

***Organization, Policies and Programs of
The Bangladesh Awami League***

and

***The Bangladesh Nationalist Party :
A Comparative Study***

An M. Phil Thesis

Riva Shahriar

Reg. No. – 115, Session 1993-94

382784

Supervised by :

Prof. Mohd. Sayfullah Bhuyan

Dhaka University Library



382784

GIFT

ঢাকা
বিশ্ববিদ্যালয়
প্রত্নতাত্ত্বিক
সংগ্রহালয়


Department of Political Science, University of Dhaka, 1999

M.Phil.

382784


ঢাকা
বিদ্যালয়
অধ্যক্ষ

**This is to certify that, this M. Phil Thesis is written by Riva Shahriar.
This thesis or any part of it has not been submitted any where for
any degree or publication.**



Prof. M. Sayfullah Bhuyan
Professor,
Department of Political Science
Dhaka University

382784



PREFACE



Political parties serve as the motive force in crystallizing public opinion and as the unifying agency which makes democracy workable. They are the indispensable links between the people and the representative machinery of govt. They are the vehicles through which individuals and group work to secure political power and if successful to exercise that power. They make people politically conscious that is aware of their role as citizens. This role cannot be performed simply by voting, but must be a continuous one if govt. is to be kept responsible to public interest. Thus, political parties are responsible for maintaining a continuous connection between the people and those who represent them either in the govt. or in the opposition.

382784

Bangladesh got independence in 1971 by the leadership of the Awami League. After independence, they went to power as they was in the election if 1970. In 1973 the first general election was held through out the country and they gained a land slide victory. Though it was definite that they would win in the election as there was no such party to win after the Awami League, but the election was not fully free and fair. The govt. party was repressive in nature to the opponent. This tendency hurt the rest of the people which increased day by day. It was a warravaged country and it was not possible to run the country so easily. The govt. had to face many important questions about the decisions taken by the govt. which ultimately did not make happy every body. In 1975, the father of the nation and his family was assassinated by a group of army officers who afterwards captured the power though they could not stay long in power. Through several incidents Ziaur Rahman came to power and martial law was declared through out the country and after civilianize his regime he formed a political party called the Bangladesh Nationalist Party. In 1982, this party was also toppled from power and Hossain Muhammad Ershad came to power. But the people could not forgive him as his way of coming to power was illegal. As a result, in 1990. He was throughout from power through a mass upheaval and the BNP came to power through a free and fair election under a care taker govt. It was the first free and fair election in Bangladesh . There was no question about its neutrality. But people did not vote for it again in 1996. But by constitution, these two parties are not very different. Primarily the AL was influenced by

the leftists, So, their policies also were affected by them. But people did not like those policies. So, they changed their policies with time. At present, their policies are alike. None the less, they are considered differently. So, I tried to know why and how people withdraw their support from either of the parties.

I acknowledge my gratitude to my supervisor professor. M. Sayfullah Bhuiyan who helped me much about my study. I also acknowledge my gratitude to professor Dalem Chandra Borman who also helped me from time to time.

Thus study is mainly focused on the support bases of the two parties and contemporary Bangladesh Politics. But politics is treated here in a broad sense. I have attempted to compare the support bases of the AL and the BNP from historical perspective and also from the evolving political process.

In the formulation of my model I am greatly indebted to Professor Shamsul Huda Harun, Sayed Sirajul Islam, Sayfullah Bhuiyan, Dennis Kavanagh, A.K. Nazmul Karim. I acknowledge my gratitude to them and fully accountable for it. I do not claim to have been able to analyse all the facts, but my study may provide some meaningful glimpses of and insights into the support bases of the AL and BNP and show how the Bangladesh electorate looked upon politics and politicians in the elections. I hope, this study will be able to serve the political parties and party leaders to identify the level of political institutionalization of the respective political parties.

I owe a debt of gratitude to a host of people who both inspired and helped me at various phases in the preparation of this study. Their combined assistance not only helped me but also minimised a number of lapses and drawbacks. It would not be possible to mention the names of all of them here. Lastly, I bear full responsibility of omissions and commissions in support of the book.

CONTENTS

<u>Chapter – I</u> : Introduction	06
I. The Rationale and Significance of the study	
II. Methodology of the study.	
<u>Chapter - II</u> : Political Socialisation and Political Culture in Bangladesh.	08
<u>Chapter – III</u> : The Awami League & The Bangladesh Nationalist Party.	15
I. Origin.	
II. Ideology.	
III. Programme and performance.	
IV. Leadership.	
<u>Chapter - IV</u> : Party Institutionalisation & Party Democracy in Bangladesh.	64
I. The Awami League.	
II. The BNP.	
<u>Chapter –V</u> : Comparison between the support bases of the Awami League and the Bangladesh Nationalist party.	81
<u>Chapter - VI</u> : Conclusion : Summary and Observation.	114
<u>Bibliography</u> :	118

Chapter-I

Introduction :

The Rationale and significance of the study.

Election is the only criterion by which we can explore the support base of a party. The voting behaviour of the people of Bangladesh is highly volatile. It is seen from the previous elections that a large number of people changed their party loyalty from election to election. There are some people who at first voted for Mujib, then Zia and Ershad and now are voting for the religious parties.

This type of attitude is not usual for the third world countries. Because the govts of these countries with scarce resources cannot satisfy the ever increasing needs of the people.

There is a common belief that AL support was mainly drawn from the social classes who belong to the lowest echelon of the society i.e. peasants, minorities, unsocialised labourers etc. and the BNP support mainly extracted from the student community and partially from the professional class and labourers. But there was no serious study to identify the support base of the parties in Bangladesh. What are the characteristics of people supporting different parties in terms of social classes, age, income, education and residential status? What sort of attitude do the people have towards political parties and political leaders? Were their voting intentions based on party consideration or the personal merit of the candidates ? what is the level of participation of the voters with the parties? These are the main questions I would like to investigate. Party popularity varies from place to place. I have tried to explain the reasons for such variation .

To ascertain the voting behaviour of the party followers and their attitude towards their party and the party leaders, I had to study the political culture and social background of the people of this country, which determine their choice and attitudes towards the political parties and politics. It is discussed in the second chapter. In the third chapter, I discussed the origins

manifestos, leadership and programmes of the two parties. Here I showed that the AL is an older organization than the BNP. Now their manifestos are not very dissimilar though the criteria of leadership is different from each other. In the fourth chapter, the level of institutionalisation and democracy of the two parties have been discussed where it is visible that the AL is more institutionalised than the BNP though in respect of party democracy. The support bases of the two parties in different parts of the country have been discussed in the fifth chapter.

Lastly, in chapter IV, I concluded my study with summery and observation.

Method of Research :

It is very necessary to follow certain method to make a successful study. Without it, it is not possible on the part of the researcher to deal with all the aspects of a problem within a limited time and resource constrains.

The methodology I followed for writing this research paper is straight forward .I used both the primary and secondary sources of information. The primary source of information was collected by interviewing 172 people who belonged to different constituencies. They were selected on the basis of random sampling. The secondary source of information was collected from published materials such as books, journals and newspapers. The people who were interviewed were categorised in terms of age, income, education, occupation and social status. Not only that these people were asked many questions to know about their political consciousness.

Time and resource constraints compelled me to select only a number of politically most relevant constituencies - both urban and rural areas- for my research.

Chapter - II

Political socialisation and political culture in Bangladesh

Parties is such an activity which is carried on in a human environment and is thus the product of the historical background, social set up, physical location and climate etc. and all these components affect the political activity that takes place in a given political unit. The economic conditions of a particular community also have its bearings on its politics. A particular economy will create particular possibilities. A community living in a highly industrialised economy, for example, develops social relations, which provides a social setting for political activity. The individual members of the society have certain values, beliefs, propensities and emotional attitudes. These propensities and attitudes with a multiple of others, make up the culture of the community. Accordingly to Lucian Pye, “political culture is shaped by the general historical experience of a country and also by the private and personal experiences of the individuals. It is because the individuals first become the members of society and then of the polity. Political culture is gradually on the cumulative orientations of the people towards their political processes.”¹ “Political culture of a society” writes Sedney Verba, “consists of the system of empirical beliefs, expressive symbols and values which defines the situation in which political action takes place.”² “It refers not to what is happening in the world of politics, but what people believe about those happenings. For instance, if a dictatorial ruler wants to project his image as a democratic ruler, he would continue to be looked upon as a dictator if the people refuse to believe what is propagated.

In Bangladesh, the political orientation of the people is expressed through the elections only. Because, Bangladesh is not developed politically. So, here the only manifested expression of the electorate is election. Though the mass media could play a vital role in exhibiting the voters expression, but in the developing countries, they act as an agent of the Govt. so, the neutral picture does not come out. So, to identify the support bases of the political parties, it is very necessary to examine the political culture of Bangladesh.

Political socialisation is the process by which the values, beliefs and emotions of a political culture are passed on to succeeding generations. The process starts at an early age and continues throughout life. The institutions of family, the school, religious institutions, the peer group, mass media, experiences gained during employment etc. serve as its agencies. Of these, the family is the first in order of importance. So following agents help the process of political socialization.

Family :

Family plays the key role in moulding the character of the child and his attitude towards authority. The formative stage of the child is from 3 to 5 years. Brothers and sisters exercise the hidden influence upon the child. But the mother and father exercise not only the hidden influence but also the manifest influence. The hidden influences shape his entire attitude towards authority, while manifest influence plays a direct role in the development of his political opinion. It has also been observed that a youngman denies the authority or obeys it or extends co-operation mainly because of the attitude moulded by the family. "An early experience in participation in decision making, "according to Almond and Verba, "can increase the child's sense of political competence, provide him with skill for political interactions and these enhances the probability of this active participation in the political system when he become adult" The family structure of Bangladesh is authoritarian in nature. Usually the father is the head of the family and he is found to dominate over the family decisions. So, the children fail to acquire democratic norms and values, as their parents are not behaving democratically. Later on, we observe that the authoritarian behaviour of the family is found to be affected in our adult citizen and in our political leaders. On the other hand, the political leaders of the western countries behave democratically, as their people believe in a set of democratic values, which they inherit from their families. It is seen in the past that the authoritarian rulers usually emerged from an authoritarian family. Such as, Hitler of Germany. So, until the nature of the family of Bangladesh is changed, the politics of Bangladesh will not change.

The Educational Institutions :

After the family, the educational institutions exercise the strongest possible influence, both latent and manifest, upon the child. Children getting education in a particular institution may develop particular kind of frame of mind. There are three kinds of educational institutions in Bangladesh. They are :-

- (a) General education controlled by the Govt. of Bangladesh.
- (b) Education through English medium.
- (c) Mardrasa education.

But uniform education policy can play an important role in developing common attitudes and orientation towards political system. So, Bangladesh should develop a unified education policy and curriculum and should implement it to develop common attitude and common national identity. In the absence of coherent education system and common medium of instruction the unity of the country may remain fragile.

Peer groups :

Peer groups also create a particular influence on the mind of individual more than in or outside the school. Peer group is a group of people of the same age sharing similar problems. Peer group is thus a friendly group. Changes in one's mental attitude from hostility and aggression to co-operation or vice-versa are registered while in the company of friends. The courses of study, debates, discussions and extra curricular activities have their own impact upon the attitudes of their grown up students. In Bangladesh, people are not so educated to understand all the critical things of politics. So, they usually select the persons to vote for by discussing with their friends, relatives or sometimes they are directed by their land lords in selecting the person to whom they are to give their votes.

Mass Media :

Mass media has a great role to play in shaping or moulding public opinion on current issues facing the country. It can educate the people and can generate positive orientation towards the

politics of the country. Mass media can also help in over coming identity crisis by creating an image of the glorious past based on history, culture and tradition. It can build up one national image abroad. Mass media can also develop orientation among our people to respect our political leaders. But in Bangladesh, mass media patronize the Govt. party and it refrains from giving neutral information about the socio-economic and political condition of the country.

Religious institutions :

Though there are no important religious institutions in our country other than the Madrasa, but religion plays a great role in the politics of Bangladesh is increasing day by day. Like the leftists, now they are also providing a separate identity. . A great number of people are coming out from these institutions every year and their number

Role of Government and party agencies :

Political parties disseminate political knowledge and values, mobilize political action and train political leaders. Individuals come directly into contact with the governmental functionaries. They come to know for what purpose the govt. stands for and what the govt is doing. If the govt. does something good, then the idea of obedience is reinforced amongst the individuals. If the govt. develops vested interests and ignores the interests of one class, then that class is bound to resent such action. So, almond and verba says, “when a citizen is ignored by his party, cheated by his police, starved in the breadline, and finally conscripted in the army, his views of the political realm are likely to be altered.” The corruption and inefficiency, which is prevailing in the govt., make many people to remark that the British Govt. was better than the present one. The parties of Bangladesh are more interested to serve their own supporters and specially, their party workers. In this way, the parties diminish their circle of patronization. Thus the rest of the people feel ignored and like to change the Govt. for betterment.

Symbol :

Symbols also play an effective role in the political socialisation. These include birthdays or martyrdom days of our national heroes such as Sheikh Mujibur Rahman, A.K. Fazlul Haque, Bhasani, Ziaur Rahamn. The observance of these days inculcates a new spirit among the young and the people begin to dedicate for national cause again.

It is important that there is continuity in the socialisation process. What one learns in family should be complemented by the subsequent learning processes. Sidney Verba has rightly pointed out, “ Gaps in the socialisation process, where by what one is prepared for in pre-adult socialisation experiences in the family and the school donot match what one learns from participation in politics, may be a major source of political disorientation and strain.”³ Student unrest in many countries is also due to gap in socialisation. In the schools and colleges, they are taught all merits of democracy but when they find the democracy in actual working they find many defects.

Before we discuss about the nature of the political culture of Bangladesh, it is very important to examine the various elements that constitute the political culture of Bangladesh. Here we will consider some of the important features to analyse the political culture of Bangladesh.

Respect and support for hereditary leadership is an important feature of political culture of Bangladesh. The people of Bangladesh by nature have emotional attachment and deep respect for the hereditary leaders and their image play a great role here. As for example, Begum Khaleda Zia or Sheikh Hasina became the leader of their parties because of their heredity. They had no party involvement and also they did not like to join in the party. But they had to change their opinions to prevent the disintegration of their parties.

Ideological consensus is present in the political culture of Bangladesh. Different parties and power groups appear to believe in democracy though there are other ideologies, such as, socialism, communism & Islamic democracy, but none of them are very much accepted by the people.

Socio-economic structure is an important factor in the determination of political culture. Bangladesh is economically and industrially a backward country. Political participation is very limited or restricted due to wide spread illiteracy and poverty. Majority of the people of Bangladesh lives in the rural areas. It is generally observed that no society possesses a single political culture. In each society, there are two kinds of political culture - elite political culture and mass political culture. The urban centred elites tend to develop a political perspective or orientation different from the rural masses who are mostly found politically inactive and apathetic. The political culture of the rural masses may be characterised as parochial. Their political ideas or attitudes are mainly determined by their religious beliefs or values. They take more interest in local issues and local politics than the national politics.

The attitude of the political parties towards the national issues is different. So, the development policies can never be successful in Bangladesh. Such as, with the fall of Ershad, the pathakali trust, upazilla system and other policies were changed.

General level of political trust in a society is an important element to ascertain the nature of political culture. Generally speaking, low level of mutual trust exists in Bangladesh. Political leaders very often change their party and party loyalty to achieve their selfish ends. Inconsistency is found in their beliefs and behaviour or actions. Organized groups or political parties do not trust one another.

The leaders of the parties are authoritarian in nature. They virtually impose their will and decisions on the rank and file members of the party. The leaders of the central party organisations dominate over the local leaders.

To organize political alliance seem to be another important feature of political culture after 1954. Since then alliances were made in each and every elections.

Another significant aspect of the political culture is the proclivity to give mass support to a single great leader, especially when a momentous issue affecting the national fate must be decided. In the 1970 elections Bangladeshis displayed unprecedented unity under the leadership of Sheikh Mujibur Rahman & gave him total support on six-point programme of

autonomy for Bangladesh. In the elections of 1991, people were united to restore democracy and in 1996, people supported Sheikh Hasina on the issue of caretaker govt.

But above all, the politics of Bangladesh lies in the hands of professionals, civilian govt. employees, university and college students, trading classes, a small but growing industrial entrepreneurial class, members of defence forces and the like. These groups have been dominating the politics of this area since the 1920s. Since then, they splitted and sub-splitted into numerous mutually hostile groups of legislators. The result was chronic political instability and quick succession of ineffective governments. But the root cause of their this kind of behaviour is their centuries old fight against the alien rulers which fostered an oppositional mentality and even with independence they have yet been unable to shed that mentality. The problem has been aggravated moreover, by the high stakes involved in all types of competition. A political party's capture of power, for example, opens up big economic opportunities for its leaders and supporters. Still more, the highly unfavourable resource-population ratio make political competition all the more intense. In Bangladesh, the game is winner take all. There is no reward for loyal opposition. The spirit of tolerance and accommodation are absent between the government and the opposition.

One way of characterising political culture is in terms of the distribution of general attitude towards the political system and the input and output processes. According to this, political culture has been classified by Almond and Verba into parochial, subject and participants. The differences which political system exhibit in this regard provide an insight into, at least, one important dimension of the political culture. Considering the general attitude towards the political system, the people of Bangladesh belong to the subject political culture.

Foot notes

- (1) Pye W. Lucian "*Aspect of political development*"
(Boston, Little Brown & company 1966.), P-7
- (2) Pye W. Lucian & Verba, Sidney, "*Comparative political culture, political culture & political development.*" [Princeton (N.J.) University Press. (1965).] P-513

Chapter - III

Origin of the Awami League :

Prior to the achievement of Pakistan in 1947, the Muslim League in East Bengal (Now Bangladesh), the ruling party in the early period of Pakistan, was divided into three factions - the Nazimuddin faction, the Suhrawardy faction and the Fazlul Haq faction. The Nazimuddin faction was essentially “conservative” and had a very narrow base of support because its leadership belonged to the “non-vernacular” i.e. Urdu-speaking group. On the other hand, the Suhrawardy faction was “Liberal” and the majority of its leaders were “vernacular”¹, i.e. Bengali speaking and had a solid base of support - among the Urban middle class – professionals - intellectuals and students. The Fazlul Haq faction was “Organizationally weak” but had a broad base of support in rural Bangladesh because it demanded the abolition of the permanent settlement (Zamindari system) in Bangladesh.

At the creation of Pakistan, each of the three factions in the Muslim League expected to dominate over the state apparatus of the province of East Bengal. However, the central leadership of the party was suspicious of both the Suhrawardy and Fazlul Haq factions, mainly because they were “liberal” and “vernacular”. Therefore, the obvious choice for it was to provide support to the “non-vernacular” Nazimuddin faction, whose leader, Khawaja Nazimuddin, was made the Chief Minister of the province. This disappointed both the Suhrawardy and Fazlul Haq factions, but the Muslim League further systematically excluded many members of these two factions from organizational positions in the ruling party after appointing the conservative leader Maulana Akram Khan as the Chief Organizer of the East Bengal Muslim League.”². It was not only in the party structures, but also in the various key structures of the state apparatus of Bangladesh - divisions, subdivisions, districts and the secretariat-that “non-vernacular” members, largely drawn from the Panjab and other parts of former British India, were appointed.

- ✓ At this point, the dissatisfied factions felt the need for a separate political platform. In June 1949, the followers of Hossain Shahid Shrawardy established a new party known as the “Awami Muslim League”. The League membership was largely drawn from professionals,

teachers, small businessmen and students-social strata that constituted the urban intermediate class. One Political Leader stated “the Awami League’s political support - came mostly from the Bengal middle class.”³. As the party begun to gain popularity, many leaders allegedly the leftists who joined the league, demanded changes in both the name and ideology of the party. Finally, in 1953, by a formal resolution in the East Pakistan Awami League Council, the party dropped the word “Muslim” from the name of the organization and adopted a secular programme.’⁴

Ideology of the Awami League :

The Awami League manifesto included nationalism, democracy, socialism and secularism from basic principles of state policy in the Bangladesh constitution of 1972. We would like to throw some light on these :-

Nationalism :

In the elaboration of nationalism the emphasis of “Bangalee” nationalism is predominant. The unity and solidarity of the Bangalee nation which derives its identity from its language and culture and attained a sovereign and independent Bangladesh through a united and determined struggle in the war of independence is the basis of Bangalee nationalism. Here an attempt has been made to join the ethnic nationality with the political nation hood leaving a wide scope for controversy over the concept of “Bangalee Nationalism”. The concept was primarily derived from the long struggle of Bengali nationalists within the context of Pakistan as one nation with its consequent geo-political development and cultural suppression. Although there should be no doubt left of the fact that the struggle for autonomy was based on Bengali nationalism and the people who now constitute the population of Bangladesh due to their common ethnicity, language and culture are Bangalees.⁵

Democracy :

The Awami League's commitment to democracy, especially to parliamentary democracy started from the foundation of the party in 1949. The party's first election manifestos as well as all other subsequent manifestos and statements made parliamentary democracy a key demand of the party. ⁶ As the ruling elite in Pakistan showed its preference for a "Vice regal" system,⁷ the Awami League chose parliamentary democracy as a major political platform to establish itself as a distinct, democratic opposition to the ruling elite. ⁸

The Awami League's tactical commitment to parliamentary democracy was strengthened during the liberation movement of 1971 as it proved to be an effective instrument in getting international sympathy and support behind the movement. That the Awami League won the 1970 national election in Pakistan, because it stood for parliamentary democracy as opposed to the Pakistani ruling elite's military dictatorship. If voted to power, the Awami League would establish parliamentary democracy as against any other forms of government. This argument repeatedly used in 1971 to mobilise support for the Awami League and the Bangladesh movement.⁹

Though at the time of liberation there was an agreement in the Awami League leadership about parliamentary democracy, a section in the party, especially a section of the more militant youth and student fronts, were not enthusiastic about parliamentary democracy. After liberation, the more militant faction of the Awami League's student front, the student league, i.e. the Rab-Seraj faction, demanded the establishment of a revolutionary govt under Sheikh Mujibur Rahman's personal rule.¹⁰ This was one of the controversial issues behind the splitting up of the Student League in May 1972. Sheikh Mujib came out against personal rule and in favour of a parliamentary democracy and ironically enough, the faction that demanded revolutionary govt under Mujib founded an opposition party, Jatiya Samjtantrick Dal (JSD) in Oct 1972. ¹¹ The Youth front of the party, Awami Jubo League, started by Sheikh Mujib's nephew, Sheikh Fazlul Huq Moni in November, 1972 and the Labours' front, Jatiya Sramik League (Sheikh Moni again being one of its leaders), intermittently demanded abolition of parliamentary democracy and establishment of a revolutionary govt under Sheikh Mujib. Sheikh Moni, in his public speeches and through his news papers repeatedly called for a

“second revolution” by Sheikh Mujibur Rahman were the masses would benefit from the leader’s direct rule.¹² Thus within the Awami League, the older party leadership had some ideological commitment to parliamentary democracy, but the more youthful leaders, especially a faction of the militant youth leaders, were ideologically opposed to it. For tactical considerations, i.e. to show a united front and to mobilise popular support, all factions of the party accepted parliamentary democracy as a model before independence, but after liberation the consensus broke down and the factions opposed to parliamentary democracy worked as a pressure lobby against the model.

After independence, the Awami League came to power and introduced the parliamentary form of govt. But due to the lack of co-operation of the leftist parties, deterioration of law and order and internal conflict of the party, it had to abandon this system and shifted to presidential form of govt through the fourth amendment to the constitution. After the assassination of Sheikh Mujib, the presidential form of govt was continuing. During the agitation against Ershad regime, the three alliances pledged to introduce parliamentary form of govt. Soon after the fifth parliamentary elections, the AL & its allies in the eight party alliance and the five party alliance renewed their commitment to establish the “sovereign parliament” as embodied in the joint declaration of three alliances.”¹³ Sheikh Hasina vowed to continue her struggle inside and outside the parliament to establish the rights of the people and to give democracy an institutional shape. On April 14, 1991 Abdus Samad Azad of AL served a notice of constitution amendment bill to the parliament secretariat for processing and scrutiny. But the BNP had always stood for presidential form of govt and was opposed to parliamentary form of govt. But the public sentiment and the opinion in the opposition camp, and the view of the majority in the BNP itself heavily tilted in favour of parliamentary system, the ruling party decided to switch over to the parliamentary form.”¹⁴.

Socialism :

While the Awami League’s commitment to parliamentary democracy can be dated back to its founding days, the party’s public commitment to a socialist pattern of economy was a relatively recent phenomenon and where parliamentary democracy was some what of an ideological issue and only partially a tactical accommodation, socialism was totally a tactical slogan that the Awami League adopted in 1969 as a result of mounting pressures from the

radical faction of the students front. The early party programmes and manifestos of the Awami League do not mention socialism and in 1957 the leftists within the Awami League left the party and formed the National Awami Party (NAP). The famous six point programme of the Awami League in 1966 only talked of redistribution of resources between East and West Pakistan and not of socialism. The Awami League first came out in favour of socialism in 1969 when it accepted the Student Action Committee's Eleven Point demands.¹⁵ The Eleven Points were the basic, minimum points of agreement amongst all progressive political parties and the Awami League, by committing itself to the Eleven Points, managed to expand its support base to the socialists and the more militant youths. During the liberation struggle in 1971, the support by the Soviet Union and other socialist East European countries helped to strengthen the Awami League's public commitment to socialism.

But though the party was publicly committed to the principle of socialism, it never spelled out what the party meant by a socialist pattern of economy. By implication, it appeared that by socialism, the Awami League meant a policy of nationalisation. What is more important, in spite of adopting socialism as one of its guiding principles, the Awami League continued to depend on its old power base, i.e. on the surplus farmers in the rural areas, and on lawyers, businessmen and literati professionals in the urban areas. In a survey of the members of the parliament, it is found that law; business and farming are the three most common occupations of the parliamentarians. The occupational background and the annual income of the members of parliament of 1970 and 1973 shows that the party leadership is recruited from the affluent middle class and they are hardly socialists. Nearly a quarter of them is urban lawyers and another quarter is businessmen. In a country where maximum annual salary is fixed at Tk. 24,000/-, 68% of the party leaders had an annual income of more than Taka 20,000/-. During the nationalist movement it picked up the support of various groups by adopting various slogans. It had both socialists as well as the country's leading capitalists within its fold.

Since socialisation meant different things to different factions, the Awami League regime could not work a coherent policy of socialist economic planning. The scientific socialists "regarded the Awami League's socialist strategy as one of mixed economy, if not of capitalism and left the party early. At the same time, the regime's policy of nationalisation and state management of economy came under fire from the free enterprise faction of the party who put constant pressure on the regime to give private capital a free hand."¹⁶

In 1990, most of the socialist states abandoned socialism and adopted capitalism. At the same time, the party also changed its economic policy and now it believes in mixed economy and healthy competition between the public and private sectors.”¹⁷.

Secularism :

The Awami League’s commitment to secular ideology was as old as the party’s commitment to parliamentary democracy. And similar to parliamentary democracy, secularism was adopted as a party program in part as an ideological issue to differentiate the party from the Pakistani ruling elite, and in part as a tactical move to recruit the support of the Hindus who constituted nearly twenty percent of the Bangalee population. The party started as a Muslim party founded by dissident factions of the Muslim League who were staunch supporters of Pakistan but lost out in the power game. The party was first named the Awami Muslim League. But before the 1954 election, the leftists decided to join the Awami League and work through the party. As a result of the leftist pressure, the Awami League adopted a more secular line, dropped the term “Muslim” from its name and permitted the Hindus to join the party.”¹⁸. In the 1950’s the Awami League championed such secular causes as the joint electorate and in 1954 it strongly condemned the communal riots in Dhaka.

Programme And Performance of the Awami League :

The Awami League provided a political organisation for the rising vernacular elite, but they still lacked a coherent political platform. The Awami League’s previous demands and demonstrations dealt with issues such as food shortages and the restoration of civil liberties. But the vernacular elite needed a political issue that would clearly set them apart from the ruling elite and would mobilise mass support behind them”. Thus every political party needs programmes to build their support behind them. It cannot be created in a day. It needs situation and time to formulate new policies to be included in the party programmes. Without reasonable and attractive political programmes, sometimes-political parties cannot sustain. As for example, the communist parties of Bangladesh could not get success as they could not adopt that kind of programmes which could reflect the expectation of the people. The AL

built their support base through different political programmes, which was severely affected by its adoption of single party (BAKSAL) through constitutional amendment. It took 22 years to fill the wound. Thus we see that some party programmes are accepted and the people reject some. Some times, political programmes annihilate the party itself. Here we are discussing the origin, growth & fall of the support bases of the AL, which was built through many painful events and struggle.

Anti - BPC Movement :

The Basic Principles Committee Report, which was the first draft of the Pakistani constitution, drew sharp criticism from East Bengal. Bengalis feared that the BPC draft, if implemented, would reduce East Bengal's majority to a minority and would turn "East Bengal into a colony of Pakistan."

A committee of action formed at a mass convention of opposition political workers in Dhaka entrusted with drafting an alternative proposal for the constitution. The convenors of the Actions Committee were Mr. Ataur Rahman Khan and Kamruddin Ahmed. Both of them were Awami Leaguers. The Committee toured East Bengal and mobilised mass opposition to the BPC Report. Finally in February 1950, a Grand National Convention was held which adopted alternative constitutional proposals. These proposals especially those dealing with East Bengal's autonomy, remained the sheet anchor of all subsequent demands for autonomy in East Bengal. The proposal assigned only defence and foreign affairs to the central govt. and even this jurisdiction was subject to the limitations that there would be two regional foreign offices and two regional defence forces, named by the people of the regions. The federal govt was entitled to levy taxes only on certain specified items and could add and new items of taxation only with the consent of the region. The draft constitution also called for the establishment of a sovereign socialist republic and for the recognition of Bengali as a state language.

Language movement :

While the anti BPC movement gave the vernacular elite its political programme its mass appeal and group coherence was supplied by the language movement. It helped to foster a

kind of linguistic nationalism in East Pakistan. It made the students a potent political force and set the pattern on student literate professional alliance, which was used, successfully in all subsequent movements. Above all, it supplied the vernacular elite with a universally popular issue, a cause under which all Bengalis could unite, a cause which helped bridge the elite mass gap.¹⁹ The 1952 language movement created Myths, symbols and slogans that consolidated the vernacular elite. It gave them not only a popular common cause but also their first martyrs. A whole new literary and cultural tradition grew out of the events of February 21”²⁰

The main driving force of the 1952 movement was the student, working in close co-operation with political party members. The students took the crucial step of breaking section 144 on February 21 and in so doing they courted arrest and some of them died. They organised not only the massive strike and demonstrations in Dhaka but also outside the provincial capital and thus demonstrated the coherence and effectiveness of student organisations.

The language movement drew wide spread sympathy and support from the rural areas, in part because the large majority of Bengali students came from these areas.”²¹ Though the peasants did not actively participate in the movement, their tacit support became manifest in the election return of 1954, when the Muslim League Govt. in East Bengal was defeated by a massive rural vote. The students’ campaign on the language issue had greatly influenced the vote. The election of 1954 resulted in the over throw of the ruling elite i.e. the defeat of the Muslim League Chief Minister by a young student leader of the language movement who had no past political experience.

The 1954 election:

The 1954 election marked the rejection of the ‘national’ elite by the Bengali electorate. A united front comprising the Awami League, the KSP, the Nizam-i-Islami and the Ganatantri Dal was formed in 1953 and a common election manifesto was drawn up. While the 21 points were essentially a programme of the vernacular elite, they also included demands directed toward mobilising support from workers and peasants. Thus a very broadly based programme and alliance was formed to fight the incumbent Muslim League Govt.’

The six-point movement :

Sheikh Mujib in early 1966 boldly presented to his fellow Bengalis a secessionist platform in the guise of his famous six point formula for the autonomy of East Pakistan”²² The leftists of East Pakistan denounced Sheikh Mujib’s six-point formula as the platform of the rising petty bourgeoisie, with no programme for amelioration of the conditions of the exploited peasants and workers of East Pakistan, but they quickly found out that for more than middle and lower middle classes enthusiastically supported Sheikh Mujib. In fact, Sheikh Mujib’s autonomy programme became the symbolic expression of the desire of East Pakistani Bengalis of all classes, regions and communities to carve out their own separate and independent destiny as a nation. From all perspectives - political, economic and psychological - Sheikh Mujib’s six-point movement became the embodiment of the nationalist movement of East Pakistan’s Bengalis.”²³

Mass Upheaval of 1969 :

The Ayub Govt. charged Sheikh Mujib and some Bengali officers in the military and civil services with conspiracy “to bring about the secession of East Pakistan with Indian help.” The trial of Sheikh Mujib was held by a special tribunal in the cantonment, and the daily proceedings of the court were published in the newspapers. This strained the nerves of East Pakistanis. Ultimately a mass upsurge took place in East Pakistan and Sheikh Mujib came out of his prison cell in Dhaka cantonment on a surging wave of popularity unsurpassed by any other leader in East Pakistan.

The election of 1970 :

Early on, in the elections of 1970, Sheikh Mujib declared that the elections were a referendum on the AL’s six point and the student’s eleven points and the AL manifesto consequently focussed primarily on autonomy. For about two years—from March 1969 to December 1970 - Sheikh Mujib toured the length & breadth of East Bengal, repeating AL demands to party workers while addressing innumerable mass rallies. The election results caught everybody by surprise. The Awami League won an absolute majority in the National

Assembly and provincial Assembly. The November cyclone in the coastal region of East Pakistan and the administration's inadequate response to the cyclone victims had served to vindicate the Awami League's stand on autonomy and in the elections that soon followed, the Awami League won a clear mandate from the people."²⁴

The war of 1971 :

After the Awami League's overwhelming electoral victory, they expected to come to power. But Bhutto and other peoples' party leaders demanded for power sharing which was rejected by Mujib. On March 1, Yahya announced his fateful decision to postpone the National Assembly session. The postponement sparked off spontaneous, rebellious demonstrations in East Pakistan and in the next few weeks Mujib came under tremendous pressure both from other parties and from the radicals of his own party to declare independence. Pressure from the military was also visible as troops were flown in, the moderate governor in East Pakistan was replaced & Yahya delivered some tough speeches. Under cross pressures from the military and the political radicals, Mujib decided to chart a middle course, he chose to launch a non-violent non co-operation movement. Between March 1 and 7, the regime offered Mujib a round table conference and recalling of the National Assembly session. While the regime was offering negotiating terms, violent clashes between the army and the people continued to occur on the streets of Dhaka and other cities. During this non-co-operation movement, East Pakistan was completely gone under the control of Mujib. The whole of the East Pakistan administration, even the Bengalis serving in the central govt agencies and in the civilian branch of Armed forces, complied with Mujib's call for non co-operation. Yahya came to Dhaka on March 15 to workout a political settlement of this crisis. Detailed information about the Mujib - Yahya talks in Dhaka was not available. But it appeared that Yahya agreed in principle to Mujib's four preconditions. But Bhutto did not agree with him. By that time, the pressure on Mujib either to get a quick settlement or to declare independence had nearly reached the braking point. On March 25, Yahya launched a policy of military solution to the crisis and on March 26, the independence of Bangladesh was formally declared in the name of Awami League and its leader, Sheikh Mujibur Rahman.

The leadership of the movement in the first phase rested mainly with the Awami League and in some places Bengali members of the EBR, EPR and the civil service, in other words, the established authority in the districts.

In the second phase of the liberation movement was a period of long term planning. Leadership of the movement during this phase either went under ground or into exile in India. Two sets of leaders emerged. One belonged to the govt in exile in Calcutta, the other to the Mukti Bahini. The former was comprised mainly of top Awami Leaguers. The govt in exile handled external relations, for the most part, while the Mukti Bahini was mainly concerned with the actual fighting. On June 28, 1971, Yahya announced his plan for a political settlement with the AL. He promised a constitutional govt and restoration of civilian rule in the next three or four months. Such settlement terms were obviously not acceptable to the govt in exile, who in rejecting them said that the people of Bangladesh would never accept a constitution from foreign source.²⁵

Bangladesh won independence on December 16, 1971 through this war; the Awami League got a strong support base for it.

Programme and Performance of Mujib regime:

When the country achieved independence there was no foreign exchange reserve, no central policy-planning agency in respect of foreign relations, defence and economic planning. Expecting an old colonial administrative infrastructure, the country received nothing substantive from the war torn victory. The road and rail communications were almost destroyed by the war and the industrial and commercial life was thoroughly disrupted. Above all the country faced the gigantic task of rehabilitation of about 10 million people who crossed into India for shelter during the war. It would not have been easy for any govt to handle these problems of great magnitude, particularly the two challenging tasks of rehabilitation and restoration of normal life at the end of the war and the reconstruction and development for a future Bangladesh.

The legend of Sheikh Mujib, his Charismatic appeal and his hypnotic hold over the Bengalis were enormous assets for the Awami League govt. The extent of Mujib's success in establishing authority was indicated by the withdrawal of all Indian troops from the country by March 12, 1972. The constituent Assembly enacted the first constitution of independent Bangladesh only seven months later.

Not only that, large-scale famine, which threatened, was avoided in 1972 and 1973 and the ten million people who had migrated to India during the occupation period were rehabilitated. Communications were restored by repairing about 300 railway bridges and 274 road bridges and the six airports damaged during the war, Chittagong harbour was cleared of mines and wrecks with the help of two Russian warships.²⁶

The general elections were called for March 7, 1973. The Awami League, the party of independence won the 1973 elections overwhelmingly. During this time, the support base of the AL was wide spread. After this, the support base decreased day by day and it reached to the end after the 4th amendment of the constitution.

Despite the attempts to legitimise the AL's rules through the election of 1973, serious political discontent erupted against the regime. The unresolved "latent" contradictions of the liberation war began to manifest within a few months after the emergence of Bangladesh. There were many fictionalised leftist political parties because of ideological differences and personality clashes among the leaders. Soon after liberation, the political environment changed significantly for them. Many of them then were strong enough to challenge the authority of the intermediate state in post liberation Bangladesh. The primary reason for the increased strength of the leftist parties in liberated Bangladesh was on the one hand, the experience of the Bengali youth with revolution during the liberation war, where they learnt that "power comes out of the barrel of a gun" and that "legitimate violence" could bring about socio-political change in a nation. On the other hand, after independence the state failed to keep its pre liberation promises, which created a tremendous gap between "expectation" and "achievement". The non-availability of essential commodities, the soaring price level, the allegations of corruption, favouritism and nepotism in the ruling party and charges about Indo-Soviet-influence in Bangladesh, all these made for receptiveness to revolutionary slogans on the part of many Bengalis.

The main challenge to the regime centred around the ideology of Mujibbad when one section of the student front of the AL, the Bangladesh Chatra League (BCL) openly challenged Mujibbad in May 1972, it marked the beginning of the break up of the unity of the ruling party. The pre-liberation 'latent' conflict within the BCL became 'manifest' within six months after the independence of Bangladesh. The BCL split into pro-Mujibbad group (siddiqui-Makhan) and an anti Mujibbad group. The radical faction of the BCL claimed that 'Mujibbad was a utopian concept' and that the socio-economic and political conditions in Bangladesh could be changed only through the establishment of 'scientific socialism'.

The split in the BCL brought about the break-up of the AL labour front and also the AL affiliated Mukti Joddha Sangsad (Freedom Fighters Association). A separate opposition led Jatiya Mukti Joddha Sangrmm Parishad (National Freedom Fighter Revolutionary Organisation) and a peasant front were formed. Finally, on October 31, 1972, a new political party called Jatiyo Samjtantrik Dal (JSD-National Socialist Party) was formed under the leadership of A.S.M. Abdur Rab, Major M.A. Jalil, who demanded higher salaries for the teachers, workers and peasants and to stop providing licenses and permits to Awami League supporters.

In early 1974, it threatened, that, if its demands were not fulfilled by March 14, 1974, it would start a 'Gherao' movement. The JSD continued to mobilise the masses through strikes, gheraos and public meetings. On October 13, 1974, it adopted a resolution demanding the resignation of the ineffective and corrupt regime and establishment of a state of peasants and workers to save the nation from disaster the party called Hartal throughout the country on November 26, 1974. Finally, the state arrested many workers of the JSD, including Major Jalil, Rab and Siraj.

The regime was also strongly denounced by the veteran political leader Muulana Abdul Hamid Khan Bhasani. In order to launch a countrywide movement, he persuaded six open opposition parties to form a united front led by him. The front, known as all party Action committee (APAC) was formed on the basis of a 15-point demand. Of these, four were particularly important: - (a) Full rationing of food throughout Bangladesh. (b) Withdrawal of the special power act (c) Elimination of black marketing smuggling and corruption and (d) Cancellation of all unequal, open or secret pacts with foreign powers.

Many of the demands of the APAC represented popular sentiment. In 1974, Bhasani warned that unless the 15-point demands were met by June 30, 1974, he would launch a mass movement against the regime. One day before the dead line, i.e. on June 29, 1974, most of the leaders of the APAC, including Bhasani, were arrested and thrown into prison.

With the ideological orientation, the under ground parties began training their political cadres in the spirit of a "second revolution" in Bangladesh and launched three types of violent activities. First, the revolutionaries started killing AL leaders secretly on a large scale. Second, along with the secret killing, the revolutionary cadres attacked the houses of rich peasants, occupied their paddy fields and distributed rice and other crops among the landless people. The attackers, usually well armed, appeared at night and shout revolutionary slogans. Third, the revolutionary cadres attacked the local law enforcement machinery - police out posts, Rakhhi Bahini camps and police stations. Between June and November 1973 alone, there were armed attacks on 52 police stations. The revolutionary parties thus posed a serious and direct challenge to the authority and security of the state.

In response to the challenge, the regime undertook two major steps. First, at the political level, the AL formed an alliance with two pro-Moscow political parties-National Awami Party led by Majaffar Ahmed (NAP-M) and the Communist Party of Bangladesh (CPB) led by Moni Singh. Second, as this alliance proved to be ineffective, the state took legal measures against the opposition; several ordinances were promulgated to suppress the violent activities of opposition parties. In the process a total of 6600 persons were killed and 86,000 persons were arrested"²⁷ whom the state characterised as "miscreants" and "anti state" elements. All these measures, failed to stop the under ground activities of the opposition parties.

Meanwhile, the political and economic situation progressively deteriorated and intra-party conflict intensified. In this crisis situation, the president proclaimed a state of emergency on December 28, 1974 and suspended all fundamental rights for an indefinite period.

In spite of the declaration of emergency, the strength of the opposition parties was increasing. Not only that the crisis within the AL and the constant pressure of Moni and other Awami Leagues as well as Pro-Moscow leaders, finally promoted Mujib to opt for the presidential form of Govt and form one party state in Bangladesh.

The establishment of BAKSAL was hailed by the NAP (M) and CPB; both viewed the constitutional changes as making an end to “the era of bourgeois parliamentary democracy and a step forward to the real democracy of the exploited masses”²⁸. But none of the other opposition parties either welcomed or joined BAKSAL. Since they were banned, they conducted their activities under ground. In its wall paintings and pamphlets in different parts of the country, especially at Dhaka University, the JSD called for the establishment of Biplibi Gono Bahani (Peoples’ Revolutionary Army)

In August, a bloody military coup took place in which Sheikh Mujibur Rahman and his whole families, except two daughters were killed.

So, the wide spread support base which the AL built-up through many years, started to decline after independence and it was decreasing day by day and with the promulgation of the BAKSAL, it came to an end. Because, the people of Bangladesh are always in favour of multi-party system and the other measures, which the regime had to take, also hurt the people. Such as, after independence, through the special power Act, the first step to violate the human rights was made. Then the deterioration of law and order, internal conflict of the ruling party, threat from the revolutionary leftists could not solve and thus taking the 4th amendment also disheartened the people. The dissatisfaction of different groups spreaded all over the country and the AL lost the popularity.

Programme and performance of the Awami League (1981-90) :

After the death of Mujib, the Awami League was fragmented into two factions. One led by Abdul Malek Ukil (AL-Malek) and the other led by Mizanur Rahman Chowdhury (AL-Mizan). During this time, there was no important party programme. Sheikh Hasina came to Bangladesh on May 17, 1981 and elected unanimously the president of the party. Within one year of her return, Ershad captured power by replacing an elected president. Then the AL led the 15th party alliance against the military regime. On the way to civilianize the regime, after the referendum, on October 1, the opposition parties were granted permission to resume indoor politics. Agitation against the regime began with renewed vigour when the restrictions on “outdoor politics” were lifted on the first day of 1986. The year 1986 dawned with demand of the two alliances’ for the parliamentary elections under a civilian caretaker govt.

But the regime rejected the demand by offering some minor concessions scheduled the parliamentary elections for April 26, 1986.²⁹ The alliances refused to take part in those elections and unitedly promised “to resist any one who will contest the polls.” But, to the surprise of many, some parties in the AL- led alliance decided to contest the electoral race on March 21, a day before the deadline for the submission of nomination papers. Though Sheikh Hasina had been claiming that her party’s participation in that election was a strategy to continue the movement against the regime both inside the parliament and on the streets, many people were not convinced. The party had to pay a very high price as seven of its component parties snapped their ties with the alliance in protest against its decision to participate in the election.”³⁰ The AL could not attract the larger younger group and the student force as the leader showed a compromising tendency in the election of 1986.”³¹ While it was hard to prove such accusations, the AL leadership failed to disprove the accusations either.

Though Sheikh Hasina entered the parliament and had promised to fight against the govt from inside, but she could not do any thing over the controversial Zilla Parishad Bill and the Budget. After the controversial Zilla Parishad Bill, which gave representation to the Armed forces in the civilian administration, was passed by the parliament, then she had to come out on the streets protesting against the passage of the bill and from the streets joining with other parties, she forced Erashad to abstain from giving assent to the Bill, though it was passed by the parliament. The AL did not participate in the presidential election and Sheikh Hasina was interned in her house.

In the second session of the national parliament passed the 7th Amendment bill to legalise all actions taken by president Erashad during the Martial law period by the JP members with support of some minor parties and a big chunk of the independent members who had cast in their lot with the JP earlier. Sheikh Hasina, the leader of the opposition in the parliament, considered the passage of the bill as a “black Chapter in the national history and a fraud perpetuated through the parliament without approval of the people.”³² During this time, the other parties told Sheikh Hasina to resign from the parliament though a number of MPs of 8 party Alliance were in favour of resignation. But Sheikh Hasina was not in favour of such an idea. According to her “ Our immediate object is to topple the govt. our strength will continue both inside and outside the house”. In reply to the implied criticism against Awami League by 5 party, sheikh Hasina declared that the fight is not against the parliament. She said that

who do not like the fall of this govt are rising the demand of the cancellation of the parliament and the resignation of the opposition MPs.” Though the movement against the regime was continuing, it was sometimes jointly or sometimes alone, but it is true that the AL never wanted to go to any movement with the BNP and this disunity enlarged the length of the regime of Erashad.

President Erashad dissolved the parliament on 6th December 1987 and on the 3rd March, the parliamentary election were held again and the main opposition parties boycotted the elections and declared a continuous hartal programme of 36 hours beginning from 1st March. But there was a feeling amongst the people that the opposition parties could perhaps have foiled the holding of the election through a united movement but failed to do so due to their lack of unity. The opposition parties gave programme after programme, but there was a lack of purpose and direction.

Beginning from 5th January up to the day of the election, hartal was organised for 136 hours over 9 occasions. These had no effect practically. The opposition leaders claimed that they had called the people to boycott the election and the people supported their boycott call by their non-participation. So, they claimed that they were successful.

Awami League preferred to contest Upazilla election held on 24th March individually without associating with other components of the 8 party alliance to test the party's popularity. If the party would make a good showing, the leaders thought, it would give them the chance to contest the national election alone on its own strength. Though it was termed a partyless election, both JP and Awami League participated for all practical purposes on party basis to demonstrate the strength of their parties.

Lastly, the Awami League felt necessity to work jointly with 7 party and 5 party groups and unitedly led to the hartal call on 28th June by all the three alliances. Since then united movement by the three alliances was continuing upto December 6, 1990, till the fall of the regime.

The Awami League did not want to unite with ideologically different parties. Ideologically, it is a leftist party and the BNP is a rightist party. It also demanded to ban the politics of

religious groups. It treated the BNP and the JP at the same way - as a military regime-coming in an unconstitutional way to the politics. So, it seemed to AL useless to unite with one of them and to drive the other one. Not only that, it also tried to go through the constitutional way. So, it participated the elections held under Ershad. It did not only try to fall down the regime of Ershad, it also tried to set 4-pre-conditions to reinstate the constitution of 1970, trial of Sheikh Mujib and thus to raise the consciousness of liberation war. It also called to unite the pro-liberation force against the anti-liberation force. But it failed to make the people listen about their plea. So, it had to compromise with its opponents for the sake of democracy.

It was again a matter of great disappointment for them that they did not get the majority in the parliament in the elections of 1991 held under a care taker govt though it polled more popular votes than any other party.

As a leader of the opposition of the Fifth Parliament, Sheikh Hasina steered all the political parties in the parliament towards changing the presidential system into the parliamentary system.

During the tenure, the Awami League launched a nation wide campaign to help the farmers and workers, built a strong movement in the rural areas demanding supply of fertilizer at a fair price, supported the cause of industrial workers for reinstatement in their jobs, burst into protest against the rape and killing of teen aged Yasmin and subsequent killing of seven others by police in Dinajpur.

Charging that the BNP govt had resorted to massive rigging in several by-elections, including in the Magura constituency, they waged a struggle for creating a permanent system, which would ensure free and fair poll. She demanded resignation of the BNP govt and amendment of the constitution for a non-party caretaker govt to conduct the polls.

They organised campaigns along with all other major opposition political parties for the caretaker govt. when the negotiated settlement on the issue with the BNP govt failed, all the MPs belonging to the opposition resigned from the parliament on December 30, 1994.

The Awami League began a renewed movement demanding general elections under a caretaker govt. The movement gained momentum when the BNP held parliamentary polls on February 15, 1996. It reached the peak after she called a non-co-operation movement in March 1996. Not only huge number of masses and professionals, but a number of govt officials and employees also came out from their places of work and expressed solidarity with the movement. Finally, Prime Minister Begum Khaleda Zia resigned and a non-party caretaker govt. was formed on March 30, 1996.

The seventh parliamentary elections were held through out the country on 12th June 1996 and the Awami League won in 146 seats in the elections. The cause of this victory is mainly party strategy in mobilising the people to vote for them in the elections and failure of the BNP to prove their adaptability to the people.³³

Leadership of the Awami League :

The Awami League a political party was forced into being by the vernacular elites of East Pakistan who were suppressed by the old Muslim Leaguers of west Pakistan. But it could not be an umbrella party before the declaration of the 6 point through the leadership of Sheikh Mujib.

The Agartala conspiracy case made Sheikh Mujib the most important leader of the deprived masses of the then East Pakistan and hastened the fall of Ayub Khan. The victory of the 1970 general election made Sheikh Mujib the undisputed leader of East Pakistan, General Yahya declared him " the future Prime Minister of Pakistan". Unfortunately, political power was not transferred to Sheikh Mujib. This led to the most tragic event in the history of Pakistan-liberation war in East Pakistan.

Bangladesh emerged as a sovereign independent state after nine-months of liberation war. After independence, the country was to be rebuilt under the leadership of Sheikh Mujibur Rahman. Large scale famine which threatened the existence of the country was avoided, ten million people who had migrated to India during the occupation period was rehabilitated, communications were restored by repairing about 3000 rail way bridged and 274 road bridges

and so on. But this slow process of development disillusioned and frustrated the people. With this, the political discontent against the regime, the unresolved latent contradictions of the liberation war also manifested within a few months after the emergence of Bangladesh. The famine of 1974 became a challenge for the existing leadership. It was widely known throughout the world. As a result, relief came from each & every corner of the world. But the relief work was mismanaged, so, the popularity of the regime was diminishing day by day.

To overcome the growing dissatisfactions and disorder that characterised the regime, the political leadership adopted drastic constitutional reforms such as one party rule change of govt from Parliamentary to Presidential, reduction of the power of Judiciary etc.

In spite of patriotic zeal and expressed concern for the masses, Mujib failed to use political power to build new institutions or to strengthen old ones. The fact is that the institutionalisation of power demands considerable sacrifice from leaders because they must transfer some of their power in order to bring about institutional base for needed change. Mujib's so called decision to transfer power to build grassroots institutions met with the same failure as in the case of Auyb Khan's plans for "basic democracies".

Conflict resolution is one of the important qualities of leadership. The failure of Mujib regime to solve the conflicts among different groups is one of the causes of collapse of the regime.

After the independence, the leftist parties demanded for a national govt consisting of the members participated in the liberation war. But the leaders refused to accept that proposal. There happened massive rigging in the elections of 1973 by the members of the AL. But no step was taken to stop or to prevent those riggings.

The ideology of Mujibbad has challenged by the Bangladesh Chatra League in May 1972. The pre-liberation "latent" conflicts within the BCL became "manifest" within six months after the independence of Bangladesh. The BCL was split into pro-Mujibbad group (Siddiqui-Makkan) and anti Mujibbad group. Claiming that Mujibbad was a utopian concept. In response to the split of the student organisation, about 40,000 people were arrested under a special order during the years 1972-73. But when the pressure from the radical / leftists

increased, Sheikh Mujib decided to release the collaborators, hoping that, if they are released, these workers and leaders of the Islamic Parties would counteract the activities of the radical left. On November 30, 1973 the AL govt granted a general amnesty to collaborators.³⁴ A number of special ordinances, directed against the radical leftists, were promulgated by the president and passed by parliament during the 44 months of AL rule. All these measures, failed to stop the under ground activities of the opposition parties.

The split in the BCL brought about the break-up of the AL Labour front and also the AL affiliated Mukti Joddah Sangsad. A separate peasant front was also formed. Finally, on October 31, 1972, a new political party called Jatiya Samajtantrik Dal (JSD-National Socialist Party) was formed under the leadership of A.S.M. Abdur Rab, Major M.A. Jalil.

In the parliamentary party of the AL, Tajuddin Ahmed led a group that opposed accepting aid from the "imperialist nations" particularly from U.S.A and took a generally pro-Indian and pro-Soviet Stance. The Tajuddin group believed that the policy of mixed economy should be abandoned in favour of a pure socialist one, since the nationalisation of industries and foreign trade without the nationalisation of the distribution system had created economic uncertainty and inflation. Another parliamentary group, under Syed Nazrul Islam and Khandokar Mashtaq Ahmed was less anti-American and was willing to accept foreign aid as well as to continue the mixed economy. At the beginning, the Prime Minister tried to maintain a balance between the two groups. In the middle of 1974, when the economic situation reached in a critical position and massive foreign aid was required, Mujib tilted the balance in favour of the "rightist faction" of the AL. On July 7, six ministers submitted their resignations to the president which, on the advice of the Prime Minister, were accepted.³⁵ Sheikh Mujib forced Tajuddin Ahmed to resign on October 26, 1974, making him a scapegoat for the economic crisis.

From the beginning of 1974, there had been continuous reports about conflicts among the younger AL cadres while Abdur Razzak, organising secretary of the AL and Tofael Ahmed, political secretary of the Prime Minister, led one group of younger AL workers and a major section of the students' League affiliated with the AL. Sheikh Fazlul Huq Moni, Chairman of the Awami Jubo (Youth) League (AJL) and a nephew of the Prime Minister, led another group of younger AL workers and a minority faction in the students' League. In March -

April, mutual recriminations and continuous intrigues among the two groups took a serious turn.

But Mujib was failed to minimise those conflicts. So, he was deprived from patronisation of any civilian institutional group in Bangladesh to implement Mujib's Programme of development.

After the demise of Sheikh Mujibur Rahman, the leadership was fragmented for the time being. The senior leaders were scrambling for the supreme leadership of the party. But the other leaders were not known or accepted to the people. In 1991, Sheikh Hasina, the daughter of Sheikh Mujibur Rahman, was an amateur in politics, was elected unanimously the president of the party.

Dr. Kamal Hossain, a renowned lawyer and leader of the AL left the party as a protest of taking leadership of the party by Sheikh Hasina. But she was little concerned about it.

During the movement against the autocratic regime, she successfully led the 15 party alliance till 1986. In 1986, when all the alliances decided for not to go to the election under Ershad, then to the surprise of many, she decided to participate in the election. Sheikh Hasina claimed that her party's participation in that election was a strategy to continue the movement against the regime from inside the parliament as well as from the outside. But her decision was denounced by most of the people. It was also a sudden blow for the supporters of the AL. And the party had to pay a very high price as seven of its component parties snapped their ties with the alliance in protest against its decision to participate in the election.³⁶ The AL could not attract a large part of younger group as the leader showed a compromising tendency in the election of 1986.³⁷

While it was hard to prove such accusations, the AL leadership failed to disprove the accusation either. Because, she could not stop the controversial Zilla Parishad Bill, passing of the amendment Bill to legalise all the activities taken by President Ershad during the Martial law period. Though she left the parliament in protest against passing the Zilla Parishad Bill and also did not participate in the Presidential Election, but the party participated in the upozilla election.

During the movement, the leadership of the AL did not like to compromise with ideologically different political parties for the sake of the movement also. This ideological rigidity and uncompromising attitude of the leadership were not appreciated by the people.

But their leadership was quite good when they were in the opposition in the parliament of 1991. Then, they were able to mobilise the people in favour of parliamentary form of govt and care taker govt issue. This was a great achievement of the AL leadership.

Origin of The Bangladesh Nationalist Party :

Bangladesh emerged as a nation state in 1971. This was the final outcome of a nationalist movement and like many other nations of Asia and Africa, it won independence as a sovereign state after a protracted war of liberation. After independence, Mujib, the leader of the freedom movement, organised the govt on a parliamentary model based on liberal democratic values and beliefs. The system was a multi party one as it exists in neighbouring India and some other Asian Countries. In spite of this multi party model, the Awami -League (AL) govt eventually banded all the extreme leftist parties. Having been banned, these parties went underground and fought armed battles with the govt at several places. The National Awami Party-Bhashani (NAP-B), United People's Party (UPP) and Jatiya Samajtantrik Dal (JSD) worked in the front line of the underground parties with large student support. But these parties failed to provide a viable national alternative to AL. The AL under the leadership of Mujib was the only dominant party in Bangladesh during the period of 1972-1975. The reason for this was that the AL led the war of independence and its leaders could successfully claim in the initial days of euphoria an aura of popular acceptability. As a result, a strong opposition could not grow up and Bangladesh, like Pakistan, failed to develop a competitive party system from the very beginning.

As in other newly independent countries, Bangladesh had to deal with diverse problems from its very inception. The AL govt under Mujib faced the serious task of uniting the various groups, which had participated in the war of independence. Unfortunately, the AL had very little experience of political management and could not cope with the problems it had to deal with. It has been observed that in this part of the world, political parties have never been a

major decisive instrument for framing public policy or for projecting their alternatives. They have also had few opportunities for open activity and competitive politics has generally been throttled by ruling elite. This is partly due to the colonial legacy. After independence, many restrictions were imposed on the free functioning of political parties. These factors did not encourage them to serve as agents of effective allocation of values or as an arena of conflict resolution or as meaningful foci for civic loyalty.³⁸

In addition to this, Bangladesh have its own peculiar socio-political history. Expressing an opinion on the nature of his country's political process, a Bangladesh scholar observes that the endemic poverty of the people, intense factionalism among the various social groups and classes and a net work of patron-client relationship reaching from the rural grassroots to central politico bureaucratic elite at national level have resulted not only in organisational weakness and a very low level of institutionalisation in polity, but also in institutional fragmentation.³⁹

As revolutionary upheaval generally leads to violence and turmoil, Bangladesh faced serious problems in its political finesse and economic fields after independence. There were inner conflicts and dissidence with the ruling AL (which included even the use of arms). There was a general insecurity, which manifested itself in corruption and the looting of Banks. At the same, time inflation with continuously spiralling prices of essential commodities and an overall deterioration in the social and economic life of the people led to severe criticism from the opposition parties, which was, of course, some times exaggerated and even irresponsible. The ruling AL was greatly disturbed by the prevailing conditions and reacted sensitively. A tripartite alliance comprising the AL, NAP-led by Muzaffar Ahmed and Communist Party of Bangladesh was formed by the govt to cope with the situation, but it did not succeed and Mujib declared an emergency in a bold attempt to override the crisis and to implement what he called a "Second Revolution Programme". It is probable that Mujib's desire to remain in power led him to convert the parliamentary system into a presidential form of govt under the rule of one party -Bangladesh Krishak Shramik Awami League (BAKSAL). This move led to the breakdown of multi-party system in Bangladesh. Mujib's presidential form of govt under BAKSAL, however did not last long. It was over thrown on August-15, 1975 by a military coup.

General Ziaur Rahman came to power through a popular sepoy revolution on Nov. 7, 1975. His meteoric rise to power was followed by a number of coups and counter coups in the wake of the assassination of Sheikh Mujibur Rahman. Bangladesh politics was then dominated by two centres - the dethroned pro-Mujib forces known to be pro-Moscow and the Military regime of General Zia supported by different anti-Mujib groups and a large majority of the masses. Against this backdrop, general Zia followed a policy of balance between the armed forces and civilian groups. To do this, he initiated a political process and at one stage, launched the BNP as a result of the civilian legitimisation of his Military regime as well as to ensure mass participation through political institutions. Thus the BNP emerged as a political platform out of a historical necessity and helped general Zia to mobilise popular support in his favour and communicate his ideas to the masses.

Ideology of The Bangladesh Nationalist Party :

The BNP's ideology was statist; faith in "Bangladeshi nationalism" was the major party platform. The party proclamation which laid down seventeen goals and objectives, clearly established BNP's image as a centrist pragmatic party.⁴⁰ Through an ordinance, Zia also amended the constitutional principles of state ideology, i.e. nationalism, democracy, socialism and secularism. As a result of the amendment, Bangladesh ceased to be a secular state and the state's commitment to socialism was diluted. The amendment (5th amendment) deleted "secularism" as one of the principles of state ideology and in its place asserted "absolute trust and faith in Almighty Allah". Bangladesh did not become an Islamic Republic but the amendment stressed that "the state shall endeavour to consolidate, preserve and strengthen fraternal relations among muslim countries based on Islamic solidarity". Socialism was also redefined to mean "economic and social justice". Further, the amendment stipulated that a citizen of Bangladesh would be termed as "Bangladeshi" and not as a "Bengalee" as provided for in the 1972 constitution. This policy to give a territorial rather than an ethnic-linguistic definition of citizenship was undertaken to please the Islamists, who favoured a territorial definition of a nation hood to differentiate the citizens of Bangladesh from the Bengalis in India⁴¹ It is seen in the third world countries that the constitutions of these states often reflect the manifesto of the party in power and the same thing happened in Bangladesh. The constitution was changed by the parties in power. Zia felt the need to infuse a sense of

separate national identity and to consolidate his support base by amending the constitution of 1972.

Bangladeshi Nationalism :

Scholars and analysts have often observed that the main problem of the new states is the maintenance of integration, which is even more important than their economic development in the transitional period. Rupert Emerson says that developing countries "are not yet nations in being but only in hope."⁴² Bangladesh also has been facing the crisis of nation building. After independence, a specially Bengalee Nationalism was kept as one of the four fundamentals of the state within which many controvertial questions were hindden. According to the BNP this theme should be discarded for the following reasons

Bangladeshis as a linguistic group differ from others in the sub-continent, though they share a common language and have territorial propinquity with the people of the Indian State of west Bengal. Because, from the beginning of their recorded history in the early sixth century AD, the people of the two areas roughly corresponding to Banglaesh and West Bengal maintained separate identities even when sharing common rulers and a common name. For nearly six centuries the two areas took different names - Banglaesh areas being usually called Vanga and West Bengal region Ganda. The two ancient Bengals differed fundamentally in the cultural field. The Ganda came early under aryan colonization and Aryan culture.

But the Aryan influence could hardly penetrate into Mongoloid, Buddhist inhabitants of vanga."⁴³ Politically, the vangas valued independence, resisted foreign invasion and showed love for extreme individualism. The Gandas, on the other hand, easily succumbed to foreign invasion, gave imperial powers slight resistance and lacked individualistic orientation."⁴⁴

Beginning in 1204 the two Bengals continued to diverge for more than 500 years of Muslim rule. Always fearful of being swamped by "the Aryans and half-caste Aryans," the people of East Bengal rediscovered their own identity through their mass conversion to Islam. This swift change of religion of the people of "Bangla,"⁴⁵ helped to perpetuate differences between the two Bengals. In accepting Islam, however, the Bengales kept their basic political character. The Bara Bhuiyans' resistance to Mughal supremacy offered one of many

examples of the spirit of Bengali independence. True to their tradition, the people of East Bengal also challenged the British rule with rebellion. A series of serious peasant revolts took place in various parts of East Bengal in the late eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. The west Bengal people, on the other hand, had accepted for long the British rule without much demur.

The British govt recognized for the first time, the separate identities of East and West Bengals when Lord Curzon, for administrative as well as political reasons, partitioned Bengal in 1905 roughly along the historically evolved line of demarcation between Vanga and Ganda. Although the partition of Bengal was annulled in 1911 on the pressure of the Caste Hindus of Calcutta, but at the same time, the division took place roughly along the historically demarcated line -Vanga-Ganda.

After 1947, the power - structure in Pakistan was so developed that the East Bengalis soon found themselves far removed from the decision-making positions. Their ancient pursuit of freedom proved illusory. They failed to become masters of their own destiny. The people of East Bengal quickly reasserted their distinct national identity. In rapid succession the language movement, the 1954 elections, the anti - Ayub movement of 1962, the six point movement of 1966, the mass upheaval of 1969, and the 1970 elections. Finally came the people's liberation war of 1971.

In that war, Bangladesh made supreme sacrifice, in blood and gold. About 1 to 3 million people died. Properties worth millions of Taka were destroyed. Yet Bnangladeshi nationalism at its most sublime form was achieved. The war created a nation of gallant men who won independence from the most brutal perpetrators of genocide and that birth may be the greatest force ensuring the nation's continuity. The revolution created heroes, myths and a vision of golden Bengal of which Bangladeshi 'generations yet unborn' will remain proud. This pride will sustain them as they try to finish the task of realising a golden Bengal."⁴⁶

So, through the above said statement, it is evident that though the people of Bangladesh and the people of west Bengal lives contiguously and also have a linguistic similarity, but they donot belong to the same nation.

After independence, there created many challenges, which needed a separate identification other than a comprehensive one depends on linguistic similarity and territorial contiguity. These challenges and conflicts arose between Hindus and Muslims, Bengalees and now-Bengalees, people of Hill tracts versus people of plain lands. Etc. Most of these people did not like to become Bengalees which depends on linguistic similarity. These conflicts generate. Zia invented Bangladeshi nationalism emphasising territorial identity which could unite all classes of people. The concept of Bangladeshi nationalism as defined by Zia is based on some fundamental principles. They are : race, the war of independence, the Bengali language, religion, lands (geographical area), culture and economy."⁴⁷ He stated that Bangladeshi nationalism aims to establish a society free from exploitation and to fulfil the basic needs of the people consistent with equality and justice. This would involve the participation of the masses in politics and in the developmental programmes of the govt and would build rural institutions for self reliance.

In the words of Abdur Razzak, the national professor of Bangladesh, the rationale of Bangladesh lies in its being a state with its own territorial limits and unity."⁴⁸ Moudud Ahmed, Deputy Prime Minister and political scientist said that the ethos of the people makes Bangladesh a separate entity. In terms of these ideas the concept of nationalism has to be redefined, because it is identified with the state and not with the origin of the people. "We are Bengalees," he added, but the people who live in Chittagong Hill Tracts will not accept that they are Bengalees, they, however, will have no hesitation in accepting that they are Bangladeshis. Citing examples of Sweden and Norway, he argued that people in these countries have the same origin and culture, but have developed separate identities. The same is the case with the Bengalees in India and Bangladeshis"⁴⁹

Democracy :

Although during the honeymoon period, the AL govt showed some signs of success in steering the new nation through a host of problems, the govt soon started to prove its incapacity to handle effectively many socio-economic and political problems of great magnitude. The soaring price level of essential commodities, rampant-corruption at all echelons of govt and administration, decline of production in the newly nationalised industries and schism in the AL of down to the grassroot level put the charisma of omnipotent

Mujib to the test. However, the most serious threat posed to the regime was the gradual deterioration of law and order and the insurgent activities of underground radical revolutionary parties which played havoc in the countryside. ⁵⁰ They vowed to overthrow the Mujib regime through guerilla warfare and resorted to the clandestine killing of the AL leaders and other known “enemies of the revolution”. To quell the “miscreants” and “anti social elements,” on December 28, 1974 through a Presidential Ordinance the govt proclaimed a state of emergency. On January 25, 1975 the country experienced a drastic constitutional amendment that replaced west minister type of govt by a presidential system and multi-party democracy by a single party authoritarianism.

Zia did not change that system but introduced a multi party system opposing all authoritarian measures of BAKSAL. Thus it became one of the four fundamentals of the party. Because, to get a fixed tenure without the pleasure of the legislature, to create firmness, promptness, vigour and initiative in administration, this system is very useful and zia liked to use that system and zia was successful in doing this by suppressing the leftists, improving the condition of law & order situation. As a matter of fact, this system was the demand of that situation. This was the time, when the administration had to take prompt decisions and its implementation. The parliamentary system seemed to be ineffective to meet the challenging problem of the time. The parliamentary system has some preconditions to be successful. Zia removed all the obstacles to parliamentary democracy. In 1991, when all the opposition parties demanded to promulgate the parliamentary form of democracy, then the BNP showed honour to the opinion of the majority.

Socialism means economic and social justice :

Zia changed the concept of “socialism” into “economic and social justice” while article 42 of the Bangladesh constitution provided for acquisition and nationalization of property “with or without compensation,” the amendment provided for acquisition, nationalization of property “with compensation only”.

People of this country were never socialist in nature. They always tried to establish for parliamentary democracy. Originally, the AL did not accept this ideology. But it had to adopt this for the pressure of the leftists in the party. But after adopting this, they could not

implement it properly. Rather they confined their activities within nationalization of the industries. Their policy of nationalisation was also failed. Not only that, the people of Bangladesh are very pious and socialism stands against religion and it also misguided the capitalist world. So, the capitalist world, specially the USA did not help Bangladesh. Considering all these measures, Zia changed this ideology and turned it into "economic and social justice."

Absolute trust and faith in Almighty Allah :

Zia amended the constitution deleting "secularism" as one of the principles of state ideology and in its place asserted "absolute trust and faith in Almighty Allah." It also became one of his party ideology. Bangladesh did not become an Islamic Republic but the amendment stressed that "the state shall endeavour to consolidate, preserve and strengthen fraternal relations among Muslim countries based on Islamic solidarity. This was under taken to please the Islamists."⁵¹ During the war, most of the Islamic world was in favour of Pakistan and after independence they did not recognise Bangladesh. Bangladesh's adoption of socialism and secularism also disappointed them. Then this country was considered under Indo-Moscow Axis. Not only that the capitalist block was also not very happy. So, they also did not help as they could. Zia tried to shift from that block and came closer with Islamic as well as the capitalist block. But he was also successful in improving the relationship with India. One result of this was the five year interim agreement on the Ganges water dispute. Which had virtually threatened Bangladesh's survival in the years prior to the agreement that Zia reached. Indeed, he understood that the sovereignty of Bangladesh will be assured only if it cultivates diplomatic relationship and friendship with as many countries as possible."⁵²

On the other side, majority of the people of Bangladesh are religious minded. Though people of this country is in practice not bigoted, to many of them, however secularism as a state principle has little appeal. On the contrary, they feel 'secularism' means absence of religion. Infact, secularism does not mean absence of religion. Religion is a private affair. It will not have any impact on state policies.

Programme and Performance of the BNP :

Zia regime :

The 19-point programme was originally issued as a manifesto by Zia during the referendum held on May 30, 1977. In course of time, this became the programme of the BNP. The main feature of this programme was that it was general in nature and content and promised to provide the people's basic needs, such as food, clothing, shelter, health facilities and mass literacy. The programme also offered amenities to women, youths, workers and govt. employees. It proposed certain economic and administrative reforms, the most important of them being encouragement to private enterprise. The participation of the people in development activities and the decentralization of the administration was proposed and great importance of national self-reliance was highlighted. The social order was to be based on Justice and fair play. However, implementation of the 19-point programme was avowedly declared as the main objective of the BNP. A broad discussion of the main features of the 19-point programme and its implementation can be meaningfully understood under the following headings:

Political :

At the outset, the BNP govt revoked some of the harsh measures of the BAKSAL Programme.⁵³ But in the post 1975 period, while Ziaur Rahman was attempting to consolidate the administrative state, serious opposition to his regime emerged. During the first three years of his rule, open political activities were prohibited and many opposition political leaders were put in prison.⁵⁴ The Awami League and the Jatiya Samajtantrik Dal (JSD) were opposed to his regime. Zia responded to the threats of these parties in two ways—by means of repression and by means of manipulation that is, a policy of “Stick and Carrots”. Of the various opposition parties, Zia considered the AL and the JSD as his two major opponents and many of the leaders and workers of both these parties were arrested and thrown into jail and through a special tribunal, the leader of the Biplobi Gono Bahini, colonel Taher, was sentenced to death.⁵⁵ Zia also adopted a policy of divide and rule. He secretly assured some JSD leaders of economic and political opportunities if they remained quiet and

the result was a split in the JSD and the emergence of a new party Bangladesh Samajtantrik Dal (BSD), under Awal. In the same way, while many of the Awami League leaders including Abdul Malek Ukil were put into prison, others were inducted into the BNP. Not only that the civil military bureaucrats came to occupy important portfolios in the state apparatus with the overthrow of the “inter mediate state” under Mujib. In the national state apparatus the main structures of decision making were the office of the president and his secretariate, the council of Ministers of the secretariate.

After the parliamentary elections in 1979, President Ziaur Rahman formed a council of Ministers, whose members were appointed by the president & held office at his pleasure. The parliament itself had been elected under terms and conditions set by the President and could be summoned, prorogued and dissolved by him at will.⁵⁶ Earlier, in December 1978, Zia had declared another amendment to the constitution, providing that -

- The president could appoint one fifth of the membership of the council of Ministers from among people who were not members of parliament.
- The president had the right to withhold assent from any bill passed by parliament, which could be overridden, only in a national referendum.
- The president could enter into any treaties with foreign nations in the national interest without informing the parliament.

Thus during the five and half years of Zia’s rule, the civil-military bureaucrats were dominant in the council of Ministers and its predecessor body, the council of advisers. The civil military bureaucrats became dominant again not only in the cabinet, secretariat, divisions and institutions, such as, the National Economic Council (NEC) and the planning commission and in the public corporations.

Thus three major groups - the BNP, the civil bureaucracy and the military bureaucracy were dominant in Zia’s administrative state. In a strict sense of the term, the BNP was not a simple political party; it was a multi-dimensional “umbrella” party. Hastily assembled under the energetic leadership of Zia and considered a dramatically opposed interests and ideological groups. Apparently, there was no meeting ground, for example, between the Islamic fundamentalists and the leftist factions within the party. The BNP thus contained the germs

of conflict at its very birth. As a "Sarkari" (govt) party, the BNP attracted those people who expected a share in state "patronage and power"⁵⁷, as the Janata Party did in India, such people did not join the party because of its ideology or programme. Consequently, the 'success of the BNP depended on the access of its members to the state machinery rather than on the support of the people. None the less, the BNP govt sought to broaden its base by involving the masses in politics and for this purpose, created various institutions and association."⁵⁸

Development Strategy :

During the period 1971-75, the state under Mujib had followed a strategy of development-which emphasized in every possible way the extension of state participation in production activities. Its main thrust was the expansion of the public sector. In 1975, when Ziaur Rahman came to power, the new state adopted an entirely different policy of development. The main direction of the new policy was to encourage private enterprise, emphasizing export oriented industry and promoting a high rate of production. The primary goal of the strategy was to maximise G.N.P growth rate through all out encouragement of the private sector."⁵⁹ The First five-year plan (1973-78), formulated under Mujib, has been in operation in 1975, the new regime therefore, instead of changing the whole plan, revised the plan targets for the remaining three years 1975-1978. The bureaucrats formulated a "Three year hard core plan" which called for greater attention and a higher allocation of resources to the private sector, particularly to the industrial sector. Private investment in industry increased from Tk. 87.4 million in 1973-74 to Tk. 2091.4 million in 1977-1978."⁶⁰ The hard core plan was followed by a two-year plan (1978-80) which was formulated on the basis of Zia's 19-point programme, promising in part to achieve a high rate of economic growth compared to that achieved during the first plan. By the time of Zia's death in mid 1981, the Second Five Year Plan (1980-85) had been prepared in which the private sector was also given greater importance. Increased participation of the private sector was envisaged in the second plan, with an allocation of Tk. 54.7 million. This accounted for about 22 percent of the total plan outlay, as compared with 13 percent allocated in the First Five Year Plan and the Two Year Plan."⁶¹ In particular, private investment in the manufacturing sector during the second plan was envisaged to be Tk. 11.00 million or 20 percent of the expected total private investment.

The quick achievement of a higher rate of growth was considered essential for the survival and stability of the country as well as for gaining political legitimacy for the regime. The development strategy of Zia's regime resulted in respectable economic growth. Growth rates computed in terms of broad aggregates like agricultural and industrial production, Gross National Product were really impressive. The state under Mujib had fared badly in terms of economic development, most of the planned targets had remained unfulfilled. The main goal of Mujib's regime was to reach the bench mark level of 1969-70 but by 1974-75, agricultural output was still below (94%) that level and industrial production even lower (87%). Even though the First Five Year Plan formulated under Mujib, only the first two years were implemented during Mujib's rule while the last three years were implemented under Zia. There was a significant improvement in growth performance in the Zia period as compared to the near stagnation of the Mujib period.

The economic growth of Bangladesh that took place after the fall of Mujib in 1975 generally increased the popularity of the Zia regime. According to the *London Times*, "by and large, President Ziaur Rahman has led the country away from false hopes and pointless quarrels." The best assessment of Zia's achievement was given by the "Financial Times" of London in 1979: General Zia's achievements since winning power in a bloody coup in 1975 have been considerable. He has not only brought relative stability but has lived by all his political promises. He has won international respect for himself and his country; it would no longer be fair to describe Bangladesh as the "basket case" of the developing world, as Dr. Henry Kissinger did a few years ago--. To the credit of the present regime, economic growth since 1975 has improved."⁶²

Its result was manifested in the electoral victory of the party as well as in the electoral victory of Zia in the referendum and in the presidential election. In the referendum Zia won a massive vote of confidence with an affirmative vote of 99.5% from among the 85% voter turn out."⁶³ The referendum gave Zia a strong sense of confidence about his authority in Bangladesh. In the presidential election, Zia won a landslide victory, securing 76% of the more than 53% voter turn out. Though this election for a five year term, but Zia had turned himself from a "soldier" to a "politician". General Osmani on the other hand, received 21% of the votes cast"⁶² who was the nominee of Gonotantrik Oikyo Jote (Democratic United Front) which was composed of the Awami League, NAP(Mujaffar), People's League, Jatio

Janata Party and Gono Azadi League. The result of the parliamentary elections held in February 1979, were a veritable endorsement of Zia's regime with his BNP winning more than two thirds of the seats, on the basis of a share of 41.2% in the total votes cast. As against the BNP's 206 seats, the AL (Malek) won only 40, the ML-IDL 19, the JSD 9, AL (MIZAN) 2 & other minor parties 7. After the election 10 of 17 independent members joined the BNP. The massive victory of the BNP underlined the continued confidence of the public in the leadership of president Zia, the soldier turned politician.

With the assassination of President Ziaur Rahman in May 1981, Vice President Abdus Satter became acting President of Bangladesh. A fresh presidential election was held on October 15, 1981 in which Abdus Satter won a landslide victory by securing 65.5% of the votes cast. But within three months of the presidential election, the Army's Chief of Staff, Lt. General Hussain Muhammad Ershad seized power from him on March 24, 1982 under martial law and suspended the constitution. Many of the ministers of Sattar's regime were arrested on charge of corruption. Since political activities were banned under martial law, the open opposition to the regime was not possible at least one year. But the traumatic events of mid-February 1983, when at least five persons were killed and hundreds of students and police were injured, led BNP and other parties to be united against the regime. Which placed five point charter of demands that included, "immediate withdrawal of martial law, restoration of fundamental rights, parliamentary elections preceding and other election, release of political prisoners and the trial of persons responsible for the mid -February student killing."⁶⁴ The govt. refused to meet the demands of the opposition. But, meanwhile, the govt allowed indoor political activities from April 1983 and the ban on open political activities was withdrawn from November and the date for presidential election was announced to be held on May 24, 1984, which would be followed by parliamentary election on November 25. which did not satisfy the opposition and resulted in strike on November 28, 1983. The govt. then shifted the date of holding parliamentary election on December 8, 1984. But this proposal also rejected by the opposition on the ground that no election could take place under martial law. But Erashad refused to withdraw martial law though he promised to loose those laws. Finally, on January 15, 1985 Erahad announced the parliamentary election to be held on April 6, in which also the opposition alliances refused to participate. Meanwhile, the opposition alliances announced a co-ordinated programme of "direct action" to over throw the military regime unless there was announcement by the end of February of a definite polling date for

parliamentary elections on the alliances own terms-that is, under a caretaker non-military govt. In response to the demands of the opposition, the president announced at a rally in Dhaka on February 13 the possibility of holding national elections in the first half of the year. Subsequently, in a national broadcast on March 2, he proclaimed that elections to the Jatiyo Sangsad (parliament) would be held in the last week of April. Despite the mass agitation against the regime, the main weak point of the opposition was their failure to forge a united movement. On March 18 both alliances, for the first time since they had begun their anti Ershad movement four years earlier, vowed jointly to “ resist anyone who will contest the polls.” But the rift in their unity occurred on the night of March 21 when the Awami League Alliance decided to participate in the election. The BNP, on the other hand, demanded the fulfilment of three preconditions for participating in the parliamentary election - restoration of fundamental rights, release of all political prisoners and annulment of the judgement against politicians convicted under martial law.” The BNP urged the people not to participate in the election. As a result, the BNP leader Khaleda Zia was confined to her house during the immediate pre-election and post election periods.

The formal ending of martial law with the conclusion of presidential elections could not replace the earlier mood of the BNP and demanded dissolution of the existing parliament and the resignation of president Ershad that there would be a fresh election which would ensure its participation in the parliament. But as the Awami League was not ready to resign from the parliament and as the govt did not agree to dissolve the parliament, so the BNP, lastly, realised that their demand would not be effective unless they dropped their demand for the dissolution of parliament. Not only that, because of the lack of unity among all the opposition alliances, provided the regime with the advantage of ruling without any meaningful opposition. So, instead of facing the govt and the 8 party alliance simultaneously, the 7 party and 5 party alliances altered their strategy to face the former singly and to make efforts for neutralize the latter. Both the alliances then opted for a one point movement, i.e. resignation of President Ershad.

Considering the futility of participation in election under Ershad govt, all major opposition parties, including the BNP, decided to boycott the fourth parliamentary election.

It seemed in 1989 that the opposition parties and alliances were gradually losing their protracted political battle against the Ershad regime. But the movement got back its momentum on October 10, 1990. In a fierce confrontation between the security force and the political activities during a massive demonstration by the opposition forces, five persons here killed and hundreds, including Khaleda Zia, were injured.⁶⁵ This killing provoked 22 major student organizations to form all party students unity and that followed by the unity of the professionals against the regime and Ershad had to yield to the united movement of the opposition alliances and parties and on December 6, 1990 handed over power to a caretaker govt headed by Chief Justice Shahabuddin Ahmed. On February 27th, 1991, the 5th parliamentary elections were held and the BNP won in 140 seats and the AL in 88 seats. But before the elections, in many surveys, it was seen that the AL will win more seats than the BNP. Later, it was discussed among many groups. According to them, People in this country go for hero worship. Begum Zia's uncompromising attitude, her relentless struggle and her firm challenge of the autocratic regime of Ershad earned for her deep respect and love of people. She won the halo of a hero. During her public meetings throughout her political career, specially during the election campaign, she refrained from expressing personal malice against the leaders of her rival parties. She explained forcefully the ills of the Erashad regime and gave positive programme basing on the 19 point programme of her late husband Ziaur Rahman. She addressed meeting & after meeting tirelessly explaining the stand of her party and promising what she would do if elected to power.

BNP could attract larger younger group and student force on its side than the Awami League. The student force appreciated the uncompromising stand of Begum Zia in her long years of struggle against the autocratic regime of Erahad while Awami League's participation in the 1986 election was not appreciated by the majority of the students and the people. Though Sheikh Hasina had been claiming that her party's participation in that election was a strategy to continue the movement against the regime both inside the parliament and on the streets, many people were not convinced.

Many political observers commented that her speech over the television that evening brought her more than 10 percent additional votes, as Sheikh Hasina's address, full of aggression and malice, reduced her party's vote at least by that margin. Both Tofail Ahmed and Razzaque commented that Sheikh Hasina's pre-election. T.V. address created an adverse reaction in the

minds of voters. Syed Altaf Hossain of NAP expressed that vanity was the cause of defeat of Awami League in the election. Saifuddin Manik, General Secretary, Bangladesh Communist Party also echoed the same sentiment.

Historically, and organisationally, BNP was a weaker party compared to Awami League its main rival in the election. BNP was founded only 12 years ago from a position of power and when that power was gone, many apprehended that the party will disappear. BNP had not its proper organization even in thana, union and word level. BNP had no experience of election before, as a party in the opposition⁶⁵. But it could play a good role through its programmes and performance. It was high time for it and after assuming power its support was decreasing.

On the 23rd March, Begum Khaleda Zia started her work formally. Addressing the secretaries and other high ranking officers of the administration on the day, she spelt out her policies and sought their co-operation in fulfilling the commitments her party had made to the people. Although the democratic process had to pass through a difficult terrain, during the first three years it seemed to many that, at long last, a stable democratic tradition was perhaps gradually taking root in the country.

Here, the development of different sectors are discussed below: -

Economic development :

The country is on the verge of attaining self reliance in cereal production with an annual deficit reduced to the size of some 2.5 to 4.5 million tons depending on the seasonal variations. Food production increased from 10 million metric tons in 1969-70 to 19.4 metric tons in 1992-93 indicating about double production over the period.⁶⁶ Recent ESCAP Survey 1995 indicates that economic prospects had been brighter with the achievement of macro-economic stability, sound fiscal policy, financial sector reforms, growth in exports, upward trend in industrial growth.⁶⁷ Due to progressive mobilization of domestic resources foreign aid financing of ADP has declined from 75% in 1990-91 to 60% in 1993-94⁶⁸

Though steady improvements over the years, the marco fundamentals indicate a deteriorating picture. The deficit was expanding with rate of import faster than that of export. Inflation had

been reported to shoot up 8%. The twin influence was apprehended to affect the stabilization packages very badly. The level of foreign reserve fell from all time high of 3.5 billion US\$ or worth of 8 months import have come down to over 2 billion US\$ or equivalent to 4 months import. Both foreign direct investment (FDI) and equity investment showed drastic fall during the current fiscal year.⁶⁹ However, the latest information mentioned that the country's export earnings in the first six months of the current fiscal year has been US\$ 2.04 billion which is 7.89% higher than the target.⁷⁰

The ESCAP 1995 survey estimated the GDP growth rate of Bangladesh in 1994 at 5% and projected 5.5% in the 1990S. According to the same report the growth rate of India was 5.4%, Pakistan 4%, Sri Lanka 5.9% and Nepal 8%, China is reported to have topped the list with an impressive 11.9% in the ESCAP region. According to the same report agriculture growth rate had been reported to be 2.6% in Bangladesh in 1995 which was termed highest during the 1990S. The industrial growth rate was reported to be 8.3% which was the highest during the current decade. The service sector had a modest growth rate of 5.3%. The sectorial share of agriculture industry and services in GDP for 1993-94 had been reported to be 30.5%, 17.7% and 51.8%, respectively.⁷¹

Political development :

Although the democratic process had to pass through a difficult terrain, during the first three years it seemed to many that, at long last, a stable democratic tradition was perhaps gradually taking root in the country. Major political parties represented in the parliament (excepting Jatiya Party which abstained from voting) reached a consensus to bring about necessary constitutional changes, through the 12th amendment to the constitution, for restoration of parliamentary democracy in the country. The parliament was having regular sessions, parliamentary committees were functioning routinely, although not as per expectation of the general population. There were tension at times during parliamentary debates and the speaker was in general, able to maintain the norms and decorum of democratic traditions of the parliamentary system.

The experience of the 1991 govt and elections conducted by it caught the imagination of the general public. A sizeable segment of the population came to believe that a non-partisan

caretaker govt was a necessary factor for ensuring free and fair elections in the country. Two separate bills were tabled in the parliament by the Jammāt-i-Islāmī (JI) and the Awami League (AL) to install a non party, caretaker govt. The bill envisaged that necessary constitutional amendments to be made so that the next three parliamentary elections could be held under a non-party care-taker govt. the Prime Minister was to resign 90 days prior to the election date and handover power to the members of the caretaker govt. The ruling party was apparently not enthusiastic about holding a debate in the parliament on these bills, rather BNP leaders emphasised that since BNP came to power through free and fair election and has the people's mandate, it was not possible for it to hand over power to an unelected body. The ruling leaders stressed that the route to free and fair elections was through strengthening of the Election Commission.

The crisis that ultimately led to the formation of the non-partisan, caretaker govt and to the holding of elections on 12 June, 1996 originated with the controversial by election in the Magura -2 constituency which was held on 20 March, 1994. The seat was held by an Awami League MP and fell vacant on his death. Earlier the members of the opposition parties staged a walkout on 1 March 1994 in protest against the remarks of the then information Minister during a debate on Hebron massacre. It was widely expected that they would return to the parliament following mediation which were taking place at the time. The by election was won the BNP candidate amidst widespread allegations of rigging, violence and connivance of the local administration with the ruling party. The Election Commission became subject of vehement criticism by all the major opposition parties. As a result the demand for holding of elections under a non-party caretaker govt became a clarion call of the opposition. This single issue helped to forge an alliance between Awami League, Jatiya Party and Jammāt-e-Islāmī who had been bitter enemies in the past. The opposition parties jointly demanded that the ruling party should give consent to the holding of elections under a non party neutral govt after the Prime Minister resigns 90 days prior to elections to the sixth parliament.

A number of initiatives were under taken by various quarters to resolve the political statement. But all these initiatives also could not achieve its objective. On the advice of the then Prime Minister, the President dissolved the fifth parliament on 24 November 1995.

Under the constitution, elections to the sixth parliament had to be held by 21 February 1996. The ruling party had no other alternative but to go ahead with the preparation of the elections to the sixth parliament. The election was held on 15 February 1996. It was boycotted by all the major opposition political parties. The voting took place amidst call for resistance and gono curfew (People's curfew) declared by the opposition parties. The election marked by wide spread violence and intimidation, were poorly administered and voter turnout was low. In some places BNP supporters stuffed ballot boxes and authorities reported unbelievable figures of voter turnout. About 9 people died on election day violence. Results of only 210 seats could be declared initially, followed by another 79, re-polling was to take place in 80 constituencies, no election could be conducted in 10 constituencies and elections could not be held in one due to legal complications.

The opposition party's agitation reached a crescendo, with the movement focused on only a single demand-the resignation of the Prime Minister. The ruling party emphasised that the holding of elections to the sixth parliament has helped to avoid a grave constitutional crisis. The govt justified the February 15th election on the ground that it was then possible to hold the elections to 7th parliament with the participation of all political parties. Necessary constitutional amendments would be passed in the sixth parliament to ensure that an election which was acceptable to all the political parties could be held. However, the opposition parties were steadfast in their demand that the P.M. had to first resign. In her speech to the nation on 3 March 1996, the former P.M. in principle agreed to the proposal of a non-party caretaker govt. She invited the opposition parties to negotiate in order to exchange ideas about the modalities of constituting the govt. The BNP met the president on 8th March and the opposition on 10th March. But these initiatives did nothing to solve the crisis. But the ruling party made the necessary constitutional changes for a caretaker govt to hold all future elections in Bangladesh. They called the first session of the sixth parliament on 19th March 1996. And the non-party caretaker bill was tabled on the 21st March and the 13th amendment to the constitution was passed by the parliament on 25th March 1996. On 30th March 1996 the P.M. met the President and asked to dissolve the sixth parliament. Though the resignation was called by the opposition as a victory of the "People's movement, the ruling party projected it as a "victory of the ruling party" as the BNP had been able to transfer power constitutionally.

The election was held on 12th June 1996. The AL won in 146 seats, while the BNP won in 116 seats, though the BNP charged of rigging and irregularity in the elections. But the observers called it as a “free and fair election”. The political observers identified some causes, which were the root of their defeat in the elections.

The BNP suffered from issue crisis in this election. Their anti-indian talks, religious stand could not attract the people any more. The Farrakka problem, Santibahini problem was not solved during their reign and they were not very sincere in solving these problems. There were nothing radical in their manifesto. The media was against the BNP their activities were not presented properly. Sometimes they were misinterpreted. At the same time, they identified the Awami League period as a time of misrule. But they were not able to justify their activities to the voters. They did not show any accountability to the voters. They remained busy to criticise the AL, rather to purify themselves. But the caretaker govt issue according to the political thinkers sank all the performances of the BNP. They did not want to accept it though most people were in favour of that. But the BNP was not concerned about it, rather they were firm in their step for not to agree to the proposal. According to the party policy makers, if they would accept the care taker govt issue on principle before the 6th parliamentary election, then it would be helpful for them. After that, the way of holding the 6th parliamentary election and its unbelievable result also disheartened the general people.

After the dissolution of the Upazilla system, the BNP did not introduce any kind of local govt. As a result they failed to create any kind of local beneficiaries.

The election campaign was not very co-ordinated. They were very confident about them. So, they were not very sincere about campaign.

The performance of the home minister was not excusable. The degradation of law and order, repression upon the students, killing of the peasants etc. affected the people too much. The govt would fire him or at least would call explanation about these from him. By this way, they would be free from the accusation. As they did not do it, so they had to bear all the responsibilities collectively.

As a result they could not satisfy any class of people. Specially, the intellectuals went away from this party, as they were not served by the party.⁷²

Leadership of the Bangladesh Nationalist Party :

Unlike Sheikh Mujib, Zia himself was the founder of the party. Not only that he set the programmes, goals, and strategies to attain those goals and selected the leaders of the party also.

Though he was not directly involved, but lastly, he got the opportunity to secure his position in the power structure. Like the other military leaders, he declared that he would go back to the barracks again after rehabilitating the politicians in the power structure. But gradually, he made himself indispensable for the leadership of the country and to undertake nation building activities. Zia felt the need of forming a political party to implement his political ideas and the development programmes. So, under his leadership, BNP emerged as a political party in 1978 by the deserters of different political parties. The 19 point programmes were general in nature and promised to provide the people's basic needs, such as food, clothing, shelter, health facilities, mass literacy and so on. No drastic change was proposed in those programmes.

Zia was a successful political leader. He followed a policy of "Stick and Carrots" to manipulate the opposition political leaders. Through this policy, political parties were divided, people were arrested, and others were inducted into the BNP. Not only that to attract the general people, he revoked some of the harsh measures of the BAKSAL Programmes.⁷³

Zia's development policy was quite different and successful than the previous one, though it is very usual for the army persons to show economic development for gaining legitimacy. None the less, the development strategy of Zia's regime resulted in respectable economic growth. Growth rate in the agricultural and industrial sectors and gross national product were really impressive. This economic growth increased the popularity of Zia. Begum Khaleda Zia also followed the previous economic policy which gave her the same expected result in the economic sectors.

A process of institutionalization involves considered delegation of authority and decentralization of decision making. The top ranking leaders are not eager or even willing to make it. But though Zia attempted through Gram Sarkar, it created serious operational problems. In fact, Zia went much further than Ayub in trying to woo the rural masses, through frequent and extensive visits to remote villages and to administrative centres of local govt. In this respect he emulated the roles of charismatic leaders such as Fidel Castro, Julius Nyerere, Sukarna and very interestingly the late Bengali Charismatic, Sheikh Mujibur Rahman.”⁷⁴ None the less, Zia’s political strategy to decentratize the power failed. Because, to motivate people to participate in development programmes (especially food for work and voluntary canal duggng endeavours), the president by passed the local leadership by delegating authority to centrally appointed and controlled professional bureaucrats. In the process, the institution building process was undermined. But in East Bengal’s modern History “these were the first politico-administrative entities at the local level”⁷⁵ This institution, however was very short lived. After the fall of the BNP govt, the dissolution of Gram Sarkar was ordered in July 1982. Khaleada Zia retained on November 23, 1991 by abolishing the Upazila Parishads introduced by Ershad. On November 24, 1991 Khaleda Zia ordered the formation of 17-member local govt commission under the Chairmanship of information minister. The commission was asked to make recommendations about the future local govt structure. A two tier system union and district council has been suggested. All members at both levels would be elected representatives of the people. The commission expressed its optimism that down to top planning system would ensure people’s participation in the development programme.”⁷⁶ But Khaleda Zia could not implement that proposed form of local govt.

General Zia was the Kingpin, the architect of the party and indeed the moving spirit behind it. He adopted various measures to consolidate his position, to hold the faction ridden BNP together. At the initial state, he encouraged genuine criticism of his programmes from inside the party, but within limits. At the same time, he used a strong arm to silence irresponsible criticisms. He dealt ruthlessly with disloyal and dissident elements in the party and never tolerated indiscipline either in the party, cabinet or the armed forces. Under this treatment, Brigadier Khaled Musharraf, Air Vice Marshall M.G. Tewab, and Lt. Colonel (Rtd) Abu Taher and many other military men as well as Maudud Ahmed, Nur Muhammad Khan and

others in the organizations had to testify themselves. After the death of Zia, the party was about to be fragmented. It was stopped by the coming of Begum Khaleda Zia in the political arena.

After the death of Zia, Justice Abdus Satter became the Chairman of the party. It was a difficult situation and there were many groups around him to seize power from him. To satisfy them, he frequently changed his cabinet to appease every group. But, none the less, he was failed to satisfy all of them and had to surrender power to the army.

Though it was inevitable, but the party could not depend upon him after that and power was shifted to Khaleda Zia. Coming to power she declared that her party would not participate any election under Ershad. Under her leadership, the BNP boycotted the presidential as well as parliamentary elections. This uncompromising attitude coupled with the participation of Sheikh Hasina in different elections under Ershad, gave her a considerable respect throughout the country. She was also successful in exploiting the anti-Indian and pro-Islamic sentiment of the electorate. She could use the student wing of the BNP, which was then the most important driving force for the country. She mobilized them to a definite direction. As a result though the party had a poor organizational network, but it could mobilize the people through its student's front.

Foot Note :

1. Jahan , Raunaq , "*Bangladesh in 1978.*"(UPL ,1980), P – 65.
2. Khan. Ataur Rahman, "*Two Years of Ministership*" ,(Dhaka : Standard Publishers, 1961), P. P - 26-29.
3. Ahmed , Kamruddin, "*A Socio - Political History of Bangal the Birth of Bangladesh.*" (Dhaka : Zahiruddin Mahmud Inside Library ,1975) P- 108.
2. Maniruzzaman ,T, "*The Bangladesh Revolution and its Aftermath.*" (UPL , First Published 1980,1988)P.P –19-20.
3. Ahmed, Maudud , "*Era of Shekh Mujibur Rahman .*" (Dhaka : UPL , 1980).
4. The Awami League's election manifestos before the 1954,1964 and 1970 elections pledged the party to the goals of parliamentary democracy and the famous six – point programme of the party incorporated parliamentary democracy in its first point.

5. Sayeed B. Khalid , "*The Political System of Pakistan.*" (Boston : Houghton Mifflin Company,1967), Chapter-10 .
6. Jahan , Raunaq , "*Pakistan: Failur in National Integration .*" (UPL , Dhaka , 1st Published in 1972 by Colomba University Press) P P 38-49.
7. Singhvied , L.M. "*Bangladesh .*" (Delhi : National Publishing House ,1971)
8. *Dainak Bangla*, May 26th 1972.
9. It is integrity to note that the Rab – Siraj faction which demanded the establishment of a revolutionary Govt. under Sheikh Mujib pledged itself to the Govt. of scientific socialism, which the opposing Siddique – Makhan Faction pledged itself to Mujibbad. The major controversy boiled down to scientific socialism versus Mujibbad.
10. *Banglar Bani*, September 24th, October 12th, 13th of 1974.
11. *The Bangladesh Observer*, April 10th, 1991.
12. Hakim , Muhammad A., "*The Shahabuddin Interregnum.*" (UPL,1973), PP 73-75.
13. During the anti Auyub movement in 1969,the students formed a combined front known as the Students Action Committee (SAC) & drafted an Eleven Point –Programme which included the Six – point programme plus Socialism. The students vowed that no political leader would be allowed to deviate from any of the Eleven Points.
14. Jahan,Raunaq "*Bangladesh Politics.*" (UPL , 1980)P-102.
15. *Bangladesh Times*, June 24th 1996.
16. Umar,Badrudin" *Language Movement and Politics in East Bengal.*" Vol-1 (Dhaka: Mowla Brothers, 1970).
17. Umar, Badruddin "*Mussalmanere Sawdesh Pratyabartana.*" PP 08-11, Mowla Brothers, 1958.
18. Alex Inkeles' data on East Pakistani Students based on interviews with 357 Students from Dhaka University and the Dhaka Polytechnic Institute in the early sixties, show that the fathers of 55% of the students are engaged in full or part time agriculture and nearly 73.3% of the students come from villages, small towns or small cities.
19. Ahmed, Tajuddin, "*Sheikh Majibur Rahman Six Point Formula: Our Right to Live.*"
20. Maniruzzaman, T, "*Group Interests and Political Changes .*" (South Asian Publishers Pvt. , 1982) P – 18.
21. Jahan Raunaq, "*Pakistan: Failure in National Integration.*" (UPL, Dhaka,1972) P - 67.
22. Rashiduzzaman, "*Leadership, Organisation, Strategies & Tactics of the Bangladesh Movement.*" (Asian SurveyXII, No.3, March 1972.) P-198.

23. Sarwar, Mustafa, "Why you vote for AL." The Bangladesh Observer, March 3rd 1973.
24. *Gonakantha*, December 19th & 20th, 1974.
25. Matlern, "Mighty Mujib." (Far East Economic Review, Vol - 87, No.7) February 14th 1975, P – 11.
26. *Asian Survey* 27:2 February 1987,P- 164. *Bangladesh in 1986: Entering a new Phase.* Sayed Serajul Islam.
27. Hakim, Muhammad A., "The Shahabuddin Interregnum" (UPL, 1993), P-23.
28. Hakim, S . Abdul, "Begum Khaleda Zia of Bangladesh"
29. Islam , Syed Serajul, "Asian Survey, Bangladesh in 1986," P-165.
30. *Sangbad*, March 24th 1986.
31. *The Bangladesh Observer*, December 31st, 1973.
32. Muniruzzaman, T, " Group Interests and Political Change." (South Asia Publishers Pvt,1982) P-134 –136.
33. Hakim, Muhammed A. "The Shahabuddin Interregnum." (UPL,1993) P-23.
34. Hakim, S. Abdul, " Begum Khaledia Zia of Bangladesh." (Vikas Publishing House Pvt. Ltd., 1992. P.P 165-170.
35. Sancbork, Richard, "Patrons, Clints and Factions." Canadian Journal of Political Source, Vol-5, No-1, 1972,P.P- 109-110.
36. Ahmed, Emajuddin, " Neo-Colonialism: Centre- Periphery Relationship – Developing Countries and Political Development." (Dhaka University Patrika, Vol -10, December 1979, P.P 189-191.
37. Devid & Sills (ed), " International Encyclopaedia of the Social Sciences." Vol – 7, P P 66-75, 76-84.
38. Jahan, Raunaq, " Pakistan: Failure in National Integration." (New York: Colombia University Press, 1972.)
39. Ahmed, Nur, " Pakistan Constitutional Assembly." Debates, Sec.8, November 21st, 1950.
40. Bangladesh Nationalist Party, "Proclamation".
41. Jahan, Raunaq, "Bangladesh Politics." (UPL, 1980) P –120.
42. Emerson, Rupert, "From Empire to Nation." (Calcutta ,Scientific Book Agency,1960)P- 94.
43. Sarker, Jadunath, "Transformation of Bengal Under Mughal Rule." In Jadunath Sarker (ed). "The History of Bengal." Vol –11,P-227, (Calcutta, Asiatic Society, 1952).

44. Anisuzzaman, M, "*Bangladesh Public Administration And Society.*" (Dhaka NIPA, 1969), P-18-19, & P-31-32.
45. Rahim, M. A. "*Social and Cultural History of Bengal*" Vol-11 (1576-1757), P-40-41.
46. Maniruzzaman, T, "*The Emergence of Bangladesh*" (Bangladesh Books International Limited, 1975) P-38.
47. Rahman, Zakir "*Bangladesh Nationalism.*" (Jatiotabadi Chatra Dal , 1981)
48. Rahman, Abdur, "*Bangladesh: State of the Nation.*" (Asian Affairs , Dhaka, Vol-2, No.2, 1980) P P 173-192.
49. Interview with Maudud Ahmed in August 14th 1982, also his speech to South Asia Students Centre, Jaipur, India, October 13, 1982.
50. Maniruzzaman, T, "*Group Interest and Political Changes*" (South Asia Publishers Pvt. 1982) P P 142 – 163.
51. Jahan, Raunaq, "*Bangladesh Politics.*" (UPL, 1980) P – 210.
52. Hakim, S. Abdul, "*Begum Khaledia Zia of Bangladesh.*" P-20. (Vikas Publishers House Pvt. Ltd.
53. Ahmed, Emajuddin, Mohammad Mohabbat Khan and Habib Mohammad Zafarullah, "*The 1979 Parliamentary Election of Bangladesh: An Analysis of Voters Choice.*" (The Dhaka University Studio, Dhaka, Part-A, Vol.-XXXVI, 1982, P125)
54. Franda, Marcho F. "*Ziaur Rahman's Bangladesh: Poverty and Discount*" American Universities Field Staff Reports, South Asia Series, No.26, 1979) P-4.
55. Lifschultz, Lawrence, "*Bangladesh: The Unfinished Revolution.*" P P 1-75.
56. Franda, Marcho F. "*Ziaur Rahman's Bangladesh.*" American Universities Field Staff Reports." (South Asia Series , No.26, 1979) P-36.
57. *ibid.* P-4 .
58. Jahan, Rounaq, "*Bangladesh Politics.*" (UPL, 1980) P-214.
59. *The Daily Ittefaq* – January 20th 1983.
60. Govt. of the Peoples Republic of Bangladesh, *Ministry of Information and Broadcasting. Bangladesh – III, No.4, P P 6-9.*
61. Govt. of the Peoples Republic of Bangladesh, Planning Commission, *The Two Years Plan, 1978-80, P-4.*
62. *Ibid* – P P –(Sanction – IX) 6 – 7.
63. *The Times* (London) June 19th, 1980.
64. *The Bangladesh Times*, June 1st 1977.

65. Besides Osmani, there were 9 other candidates in the president election.
66. Rahman, Md. Aatur, "*Bangladesh in 1983: A Turning Point for the Ministry.*" (Asian Survey, Vol – 24, No. – 2, Feb 1984. P-242.
67. *Holyday* – October 12th 1990.
68. Hakim, S. Abdul, "*Begum Khaleda Zia of Bangladesh.*" (Vikas Publishers House Pvt.Ltd, 1992), P P 168 – 173.
69. *Hunger Project Report: 1993.*
70. *Bangladesh Observer*, April 19th 1995.
71. *Bangladesh Economic Review*, January 1995.
72. Nag, N. C. "*Bangladesh Observer*" February 14th 1996.
73. *The Independent*, March 6th, 1996.
74. *W. B Report.* 1995.
75. *Bichitra*, June 21st, 1996.
76. Ahmed, Emajuddin; Khan, Mohammad Mohabbat and Zafarullah, Habib Mohammad "*The 1979 parliamentary Election of Bangladesh: An Analysis of Voters Choice*" (The Dhaka University Studies, Dhaka , Part-A, Vol – XXXVI,1982) P – 125.
77. Chy., Zillur Rahman, "*Leadership Crisis – From Martial Law to Martial Law*" P –188-189.
78. Bertocci, Peter J. – "*Bangladesh in 1980. Proetorian politics in an intermediate state*" Asian Survey – 22: 10 (October 1982) P –997.
79. *Daily Star* – August 3rd 1992.

Chapter - IV

Party institutionalisation and party democracy in Bangladesh.

Institutionalisation is the process by which organisations and procedures acquire value and stability. The level of institutionalisation of any political system can be defined by the adaptability, complexity, autonomy and coherence of its organisations and procedures. So, also, the level of institutionalisation of any particular organisation or procedure can be measured by its adaptability, complexity, autonomy and coherence. If these criteria can be identified and measured, political systems can be compared in terms of their levels of institutionalisation and it will also be possible to measure increase and decreases in the institutionalisation of the particular organisations and procedures within a political system.”¹

Adaptability - Rigidity :

Adaptability is an acquired organisational character. It is in a rough sense, a function of environmental challenge and age. Rigidity is more characteristic of young organisations than of old ones. Old organisations and procedures, however, are not necessarily adaptable if they have existed in a static environment. In addition, if over a period of time an organisation has developed a set of responses for effectively dealing with one type of problem and if it is then confronted with an entirely different type of problem requiring a different response, the organisation may well be a victim of its past successes and be unable to adjust to the new challenge. In general, however, the first hurdle is the biggest one. Success in adapting to one environmental challenge paves the way for successful adaptation to subsequent environmental challenges. If for instance, the probability of successful adjustment to the first challenge is 50 percent, the probability of successful adjustment to the second challenge might be 75 percent, to the third challenge 87.5 percent, to the fourth 93.75 percent and so on.

Some changes in environment, moreover, such as changes in personnel, are inevitable for all organisations. Other changes in environment may be produced by the organisation itself - for instance, if it successfully completes the task it was originally created to accomplish, so long as it is recognised that environments can differ in the challenges they pose to organisations,

the adaptability of an organisation can in a rough sense be measured by its age.”² Its age, in turn can be measured in three ways.

The older an organisation is, the more likely it is to continue to exist through any specified future time period. The probability that an organisation which is one hundred years old will survive one additional year, it might be hypothesised, is perhaps one hundred times greater than the probability that an organisation one-year-old will survive one additional year. Political institutions are thus not created overnight. Political development, in this sense, is slow, particularly when compared to the seemingly much more rapid pace of economic development. In some instances particular types of experience may substitute for time, fierce conflict or other serious challenges may transform organisations into institutions much more rapidly than normal circumstances. The AL is an old party in Bangladesh. So, it will survive one more additional year than the BNP. Political institutions are not created overnight. They need time. Not only that though primarily it was created to fight against the West Pakistan domination, but it got institutionalised character through the independence war. This party directed the people to dedicate their lives for the country. This type of special occurrence concise the expected time and mature an organisation before time. The BNP came from the barrel of the gun though it was the need of time. It came into existence through a series of coups held after the death of Sheikh Mujib. When Sheikh Mujib was killed, then Khondoker Mostaq Ahmed was appointed as the president of the Republic. But after passing many important amendments, he was also replaced by Khaled Mossaraf, but through a sipoy mutiny he was killed and Ziaur Rahman - a previous freedom fighter united the nation under the nationalist power and sustained in power. It was a critical situation and his coming to power created a relief among the people. This unprecedented incident solved the political crisis faced by the nation. But it is true that the BNP emerged as a political party in 1978, where the AL was founded in 1949. So, the BNP will need more time to acquire institutionalisation than the AL. Being an older party, the AL has wider base of support all over the country. So, it has satisfied some of the elements of institutionalisation. A second measure of adaptability is generational age. So long as an organisation still has its first set of leaders, so long as a procedure is still performed by those who first performed it, its adaptability is still in doubt. The more often the organisation has surmounted the problem of peaceful succession and replaced one set of leaders by another, the more highly institutionalised it is.

The politics of Bangladesh has a great lack in periodical succession. Like other third world countries, the leaders inherit power but not through constitutional procedures. The AL is an old organisation. It has many sets of leaders. They are capable, had important contribution in the liberation war. But, none the less, after the death of Sheikh Mujibur Rahman, the party was drawing for the lack of leaders. Not only that the party was also fragmented and reached at the question of existence. Lastly, the party was bound to call Sheikh Hasina, the daughter of the father of the nation and was elected as the Chairperson of the party and saved the party from collapse. So, as the leaders of the next row were not installed in the simple way, so, it should be said that this party has not been institutionalised in this respect. The BNP also suffered from the same problem. After the death of Zia, people were not agreed to accept the other leaders but Khaleda Zia. Primarily she did not want to join in the politics, but she was persuaded by the party leaders to come to politics. Thus she saved the party from impending collapse. So, the BNP also has not been institutionalised like the AL.

Thirdly usually an organisation is created to perform one particular function. When that function is no longer needed, the organisation faces a major crisis; it either finds a new function or reconciles itself to a lingering death. As a result, most of the parties which played critical role in liberating their respective countries died out immediately. Because, most of these organisations were created before independence to organise the people in favour of war. After successful completion of war, when the party comes to power, usually, failed to show sagacity in ruling the country. It is not so easy to jump spontaneously from that activity to this without any trouble and run the country smoothly. Most of the organisations fail to perform this. The AL also was born to get independence for the country. After independence it also faced crises in running the country. Lastly, its existence was under question. But after the death of Mujib, the wave of politics changed and people were attracted to that party sympathically and they also successfully used the chance by showing the disabilities of the existing govt and came again in the lime light and when they were defeated, they accepted the mandate of the people and again changed their direction of attention. They started movement for caretaker govt and won the people and lastly got the mandate of the people. Thus the party is adopting different issues one after another to get more and more attention from the people. On the other hand, the BNP came in the political arena as a nationalist force in a crucial time when the people of our country were very distress. Zia was a good

administrator and politician. He developed the country socially and economically. He could also improve the relationship of Bangladesh with the foreign countries. After the death of Zia, the uncompromising stand of Khaleda Zia against the Erashad regime was appreciated by many people. This stand was honoured by the people and she achieved the mandate of the people. But after that the party could not raise any issue to attract the people rather their wrong policies irritated the people very much. Not only that, they were quite imbecile about that the activities of the opposition, they could not take any positive step to stop the opposition. This inability to manage the opposition at the right time created a great set back and they were defeated in the election. Thus, due to lack of adopting proper decision at the proper time, it lost its long awaited result within a few years. So, it is very important for the political parties to keep eye to the changing circumstances and change policies with this. Otherwise they are sure to ruin power within a short time.

Complexity - Simplicity :

The more complicated an organisation is the more highly institutionalised it is. Complexity may involve both multiplication of organisational subunits, hierarchically and functionally and differentiation of separate types of organisational subunits. In addition, an organisation which has many purposes is better able to adjust it self to the loss of any one purpose than an organisation which has only one purpose. Relatively primitive and simple traditional political systems are usually overwhelmed and destroyed in the modernisation process. More complex traditional systems are more likely to adopt to these new demands. The simplest political system is that which depends on one individual. It is also the least stable. Tyrannis, Aristotle pointed out, are virtually all "quite short lived."³ A political system with several different political institutions, on the other hand, is much more likely to adapt. The needs of one age may be met by one set of institutions, the needs of the next by a different set.

Both the parties have multiple sub-units, hierarchical leadership and as it has several sub-units, so, they are to perform multiple jobs other than the party's principle aim to go to power. These units expand their activities beyond the power circle. Thus a political party can expand its activities in all sectors of human life. Such as, both the parties are working in cultural sector, environmental sector, religious sector etc. Thus, by expanding its sub-units,

indirectly expanded their sphere of activities. In this way, though the AL was out of power for about 21 years, but its other activities alived it.

Autonomy - Subordination :

A third measure of institutionalisation is the extent to which political organisations and procedures exist independently of other social groupings and method of behaviour.

In a highly developed political system, political organisations have an integrity, which they lack in the less developed systems. In some measure, they are insulated from the impact of non-political groups and procedures. In less developed political systems, they are highly vulnerable to outside influences. Political institutionalisation, in the sense of autonomy, means the development of political organisations and procedures that are not simply expressions of the interests of particular social groups.

A political organisation that is the instrument of a social groups-family, clan, class-lacks autonomy and institutionalisation. If an organisation in the traditional Marxist claim, is really the executive committee of the bourgeoisie, then it is not much of an institution. The autonomy of political institutions is likely to be the result of competition among social forces. A political party, for instance, that expresses the interests of only one group in society - whether labourers, businessmen, or farmers is less autonomous than one that articulates and aggregated the interests of several social groups.

Political organisations also have varying degrees of autonomy. A highly developed political system has procedures to minimise, if not eliminate the role of violence in the system and to restrict to explicitly defined channels that influence of wealth in the system. To the extent that political officials can be toppled by a few soldiers or influenced by a few dollars, the organisations and procedures lack autonomy are, in common parlance said to be corrupt.

Political organisations and procedures that are vulnerable to none political influences from within the society are also usually vulnerable to influences from outside the society. They are easily penetrated by agents, groups and ideas from other political systems. Thus a coup detat in one political system may easily trigger coup detats by similar groups in other less

developed political systems. In some instances apparently, a regime can be overthrown by smuggling into the country. In other instances, a regime may be overthrown by the exchange of a few words and a few thousand dollars between a foreign ambassador and some disaffected colonels.

In a highly institutionalised political system, the most important positions of leadership can normally only be achieved by those who have served an apprenticeship in less important positions. The complexity of a political system contributes to its autonomy by providing a variety of organisations and positions in which individuals are prepared for highest offices. In a sense top positions of leadership are the inner core of the political system the less powerful positions, the peripheral organisations and the semi-political organisations are filters through which individuals desiring access to the core must pass. Thus the political system assimilates new social forces and new personnel without sacrificing its institutional integrity. In a political system that lacks such defences, new men, new view points, new social groups may replace each other at the core of the system with bewildering rapidity.

The AL came into being in 1949. Primarily, it was a capitalist party named the Awami Muslim League. But in 1956, by the pressure of the leftist wing of the party, it amended the name of the party and named it as the Awami League. In 1954, this party went for an election in coalition with other parties among whom there included the communist party. In 1966 Sheikh Mujib declared that the future constitution of East Pakistan would be made on the basis of 6 point and 11-point demand. It is told that the six point was the manifestation of the demands of the middle class and 11 point of the peasants, labours, etc. Thus before the independence the party became an umbrella party where each and every body could take shelter. After independence the AL was influenced by socialism and nationalised most of the big industries and tried to build a state where there would prevail the dictatorship of the proletariat. But their policies were not implemented properly because of inefficiency, dishonesty and maladministration. At last, in 1975, the party amended the state constitution introducing one party system on the basis of socialism. In this way, the party became the instrument of oppression in the hands of the ruling oligarchy. It has already been said before that when an organisation becomes the instrument of a particular group, clan or any other class, then it lacks institutionalisation.

This situation invite violence and increase flow of illegal money from inside and outside and the govt can not sustain in power peacefully. The same thing happened in 1975 to the AL. After the fall of Mujib regime the party leaders realised their set back and lost their mass support. After a long period, the AL assumed power in 1996.

In the institutionalisation process, leadership emerges. If an organisation is to get value and stability, then it has to depend upon normal leadership procedure, that is, to depend upon apprenticeship of leadership. But most of the developing political systems suffer from hereditary or dynastic rule. In Bangladesh, dynastic rule continues. Sheikh Hasina has become the P.M. of Bangladesh because her father was the founding father of Bangladesh. The same is true in case of Khaleda Zia who also became the P.M. of Bangladesh not dint of her leadership qualities, but because she was the wife of President Zia. Ziaur Rahman came to power as a result of an army coup. Primarily, he was not representing any party. But after some time, he understood that without the backing of any party no one could sustain in power for long. So, he organised a party (BNP) persuading the deserters of different parties. Zia's BNP emerged as the largest major party as an alternative to the AL. It's ideology and election manifesto were attractive to the people.

Zia achieved great success in establishing cordial relationship with foreign countries particularly with the Muslim countries of the Middle East. His Green Revolution policy was also successful though the military budget was still higher. It is said that Zia's BNP was a conglomeration of heterogeneous elements. But army was still the dominant base of support of the Zia regime. We see that the retired army officers were installed in the different big companies, in the cabinet and in different advisory bodies. After the death of Zia, the party was thrown out of power and second army rule was established in Bangladesh. After struggling for 9 years against the autocratic regime of Ershad, democracy was re-established in Bangladesh by the united movement of the political parties. Party institutionalisation could not take place because of organisational weakness. So, after assuming power the party leader became the dictator and could not manage anything properly. As a result, they were defeated in the election. So, to institutionalise an organisation, it is very necessary to develop leadership from apprenticeship.

Coherence - Disunity :

The more unified and coherent an organisation is the more highly institutionalised it is, the greater the disunity of the organisation, the less it is institutionalised. Some measure of consensus, is a prerequisite for any social group. An effective organisation requires at a minimum, substantial consensus on the functional boundaries of the group and on the procedures for resolving disputes, which come up within those boundaries.

With the assistance of the Indian govt the exile govt started the armed liberation of Bangladesh. Colonel Ataul Ghani Usmani, a former officer of the Pakistan Army, was appointed commander -in-chief of the liberation armed forces and several thousand men from the EBR and EPR who had fled to India were placed in charge of the regular units of the Mukti Bahini and a vast majority of the guerrillas were also recruited to the Mukti Bahini were students of schools, colleges and universities drawn largely from peasants, lower middle class and middle class families. Because of the massive popular support that the guerrillas received, the new recruits to the Mukti Bahini often emerged as exceedingly popular heroes in Bangladesh, with considerable political influence in local areas. This led a number of observers to fear an eventual take-over from the older AL leadership by the Liberation Armed Forces, especially in the event that Sheikh Mujibur Rahman should not return from prison. With this in mind, four chiefs of the political commandos (Tofael Ahmed, Sheikh Fazlul Haque, Serajul Alam Khan and Abdur Razzak) formed an organisation called the Mujib Bahini, to preserve the interests of Sheikh Mujib and his closest supporters. So effectively was this operation carried out that the existence of the Mujib Bahini was not even known to most other sections of the Mukti Bahini until the late summer when occasional clashes between the Mukti Bahini and the Mujib Bahini erupted."⁴ In September-October 1971, a section of the AL had reportedly tried to arrive at some sort of compromise with general Yahya Khan on the basis of an agreement that would ensure the release of Sheikh Mujibur Rahman and the autonomy of Bangladesh within the frame work of one Pakistan. After the birth of Bangladesh, factionalism within the party started when one section of the student front of the AL- the Bangladesh Chatra League openly challenged Mujibbad in May 1972 which marked the beginning of the breakup of the unity of the AL. The split in the BCL brought about the break-up of the AL Labour front and also the AL affiliated Mukti Joddha Sangsad. A separate opposition led Jatiya Mukti Joddha Sangram Parishad and a peasant

front were formed. Finally, on October 31, 1972, a new political party called Jatiya Samajtantrik Dal (JSD) was formed under the leadership of A.S.M. Abdur Rab; Major M.A. Jalil became the president of the party.

The party failed to meet the challenge of intra-party conflict. As a result, the party could not be institutionalised. After the death of Sheikh Mujib, the party was again divided for leadership. The existing leadership could not manage the situation. So, ultimately, they invited the daughter of the father of the nation as a Chairperson of the party in 1981. Since then the party is controlled by her. But this procedure was not accepted by all. So, in 1986, when Sheikh Hasina took the decision to take part in the election, then it was denounced by Dr. Kamal Hossain, a renowned member of the party and accused her for the defeat of the party in 1991. But sitting in the opposition, the party became again united and won in the election of 1996 and after that the deserters of the AL, such as the BAKSAL came back to the party. Now though there exists a few factions within the different groups of the Chatra League but centrally there exists no factionalism though it is true that all the policies of the govt are not adorable for all, but visibly, there exists no factionalism in the centre.

In the last two years of Zia's rule, despite Zia's own popular image and his call for unity the BNP "party of parties" was faced with inner party feuds. It remained divided along various lines - officials versus politicians, socialists versus non-socialists, Islamists vs secularists and freedom fighters vs non-freedom fighters. These divisions led to bitter internal factionalism, which also manifested itself in the Jatiyotabadi Chatra Dal, the student wing of the BNP. In 1979, two factions of the students' wing of the BNP fought a "gun battle" at Dhaka University. The situation had come to such a pass that the New Nation wrote:

The system - whatever it is- under which this country is said to be governed seems to be on the verge of the collapse As things deteriorate, BNP will not be able to bear the strains. Perhaps it will be destroyed by its own time bomb of greed corruption and self-advancement of its members."⁵

After the death of Zia, there created a rebel group within the BNP who challenged the leadership of the then president Sattar and Khaleda Zia was asked to take the leadership from him as he was accused by them that the party was not following the line laid down by late

president Zia and the balance between the rightist and the progressive forces had been disturbed. Begum Zia inquired of the matter and refused to have the leadership. Rather she decided to keep it to Justice Satter.

But on 1st April 1983, BNP suffered the first split. Mr. Shamsul Huda Chowdhury, Dr. Matin and Reazudin, all former ministers of BNP along with some followers held a convention to set up a separate BNP alleging that BNP was not following the policy and programme of late President. Though they formed a parallel BNP, they could not draw many followers with them. The majority stayed with the main party who had confidence on Begum Zia. The BNP suffered the second split on 6th April 1985 when Shah Aziz together with Barrister Sultanuddin, Majeedul Islam and Abdul Alim, all former ministers of BNP, left the party. In 1988, she had to deal with the then secretary general, Obaidur Rahman and Abul Hasanat and expelled them from the party. They formed a separate party. Thus this party faced split in April 1983 and in June 1985. Most of the top ranking leaders of the party deserted the party. With all these defection and termoils, Begum Zia steered the party skill fully, coolly and with single-minded determination. In spite of frequent defections from the party, it grew strength and strength, to become the forerunner of the movement, which would ultimately, toppled General Ershad.

After assuming power, BNP confronted the caretaker govt issue, but BNP was not ready to accept that proposal rather they alleged to strengthen the election commission for a free and fair election. But the opposition was very opportunist to use that option. So, they continued to create turmoils, hartals to make the govt bound to accept this issue. This issue also hampered the unity of the party. At one stage, the information Minister Barrister Nazmul Huda also supported the opposition through newspapers. He was then sacked from his post. Thus there prevailed a trend to overrule the decision of the supreme command of the party. In 1998, when the BNP decided to quite parliament demanding 4 points to ensure their right in the parliament, then another member of the parliament Major (Rd) Akterruzzaman wrote an open letter to Khaleda Zia through the news papers justifying his opinion to go back to the parliament which undermined the supreme command of the party. Thus a great lack of coherence is often seen in the BNP.

From the above discussion, it is evident that though the AL is an older party than the BNP, it failed to institutionalise itself. But it is true that in institutionalising a party, the role of the leaders, socio-economic condition of the country and autonomy of the country from outside world is very important. Leadership is an important variable for institutionalisation of political parties. Bangladesh is lacking imaginative and creative party leadership. Intra-party conflicts, factionalism and the oligarchical behaviour of the party leaders must be given up to expedite the process of party institutionalisation in Bangladesh. Not only that the existing socio-economic condition of the country sometime make the leaders bound to produce blank speech to their people. Above all, all these parties are directed by the outside world, which affects their autonomy.

The Awami League and the Bangladesh Nationalist party are the political parties, which view the political culture of the parties of this country. Though these two parties differ from their origins, ideologies & programmes etc, but none the less thus activities are similar in nature.

The AL came into being as a protest movement of the vernacular elites against the ruling elites who tried to suppress them. Their coming to power was constitutional. But after that it did not establish democracy within the party structure and its activities.

The similar things happened in the case of the BNP. It did not come to power in the constitutional way though it was the need of the time. Here we are discussing about the degree of democracy of these parties :-

Both of the parties try to suppress the opposition opinion, they never, try to think that the opposition also has a great support behind them. In 1991, though the AL could not win, but acquired more votes than the BNP. To establish the opposition rights, there are some countries in the world who shares power with govt party according to their seats won. After getting independence, the AL formed a govt by the elected persons of 1970. But there was a demand by the other parties to form a national govt representing all the parties. Because, it was the demand of the war. But this opinion was not honoured. Rather this opinion was tried to be suppressed. During Zia, a shrewd policy of 'carrot and stick' was adopted. The stick was mostly for the two uncompromising opponents of the regime, the AL and the JSD. In 1991, after winning in the election, the BNP fully forgot to execute the 5-point demand,

which was drawn during the movement against Ershad to develop a system essential for a democratic country. So, it is proved that the BNP is not sincere to develop the democratic values in the country. So, after 25 years of independence, there exist many repressive measures, which can be applied to harass any person who talks against the govt. Not only that, the BNP also ignored the majority opinion formed for a care taker govt issue. They also arranged an election in February 15, 1996 to legalise their activities against the public opinion. In 1996, after assuming power, the AL also tried to influence their opposition by developing a unanimous form of govt.

Imposition of black laws is a criterion of Bangladesh parties. It is started since the Mujib regime. His imposition of special power act was the way to harass his opposition. Since then, this law is used time to time and no party is eager to repeal this black law. In 1991, the BNP introduced an anti-terrorism act for two years. But it is told that this law was also used against their opposition.

The parties of Bangladesh are habituated in voting forgery. During Sheikh Mujib, there was no other party to vote for, but none the less, the members of the AL govt were eager to get all the seats of the parliament. So, they took coercive measures. They killed many candidates and snatched the ballot boxes from the polling booths. In 1991, it is said that irrespective of uncompromising stand of Khaleda Zia, the BNP was to be defeated for the lack of grassroots level organisations. So, they made a unholy alliance with the Jamat-e-Islam to defeat the AL. This kind of activity does not indicate a fair democratic value. The election of 15th February 1996 was also an example of unfair election. Not only that there is a tradition among the political parties to collect votes from the vote banks, capturing the polling centres by the party terrorists, or getting illegal administrative influence - etc is a common picture for Bangladeshi parties.

The parties take similar measures to suppress the opposition. They open cases against the party workers to stop their activities. It is used to limit the activities of those members. It was seen in the Zia regime, Khaleda Zia regime, Hasina regime etc.

All these parties are against the democratic values. Democracy should protect the life, liberty and property of their citizens. But they are apathetic about this. Since the Mujib regime, law

and order situation is not very improved. It is very logical that after independence, law & order situation generally deteriorates in every country. But after so many years from independence, this existing situation is not adorable. It is known to everybody that the students of Dhaka University played a great role in every crucial time. But the parties always play with their fortune. The students are given arms by them; they kill one another for their own party. But the parties do not really think of this. They take no initiative to stop all these incidents.

In a democratic organisation, nomination for creating new leader depends upon few things. Such as, candidates devotion to the party, seniority etc. But in Bangladesh, party nomination does not follow that rule. In the election of 1991, the candidates of the BNP were chosen from the wealthy applicants where the devoted workers did not get consideration. In 1996, the nomination of S.M. Kibria and Major General Nuruddin was also a draw back for democratic tradition. Dr. Alauddin and Habibur Rahman were the two eminent workers of the AL who did not get nomination from their party.

Directorship of the leaders is a common picture for Bangladeshi politics. After independence, the AL came to power. Primarily, Sheikh Mujib was the president of the Republic. But to legalise his activities, he stepped down and swore as the Prime Minister of the Republic. He had a parliament, a cabinet etc. But power was always concentrated in his hand. Indeed, the charismatic leaders are always like that. They never like to listen anything against them. As a result of saying anything against him, his four colleagues were arrested and sent to jail. To stop the leftist movement, a parallel army called "Rakhi Bahini" was introduced. But when all these attempts failed invain, then he introduced one party system where he was all in all.

Coming to power Zia consolidated his position by adopting carrot and stick policy. The stick was mostly for the two uncompromising opponents of the regime, the AL and the JSD. The leaders and workers of both these parties were put in prison. In April he forced out his chief rival, Air Vice Marshall Tawab, who had the support of the rightist forces. In July 1976, colonel Taher was executed and other top leaders of the JSD were given life term sentences in a military coup. Thus he concentrated all the power in him though he had parliament, opposition etc.

After the death of Mujib and Zia, power was transferred to their daughter and wife undemocratically irrespective of many devoted leaders. Though in both cases, a formal consent was taken from the parties. Now power is concentrated within the two leaders. In 1986, Sheikh Hasina decided to contest in the election. Though an honourable portion of the workers did not agree to this decision. They even did not know about this. But as she herself had the monopoly power, so she could implement her decision. Same thing happened in the caretaker govt issue. Most of the members of the BNP were eager to compromise with the opposition about this issue. But they did not express it as the information minister Nazmul Huda was forced to resign when he expressed his intention to talk to the opposition about this issue. It is also applicable for the AL. Here people are governed by their leader. No body is so handsome to go against the policies of their party. Because, to go against any policy of the party is to go against the party as well as to go against their leadership and thus to lose the favour of the leader. Though Major Akteruzzaman told it bravely, but there are many policies in the govt sector, which was not liked by the members of the party. But they never revolt against these policies. Kader Siddiqui was questioned by the party. But he did not get the support of the senior leaders of the party. Now his activity in the party has made limited. He has no right to talk in the party forum. Dr. Kamal was also questioned and was ultimately banished from the party. Thus party democracy was hampered. But if these parties do not maintain democracy internally, then how they will establish it in the national level.

Party council should be held once a year. But this rule is not strictly followed and though it is held sometimes, but democratic way of electing leaders is not followed. Rather the leaders are selected by the direct patronisation of the central leadership. The leaders of district and Thana level are not consulted. Not only that an inactive presidium exists in every party. Thus, this tendency of the leaders prohibits the party from institutionalisation.

But above all, "It is organization which gives birth to the domination of the elected over the electors, of the mandatories over the mandators, of the delegates over the delegators. These words first published in 1911" by Reobert Michels in his famous "Iron law of oligarchy." In political parties, Reobert Michels, then a young German sociologist, laid down what has come to be the major political argument against Rousseau's concept of direct popular democracy which under lay much of the traditional democratic and socialist theory. For Michels argued that the malfunctioning of existing democracy, in particular the domination

by the leadership over the society and popular organisations, was not primarily a phenomenon which resulted from a low level of social & economic development, inadequate education or capitalist control of the opinion forming media & other power resources, but rather was characteristic of any complex social system. Oligarchy, the control of a society or an organisation by those at the top, is an intrinsic part of bureaucracy or large-scale organisation. In this respect, Michels gave birth to his theory of organisation. According to him, "Large scale organisations give their officers a near monopoly of power".

Political parties, trade union & all other large organisation tend to develop a bureaucratic structure, that is, a system of rational organisation, hierarchically organised. The sheer problem of administration necessitates bureaucracy. As Michels stated: "It is the inevitable product of the very principle of organisation. Every party organisation, which has attained to a considerable degree of complication demands that there should be a certain number of persons who devote all their activities to the work of the party. But the price of increased bureaucracy is the concentration of power at the top and the lessening of influence by rank and file members. The leaders possess many resources, which give them an almost unsurmountable advantage over members who try to change policies. Among their assets can be counted:

- (a) Superior knowledge e.g. they are privy to much information which can be used to secure assent for their programme.
- (b) Control over the formal means of communication with the membership e.g. they dominate the organisation press; as full time salaried officials, they may travel from place to place presenting their case at the organisations expense and their position enables them to command an audience. &
- (c) Skill in the art of politics, e.g. they are far more adept than non-professionals in making speeches, writing articles & organising group activities.

The masses are incapable of taking part in the decision making process and desire strong leadership.

These occupational skills which in here in the leader's role are power assets which are further strengthened by what Michels' called the "incompetence of the masses. "Any effort to sustain membership influence requires, among other things, that the members be involved in the activities of the organisation, participating in meeting and being aware of and concerned with the major problems affecting the life of the movement. In actually, however, relatively few members attend party or union meetings. The pulls of work, family personal leisure activities & the like severely limit the amount of actual time & psychic energy which the average person may invest in membership groups of politics. The lower interest & participation are also due to the fact that the membership of any mass organisation necessarily has less education & general sophistication than the leadership.

The leaders of mass organisations are part of the dominant "political class". This does not necessarily mean that they will not continue to oppose other sections of the political elite. In order to maintain & extend influence, they must command support from a mass following. Hence they will continue to oppose other elements of the ruling strata such as business & the aristocracy. The objective, however, of the mass-based elite is to replace the power of one minority with that of another, themselves.

When faced with a threat to their authority or office from within the organisation, the leaders will become extremely aggressive & will not hesitate to undermine many democratic rights. To lose command of their organisation is to lose that which makes them important individuals and hence they are strongly motivated to preserve their position even if it requires using repressive methods. They legitimise such behaviour by pointing out that a mass organisation is inevitably an organisation maintaining itself by its struggle with powerful and evil opponents. Therefore all efforts to introduce factionalism into the organisation to challenge the appropriateness of party or organisation policy, result in aid and comfort to its enemies. Serious criticism of the leadership is thus defined as treachery to the organisation itself.

Discussing all these, it can be said that the parties of Bangladesh are not democratic in nature. Indeed, democracy can not be imposed from above. It must grow from within. Democratic institutions can emerge only from a society, which is also democratic. Democracy can flourish in a society if the families cultivate democratic values and behaviour. It is said that family is a state writ large. Whatever we learn in our family will be reflected in the larger arena of our social and political life. What I would like to emphasise is that socialisation and upbringing in the family will mould our future behaviour and attitude. That is, if the family is democratic, then our social and political institutions will tend to be democratic. If the family structure and behaviour are autocratic, then the institutional behaviour can not be expected to be democratic. In fact as our families are autocratic, so our people as well as our leaders are found to be autocratic in nature. In another way, Robert Michels invented that the leader of a bureaucratic organisation is inevitably autocratic. Their quality and supremacy made them autocratic. Thus oligarchial tendencies tend to operate in each and every large-scale organisation. However, political parties & party leaders in the developed societies are found to be less autocratic and oligarchic in their social & political behaviour. This is because, the family and social environment in those countries are found to be more democratic.

FOOT NOTES

1. Huntington, S.P. "*Political Order in Changing Societies*", (New Heaven : Yale University Press, 1964.) P.P-12-24
2. H. Starbuck, William "*Organisational Growth and Development.*" (Chicago Rand, McNally, 1965) P.453.
3. Aristotle, "*Politics*" (Translated, Ernest Barker, Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1946) P-254.
4. This paragraph is based on interviews with several members of the Mujib Bahini in March 1972.
5. *Asia Research Bulletin No.3, Monthly Political Supplement* (August 31st 1981) P-837.

Chapter - V

Profile of Support base :

In all countries, each political party has its own distinct support base, which influences its entire working pattern. Some depend for their support on the middle classes, others on labourers and proletariat while there are those which are supported by peasants or even by various social and religious groups.

In all modern complex societies, there is a close relationship between political organization and social forces. Such forces may be ethnic, religious, linguistic or economic. In a modern political system, groups are the basic actors and a political system is the result of the process of group interaction.”¹ In a way, most least developed countries may be termed as multi-class societies, where divisions exist at all levels. These cleavages are reflected in the social behaviour of individual and the political behaviour of groups. In every complex multi-class society, some sections are more privileged and rich than others. There are those who are better educated while others are illiterate. Some occupational groups carry a lot of prestige while others do not. Generally it is the better educated who are engaged in prestigious professions and economically prosperous and are more likely to participate actively in politics.² In other words, social and economic factors seem to determine political attitudes. In the United States of America, for example, those with higher income tend to be Republicans while those in the lower income groups tend to be Democrats.”³ Political attitudes and behaviour are thus influenced by social, economic and educational factors. It has also been observed that lawyers in the higher income group are known to participate more actively in politics than those in other professions. In the new states, active engagement in political movements is an important factor for leadership.

Those in the more lucrative occupations like businessman-industrialists; doctors, engineers, journalists and professors are better placed to participate in politics than a factory worker or a

former. Leaders therefore tend to come from the prestigious professions and the upper classes.

Politics in Bangladesh is no different in this respect that in other new states. In Bangladesh the most important differences are those between the rich and the poor, the literate and the illiterate, the urban and the rural. In addition, there are important religious differences. About 78% percent of Bangladeshis live in rural areas while 22% percent are in urban centres. Of the rural population 80% percent are employed in agriculture, the rest are petty shopkeepers, school teachers and other low income professionals. About 36% percent of the people are educated, the most highly educated are generally westernized. 85.5% percent are Muslims and 13.5% percent are Hindus. Some believe in secularism and others are fundamentalists. In short, the composition of Bangladesh society may be said to be multi-dimensional, although population in terms of language, is overwhelmingly homogeneous, while ethnically, language, caste, tribe constitute the major divisions in other South Asian countries, religious and class can be described as the two main sources of fission in Bangladesh society of politics. ⁴

Strategy of Recruitment. (The Awami League) :

The formation of the Awami League provided a political platform for the rising intermediate class. However, its followers still lacked a political issue which could clearly, “set them apart from the ruling elite and could mobilize mass support behind them. ⁵ In the 1950’S, the political front of the intermediate class in East Pakistan, i.e. the AL rapidly gained popularity in the province but in 1958, Martial law was promulgated, all political activities were banned for four years until 1962. Sheikh Mujibur Rahmna, general secretary of the AL, took the initiative in rebuilding the party in early 1964, by that time Suhrawardy had died and the restrictions on political activities had been lifted. He was convinced that the surplus farmers in the rural areas and the professionals, intellectuals and students in the urban areas would, in order to acquire control over the instruments of patronage, identify themselves with the nationalist elements of the Awami League. Mujibur Rahman, therefore, revived the Awami League in 1964, but soon found that, while the petty bourgeoisie cadres were adequate for “winning elections.” they were unwilling to withstand a more fundamental confrontation.”⁶

This made him conscious of the need for mobilizing the peasants and workers behind the slogans of "Bengali Nationalism". It was at this stage that Mujib came up with the six-point demand – "Charter of Survival Program" for East Pakistan, which he announced at a national conference of opposition parties held in Lahore on February 5, 1966. The six point demand aroused mass consciousness sharply in East Pakistan as mass meetings and rallies were held throughout the province. All these activities helped to rejuvenate the moribund party organisation of the Awami League." The Awami League persisted with its movement for the implementation of the six points. Finally, Sheikh Mujib along with 35 associates were arrested on the charge of conspiring to bring about the secession of East Pakistan from Pakistan through an armed revolt with Indian help."⁷The arrest of Mujib enhanced his popularity to such an extent that he soon became the symbol of Bengali nationalism. On the other hand the conspiracy case against Mujib and his associates, made for an explosive political situation in East Pakistan. Many of the opposition political parties joined the six point movement and set up a new political group, the Democratic Action Committee (DAC). The various student organizations also united to form an all parties Student Action Committee (SAC) and demanded the release of Mujib. The SAC adopted an eleven-point-program incorporating, in addition to the six points, some radical proposals.⁸

Along with the growing popular movement of the opposition forces in East Pakistan, violent agitation also broke out in West Pakistan on the issue of Tashkent Agreement in 1966. The peasants, workers and middle classes joined in these movements as they were alienated from the regime because of deterioration in their standards of living. In the face of the strong popular movement in East Pakistan..... Ayub had no choice but to resign & to release sheikh Mujib and other political detainees."⁹

Soon after Yahya Khan's announcement on the elections, the AL issued its election manifesto, which incorporated the demands included in the six point and eleven point programs. In order to pre-empt the attraction of the leftists workers and peasants, the manifesto pledged the nationalization of heavy industries and financial institutions and workers' participation "in the equity capital as well as in the management of the enterprises.

¹⁰ Due to the appeal of its political program to various sections of the community and the growing popularity of Mujib, the Awami League won a massive victory in the 1970 elections, obtaining 167 out of 169 seats allocated to East Pakistan in the National Assembly and 288 out of 300 seats in the provincial Assembly of East Pakistan."¹¹

Burial of Support base:

Soon after independence, a presidential order was issued which empowered the president to dismiss any bureaucrat from office and stipulated such a termination order could not be challenged in a court of law. Subsequently 53 senior civil bureaucrats were fired from their jobs in January 1972.¹² Later two broad measures-constitutional & reformative - were adopted to reduce the powers & privileges of the existing civil bureaucrats.

Not only did the state reduce the power and position of the civil bureaucracy, but it also adopted policies which affected adversely the position of the military bureaucracy in Bangladesh. Two major steps, the relative reduction of defense expenditures in the budget and the formation of a parallel para military force-were taken in this respect. The military services were, in fact, in total disarray at independence. The Pakistani Army, before its surrender, had destroyed most of the arms and ammunition, while the military training institutions had collapsed earlier during the liberation war.

After independence, no definite or effective measures were taken to rebuild the military institutions because the state gave priority to social reconstruction. While the state practically stopped recruitment to the armed forces, many of the senior officers, recruited during United Pakistan, were removed from office. In order to stop new recruitment and purchase of arms from foreign countries, the state provided only a marginal allocation for defense in the national budget. The second measure for weakening the power of the military bureaucracy was the establishment of a new militia - the Jatio Rakkhi Bahini (National security force) formed as a parallel organisation to the army. In 1974 the total strength of the Bahini was about 20,000; which was expected to be raised to 130,000 by 1980. Indeed, a considerable part of the defence expenditure was allocated to the improvement of the Rakkhi Bahini. So, the bureaucracy both civil and military went against the regime soon after their assumption of power.

The regime was also challenged by the students. The Bangladesh Chatra League (BCL) openly challenged Mujibbaa in May 1972, which marked the beginning of the break up of the

unity of the ruling party. Four student leaders -A.S.M. Abdur Rab, Sahjahan Seraj, Nur-E-Alam Siddiqui and Abdul Quddus Makhan widely known as "Char Khatifa" have dominated the BCL in the late 1960'S. Rab and Siraj were interested in the establishment of an independent socialist Bangladesh." ¹³ through armed revolution. Siddiqui and Makhan on the other hand, believed in achieving independence through parliamentary means. The preliberation "latent" conflict within the BCL became "manifest" within six months after the independence of Bangladesh. The BCL split into pro-Mujibbad group (Siddiqui-Makhan) and an anti Mujibbad group claiming that the Mujibbad was a utopian concept" and that the socio-economic and political conditions in Bangladesh could be changed only through the establishment of scientific socialism. Thus a great number of student went against the party.

The split in the BCL brought about the break up of the AL labour front and also the AL affiliated Mukti-Joddha Sangsad. A separate opposition led Jatiya Mukti Joddha Sangram Parishad and a peasant front were also formed. The Mujibbad ideology was also strongly denounced by the veteran political leader Maulana Abdul Hamid Khan Bhasani, who organized a number of mass meeting against the regimed on the basis of a 15 point demand. He also persuaded six open opposition parties to form a united front. Many of his demands created popular sentiment. Opinion raised again the unfairness of the election held in 1973. The opposition leaders claimed that the election was unfair because many opposition candidates had not been able to file nomination papers, they had allegedly been kidnapped by AL workers and kept confined until the deadline for filing nomination papers was over."¹⁴

The underground revolutionary parties usually attacked the houses of rich peasants occupied their paddy fields and distributed rice and other crops among the landless people. According to one report "the villagers are passing sleepless nights being afraid of decoits and miscreants" and that Bengali villages had become looters "paradise"¹⁵. It is said that people can forgive the killer of their fathers but not the snatchers of their wealth." In response to the challenge the regime took so many measures, all of whom reached in vain. As a result people became dipressed about the regime.

The industrial policy of the regime such as nationalization of major industries, bank and insurance companies and the imposition of ceilings on private investment and land holdings patently could not have been designed for the purpose of serving the interests of the

bourgeoisie and landlords. In fact the indigenous bourgeoisie in Bangladesh was weak. Since the bourgeoisie in Bangladesh was kept under developed by the British and later by the Pakistanis, no strong indigenous bourgeoisie developed in Bangladesh. Even those who were emerging as big businessmen in the late 1960's were not given opportunities to expand their assets during the Mujib period. Through the implementation of the above measures, indeed, the state intended precisely to weaken the power base of the emerging upper bourgeoisie in Bangladesh. So, the bourgeoisie were not happy with the regime. Because these bourgeoisie supported the 6-points movement as they were deprived from their due share under Pakistan rule. But after independence they did not acquire it due to the policy of the regime.

Not only that the state failed to keep its pre-liberation promises, which created a tremendous gap between "expectations and achievements". The non availability of essential commodities, the soaring price level, the allegations of corruption, favouritism, and nepotism in the ruling party and the charges about Indo-Soviet in Bangladesh - also decreased the support of the regime among the people.

Lastly, the formation of BAKSAL was a sudden blow in the wishes of the people. Because, the people of this country had a long struggle for parliamentary democracy. So, to go against this view is to go against the expectations of the people. The establishment of BAKSAL was hailed by the NAP (M) and CPB; both viewed the constitutional changes as marking an end to "the era of bourgeoisie parliamentary democracy & a step forward to the real democracy of the exploited masses."¹⁶ But none of the other opposition parties either welcomed or joined BAKSAL. Thus the support base which was made by 22 years, was demolished within 3.5 years.

Strategy of recruitment (The Bangladesh Nationalist Party):

The "scpoys revolt" reinstated Major General Ziaur Rahman as the Chief of Staff of the Bangladesh Army. Justice A.S.M. Sayem, who had been appointed earlier by Khaled Musharaf, continued both as President & Chief Martial Law Administrator. During the first few months, without taking formal leadership of the state, Zia ruled the country through

martial law regulations, remaining in the background as the Deputy Chief Martial Law Administrator. On April 1, 1977. Zia took over the presidency, forcing Sayem to resign on grounds of ill health, and retaining his position as Chief Martial law Administrator and Commander-in Chief of the armed forces. After his assumption of the Presidency, Zia slowly and steadily built the support base for him as well as for his newly built party.

From the very beginning, Zia was trying to solve the problems faced by the people of this country. There was a great confusion about the four fundamental principles of the constitution of 1972. Zia brought necessary changes in the constitution by amendments. So he amended the constitution by changing 'Bangali' as 'Bangladeshi' which emphasized territorial nationality rather than ethnic identity, because, there were Bengali in the neighbouring country also. He dropped the word 'secularism' which was meant by most of the religious people as 'absence of religion' asserting "absolute trust and faith in Almighty Allah". He also envisaged the consolidation, preservation and strong fraternal relations among Muslim countries based on Islamic Solidarity. The articles and clauses underlining the commitment of the state to establish 'socialism' were also deleted. As the people were already been apathetic about this. Rather the term was redefined as economic and social justice. Article 42 of the constitution, which had empowered the state to acquire and nationalize property "with or without compensation." was amended to read "with compensation only".

Zia came to power when the people were suffering from grave economic crisis. So, he brought about a radical change in its economic policy. To help the vernacular businessmen, he encouraged private enterprise; emphasising export oriented industry and promoting a high rate of production. The primary goal of the strategy was to maximise GNP growth rate through all out encouragement of the private sector. Thus he created the support of the businessmen behind him. As the overall policy of economic development of the state under Zia achieved a high rate of growth through a "pure growth" strategy.

If one looks at agricultural and industrial production, there was a significant increase after 1975. While rice production was 11.32 million tons in 1974-75, it rose to 13.55 million tons in 1979-80. More spectacularly, production of wheat, another basic food, rose from 1.6 million tons in 1974 -75 to 8.10 million tons in 1979-80. The index for industrial production

which stood at 81 in 1972-73. (Base: 1969-70=100) reached the pre-independence level in 1976-77 and advanced to 108 in 1978-79. Jute production, which stood at 450,000 tons in 1974-75, rose to 522,000 tons in 1979-80 amount production rose from 136,000 tons in 1974-75 to 3,43,000 tons in 1979-80. Steel ingots production reached 1,33,000 tons in 1979-80 from only 49,000 tons in 1974 -75.

“The quick achievement of a higher rate of growth is considered essential for the survival and stability of the country as well as for gaining political legitimacy for the regime” The development strategy of Zia’s regime resulted in respectable economic growth. So, his regime got acceptance to the people.

He was the only President who travelled extensively from one part of the country to another part and worked a lot with the villagers. Thus he created for him as well as for the BNP a continuous support among the villagers. “This in turn helped to recruit support and broaden its base all over the country so that it represented all sections of the people. The leadership style of Zia helped to strengthen the base of the BNP. Zia often used to talk directly with rural people on order to get himself acquainted with their problems. Sometimes he joined them in manual labour such as the digging of canals. His frequent tours of the rural areas made the people feel that he was one of them and his govt was their own. The rural masses also felt for the first time that the man at the top, was really concerned about their development.”¹⁷ The gap that usually exists between the masses and the govt at the top may thus be said to have been narrowed by president Zia’s personal efforts. The rural masses, therefore, supported the BNP and its programmes as they identified themselves with its leader.

One of the most powerful and effective political forces in Bangladesh are students. They may be called the vanguard of all political movements in the country. It has been proved in the history of Bangladesh that no political party could survive without students support. After prolonged discussions within the party, it was decided to form a student wing called Jatiyatabadi Chatra Dal. They organized its branches in all Universities and Colleges.

The labour force in Bangladesh was organized and the BNP extend its support base in this sector through the Jatiyatabadi Shramik Dal. The Shramik Dal established its branches in all working class units.

Recognising the importance of women in national development, Zia was committed to improve their social position. He reserved 30 seats for them in parliament as well as 10 percent of govt jobs. This policy attracted many women to join the party. In addition, the govt sponsored Bangladesh Mahila Sangstha of which branches were established in all 470 thanas of Bangladesh. The Bangladesh Mahila Sambaya Samity with about one lac members and the National Women's Federation with about 25 affiliated bodies were also closely associated with the social, economic & political activities of the BNP. All of these organizations contributed to the mobilization of whom were involved in electioneering, worked actively to build a strong base for the BNP."¹⁸

In order to restore the position of the bureaucracy, he first abolished presidential order No. 9 of 1972, which had provided for dismissal of officials without showing cause. Furthermore, those bureaucrats who had lost their jobs under this order after liberation were allowed to appeal their cases. The defense budget was immediately revised upwards, with the original allocation raised from Tk. 750 million to Tk. 1109.34 million. In subsequent years, the defense budget was increased further.

During the general elections held in 1978, 1979 and 1981 a majority of lawyers in the district and sub-divisional towns backed the BNP candidates."¹⁹ Among other professional groups large number of university, college & school teachers extended their support to the BNP."²⁰ This line was followed by journalists. During BAKSAL rule, there were only four daily news papers, while about 400, including daily's weekly's and other periodicals, were brought out during the BNP rule. They helped to promote the image and popularity of president Zia and the BNP."²¹

The Hindu minority in Bangladesh generally cast its vote as a group. It has also been reported that Hindus voted for the AL primarily on account of its secular ideology and its foreign policy stance of promoting friendly relations with India. This attitude partially changed during Zia. He attempted to attract large number of Hindu Leaders and groups to his party.

As a result, the Bangladesh Jatiya Hindu Parishad, sponsored by the BNP, came into existence in 1980. President Zia also patronized Bangladesh Hindu Jubo Kallyan Sangsad and Bangladesh Scheduled Caste Community worked for the victory of the BNP candidate Justice Abdus Sattar”²² According to one source, 25% of Hindus voted for the BNP candidate.”²³

It may be summarised that the BNP’s support base was not confined to a single class or group. It attracted every class of people of the society.

With the assassination of president Zia in May 1981 and the army intervention in politics, the two parties again began to broaden their support base. For legitimization, there were held many elections. But none of them were considered free and fair. So, the opposition political parties demanded a free and fair election under a neutral authority. During this time, the movement against Ershad was only the issue to win the people. But the AL suddenly changed the track by joining in the election with Erashad. They had the rational for going in the election to create the way of protesting from inside and outside the parliament. But the general people could not expect it; rather they considered it as farce against the desire of the people. Dr. Kamal Hossain, ex-member of the presidium of the AL central Committee addressed a letter to Sheikh Hasina detailing what he considered to be the reasons of losing their previous support base which they earned during the movement against the Ershad regime and by the incident occurred on the 15th August 1975.

While there was vote decoity and media coup were done by the govt during the 1986 election, AL could not utilise this opportunity and resign against the regime but showed weakness and vacillation. This surprised the workers of the AL as well as most people in the country. According to them, effective movement then by Awami League, could have brought the down fall of the Ershad regime and bring credit to the party there by.

On 24th January 1988 in the Chittagong meeting of the AL, Ershad regime indiscriminately opened fire killing a number of people. This created a big sensation in the county and there were protests all over the country by all parties. A programme was announced to bring out a silent procession to show respect to the martyrs on that occasion from the central Shahid Minar on January 27th. On that day, people of all sections irrespective of party affiliation had assembled at the Shahid Minar to participate in the rally. People in general throughout the

country had hoped that both Begum Zia and Sheikh Hasian would be present there on the same platform to address the people and would jointly lead the procession. In spite of repeated announcements by Awami League, organizers about the arrival of their leader, Sheikh Hasina did not come to the Shahid Minar. Begum Zia attended the rally, led the mammoth procession and won a remarkable political victory over Sheikh Hasina who suffered a great loss of esteem on that occasion raised the question of her sincerity regarding the movement against Ershad. Not only that there were so many occasions when Sheikh Hasina refused to work unitedly to bring down the fall of Ershad regime. This also created a bad impression about the AL, about their intention that they are more interested to serve their interest rather to serve the state. So, they did not want to share any credit with the BNP, rather they preferred to compromise with Ershad.

Due to lack of proper leadership, guidance and support to the proper groups of the students wing of the party vis-a-vis undue patronisation of their rival wings, the student wing of the Awami League throughout the country became weak. The BNP student front captured most of the university and college student bodies by convincing victory against the student wing of the AL.

After the fall of Ershad, Awami League election propaganda attached its importance more to preach malice against Zia and less importance to its future programme of action for lacking the problems of the country. In their election meetings, AL equated Zia period with the period of Ershad which was not at all convincing to the general mass of the country. People were not ready to be convinced with those words, rather they were aware about the difference of the two periods.

Sheikh Hasina campaigned for reintroduction of the 1972 constitution and the four basic principles, which included secularism. She laboured hard to explain in many meetings that secularism does not mean absence of religion. Majority of the people of Bangladesh are religious minded. Though people of this country in practice not bigoted to many of them, however secularism as a state principle has little appeal. On the other hand secularism is sometimes meant as absence of religion. They were alarmed that if secularism was introduced, the word "Bismuillah" (In the name of God) incorporated by late President Ziaur

Rahman in the constitution would be abolished. Most of the parties contesting in the election reinforced this alarm through their propaganda.

Till the election of 1991, AL could not come out of its stigma of being a pro-Indian party. But quite a large number of people tend to have this impression whether there is any basis or not for such impression. Many political observers commented that her speech over the television that evening which was full of aggression and malice, reduced her party's vote at least by 10 percent. Both Tofael Ahmed and Razzaque commented that Sheikh Hasina's pre-election T.V. address created an adverse reaction in the minds of voters. Syed Altaf Hossain of NAP expressed that vanity was the cause of defeat of Awami League in the election. Saifuddin Ahmed Manik, General Secretary, Bangladesh communist party also echoed the same sentiment.

On the other hand, the BNP could rebuild their support base during the movement against Ershad through the leader of Khaleda Zia. They can be discussed as bellow :-

The BNP could attract larger younger group and the student force in its side than the AL. The student force appreciated the uncompromising stand of Begum Zia in her long years of struggle against the autocratic regime of Ershad, while AL's participation in the 1986 election was not appreciated by the majority of the students and the people. Though Sheikh Hasina had been claiming that her party's participation in that election was a strategy to continue the movement against the regime both inside the parliament and on the streets, many people were not convinced. She had finally to revert to the politics of the street, which Begum Zia was all the time continuing. Begum Zia's stand in this regard proved to be more pragmatic.

Moreover, the new generation had not seen the days of Sheikh Mujib and his dynamic and charismatic politics and leadership. The young generation between the age of 21-25 years were too junior to understand and appreciate politics of the Mujib period. The junior group of 1973-95 is the real young group of today. They had seen President Ziaur Rahman and appreciated his integrity; simple living, hard work and mass contact tours and still remember those with appreciation. Moreover, they are more influenced by the present performance of the leaders.

People in this country go for hero worship, Begum Zia's uncompromising attitude, her relentless struggle and her challenge to the autocratic regime of Ershad earned for her a deep respect and love of people. She won the halo of a hero. During her public meetings throughout her political career, specially during the election campaign, she refrained from expressing personal malice against the leaders of her rival parties. She explained forcefully the ills of the Ershad regime and gave positive programmes basing on the 19-point programme of her late husband Ziaur Rahman. She addressed meeting after meetings tirelessly explaining the stand of her party and promising what she would do if elected to power. Many political observers commented that her speech over the television that evening brought her more than 10 percent additional votes.

Thus in 1991, through the election of 1991, there created a clear support base for the AL and the BNP. But by 1996, this support base again changed because, the BNP was failed to satisfy the people belonging to its support base. This was the first time when voters turn out was about 73% which was 55.35% in 1991. So, through this, it can be easily thought that people are more conscious than before.

The causes of the change is alarming for the BNP and is discussed bellow: -

According to the weekly "Robber" the as usual anti Indian stand did not attract the people as they are now more pragmatic than before.

Historically and organizationally, BNP was a weaker party compared to AL. BNP was founded only 12 years ago from a position of power. Unlike the AL, it has no grassroots organization. After 1991, they were not able to build any such organization as the opposition political parties were not co-operative in accomplishing this work. Thus there created a distance with the people.

Fifteen ministers of Khaleda Zia cabinet were defeated. They did not go to the people for vote. Because, they were over confident about their performance and they were thinking that people has rejected the AL and will never accompany them. But they never thought about the Major election when the BNP was banished from Dhaka and Chittagong.

It is their bad luck that they could not satisfy any professional class. Specially, the media was deadly against them. They published each and every news with exaggeration.

But it is true that there were many failures in their performance. As they came to power after mass upheaval. So, the people expected much from that govt. The same thing happened after independence when the govt could not fulfil their expectation.

The opposition accused them that they are not sincere to demonstrate the joint declaration of the three alliances. They highlighted it to the middle class and the middle class were not happy with this. Because, this declaration was held to Promote and protect democracy. Democracy was not secured in this country ever and it was the first time when the political parties agreed to take some measures to ensure democracy in this country. Not only that the failure of the home minister to eradicate terrorism, existing fertilizer crisis, Yeasmin killing also disappointed the people.

The BNP could not get absolute majority in the parliament. They formed the govt. with the help of the Jamat-E-Islami. With this, they had to face many by-elections where the 2nd candidate was stronger than the BNP candidate. So, to win in the election and for the sustainment of the govt, they adopted unfair means in the elections. The opposition political parties reacted deadly against this and demanded to hold election under a caretaker govt. But as it was a new concept and beyond the constitutional rules, so, the BNP was reluctant to accept it. But due to over publicity of the matter, this subject got publicity. As a result, the BNP had to lose a great support from them.

On the other hand, the AL keeps no stone unturned to win the people. They availed of all the chances. Their Mayor used their word commissioners to mobilize the people in favour of them. They could use the caretaker govt issue very successfully. They could make the people understand about its need in the contact vote rigging during the past regimes.

The manifesto of the AL had a clear direction for running the country well where the BNP showed a great failure. They also requested the people to forget and forgive their past failure. The Awami League was able to overcome its past legacy of misgovernance by adopting new election strategy. Sheikh Hasina successfully exploited the sentiment and sympathy of the

common people by her emotional appeal to give her a chance to serve the country. She also effectively used religion to win over the heart of the people.

Indeed, the BNP could not satisfy the people. Due to arrogance and over confidence about mass popularity, the voters switched over to the AL. The voters also needed a change

Profile of support base (II) :

Though the AL and the BNP are the two most important parties of Bangladesh, but their representation is not similar all over the country. Their appeal varies from time to time, division to division and place to place.

Table - 1.

DIVISIONS	SEATS	AL		BNP	
		1996	1991	1996	1991
RAJSHAHI	72	18	16	32	26
KHULNA	37	22	15	12	14
BARISAL	23	11	11	5	7
DHAKA	90	59	27	30	56
SYLHET	19	13	7	3	1
CHITTAGONG	59	23	12	34	36
	300	146	88	116	140

Comparing the results of 1991 & 1996, it had been seen that the AL could not do much better than the BNP though the BNP had a lot of misrule, maladministration during their time. But it is true that they did not get enough time to prove their utility to the people. But none the less, the BNP got only a few seats less than 1991 and the party did not get mandate from Dhaka. Because the people of Bangladesh are poor, mostly illiterate. They are not concerned about day to day incidence of the political arena. They finish their duty by giving their votes only. Sometimes they are more interested in local politics. The middle class people, who are the driving force of politics, mainly placed in Dhaka and they warned the BNP in the Mayor election. But the BNP was quite confident about their performance and could not realise the consequences.

But there are some constituencies where the BNP candidates were defeated by minor votes in the election of 1996. So, in those places the result can be changed. The following tables are the embodiment of the statement.

Table-2

There are some constituencies where the candidates were defeated by minor votes. So, in those places the result can be changed very soon.

Table-2 (A)
Upto to 500 votes

Sl.No.	Constituency	Party 1996	Votes polled	Diff.	Party 1991
1.	Patuakhali-2	AL BNP	45937 45913	24	AL IND
2.	78 Kushtia-4	BNP AL	55,871 55,510	361	AL JI
3.	253 Comilla-6	AL BNP	37090 36724	366	IND AL
4.	264 Chandpur-5	AL BNP	62,309 61,895	414	BNP IND

So, the party should care of these constituency as it can be lost at any time.

Table-2 (B)
Upto-501-1000 votes

Sl. No.	constituency	Party 1996	Votes polled	Diff	Party 1991
1.	210 Faridpur-2	BNP AL	55118 54572	546	AL BNP
2.	203 Narayanganj-2	AL BNP	58,947 58,388	559	BNP IND
3.	228 sylhet-1	AL BNP	59710 58990	720	BNP AL
4.	67 Sirajganj-7	BNP AL	58023 530726	951	BNP AL

Table-2(C)

Upto-1001-1500 votes

Sl. No.	constituency	Party 1996	Votes polled	Diff	Party 1991
1.	80 Chuadanga-2	BNP AL	64755 63732	1023	JI BNP
2.	200 Narsingdi-4	AL BNP	78723 77620	1103	BNP AL
3.	231 Sylhet-4	BNP AL	23946 22725	1221	AL BNP
4.	59 Natore-3	BNP AL	43162 41718	1444	JI AL
5.	223 Sunamganj	AL BNP	68787 67312	1475	CPB JSD

Table - 2(D)

Upto 1500 to 2000 votes

Sl. No.	constituency	Party 1996	Votes polled	Diff	Party 1991
1.	69 Pabna-2	AI BNP	67250 65745	1505	BNP AL
2.	100 Khulna-2	BNP AL	56306 54778	1528	BNP AL
3.	101 Khuna-3	AL BNP	39332 37780	1552	BNP AL
4.	2 Panchagar-2	BNP AL	48534 46815	1719	CPB JP
5.	226 Sunamganj-4	BNP AL	36155 34360	1795	AL BNP
6.	8 Dinajpur-3	BNP AL	51802 59857	1945	BKSL JP
7.	138 Tangail-6	BNP AL	34279 32329	1950	BNP AL

Table -2(E)

Upto 2001 to 2500 votes

Sl. No.	constituency	Party 1996	Votes polled	Diff	Party 1991
1.	121 Barisal-1	AL BNP	52418 50125	2293	AI BNP
2.	186 Dhaka-7	BNP AL	87255 84940	2315	BNP AL
3.	117 Bhola-1	AL BNP	50099 48757	2342	AI JP
4.	102 Khulna-4	AL BNP	59566 57221	2345	AL BNP
5.	280 Chittagong-2	AI BNP	45478 43121	2357	BNP AL
6.	108 Sat Khira-4	BNP AL	46730 44272	2458	AL JI

Table -2(F)

Upto 2501 to 3000 votes

Sl. No.	constituency	Party 1996	Votes polled	Diff	Party 1991
1.	153 Mymensingh-5	BNP AL	48330 45706	2624	BNP AL
2.	66 Sirajgaon-6	AI BNP	29592 26855	2737	BNP AL
3.	170 Kishoregonj-6	BNP AL	47176 44261	2915	BNP AL

According to the previous discussion it is evident that the people of Bangladesh belong to the subject political culture. So, they generally do not react at any occurrence. But if they are organised once then they can work collectively. The AL could come to power due to their party's strategy. But in the above showed constituencies, they can lose their seat any time and

in this way, they may have to sacrifice their long awaited power, if they do not be conscious about this. Not only that, it is also true that Begum Khaleda Zia is more popular than Sheikh Hasina. According to Table -3 shown bellow: -

TABLE -3

SI NO	CONSTITUENCY	NAME OF THE CANDIDATE	PARTY NAME	TOTAL VOTES	VOTE CAST	VOTES SECURED
1	41-BOGRA-6	BEGUM KHALEDA ZIA	BNP	292,322	232,075	136,669
2	184 DHAKA-5	A K M RAHAMATULLAH	AL	388,002	278,939	132,443
3	190 DHAKA-11	KAMAL AHMED MAZUMDAR	AL	393,155	270,507	128,766
4	182 DHAKA-3	AMANULLAH AMAN	BNP	273,010	207,128	124,096
5	214 GOPALGONJ-1	FARUQ KHAN	AL	186,212	137,553	119,536
6	286 CHITTAGONG-8	AMIR KHASRU MAHMUD CHY	BNP	344,128	247,377	116,547
7	215 GOPALGONJ-2	SHEIKH FAZLUL KARIM SALIM	AL	175,493	133,275	115,032
8	53 RAJSHAHI-2	KABIR HOSSAIN	BNP	285,122	246,606	108,471
9	53 RANGPUR-3	HOSSAIN MOHAMMAD ERSHAD	JP	217,141	151,390	105,590
10	48 NAOGAON-3	M AKHTER HAMID SIDDIQUI	BNP	237,856	203,223	105,225

Profile of support base:(iii)

Who supported which parties under what socio-economic trademark in the elections, is an important thing. Support is significantly affected in terms of occupation, income, education and residential status. Our purpose is only to draw a broad hint about the characteristics of the support base of the political parties in a typological manner worked out in the different tables. It is evident that the Awami League has an average support of 46.51 percent of our entire

responding sampling universe. It is obvious that the Awami League support palpably cut across all sections of the country. The BNP, which is next in line in the race for electoral support, has an average electoral support of 41.86 percent mainly extracted from the student community and appreciably from businessmen and housewives.

What is striking is that the number of party 'regulars' retained in the Awami League is sizeable than any other parties and the percentage of 'regulars' coming from different social groups is still huge. Because, it is an old party and as well as it has a grassroots organization. On the other hand, the BNP is a relatively a new party and was born from the armed forces. So, it is always suffering from a constitutional crisis and a great number of professionals and service holders could not support it. It is basically a party of 'converts' 'renegades' and erstwhile Mavericks. Most of the leaders and rank and file of the BNP were former Awami Leaguers, or army officers. The student class is the main power for the BNP. This is significant in the sense that the student community who had played the role of the Prometheus unbound earlier and happened to be crusaders for socio-political reform had not yet shown a clean pair of heels from the AL. None the less, the AL came out successful in 1996.

Age :

The Awami League scored lesser success within the age group e.g 18 to 25 and 46 to 55 in contrast to the remaining age groups where it fared much better. On the other hand, the BNP has a great lack in the age group of 36 to 45 years.

Significantly, the youth components of the country particularly the student community, with which the AL had the closest contact in the pre-independence days, were by and large, became a thing of the past in the post independence period. However, the decline in youth support was not so alarming for the party as it has still an impressive chunk of support among the middle age group.

In Bangladesh, the age group between 18 to 35 are in their highest numbers. Hence, in each coming election the youth components play a decisive role in the future party patterns of the country. But it is hopeful that their popularity is increasing day by day. The alienation which

they created in the post independence periods, now it is more or less covering very quickly. Basically in 36 to 45 age group, there exists mainly the freedom fighters and they are the utmost supporters of the AL. On the other hand, in the other groups of people, there prevails a dual perception among the people. They always think about their gain. They often shift from one party to another as they are the experienced groups. They want to depend on one party, but as no party can make them happy, so, often they are to move from that party.

Percentage distribution of support of political parties by age groups

Year - 1996

N-172

Age Group	AL	%	BNP	%	Others	%	Non	%
18-25	18	22.5%	24	33.33%	3	23.07%	1	14.29%
26-35	26	32.5%	22	30.56%	4	30.77%	2	28.57%
36-45	20	25.0%	9	12.50%	2	15.38%	0	-
46-55	8	10.0%	9	12.5%	3	23.08%	3	42.86%
56-65	4	5.05%	4	5.56%	0	-	0	-
66 & above	4	5.0%	4	5.56%	1	7.69%	1	14.28%
	80		72		13		7	

Income :

The act of choices in party and voting behaviour, by and large, to be influenced by the financial status of the respective social groups comprising the electorate. Here the AL succeeded in obtaining the average support of all income groups in the inverted pyramidal structure of income groups. It is located its apex of support at the lowest income groups, where as the BNP recruited its adherents from among the higher income brackets.

Bangladesh is a poor and village oriented country where 47% people are living under poverty level. They are poor, educationally backward and politically unconscious. They are conveying their fore fathers opinion till now. As the AL was away from power for long, so, they could not patronize any of the income groups. None the less, they are not deprived from the patronization of all income groups, though it is sure that the AL has lesser support in the

middle income group. But for the BNP, it is very necessary to win the poor people, because, Bangladesh is a poor country and the major portion of the people are poor. So, to get a handsome number of population with them, it is necessary to revise their policy by fostering the lower income group.

Percentage distribution of support of political parties by income groups.

Year 1996

N-172

Income Group	AL		BNP		Others		Non Res	
		%		%		%		%
2000-5000	52	65%	38	52.78%	8	61.54%	4	57.14%
50001-10000	12	15%	18	25.0%	4	30.77%	2	28.57%
10001-15000	6	7.5%	8	11.11%	0	-	0	-
15001-20000	8	10.0%	6	8.33%	1	7.69%	1	14.29%
200001 & above	2	2.50%	2	2.78%	0	-	0	-
Total	80	46.51%	72	41.86%	13	7.56%	7	4.07%

Education :

Logically speaking, the dimension of education among different categories of the electorate should provide a rational clue of their choice of parties and voting decision. The AL drew the largest balk of support from among the illiterates and those with a modicum of education though the highly educated section also patronizes it. Contrarily the BNP derived support from the higher educational level, i.e. in H.S.C or honours levels. Here the BNP showed its failure remarkably in the highest and the lowest level.

Percentage distribution of support of political parties by education.

Year-1996

N-172

Level of education	AL	%	BNP	%	Others	%	Non	%
Upto Calss VIII	38	47.5%	32	44.44%	9	69.23%	3	42.86%
S.S.C	10	12.5%	4	5.56%	1	7.69%	1	14.28%
H.S.C	10	12.5%	14	19.45%	0	-	0	-
B.A	10	12.5%	16	22.22%	2	15.39%	0	-
M.A	12	15.5%	6	8.33%	1	7.69%	3	42.86%

Residential Status:

Urbanisation is not only an index of economic development but its multiple effect set in motion the forces of political developments as well. In Bangladesh, the rate of urbanization is still poor. Hence, the real Bangladesh lives characteristically in a rural setting. In order to discover some basic parameters of the Bengalis, one should catch the electorate at the macro level. Indeed, occupation, income, age and education are good pointers to evolve the support base of any party and the propensity of party commitments. But the urban rural variables may offer another angle of vision of the electoral behaviour in an enlarged context. It is evident that the AL posed greater credibility than the BNP to the rural masses. It is not however, the case of support of the city 'Sleekers' and 'village bumpkins' being distributed among the parties. The urban rural dichotomy existed in terms of orientation, critical faculty, educational opportunity and political communication. Urbanization, brings in its wake, among other things literacy, psychic mobility, empathy and communication amenities and critical conception about state affairs. Contrarily, the rural electorate adheres to their conservative, traditional time of loyalty in static surroundings. They like political parties amongst in a lopsided manner. They neither think in curves like their opposite numbers in the urban areas nor do they change loyalties over night. Historically, this has been the case in this part of the world. In the Pakistan era, the rural people took eight years to switch loyalty from the Muslim League to the Awami League of the present day. They mill of political behaviour among the rural people grinds slowly and takes a longer time to produce action.

Percentage distribution of support base of political parties by residential status.

Year-1996

N-172

Place of residence	AL	%	BNP	%	Others	%
Rural	16	20%	14	19.44%	2	10%
Urban	64	80%	58	80.56%	18	90%
Total	80	100%	72	100%	20	100%

Occupation :

The occupational dimension of the people is one of the important determinants of voting behaviour. For occupation provides them with some distinct socio-economic milieu resulting in class identification. The very psychology of belonging to a particular social class affects a person's political perception. It is evident from the table that the AL's support base lay largely with the economically deprived community rather than with the affluent classes. The professional class gave much support to the Awami League. The lowest support came from the category of students. It is very significant in that sense that the students are the most important factor in the politics. Besides this election, the students performed a great role in the previous elections. The opposite picture is shown in the BNP figure. They have a great lack of support in the labour and peasant classes. So, they should try to alter their strategy to attract the workers' class.

Percentage distribution of support of political parties by occupation.

Year 1996

N-172

Occupation	AL	%	BNP	%	Others	%	Non	%
Student	8	10%	14	19.44%	1	7.14%	1	16.67%
Service holder	10	12.5%	12	16.67%	3	2.42%	1	16.67%
Businessman	12	15%	14	19.44%	4	28.57%	2	33.33%
Labours	18	22.5%	8	11.11%	2	14.29%	2	22.33%
Peasants	18	22.5%	10	13.89%	2	14.29%	0	-
House Wives	14	17.5%	14	19.44%	2	14.29%	0	-
Total	80		72		4		6	

Sex :

Bangladesh is a developing country. About 78 percent people are living in the villages and 47 percent people live under poverty level. Literacy rate is 36 percent and women literacy rate is only 16 percent. It is a patriarchal society. People are not very interested to send their female child in the schools. Though they sometimes go to school, but they are not encouraged to go outside freely and mix up with outsiders. They are encouraged to work and be habituated with household works. So, their perception about politics is fully influenced by their family orientation. Primarily, they are influenced by their parents or brothers or sisters and later, they are influenced by their husbands

On the other hand, men are free from above bindings. So, they can easily build up their conception about the state affairs.

Comparison of support base of the AL and the BNP by sex

Year-1996

N-172

SEX	AL		BNP		Others	
Male	60	75%	56	77.78%	18	90%
Female	20	25%	16	22.22%	2	10%
Total	80	100%	72	100%	20	100%

Religion :

With the emergence of Bangladesh and institutionalisation of secularism, the minorities did not appear to form autonomous political organization to promote their sectarian interests. Their traditional fears seemed to have been contained through their integration into the main stream of Bangladesh politics. The minority groups then preferred to align with various political parties on the basis of socio-economic and political consideration rather than to promote sectarian party interests. Correspondingly, the political parties of Bangladesh then restored to the tactic of striving for balanced tickets in the elections to woo the minority community.

In Bangladesh, there are only religions minorities of which the Hindus, racially Bengalee, are the largest community, here the Hindus are only considered. The AL has a great support among the Hindus, on account of its secular ideology and its foreign policy stance of promoting friendly relations with India. This attitude partially changed after general Zia came to power. He attempted to attract a large number of Hindu leaders and groups to his party. As a result, the Bangladesh Jatiya Hindu Parishad, sponsored by the BNP, came into existence in 1980. President Zia also patronized Bangladesh Hindu Jubo Kallyan Sangsad, and Bangladesh Scheduled caste community worked for the victory of the BNP candidate Justice Abdus Sattar. In this way, their popularity is rising among the Hindus day by day. Though there was a previous conception that all the Hindus are the supporters of the AL, but now it is partially changed and the Hindus are also extending their support to other parties.

Comparison of support of the AL and the BNP by religion

Year - 1996

N-172

Religion	AL	%	BNP	%	Others	%
Muslim	70	87.5%	68	94.44%	18	90%
Hindu	10	12.5%	4	5.56%	2	10%
Total	80	100%	72	100%	20	100%

Some other questions are also asked to know the political awareness of the people. But here the reaction was disappointing. Most of the people do not think why they vote. There were two types of answers of those questions, some were open and some were closed. Most of the people were embarrassed when they were asked the open answer questions. They felt very disturbed to answer those questions. But it was evident that the educated classes are more conscious about politics. But it is true that it is easy for them to know about politics by the news papers, journals, magazines, etc. The less educated or illiterate persons as well as the house wives are not conscious enough because there is lack of education, sphere of activity, life style, economic background etc. But most of these classes have a static support to some party. Though among them the labourers are not static. Because though they have no educational background but they are often used as an instrument by the political parties. There was a research about the rest of the less educated class that they took a great time to shift their support from the Muslim League to the Awami League. They are more concerned about local politics. The following tables are the result of my interview to the different categories of people.

Table - 1

Political awareness of the people

Year-1996

N-172

- Do you know the date of formation of the party you support?

Occupation	AL				BNP				OTHERS			
	Y	%	N	%	Y	%	N	%	Y	%	N	%
Students	6	18.75	2	4.17	10	9.41	4	10.53	2	13.33	0	0
Service Holders	6	18.75	4	8.33	6	17.65	6	15.79	5	33.33	1	20
Businessmen	6	18.75	6	12.50	8	23.53	6	15.79	3	20.00	1	20
Labours	6	18.75	12	25.00	4	11.76	4	10.53	3	20.00	1	20
Peasants	4	12.50	14	29.17	2	5.88	8	21.05	1	6.67	1	20
Housewives	4	12.50	10	20.83	4	11.76	10	26.31	1	6.67	1	20
	32	100%	48	100%	34	100%	38	100%	15	100%	5	100%

Table - 2

Political awareness of the people

Year - 1996

N-172

- Do you attach importance to political parties, personalities or both ?

Occupation	AL						BNP						Others					
	Per	%	Per	%	Both	%	Per	%	Per	%	Both	%	Per	%	Per	%	Both	%
Students	4	13.79	2	5.41	2	14.29	4	16.47	6	20.00	4	21.12	2	11.77	0	0	0	0
Service Holders	5	17.24	3	8.11	2	14.29	6	25.00	4	3.33	2	11.11	6	5.29	0	0	0	0
Businessmen	6	20.69	4	10.81	2	14.29	8	33.33	4	13.33	2	11.11	4	23.53	0	0	0	0
Labours	8	27.59	6	16.22	4	28.56	2	8.34	4	13.34	2	11.11	2	11.76	2	66.67	0	0
Peasant	4	13.79	12	32.43	2	14.28	2	8.33	6	20.00	2	11.11	1	5.88	3	33.33	0	0
House Wives	2	4.90	10	27.02	2	14.29	2	8.33	6	20.00	6	33.34	2	11.77	0	0	0	0
	29	100%	37	100%	14	100%	30	100%	30	100%	18	100%	17	100%	3	100%	0	0

Table - 3**Political awareness of people**

Year-1996

N-172

- Do you know the manifesto of the party you support?

Occupation	AL				BNP				OTHERS			
	Y	%	N	%	Y	%	N	%	Y	%	N	%
Students	6	18.75	2	4.17	12	31.58	2	5.88	2	13.33	0	0
Service Holders	8	25.00	2	4.17	8	21.05	4	11.76	5	33.33	1	20
Businessmen	6	18.75	6	12.5	8	21.05	6	17.65	3	20.00	1	20
Labours	6	18.75	12	25.00	2	5.26	6	17.65	3	20.00	1	20
Peasants	2	6.25	16	33.33	2	5.26	8	23.53	1	6.67	1	20
Housewives	4	12.5	10	20.83	6	15.80	8	23.53	1	6.67	1	20
	32	100%	48	100%	38	100%	34	100%	15	100%	5	100%

Table - 4**Political awareness of people :**

Year-1996

N-172

- Do you know the name of the leaders of the party you support ?

Occupation	AL				BNP				OTHERS			
	Y	%	N	%	Y	%	N	%	Y	%	N	%
Students	8	14.29	0	0	14	25.93	0	0	2	14.29	0	0
Service Holders	10	17.85	0	0	12	22.22	0	0	5	35.71	1	16.67
Businessmen	10	17.85	2	8.33	12	22.22	2	11.11	3	21.43	1	16.67
Labours	12	21.43	6	25	4	7.41	4	22.22	2	14.29	2	33.32
Peasants	8	14.29	10	41.67	6	11.11	4	22.22	1	7.14	1	16.67
Housewives	8	14.29	6	25.00	6	11.11	8	44.45	1	7.14	1	16.67
	56	100%	24	100%	54	100%	18	100%	14	100%	6	100%

Table - 5

Political awareness of the people

Year-1996

N-172

- Do you raise money and contribute financially to the candidates of the party you support ?

Occupation	AL				BNP				OTHERS			
	Y	%	N	%	Y	%	N	%	Y	%	N	%
Service Holders	2	12.5	8	12.5	2	13.33	10	17.54	2	28.57	4	30.78
Businessmen	8	50	4	6.25	8	53.343	6	10.53	3	42.85	1	7.69
Labours	3	18.75	15	23.44	2	13.33	6	10.53	1	14.29	3	23.08
Peasants	0	0	18	28.13	0	0	10	17.54	0	0	2	15.38
Housewives	1	6.25	13	20.30	1	6.67	13	22.81	0	0	2	15.38
Students	2	12.5	6	9.38	2	13.33	12	21.05	1	14.29	1	7.69
	16	100%	64	100%	15	100%	57	100%	7	100%	13	100%

Table no -6

Political awareness of the people

Year 1996

N-172

- Do you participate in the mass meeting organised by the party you support ?

Occupation	AL				BNP				OTHERS			
	Y	%	N	%	Y	%	N	%	Y	%	N	%
Students	5	19.23	3	5.57	4	19.05	10	19.60	2	16.67	0	0
Service Holders	2	7.69	8	14.81	3	14.29	9	17.65	4	33.33	2	25
Businessmen	4	15.38	8	14.81	6	28.57	8	15.69	2	16.67	2	25
Labours	10	38.47	8	14.81	5	23.81	3	5.88	2	16.67	2	25
Peasants	3	11.54	15	27.78	2	9.52	8	15.69	1	8.33	1	12.5
Housewives	2	7.69	12	22.22	1	4.76	13	25.49	1	8.33	1	12.5
	26	100%	54	100%	21	100%	51	100%	12	100%	8	100%

Table – 7.**Political awareness of the people**

Year-1996

N-172

- Percentage distribution of support of political parties in terms of total numbers, regulars and defectors by different social classes of voters.

Occupation	R	%	D	%	T	%	R	%	D	%	T	%	R	%	D	%	T	%
	AL						BNP						Others					
Students	6	11.54	2	7.14	8	10	12	21.43	2	12.5	14	19.44	1	7.69	1	14.29	2	10
Service Holders	4	7.69	6	21.43	10	12.5	6	10.71	6	37.5	12	16.68	4	10.78	2	28.57	6	30
Businessmen	6	11.54	6	21.43	12	15	10	17.86	4	25	14	19.44	2	15.38	2	28.57	4	20
Labours	8	15.38	10	35.72	18	22.5	6	10.71	2	12.5	8	11.11	3	23.08	1	14.28	4	20
Peasant	16	30.77	2	7.14	18	22.5	8	14.29	2	12.5	10	13.89	1	7.69	1	14.29	2	10
House wives	12	23.08	2	7.14	14	17.5	14	25	0	0	14	19.44	2	15.38	0	0	2	10
Total	52	100%	28	100%	80	100%	56	100%	16	100%	72	100%	13	100%	7	100%	20	100%

Discussing all these tables, we can understand that the students are the most valuable forces of Bangladesh politics. They performed the prime role in the various incidents. They are the conscious part of the entire social class without getting any ill motives. Unlike this, the service holders and the businessmen are the selfish part of the entire social classes. They always think about their benefits in the party manifesto. There was a rumour that the last T.V. speech of Sheikh Hasina disappointed the businessmen and as a result she did not get their mandate. The service holders also are belonging to that group who always act as an interest group. So, the businessmen and service holders are the main defectors, but among them the businessmen are the main group who is financing the political parties. But the house wives are the most static part of voters. They never change their stand. Therefore, till now, people of this country are very admire of their leaders. There is a great percentage of people who like to vote for their beloved leaders irrespective of their party choice.

Lastly, it is to be said that a great number of supporters of the AL are workers as well. But the lesser percentage of supporters of the BNP are workers.

FOOT NOTES

1. Truman, David , “*The Governmental Process*” (New York : Alfred A. Knoph ,1951)
P.P, 104 –106
2. Lene, Robert, “*Political Life*” P-326
3. Larner, Daniel, “ *The Passing of Traditional Society*” P.P,43 – 75
4. Jahan, Raunaq, “*Pakistan: Failure in National Integration.*” (New York : Columbia University Press, 1972) P-42.
5. Sobhan & Ahmed, “*Public Enterprise In an Intermediate Regime ;A Study in the Political Economy of Banglades*”(Dhaka:Bangladesh Institute Of Development Studies,1980) P-26
6. Jahan, Raunaq, “*Pakistan : Failure in National Integration .*” (New York : Columbia University Press, 1972) P –139
7. Sobhan & Ahmed, “*Public Enterprise In an Intermediate Regime ;A Study in the Political Economy of Bangladesh*,(Dhaka:Bangladesh Institute Of Development Studies,1980) P-96
8. *The New York Times*,Feb 22 ,1969
9. *Bangladesh Documents*,(Mardras : B.N.K. Press,1971) P.P, 66-82
10. *Ittefaq* , January 23, 1971
11. *The Constitution of the Peoples Republic of Bangladesh Article 134*, P.P, 55
12. “*Manifesto of All Pakistani Awami League*” (Dhaka : Publicity Secretary,1970)
13. *Ganakantha* – February 7,1973
14. *Morning News*, November 14,1973
15. Mattern – “*Mighty Mujib's, New Brand of Democracy*” Far Eastern Economic Review, February 7,1975 P.P,11.
16. Rahman M. Shamsur, “*Political Consciousness in a Rural Community in Bangladesh: A case Study of Halinda Village in the District of Rajshahi.*” (Local Govt. Quarterly .Vol No.-9, March – June 1980) P.P, 43.

17. Maniruzzaman, Talukdar & Banu, Razia Akter, "*Civilian Succession.*" P.P-117-140
18. *The Daily Ittefaq*, August 13 & 14, 1981.
19. *The Bangladesh Observer*, November 5 & 6, 1981
20. *The Bangladesh Illustrated Weekly*, Vol – IV. No. 15 –16 P .P 45 – 80.
21. *The Bangladesh Observer*, September 21, October 8, 9, 20 & 22, 1981.
22. *Endeavour*, Vol – 1A, No. –7, 1981, P.P –13-14.

Chapter -VI

Conclusion

Every political party has a support base. Therefore, it is changed in respect of its performance. Sometimes, party programmes also can help the party to widen or to squeeze the support base.

The AL was able to draw the support of the middle class people through its six-point demand. Later, the party extended its support among the student community by including their 11-point demand. Party leaders were able to mobilize mass support during the liberation war culminating the independence of Bangladesh. But gradually the party lost its popular support due to non-democratic character and misgovernance of the country. These and other factors led to the fall of the Mujib regime in Bangladesh.

The emergence of Zia in the political arena is an un-precedented event. He came to power after a series of coups. Zia's coming to power relieved the people from uncertainty and anxiety which were prevailing among them since the death of Sheikh Mujib. Zia was known to the people as a freedom fighter who did announce the independence of Bangladesh over a radio from Kalurghat at Chittagong. Zia, the soldier politician could read the sentiment and psychology of the majority people of Bangladesh. In a planned way he proceeded to win the support of the people by adopting necessary amendments to the constitution-namely the Fifth Amendment which widened his support base. Zia, who created his own party-BNP and adopted nineteen point programme for the socio-economic development of the country. He wanted to make the country self sufficient in food by his canal digging programme and also gave a new direction to pursue foreign policy of Bangladesh. Zia widely travelled throughout the country and won the heart of the people. He was a far sighted, energetic young leader with patriotic and nationalistic outlook.

After his death, General Ershad came to power by slaying a coup. His long nine years' oligarchial rule destroyed the democratic institutions of the country. His regime was overthrown by the mass movement in 1990. Then Begum Khaleda Zia, the widow of President

Zia, came to power through general election in 1991. But she could not complete her term. She gradually lost her popularity at the end of the regime due to vote rigging corruptions and mis-governance of the country. The Awami League under sheikh Hasina, won the majority seats in the Jatio Sangsad and formed the govt in Bangladesh in 1996.

The support base of political parties seems to be stabled in the developed countries but it is volatile and highly unstable in the developing countries due to parochial / fragmented political culture and socio-economic condition of the country. Beside these leadership, depressing ideology, programme, performance, institutionalisation and democratic character of the parties are also determining factors for this mobility of support base.

In discussing about the political culture of Bangladesh, it is said that mistrust/distrust exists in the minds of the people about their governments. This non-co-operative attitude developed during the imperialist rule. So, they have not yet been able to shed that mentality. So, they usually relish to oppose and belittle all types of leadership, raising a storm over nuances of political issues and defy organizational discipline of any kind.”¹. So, the policies taken by the govt are never supported by the people. Not only that the middle class people are the most dominating part among the people. They are over politicized, factional in nature and ideologically rhetoric and have a great disrespect for organizational discipline. “². They often change their attitude and loyalty towards the political parties. In 1991, they supported the BNP and in 1996, they stood beside the AL. Another important characteristic of this middle class people is that they often give mass support to a party or party leader, when a momentous issue confronting the nation. In the mass upheaval of 1990, the issue was establishing democracy. In 1996, it was to ensure a free and fair election.

Moreover, in the transitional societies like Bangladesh, ‘politics is personality centred’.In these societies where political orientation is shaped and created by political personalities. In such a situation, the political leaders of Bangladesh can play a significant role in determining the programme, performance and institutioinalization of democracy in their respective parties.

But these leaders always disappoint the masses, when they go to power. They try to perpetuate in power on the plea to achieve socio-economic development. Because, without a

stable govt, no development is possible. This attitude brings a change in their conception about their commitment to the liberal democratic model of govt and politics. The same thing happened in the previous years. Both the leaders of the AL and the BNP did not help to develop the democratic institutions. Because, they considered it as threat to their power. So, they tried to avoid elections, adopted unfair means to win in the elections, used repressive measures against their opposition political leaders. Not only that, they did not tolerate agitation of the students, labourers, petty officials and peasants when they got involved in the protest movements against the govt policies, on the plea that it was against economic development though they came to a power by restoring to similar methods such as Hartal, Strike or violence in the same way. After this, the leaders are extremely sensitive to criticism. They defend their policies and actions claiming a monopoly of wisdom, virtue and patriotism. During the reign of Sheikh Mujib, Tajuddin Ahmed, and Sayad Nazrul Islam were deposed from their posts as they criticised the economic policies of Sheikh Mujib. "At the initial stage, he encouraged genuine criticism of his programmes inside the party, but within limits. At the same time, he used threat of force to silence irresponsible criticisms. He dealt ruthlessly with disloyal and dissident elements in the party and never tolerated indiscipline either in the party, cabinet or the armed forces. The treatment meted out to Brigadier Khaled Mosharraf, Air Vice Marshal M.G. Tawab and Lt.Colonel (Rtd.) Abu Taher and many other Military men as well as to Moudud Ahmed, Nur Mohammad Khan and others in the party organisations bear testimony to his sternness."³. Begum Kheleda Zia forced Nazmul Huda to resign as he criticized Khaleda Zia.

The leaders are not at all sincere to institutionalize and democratize their parties. To institutionalize the party, it is necessary to decentralize power. The charismatic leaders are not at all concerned about this. Zia was the first man who took some steps to decentralize power. But it also fell in vain. Party democracy is an important factor for building democracy. But both of the parties are not at all democratic in their activities. Every thing is decided by the leaders at the top of the party organisations.

Indeed, the major goal of the leaders is to stay in power and values are instrumental to it. So, they do not hesitate to give up their commitment to liberal democratic values and institutions when these appear to endanger their continuation in power. The leaders tend to operate their

systems very much as a personal rule. They deliberately try to by pass institutional relationships and substitute them by personal adhoc relationship with groups and individuals.⁴

Both of the parties are found to be less committed and careless in implementing their given party programmes and polices. Consequently the socio-economic condition of the masses is not improved.

Bangladesh, a small country of 56000 square miles and inhabited by 120 million people, is one of the poorest countries in the world. The developing countries like Bangladesh has been grappling with series of socio-economic issues. It suffers from political instability. Law and order situation has been deteriorating very fast. Under the circumstances, the hope and aspiration of the masses can not be realised due to misgovernance and poor political leadership. The major political parties and party leaders can play a significant role in institutionalizing democracy and ensuring political stability by developing consensus on fundamental national issue facing the country.

FOOT NOTES

1. Moniruzzaman,T. "*Group Interest & Political Change.*"[South Asia Publishers (Pvt) Ltd.], P.P –234.
2. *ibid* , P.P –232
3. Hossain ,Golam, "*Zahir Rahman & The BNP.*" (UPL,1988) P-54.
4. Jahan, Rounaq, "*Bangladesh Politics.*" (UPL,1980).Introduction.

MANZUR
Shah PARAN
SEAM
IR DU
08-09

BIBLIOGRAPHY

1. Ahmed, Moudud, "*Bangladesh : Era of Sheikh Mujibur Rahman*" (UPL, 1983)
2. Ahmed, A.F.Saleh Uddin , "*The Emergence of Bangladesh :The Historical Background in "A Nation in Born"*"(Calcutta : Calcutta University, Bangladesh Sahagak Samaty,1974)
3. Ahmed,Abul Monsoor , "*Amar Dekha Rajnitir Panchas Bachhar*" (Dhaka : Nowroze Kitabstan,1970)
4. Ahmed ,Kamruddin, "*The Socio – Political History of Bengal and The Birth of Bangladesh*" (Dhaka : Zahiruddin Mahmud Inside Library, 1975)
5. Bently, Arther F. "*The Process of Govt. A Study of Social Pressures*" (Chicago : Chicago University Press,1908)
6. Alavi, Hamza, "*The State in Post Colonial Societies : Pakistan & Bangladesh, in imperialism and Revolution in South Asia*" (New York : Monthly Review Press
7. Almond G.A and Verba S.A, "*The Civic Culture*"(Princeton : Princeton University Press,1963)
8. Gabriel, Almond, and Powell, G.Bingham, "*Comparitive Politics : A Development Approach*" (Boston , Mess : Little,Brown,1966)
9. Almond, G.A.and J.S.Coleman, "*The Politics of Developing Areas*"(Princeton.N.J, 1950)
10. Ahmed Moudud , "*Bangladesh : Constitutional Quest For Autonomy*" (1950 – 1971) (Wiesbaden : Franzsteiner Verlag,1971)
11. Anisuzzaman, M, "*Bangladesh Public Administration & Society*" (Dhaka : Bangladesh Books International Limited)
12. Broom Field , J.H, "*Elite Conflict in a Plural Society : Twentieth Century Bengal*" (Berkeley, University of California Press,1968)
13. Chowdhury, G.W., "*The Last Days of United Pakistan*"(London : C.Hurst and Company,1974)
14. Emerson, Rupert, "*From Empire to Nation*" (Cambridge : Harvard university Press,1960)
15. Franda, Marcus, "*Bangladesh : The First Decade*" (New Delhi : South Asian Publishers,1982)
16. Huntington, Samuel P, "*Political Order in Changing Societies*" (New Haven Yale University Press,1968)
17. Islam,Syed Serajul , "*Bangladesh : State and Economic Strategy*"(Dhaka :UPL 1988)
18. Rounaq, Jahan, "*Pakistan : Failure in National Integration*" (New York : Colombia University Press,1972)
19. Rounaq, Jahan, "*Bangladesh Politics: Problems & Issues*" (Dhaka : UPL 1980)
20. Khan, Zillur Rahman, "*Martial Law to Martial Law: Leadership Crisis in Bangladesh*" (Dhaka UPL 1984)
21. Lifschultz, Lawrence. "*Bangladesh : The Unfinished Revolution*"(London : Zed Press, 1979)
22. Lerner, Danial, "*The Passing of Traditional Society*"(New York : The Free Press of Glencoe,1958)

23. Khan, Aatur Rahman, "*Two Years Of Ministership*"(Dhaka : Standard Publishers,1961)
24. Mascarenhas,Anthony, "*Bangladesh : Legacy of Blood*" (London : Hodder & Stoughton,1986)
25. Maciver, R.M, "*The Web Of Govt*"(New York : The Free Press,1965)
26. Moniruzzaman, T. "*The Bangladesh Revolution & Its Aftermath*"(Dhaka : Bangladesh Books International,1981)
27. Moniruzzaman, T. "*Radical Politics & The Emergence of Bangladesh*" (Dhaka : Bangladesh Books International,1975)
28. Moniruzzaman, T. "*Group Interests & Political Changes*" (South Asian Publishers,1982)
29. Moniruzzaman, T. "*The Politics of Development : The Case of Pakistan 1947-1958*" (Dhaka : Green Book House,1971)
30. Mills, C.Wright, "*The Power Elite*" (New York : Oxford University Press,1956)
31. Muhith, M.A., "*Bangladesh : Emergence of a Nation*"(Dhaka : Bangladesh Books International,1978)
32. Morgenthau, Hans.J., "*Politics Among Nations*" (New York : A Knopf ,1964)
33. Palombara, Joseph La and Weiner Myron, "*Political Parties & political Development*"(Princeton : Princeton University Press,1966)
34. Pye, W. Lucian, "*Politics, Personality and Nation Building*"(New Heaven :Yael University Press,1966)
35. Riggs, Fred W. "*Bureaucrats & Political Development*" (Princeton N.J. :Princeton University Press,1963)
36. Rahim, M.A., "*Social & Cultural History of Bengal*" Vol-II (1576-1757) {Karachi : Pakistan Publishing House, 1957}
37. Sayed, Khalid B. "*The Political System of Pakistan*"(Boston : Goughton Mifflin Company,1967)
38. Sayed, Khalid B. "*Pakistan : The Formative Phase1947-1958*"(London : Oxford University Press,1968)
39. Sobhan, Rehman & Ahmed, Mujaffer, "*Public Enterprise in an Intermediate Regime: A Study in the Political Economy of Bangladesh*" (Dhaka : Bangladesh Institute Of Development Studies,1980)
40. Sarker, Jadunath, "*The History Of Bengal*" (Dhaka : UPL) Vol-II
41. Truman, Devid B. "*The Governmental Process*" (New York : Alfred A. Knopf,1951)
42. Wheare, K.C. "*Modern Constitutions*" (London : Oxford University Press,1966)