintang nationalists in 1949. The Red Army, re-named as the People's Liberation Army (PLA) after 1949, has evolved into a well-disciplined, well organized and progressive fighting machinery. It, however, remains unequivocally subordinate to the CCP which is indicated by the well publicized cliché that the party must always control the gun. However, the latest trend is: the military hierarchy has become progressively more separate from government and party hierarchies. Deng's military reforms which continue till date have succeeded in producing a younger, better educated and better trained PLA with greater technical skill and modern

armaments. The Army component of PLA is trimmed by reducing the ordinary troops that are technically backward while the Navy, Air Force and Second Artillery Forces are strengthened. The State Council of China as it inherits its power from National People's Congress (NPC) provides the routine direction and administration of the military while its command is exercised by the Central Military Commission (CMC). PLA's General Staff Department, General Political Department, General Logistics Department and General Armament Department are placed under the leadership of the Central Military Commission. "The General Staff Department organizes and leads the building up of the nation's armed forces and organizes and directs their military operations. The General Armament Department organizes and leads army's work in military equipment".^{xiv} People's Liberation Army (PLA) has both active and reserve components. The Chinese People's Armed Police Force is the component part of the Chinese Armed Forces. The PLA is composed of the Army, the Navy, the Air force and the Second Artillery Force. Defense research and production, and defense expenditure and assets are taken care of by the State Council while the CMC approves "the military equipment system of the Armed Forces and military equipment development plans and programme". The State Council and the CMC jointly prepare and implement the mobilization scheme of the People's Liberation Army.

Table -6
Military Hierarchy of PLA



Source : June Teufel Dreyer, " China's Political System- Modernization and Tradition", Third Edition, Macmillan, p.207.

Chinese armed forces are now transforming themselves from a manpower intensive to a qualitatively superior technology intensive type in order to comprehensively enhance the armed forces' combat effectiveness. The current development and modernization programme of different components of PLA are shown in the following paragraphs.

China's Nuclear Doctrine and its Arsenal

5.22. The United States reportedly blackmailed China in 1950s by using nuclear threats. Americans considered the use of nuclear weapons against the Chinese during the Korean War in 1953; a year later it also thought of using the nuclear weapons in order to rescue the besieged French garrison of Dien Bien Phu in 1954 and finally during the Taiwan Strait Crisis in 1954 U.S. also threatened to use weapons if Beijing expanded the conflict. Faced with such repetitive threats and blackmails, Chinese Communist Party leaders decided to acquire nuclear weapons within shortest time possible. One of the primary goals of Chinese going nuclear was to liberate Taiwan apart from the overall consideration of *real politics*. Once China had the 'deterrent' nuclear weapons in its arsenal, America could no longer use the threat of nuclear attack to restrict Chinese moves against Taiwan. "What has not changed in the Post-Cold War era," as Johnson argues, " is a deeply rooted hard *realpolitik* worldview that nuclear weapons buy both soft power (international status and influence) and hard power (military operational power)"^{xlvi} China, however, would like to have a more robust doctrine of limited nuclear deterrence. Limited deterrence capability upgrading from minimum would entail the forces that would deter conventional, theatre, and strategic nuclear war and also contain the escalation in the event of a nuclear confrontation. Alastair Johnston,

however, concludes that China is still a long way off from acquiring limited deterrence capability. However, its modernization programme is geared towards that direction as would be shown in the following paragraphs.^{xlvii} This is substantiated by other proponents who opine China's increased nuclear capability indicate an important shift towards a more aggressive nuclear policy. They argue "More Chinese missile might signal a possible shift from a retaliatory counter value posture to an offensive counterforce posture, particularly if accompanied by necessary improvements in accuracy". According to (Paul) Godwin, a sufficient number of weapons could permit China for the first time to attempt intrawar escalation control, since Beijing would retain enough forces to respond at a higher level if the aggressor chooses to escalate a nuclear exchange"^{xlviii} Even in case of minimum deterrence, China could counter-attack the territory of the state that had first used the nuclear weapon.^{xlix} China maintains a small but an effective nuclear capability. It undertakes not to be the first country to use the nuclear weapons. However, any such attack by any adversary will invariably be met by a counterstroke by China.^l It would like to have a survivable long-range missile force that could hold a significant portion of the US population hostage in a retaliatory strike.^{li} However, Chinese limited nuclear deterrence, unlike the western doctrines, doesn't cater for one to one response but to raise the cost of war dramatically high to prevent an enemy victory.^{lii}

5.23. The limited nuclear deterrence would cater for weapons like more accurate survivable and penetrable ICBM^{liii}, SLBM as a retaliatory force, tactical and theatre nuclear weapons to hit battlefield and theatre military targets, ballistic missile defense, space based early warning and command

and control systems and anti-satellite weapons to hit enemy military satellites.^{lv} China, as already mentioned, is moving towards the direction like it is going for miniaturisation of its nuclear warheads and developing more accurate, mobile, solid fueled, MIRVed missile systems believed to be faster, sturdier and more accurate.

5.24. China's nuclear force today is designed for two types of missions i.e. medium and longer-range strategic strikes (two thirds of the warheads are dedicated) and tactical uses including low-yield bombs, artillery shells, atomic demolition mines and possibly short-range missiles (together accounting for one-third of the warheads). Most of China's ballistic missiles, being core of the strategic force, are meant for use in Eurasia and possibly only a small number of 20 missiles is capable of reaching the United States.^{lv} About 230 nuclear warheads can be deployed on aircraft, missiles and submarines with regional capabilities. Another 150 nuclear warheads are believed to be meant for tactical uses. Presently two long-range ballistic missiles are in the development stage, the 8,000-km DF-31^{lvi} and the 12,000-km DF-41- both are expected to be solid fuelled and based on mobile launchers. These may be either multiple re-entry vehicles (MRV) or more capable but technically difficult independently targeted re-entry vehicles (MIRV). Further refinement of DF-31, along with the introduction of JL-2 SLBM and Type 094 SSBN submarine would significantly enhance China's nuclear deterrence capability.^{lvii} DF-31^{lviii} was supposed to be deployed before 2005 and DF-41 possibly around 2010. The threat posed by DF-31, when it becomes operational, is, indeed, real. The DF-31 will close the deficiencies between current Chinese, U.S. and Russian ballistic designs and it would provide China with a strike

capability, may be difficult to counterattack at any stage of the operation. Pentagon believes PLA may deploy 60 ICBMs by 2010 with as many as 140 warheads. Such development contributes in realizing the vision of overcoming future US ballistic missile defenses.^{lix} China is also reported to be building four to six new type 094 SSBNS (Nuclear Powered and Nuclear Ballistic Missile Equipped Submarine). China's regional ballistic missile capabilities would be greatly upgraded with the induction of DF-21, the solid fuelled medium range missile with a faster launch time. The 48 operational DF-21s have a range of 1800 km and are carried on mobile launchers.^{lx} DF 21/21A has a payload of 600 kg and is modified as JL-1.^{lxi} Chinese Xia- Class SSBN is operational with this class of missile as would be shown in the Chapter subsequently.

5.25. In early 1999 there were about 200 short and intermediate range missiles deployed in the Fujian province across the Strait of Taiwan and it is estimated the number might rise between 500 and 650 within five years. These are basically tipped with conventional warheads, although they could also be given nuclear payloads. Chinese missile production projection shows it can produce a thousand new missiles, mostly short range within the next decade and another 10-12 ICBMs every year. It is also capable of an "aggressive deployment of upward of 1,000 thermonuclear warheads on ICBM by 2015". A recent American National Intelligence estimate, however, shows a smaller number amounting to tens of ICBMs are capable of targeting continental United States.^{lxii} On the other hand, the IRBM and MRBM are capable of posing strategic threats to India or Japan, and to a lesser degree to Russia and also to the United States through the vulnerability of US military bases in Japan and South Korea.^{lxiii}

Overall from the perspective of *realpolitics* the overall message is, as argued by Brad Roberts et al, that over the next decade what would concern America most is the Chinese nuclear policy, not the Russian or any of the rouge states.^{lxiv}

MAP 10: Ranges of Chinese Missiles



Source : Ashley J. Tellis, *India's Emerging Nuclear Posture : Between recessed Deterrent and Ready Arsenal* (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2001); National Intelligence Council, *China and Weapon Of Mass Destruction: Implication for the United States*, Conference Paper, November 5, 1999

The People's Liberation Army Navy [PLAN]

5.26. Apart from protecting oceanic shipping lanes, fishing grounds, and resources, the rationale for Chinese blue water naval modernization is also for projecting China's "national awesomeness" (*quo wei*) and expanding " political influence" (*Zhengzli Yingxiang*).^{lxv} Again, in order to protect its

commercial ships in its long oceanic shipping lanes, a Chinese military expert recommended both defensive and offensive options for a new naval strategy for China: "One (Option) is making quick reactions, including military reaction, when a crisis occurs to display the strength for safeguarding the country's interests. The other is the capability of reciprocal deterrence. This means if you can threaten my international shipping route, I can also threaten your security in various fields, including your shipping route security".^{lxvi} China would, therefore, like to readjust its naval strategy. China faces threats not only along its coasts but also on high seas; it should, accordingly, shift its focus from coastal to oceanic defense. China has 18,000 km mainland coastline and 14000 km island coastline surrounding 3,416 islands and thereby it constitutes the single largest maritime landmass in the Asia-Pacific. China is a major beneficiary of UNCLOS that accepted and encoded the Latin American demand for the 200-mile Exclusive Economic Zone (Article 57).

MAP 11: China's Ocean Neighborhood




Source: Greg Austin, *China's Ocean Frontier—International Law, Military Force and National Development*, Allen and Unwin in collaboration with the Australian National University, Canberra, 1998, VIII.

5.27. As already indicated China's naval strategy is undergoing a paradigm shift from coastal defense of the mainland to active defense of maritime economic resources and strategic interests. Based on such doctrinal shift, China's present day naval exercises are being planned away from the coastal waters. Reunification of Taiwan with the mainland, looking for energy resources and controlling the oil life line in the South China Sea with concomitant control of the Paracel and Spratly island groups, projecting power in the Asia Pacific and Indian ocean area thereby restraining American military superiority are some of the important objectives that propel China for the modernisation of its naval power. China's 'strategic initiative', as called, would like to resolve, with the development of capabilities of navy and air force, the concerns i.e. like overcoming superpower dictates, asserting China's sovereignty over the South China Sea islands in the face of other claimants, possibly effecting Taiwan's forceful unification and curtailing Japanese rearmament.^{lxvii} To put it in perspective, the PLAN would have the capabilities to control the entire South China Sea, Taiwan, East China Sea and the Gulf of Tonkin as it develops the blue water capability, as discussed subsequently. China may attempt to dominate the Sea- Lines - of Communication in the Eastern Indian ocean and West Pacific followed by power projection in the Indian and Pacific oceans. Although these are still some kind of conjectures to such assessment but their perspective plan, as understood from the published literature, and increase in the military outlay show indications towards that end; and this has also to be seen from the *power politics* point of view - PLAN would be the most potent force and have the long arm in such power projection. Lia Huaqing, the architect of the modern PLAN reportedly raised the area to be "safeguarded" by PLAN to 600 nautical

miles from mainland coast-- implying its strategic objectives. The control of some of the Spratly island enlarges this range upto 1,000 nautical miles and would encompass areas from Vladivostok in the north to the Strait of Malacca including Japan (Ryukus islands), the Philippines and the South China Sea (First island chain).

MAP 12 : China's Maritime Strategy towards Western Pacific Chain Islands



Source: Strategic Analysis, IDSA, March 2000, p.2043

5.28. This falls within the scope of “green water” strategy. The “blue water” capability coincides with the “second island chain” roughly encompassing the Kuriles in the north, the Bonin and Mariana Islands and Papua New Guinea in the South.^{lxviii} In 1986 with the backing of Dengxioping and others Lia Huaqing formulated three phases plan to

develop PLAN into a world class sea power by the year 2040. Till 2000, the focus was on training and enhancing existing formations' renovation and improvement of conventional naval vessels. From 2001 to 2020, the second stage would concentrate on aircraft carriers thereby projecting power in the Western Pacific and other oceans around the world. And the third phase from 2021 to 2040 would transfer the PLAN into a major sea power with blue-water capability.^{lxix} Sometime between 2000 and 2050, 'China would have naval task forces comprising aircraft carriers, surface ships and submarines possessing anti air, anti-ship and anti-submarine capabilities. The PLA Navy would have five goals i.e. to achieve a fairly large radius of combat action; to control the given sea and air space independently; to have a strong rapid response capability, have a strong amphibious capability and to have certain strategic nuclear capability.^{lxx}

5.29. It is reported that China is planning to build four to six Type 094 nuclear powered and nuclear ballistic missile equipped submarines (SSBN). These are likely to incorporate 16JL-2 missiles capable of carrying upto six warheads per missile. The six submarines would give China the ability to keep two submarines on station in the Pacific at all times. China would like to trim its submarine fleet but make it more modern. Submarines of the *Song type* (Type 093) - first of which is already commissioned in 1999 and two more are under construction which may be fitted with either C-801 or C-802 anti-ship missile. *Song class* submarines, as the *Jane's Intelligence Review* reports, are also being indigenously developed; two are already done and three more are currently under construction.^{lxxi} It has given them the capability to shoot cruise missiles from under water. China has also purchased 4 *kilo class* submarines from

Russia.^{lxxii} In 2002 China ordered eight more Russian *Kilo-Class* diesel submarines. Chinese craft would soon receive Club Cruise Missiles from Russia and “fire and forget” torpedoes with the capability of sinking a destroyer with one shot. As a reaction to this development Lyle Goldstein, a Professor at the U.S. Naval War College in Rhode Island, says, “China’s submarines are a potent threat to our Navy, and we’re not prepared to deal with them as we once were”.^{lxxiii} A new submarine probably based on the design of the Russian Victor III SSN is due to be commissioned anytime soon. According to the military Balance 2005-2006, Chinese navy is already in possession of 69 submarines, both strategic and tactical.

5.30. Liu Huaqing said, “I will die with everlasting regret if China does not build an aircraft Carrier”, and China planned to acquire two carriers by 2005.^{lxxiv} China, however, remains far from manufacturing a plane with requisite metallurgy, avionics and power plant, which can take off and land in an aircraft carrier. As such it has deferred the commissioning of the aircraft carrier from 2005 to until or after 2010.^{lxxv} China is reported to be building an aircraft carrier, with commissioning by 2010-2015.^{lxxvi} However, there is a report that Chinese Navy is carrying out repairs on the Ex-Russian Kuznetsov - class - aircraft carrier *Varyang*. This raises the question whether China wants a carrier of its own. A retired US Navy Rear Admiral Eric Mcvadon is somewhat surprised to learn that China is seriously pursuing a carrier project since China is more interested and focused on improving its anti-access capabilities in a Taiwan crisis scenario where aircraft carrier would be of marginal value. Notwithstanding the logic given, *Jane's Defense Weekly* of 17 August 2005 writes that 'PLAN technicians have undertaken thorough studies of the basic structure of the

Varyang during the last few years to get a comprehensive understanding of the carrier's structural design. The weekly further mentions that, "A military strategist from a Chinese military university has commented publicly that the *Varyang* would be China's first aircraft carrier".^{lxxvii} However, China's ultimate intentions or projections are still not that clear. It could be China is keeping this option open while it is focused more on the hardwares that would be necessary in a Taiwan scenario.

5.31. Since the last decade, a new generation of surface vessels has become operational in the Chinese Navy. Notables among those are the deployment of the *Luhu-class* destroyer and *Jingwei class* frigates. The 4500-ton *Luhu* has improved guns and a missile system, satellite navigation system and a helicopter deck and associated hanger.^{lxxviii} Having fitted with western electronics and armaments five *Jiangwei II* class (Type 057) frigates have entered the PLAN in 1998-1999. They have a new SAM system and upgraded fire control system and radar. *Jiangwei - III* Class is also reported to be considered for deployment.^{lxxix}

5.32. As already shown in the earlier Chapter, China has the addition, in its fleet, of two Russian - built *Soveremnyy* class destroyers, the largest and most powerful surface warships ever operated by Chinese Navy. They carry the most formidable SSN-22 *Sunburn* supersonic sea-skimming anti-submarine missile. It is also armed with the SA-N-7 'Gadfly' that gives it a limited naval air-defense capability. China has a plan to buy two more *Sovremenny* 'DDGs' (Guided Missile Destroyers) with modifications--delivery date of which is still unknown,^{lxxx} *The Military Balance 2005-2006* reports that PLAN is acquiring more amphibious assault ships, fast - attack

craft, and two project 965 EM missile destroyers equipped with the *Mozkit* anti-ship missile system which will add to the anti-ship capability already available with *Sovremenny* - class destroyers.^{lxxxix} There are also reports that China is now indigenously building four 052 - class air defense destroyers. These acquisitions are clearly indicative of the fact that PLAN is being upgraded to take care of an offensive against Taiwan where American involvement is also factored in. In case of Taiwan, PLAN is likely to mount blockade operation around Taiwan and amphibious operations on the offshore islands of Quemoy and Matsu. Without the aircraft carriers that would be providing effective air cover or sufficient number of destroyers with adequate area-AAW capabilities, PLAN's current fleets would not be able to handle any sustained, large scale blockade operations. Given such deficiencies, the blockade could be carried out primarily through missile attacks on the key ports along Taiwan's east coast (e.g. Taidong and Hualien) or by the PLAN's submarines.^{lxxxii} On both counts PLAN has already made great strides. Even its destroyer fleet has come to a reckonable shape.

5.33. The acquisition and modernization of destroyers, frigates and submarines fulfill three strategic objectives of force restructuring for the twenty first century. These would be trained, forming battle groups, as 'rapid response units and for blue water missions'. They would also enhance the groups' anti air and anti-submarine capability (specialization). PLAN has three fleets i.e. North, East and Southern fleets.^{lxxxiii} PLAN wants that these fleets should be able to 'operate independently in which case it would not have to 'trade off' strength in key strategic directions (Quantity).^{lxxxiv}

5.34. The Core of the PLAN Air Force (PLANAF) is the dedicated maritime strike aircraft JH-7, a fighter-bomber. It is still being upgraded with new avionics, sensors and weapon systems and being renamed FBC-1. PLANAF has another most potent six PS-5 amphibious and 20 Y--S maritime patrol aircraft with a range of over 1,000 miles and can carry C-801/802 anti-ships missiles. These aircraft would critically support the fleet in case a showdown takes place in the Taiwan Strait or in the South China Sea.^{lxxxv} The reported acquisition of SU-30 MKK multi-role combat aircraft would greatly optimize offensive naval warfare capability as well. *The Military Balance 2005-2006* shows Chinese Naval Aviation is already having 24 Su-30 Mk2 aircrafts in its arsenal. PLAN naval aviation is reported to be building an airstrip in the Woody islands in the Paracel for possible use in the conflicts in the Spratlys. It is possible that China might station some of her SU-27SMKS in that airfield to support the PLAN military activities in the Spratlys.^{lxxxvi}

People's Liberation Army Air Force (PLAAF)

5.35. Air Districts (ADs), that roughly correspond to Army's Military Regions (MRS) are the basic field formations of PLA-AF. Each AD consists of a number of independent air regiments, a bomber division, a ground attack division and a superimposed air defense zone. Each air defense zone is divided into air defense sectors and control all air defense resources ranging from the fighters to the radars and the air defense artillery. According to the *Military Balance 2005-2006* PLA-AF is having a total of 32 air divisions of which 22 are fighters, 3 Bombers, 5 Attacks and 2 Transports. There are varying number of air divisions in the MRs;

however, the concentration is more on the south-east way be to give more weightage to Taiwan and South China Sea. However, technologically China's Air Force is at the comparable level with some of the regional air forces like India, Taiwan, Japan, Malaysia etc, let alone the western air forces. Its technologies are still relatively outdated and the economies of scale discourage the manufacture of the 'state of the art' aircraft indigenously. It is, therefore, looking to Russia for the import of the latest aircraft, as already discussed. China also tried to get the American and Israeli technologies but they got blocked due, mainly, to her so-called human rights violations. However, China is also desperate to go for the license production of the SU-27 / 30 series 'Flanker' fighter aircraft - Russia being its country of origin.

5.36. *China's 2004 National Defense White Paper* makes PLA-AF responsible for safeguarding China's airspace security and maintaining a stable air defence posture nationwide. It has, therefore, shifted from territorial air defence to one of both defensive and offensive operations. Central Military Commission (CMC) prescribed the missions for the Air Force: 'defend strategic points and mass of troops, maintain air domination in the theatre of operations, launch surprise attacks on high-value targets, participate in nuclear counterattack; prepare defenses against air raids; support other services both in defense and counter-offensive'. The Air Force fashioned its own strategy and listed a number of high priority projects: surface-to-air missiles, medium/long range all weather interceptors, early warning systems, electronic countermeasure equipment and automatic command and control systems. Its most R&D programs centred on fighters and fighter-bombers, the HQ-7 surface to air missile, a

navigation system for the H-6 medium bomber, new-type radar systems, unmanned reconnaissance aircraft and avionics for fighters.^{lxxxvii}

5.37. PLAAF, as directed by CMC, by the end of the twentieth century, made preparations for rapid expansion in case of a full-scale war. PLAAF wants, accordingly, to develop capabilities for quick reaction, integrated co-ordination and combat in depth. PLAAF planned to disperse the fighters throughout the country, while bombers and attackers would be concentrated in the rear as second-strike deterrent. It divided the air combat units into quick reaction air groups, alert air groups and strategic reserves.^{lxxxviii} However, right today, SU-27 is the only capable system in the Chinese inventory. Integrated co-ordination with other sub-systems of a modern air force is still a far cry.^{lxxxix} Apart from 24 SU-27 fighters from Russia, China wants to build another 200 SU-27s, under the Chinese designation J-11. However, the project may be shelved in case China obtains licensing rights to build SU-30, which offers several technological advances over SU-27. China, at the moment, wants to purchase 30-60 SU-30 MKs.^{xc} However, according to the *Military Balance 2000-2001*, 50 SU-30s Russian aircraft should have been delivered to China in 2002 with a substantial proportion being assembled in China. These aircraft along with the SU-27 air superiority fighters would greatly increase China's ability to dominate the airspace around Taiwan.^{xcii} However, Russia is reluctant to provide advanced technologies of MIG-31 to China, which it wants to co-produce. China has purchased 100 RD-33 engines, which power the MIG-29, to upgrade its indigenously produced F-7 aircraft.^{xciii} Apart from shopping mainly from Russia, Chengdu Aircraft Corporation (CAC) is building J-12, a truly modern aircraft, optimized for air superiority role

and also incorporating some stealth technology. It is likely to enter the service around 2015. *Shenyang Aircraft Corporation (SAC)* is currently engaged in the 'development of F-811M aircraft which incorporates a Russian Zhouk 811 radar with a range of 70 km, capable of tracking 10 different targets while engaging two of them'. CAC, in collaboration with Russian MAPO MIG is building FC-1 fighter that uses the same engine of MIG-29 fighter. This aircraft is comparable to the early versions of F-16 and upgraded Mirages III. In 1999, Pakistan and China agreed to jointly develop FC-1.^{xciii} It is believed these aircrafts would be able to counter F16A/B and Mirage 2000-5 aircrafts of the Taiwan Air Force. There are reports that China is also developing a stealth fighter aircraft similar to F-22.^{xciv}

5.38. The range of these aircraft and their loiter time would greatly increase with the acquisition of mid-air refueling capabilities from Iran.^{xcv} The mid-air refueling capabilities, bought either from Iran or Israel, would be operational in next few years. It is also reported that China is trying to buy a complete operational airborne early warning system either from Russia or Israel.^{xcvi} The PLAAF will soon acquire its first of five Russia-made Beriev A-50Eh airborne early warning and control (AEW&C) aircraft for airborne battle management.^{xcvii} China is taking preparations to pose a credible threat to Taiwan probably around 2007-2008. PLAAF's desire to acquire mid-air refueling capabilities and fourth generation aircraft - indicates that China would like to project air power into the South China Sea and beyond.^{xcviii}

The PLA Second Artillery Corps

5.39. The PLA second Artillery is the major strategic force that caters for deterring any potential enemy from using nuclear weapons against China; it is also responsible for carrying out nuclear counter attacks and precision strikes with conventional missiles. The second Artillery Force comprises “both nuclear and conventional missiles, covers different ranges, and possesses markedly increased power and efficiency. It conducts missile launching training and readiness exercises in near-real conditions and constantly enhances its quick response and precision strike capability^{xctix}”. The new Dong Feng (DF-31) ICBMS are attached to the 80304 Unit of the Second Artillery Corps. The Dong Feng 31 missiles have been tested with multiple warheads. The Second Artillery Corps has recently inducted a digital microwave communications system that can provide all weather encrypted communications capability upto the missile launchers.

People’s Liberation Army (Land Forces).

5.40. PLA’s land forces is, in fact, the core of the Chinese armed forces although generally technological breakthroughs are being made in case of its Navy and Air force. It is still the ground forces of PLA who calls the shot in achieving the strategic or foreign policy objectives. As part of the modernisation program the PLA had undertaken all comprehensive reorganisation programs basically trimming the manpower and the Military Regions (MRs) that remain responsible to General Staff Department (GSD) under the Ministry of National Defense theoretically.

Command of the Military Regions (MRs) both during war and peace through the GSD is done by the Central Military Commission. A high ranking PLA officer described the PLA as "an overweight man who needs to do a shape exercise". By 2005 the PLA was supposed to trim the total troops by another 2,00,000 to reach 2.3 million (the army forms 1.6 million of these). This is supposed to be the follow up of earlier cuts of 500,000 during the ninth Five year Plan Period (1996 - 2000). This reorganization or trimming exercise may bring down the strength of the troops to 1.8 million as contemplated.^c The number of MRs has been also reduced from 11 to 7 in order to improve regional defense. MR commanders have been given more authority, as part of decentralisation process transferring some of the powers from GSD to MR.^{ci} MR is like war zones with full responsibility of command of all forces within their areas of jurisdiction. ^{cii} The seven MRs, each having two to three Group armies and, having strength varying between 180,000 to 300,000, covering different directions of China like North East - Shenyang MR, North- Beijing MR, West Lanzhou MR, South-West - Chendu MR, South Gunagzhou MR, Centre - Jinan MR and East - Nanjing MR. (Source: *The Military Balance*, 2005-2006 p. 272). There were efforts to further reduce the number of MR or disband them altogether in order to meet the requirements of limited wars and consequent joint operations. In October 1998, Beijing MR activated an 'information superhighway' as part of joint operations campaign training.^{ciii} MRs should be small but effective high tech groups that facilitate close combat co-ordination in a limited war.^{civ} Chinese context of 'limited war' means to coerce the enemy government to change a policy or to acquire control of natural resources. A related example could be the conflict over the Spratly islands. A closely related concept could be the local or regional war

envisioning conflict around China's periphery. The new strategy calls for the development of rapid-reaction or "fist" (*question*) units, which are deployable anywhere in China within 24 hours. David Sham-Baugh maintains that one of the divisions in each Group Army (GA) is earmarked as rapid reaction unit (RRU). *Jane's Intelligence Review* opines some RRU units are divisional in scale; however, they are increasingly formed into brigade groups, (around 6,000 men) or even battalion groups, as part of War Zone Campaign concept and as already highlighted. The Review quoting unconfirmed sources, give the make - up of such independent brigades: "four tank battalions with 31 tanks each; one mechanized infantry battalion with 40 armored personal carriers; one artillery battalion with 18 self - propelled guns; and one anti-aircraft battalion with 18 self - propelled anti-aircraft guns. There are also specialist artillery and anti-aircraft RRU brigades".^{cv} The PLA marines based in Hainan Island are intended for deployment in the South China Islands.^{cvii} The "fist" units like the 15th Airmobile Army and the PLA's Marine Corp units were the first to receive modern equipment and funds for training. These units are to respond to any crisis on China's periphery and develop China's doctrine on combined arms operations such as amphibious assaults.

5.41. The latest tanks in possession in China are the Type 85-11/111, an updated version of Type 80. The latest design is the Type 90-11 resembling Russian T-72 and similar in performance, but yet to enter into full production and is not expected to do so in near future.^{cviii} In 1993, China received the deliveries of 50 T-72 tanks and 70 BMP-1 armoured infantry-fighting vehicles. In 1996, China received 200 T-80 main battle tanks from Russia.^{cviii} The Military Balance 2001-2002 shows that PLA has started

fielding Type 98 main battle tanks (MBT), the most advanced to enter the service.^{cix}

5.42. PLA land forces over the years is being organized to strengthen the flexible fighting capability i.e. to 'streamline command control systems; strengthen the air drop capabilities; and strengthen co-ordination with the navy and the air force as well as field air defense capability and marine transportation capability, in addition to continuously enhancing the motorization, mechanization and armortization of the army'.^{cx} PLA logistics is being tailored to support a MR commander conducting autonomous operations over an extended period of time. PLA has, recently, improved its logistic support to military operations in a Taiwan scenarion-operations and in high technology weapons and equipments. It has, reportedly, automated many inventory control processes, streamlined procurement and improved mechanisms for getting supplies to deployed troops.

5.43. To facilitate launching assaults across the Taiwan Strait PLA is now undergoing "building block" reform under which divisions are restructured into brigades which the Chinese call "medium size combat force". Keeping this objective in view, Type 92 wheeled armoured cars have been fielded to establish light mechanized brigades. In the 27th and 40th Group Armies (GA), brigades have replaced all the divisions.^{cxii} A Japanese source also indicate that Chinese are improving their amphibious capability, presumably to gain control of both sea and air over the Taiwan Straits, by reorganizing some divisions under Group Armies. 'A Division of the First Group Army of the Nanjing Military Region that faces Taiwan has strengthened its amphibious capability by inducting an improved

version of Type 63A amphibious tank'.^{cxii} Latest May 2006 Pentagon Report claims that China has deployed 400,000 ground troops in three Military Regions (MRs) opposite Taiwan, an increase of 25,000 from last year.^{cxiii} The Report further claims that by late 2005, China had deployed some 710-790 mobile short-range ballistic missiles (presumably part of Second Artillery Corp) to garrisons opposite Taiwan and it is expected to expand at an average rate of about 100 missiles per year. China Brief published by Jamestown Foundation reports China has earmarked eight group armies for extensive joint training for cross Strait Campaign. The 1st and 41st Group Armies have been given clear directives for amphibious warfare purposes. The other six group armies, numbering about half a million men (the 12th, 31st, 26th, 67th 39th and 40th) are also undergoing training for amphibious and airborne operations. In order to succeed in its invasion against Taiwan, according to 2003 U.S. Defense Department Report on the Chinese Military, China would have to conduct a multifaceted campaign, involving air assault, airborne insertion, special operations raids, amphibious landings, maritime area denial operations, air superiority operations and conventional missile strikes. The campaign would succeed, as the report predicted, provided there is no third party intervention and Beijing were willing to accept the almost certain political, economic, diplomatic, and military costs that such a course of action would entail. PLA is, however, being refurbished, groomed, and trained to undertake such complex multifaceted operations against Taiwan, may not be in too far distant a future.

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CHAPTER 6

IMPLICATIONS FOR THE REGION

Abstract

This Chapter brings into focus different dimensions of implications that may accrue from the *power politics* game of different actors vis-à-vis Chinese military modernization that impacts on other actors in the Asia-Pacific region. These implications can be seen both at political and military strategic level. The Chapter shows how China, U.S.A, Japan, Taiwan, India and Southeast Asian countries would interact or counteract with each other - in the *power politics* game in the region. The power configurations likely to emerge in the foreseeable future have been delineated in the Chapter. China may not come out as a super power but its power potentials are likely to challenge the U.S.A. in the foreseeable future. Taiwan would be the bone of contention between the alliances that are likely to emerge or are already there. The vexed Taiwan issue and the South China sea disputes are the *raison-de-etre* for the military upgradation. This gives rise to tremendous arms race in the region. This race would go unabated with an unimaginable sophistication. Action - reaction cycle is highly activated. Seemingly this action - reaction cycle cannot be kept under lid since resources are available and issues are palpable. Overt military confrontation although is unlikely in the near future but preparations are afoot in that direction. Strategic competition between America and China, both in military and economic spheres, continues in full swing although China would not be able to challenge the United States to the extent Soviet Union did to the United States during the Cold War.

The Chapter, however, concludes that Chinese economic clout is more pronounced than what it was with the Soviet Union, as such in the long run, China would be able to call shots in the Asia Pacific region in a more sustained and authoritative way.

Politico - Strategic

6.1. China's Strategic rise, both in economic and military fields, is a subject of great interests to the security experts specially of the Western origin. Different permutations and combinations can be visualized in respect of *power politics* between China and other Asia-Pacific powers. In different visualizations there are wide differences as to the fall out of China's projected rise. There are conclusions or perceptions like: China would change the security and strategic architecture of the Asia-Pacific or the world at large. China would turn out be a *hegemon*, China would revive its 'Middle Kingdom' syndrome. China would challenge the power of America. China would turn out to be a great power (few overstretch it to the status of a superpower), China wants the status of a unrivalled power specially in the Asia - Pacific region and so on and so forth. Relatedly it would be worth mentioning the three scenarios, or visions as visualized by an Australian security expert Michael Wesley, of China's future in the region and its implications. **Vision 1: An Accelerating Status Quo**, a view held by many Australian policymakers and academics, envisions "China and other states of the Western Pacific to seek greater wealth, power, and internal stability". It further concludes that even if China grows stronger in all dimensions, it would not be able to overtake the power the United States possesses. The predominance of American power will persist for the majority of the 21st century. Other powers like China, Japan and the

ASEAN States will continue to advance in wealth and power but that, in the long run, would not change the *status quo* in the hierarchy of power. **Vision 2:** Visualizes an emerging Asia-Pacific community where there would be better interdependent links through trade liberalization, regional stability and greater understanding. In the process the Asia-Pacific institutions like the Asia-Pacific Economic community (APEC), the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) and the ASEAN Post Ministerial Conference etc would be further strengthened. China, in the process, will integrate further into Asia-Pacific system and 'become more open, liberal, and less inclined to pursue interests that oppose other countries in the region. **Vision 3:** deals with a Balance of Power in the Asia-Pacific where it foresees China will be "probably the second-biggest Power" in the world. The regional power race would continue and would be provided by the rivalry between China and India, and Japan that is sceptical about the U.S. security commitment. Sino-Russian communiqué of December 1999 urging all nations to join a "balanced, multipolar world order" speak for itself the exigency of the former rivals in balancing American Power. This vision concludes that "China will be one of the great powers in an Asia-Pacific Balance of Power"ⁱ. Mr. Farooq Sobhan opines that the balance of power in the Asia-Pacific 'has clearly been shifting towards the Chinese'. Chinese neighbours have good reasons to feel that with the spectre of Chinese military growth, it could potentially devastate their own armed forces if conflict were to occur.ⁱⁱ

6.2. In the similar vein of the visions, Brezniski thinks China is unlikely to challenge the U.S. military and will remain focused on economic development; it would, however look for an opportunity to be recognized

as a great power. Despite the Taiwan issue, Brezniski considers China will not adopt a confrontational policy, due mainly to its phenomenal economic growth and possibility of shaking the grip of the communist party over its people. However, Professor John Mearsheimer of Chicago University contradicts Brezniski's conclusions. He believes an increasingly powerful China will push the U.S. out of Asia as did the U.S. push out the European great powers from the Western hemisphere. His argument is corroborated by the fact that thirty years from now China would be having a much larger GDP and a formidable military. This argument is again contradicted by Brezniski who posits China's neighbours including India, Japan, Singapore, South Korea, Russia and Vietnam may join the U.S. to contain the Chinese power. Brezniski is supported by Thomas Donnelly of the American Enterprise Institute who thinks the global "correlation of forces" is in favour of American pre-eminence.ⁱⁱⁱ Although these futuristic scenarios are speculative there are reasons to convince oneself that China may push the U.S. out of its area of interest; such possibility is borne out by the facts that American 'Imperial Overstretch' is reaching its limit and Chinese power is continually on the increase and it has not undertaken any hegemonistic manoeuvre as yet. The giant has just started to wake up. China's rise both as a formidable military and economic power, as can be visualized, that would be able to call shots in the Asia Pacific region in not too distant a future has to be accepted by the international community in right earnest. Its politico-strategic objectives are visible and it means business to realize those objectives. America would find it difficult to tame and contain this giant that is waking up to flex its muscle or to establish its stranglehold at least in the Asia-Pacific region. However, it is unlikely China would go for any expansionist or imperialist tendencies. It again all

depends on the perceptions each party would visualize to call any showdown on any particular issue or flashpoint whether to call it expansionist or a national sovereignty issue, as seen from China's point of view.

6.3. Having deduced such, it can be argued that, a new cold war scenario has probably already 'set in' in the Asia-Pacific region. The United States is the unchallenged superpower at the moment – having both extraordinary economic and military clout. Who could, therefore, challenge the United States? If any power is challenging America, to some extent, at least in this part of the world, it is China whose economic and military modernization has caught the imagination of the Americans. A race is on and the rhetoric of 'strategic partnership' changing to "strategic competitor" was therefore, a logical development. Three specific concerns for Asia-Pacific security may be raised here. Firstly, Beijing's military build up may disturb the regional balance and pose security threats to the neighbours. Secondly, the potential arms race is already on or in the offing. And thirdly, China may resort to force to resolve the territorial disputes especially in the South China Sea^{iv}. It is difficult to foresee if regional balance of power will be upset since Japan, Taiwan and India are also continuously updating their military machine or are having the security umbrella of the United States. However, the Southeast Asians may not, in the foreseeable future, be able to catch up with the military modernisation of China. However, their military modernization effort is also noticeable. The interoperability of the two militaries and joint preparedness are also on rise.

6.4. As highlighted by Huntington, China is the second level major regional power followed by Japan at the third level whose interests often

conflict with the more powerful China. Therefore, it is natural that the United States, along with Japan, should have common interests in limiting the dominance of China in the region. China, is therefore, alarmed when it sees military alliance between Japan and the United States and the later supporting the expansion and modernisation of Japanese military capabilities. The revised defense guidelines between the United States and Japan are directed to achieve the objectives of America's 'Preventive Defense' in the region where hi-tech threats from China are looming large. US presence in Asia Pacific is linked up with further militarization of both Japan and China. US withdrawal from the region would destabilize the region in the sense, as already shown, there is a deep-seated mistrust between Japan and China. US military presence in the Asia Pacific lanes is ensuring the steady supply of strategic goods specially oil through these routes. Its absence would force Japan to go for further militarization and a competition between Japan and China would intensify. Japan's shift from commercial liberalism to reluctant realism is likely to colour the Sino-Japanese relations in the foreseeable future as already shown. Japan is likely to select a course between outright containment and engagement since Chinese military capabilities would continue to grow and the complex geo-strategic scenario involving the interests of the United States, China and Japan apparently over Taiwan, Senakaku Islands and South China Sea is unlikely to smoothen significantly. China is likely to go all out for a 'blue water navy' and Japan also might follow suit. However, China would need time to truly acquire blue water capability. All these trends clearly show the signs of a new cold war. China considers the key to maintaining peace and stability is to build a 'triangular relationship' among China, Japan and the United States.^v Any change in the pattern of

this relationship would have direct impact on the power projection or modernization trends. As can be deduced, China would prefer to have the *status quo* for the time being in place although the revitalized strategic alliance between Japan and USA would be a difficult front to confront.

Military - Strategic

6.5. China's ICBMs are targeted against the mainland United States. North Korean missiles could also be a threat both to Japan and the USA. As a consequence, America is going ahead with the National Missile Defence (NMD) in the mainland or the 'Theatre Missile Defence (TMD)' for Japan and Taiwan. As a countermeasure, China is likely, for ensured penetration, to build up further long-range missile force and introduce some MIRV as already shown in the study. It may also think of other countermeasures. The future Chinese nuclear program may have three possibilities. Firstly, in order to preserve or restore limited deterrence with the United States, it may increase the number of ICBMs and enhance their effectiveness in penetrating the nuclear missile defence. China, in fact, is already doing so. Secondly, China may concentrate more on India or other countries at theatre level and move towards more robust limited-deterrence strategies. And thirdly, it would develop a force powerful enough to inflict significant damage to all adversaries across the board^{vi}. Other responses by China could be, as outlined by William T. Tow, in case TMD is installed may be in Taiwan or Japan, "(1) deploying a large number of short-range system to over-whelm the TMD assets; (2) deploying missiles with multiple re-entry vehicles or multiple independently targetable re-entry vehicles; (3) by deploying cruise missiles for which no defense technology currently exists; or (4) by adopting various TMD development or

procurement options (that is, modified Russian missile defense technology) to neutralize initial military disadvantages that may incur in the region's military balance". To execute the second option China may resume nuclear test, thereby China may fore-shake Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) and also simultaneously develop new generation of nuclear warheads and commensurate delivery systems.^{vii} Americans, in all probability, will have to take into consideration, while installing its planned national missile defence, China's implementation of MIRV along with several hundred more warheads and better penetration aids. It is reported that, as a response to American National Missile Defence Programme, the Chinese DF-31 ICBM is being fitted with a new decoy system making its warheads more difficult to identify and intercept. As a response to American Ballistic Missile Defence System, China is likely to expand its nuclear arsenal to as many as 75-100 ICBMS and deploy up to 200 warheads by 2015. Another source claims that China would deploy 500 nuclear warheads by 2015, with 300 warheads on MIRV/MRV/ ICBMS and the remaining warheads on SLBMS.^{viii} Implications of American proposed Ballistic Missile Defense System in the Asia - Pacific is further refinement, more range, more sophistication, more penetrability of Chinese missiles which is natural as part of action -reaction cycle in a *power politics* game. China has to take care of American sophistication as far as it relates to Taiwan - Japan security complex. Such implication in the military field is obvious; afterall China's immediate military objective is Taiwan where both America and Japan would in all probability, get militarily embroiled as argued in the earlier Chapters. However, geopolitical scenario or the overriding national interests of the actors at any point in time may also tilt the involvement of the actors like U.S.A and Japan.

6.6. America's likely involvement is corroborated by its decision to sale sophisticated weapons specially the naval ships to Taiwan. Taiwan also recently purchased 150 US F 16s, 60 French Mirage 2000-55s aircraft and ordered six Lafayette class frigates from France.^{ix} Should Taiwan declare formal independence, it is most likely China would use military force where United States is also likely to get involved? The United States, as demonstrated time and again, means business in the Taiwan Strait. However military involvement of the United States would not put an end to the problem. Given this scenario, China would continue to develop and modernize its strategic missile forces, improve its fighter bomber fleet and also its amphibious and troops lifting capabilities. Surveillance and intelligence gathering would continue unabated both by the United States and China. However, if the Taiwan issue is settled through peaceful means, situation would stabilize and a healthy constructive US-China co-operation would emerge. However, in the foreseeable future, the *power politics* imperatives may not allow to settle the scores through peaceful means.

6.7. Militarily Northeast Asian States are stronger while the Southeast Asian states are military lightweights. In South China Sea, territorial disputes are galore between China and many of the Southeast Asian nations including Vietnam as already shown. There is a fear psychosis with the nations of Southeast Asia as also already mentioned. They would, therefore, like to keep China engaged diplomatically; however its military modernization would continue as already indicated. It would like to have the presence of the United States in the region. Thailand, Philippines and Singapore have good military co-operation with the United States. As a

matter of fact, except Philippines, the founding members of ASEAN have substantially modernized their armed forces with priority to air and naval power. Some of the countries like Malaysia, Singapore, Thailand, Indonesia and even Philippines are already in the process of acquiring or have already acquired some of the 'state of the art' aircraft (MIG-29, HAWK, F-16 Fighters and SU series), submarines and frigates from sources like USA, France, Britain, Germany, Russia and even Israel.^x Analysts predict that in the next decade the Asian States like Japan, South Korea, Malaysia and Indonesia would acquire more than 36 submarines. This speaks that the region remains one of the most lucrative markets in the world for the arms dealers.^{xi} This trend is likely to continue, at least, in the foreseeable future. This has been possible due to a combination of factors like availability of financial resources, availability of the defense weapons and the changed security scenario especially after the Cold War. This trend is further fuelled by the massive military modernisation by China just the next door. However, ASEAN is unlikely to form a military alliance. In doing so it would be portrayed ASEAN is trying to 'gang up' against China. Rather ASEAN is trying to cool down China along with Japan by engaging them with ARF. It has really paid dividends when China toned down its approach towards Spratlys dispute by agreeing to discuss the issue with the parties concerned. As a matter of fact, ASEAN countries are striking a balance between ensuring own physical security and not antagonising China. ASEAN countries are also likely to engage China economically and in regional security concerns alongside maintaining a credible armed forces and links with external powers, primarily the United States.

6.8. India although primarily tied down to south Asian security orbit has, of late, according to much talked about Gujral Doctrine, is looking to the East and trying to derive benefits by cultivating economic and strategic relations with the ASEAN states as already discussed. India thinks China is encircling India by providing arms to Pakistan, Myanmar and other smaller states of South Asia. India and China have still many outstanding border disputes although much progress has been made towards their solution. China would, at least in the foreseeable future, like to maintain *status quo* with India in order to have time to modernise its economy and military. However, India remains on guard because of its bitter memories of 1962. India continues to modernise both its nuclear and conventional forces. As a matter of fact, technologically Indian aircraft, at least at this point in time, would be superior to that of PLAAF. Both India and China, given the appropriate military resources, would probably like to dominate the Indian Ocean. China has already proclaimed to make sovereignty rights over the island territories of the South China Sea. It has also made substantial inroads in Myanmar both militarily and economically. Indian naval presence in the Andamans is close to Myanmar. India is trying to cultivate better relations with the Southeast Asian States. So the *power politics* between these two military and economic giants is on. Indian Navy today is a formidable force with the 'state of the art' equipment. Again it may not be long before that the Chinese naval task forces, headed by aircraft carriers, make voyages in the India Ocean especially in the Bay of Bengal and the Arabian Sea.^{xii} Prof Geoffrey Till, a maritime warfare expert from the United Kingdom, in an interview with the author, contradicts such possibility in near future. His assertion is that both Chinese and Indian Navies are still far away from acquiring the wherewithal to allow

them to dominate the areas that are beyond their present areas of influence. To put it plainly China may not be able to dominate either the Arabian Sea or the Bay of Bengal like India may not be able to dominate the Southeast Asian region or South China Sea in near future. ^{xiii} If, however, China feels that its sea-lanes are vulnerable- specially when its domestic energy demand is soaring - it would then be inclined to accelerate its naval buildup specially moving towards blue water capability. However, if America continues to provide unbiased freedom of navigation in the global sea-lanes, China may not then go all out for an expensive blue water capability on its own right away. This may be a win-win situation for all the actors. "J. Mohan Malik concludes that over the next decade, a serious contest both in the military and economic spheres will develop between China and India".^{xiv} India and China will counter each other both in South and Southeast Asia.^{xv} The conclusion that can be drawn is that the stage is being set to enact the play of the actors, however it may not be so in the immediate future.

6.9. Russia supplies arms both to India and China. Russia would like to arm China in order to contain the West, primarily the United States. However, Russia would remain cautious about its own security after all both are big regional powers with common boundary and having relations of animosity for decades together. Russia, in all probability, would not like to transfer the latest technologies either to China or India. India is again concerned about the Russian technology transfer to Pakistan either through China or some other former Soviet Republics. It has been reported that Russian RD-33 engine may be used in multi-purpose fighter plane FS-1 that is being jointly developed by China and Pakistan.^{xvi} A very glaring

implication in the present scenario is the extensive Russian technology transfer in the region.

6.10. Implications that India and China are receiving arms from the same source i.e. Russia, are obvious First, it may promote greater transparency and confidence among the countries. Secondly, because of competitive purchase, it may benefit the supplier i.e. Russia, and lastly both China and India would develop self-reliance and diversify sources of arms purchase.^{xvii} Diversification of source of arms purchase both by China and India is visible. China, to the utter discomfort of US, buys a substantial portion of its military hardware from Israel. Again India after having signed defense cooperation agreement with America (along with civilian nuclear cooperation) would gradually tilt away from Russia and asks the Americans to supply her the cutting edge military technology that it so badly needs. America, as the indications are clearly visible, would provide the state - of the art military hardware to India presumably to counter - weight China as already highlighted earlier and as would be shown in the next Paragraph. China would continue steadfastly to develop its self - reliance on arms manufacture, since it is constrained by Western arms embargo. Finkelstein observes, by 2020, PLA leadership would aspire its military to be "(1) capable enough to fight and defeat other regional militaries on its periphery, and (2) a military that is credible enough to deter outside military intervention in potential conflicts with regional adversaries on China's periphery." ^{xviii}

6.11. Latest move to deepen further the strategic cooperation - apart from the economic that is already strong- between India and U.S. would have different implications for the region. This is again the game of *power*


politics. American Secretary of State Dr. Rice's recent visit to India has opened up the possibility of U.S.-India cooperation on nuclear power generation, idea about co-production of multi-role combat aircraft-which India on its own has been trying for decades together- intensified collaboration on missile defense and expanded defense trade and cooperation and a larger role for India in international organizations. Robert Blackwill, a former American Ambassador to India suggests that given the strategic challenges ahead - implying the China threat- "the U.S. should want the Indian forces to be equipped with the best weapons systems and that often means American. To make this happen, the U.S. has to become a reliable long term supplier including thorough co-production and licensed manufacture arrangements and to end its precious inclination to interrupt defense supplies to India in a crisis".^{xix} This is pure and simple American game of *power politics* to contain China on the Himalayan front. Why should India not take advantage of this American ploy when India always has China in mind ? Action reaction cycle is, therefore, activated again. However, India's outstretching capability is hobbled by its own nuclear confrontation with Pakistan, various insurgencies and cross border insurgencies both at home and with neighbors respectively and as its economy is not expected to be as robust as that of China. Can India, therefore, play an assertive role as a counterweight to China ? This may be called on enigma.

End Notes

6.12. Taking the politico-strategic and military-strategic assessments, the likely pattern of alignment that emerges in the Asia-Pacific is shown in

Figure 2. The emerging pattern about the Chinese and US sphere of influence validates the 'setting in' of another cold war era as deduced earlier. However, the sphere of influence of this emerging 'Cold War' type division is conceptually and structurally different than the previous one. For example, Taiwan though maintains strong military tie with the US and is depended on US for its security needs, maintains a formidable economic connection with China. Similarly, Pakistan which has strong military-to-military cooperation with China and falls under Chinese sphere of influence (especially when it comes confronting India) has been the biggest non-NATO

Figure: 2



allies of the US. US-Pakistan military cooperation (though seasonal) has also been strong in recent times. Evidently, such contradictions make the

emerging alignment more fluid and less predictable giving rise to speculation like formation of Eastern NATO etc.

6.13. The point that is loud and clear is : militarily, China does not challenge the United States to the extent the former Soviet Union did. More so, to see things from a different perspective, there are deep economic ties between China and the United States which was not the case with the erstwhile Soviet Union. With such ties it is unlikely that U.S. - China relations would straightway turn into a military confrontation as existed between the Soviet Union and the U.S. The Soviet Union never enjoyed any economic clout and the U.S. - Soviet trade was nothing compared to that with China. However, China's new economic might is helping her to acquire geostrategic clout and buy her the military were-withal specially in respect of Taiwan. China and the United States can co-exist in East Asia and the world at large even though they are the 'strategic competitors' presently. The Chinese - U.S. relationship is not a relationship of confrontation and rivalry for primacy, as was the case between the U.S and Soviet Union during the Cold War, but it does contain some of the same characteristics. There is a tremendous gap between the two countries in terms of national power and international status; again China's political, economic, social, and diplomatic influences on the United States are far smaller compared to United States' influences on China. It is, therefore, likely that in their exchanges, the United States would take the offensive role and China the defensive role. It is also likely that in their state - to - state interaction, they would not be able to establish truly friendly relations. However, given the good will, new 'cold war' could be avoided although there are obvious strategic differences between these two

powers, as already highlighted. It is unlikely that the United States and China would go for geo-strategic alliances to counter each other, although they will continue to court allies in the region; however their relations would be governed by their ideological, strategic and cultural differences. Diplomatic efforts both by America and China, the two out of three power centers of the world today-EU being the other power centre - would continue to court coalitions or groupings to counter each other; but the suggestion, given by Indian Foreign Minister Mr. Natwar Singh that a coalition of China, India and Russia would revolutionize Asia, is more hypothetical. Such coalition, as the events are unfolding is a remote possibility; more so *real politics* may not permit such a course. However, China, Russia, EU, Japan and to some extent India "can make a dent in the American scheme".^{xx} Chinese - U.S. relationships fluctuates between cooperation and confrontation; it is also unlikely that it would converge into a destructive collision course in the foreseeable future. China is unlikely to follow the path of Germany in the run upto World War I or those of Germany and Japan leading upto World War II, "when those countries violently plundered resources and pursued hegemony". It is also unlikely that China will follow the path of the great powers vying for global domination during the Cold War as already highlighted. There is also another optimistic side of pondering when China is becoming richer - who is more likely to liberalize more politically having moderating effects on its neighbors. This moderating effect would be the outcome of economic interdependence with the neighbors. It might, therefore, in the long run, serve the regional security better.^{xxi}

6.14. However *real politics* of all the actors in the region would go unabated. It is borne out by the fact-as forecast made by *Newsweek* and although China for the time being is seeking a peaceful environment- "Chinese military Planners (were) believed to be preparing a contingency plan to attack Taipei by 2006"-the year Chen (Taiwanese President) says he intends to revise the Taiwanese constitution as part of what Beijing sees as a "timeline towards independence". It may be improper to give an exact timeframe when Taiwan would declare independence or China would launch offensive to capture Taiwan militarily but it can reasonably be established that both parties are steadily moving towards their respective end states. However, American factor - that acts both on China and Taiwan - has a restraining effect on the end states of both the actors. *Status quo* is, therefore, likely to linger at least for some more time.

6.15. *Newsweek* further concludes, quoting Pentagon officials, that China is seeking "comprehensive, well-planned, well-executed transformation" of its military capabilities. So next time it may not be rhetorics but bombs that might start dropping on Taiwan.^{xxii} So, as part of action - reaction cycle other actors in the region cannot afford to mull over the consequences. Power transformation or projections of other actors have to come into play. Visibly one may see a kind of contradiction in the security scenario. We cannot, however, afford to ignore the military transformation or preparation of the potential actors for a likely showdown; it may not, necessarily, however take place immediately as already highlighted. One may again argue China is playing both 'carrot and stick' game; however its stick approach is visibly more apparent with the recent passage of a law in the Chinese National People's Congress that provides the Chinese

military the legal basis for attacking Taiwan in the event Taiwan declares independence in a bid to secede from China. One may not call it a mere rhetoric when on March 8, 2005 Wang Zhaoguo, the Vice-Chairman of the National People's Congress declared that war might be the only option left for China's decision makers if other options to reunite Taiwan are exhausted. Taiwanese President Chen Shui-bian, whose party being pro-independence won the last election, called the legislation "the biggest threat to regional stability".^{xxiii} When we consider the carrot approach the scenario may unfold differently. When Taiwan has invested more than \$ 150 billion in China and when the two economics are closely getting integrated and when both are Chinese speaking nation with China having 1.3 billion people and 3.7 million squares miles of territory and when China is aspiring to be a leader in the Asia-Pacific region, it might become difficult for Taiwan to live as an independent country. It might forgo declaring a formal independence and ask for a kind of confederation with nominal Chinese central government control and maintaining separate institutions, systems, laws, a kind of armed forces and the right to foreign trade as has been already highlighted in Chapter 2. Chinese are getting prepared for both the options or contingencies to be applied depending on the scenario that unfolds. However, Chinese astute way of simultaneously activating both the options, in fact, complements each other and gives the process greater momentum.

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- iv Young, Jing Dong, *op. cit.*, p.75.
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- vi Robert et al, *op. cit.* P.60
- vii William T. Tow, *op. cit.*, p.24
- viii NTI Research Library, "China's Nuclear Weapon Development, Modernization and Testing", [http:// www.nti.org/db/china/wwwmdat.htm](http://www.nti.org/db/china/wwwmdat.htm).
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- xii Skhuja, Vijay, 'Dragon's Dragonfly: The Chinese Aircraft Carrier", *Strategic Analysis*, IDSA, October 2000, p.1383.
- xiii Discussion between the author and the Professor during latter's visit to the Defense Services Command and Staff College, Dhaka to conduct a Seminar on Maritime Warfare in the month of October, 2005
- xiv Roy, *op. Cit.*, p.171.
- xv Karim, Mohammad Aminul (Lt Col), "Power Politics in the Indian Ocean Region after the Cold War", *BISS Journal*, Dhaka, October 1995, pp. 532-534.
- xvi *Ibid*, p. 663
- xvii Shambaugh, David, "Sino-American Strategic Relations: From Partners to Competitors", *Survival*, Spring 2001, p.113.
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- xix Robert, Blackwill, "A New Deal for New Delhi", *SAN Feature Service*, *The Independent*, Dhaka, March 5, 2005.

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CHAPTER-7

CONCLUDING REMARKS

7.1 *Power politics* in the region is vibrant and upbeat. The geo-strategic, geopolitical and geo-economic importance of the area is widely acknowledged. The actors in the area primarily China and the United States and other regional powers like Japan, Taiwan, India, Russia, Southeast Asian states are very much alive, collectively or individually, to the situation. Interestingly, with a few exceptions the priority of most of these regional actors has been primarily economic cooperation rather than military modernization. Chinese military modernization viewed against this context merits careful examination as it is likely to provide varied conclusions. Particularly after the end of Cold War that was supposed to mark the 'End of History' and bring the triumph of democracy the world over and the free play of the market forces, the military modernisation of China and the *power politics* in the region may not take us to that end.

7.2 The compulsions of Chinese military modernization can be explained from three particular dimensions. First is the nationalist fervour of the Chinese nationhood originating from its history of 'Century of Humiliation' that they want to re-address, second is the symbiotic relationship of the growing economic strength of China that makes her capable of pursuing the military modernization, and third is the regional/international environment where China wants to play an increasingly important role and hedge the others major players (particularly US) in the region. Given these dimensions, China is going ahead with projecting its power, at least, in the Asia Pacific / Indian Ocean region and would like to

establish firmly its power status. This in turn has initiated the action-reaction model prompting USA to counterbalance China by patronizing other regional powers as has been examined in the paper. The end state of such *power politics* will be the creation of new alignment in the region. Interestingly, the regional forums and organizations are playing a stabilizing role by contributing to the economic agenda. It is likely that such regional forums and organizations will be aligned on the basis of security issues and outlook in future. The security overtone of the SCO during its last meeting is indicative of that.

7.3 However, one need not to be too speculative of the rise of Chinese nationalism as it apparently does not have an expansionist motive. All roads of Chinese nationalism leads to Taiwan and successive Chinese regime have stated that 'the settlement of the Taiwan issue and the realization of the complete reunification of China embody the fundamental interests of the Chinese nation.' The reunification of Taiwan is perhaps the prime justification of PLA's modernization as it is inextricably linked with several vital interest of Chinese nationalism. First it rectifies the 'Century of Humiliation' of China by the outsiders. It also compensates Chinese loss of communist ideology by stressing nationalism. China, by embracing market economy has shifted from the communist ideology at least in the economic front. The vices that come with the free market economy are compensated by the nationalistic fervour created through the reunification issue. Third, the loss of Taiwan is viewed as the first step of the catastrophic blow of the breaking up of China which the Chinese are not ready to accept even at the expense of their economic interest. An independent Taiwan creates an unacceptable security situation for China

and also cuts off the envisioned passage of China in the South and East China Sea. Taking into account all these realities, it is safe to conclude that the military modernization of China will perhaps find its most predictable use in case Taiwan declares its independence. Thus, sovereignty is a non-negotiable issue to the Chinese leadership and along with that a territorial grab over the disputed territories by any of the claimant nations will most definitely trigger China to retaliate as was demonstrated in 1988 against Vietnam and 1995 against the Philippines.

7.4 The symbiotic relationship of the economic and military power signifies the other rationale for Chinese military modernization. Given the impressive economic growth of China and its desire to assert its position in the region against US influence and coercion makes the Chinese military modernization a natural phenomenon. More so, a closer examination of China's past, its national interests and policies show that it is intensely focused on nation building through economic reforms. Its preoccupation with economic growth is a key stabilizing factor. Again, China is keenly interested in Southeast Asia as a stepping stone towards achieving international recognition as a great nation. Hence, it is unlikely that the Chinese military modernization will result in some irresponsible act of expansionism or hegemonic desire to bitter the relation with her neighbours and thereby jeopardise her overall ambition. In addition, China's military machine, even after modernization, is mostly defensive and is still technologically and doctrinally behind Western capabilities. Moreover, ASEAN's web of bilateral and multilateral military arrangements and continued US presence contribute as an effective deterrent to any form of military aggression.

7.5 However, in spite of impressive economic growth rates, China's political reform lags behind its economic achievements. Consequently, Western strategists often view China as an emerging threat citing events over the Taiwan Straits and the South China Sea as evidence of a potential drive for hegemony. However, China's foreign policies are influenced by the legacy of its past and the humiliation of imperialism that has led it to consider the issue of sovereignty as non-negotiable and nation rebuilding as top priority. China also recognizes the geo-strategic importance of Southeast Asia and the sea-lanes plying through the region and seeks to embrace it politically and economically. But the nations of Southeast Asia are evolving its own regional identity to meet the challenges of the 21st Century through ASEAN (Association of Southeast Asian Nations). In addition, the United States has vital interests in the Asia Pacific and has renewed its commitment to maintain its presence. As China continues to grow and rise to the international stage, ASEAN and the United States will need to continually review their contributions to maintain stability within the region. This notwithstanding, where vital interests are in conflict, hostility may still arise particularly in case of Taiwan as eluded before.

7.6 Viewed against internal priorities of China and the geopolitical realities, the continued Chinese military modernization may not qualify as the prime security concern for the region as a whole. The uncertainties of the post Cold War era together with the lack of an apparent threat had convinced many strategists to depict China as an emerging threat especially to the US interest. Again China's vast potential to become a significant player in the global and regional economic and security environment qualifies it as a partner to maintain stability in the region and

a cordial US-China bilateral relationship is instrumental to this shared regional interest. China recognizes that regional stability is a key to meeting its first priority of economic prosperity. Thus, deviation of any of the partners from this shared interest of maintaining regional stability may sow the seed of mistrust and breed instability. In the final analysis, China is not the evil dragon as feared by many in the West, but rather, it is a phoenix attempting to consolidate itself and rise back to its previous glory. Consequently, ASEAN and the US should take heed of China's needs and the foreign policies with China should remain as comprehensive engagement and not containment so as to preclude inadvertently pushing it in a collision strategic direction.

7.7. In the backdrop of this scenario and evolving Cold War in the region, efforts should, however, be geared up for confidence building measures (CBMs) like strengthening economic co-operation, maintaining communication to resolve the disputed issues, fall back to the patronage of the institutions like the UN, ASEAN, ARF, APEC, North East Asian Security Co-operation (if formed), exchange of military information and better military to military contacts and liaison. There is at least one encouraging trend in the area i.e. most of the powers at the moment are putting their outstanding issues at the back burner and putting in 'concerted' efforts for economic development both regionally and globally. The market forces are very much at play-- hopefully the pluralist democracy would also find its full place in the long run. The triumph of market forces and pluralistic democracy may also work as catalyst to peace and stability in the region.

APPENDIX 1**TOTAL ARMED FORCES:****PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA- 2005-2006**

Chinese Yuan Renminbi Y		2003	2004	2005
GDP ^a	Y	11.7tr	13.9tr	
	US\$	1.41tr	1.68tr	
Per capita	US\$	1,093	1,293	
Growth	%	9.3	9.5	
Inflation	%	1.2	3.9	
Debt	US\$	193bn		
Def exp ^a	US\$	ε55.9bn	ε62.5bn	
Def bdgt ^b	Y	185bn	207bn	244bn
	US\$	22.3bn	25bn	29.5bn
US\$1=Y		8.28	8.28	8.28

^aestimate including extra-budgetary military expenditure

^bOfficial budget at market exchange rates

Population 1,306,313,812

Ethnic groups: Tibetan, Uighur and other non-Han 8%: Xinjiang

Age	0-14	15-19	20-24	25-29	30-64	65 plus
Muslim ε60%; of which Uighur ε44% Tibet Chinese ε60%; Tibetan ε40%						
Male	11%	5%	4%	4%	24%	4%
Female	10%	5%	4%	4%	23%	4%

Capabilities

ACTIVE 2,255,000 (Army 1,600,000 Navy 255,000 Air 400,000)

Paramilitary 3,969,000

Terms of service selective conscription; all services 2 years

ORGANISATIONS BY SERVICE

RESERVES some 800,000

Strategic Missile Forces (100,000+)

OFFENSIVE

Org as 20 launch brigades within 6 msl armies; org varies by missile type; one testing and one trg base

MSL * STRATEGIC 806

ICBM 46: circa 6 DF-31 (CSS-9) (1bde); circa 20 DF-4 (CSS-3) (2 bde); 20 DF-5A (CSS-4 Mod 2) (4 bdes)

IRBM 35: circa 33 DF-21 (CSS-5) (4 Bde); circa 2 DF-3A (CSS-2 Mod) (1 bde)

SRBM 725

DF-11/M-11 (CSS-7) 500: 500 DF-11A/M-11A (CSS-7 Mod 2) (4 bdes)

DF-15/M-9 (CSS-6) 225 (2 bdes)

Navy

SUMBARINES * STRATEGIC * SSBN 1: 1 Xia

(Capacity 12 JL-1 (CSS-N-3) strategic SLBM)

Defensive

RADAR * STRATEGIC: some phased array radar; some detection and tracking radars (cover Central Asia and Shanxi (northern border)) located at Xinjiang

People's Liberation Army ε800,000; ε800,000 Conscript (reductions continue) total 1,600,000)

FORCES BY ROLE

Group army: strength from 30-65000, org varies, normally with 2-3 mech/mot inf div/bde, 1 armd div/bde, 1 arty div/bde, 1 SAM /AAA or AAA bde, cbt readiness category varies with 10 GA at category A and 8 at category B (reorg to bde structure in progress)

Army 18 (Group) Armies (total: 1 mech Inf bde, 1 AT bde, 12 armd bde, 12 ADA bde, 14 arty bde, 15 inf div, 2 amph aslt div, 22 mot inf bde, 24 mot inf div, 3 mech inf div, 4 AT regt, 7 arty div, 9 armd (SAM/AAA) AD bde)

Arty/ Air	(coastal defence) air forces
Mil region	7 comd
Provincial mil	28 district
Inf	5 (border) indep regt
Mot inf	1 Indep bde; 1 Indep regt
Mtn inf	2 (indep) bde
AB	1 ((manned by AF)) corps (3 AB div, 35,000 AB)
Arty	1 indep regt
SSM	1 indep bde; 9 (coastal defence) regt
ADA	1 indep regt
Engr	1 indep bde; 50 regt

Sigs 50 regt
Avn 2 (indep) regt (trg); 8 indep regt
Gd 4 (garrison) comd (with 1 mtn inf bde, 12 inf div, 4 inf bde, 87 (bn) inf regt)
AD 8 (coastal defence) regt

Reserves

some 30 inf div (each 3 inf , 1 arty regt); 12 AD div; 7 log spt bde

EQUIPMENT BY TYPE

Tk 8,580+

MBT 7,580+: 1,200 Type-96; 1,000 Type-88A/Type-88B; 80 Type-98A; 300 Type-79; 5,000+ Type-59-II/Type-59-I

LT TK 1,000

TYPE-62 400:400 Type-62 Lt Tk/Type-62-I

TYPE-63 600:200 Type-63A 400

AIFV 1,000:1,000 Type-86A WZ-501

APC 3,500+

APC (T) 2,600

TYPE-63 2,300: 2,300 Type-63-II/Type-63-I/Type-63A/Type-63C

TYPE-89-I 300

APC (W) 900+

TYPE-77 200:200 Type-77-II

TYPE-92 600+

WZ-523 100

ARTY 17,700+

TOWED 14,000: 13,850 Type-54 (D-1) 152mm/Type-54-1

(M-30) M-1938 122mm/Type-59 (M-1944) 100mm/Type-59 (M-46) 130mm/

Type-59-I 130mm/Type-60 (D-74) 122mm/Type-66 (D-20) 152mm/Type-83 122mm; 150 Type 88 WAC-21 155mm

SP 1,200

122mm 700: ε200 Type-70-I; ε500 Type-89

152mm 500: ε500 Type-83

GUN/MOR * 120 mm 100: 100 2S23 NONA- SVK

MRL 2,400+; 2,400+ Type-70 SP 130mm/Type -81 122mm /Type-82
130mm/ Type-83 273mm / Type-89 SP 122mm/Type-96 (WS-1) 320mm

MOR

81mm: some Type-W87

82mm: some Type-53 (M-37)/Type-67/Type-82 SP/Type-82

100mm: some Type-71 (reported)

120mm: some Type-55 (incl SP)

160mm: some/Type-56 (M-160)

AT

MSL 7200: 7,176 HJ-73A/HJ-73B/HJ-73C/HJ-8A/HJ-8C/HJ-8E; 24
HJ-9

Red Arrow 9

RCL

105mm: some Type-75

75mm: some Type-56

82mm: some Type-65 (B-10)/Type-78

RL * 62mm: some Type-70-1

GUNS 300+

100mm: some Type-73 (T-12)/Type-86

120mm: 300+:300+ Type-89 SP

HELICOPTERS

SAR 7:7 SA-321 Super Frelon

ATK 31:31 WZ-9

ASLT 8: 8 SA-342 Gazelle (with HOT)

SPT 260:

AS-350 Ecureuil 53

MI-171 95: 45; 50 Mi-171V5

Mi-6 Hook 3

S-70 19: 19 S-70C2 (S-70C) *Black Hawk*
MI-8 90: 40 MI-17 (Mi-8MT) *Hip H*; 50 Mi-8T *Hip*

UTL 69+

AS-365 61: 61 AS-365 *Dauphin 2* utl hel/Z-9 (AS-365N) *Dauphin 2*

SA-316 *Alouette III 8*

Z-10 some

UAV: some ASN-104/ASN-105/ASN-206/W-50

AD

SAM 284+

HQ-61 (CSA-N-2) 24:24 HQ-61A *Red Leader*

SP 260

HQ-7 200: 200 HQ-7A

SA-15 *Gauntlet 60* (Tor-M1)

MANPAD

HN-5: some HN-5A/HN-5B *Hong Nu*

FN-6/QW-1/QW-2 some

GUNS 7,700+:50+ Type-90 (GDF-002) towed 35mm; 7,650 Type-55 (M-1939) towed 37mm/Type-56 (M-1939) KS-12 towed 85mm/Type-59 (KS-19) towed 100mm/Type-59 (S-60) towed 57mm/Type-65 towed 37mm/Type/Type-74 towed 37mm/Type-80 (ZU-23-2) towed 23mm/Type-80 SP SP 57mm/Type-85 towed 25mm/Type-88 SP SP 37mm
RADAR * LAND: some *Cheetah* (arty); some RASIT (veh, arty); some Type-378 (veh)

MSL * TACTICAL * SSM: some HY-2 (CSS-C-3) *Seerseeker*; some HY-4 (CSS-C-7) *Sadsack*

North East-Shenyang MR €250,000

Army 3 gp((Heilongjiang, Jilin, Liaoning MD): 2 armd, 1 mech, 4 mot, 1 arty div; 2 armd, 5 mot, 3 arty, 1 SAM/AAA, 3 AAA, 1 ATK bde)

North -Beijing MR €300,000

Army 3 gp ((Beijing, Tianjin Garrison, Inner Mongolia, Hebei, Shanxi MD): 2 armd, 1 mech, 5 mot, 1 arty div; 3 armd, 7 mot inf, 4 arty, 2 SAM/AAA, 3 AAA bde, 1 ATK regt)

West - Lanzhou MR €220,000

Army 2 gp ((incl Ningxia, Shaaanxi, Gansu, Qing-hai, Xinjiang, South Xinjiang MD): 1 armd, 2 mot inf, 1 arty div; 1 armd, 2 mot inf, 1 arty, 1 AAA bde; 1 ATK regt)

South-West -Chengdu MR €180,000

Army 2 gp ((incl Chongqing Garrison, Sichuan, Guizhou, Yunnan, Tibet MD): 4 mot inf, 1 arty div; 2 armd, 1 arty, 2 AAA bde)

South-Guangzhou MR €180,000

Army 2 gp ((Hubei, Hunan, Guangdong, Guangxi, Hainan MD): 1mech, 3 mot inf, 1 arty div; 2 armd, 1 arty, 1 SAM/AAA, 1 AAA bde. Hong Kong: €7,000 with 1 inf bde (3 inf, 1 mech inf, 1 arty regt, 1 engr bn), 1 hel unit)

Centre-Jinan MR €190,000

Army 3 gp ((Shandong, Henan MD): 2 armd, 1mech inf, 3 mot inf, 1 arty div; 1 armd, 1 mech inf, 4 mot inf, 2 arty, 2 SAM/AAA, 1 AAA bde, 1 ATK regt)

East-Nanjing MR €250,000

Army 3 gp ((Shanghai Garrison, Jiangsu, Zhejiang, Fujian, Jiangxi, Anhui MD): 2 armd, 1mech inf, 3 mot inf, 1 arty div; 1 armd, 4 mot inf, 2 arty, 2 SAM/AAA, 1 AAA bde; 1 ATK regt)

Navy €215,000; 40,000 conscript (total 255,000)

SUBMARINES 69

STRATEGIC * SSBN 1:

1 xia (capacity 12 JL-1 (CSS-N-3) strategic SLBM) opcon offensive

TACTICAL 68

SSN 5:

5 Han (Type 091) each with YJ-82 tactical SSM, 6 single 533mm TT

SSG 1:

1 mod Romeo (Type S5G) with 6 YJ-1 (CSS-N-4) Sardine tactical SSM, 8 Single 533mm TT (test platform)

SSK 61:

2 Kilo (RF Type EKM 636) each with 6 single 533mm TT

2 Kilo (RF Type EKM 877) each with 6 single 533mm TT

3 Ming (Type ES5C/D) each with single 533mm TT

35 Romeot (Type ES3B) each with 8 533mm TT
3 Song each with YJ-2 (CSS-N-8) Saccade tactical SSM, 6 single
533mm TT

16 imp Ming (imp, Type ES5E) each with 8 single 533mm TT
SS 1: 1 Golf (SLBM trials)

PRINCIPAL SURFACE COMBATANTS 63

DESTROYERS * DDG 21:

2 Hangzhou (capacity either 1 Z-9C (AS-565SA) Panther
ASW hel or 1 KA-28 ASW hel) (RF Souremeny) each with 2 SA-
N-7 SAM, 2 Twin 533mm ASTT (4 eff.), 2 quad (8 eff.) each with
SS-N-22 Sunburn tactical SSM, 2RBU 1000 Smerch 3, 2 twin
130mm gun (4 eff.)

1 Luda III with 2 triple 324mm ASTT (6 eff.), 4 Twin (8 eff.) each
with 2 YJ-1 (CSS-N-4) Sardine tactical SSM, 2 twin 130mm gun (4
eff.)

11 Luda Type-051 each with 2 triple 324mm ASTT (6 eff.), 2
triple (6 eff.) each with HY-2 (CSS-N-2) Silkworm/YJ-1 (CSS-N-
4) Sardine, 2 FQF 2500 (24 eff.), 2 twin 130mm gun (4 eff.)

1 Luhai (capacity either 2 Z-9C (AS-565SA) Panther ASW hel or
2 KA-28 ASW hel) with 2 triple 324mm ASTT (6 eff.), 1 octuple (8
eff.) with 8 Crotale SAM, 4 quad (16 eff.) each with YJ-1 (CSS-N-
4) Sardine tactical SSM, 1 twin 100mm gun (2 eff.)

2 Luhu (capacity 2 Z-9C (AS-565SA) Panther ASW hel) (Type
052A) each with 2 triple 324mm ASTT (6 eff.), 1 octuple (8 eff.)
with Crotale SAM, 4 quad (16 eff.) each YJ-1 (CSS-N-4) Sardine
tactical SSM, 2 FQF 2500 (24 eff.), twin 100mm gun (2 eff.)

2 mod Luda (capacity 2 Z-9C (AS-565SA) Panther ASW hel) each
with 2 triple 324mm ASTT (6 eff.), 2 triple (6 eff.) each with HY-
2 (CSS-N-2) Silkworm tactical SSM, 1twin 130mm gun (2 eff.),
mine (capability)

2 mod Luda Type-051DT each with 1 octuple (8 eff.) with
Crotale SAM, 2 quad (8 eff.) each with YJ-1 (CSS-N-4) Sardine
tactical SSM, 2 FQF 2500 (24 eff.), 2 twin 130mm gun (4 eff.),
mine (capability)

FRIGATES * FFG 42:

ε26 Jianghu Type 1 each with ε2 Twin (4 eff.) each with ε2 SY-1
(CSS-N-1) Scrubbrush tactical SSM, ε4 RBU 1200 (20 eff.), ε2
100mm gun

ε1 Jianghu Type II (capacity 1 Z 9C (AS-565SA) Panther ASW hel) with ε1twin (2 eff.) with εSY-1 (CSS-N-1) Scrubbrush tactical SSM, ε2 RBU 1200 (10 eff.), ε1 twin 100mm gun (2 eff.)

ε3 Jianghu Type III each with ε8 YJ-1 (CSS-N-4) Sardine tactical SSM, ε4 RBU 1200 (20 eff.), ε2 twin 100mm gun (4 eff.)

4 Jiangwci I (capacity 2 Z-9C (AS-565SA) Panther ASW hel) each with 1 HQ-61 (CSA-N-2) SAM, 2 triple (6 eff.) each with 3 YJ-1 (CSS-N-4) Sardine tactical SSM, 2 RBU 1200 (10 eff.), 1 twin 100mm gun (2 eff.)

8 Jaingwei II (capacity 2 Z-9C (AS 565SA) Panther ASW hel) each with YJ-1 (CSS-N-4) Sardine tactical SSM, 1 octuple (8 eff.) with 1 Crotale SAM, 2 RBU 1200 (10 eff.) 2100mm gun

PATROL AND COASTAL COMBATANTS 331

PCC 21:

2 Haijui each with 4 RBU 1200 (20 eff.),

19 Haiqing each with 2 Type-87 (12 eff.)

PCI 87: 8 Haizui less than 100 tonnes; 79 Shanghai less than 100 tonnes

PCR ε30 less than 100 tonnes

PFC 88: ε88 Hainan each with ε4 RBU 1200 (20 eff.)

PFM 96:

31 Houku (Komar-Type) each with 2 SY-1 (CSS-N-1) Serubbrush tactical SSM

22 Hauxin each with 4 YJ-1 (CSS-N-4) Sardine tactical SSM

5 Huang each with 6 YJ-1 (CSS-N-4) Sardine tactical SSM

ε38 Hiuangsfeng/Hola (FSU Osa 1-Type) each with ε4 SY-1 (CSS-N-1) Scrubbrush tactical SSM

PHT 9: 9 Huchuan

MINE WARFARE 130

MINE COUNTERMEASURES 129

MSC 55: 50 Lienyun auz; 5 Wosao

MSD * MSD INSHORE 46: 4 drone, 42 in reserve

MSI 4: 1 Shanghai II; 3 Wochang

MSO 24: 24 T-43

MINELAYERS * ML 1: 1 Wolei

AMPHIBIOUS

LS 50

LSM 31:

1 Yudao

1 Yudeng (capacity 9 tanks; 500 troops)

12 Yuhai (capacity 2 tanks; 250 troops)

17 Yuliang (capacity 3 tanks; 100 troops)

LST 19:

3 Shan (capacity 16 tanks; 165 troops) (US LST-1)

7 Yukan (capacity 10 tanks; 200 troops)

9 Yuting (capacity 10 tanks; 250 troops) each with 2 hel

CRAFT 285+: 45 LCU; 230 + in reserve; 10 ACV utl

LOGISTICS AND SUPPORT 163:

AF 14

AGB 4

AGOR 33

AH (MED) 6: 6 Qionsha

AO 3: 2 Fuqing; 1 Nanchang

AOT 33

AR 2

AS 10

ASR 1

ATF 25

Tpt 30

Trg 2 (one hel trg)

Merchant Fleet

LOGISTICS AND SUPPORT 1957: 913 (other) AOT 298 container 191
dry bulk 555

Naval Aviation 26,000

AIRCRAFT 436 combat capable

BBR 68:

50 H-5, F5, F-5B (II-28) Beagle (torpedo-carrying lt bbr)

18 H-6D each with YJ-6 (CAS-1) Kraken ALCM ASM

FTR 74

J-8 36: 24 J-8 Finback ftr ac/J-8A Finback; 6 J-8B Finback; 6J-8D
Finback

J-8IIA Finback 12

MiG-21 26: 26 J-7 (MiG-21F) Fishbed C

FGA 274: 20 JH-7; 30 Q-5 Fantan; 24 Su-30Mk2; 6 200J-6 (MiG-19S)

Farmer B

ASW 4: 4 PS-5 (SH-5)

RECCE 7: 7 HZ-5 (II-28R) Beagle

MP 4: 4 Y-8X

TKR 3: 3 HY-6

TPT 66

An-12 4: 4 Y-8 (An-12BP) *Cub A*

Y-5 (An-2) *Colt 50*

Y-7 (An-24) *Coke 4*

Y-7H (An-26) *Curl 6*

Yak-42 2

TRG 73: 16 JJ-6 (MIG-19UTI) Farmer*; 4 JJ-7 Mongol A* 53 PT-6 (CJ-

6)

HELICOPTERS

SAR 27: 15 SA-321; 12 Z-8, Z-8A (SA-321 Ja) Super Frelon

ASW * KA-27 8: 8 Ka-28 (Ka-27PL) *Helix A*

ASLT 8: 8 AS-565

SPT 8: 8 Mi-8 *Hip*

MSL * TRACTICAL * ASM * ALCM:

YJ-6 (CAS-1): some; some YJ-61 (CAS-1 (improved)) Kraken

YJ-8K (CSS-N-4) *Sardine* some

Marines 610,000

FORCES BY ROLE

Army 3 (also have amph role) div

marine inf 2 bde (each: 1 inf bn, 1 AD bn, 1 (armd) mech inf bn, 2 amph
necce bn, 2 arty bn, 2 tk bn)

EQUIPMENT BY TYPE

TK * LT TK TYPE-63 150: 150 tYPE-63A

APC * APC (T) 60: 60 Type-63

APC (W): some Type-92

ARTY * TOWED * 122mm: some Type-83

MRL * 107mm: some Type-63

AT * MSL: some HJ-73; some HJ-8

AD*SAM*MANPAD: some HN-5 HongNu/Red Cherry

North Sea Fleet

coastal defence from DPRK border (Yalu River) to south of Lianyungang (approx 35° 10'N; equates to Shenyang, Beijing and Jinan MR, and to seaward; 9 coastal defence districts

FORCES BY ROLE

under review

Navy 1 HQ located at Qingdao

FACILITIES

Support base 1 (HQ) located at Qingdao, 1 located at Lushun

East Sea Fleet

coastal defence from south of Lianyungang to Dongshan (approx 35° 10' N to 23° 30'); equates to Nanjing Military Region, and to seaward; 7 coastal defence districts

FORCES BY ROLE

Navy 1 HQ located at Dongqian Lake (Nisbo)

FACILITIES

Base 1 located at Jujian, 1 located at Zhoushan, 1 located at Dongqian Lake (Ninsbo)

South Sea Fleet

coastal defence from Dongshan (approx 23° 30' N) to Vn border; equates to Guangzhou MR, and to seaward (including Paracel and Spratly Islands)

FORCES BY ROLE

Navy 1 comd HQ located at Guangzhou

FACILITIES

Base 1 located at Yulin, 1 located at Guangzhou, 1 located at Zuanjiang

Air Force 210,000 (AD; 40,000 (strategic forces); 150,000 conscript (total 4000,000)

32 air divs (22 ftr, 3 bbr, 5 attack, 2 tpt), Up to 4 sqn, each with 10-15 ac, 1 maint unit, some tpt and trg ac, make up an air regt; 3 air regt form an air div. Varying numbers of air divs in the Mil regions - many in the south-east. Flying hours 130 hrs/year on J-8 Finback ftr ac; 180 hrs/year on Su-27 Flanker/Su-30 Flanker; 80 hrs/year on H-6 (Tu-16)

Badger

bbr ac; 130 hrs/year on J-7 (MiG-21F) Fishbed C MiG-21 ftr

FORCES BY ROLE

Bbr 5 regt with up to 50 H-6E/H-6F/H-6H; 8 regt with 94 H-5, F-5, F-5B (II-28) Bengler; 1 (nuclear ready) regt with up to 20 H-6 (Tu-16) Badger; 3 regt with 46 H-6H (possibly with YJ-63 cruise missile)

Ftr 3 regt with 28 J-8 IIB Finback; 3 regt with 62 J-8D Finback; 16 regt with 400 J-7II Fishbed/J-7IIA; 1 regt with 11 J-8F Finback; 9 regt with 116 J-11 (Su-27SK) Flanker; 12 regt with 296 J-7E Fishbed; 5 regt with 32 Su-27UBK Flanker; 2 regt with 36 J-7C Fishbed; 1 regt with 24 J-7G Fishbed; 4 regt with 80 J-8 Finback; 1 regt with 24 J-8 IID Finback; 2 regt with 40 J-8III Finback

FCA 12 regt with 408 Q-5C Fabtab/Q-5D Fantan; 2 regt each with 31 J-10; 25 regt with 722 MiG-19 Farmer; 4 regt with 73 Su-30MKK Flanker; 2 regt each with 13 JH-7A

ELINT/ 2 regt with 45 JZ-6 (MiG-19R); some regt with 126 Aircraft; JZ-7 (MiG

Recce 21R) Fishbed H; 1 Tu-154M Careless; 1 regt with 8+ JZ-8 Finback

AEW/ some regt with A-50 Mainstay; 4 Y-8
AWACS

Tpt 1 regt with 16+ Tu-154M Careless; 3 regt with 13 Il-76MD Candid B; 3 regt with 4 tpt; 1 An-12 Cub; 170 Y-5 (An-2) Colt; 41 Y-7 (An-24) Coke/Y-7H (An-26) Curl; 15 B-737-200 (VIP); 5 CL-601 Challenger, 2 Il-18 Coot; 20 Y-11; 8 Y-12

Tkr 1 regt with 10 HY-6

ADA/SAM 1 div located at North

ADA	1 bde located at centre; 1 bde located at East; 1 bde located at North-East
Trg	1 regt with 12 H-6H; some regt with 142 Trg; PT-6 (CJ-6); 179+ JJ-7 Mongol A; 140+ JL-8 (K-8); JJ-6 (MiG-19UTI) Farmer
Hel	some regt with 30-40 hel; 6 AS-332 Super Puma (VIP); 50 Mi-8 Hip; 20 Z-9 (AS-365N); Dauphin 2; 4 Bell 214
SAM	3 div located at North; 2 bde located at South; 1 bde located at North-East; 2 bde located at East; 1 bde located at South West; 100+ unit with 60+ HQ-7; 24 HQ-9; 144 S-300 PMU-1 (SA-10C) Grumble/SA-10D Grumble; 500+ HQ-2 (SA-2) Guideline/HQ-2A/HQ-2B(A); 160 (Strategic Air Defence) unit with 850+ 300 PMU 1 (SA-10B) Grumble/S-300 MPU 2 (SA-10C) Grumble

EQUIPMENT BY TYPE

AIRCRAFT 2,643 combat capable

BBR up to 222: 94 H-5, F-5, F-5B (II-28) Beagle up to 20II 6 (Tu-16) Badger; up to 50 H-6E/H-6F/H-6H; 12 H-11 (possible with YJ-63 cruise missile)

FTR 1,252

J-7II 400: 400 J-7II Fishbed ftr Aircraft/J-7IIA

J-7C Fishbed 36

J-7E Fishbed 296

J-7G Fishbed 24

J-8 153: 80; 62 J-8D Finback; 11 J-8F Finback

J-8IIA 52: 28 J-8 IIB Finback; 24 J-8 IID Finback

J-8III Finback 40

J-1062

Su-30-73: 73 Su-30MKK Flanker

Su-27 116: 116 J-11 (Su-27SK) Flanker

FGA 1,169:

JH-7 39: 13; 26 JH-7A

Q-5 408: 408 Q-5C Fantan/Q-5D Fantan

MiG-19 Farmer 722

RECCE 53 +: 45 JZ-6 (MiG 19R); some JZ-7 (MiG 21R)

Fishbed H; 8+ JZ-8 Finback

AEW 4 +: some A-50 Mainstay; 4 Y-8

TKR 10: 10 HY-6

TPT 296+: 4 An-12 Cub 1

B-737 15: 15 B-737-200 (VIP)

CL-601 Challenger 5 II-18 Coot 2

II-76 13: 13 II-76MD Candid B

Tu-154 17: 17+ Tu-154M Careless

Y-11 20 Y-128 Y-5 (An-2) Colt 170 Y-7 (An-24) Colt

7H (An-26) Curl 41

TRG 493+: 142 JJ-6 (MiG-19UTI) Farmer some II.....

Mongol A 179+ JL-8 (K-8) 140+ PT-6 (CJ-6) some.....

Su-27UB 32: 32 Su-27UBK Flanker

HELICOPTERS

SPT 56: 6 AS-332 Super Puma (VIP); 50 MiG

UTL 24

AS-365 20: 20 Z-9 (AS-365N) Dauphin 2

BBell 2144

UAV: some Chang Hong 1

AD

SAM 1,578+

SP 1,078+: 60+ HQ-7; 24 HQ-9

S-300PMU (SA-10) 994: 850 S-300MPU1 _____

Grumble/S-300MPU2 (SA-10C)

300MPU2 (SA-10-C) Grumble/SA- _____

HQ-2 (SA-2) Guideline Twoed/HQ _____

500+

GUNS 16,000: 16,000 100mm/85mm

MSL* TACTICAL 4,500+

ASM: some AS-14 Kedge; some AS-17 Krypton; some AS-18 Kazoo; some YJ-63 (expected)

AAM 4,500+: 100 AA-12 Adder; 1,200 P-27 (AA-10) Alamo;

3,200 P 37 (AA-11) Archer; some PL-12; some PL-2B; some

PL-5B; some PL-8

Paramilitary €1, 500,000 active

People's Armed Police €1, 500,000

Ministry of Public Security

Police 45 div (14 each with 4 regt, remainder no standard organization; 1`-2 div per province

Border Defence 100,000+

Comms 69,000+

Internal Security €800,000

NON-STATE ARMED GROUPS

see Part II

DEPLOYMENT

BURUNDI

UN * ONUB 3 obs

COTE D'IVOIRE

UN * UNOCI 7 obs

DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF CONGO

UN * MONUC 1 (bn) inf gp; 10 obs; 220

ETHIOPIA/ERITREA

UN * UNMEE 6 obs

LIBERIA

UN * UNMIL 5 obs; 567; 25 civ police

MIDDLE EAST

UN * UNTSO 4 obs

SERBIA AND MONTENEGRO

UN * UNMIK 1 obs

SIERRA LEONE

UN * UNAMSIL 2 obs

SUDAN

UN * UNMIS 8 civ police

WESTERN SAHARA

UN * MINURSO 19 obs

(Source: Military Balance 2005-2006, IISS, United Kingdom)

APPENDIX- 2PRC: 2004 WHITE PAPER ON NATIONAL DEFENSE

The State Council Information Office published on 27 December 27 2004 a white paper entitled *China's National Defense in 2004*. The document, composed of 10 chapters and seven appendices, describes China's national defense policies and army's modernization process. This is the third white paper that the Chinese government has issued since 2000 about China's national defense. The full text of the white paper follows:

China's National Defense in 2004

<u>Foreword</u>	<i>Included</i>
<u>Chapter I. The Security Situation</u>	<i>Included</i>
<u>Chapter II. National Defense Policy</u>	<i>Included</i>
<u>Chapter III. Revolution in Military Affairs with Chinese</u> <u>Characteristics</u>	<i>Included</i>
<u>Chapter IV. Defense Expenditure and Defense</u> <u>Assets</u>	<i>Included</i>
<u>Chapter V. The Military Service System</u>	<i>Not</i> <i>included</i>
<u>Chapter VI. National Defense Mobilization and Reserve Force</u> <u>Building</u>	<i>Not</i> <i>included</i>

Chapter VII. Science, Technology and Industry for National Defense.....*Not included*

Chapter VIII. The Armed Forces and the People.....*Not included*

Chapter IX. International Security Cooperation.....*Not included*

Chapter X. Arms Control, Disarmament and Non-Proliferation Appendices.....*Not included*

Foreword

A panoramic view of the present-day world displays the simultaneous existence of both opportunities for and challenges to peace and development, and of positive and negative factors bearing on security and stability. The opportunities cannot be shared and the challenges cannot be overcome unless diverse civilizations, social systems and development models live together harmoniously, trust each other and engage in cooperation. Hence, the pursuit of peace, development and cooperation has become an irresistible trend of history. The development goal for China to strive for in the first two decades of this century is to build a moderately prosperous society in an all-round way. As a large developing country, China has before it an arduous task for modernization, which calls for prolonged and persistent hard work. China will mainly rely on its own strength for development, and therefore poses no obstacle or threat to any one. China needs a peaceful international environment for its own development, which in turn will enhance peace and development in the

world. Holding high the banner of peace, development and cooperation, China adheres to an independent foreign policy of peace and a national defense policy of the defensive nature. China will never go for expansion, nor will it ever seek hegeony.

A major strategic task of the Communist Party of China (CPC) in exercising state power is to secure a coordinated development of national defense and the economy, and to build modernized, regularized and revolutionary armed forces to keep the country safe. The Fourth Plenary Session of the 16th CPC Central Committee and the Enlarged CPC Conference of the Central Military Commission (CMC), held successively in September 2004, paid a high tribute to Jiang Zemin for his outstanding contributions to national defense and military modernization, and appointed Hu Jintao Chairman of the CPC Central Military Commission. Meanwhile, the CMC composition was also readjusted and expanded, and the developmental direction for national defense and military modernization clearly defined. In the new stage of the 21st century, China's national defense and army building shall be guided by Deng Xiaoping Theory and the important thought of the "Three Represents," in an all-round way implement Jiang Zemin's thought on national defense and army building, maintain the fundamental principle and system of absolute Party leadership over the armed forces, and take the military strategy of the new era as an overarching guideline to actively push for the national defense and military modernization.

This White Paper, China's National Defense in 2004, is published to illustrate China's national defense policies and the progress made in the past two years in its defense and army building.

Chapter I. The Security Situation

The current international situation continues to undergo profound and complex changes. Peace and development remain the dominating themes of the times. Although the international situation as a whole tends to be stable, factors of uncertainty, instability and insecurity are on the increase.

The trends toward world multipolarization and economic globalization are deepening amid twists and turns. New changes are occurring in the balance of power among the major international players, with the process of their realignment and the redistribution of their interests accelerated. New and profound readjustments have taken place in the relations among the world's major countries. While cooperating with and seeking support from each other, they are checking on and competing with one another as well. With their overall strength continuing to rise, the developing countries have become important players in promoting a multipolar world and democratized international relations. The United Nations is playing an irreplaceable role in international affairs. Economic globalization and technological advancement have generated new opportunities for development. As a result of accelerated global industrial restructuring, and the continued development of regional economic cooperation, world economy has witnessed new growth, with interdependence among nations

deepened and their common interests increased. However, a fair and rational new international political and economic order is yet to be established. Tendencies of hegemonism and unilateralism have gained new ground, as struggles for strategic points, strategic resources and strategic dominance crop up from time to time. The Iraqi War has exerted a far-reaching influence on the international and regional security situations. The imbalance in world economic development has worsened, with the North-South gap continuing to widen, and economic security confronting new challenges.

The military factor plays a greater role in international configuration and national security. Worldwide Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA) is gaining momentum. The forms of war are undergoing changes from mechanization to informationalization. Informationalization has become the key factor in enhancing the warfighting capability of the armed forces. Confrontation between systems has become the principal feature of confrontation on the battlefield. Asymmetrical, non-contiguous and non-linear operations have become important patterns of operations. The world's major countries are making readjustments in their security and military strategies and stepping up transformation of their armed forces by way of developing high-tech weaponry and military equipment and putting forth new military doctrines. As a result, the generation gap in military technology between informationalization on the one hand and mechanization and semi-mechanization on the other is still widening, and military imbalance worldwide has further increased. The role played by military power in safeguarding national security is assuming greater prominence.

Traditional and non-traditional security issues are intertwined with the latter posing a growing threat. Some regional hot spots have cooled down. Security cooperation at the regional level has deepened. The worldwide campaign against terrorism has made progress. International cooperation in the fields of information security, energy security, finance security and environment security has been enhanced. And international efforts to crack down on transnational crimes, prevent epidemic diseases, and reduce the impact of disasters have been intensified. However, world peace remains elusive. Geopolitical, ethnic, religious and other conflicts interact with political and economic contradictions, resulting in frequent outbreak of local wars and armed conflicts. International terrorist forces remain rampant. It seems rather difficult to eliminate completely the root causes of terrorism, making the fight against terrorism a long and demanding task before the international community.

The Asia-Pacific region enjoys basic stability in its security situation. As the world's most dynamic region economically, most nations in the region have made development the centerpiece of their policy. Major country relations continue to improve and grow. Peaceful consultation has become the basic approach to the settlement of disputes. Security dialogue and cooperation of various forms have become more animated. Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) is playing an important role in promoting common development. The institutionalization of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) has been basically accomplished. The SCO is incessantly expanding and deepening its cooperation in the political, security, economic, humanitarian and other fields. The SCO is playing a greater role in promoting peace, stability and development in the

region. China has established a strategic partnership with the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) dedicated to peace and prosperity in the region, and engaged in comprehensive cooperation that has seen rapid expansion. Cooperation in East Asia, with the ASEAN and China, Japan and the ROK as the main players, keeps expanding, leading to greater economic development and political and security trust in the region. The ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) as the most important official channel for multilateral security dialogue in the Asia-Pacific region, plays a positive role in promoting security cooperation in the region. The nuclear issue on the Korean Peninsula has been brought onto the track of peaceful settlement through dialogue, and the process of the Six-Party Talks has made progress in the discussion of substantive issues and the institutionalization of the process. Tensions between India and Pakistan have been eased, and the two countries have maintained the momentum of peaceful dialogues.

Meanwhile, complicated security factors in the Asia-Pacific region are on the increase. The United States is realigning and reinforcing its military presence in this region by buttressing military alliances and accelerating deployment of missile defense systems. Japan is stepping up its constitutional overhaul, adjusting its military and security policies and developing the missile defense system for future deployment. It has also markedly increased military activities abroad. The foundation for the Six-Party Talks is not solid enough as uncertain factors linger in the settlement of the nuclear issue on the Korean Peninsula. The threat posed by terrorism, separatism and extremism is still grave. Such transnational crimes as smuggling, piracy, drug trafficking and money laundering are

rampant. Many countries are confronted with the formidable task of eliminating poverty, achieving sustainable development and enhancing security in the area of public health.

The situation in the relations between the two sides of the Taiwan Straits is grim. The Taiwan authorities under Chen Shui-bian have recklessly challenged the status quo that both sides of the Straits belong to one and the same China, and markedly escalated the "Taiwan independence" activities designed to split China. Incessantly trumpeting their separatist claim of "one country on each side," they use referendum to engage in the separatist activities aimed at "Taiwan independence," incite hostility among the people on the island toward the mainland, and purchase large amounts of offensive weapons and equipment. They have not given up their attempt at "Taiwan independence" through the formulation of a so-called "new constitution for Taiwan." They are still waiting for the opportune moment to engineer a major "Taiwan independence" incident through the so-called "constitutional reform." The separatist activities of the "Taiwan independence" forces have increasingly become the biggest immediate threat to China's sovereignty and territorial integrity as well as peace and stability on both sides of the Taiwan Straits and the Asia-Pacific region as a whole. The United States has on many occasions reaffirmed adherence to the one China policy, observance of the three joint communiqués and opposition to "Taiwan independence." However, it continues to increase, quantitatively and qualitatively, its arms sales to

Taiwan, sending a wrong signal to the Taiwan authorities. The US action does not serve a stable situation across the Taiwan Straits.

China's national security environment in this pluralistic, diversified and interdependent world has on the whole improved, but new challenges keep cropping up. The vicious rise of the "Taiwan independence" forces, the technological gap resulting from RMA, the risks and challenges caused by the development of the trends toward economic globalization, and the prolonged existence of unipolarity vis-a-vis multipolarity - all these will have a major impact on China's security. Nevertheless, China is determined to safeguard its national sovereignty and security, no matter how the international situation may evolve, and what difficulties it may encounter, so as to join hands with the people around the world in advancing the lofty cause of peace and development for mankind.

Chapter II. National Defense Policy

China persists in taking the road of peaceful development and unswervingly pursues a national defense policy defensive in nature. China's national defense is the security guarantee for the survival and development of the nation. The main tasks of China's national defense are to step up modernization of its national defense and its armed forces, to safeguard national security and unity, and to ensure the smooth process of building a moderately prosperous society in an all-round way.

Proceeding from the fundamental interests of the country, China's national defense policy is both subordinated to and in service of the country's development and security strategies. Firmly seizing and taking full

advantage of the important strategic opportunities presented in the first two decades of this century, China sticks to keeping its development in pace with its security and makes great efforts to enhance its national strategic capabilities by using multiple security means to cope with both traditional and non-traditional security threats so as to seek a comprehensive national security in the political, economic, military and social areas.

China's basic goals and tasks in maintaining national security are:

To stop separation and promote reunification, guard against and resist aggression, and defend national sovereignty, territorial integrity and maritime rights and interests.

To safeguard the interests of national development, promote economic and social development in an all-round, coordinated and sustainable way and steadily increase the overall national strength.

To modernize China's national defense in line with both the national conditions of China and the trend of military development in the world by adhering to the policy of coordinating military and economic development, and improve the operational capabilities of self-defense under the conditions of informationalization.

To safeguard the political, economic and cultural rights and interests of the Chinese people, crack down on criminal activities of all sorts and maintain public order and social stability.

To pursue an independent foreign policy of peace and adhere to the new security concept featuring mutual trust, mutual benefit, equality and coordination with a view to securing a long-term and favorable international and surrounding environment.

It is the sacred responsibility of the Chinese armed forces to stop the "Taiwan independence" forces from splitting the country. The Chinese government continues to adhere to the basic principles of "peaceful reunification" and "one country, two systems" along with the eight-point proposal on developing cross-Straits relations and advancing the process of peaceful reunification of the motherland at the current stage. So long as the Taiwan authorities accept the one China principle and stop their separatist activities aimed at "Taiwan independence," cross-Straits talks can be held at any time on officially ending the state of hostility between the two sides, including on the establishment of a confidence-building mechanism in the military field. The Chinese people are resolutely opposed to all separatist activities in whatever manifestation aimed at "Taiwan independence," to foreign interference of any form, and to arms sales to Taiwan or entrance to military alliance of any form with Taiwan by any country in the world. We will never allow anyone to split Taiwan from China through whatever means. Should the Taiwan authorities go so far as to make a reckless attempt that constitutes a major incident of "Taiwan independence," the Chinese people and armed forces will resolutely and thoroughly crush it at any cost.

To adapt itself to the changes both in the international strategic situation and the national security environment and rise to the challenges presented by the RMA worldwide, China adheres to the military strategy of active defense and works to speed up the RMA with Chinese characteristics.

To take the road of composite and leapfrog development. Going with the tide of the world's military development and moving along the direction of informationalization in the process of modernization, the People's Liberation Army (PLA) shall gradually achieve the transition from mechanization and semi-mechanization to informationalization. Based on China's national conditions and the PLA's own conditions, the PLA persists in taking mechanization as the foundation to promote informationalization, and informationalization as the driving force to bring forward mechanization. The PLA will promote coordinated development of firepower, mobility and information capability, enhance the development of its operational strength with priority given to the Navy, Air Force and Second Artillery Force, and strengthen its comprehensive deterrence and warfighting capabilities.

To build a strong military by means of science and technology. The PLA works to improve its combat capabilities by taking advantage of scientific and technological advances and aims at building qualitative efficiency instead of a mere quantitative scale, and transforming the military from a manpower-intensive one to a technology-intensive one. Implementing the Strategic Project for Talented People, the PLA focuses on training a new type of high-caliber military personnel. It works to build up a complete

system of weaponry and equipment by stepping up development of new- and high-tech weaponry and equipment while upgrading those in active service. In an innovative spirit, the PLA endeavors to improve its training system as well as the means and methods of training so as to raise its military training to a higher level. Relying on national economic, scientific and technological development, the PLA is devoted to improving the level of scientific management and achieving a higher overall cost-effectiveness in military expenditure so as to modernize the armed forces with less input and better results.

To deepen the reform of the armed forces. Based on the transformation of modern warfare and the requirements of the socialist market economy, the PLA seeks to achieve development and breakthroughs in the process of reform and innovation. The PLA develops its military theories in an innovative spirit, and explores the laws of building the army and conducting operations under the condition of informationalization. In accordance with the principle of making the troops smaller and better, as well as more integrated and efficient, and with emphasis on adjusting the organizational structure and reforming the command system, the PLA works to build and further improve the military structure and organization to make them appropriate in size, optimal in structure, streamlined in institutional set-up and flexible and swift in command. The PLA also works to readjust and regulate the relationship within the military as well as that with the government and society so as to put in place policies and mechanisms which will help motivate officers and soldiers.

To step up preparations for military struggle. The PLA takes as its objective to win local wars under the conditions of informationalization and gives priority to developing weaponry and equipment, to building joint operational capabilities, and to making full preparations in the battlefields. Meanwhile, it adheres to the people's war concept and develops the strategies and tactics of the people's war. To meet the requirements of integrated and joint operations, the PLA endeavors to establish a modern operational system capable of giving full play to the overall efficiency of the armed forces as well as the national war potentials. The PLA conducts more training and exercises with specific objectives in order to raise its capabilities in coping with various crises and contingencies.

To carry out military exchanges and cooperation. In line with the national foreign policy, the PLA conducts military cooperation that is non-aligned, non-confrontational and not directed against any third party. The PLA takes part in the UN peacekeeping operations and international counter-terrorism cooperation. While promoting military exchanges in various forms, the PLA works to establish security dialogue mechanisms in order to create a military security environment featuring mutual trust and mutual benefit. It takes part in bilateral or multilateral joint military exercises in non-traditional security fields so as to enhance the joint capabilities to cope with threats in those fields. The PLA learns from and draws on the valuable experience of foreign armed forces, and introduces, on a selective basis, technologically advanced equipment and better management expertise from abroad to advance the modernization of the Chinese armed forces.

Chapter III. Revolution in Military Affairs with Chinese Characteristics

The PLA, aiming at building an informationalized force and winning an informationalized war, deepens its reform, dedicates itself to innovation, improves its quality and actively pushes forward the RMA with Chinese characteristics with informationalization at the core.

Reducing the PLA by 200,000

It has been the established policy to build a streamlined military with Chinese characteristics. Since the mid-1980s, China has twice downsized its military by a total of 1.5 million. In September 2003, the Chinese government decided to further reduce 200,000 troops by the end of 2005 to maintain the size of the PLA at 2.3 million. The current restructuring, while cutting down the numbers, aims at optimal force structures, smoother internal relations and better quality.

Rebalancing the ratio between officers and men. By streamlining structure, reducing the number of officers in deputy positions, filling officers' posts with non-commissioned officers (NCOs) and adopting a system of civilian employees, the number of the PLA officers can be substantially reduced to optimize the ratio between officers and men.

Improving the system of leadership and command. The emphasis is put on streamlining the staff offices and the directly affiliated organs at the corps level and above, so as to compress the command chains and further improve the operational command system to strengthen the command

functions. The numbers of offices and personnel are both reduced by about 15% by adjusting staff functions, dismantling and merging offices and reducing the numbers of subordinate offices and assigned personnel.

Optimizing the composition of the services and arms of the PLA. The Army is streamlined by reducing the ordinary troops that are technologically backward while the Navy, Air Force and Second Artillery Force are strengthened. The make-up of troops and the size of the services and arms are optimized with an increasing proportion of new- and high-tech units.

Deepening the reform of joint logistical support. The PLA continues to adopt the system of joint logistical support at military area commands. The scope of joint logistical support is further enlarged and the number of logistical organizations and personnel are reduced while the rear hospitals, recuperation centers and general-purpose warehouses formerly under the administration of the services and arms are all integrated and reorganized into the joint logistical support system. An integrated tri-service joint logistical support system gradually takes shape, thus improving the overall efficiency.

Realigning the organizational structure of military educational institutions. The PLA aims at improving the structure and system for educating military personnel in both military and civilian educational institutions, and speeding up the establishment and improvement of a new educational system. This new system focuses on pre-assignment education which is

separated from education for academic credentials. In accordance with the requirements for running educational institutions intensively on a proper scale, the PLA has optimized the system and structure of educational institutions by cutting down on those that are not essentially different from their civilian counterparts, and those that are more than necessary, and merging those that are co-located or have similar tasks.

Strengthening the Navy, Air Force and Second Artillery Force

While continuing to attach importance to the building of the Army, the PLA gives priority to the building of the Navy, Air Force and Second Artillery Force to seek balanced development of the combat force structure, in order to strengthen the capabilities for winning both command of the sea and command of the air, and conducting strategic counter-strikes.

The PLA Navy is responsible for safeguarding China's maritime security and maintaining the sovereignty of its territorial seas along with its maritime rights and interests. The Navy has expanded the space and extended the depth for offshore defensive operations. Preparation for maritime battlefield is intensified and improved while the integrated combat capabilities are enhanced in conducting offshore campaigns, and the capability of nuclear counter-attacks is also enhanced. In accordance with the principle of smaller but more efficient troops, the PLA Navy compresses the chain of command and reorganizes the combat forces in a more scientific way while giving prominence to the building of maritime combat forces, especially amphibious combat forces. It also speeds up the process of updating its weaponry and equipment with priority given to the

development of new combat ships as well as various kinds of special-purpose aircraft and relevant equipment. At the same time, the weaponry is increasingly informationalized and long-range precision strike capability raised. It takes part in joint exercises to enhance its joint operational capabilities and integrated maritime support capabilities.

The PLA Air Force is responsible for safeguarding China's airspace security and maintaining a stable air defense posture nationwide. In order to meet the requirements of informationalized air operations, the Air Force has gradually shifted from one of territorial air defense to one of both offensive and defensive operations. Emphasis is placed on the development of new fighters, air defense and anti-missile weapons, means of information operations and Air Force automated command systems. The training of inter-disciplinary personnel is being accelerated for informationalized air operations. Combined arms and multi-type aircraft combat training is intensified to improve the capabilities in operations like air strikes, air defense, information counter-measures, early warning and reconnaissance, strategic mobility and integrated support. Efforts are being made to build a defensive air force, which is appropriate in size, sound in organization and structure and advanced in weaponry and equipment, and which possesses integrated systems and a complete array of information support and operational means.

The PLA Second Artillery Force is a major strategic force for protecting China's security. It is responsible for deterring the enemy from using nuclear weapons against China, and carrying out nuclear counter-attacks and precision strikes with conventional missiles. By upgrading missiles,

stepping up the R&D of missiles, and promoting the informationalization of missiles and supporting equipment for command, communications and reconnaissance, the Second Artillery Force has built in its initial form a weaponry and equipment system that comprises both nuclear and conventional missiles, covers different ranges, and possesses markedly increased power and efficiency. The PLA Second Artillery Force boasts a contingent of talents mainly composed of academicians of the Chinese Academy of Engineering and missile specialists. More than 70% of its active-duty officers have bachelor's degrees or above. High-tech means are used to reform its training and shorten the cycle for new weaponry and equipment to be combat-ready. It conducts missile-launching training and readiness exercises in near-real conditions and constantly enhances its quick-response and precision-strike capabilities.

Speeding Up Informationalization

In its modernization drive, the PLA takes informationalization as its orientation and strategic focus. By adopting the general approach of giving priority to real needs, making practical innovations, valuing talented personnel, and achieving informationalization by leaps and bounds, the PLA is actively engaged in the research and practice of informationalization.

In the past two decades, the PLA has been pushing forward informationalization in the field of military operations, focusing on command automation. It has completed a series of key projects to build military information systems and made great progress in building information infrastructure. As a result, command means have been

substantially improved at all levels of headquarters and combat troops. Computers and other IT equipment have been gradually introduced into routine operations. The ability to provide operational information support has been greatly enhanced while more and more IT elements have been incorporated into main battle weapon systems. The CMC has approved and promulgated the Guidelines for the Development of Automated Command Systems of the Chinese People's Liberation Army and the Regulations of the Chinese People's Liberation Army on Automated Command Systems, defining the goals and relevant policies and statutes for developing automated command systems.

In the new stage of the 21st century, the PLA strives to comprehensively push forward informationalization with military information systems and informationalized main battle weapon systems as the mainstay and with military informationalization infrastructure development supported and guaranteed. In its drive for informationalization, the PLA adheres to the criterion of combat efficiency and the direction of an integrated development, enhances centralized leadership and overall planning, develops new military theories and operational theories while optimizing management system and force structure, updating systems of statutes and standards, and emphasizing training for informationalization. The PLA strengthens the building of military information systems and speeds up the informationalization of main battle weapon systems. It also makes full use of various information resources and focuses on increasing system interoperability and information-sharing capability. The PLA takes advantage of progress in government and social sectors in the field of informationalization, and establishes a scientific research and production

system and information mobilization mechanism that integrates military and civilian efforts to promote the informationalization process of both the PLA and the government.

Accelerating the Modernization of Weaponry and Equipment

The PLA regards weaponry and equipment as the crucial material and technological basis for pushing forward the RMA with Chinese characteristics. In accordance with the national security needs, the PLA accelerates the modernization of weaponry and equipment, depending on national economic development and technological advance.

In order to strengthen the capability to win local wars under informationalized conditions, the PLA, in its development of weaponry and equipment, stresses the importance of capstone design, persists in taking informationalization as the leading force while advancing mechanization and informationalization simultaneously, and strives to build a streamlined, efficient and optimized modern weaponry system appropriate in size and optimal in structure.

Giving priority to the development of new- and high-tech weaponry and equipment. The PLA intensifies its R&D efforts and strengthens its innovative capability through self-reliance. It accelerates the R&D of new informationalized combat platforms and precision munitions, as well as electronic counter-measures equipment, and puts more effort into elevating the capabilities for precision strikes and information operations.

Accelerating the modification of old and outmoded weaponry. A number of old and outmoded weapons and equipment, which are backward in

technology, poor in performance and no longer cost-effective in maintenance, are being phased out, and part of the active-service main battle weaponry is reconfigured on a selective, priority and phasal basis. By embedding advanced technology, developing new munitions, and integrating command and control systems, the PLA has restored or upgraded the tactical and technical performance of some current main battle weapons.

Continuously elevating integrated support for weaponry and equipment. Taking existing weaponry and equipment as the basis, the PLA emphasizes the organic and systematic development of combat and support capabilities of weaponry and equipment. In accordance with the development of main battle weaponry and equipment, the PLA develops new types of general- and special-purpose support equipment, while strengthening the maintenance and technical support forces with priority given to new equipment and the training of personnel who employ, maintain and manage the new equipment, so as to elevate the integrated support of weaponry and equipment, thus satisfying the needs of readiness for military struggle.

Implementing the Strategic Project for Talented People

In August 2003, the CMC began to implement its Strategic Project for Talented People. The Project proposes that in one to two decades, the PLA will possess a contingent of command officers capable of directing informationalized wars and of building informationalized armed forces, a contingent of staff officers proficient in planning armed forces building and military operations, a contingent of scientists capable of planning and

organizing the innovative development of weaponry and equipment and the exploration of key technologies, a contingent of technical specialists with thorough knowledge of new- and high-tech weaponry performance, and a contingent of NCOs with expertise in using weapons and equipment at hand. The Project will be implemented in two stages. By the end of 2010, there will be a remarkable improvement in the quality of military personnel, and a big increase in the number of well-educated personnel in combat units. The following decade will witness a big leap in the training of military personnel.

In recent years, the PLA has utilized military educational institutions as major platforms for training military personnel. Officer candidates have, in the main, been trained in four-year colleges. A functional transformation of military educational institutions is taking place with the emphasis shifting from academic credentials education to pre-assignment training. More and more military personnel with specialties for both military and civilian use will be trained by regular institutions of higher learning. So far, more than 90 such institutions have undertaken the task of training PLA cadres. In implementing the Project for Strengthening the Military with High-Caliber Personnel, nearly 30 key regular institutions of higher learning have trained a great number of Master Degree students for the PLA, whose specialties are urgently needed. Various training courses have been offered at military educational institutions, including courses for young and middle-aged cadres, high-tech knowledge training courses for leading cadres at the levels of military area command and corps, and training programs of cross-service and cross-arm expertise. Hundreds of military cadres have been sent to the central and provincial Party schools. Division

and brigade commanding officers have been arranged for study tours abroad. The number of commanders has been increased among the overseas military students.

Intensifying Joint Training

Adapting to the features and patterns of modern warfare, the PLA has intensified joint training among services and arms at all levels to enhance joint fighting capabilities.

Highlighting joint operational training. In view of the future operational tasks, the PLA has given priority to training with specific objectives, joint operational training and high-level command post training. It has successfully organized a series of major joint operational training activities. Studies and exercises directed at operational issues are emphasized with additional attention to the development of operational doctrines and training regulations, and the construction of network systems. By exploring approaches for operational guidance, operational command and operational training for joint campaigns, the PLA has improved the capabilities of commanding officers at each level to organize and direct joint operations.

Conducting joint tactical training. To meet the needs of joint operations at the tactical level, units of different arms and services stationed in the same areas have intensified their contacts and cooperation in the form of regional cooperation to conduct joint tactical training. In September 2003, the General Staff Headquarters organized a PLA-wide demonstration on regional cooperation for military training in Dalian. That event drew

lessons from regional cooperation for military training and explored new ways to conduct joint tactical training.

Improving the means of joint training. After years of development, substantial progress has been achieved in on-base training, simulation training and network training. Almost all combined tactical training activities at division, brigade and regiment levels can be conducted on base. All services and arms have set up their basic simulation training systems for operational and tactical command. A (joint) combat laboratory system of simulation training for all military educational institutions has been initially put in place. A military training network system has been set up to interconnect the LANs of military area commands, services and arms, and command colleges.

Training commanding officers for joint operations. The military educational institutions have intensified their joint operations training. The elementary command colleges offer basic courses in joint operations. The intermediate command colleges offer courses on service campaigns and combined operations. The advanced command university offers courses on strategic studies and joint operations. In order to bring up commanding officers for joint operations, PLA units carry out on-duty training and regional cooperation training, and acquire knowledge of other services and arms and joint operations through assembly training, cross-observation of training activities, academic seminars and joint exercises.

Deepening Logistical Reforms

The PLA continues to deepen, expand and coordinate the reforms of its logistical system, and makes efforts to enhance the capability to provide fast, efficient and integrated support.

Pushing forward an integrated tri-service support system. Experimental reforms of joint logistics started in the Jinan Theater in July 2004. First, all logistical organs of the three services are integrated into one. The Theater Joint Logistics Department or Joint Logistics Department of Military Area Command, originally called Logistics Department of Military Area Command, takes responsibility for joint logistical support for all in-theater units of the three services. The percentage of non-Army cadres in this department has risen from 12% to 45%. Second, all logistical support resources of the three services are integrated. All in-theater logistical support facilities such as rear depots, hospitals, recuperation centers, and material supply and engineering facilities, originally under the leadership and management of the services and arms, have been transferred to the joint logistics system for unified integration, construction, management and employment. Third, all logistical support mechanisms of the three services are integrated. The in-theater logistical support for troops of the three services is no longer categorized into general or special supply support. All supplies are planned and provided by the joint logistics system. Fourth, all logistical support channels of the three services are integrated. The multiple support channels for troops of the arms and services have been readjusted and integrated into one support channel of the joint logistics system, aiming at compressing the supply chain and

improving efficiency to form an effective system of supervision and management.

Conducting technological research of logistical equipment. Over the past two years, the PLA has completed experiments to finalize the designs of 92 types of new logistical equipment, with the designs in logistical equipment system finalized at a rate of 93%. A new-generation logistical equipment system with all necessary specialized varieties has been basically established with some of the equipment reaching the internationally advanced standards. The Fourth Beijing International Exhibition on Military Logistical Equipment and Technology was held in April 2004. More than 340 manufacturers from 26 countries and regions took part in the exhibition, and military logistics delegations from 16 countries were invited to attend the exhibition as well as the international symposium on the development strategy of military logistical equipment and technology.

Deepening reforms of the medical support system and logistics outsourcing. In May 2004, the PLA started in an all-round way to carry out the reform of its medical support system based on pilot and expanded experiments. The reform features categorized support, appropriate medical care, unified management and treatment at designated hospitals, and treatment upon presentation of medical cards. The PLA has established a new type of medical support system in which medical service is free for servicemen, preferential for dependents accompanying officers, and available to civilian employees in the PLA through medical insurance. This has improved the quality of medical service and enhanced the

capability of medical support. The PLA has adopted the management method of packaging wages for civilian employees and the policy of providing resettlement benefits to redundant personnel. It has also introduced in an all-round way such housing reform measures as monetization, market supply and management outsourcing, stepped up efforts to cash housing subsidies, and further enabled servicemen to purchase houses.

Innovating Political Work

The PLA takes as guidance Marxism-Leninism, Mao Zedong Thought, Deng Xiaoping Theory and the important thought of the "Three Represents," adheres to the fundamental principle and system of the Party's absolute leadership over the armed forces, puts ideological and political work first, innovates political work in its content, approaches, means as well as mechanism to give full play to the support and combat functions of political work.

In December 2003, the new Regulations on the Political Work of the Chinese People's Liberation Army was revised and promulgated. The regulation maintains that political work is the fundamental guarantee of the Party's absolute leadership over the armed forces and the assurance for the armed forces to accomplish their missions. It clearly defines political work as a significant component of combat capabilities of the PLA, and stresses the importance of giving full play to the combat function of political work. Education in the RMA with Chinese characteristics is given PLA-wide. Wartime political work is studied and rehearsed extensively. Political work is strengthened in all services and arms as well as the units

carrying out special missions. Education in the PLA's functions and sense of urgency has been intensified in the PLA so that officers and men are motivated in their trainings and a tough fighting spirit and a good working style are fostered.

The PLA relies on laws and regulations to promote the innovation of political work. In April 2004, the CMC promulgated the Regulations on the Work of the Armed Forces Committees of the Communist Party of China (for Trial Implementation), which further defines the duties and responsibilities of the Party committees, the standing committees of the Party committees, secretaries and committee members, and further improves the decision-making procedures and principles in Party committees. In February 2004, the CMC released the Provisions on Strengthening the Education and Management of High- and Middle-Ranking Cadres of the PLA, which establishes and refines the systems for cadres at the regiment level and above to do self-study and review, to receive thematic education, to take admonishment talks, to make ideological and political assessment, to submit work and probity reports as well as reports on important work assignments.

The PLA attaches great importance to ideological and cultural work. In the period of 2000-2002, the CMC allocated RMB 140 million for the cultural work of grass-roots units. In recent two years, the General Political Department and the General Logistics Department have jointly issued a number of regulations in succession, including the Provisional Regulations of the Chinese People's Liberation Army on the Management of Cultural

Equipment and the Provisional Regulations on Grass-Roots Cultural Construction. Beginning in 2003, the cultural equipment supplied to grass-roots units are covered by regularized outlays and managed as organic equipment. In May 2004 a PLA-wide forum on art and literature was held, in which a five-year plan was formulated for art and literature work in the military. The PLA publishes more than 2,800 titles of books and audio-visual products every year. All units carry out rich and colorful on-camp cultural activities to promote the all-round development and enhance combat capability.

Governing the Armed Forces Strictly and According to Law

The PLA implements the principle of governing the armed forces strictly and according to law, strengthens the building of the military legal system, raises the level of regularization, and enhances the combat capability of the armed forces.

The PLA has emphasized incorporating into laws and regulations its good traditions in governing the armed forces and the requirements of the RMA with Chinese characteristics, so as to regulate all dimensions of the armed forces building. In the new historical era, the PLA has promulgated and revised a large number of military regulations, including the Regulations on Routine Service of the People's Liberation Army, Regulations on Discipline of the People's Liberation Army, Regulations on Formation of the People's Liberation Army, Regulations on the Headquarters of the People's Liberation Army, Regulations on the Political Work of the People's Liberation Army, Regulations on the Logistics of the People's Liberation Army, Regulations on the Armaments of the People's Liberation

Army, Regulations on the Military Training of the People's Liberation Army, Regulations on the Garrison Service of the People's Liberation Army, and a new generation of operations regulations. The military law system has been basically established with regulations as its main body. In April 2003, the CMC promulgated the Regulations on Military Rules and Regulations to regulate the military legislative work. In January 2004, according to the CMC's directive, the PLA and the People's Armed Police Forces (PAPF) proceeded to sort out in a comprehensive way all their current regulations and rules, and uniformly organize the compilation and printing of the collections of military regulations and rules so as to provide legal basis for strict governing of the armed forces. The armed forces have carried out legal education in a deep-going way and conducted regulation training courses at various levels to guide the officers and men to perform their duties in accordance with the law.

The PLA has maintained the authority and solemnity of the regulations and rules and administered troops strictly in accordance with the regulations and rules. Incorporating the cultivation of good style and strict discipline into routine military training and administration has helped to sharpen the awareness of the officers and men in their observance of regulations and rules. Through strict training, refined military bearing, strict discipline and resolute and swift work style have been cultivated among the troops. In August 2003, the CMC revised and issued the Outline for Armed Forces Building at the Grass-Roots Level, which has promoted the regularization of the orders in preparation against war, training, routine work and everyday life at the grass-roots level. The General Staff Headquarters, the General Political Department, the General

Logistics Department and the General Armaments Department have twice formed joint working groups for overall inspection of strict administration of the troops. In accordance with the CMC requirements, the PLA and the PAPF have intensified rectification and improvement, and have further promoted the implementation of the guiding principle of governing the armed forces strictly and according to law.

Chapter IV. Defense Expenditure and Defense Assets

China manages and uses its defense funds, ensures the procurement and supply of its military equipment and materials, and protects its defense assets in conformity with legal provisions and in accordance with the needs of national defense building and the requirements of the socialist market economy.

Defense Expenditure

Pursuant to The National Defense Law, the Chinese government follows the guiding principle of the coordinated development of national defense and economy. Based on the economic development and revenue growth, it has continued to increase its defense expenditure moderately so as to keep up with the changes in the demands of national defense. China's GDP in 2002 and 2003 was 10,517.234 billion yuan and 11,725.194 billion yuan respectively. Its defense expenditure in 2002 and 2003 was 170.778 billion yuan and 190.787 billion yuan respectively. Its defense budget for 2004 is 211.701 billion yuan.

The increased part of China's defense expenditure has primarily been used for the following purposes: (1) Increase of the salaries and allowances of

the military personnel. It is necessary to raise the salaries and allowances of the military personnel in step with the socio-economic development and the per-capita income rise of urban and rural residents. In the light of the unified wage adjustment policy for the personnel of state organs, China has raised the salary rates of officers, civil cadres and non-commissioned officers; the allowances of conscripts and cadets under the supply system; and the pensions of the retired. (2) Further improvement of the social insurance system for servicemen. In December 2003, the Provisional Measures on Social Insurance for Unemployed Accompanying Spouses of PLA Servicemen was formulated, to guarantee their basic living standard and provide them with social insurance subsidies. (3) Support for the structural and organizational reform of the military. China once again downsizes its military by 200,000, and has to increase the expenses on the resettlement of the discharged surplus personnel accordingly. (4) Increased investment in the development of high-caliber talents in the military. The PLA has established and refined an incentive mechanism for talented people, improved conditions in military educational institutions, and entrusted non-military colleges and universities with the education of qualified personnel, so as to ensure the achievement of the PLA's Strategic Project for Talented People. (5) Moderate increase of equipment expenses. This is aimed at promoting the leapfrog development of weaponry and equipment, and stepping up preparations for military struggle.

In the past two years, the percentages of China's annual defense expenditure to its GDP and to the state financial expenditure in the same period have remained basically stable. For most of the years since the

1990s, the growth rate of China's defense expenditure has been lower than that of the state financial expenditure.

The absolute amount of China's defense expenditure has long been lower than those of some major Western countries, and the proportion to the GDP and state financial expenditure has also been relatively low. In 2003, China's defense expenditure amounted to only 5.69% of that of the United States, 56.78% of that of Japan, 37.07% of that of the United Kingdom, and 75.94% of that of France.

The management of China's defense funds has become more transparent and standardized, and its cost-effectiveness has been steadily improving. The budgeting reform for defense expenditure has been further deepened, and a new defense budgeting system established, which introduces the zero-base budgeting method and united budgeting system. The budget adjustment and control function has been strengthened, and the input direction and amount of defense funds optimized. The tendering and bidding system for the procurement of defense materials, projects and services has been improved, and the scope of centralized payment extended.

Table 6: Percentage of China's Annual Defense Expenditure in Its GDP (1997-2003)

Year	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003
Percentage	1.09	1.19	1.31	1.35	1.48	1.62	1.63




Chart 1: Comparison Between the Growth Rate of China's Defense expenditure and That of Its State Financial Expenditure (1995-2003)




Chart 2: Comparison of the Defense Expenditures of Some Countries in 2003 and 2004 (unit: billion US dollars)

Note 1: Statistics in the charts are sourced from the national defense reports, financial reports and other government reports published by the said countries.

Note 2: The average exchange rate in 2003 was US\$ 1.0â€‰% ^ RMB 8.2770. On Nov. 20, 2004, US\$ 1.0â€‰% ^ RMB 8.2765.

Table 2: The Percentages of the Defense Expenditures in the GDP and Financial Expenditures of Some Countries in 2003

Country	USA	Russia	UK	France	Japan	China
Defense expend. as % of GDP	3.60	2.64	3.11	2.22	0.99	1.63
Defense expend. as % of financial expenditure	16.20	14.69	8.10	11.00	6.06	7.74




Chart 3: China's Defense Expenditure, 2003 by Proportion (unit: RMB billion yuan)

Military Order Placement and Procurement

China practices a state ordering system to guarantee the procurement and provision of weapons, equipment and military materials. The General Armaments Department is responsible for the procurement of weaponry

and equipment while the General Logistics Department is in charge of the procurement of military materials.

In October 2002, the CMC promulgated the Regulations on the Armaments Procurement of the PLA. In December 2003, the General Armaments Department issued relevant provisions, including the Provisions on the Management of Armaments Procurement Plans, the Provisions on the Management of Armaments Procurement Contracts, the Provisions on the Management of Armaments Procurement Modes and Procedures, the Provisions on the Management of the Examination of the Qualifications of Armaments Manufacturing Units and the Provisions on the Management of the Centralized Procurement of Armaments of the Same Kind. All these regulations and provisions constitute a new statutory system for the procurement of armaments. In recent years, the procurement of armaments has followed the basic principles of the government procurement system, gradually pulled down the sectional barriers in military industry, introduced the mechanism of competition and supported state-owned enterprises outside the military industry and private high-tech enterprises to enter the market of military products. The procurement mode has been in an accelerating transition from procurement at designated enterprises to multiple ways of procurement such as open bidding, invited bidding, competitive bargaining and inquiry procurement. This has raised the overall cost-effectiveness of armaments procurement and ensured the procurement at reasonable prices of weapons and equipment advanced in performance, superior in quality and complete as a set. The procurement of military computers and network devices, vehicle chassis, generating sets, shelters, and other types of

general-purpose equipment has changed from separate to centralized procurement at the PLA level.

Since February 2002, in accordance with the Overall Plan for Deepening the Reform in the Procurement of Military Materials, Projects and Services approved for distribution by the CMC, the General Logistics Department has promulgated in succession the Provisions on the Management of the Procurement of Military Materials, the Provisions on the Management of Inviting Tenders for Military Materials, the Provisions on the Management of Procurement Contracts for Military Materials, the Provisions on the Management of the Price Review Work of Procurement Agencies of Military Materials, the Provisional Measures for the Management of Centralized Procurement Payment of Military Materials, Projects and Services, and the Provisions on Auditing the Procurement of Military Materials, Projects and Services. Following the basic principles of government procurement and taking into consideration the actual conditions of the building and management of the armed forces, the PLA has adopted in an all-round way a mode of procurement of military materials which focuses mainly on hierarchical management and centralized procurement. This mode has improved the operational mechanism of proper division of labor and mutual restraint among the departments in charge of funds, planning and procurement, and raised the level of standardization, specialization and informationalization in the procurement of materials as well as the cost-effectiveness resulting from large-scale procurement. Now procured in a centralized way are more than 1,000 kinds of materials in 24 categories needed in the development, training, scientific research and daily life of the armed forces. Procurement

items included in the annual budget are procured through public bidding if their procurement value exceeds the quota. The quota prescribed by the General Logistics Department is RMB 500,000 yuan or more.

Protection of Defense Assets

Defense assets are funds, land and other resources which the state has directly invested in or appropriated for the building of the armed forces, defense scientific research and production and other aspects of defense construction. They also include the resultant weaponry and equipment, installations and facilities, materials and technological achievements used for defense purposes. The defense assets possessed, used and managed by the PLA in accordance with the law belong to the PLA's state-owned assets. The state has promulgated the National Defense Law of the PRC, the Law of the PRC on Protecting Military Facilities, and the Implementation Measures for the Law of the PRC on Protecting Military Facilities. The PLA has formulated more than 30 rules and regulations on the management of its state-owned assets, such as the Provisions on the Management of the State-Owned Assets of the PLA. This has put the work of protecting defense assets on the legal track.

The people's governments and military organs at all levels jointly protect military facilities and safeguard national defense interests. Under the leadership of the State Council and the CMC, the General Staff Headquarters is in charge of the work of protecting military facilities throughout the country. The headquarters of the military area commands are in charge of the work of protecting military facilities within their areas of responsibility. In the areas where there are military facilities, the local

governments at and above the county level and the relevant military organs stationed there jointly set up military facility protection committees, with their administrative offices established in the provincial commands (garrison commands), sub-commands (garrison commands) and the people's armed forces departments of counties, autonomous counties, cities and municipal districts. Following the guiding principle of providing categorized protection and ensuring the safety of key facilities, the state designates military forbidden zones and military restricted zones as a way to protect military facilities, and also takes appropriate measures to protect military facilities outside such zones. Protected by law are works for military operations, airspace clearance around military airports, military communication and power transmission lines, military oil and water pipelines, electromagnetic environments of fixed military radio installations, frontier defense installations and military survey marks.

Under the General Logistics Department is the Bureau of PLA's State-Owned Assets Management in charge of the management of the PLA's state-owned assets. The PLA's state-owned assets are managed under the system of unified leadership and hierarchical responsibility. The logistics organ at each level is responsible for management of the state-owned assets at its own level. In recent years, the PLA has adopted a management method of property inspection and registration and physical assets valuation and accounting, and instituted a system of property right registration, assets assessment and assets reporting, thus effectively standardizing the management of the PLA's state-owned assets and ensuring their safety, integrity, appropriate allocation and effective use.

(Source: <http://www.fas.org/nuke/guide/china/doctrine/natdef2004.html>)

Appendix 3

Survey of Opinion on “Power Politics In Asia-Pacific Region: The Case Of Chinese Modernization” by- Mohd Aminul Karim,
email:mdaminulkarim@yahoo.com

Prelude: The dissertation titled ‘Power Politics in the Asia-Pacific Region: the case of Chinese Modernization’ seeks to show how the Chinese military fits into or impinges the power politics game in the Asia-Pacific region especially centering around Taiwan and South China Sea. Following are few questions related to the dissertation. Your valuable answers/opinions will be of immense benefit to the completion of the paper. Necessary credit/citation of your opinion (in generalized or specific form) will be given as per the rules of dissertation. Please indicate if you don’t want to be cited as well. You have the option either to answer all or any of the questions.

Questions:

1. Americans play a delicate role when it comes to the question of Taiwan. While agreeing with Taiwan which has been a bone of contention between the US-China relations. How far do you think the American will go to defend the interest of Taiwan in case the Chinese resort to a forceful re-unification?

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2. Presumably, the Chinese have so far shown considerable tact and patience in dealing with the Taiwan issue. Remaining steadfast in their claim over the island, the Chinese policy about the reunification of the island has evolved over the past decade from flamboyant rhetoric to a more modest ‘carrot and stick’ approach. Given the case of Chinese military modernization in recent times, what do you think will be the triggering effect to wane out Chinese patience? How far do you think the Chinese will go to reunite Taiwan?

3. With the exponential growth of her economy, China has also undertaken a massive modernization plan of its military. Given the contention of the Chinese leaders who believe that power politics still define the international system, what do you think will be the implication of such military modernization? Do you predict any effect on the existing balance/imbalance of power in the Asia-Pacific region?

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4. Given the Chinese ambition of a Blue Water Navy, how you visualize the future of the disputed island in South China Sea? Will there be any behavioral change in Chinese foreign policy in settling the disputes? How will the US accommodate or learn to live with a Blue Water capable PLA navy? (Action-reaction model)

5. Japan’s relation with China is marked with an interesting past and a cautious future. Although the leadership of both the countries has tried to leave the past and build future, it has been an uphill task at times. In present geo-strategic setting, how far do the Japanese feel vulnerable to a modernized and militarily potent China? What actions, if at all, do the Japanese feel needs to be taken to balance out the rising Chinese supremacy in the region?

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6. Being a communist state, China has achieved enviable economic progress. However, much of its economic policies and business orders are based on free market economy as opposed to socialist practices. While that has ensured a degree of sustainability of its economic achievements, the political practice and single party rule is still continuing. Given the experience of the Former Soviet Union (FSU) where the communism did not work, do you think China will go for political and democratic liberalization?

7. Given the massive military modernization in China vis-à-vis its peaceful rise as a great power in the world affairs, what implications do the ASEAN and ARF have? How far will these regional organizations remain relevant in China’s foreign policy outlook especially about her claim over the Spratly Island and South China Sea?

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8. India has recently become a key ‘strategic partner’ of US in South Asia. China enjoyed a similar status during her hostilities with the FSU. However, now, the geopolitical realities and the realignment of US policy in the Asia-Pacific region have put China more as a ‘strategic competitor’ than a partner. How much do you think will it affect the overall balance of power in the Asia-Pacific region? Has it triggered any arms race and if so where would it lead the region? Does the US policy to patronize India against China impinge on the security environment in the region?

9. China has some disputes with Vietnam and other ASEAN countries on the ownership of Spratly and Paracel Island. Given the China’s rise as a great power how do you view the possible Chinese response to solve these bilateral problems?

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10. What prospect does the China-Russia cooperation has in redefining the balance of power? How far the recent moves in the EU countries to lift the arms embargo play a role in Chinese modernization?

Name:

Designation:

Organization:

E-mail:

Date

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 2. Mr. Farooq Sobhan, Former Foreign Secretary of Bangladesh and Bangladeshi Ambassador to China.
 3. Professor Emeritus Brij Khare, Department of Political Science, California State University, U.S.A.
 4. Professor M. Shahiduzzaman, Department of International Relations, Dhaka University, Bangladesh.
 5. Professor Geoffrey Till, a Maritime Expert from U.K.
 6. Professor Haroon A. Khan, Henderson State University, U.S.A.
 7. Professor Rukhsana Kibria, Professor of Department of International Relations, University of Dhaka.