

M.Phil Thesis

on

Relationship between Political Islam and Democracy: Egyptian Experience

Supervised By

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
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
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Dedication

All the dead Islamic Scholars

And to my


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Khan Sarifuzzaman

13 January 2017

Abstract

The rise of political Islam, after the First World War, has drawn the attention of the scholars of political science to the general people. This study has tried to find out the relationship between political Islam and democracy. The conflicting nature between political Islam and democracy as well as Islamic political system and democracy are the two significant findings of this research.

The study explored six points of conflict: Sovereignty, Source of law (secularism), Form of government, Nationalism, Accountability and Representation. Both the Islamic system and political Islam mainly contradicts in these two indicators with democracy. The Islamic system and political Islam believe in the sovereignty of Creator (Allah). As a result they don't believe in man-made law (human mind or majority) or secular source of law for the state. For the philosophical and ideological differences it creates some other contradictions. The above observation is found in both conceptual issues and in the case study of Egyptian political system.

Methodologically it is a qualitative case study research in which secondary data and information are used. Most of the recent researcher tries to show the compatibility between Islam or political Islam and democracy but the conflict and incompatibility were out of the study. The study will provide a different perception to the policy maker, politicians and scholars in both Muslim and non-Muslim world. It will open a new area of study in both the study of political science and international relations.

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List of Acronyms

BBC	British Broad Casting
CIA	Central Intelligence Agency
DRI	Democracy Reporting International
EGSP	Egyptian Government Services Portal
ESIS	Egypt's State Information Service
FJP	Freedom and Justice Party
GDP	Gross Domestic Product
HT	Hizb-ut Tahrir
ISIL	Islamic State of Iraq and Levant
MB	Muslim Brotherhood
NDC	National Defence Council
NDP	National Development Party
NDP	National Democratic Party
NGO	Non Government Organization
PBUH	Peace Be Upon You
PJD	Justice and Development Party
RA	Raji Allahutaa'launhu
SAW	Sallilahu Alihi Wasallam
SCAF	Supreme Council of Armed Forces
SSC	Supreme Constitutional Court
SWT	Subhanahu Wa Taa'la
UN	United Nations
UNDP	United Nations Development Program

Chapter-1

Background of the Problem and Research Outline

Chapter-1: Background of the Problem and Research Outline

1.1 Introduction

Islam is a religion and a ‘complete code of life’ or an ‘ideology’ which has distinct social, economic and political system (according to most of the classical scholars). On the other hand, democracy is a secular political system which has been a political tool of capitalist nations especially after French Revolution in 1789. Subsequently, conflict is an innate nature between ideologies and between political systems. Western capitalist nations are working over democratizing Muslim world since First World War. After the First World War, the arrival of the buzzword ‘political Islam’ is observed in Muslim world and in international politics. In this perspective, Egyptian politics is an ideal case to understand the relation between Islam and Democracy in Present Egypt.

Change is the universal nature of the society and politics. Political Islam has arrived in Egyptian political arena for its internal situation and external factors: role of colonial powers against Egypt and Muslim world. The First World War and the demise of the Ottoman Caliphate in 1924 have brought a radical change in the political system in Muslim world. From this point of the history, the Western capitalist countries start to compete in occupying the Muslim lands. They set up their liking rulers in these countries to ensure their imperialist hegemony. So, military and autocrat rulers took this opportunity. They impose their oppressive rule upon the less organized and almost parochial political culture involved people. The citizens of Ottoman Empire lose their powerful state for their decreasing ideological and political awareness. But in 1948 the establishment of Israel in their land, American War on terrorism and Iraq war have shaken the whole Arab and the Muslim world. The mass realization rises up to the common people against the tyrant ruler and their imperialist masters. The people lost their personal liberty and political rights for the police states. The Arab Spring is just a movement to establish the common people’s all sorts of rights and their lost ideological dignity. Eventually, fact is that they kicked off against western-backed dictatorships meant they posed an immediate threat to the strategic order¹ but the most important incident has occurred when Mr. Morsi, the first Democratically elected president in Egypt, and his party has been kicked out by western backed army, then the conflict between pro-democratic Islamists and secular Democratic politics getting more distinct. Therefore, to find out this conflicting nature between Political Islam and western Democracy is the major concern of this research.

¹ The ‘Arab spring’ and the west: seven lessons from history, The Daily Guardian, Thursday, 22 December 2011 20:11

As Middle East has become the centre of international politics², so it has been the matter of interest to study to the many researchers. This study will try to find out the pattern of relationship between political Islam and democracy in contemporary Egyptian politics.

1.2 Statement of the problem

- It is a disputed issue in Muslim world's politics and its real causes and consequences still are not well known through enough academic research in our country. There are different notions about the relation between political Islam and democracy therefore this study wants to search out the fact through the case study on Egyptian politics.
- It will open a new area of research.
- Islam and Democracy also playing vital role in our social and political life. Therefore, it is needed to understand the relation between these two in the light of Egyptian politics.
- This issue is related with our national policy as for Arab world is one of our biggest labor markets, import-export market and also we get good amount of aid from Arab countries. Moreover, Bangladesh has a historical relation with Egypt.

1.3 Research design and methodology:

1.3.1 Methodologies: case-oriented qualitative method (central approach)

Ragin and Becker [1992:2] argued that every social study is a 'case study' either empirical or and place. There are a variety of techniques for the case-oriented qualitative approach [Coffey and Atkinson, 1996: 14], but this study is a content analysis based case study having specific concept and its application on 'Egyptian politics within the time frame from 1919 to 2013' (Post First world war to the incident of the down fall of pro-Islamic government of Muslim Brotherhood) and place. But the matter of excellence is concept and indicator will be examined by both classical scholars of the ages and will be compared to the present top most scholars of Bangladesh to reach an end. As the qualitative method is widely applicable and is well suited for studying the real-life situations of any social phenomenon [Punch, 1998: 243]. Social science events are causally connected to each other with many underlying conditions and linking study **indicators**. Most social factors are complex and outcomes may fluctuate due to the involvement and influences of a large number of indicators. Evera's [1997: 53] statement that 'case-study results cannot be

² Khan Sarifuzzaman, 'Clash of civilization and Middle East centric world politics', 25 October 2007, www.jaijaidin.com/archive

generalised to other cases' appears to support this argument. However, this study will apply the following operational methods to explore the theme.

1.3.2 Method 1: Use of qualitative tools

This study will use qualitative approaches as research tools in its analyses. The qualitative approach focuses on social research in a natural setting [Punch, 1998: 199]. The qualitative approach is best suited for addressing historical outcomes of particular cases [Ragin, 1994: 78]. Qualitative tools allow the researcher to connect interactions among variables [Punch, 1998: 247]. This thesis explores Relationship between Political Islam and Democracy on the basis of a causal explanation and pattern of relation between these two based on the designated indicators.

1.3.3 Method 2: Significant investigation of the relevant academic literature

In general, case studies are the preferred strategy when 'how' or 'why' questions are being posed [Yin, 1994: 20 - 21], when the investigator has little control over structures or events, or when the focus is on a contemporary phenomenon within some real-life context. This study will use the published literature to explore how and why specific patterns of interaction and opposition, fusion and conflict, between two ideology-based system, political Islam and democracy.

1.3.4 Method 3: Theoretical application to test the hypotheses and research questions

A qualitative case study can suggest causal links among the selected indicators based on specific research questions and proposed hypotheses [Yin, 1994: 17; Punch, 1998: 247]. The aims of the case study are to create hypotheses qualitatively and then test them, identify antecedent conditions (study variables) and explain cases of intrinsic importance [Evera, 1997: 54].

1.3.5 Case Study: Strengths and Limitations

The research question will be observed analyzed by a single-case study on the characteristics of political Islam and democracy as well as their interaction and relation in Egyptian polity. The time frame of the case study is post 1st world war to downfall of Brotherhood's rule up to June 30, 2013. The conduct of a case study, a qualitative research method, fits the research question best. A case study provides the prospect to deal with the historical and sociological side of the topic as it focuses on institutions, identities of the actors and preferences. A case study moreover creates the chance to test implications from theories against empirical observations and to use those results to add new insights to the existing theory (George & Bennett, 2005: 5; Boeije, 2005: 17-27). A case study is the decisive method for

exploring complex causalities and for retaining a holistic and significant interpretation of real-life events (Yin, 2009: 4). Its potency is in the first place that it gives for a high level of conceptual validity, as it takes in contextual factors. Secondly, as a case study is theory-laden but not theory-determined it is possible to derive new hypotheses from the case. It can as well test deductive theories, suggest new variables that need to be incorporated and refine a theory. Thirdly a case study allows for exploring the fundamental mechanisms in detail (George & Bennett, 2005: 9-22, 111).

There are some constraints of doing a case study that the research findings cannot be generalized to all cases. Particularly a single case study has this limitation. In addition case studies can only create tentative conclusions on how much a variable affects the outcome (George & Bennett, 2005: 22-34). At the same time “case studies are stronger in identifying the scope of conditions of theories and assessing arguments about causal necessity in particular cases” (George & Bennett, 2005: 27). In this research it is deliberately chosen to do a single case study as the Egyptian case is as well a theoretical as a political relevant case. Egypt can be told as the birth place of political Islam where recently a government was formed through a fair election and that government also ruled the country a short span of time. On this political ground it can be easily observed and analyzed the relationship between political Islam and democracy.

Some indicators have been taken to make a comparative discussion and to reach a conclusion.

1.3.6 Survey of Secondary Materials

The method that will be used is an analogical single case study. A comparison case study assesses whether the expectations from the theory can explain or predict the outcome of a case (George & Bennett, 2005: 181). In other words:

“The investigator observes values on the independent and dependent variable within a particular case and observes the world (without doing further case studies) to ascertain values on the independent and dependent variable that are typical in most other cases. The investigator then deduces from these observations and from the test theory expected relative values for the independent and dependent variable in the study case and measures the congruence or incongruence between expectation and observation” (Van Evera, 1997: 58).

In this research the *willingness* of the military to allow for democratization during a political transition is one of the important factors. From the theoretical framework it has become clear that there are several variables which determine the extent. Those are given

- 1. Sovereignty**
- 2. Source of law**
- 3. Form of government**
- 4. Nationalism**
- 5. Accountability (Constitution, Election, Parliament, the President in Democratization Process)**
- 6. Representation (Political Parties)**

This study will test the hypothesis on the basis of these indicators the both side Political Islam and Democracy that how much are they compatible or incompatible each other. To assess that the original political system of Islam, introduced by Muhammad, the prophet of Islam, will be examined as for Political Islam's ideological basement is formed on the basis of Islamic political ideals.

Democratization can be defined as the process of applying democratic principles and procedures to state institutions. These democratic principles and procedures include accountability of institutions, free and fair elections and a set of political and civil rights (O'Donnell & Schmitter, 1986: 8; Stepan, 1988: 6; Huntington, 1991a: 9).

1.3.7 Information Collection and Analysis

The structure of the analysis of the case is based on the operationalization set out in this chapter. The second chapter has explained the ideological basis from where Islamic system and democratic system is emanated because political Islam is developed on the basis of Islamic ideology. Third chapter has pictured theoretical discourse of the development of the concept Islamic state. Fourth chapter has discussed the details of Islamic political system with the proof of Quranic verse tradition of prophet Muhammad (SAW). It has also examined the indicators of Islamic political system. The development of the idea of political Islam and the movements of Islamists are discussed in chapter five. The concept of democracy, its main characteristics, origin and types are analyzed on the basis of the indicator in chapter six. The comparative suitability between Islam and democracy and political Islam and democracy is analyzed on the basis of indicators in chapter seven. Mainly difference and conflict between Caliphate system and the political Islam and Caliphate system and democracy is analyzed in chapter eight. Chapter nine has examined the case study on Egyptian politics in the light of the relation between political Islam and democracy which has proofed the correctness of hypothesis of this research.

In this study the secondary data are collected from the reports of international organization, media, journals, books, and religious scriptures of Islam, opinion of classical and modern scholars.

1.4 Research design: Indicators, hypotheses, and research questions

The main variables or indicators of the study are-

1. Sovereignty
2. Source of law
3. Form of government
4. Nationalism
5. Accountability (Constitution, Election, Parliament, the President in Democratization Process)
6. Representation (Political Parties)

Indicators	Political Islam	Democracy
<i>Sovereignty</i>	Sovereignty of Allah (God)	Popular Sovereignty (human being)
<i>Source of law</i>	Islamic <i>Shariah</i>	Human consultation (man-made secular law)
<i>Form of government</i>	Caliphate or Islamic governance	Democracy: Parliamentary or Presidential
<i>Nationalism</i>	Islamic <i>Ummah</i>	Nation State
<i>Ideological perspective</i>	Islam	Secularism and Capitalism
Accountability (Constitution, Election, Parliament, the President in Democratization Process)	Rigid	Flexible
Representation (Political Parties)	Rigid	Flexible

Table: Indicators to define political Islam and democracy

Objective of the Study:

- *To find out the nature of the relation among Islam, political Islam and Democracy.*

Research questions

1. Is the Political Islam compatible with democratic political system?
2. What are the fundamental factors create contradiction between Islamic system and western liberal democratic system?

1.5 Explanation of hypotheses and theoretical framework of the study

Hypotheses:

1. *There is a conflicting nature between Islam, Political Islam and Democracy**
2. *Political Islam contradicts democratization process of Egypt.*




Chart: Model of conflict between hypotheses are depicted as Islamic ideology and 'capitalists' democratic³ ideology * '-' indicates minus

³ Capitalist democracy or modern liberal democracy all are synonymously used by many scholars.

The Hypotheses are chosen on the basis of existing worldwide debate about the compatibility between Islam and democracy. Hypothesis-1 will study the pattern of relation of conflict or compatibility between Islam⁴ and democracy on the basis of given indicators. Hypothesis-2 will explicitly analyze the relation between political Islam and modern Democracy. On the basis of taken indicators because parliamentary form of democracy has taken birth from the core values of democracy and out of all form of democracy it is the most popular one at the present world. On the other hand, after the fall of Ottoman Caliphate specially many of modern Islamic thinkers are viewing the idea and role of Islamic state in different ways as well as before it no organized Islamic political party were developed. After the First World War, Islamic brotherhood⁵ (1928) of Egypt is the first organized political party that organized way demanded Islamic system against their autocratic government. This type of political activities by an Islamic political party is viewed by western scholars as 'political Islam'. Presently almost in every Muslim majority countries, this type of many parties are active. Their main goal is to return the Islamic system of life on the basis of holy *Quran* and *Hadith* that is why political Islam is taken here to study Islamic politics. Moreover, the idea is depended on Islamic ideology.

The hypotheses have two different concepts and idea which have connected parliamentary democratic system and political Islam from their mother concept Democracy and Islam.

⁴ Islam is not considered only as a religion (a set of rituals) because its 1400 years' history shows the document of its implementation as a system of life that means it has a specific social, political and economic solution those were implemented from Prophet, his four rightly guided Caliphs and later Umayya to Uthmani Caliphate.

⁵ At the very outset, their aim and activities was to return Islamic Caliphate system but with the change of reality, they have changed their aim, method, means and tool throughout the Muslim world in name of pragmatism. Some time compromising the autocrat and sometimes participating in democracy and sharing the power.



Fig: Theoretical Framework of the Research

A framework is structured for the systematic study of the Egyptian case of relationship between political Islam and democracy. Profound influence of political Islam, Islamic system and secular democratic forces is observed in Egyptian military, political parties and democratization process. The analysis and conclusion of the study will be developed circling these actors.

Chapter- 2

Theoretical Review

Chapter- 2: Theoretical Review

2. Theories of Islamic Political System

2.1.1 Introduction

The theoretical concept of this chapter is framed in this chapter. Specially the concepts of Islamic State, Islamic Politics, Islamic Political System, Political Islam are reviewed here. Moreover, the compatibility and conflicts between political Islam are also explored. The referred theoretical concepts are used in case study of Egyptian political experience.

Classical and modern different scholars defined Islamic political system and Islamic state from different perception. Perceptions and development of Islamic political thought is discussed in this part.

2.1.2 Theories of Islamic State

The State is a word of terminology which passes on to an authority that commands and prohibits a group of people who live in a certain piece of land. On the contrary, the definition of the state varies due to the difference of standpoints and nations towards its reality.

The westerners hold towards the reality of the state, and towards the type of rule within the state, whether this were religious, as was the case in the medieval times, or dictatorial or democratic. However, all agree that the state is reflected in the land, its peoples and its rulers. These three represents the cornerstones of the state. To the westerner thinkers, the state is established over a specific piece of land, in which a specific group of people live permanently, and over whom a ruling authority controls. As for the Islamic state, it is a ruling authority, and a political entity that looks after the citizens' affairs according to the Shari'ah rules; in other words, it is a Khaleefah ruling by what Allah (swt) has revealed and propagating Islam as a Message to the whole world. According to the major classical scholars, Allah (swt) has decreed that the Islamic state should be the method to implement the Shari'ah rules and to carry Islam by way of Da'awa and Jihad as a Message of guidance and light to the whole world.

After the downfall of Ottoman Caliphate in 1924, the necessity and momentum in the Muslim Umma started to feel for the colonial occupation in the Muslim lands. Since the 1979 Islamic revolution in Iran, which established the Islamic Republic of Iran, the idea has become more imperative if not

a contentious issue in world politics (Esposito 1990). There are three important reasons for this state of affairs.

Firstly, some of the Islamic states, such as the Islamic Republic of Iran and the Islamic Emirates of Afghanistan (Afghanistan under the Taliban regime), have been opposed to the West, and the USA in particular. Some of the top theoreticians and ideologue of the Islamic states, such as Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini of Iran and Syed Qutb of Egypt, have also been active polemicists against the West. (For a review of their ideas, see Rahnama 1994.)

Secondly, except in the Muslim world, liberal democracy has been recognized everywhere as the most efficient and legitimate form of government. It is also increasingly becoming the system of choice globally in the age of capitalist globalization. Merely in the Muslim world, that popular reaction is in search of an alternative principle or process for self-governance. Accordingly the idea of an Islamic state stands for not only a rejection of liberal democracy in its moment of triumph but also a means to list opposition to the global hegemony of the West (Bin Sayeed 1995).

Prior to the Iranian revolution, the idea of an “Islamic state”, in modern age when capitalist nation state and socialist state was ruling the world, was merely abstract and theoretical. Its potentiality as a transformative agent - transformative of the global regime through a radical foreign policy, and of domestic society through an aggressive socio-political campaign - stayed fantasy. But after the Iranian revolution most Islamists realized that this dream of acquiring a coercive instrument for socio-political change was possible and their activism became more focused and even more successful. Since then several states have claimed to become Islamic, including Sudan and Afghanistan (Esposito and Piscatori 1990). Recently, the self declared Caliphate¹ by ISIL [Islamic State of ...I] has created more enthusiasm among the young and new generation of Muslim word and of the rest.

As Islamic revivalist movements, primarily *Jamaat-e-Islami* (Islamic Society) in South Asia, and *Ikhwan al-Muslimeen* (Islamic Brotherhood) in the Arab World, gained momentum and led to a greater awareness of Islam in Muslim societies, the call to Create Islamic states gained more and more momentum here. Islam became the alternative to the

¹ The Caliphate (Caliphate) or *Caliphate* is a political and social leadership over all the Muslims in the world. Its responsibility is to implement the laws of the Islamic system and convey the Islamic Message to the rest of the world. The Caliphate is called the Imam as both words have been narrated in many *sahih ahadith* (pure message of prophet) with the same meaning. The Khalif (Caliph) is the head of state in the Caliphate system. Hazrat Abubaker was the first *Khalif* (Caliph) of Islam. He was not a king or dictator but a Caliph whom the Muslims through a special ruling contact, *baya*, gave a legal (elected or nominated) leadership that had authority to rule and the authority by rule of Islamic law. Without this *baya*, he could not be the head of the state. This is completely opposite to a kingship or dictatorship that imposes his authority through force.

cold war dichotomy (Khan, 2001), that presented the world with only two alternatives, the Capitalist West or the Communist East. For Muslims seeking authenticity the slogan, 'Islam is the solution', had great appeal (Khan, 2001). Just accepting this concept and by advocating Islam, one was not only free of Western global ideologies of capitalism and communism. Furthermore, they would be also free from the internal colonization by secular Westernized elites who used authoritarian rule to subjugate Muslims in their own countries. Consequently, the rejection of Western ideas and ideologies was a mark of rebellion against imperialism as well as internal colonialism (Ayubi 1991; Esposito 1997).

The concept of an Islamic state are the multiple roles of the Prophet Muhammad as religious founder, political leader, head of state and spiritual guide, and his unparalleled victory in establishing his religion as the foundation of a state and society within a decade (Khan, 2001). In AD 622 just 12 years after his declaration of Prophet Hood, Muhammad migrated from Mecca to Medina, and founded an Islamic society and state at the call of the various tribes that lived in Medina (then known as *Yatbribi*). His state was based on a treaty or social contract referred to as the *Dostur-Al-Madinah* (Constitution of Medina) (Ayubi 1991; Haykal '1976; Khan 2002b). The Constitution of Medina established the importance of consent and cooperation for governance. According to the compact, Muslims and non-Muslims are equal citizens of the Islamic state, with identical rights and duties. The communities with different religious orientations enjoyed religious autonomy. Without some basic and ideological issues of the state, other religion's people amounted to essentially choice of legal system based on their religion. The Jews by Torah, Christians by the Gospel, and Muslims were judged by the Quran. This idea of religious freedom was much wider in scope than the modern idea of freedom. The Constitution of Medina established one kind of pluralistic state, a community of communities. It promised equal security to all and all were equal in the eyes of the law. The principles of equality, consensual governance and pluralism were upheld by the compact of Medina (Khan 2002b).

This prophetic superiority made the inseparability of religion and politics an enduring aspect of Islamic thought and practice (Khan, 2001). The status of Muhammad as the Prophet of God and the ruler of Medina set up the significance of religion in statecraft and the role of religious identity in shaping the character and identity of the political community (Khan, 2001) creating a new ideology and political culture. The objective of forming a political community is also seen in terms of religious needs and religious obligations. Hence, when contemporary political theorists talk of an Islamic state, they imagine it as an ideological instrument. The instrument was designed

for the clear purpose of advancing an Islamic religious agenda; even though the very objectives of the Islamic constitution (*maqasid al-Shariai*) are widely understood as those guiding principles. Islamic constitution facilitated the individual and the community to live a virtuous life in a society determined to establish social justice and public welfare (Chapra 1992; Osman 1994).

The idea of an Islamic state is a highly comprehensive and even imprecise conception within contemporary Muslim and Islamic political thought. It needs both historical and analytical clarification. There are at least two major types of discourses about the Islamic state:

1. One from classical thinkers who lived and wrote when Islamic civilization was dominant and before much of the Muslim world was colonized;
2. The later in the postcolonial era when the pain of subjugation was still felt strongly and the power and influence of former imperial powers was still clear.

This study will differentiate between the two by calling pre-colonial theories, *Islamic theories of the state*, and postcolonial theories, *theories of the Islamic state*.

Islamic theories of the state are mainly the discussion of the nature of the state in the inadequate political theory developed by Muslims prior to the colonial era. There are chiefly four major theorists of this era including Al Farabi (870-950), Al Mawardi (974-1058), Ibn Taymiyyah (1263-1328) and Ibn Khaldun (1332-1406).

Theories of the Islamic state are present-day attempts at imagining an ideal of the just and dominant Islamic state. The major contributors to this discussion are Jamaluddin Afghani (1837-97), Maulana Maududi (1903-79), Ayatollah Khomeini (1902-89), Syed Qutb (1906-66) and Taqiuddin an-Nabbhani (1909-77). (For histories of Islamic political thought and practice, see Ahmad 1986; Black 2001; Enayat 1991; Watt 1968.)

2.1.3 Islamic Theories of the State

While Islamic thought is multilayered and very rich, the practice of political theory as well as philosophy stays immature (Khan 1997). May be this could be clarified by the hegemonic way of Islamic legal thought which has constantly looked to colonize Islamic thinking at the cost of metaphysics, mysticism, philosophy and literature (Khan 2001). Indeed, even contemporary Islamic legal researchers regularly have a tendency to liken Islam itself with Islamic legitimate thinking as though there is nothing outside law (and the study of Sharia).

In any case the pre-colonial time did witness a few political scholars of whom Al Farabi, Al Mawardi, Ibn Taymiyyah and Ibn Khaldun remain extremely well-known. Al Farabi's

methodology was philosophical, Al Mawardi's legalistic, Ibn Taymiyyah's theological, and Ibn Khaldun's sociological.

2.1.3.1 Al Farabi about State, Governance and Participatory Rule

Abu Nasr Al Farabi is broadly perceived as one of the most important Islamic philosophers. His debts is recognized by both the Western as well as Islamic philosophical and political traditions. In his *Mabadi ara al-madinat al-fadilab*, (Opinions of the Citizens of the Excellent City), Al Farabi builds up his thoughts connecting metaphysics and cosmology with social morals and political community. He adds to a typology of polities and talks about how a feeling of aggregate reason, educated by an awareness of the heavenly, can empower human creatures to create idealistic cities and polities which won't just be administered in an equitable and respectable fashion yet will likewise empower their subjects to move in the direction of the flawlessness of the self (Al Farabi 1998; see additionally, al-Ma'sumi 1963; Black 1996).

Al Farabi envisioned the state as an agreeable effort of free and willing citizens looking for a common reason, ultimate happiness through contact with the dynamic judgment. Basically the state for Al Farabi, whatever the collective objective, presence or flawlessness, was an instrument to take care of collective action problems. In his discussion of the nature of a state he envisions two critical contemporary theories, in particular, systems theory, and the Weberian origination of the modern state as an item of rationalization, division of work, and specialization. Al Farabi compares the state with a human body and agrees that just as every organ through perfecting its own particular function and incorporating with the whole makes a functional body. So, different components of society perfect their roles and incorporate to make the state. It is in the justification of the state and in treating it as a system that Al Farabi sneaks in his Platonic Republicanism by talking of hierarchical people and hierarchical roles from noble to ignoble. He puts the philosophers or thinkers on top of the chain of command. He contended that their learning, wisdom and nobility were important for any city to accomplish a righteous status (Al Farabi 1998).

Dissimilar to contemporary political theory where the stress is on perfecting structure and process, Al Farabi focuses on the nature and character of the governors in contending for the plausibility of acknowledging virtue in society. It is when righteous people administer that we have a virtuous society. Social righteousness for Al Farabi is a personality effect and not a systemic effect (Khan 2002a: 111-14). Unnecessary to say, contemporary scholars who live in far more complex social orders would disagree this reason. In any case, we must recall that Al Farabi's work was just the start of Islamic political theorizing.

According to Al Farabi the way to virtue and happiness is knowledge. The categories of knowledge that he demands rulers and citizens of an idealistic city. Al Farabi uncovers his Islamic stripes: the natives of the righteous city must have God awareness and it is likewise here that politics and faith get to be inseparable (Al-Ma'sumi 1963: 704-9). Righteous governance and virtuous polities happen when politics is guided by the individuals who have knowledge of the divine origins of being. The Koran frequently depicts such individuals as the individuals who know (Arifeen).

Al Farabi was the first Muslim scholar to investigate the ethics of democracy. Al Farabi places democracy in the sorting of ignorant cities. Ignorant cities are those cities which by and large are not mindful of God (the first cause). They additionally don't have a solitary reason. He perceives that since democracies are free societies there will be different goals that the subjects of a democracy will look for. He likewise proposes interestingly that if individuals who look for security dominant the polity, a democracy can turn into a national security state (Al Farabi talks in terms of cities of war and peace). However, he likewise makes an extremely fascinating perception which is maybe the most imperative lesson contemporary Muslim scholars can take from him. Al Farabi proposes that in light of the fact that democracies are free societies and are also non-homogenous, there will be individuals who will excel in good and individuals who will exceed expectations in evil. However, the way that one can discover the interest of flawlessness present inside of a democracy. A democracy has the most obvious opportunity of all ignorant cities of turning into a virtuous city (Al Farabi 1998: 315). This is a preventative however intense support of democracy, at the point when the alternatives options existing to societies to a great extent fall in the ignorant category, which incorporates monarchies and additionally autocracies. (For discussion of Farabi's origination of democracy, see Mahdi 1987:2001.)

2.1.3.2 Al Mawardi with Regards to the Caliphate

The tenth to the twelfth century saw the persistent decay of the power of the Abbasid Caliphate. Warlords and independent rulers increased more power and the role of the Caliph himself started to shrink. In the early eleventh century, when the Sunni scholar Al Mawardi was working for the Abbasid caliph, the Buwayhid tribe and their warlords not just picked up control over the central lands of the empire yet likewise practiced *de facto* sovereignty over Baghdad. The Buwayhid like the Fatimids, who then had control over Cairo and a significant part of the southern parts of the Islamic lands and claimed religious leadership over the whole *Ummah*, were Shiites. Subsequently the Sunni Caliph of Baghdad had neither direct nor any religious control over the Islamic realm. It was in this period that Al Mawardi, who worked for the Caliph and was attempting

to safeguard and restore the institution of the Caliphate. Then he composed his acclaimed *Al Ahkam as-Sultaniyyah, The Ordinances of the Government* (Watt 1968).

Al Mawardi composed his popular treatise between 1045-58, a critical time when there appeared the probability that through an alliance with the rising Seljuks, the Abbasid Caliphate could recapture its past glory and power. In spite of the fact that much of Al Mawardi's work is empirical and deals most part with practical angles of governance and public administration. A little part of his work deals with the theory of the Caliphate. It is a blend of legalistic manipulation and political theology with the clear goal of allocating selective religious legitimacy to the Caliph and attempting to restore his socio-political status and lawful authority (Qamaruddin 1963).

Al Mawardi's *Ahkam* is not a theory of the state in any sense of the term. It does not offer any origination of what a definitive purpose of a political community is, or why states exist, and what are just and good states. His whole center is advancing a theoretical debate to legitimize the claim of the Abbasid Caliphate to legitimize control over the whole Muslim community to the rejection of all other rulers, regimes and claims. In one sense his theory of the Caliphate is a denial of the Shiite claims. This political goal gets to be clearer in one specific claim that he progresses as to who can be the Caliph. Al Mawardi contends that if there is more than one individual qualified to be the Caliph, then it is not necessary that the best one ought to be the Caliph. It is acceptable for anybody to be picked as the Caliph. The Electoral College, which can comprises of even one individual (he doesn't advocate universal franchise establishment as advocated by the Kharijites, for instance), does not have to offer a clarification in respect to why they picked the second rate applicant over the superior competitor. This is distinctly a Sunni barrier against the Shiite claims that nobody was more better than the descendents of the Prophet when it came to religious legitimacy. This present from Al Mawardi and other Sunni jurists up to present time remains a reason for the incompetent rulers who have tormented the Muslim world (for an excellent critique of Al Mawardi, see Khan 1963).

Al Mawardi's technique was somewhat oversimplified. He fundamentally mulled over the historical backdrop of the early Caliphate and constructs his theory with respect to this early Islamic period. The primary four Caliphs are considered as the rightly guided Caliphs by Muslims generally. Despite the fact that this claim is not in light of the Koran or any unequivocal custom of the Prophet, it is so broadly acknowledged by Islamic researchers that it has turn into a religious canon. Since the early Caliphs were considered as righteous, huge numbers of their practices and moves are likewise taken as standards. In this manner Al Mawardi's theory of the Caliphate is an explanation of specific historical episodes as theoretical principals of Islamic government (Al Mawardi 2000; see also Brown 2000).

Al Mawardi additionally demanded some fairly questionable criteria in his theory of the Caliphate. Case in point, he demanded that just an individual from the tribe of Quraish can be the Caliph. This stipulation was to reject the Buwayhids, the Fatimids and the Seljuks from usurping the title of the Caliph. It didn't make a difference to him that it was totally in disagreement to the universalism characteristics for the message of Islam. It likewise did not make a difference to him that he was decreasing Islamic political theology to crass tribalism and parochialism. (In his last sermon, considered his last will and confirmation, which Muslims must maintain, the Prophet particularly educated his supporters not to distinguish between an Arab and a non-Arab. Making tribal distinctions for purposes of legitimacy was plainly self serving (for the Quraish and the Abbasids who had a place with the Quraish tribe] and contradictory to the Message of Muhammad.(See Siddiqui 1991]). After all, he was a court scholar and he served his master the Abbasid Caliph in exemplary manner. It is clear from his different works in the field of law and even in sociology that Al Mawardi was an incredible mastermind and scholar. However, his powerlessness to safeguard his political philosophy from his partisan politics demands that his commitment, regardless of its popularity with contemporary Islamists, be seen with alert.

2.1.3.3 Ibn Taymiyyah and the Dominance of the Sharia

Ibn Taymiyyah lived a period when the Muslim world encountered some level of insecurity. The Tartars and the Crusaders were undermining the integrity of Muslim lands and numerous new religious practices enlivened by mixed mysticism and neo- Platonic philosophers were in Ibn Taymiyyah's view, threatening the trustworthiness of Islam as a faith. Pretty much as Al Mawardi's theory of the Caliphate was inspired by the dangers to the Caliphate, Ibn Taymiyyah's thoughts of the state were likewise roused by a profoundly felt insecurity about the fate of Islam as a faith and Islam as a civilization or empire. While Al Farabi and later Ibn Khaldun's endeavors to theorize the state were propelled more by intellectual interest than temporal politics, the theories of Al Mawardi and Ibn Taymiyyah were solidly inserted in the politics of their time and were clearly intended to propel their partisan positions. While Al Mawardi looked to restore the eminence of the Caliphate, Ibn Taymiyyah tried to restore the worldwide strength of the Islamic civilization and domestic mastery of Islamic *Sharia* (Black 2001; Khan 1982; Ibn Taymiyya 1985).

Ibn Taymiyyah's methodology was a noteworthy departure from conventional scholar-ship. His methodology was a blend of particular utilization of tradition and past scholarship and a direct utilization of the Koran as opposed to Al Mawardi who depends fundamentally on the traditions and historical narratives about the early time of Islam. One of the reasons why Ibn Taymiyyah's rather ideological and stark conceptualization of the motivation behind the state has great appeal for so

many is the raw nature of his discussion. He depends on direct and literalist utilization of the Koran and his choice of Koranic verses gives a quality to his talk which his devotees find compelling. After all if he is utilizing such a variety of words of God, then it makes sense that his talk must be more authentic than others whose discussions are corrupted by their reason and interpretation. Ibn Taymiyyah likewise makes the most efficient analysis of the need, the nature and the ideological goals of the state, and this clarity of discussion adds to his appeal and impact even today. While Al Mawardi's limitations are clear, Al Farabi's and Ibn Khaldun's analysis have a quality, which alienate simplistic readers. The two make scholarly demands of their reader, particularly Al Farabi whose compositions are complex and philosophical. Nevertheless, Ibn Taymiyyah is clear, dogmatic, and straightforward.

Ibn Taymiyyah was persuaded that Islamic duties, for example, inspiring good and prohibiting evil, couldn't be achieved without state power. He additionally felt that few Islamic obligations, for example, *Jihad* (struggle) against sin and disobedience to God, implementation of Islamic law, and even establishment of aggregate commitments, for example, setting up social justice required the power and the state machinery. Advocating that religion required the state to acknowledge itself, Ibn Taymiyyah accommodated the first after in theoretical discussion that 'religious need of the state'. In this way unlike past Muslim masterminds like Al Farabi, who accepted that religious knowledge was essential for political excellence, Ibn Taymiyyah contended that political power was important for religious excellence (Khan 1982: 23-51).

Ibn Taymiyyah's persisting and to some degree problematic portrayal of the Islamic state as one that authorizes the Sharia is his most particular contribution to the conception of the Islamic state. Today this has become the defining characteristic of the Islamic state for most masterminds and about every single Islamic movement. Today Muslim states and politicians utilize the symbolic use of the *Sharia* (which is regularly operationalized as the utilization of stringent Islamic laws known as *hudud*, laws against adultery, theft, homicide and apostasy), alongside banning of interest as a litmus test to focus the Islamic nature of states (Khan 1982: 23-51).

Ibn Taymiyyah correspondingly underscored the significance of security and military functions of the Islamic state. Some modern scholars argues that Tymiyyah contradicts in this case that the Koranic order that 'there is no impulse in religion' (Korn 2: 256). Basically he sees the state as a coercive means to extend and spread Islam out of its borders, while keeping up the doctrinal purity of Islamic practice inside of its border. He conveyed seriousness to the matter of establishing Islam, and this way to deal with religion without compassion has turn into the trademark of neo-conservative

movements, for example, the *Salafi* movement and the *Wahhabi* movement, which see Ibn Taymiyyah as an extraordinary reviver and resuscitator of purity in Islam. Obviously Ibn Taymiyyah's Islam is one which is profoundly motivated by insecurity and fear that the faith and its state are under attack and going to be obliterated. This insecurity more than whatever else is the reason for his imagination of the state as an Islamic *Leviathan* that exercises absolute power inside and savagely assaults dangers from outside.

2.1.3.4 State and Civilization of Ibn Khaldun

Ibn Khaldun's methodology was remarkable and significantly more empirical than any of the three scholars considered so far. While Al Farabi, Al Mawardi and Ibn Taymiyyah were all normative and prescriptive, Ibn Khaldun was empirical, historical and descriptive in his examination of the beginning and decline of states and societies. He was less keen on depicting attractive qualities in states and was somewhat possessed in comprehension the common laws that molded the root, development and decays of societies and civilizations. The state was a constitutive component of this civilizational life cycle. In an inquisitive manner Ibn Khaldun's state has a double character (to some degree as Giddens Anthony's (1984) structuration theory, which is crucial to constructivism in contemporary international relations theories. It is both the medium and the result of civilization (Ibn Khaldun 1969; see additionally Mahdi 1957, 1963; Lakhsassi 1996; Black 2001: 165-82).

Ibn Khaldun's key idea was the way to go of *Asabiyyab* or solidarity. He, similar to Al Farabi, also saw the state as an expression of a group's collective desire to accomplish a solitary objective. The essential union of interests that leads to the acknowledgment of a common goal comes from the materialization of group solidarity or tribal kinship, *asabiyyah*. Ibn Khaldun's theory of the state is basically an examination of how tribes, which live in provincial and nomadic conditions, unite as one under the relations and guidelines of connection, and when this *Asabiyyah* is territorialized through victory, they build up a state. The rise of urban communities and urban way of life is the start of the foundation of society and development which prompt the phases of satisfaction and degradation and the breakdown of solidarity and the state. Ibn Khaldun contended that the improvement of the state had five stages:

1. Emergence of solidarity in tribal and roaming individuals prompting regional victory.
2. The capture of region and the foundation of the state with the tribal head as the pioneer.
3. Consolidation of power and sovereignty and the foundation of cities.
4. Emergence of culture, civilization and the state of contentment as citizens of the city enjoy the fruits of civilization and conquest.

5. Decline of solidarity, the downfall of the state, and the emergence of threats on the borders of the city as alternate tribes, freshly rejuvenated by the emergence of their own solidarity, seek to establish their own state.

Ibn Khaldun proposed that while tribal character and connection may function as *asabiyyah* in developmental and rustic stages, religion was the main bond that could keep a human progress alive and flourishing. The solidarity that is so important to keep up the territorial integrity and the cultural momentum of the civilization could come only from religion.

The Caliphate as a form of government and type of Islamic state had been recognized by Muslim jurists as a canonical religious institution. Even Ibn Khaldun, the famous historian and social thinker believed in canonical need of the Caliphate. And for Muslims the need of its establishing was their religious obligation. Along these lines he as well, as Al Farabi, places religion as a need for the state (for a discussion of the continuing relevance of Ibn Khaldun, see Ahmad 2002; Cox 1992). It is fascinating to note that not just did the ascent and decay of the Islamic civilization take after the life cycle portrayed by Ibn Khaldun; the present day condition of Saudi Arabia too is by all accounts in any way following it. What is not clear is whether the present day Saudi Arabia is in stage 3, 4 or 5.

Note that all the four noticeable established Muslim political masterminds saw religion assuming an essential part in the arrangement, support, administration and sustenance of the state. For Al Farabi religion conveyed a foundational and epistemological quality to the polity, for Al Mawardi it was a legitimizing guideline, for Ibn Taymiyyah state was essential for religion itself and for Ibn Khaldun religion was the concrete that kept the state and society fundamental, Needless to say none of these scholars have propelled a huge treatise on the state, They are spectacularly comparable in restricted and that will be that they are all formative approaches to deal with examining the state from alternate points of view; political socio-cultural, legal and theological. It is one of the confinements 'of Islamic political thought that next to no work has been done to seek after the philosophical and sociological ways to deal with the state that were started by Al Farabi and Ibn Khaldun. A sign of the insecurity of contemporary Muslim felt that Al Mawardi and Ibn Taymiyyah, assume such a noticeable part in the theories of the Islamic state that are being progressed in the postcolonial time.

2.1.4 Theories of the Islamic state

Muslims not just wished to compose and administer their own particular social orders additionally wished to do as such in the authentic traditions of their own civilization. This quest for organizational and political legitimacy is interesting to the Muslim world principally in light of the fact that like the contemporary West the Islamic civilization too was a globally prevailing one in more than a military sense. The Islamic world had its own particular human progress or civilization, which implies that it had its own specific manner of organizing state and society. This had worked for it for over a thousand years. Numerous Muslims, intellectuals and conscious people, trust that it was the takeoff from the 'Islamic way' which was the reason for the decay of the Islamic civilization and a return would once again herald the reawakening of Islamic civilizational glory. The Islamic state has been imagined as the vehicle of change that would understand these desires (Ayubi 1991; Asad 1981; Enayat 1991; Ahmad 1986).

There have been **three particular theoretical headings** that Muslim scholars have tried to shape the Muslim world's postcolonial reality. The **first** and the most prevailing one was by secular Muslims who essentially looked for just political opportunity while socially and mentally grasping the West (Khan, 2001). A hefty portion of these Westernized secular elites replaced outside colonization with inside colonization and as a result proceeded with the same regimes as the past. These secular elites throughout the years have turned out to be corrupt, more slanted to sellout national interests in quest for power and riches and regardless of their Western intellectual steadfastness, greatly dictator and undemocratic. A significant part of the Muslim world today is ruled by these Western secular dictator elites. The points of confinement of their vision and the destitution of their dedication is maybe one of the significant reasons for the present crisis in the Muslim world.

2.1.4.1 Revival of Caliphate

The **second and the third directions** that Muslims are seeking after are both Islamic and non-secular in nature. They are the endeavors to either build up an Islamic state or revive the old institution of the Caliphate. The Islamic state and the Caliphate however comparable are entirely mutually exclusive ideas. It was the acknowledgment by driving Muslim scholars, for example, Rashid Rida that the likelihood of reinstating the Caliphate was impossible, which drove them to settle for a restricted Caliphate accepting the post colonial order of nation states and propelling the thought of the Islamic state. The theory of the Islamic state on a basic level acknowledges the world of nation states and is likewise a relinquishment of the utopian objective of worldwide political integration of the Muslim world.

The most prominent theorist with some contemporary influence in advocating the revival of the Caliphate was Taqiuddin an-Nabhani, the founder of *Hizb ut-Tahrir*. An-Nabhani has provided the Caliphate (*Caliphate*) movement the intellectual frame-work for their ideology. He produced a grand narrative about the virtues of the Caliphate far removed from historical reality. He believed that until the British and the Turks destroyed the institution of the *Khalifah*, the entire Muslim world was under one rule. Details such as the existence of three simultaneous Caliphs, the Abbasids in Baghdad, The *Fatimids* in Egypt, and the *Umayyads* in Spain during the tenth and eleventh century, or the lengthy wars between Muslim empires, and the presence of numerous dynasties such as the Mughals in India or the Safavids in Iran, are irrelevant to his argument that a unified Caliph ruled uninterrupted from the first successor to Prophet Muhammad until 1922. If he considers the then largest empire, like Umayyads or Abbasid Caliphate as the central Islamic rule then his claim is partially correct. He appears to be labouring under a basic belief that all Muslims have to do is declare the *Caliphate as well as* Islam and Islamic civilization will get back its lost glory. He obviously does not bother to explain how, if *Caliphate* alone is the solution of all problems, this glory was lost in the first place even while the *Caliphate* existed (an-Nabhani 1996).

An-Nabhani's book, *The Islamic State*, is full of historical factual errors, confusion between description and recommendation, and is more an expression of rage and frustration at the Muslim *condition* than a systematic theory of an Islamic polity. This confusion is further heightened by using the term 'Islamic state' interchangeably with the global 'Caliphate'. He does proceed a sample constitution, however, which is a confused mixture of liberal democratic (support election as a means of selecting Caliph or provincial rulers) ideas and Islamist rhetoric. This itself is a departure from the practice of the original Caliphate, which was never a constitutional polity. An-Nabhani's idea is now advanced mostly by disenfranchised and dissatisfied Muslim youth who use it to express their frustration with modernity and the powerlessness of the *Ummah* in the face of Western dominance.

2.1.4.2 The Changing Characteristics of the Islamic State

The third and the long lasting and partially successful response to Muslim post-colonial reality is the idea of the Islamic state. The thought of the Islamic state is essentially a postcolonial expression that throw-outs Western cultural and *geopolitical* domination of the Muslim world. It must be understood within the perspective of Muslim self-conception and Muslim political ambition under colonial occupation. The first modern call for a political revival of the Muslim community was moved up by Jamaluddin Afghani whose most

important goal in life was to decolonize Muslim lands and Muslim culture. He sought Muslims to become independent of the West politically as well as culturally, and he imagined an Islamic polity that would act as this symbol of hope of freedom from Western occupation. Even though Afghani did not actually utter of an Islamic state, his ideas of political independence from the West remain key foundations for the following call for an Islamic state prepared by Maududi and Iqbal in South Asia and echoed in Egypt by Rashid Rida, Hassan al-Bannah and Syed Qutb (Rahnerna 1994; Esposito and Voll 2001).

Afghani and his follower such as Muhammad Abduh were basically Islamic modernists. They received several aspects of modernity such as the importance of rational thought and science. Afghani and Abduh made it to some extent in reviving the rationalist tradition of the early *Mutazzalites*. But Afghani's most important blow was his ability to incite Muslim nationalism and stimulate the desire for political freedom. But even at late nineteenth century and early twentieth century, Muslim intellectuals were still talking of the *Ummah*, of the Muslim community as one global political unit and they expected to unite them all under one flag. This call for a global political unity became temporarily more pressing and popular in the late 1920s after the British forced the Ottomans to break up the institution of the Caliphate. Until then, the Caliphate had served as a sign of Muslim political unity and with its closure, the dream of a unified free *Ummah* ended (Keddie 1983).

The earliest pronouncement of the Islamic state was made in South Asia by Maulana Maududi, the founder of *Jamaat-e-Islami*, a movement seeking to revive Islamic civilization through the founding of an Islamic state. Another was Muhammad Iqbal who is considered the intellectual architect of Pakistan. The independence movement in India had created a sense of insecurity among Muslims who feared that they would be marginalized and dominated by the Hindu majority in the area after independence. This uncertainty and the mishandling of Muslim fears by India's Hindu leaders directed to the call for a separate state for Muslims in South Asia. Pakistan was thus conceive as a safe haven for Muslims, as a Muslim homeland. Both Iqbal and Maududi, however, anticipated not just to create a Muslim homeland but also an Islamic state.

For Iqbal, an Islamic state was the face of the Muslim spiritual self that sought to stand out morally in all spheres including the political ground. He imagined the Islamic state as a zenith of the Muslim quest of perfection and also submission to the will of God. He saw it as a vessel of Muslim identity and symptom of Islamic civilization (Esposito 1983). Maududi, however, thought the Islamic state as an ideological apparatus that sought to establish the

'sovereignty of God' (*Al-Hakimiyyah*) on earth. This was the first and also the most sophisticated theorization of an Islamic state. For Maududi, the purpose of the Islamic state was to implement the will of Allah and this was to be operationalized by applying the *Sharia* as the law of the land (Maududi 1992; see also Hasan 1984; Nasr 1997). Both Iqbal and Maududi granted the territoriality of the Islamic state as differed to the globality of the *Ummah* and they also accepted democracy with some adjustment which they called Islamic democracy. Iqbal sought to bound the franchise to those who were intellectually developed and knowledgeable and Maududi sought to formulate democracy ultimately subordinate to the *Sharia*. In real meaning, they were willing to embrace the democratic process but not the democratic spirit. Five significant characteristics are common to all these theorists:

1. *They considered the Islamic state as an ideological actor seeking to liberate the Muslim Ummah from Western domination. For most of these theorists the concept of a wicked, imperial, Judeo-Christian and anti-Islamic West was the threat against which the Islamic state was expected to appear and resist.*
2. *For the first time Islamic political theorists realized the need to state that religion and politics are not separate. Thus the Islamic state became a medium to reject secularism and secular humanism.*
3. *The Islamic state was symbolized as a political arrangement wherein God and God alone was sovereign and legislator. Once again this was considered in opposition to Western democracies where it was assumed that human will was sovereign, thus denying the option of politics guided by moral absolutes.*
4. *The ideological objective of the Islamic state was seen as applying the *Sharia* within its borders and a dedication to *Jihad* (struggle) to spread Islam abroad.*
5. *Finally nearly all theorists of the Islamic state in post colonial age including Maududi, Qutb, Iqbal, Rida and Khomeini, their (except An-Nabhani) criticism of democracy aside, advocated the embrace of democratic procedures in selecting rulers and legislators, even advocating collective decision-making.*

It is obvious that except for an-Nabhani who is a modernized imitation of Al Mawardi, most other theorists of the Islamic state are modern versions of Ibn Taymiyyah in their conception of the implementation of the *Sharia* as the definitive characteristic of an Islamic state. They too like Ibn Taymiyyah were living in times when Muslims felt insecure about their borders from Western imperialism and the dilution of their Islamic identity from the globalization of Western culture. Because of prolong history of war between Muslim and Roman and Persian Christian and Jews after the emergence of Islam in Arabian Peninsula. The insecurity

has been more increased for the long history of crusade. Second spell of mistrust and demand of Islamic State or Caliphate got life in post 9/11 aggression of western powers in Muslim lands. We can see the effort of Taleban and ISIL (Islamic State of Iraq and Levant) to establish Caliphate though there is dispute among the Muslim about the Taleban's or ISIL's concept of Caliphate.

In an Islamic state God alone is sovereign - is merely a further way of registering their resistance to Western domination, which still constant even after decolonization. When Islamist theories say God is sovereign, what they basically mean is that *Sharia* is must be functional and Western influences must be opposed.

2.1.5 Defining Islamic State in the Age of Globalization

9/11 incidence, insecurity and non-representative autocratic rule was the center demand by the non-secular majority Muslims of the Islamic State or Reviving Caliphate system in the postcolonial age. Most of the Muslim scholars have used Islamic state as the synonymous of Caliphate because of the Islamic concept of global brotherhood and anti Nationalistic view. All the scholars' common idea was to establish a state like Prophet Muhammad (SM) that was established in Madina-Mekka and his rightly guided Caliphs carried it on. The main feature of Islamic State idea among the scholars is acceptance and rejection of modern secular values as the foundation state and society. But rejection has got the momentum among the new generation in the Muslim world.

2.1.6 Conclusion

It is ironic that the discourse on the Islamic state is at once a rejection of Western modernity, as well as a consequence of and a simultaneous embrace of Western modernity. Several constitutive elements of modernity, the nation-state, territorial sovereignty and democratic procedures have been incorporated into the idea of the Islamic state by some reformist or liberal scholars. The idea of the Islamic state is more useful for discursive purposes, than for developmental purposes in an unislamic society. It is a useful means to save the Muslims from the repression of Western intellectual domination, but it has little value in generating socio-political change in the real sense. After the demise of Ottoman Caliphate, wherever the effort of Islamic states have emerged, they have only brought defeat, isolation, sanctions, war and criticism from the capitalist super powers or from the socialist super powers who feel the threat, the Muslims' ideological state or political unity. Very little support is found from the present rulers of the Muslim world. It is only through more practical experience that Islamic political theory can advance beyond the ideological state in which it currently exists. The present struggle for more freedom in Iran which promises to reshape the basic

premises of the Islamic revolution of 1979. Besides, the experience that Islamists may gain by running a secular democracy in Turkey, short time rule in Egypt by Muslim Brotherhood and Caliphate of ISIL in Iraq which has been unaccepted by international community. These are some practical lesson, which could ultimately help reformulate contemporary theories of Islamic State.

2.2 Principles of Islamic Political System

2.2.1 Concept of Islamic Politics

In Islamic ideology Politics or *Siyasah* means looking after the affairs of the *Ummah*¹ (Community, citizen or nation) internally and externally. This responsibility will carry out by both the Islamic state or government and the *Ummah*. The state is the unit that employ in this caring in practice while the *Ummah* engages in it by taking the state to task. (An-Nabhani 1996)

The Qur'an was sent as a divine guidance to those who believe and contains principles and guidelines essential for social, political and spiritual guidance of humanity². The Qur'an should however not be mistaken as a manual. It is an essence of divine values, a collection of revealed principles the understanding and following of which will lead us along the straight path. The derivation of a manual from the divine principles is one of the most important responsibilities that come from being a Muslim. This responsibility is like a *fard-e-kifaya* (communal obligation).

This definition of politics remains amongst all people, for it explains the actuality of politics as a term. It is like the definition of the mind, truthfulness and authority, among others. Every term has a common reality for all people and so has a common meaning for them, for it is a comprehended reality. Nonetheless, they vary in the rules that govern such a reality. From western secular perception politics is art of compromise among various political groups to run the state. In socialism politics is the means of demolishing class based society to ensure equality. In Islamic culture and civilization politics has a different perception and purpose. Furthermore, the linguistic meaning of this word in the root verb *Sasa, Yasoosu, Siyasatan* is to care for ones affairs. The author of *Al-Qamoos Al-Muheet*, (an Arabic dictionary) says, and *sustu ar-raiyata siyasatan* means commanded her and forbade her. This definition can also be extracted from the Ahadith addressing the rulers responsibility, the obligation of taking him to duty and the significance of caring for the interests of Muslims.

The Messenger (SAW) said: ***“Any person Allah (SWT) has placed in (a position) to foster the peoples affairs and he does not give them his advice he will not even smell the scent of Jannah (paradise)”***

¹ In first state in Madina prophet Muhammad (SAW) included other religion's people in the *Ummah*.

² Dr. Muqtedar Khan (2001), *The Compact of Medina: A Constitutional Theory of the Islamic State* <http://www.ijtihad.org/compact.htm>. This writing was also published in the *Mirror international* on May 30th, 2001

Furthermore, the evidences of commanding good and forbidding evil are evidences for the obligation of questioning the ruler, for they are general and thus include the ruler as well as others. Allah (SWT) I commanded to command goodness and forbid evil in a decisive manner.

He said:

“And let there arise amongst you a group, inviting to all that is good (Islam), commanding al-Marouf (good) and forbidding al-Munkar (evil); and those are the ones whom are the successful”. [Al- Imran: 104]

“Those who, if We firmly establish them on earth, remain constant in prayer, and give in charity, and command what is right and forbid the doing of what is wrong”. [Al- Hajj: 41]

“And the believers, both men and women, they are protecting friends one to another; they command what is right and forbid what is wrong.” [At- Tauba: 71]

“You are the best Ummah raised to mankind, you command what is right and forbid what is wrong.” [Al- Imran: 110]

“Those who follow the (last) Messenger, the unlettered Prophet whom they find mentioned in the Torah and Gospel; He commands them of what is right and forbids them what is wrong.” [Al- Araf: 157]

“(It is a triumph of) those who turn (unto Allah (SWT)) in repentance and who worship and praise (Him), and wander in devotion to the cause of Allah (SWT), and bow down (before Him) and prostrate themselves in adoration, and command what is right and forbid what is wrong.” [At- Tauba: 112]

Authority and caring for the peoples affairs is designated by the Islamic *Shariah* exclusively to the ruler.

Messenger of Islam (SAW) said: *“Whoever sees something he dislikes from his Ameer, he should be patient with him, for anyone who rebels against the authority and dies in that state (of rebellion), he will die in a state of Jahiliyah (ignorance).”*

This Hadith construct rebellion against him a rebellion against the authority.

This means authority belongs to the Ameer, and no one else.

Abu Hazim said: “I accompanied Abu Hurairah for five years, and he informed us of the Prophet saying:

“The Prophets ruled over the children of Israel, whenever a Prophet died another Prophet succeeded him, but there will be no Prophet after me. There will soon be Khulafa’ and they will number many.” They asked: ‘what then do you order us?’ He said: “Fulfill the Bay’ah to them, one after the other and give them their dues for Allah (SWT) will verily account them about what he entrusted them with.” [Bukhari, Sahih, #3455 and Muslim, Sahih, #4750]

And the saying of the Messenger (SAW):

“Anyone who took charge of any Muslims and he died while he was deceiving them Allah (SWT) will prevent him from entering paradise (Jannah). And: There will be leaders over you, (who will do things) you recognise (as part of the Deen), and you do not recognise. Whoever recognised he would be relieved (of sin), and whoever denied (the wrong), he would be safe.”

But, what about he who accepted and followed. They said: *Should not we fight against them.*

He (SAW) said:

‘No, as long as they prayed. And Whoever awakens and his concern is not for Allah (SWT), he does not belong to Allah (SWT). And: Whoever awakens not concerned with Muslims (affairs) is not from them.’

Jareer ibn Abdullah said:

I gave a pledge to the Prophet (SAW) to establish the prayer, to give the alms, and to give advice to every Muslim.

Jareer Ibn Abdullah also said: I came to the Prophet (SAW) and said: *“I give a pledge to you on Islam. The Messenger placed the condition upon me to give advice to every Muslim”*.

These Ahadith, whether indicating to the head of state in his place of ruling, or to the *Ummah*’s accounting of the ruler, or those dealing with the relationship between the Muslims with each other as far as caring for their concern and giving them the honest advice is concerned, they all has given the definition of politics as: fostering the *Ummah*’s issues. Consequently, the definition of politics is a divine definition derived from the *Shariah* evidences. About the caring for the affairs of the *Ummah* in practice, *Shara* has given the ruler alone that duty. Neither the citizens, collectively or anyone of them individually is permissible to carry out such tasks, unless he is legitimately appointed to do so. Such legal appointment can be ensured by a pledge of allegiance from the people as is the case with the Caliphate.

Anyone who is not appointed by the pledge of allegiance (from the citizens) or by the Caliph is not allowed carrying out any of the affairs of the *Ummah*, either internally or externally. Islamic evidence also employ the citizen of it to account its rule for his activities.

Abu Said Al-Khudri said: Allah (SWT).s Messenger (SAW) said:

“Whoever of you sees evil, let him change it with his hand, and if not able then with his mouth and if he is still not able then let him hate it within his heart and that is the least of faith.”

Also Uday b.Umayrah said: I heard the Prophet (SAW) say:

“Allah (SWT) does not punish the general public because of the wrong doing of specific people until they see the evil (committed) among them while able to stop it and they do not. If they do that, Allah (SWT) will punish the specific people and the general public.”

The above Ahadith make commanding good and forbidding evil an obligation. These Ahadith oblige the Muslims to command the rulers to do good and forbid them from doing evil. Undoubtedly, this is the very action of questioning them for their actions. However, there are Ahadith that address questioning the ruler

specifically due to the importance of commanding him to do good and forbidding him from evil. Atiyyah reported that Abu Said said: Allah’s (SWT) Messenger (SAW) said:

“The best jihad is a word of truth to an unjust ruler.”

Abu Umamah reported that: A man approached Allah’s (SWT)

Messenger (SAW) at the first *Jamrah* (in Hajj) and asked him: ***Oh Messenger***

of Allah (SWT), which is the best jihad? The Messenger (SAW) remained silent. When the Messenger threw the second stone, the man asked him again.

The Messenger did not answer. Upon throwing the stone of Aqbah, and the Messenger was about to mount, he (SAW) said:

“Where is the questioner? He said: Here I am Oh Messenger of Allah (SWT). He (SAW)

said: “A word of truth said to an unjust ruler.” This is a clear text pertaining to the ruler and the compulsion of saying the truth to him, i.e. accounting him. Struggling against those rulers who take peoples rights

or fall short in their duties or ignore any of the *Ummah’s* affairs or do the

like of that is a compulsion. This is because Allah (SWT) demanded it and

considered it like *jihad*. Rather, He (SWT) instructed it the greatest type of *jihad*; since Muhammad (SAW)said the best jihad is struggling against the tyrant ruler. This in itself is sufficient to prove that it is an obligation to question the rulers.

The Messenger (SAW) inspired the resist against the unfair rulers regardless of the harm that is inflicted upon the person who does so. The Muslim is encouraged to do it even if it leads to his death. It was reported that the

Messenger (SAW) said:

“The master of martyrs is Hamzah and a man who stood up to an unjust ruler, commanding him (to do good) and forbidding him (from evil) and was killed.”

This is one of the most ardent forms commanding the Muslims to tolerate harm, even death, in the practice of questioning the ruler and struggling against the unjust rulers.

2.2.1.1 Source of legislation: Sovereignty of Allah

In a democracy, laws are prepared by an assembly elected by the people; in a caliphate, the sources of legislation are made-up to be the *Qur'an* and the *Sunnah*. concerning the superiority of God in making laws rather than people.

The *Qur'an* states:

Say, "Allah is most knowing of how long they remained. He has [knowledge of] the unseen [aspects] of the heavens and the earth. How Seeing is He and how Hearing! They have not besides Him any protector, and He shares not His legislation with anyone." (18:26)

"Legislation is not but for Allah". (12:40)

[We said], "O David, indeed We have made you a caliph upon the earth, so judge between the people in truth and do not follow [your own] desire, as it will lead you astray from the way of Allah." Indeed, those who go astray from the way of Allah will have a severe punishment for having forgotten the Day of Account. (38:26)

Concerning the menace of following the will of the people (rather than the will of God as expressed in the *Qur'an* and the *sunnah*), the *Qur'an* states:

“And if you obey most of those upon the earth, they will mislead you from the way of Allah . They follow not except assumption, and they are not but falsifying. (2:116)

but most of the people do not know. (12:40)

And indeed, many among the people, of Our signs, are heedless. (10:92)

And indeed, many among the people are defiantly disobedient. Then is it the judgment of [the time of] ignorance they desire? But who is better than Allah in judgment for a people who are certain [in faith]. (5:49-50)

Or do they say, "In him is madness?" Rather, he brought them the truth, but most of them, to the truth, are averse. But if the Truth had followed their inclinations, the heavens and

the earth and whoever is in them would have been ruined. Rather, We have brought them their message, but they, from their message, are turning away. (23:70-71)

And indeed do many lead [others] astray through their [own] inclinations without knowledge. Indeed, your Lord - He is most knowing of the transgressors. (2:119)

While in a democracy, people vote for members of their representative assembly. That may impact legislation through direct votes in referendum. On the other hand in a caliphate popular feedback is provided through a consultative group (*shura*), although this happened rarely in the historical caliphates.

The *Qur'an* mentions this:

And those who have responded to their lord and established prayer and whose affair is [determined by] consultation among themselves, and from what We have provided them, they spend. (42:38)

"...So judge between them by that which Allah hath revealed, and follow not their desires away from the truth which hath come unto thee. For each We have appointed a divine law and a traced out way. Had Allah willed He could have made you one community..." (5:48)

2.2.2 Caliphate System of Government in Traditional Sense

A caliphate (in Arabic *khilāfa*) means "succession". It is a form of Islamic political-religious leadership that centers round a caliph. In Arabic it is *khalīfah* means "successor" to the prophet Muhammad. The succession of Muslim territory that subsists in the Muslim world is generally illustrated as "Caliphate". Conceptually, a caliphate stands for a sovereign state of the entire Muslim or the *Ummah*.

In its earlier days of Islam, the first caliphate is called the Rashidun Caliphate. Primarily Muhammad's immediate close disciples led it in continuation of the politico-religious systems he had introduced. The main piece of political writing inherited from the Muhammadan period is *al-sahīfah*, the document often known as the constitution of Medina. The text of which is attributed mostly to the *hijrah* episode of 622 to 624 CE. This constitution articulated of the believers as forming one *Ummah* (community), which also consist of the Jews of Medina. Even though composed of tribes, each of which is in charge of the conduct of its members, the *Ummah* as a whole is to act collectively in enforcing social order and security and in confronting enemies in times of war and peace.

After Prophet Muhammad (SAW) migrated from Mecca to Yathrib in 622 CE, he established the first Islamic state. For ten years Prophet Muhammad (SAW) was not only the leader of

the emerging Muslim Ummah in Arabia but also the political head of Medina. As the leader of Median, Prophet Muhammad (SAW) exercised jurisdiction over Muslims as well as non-Muslims within the city. The legitimacy of his rule over Medina was based on his status as the Prophet (SAW) of Islam as well as on the basis of the compact of Medina.³

He ruled over them by virtue of the tri-partite compact that was signed by the Muhajirun (Muslim immigrants from Mecca), the Ansar (indigenous Muslims of Medina and the Yahud (Jews). It is interesting to note that Jews were constitutional partners in the making of the first Islamic state⁴. The compact of Medina provides an excellent historical example of two theoretical constructs that have shaped contemporary political theory and should therefore be of great value to those scholars who are involved in the theorizing of the Islamic state. Political theory relies heavily on the ideas of a social contract and a constitution. A social contract, made famous by the French philosopher Rousseau is an imaginary agreement between people in the state of nature that leads to the establishment of a community or a state.

While western political thinkers like Rousseau and Locke have used this idea of an imaginary social contract as a fundamental premise for theorizing the modern state, there are really very few real examples of such an event in human history. In the American history, the Mayflower compact is one example. The writing and signing of the constitution after six months of deliberation in Philadelphia may be considered as another example of a social contract. But Muslims are fortunate to have the compact of Medina as a tradition upon which the foundations of a modern state can be built.⁵

The second idea that underpins contemporary political theory is the concept of the constitution. In many ways the constitution is the document that enshrines the conditions of the social contract upon which any society is founded. The writing of a constitution is a very old idea. Aristotle himself had collected over 300 written constitutions in his lifetime. The compact of Medina clearly served a constitutional function since it was the constitutive document for the first Islamic state.

³ Dr. Muqtedar Khan (2001), *The Compact of Medina: A Constitutional Theory of the Islamic State* <http://www.ijtihad.org/compact.htm>. This writing was also published in the *Mirror international* on May 30th, 2001

⁴ Dr. Muqtedar Khan (2001), *The Compact of Medina: A Constitutional Theory of the Islamic State* <http://www.ijtihad.org/compact.htm>. This writing was also published in the *Mirror international* on May 30th, 2001

⁵ Dr. Muqtedar Khan (2001), *The Compact of Medina: A Constitutional Theory of the Islamic State* <http://www.ijtihad.org/compact.htm>. This writing was also published in the *Mirror international* on May 30th, 2001

Thus we can argue that the compact of Medina serves the dual function of a social contract and a constitution.

The Sunni stem of Islam views that as a head of state, a caliph should be elected by Muslims or their influential representatives (Al-Ghamdy 2011). The adherents of Shia Islam think a caliph should be an *Imam* preferred by Allah (SWT) from the *Ahl al-Bayt* (the "Family of the House", Muhammad's direct descendants). The prominent Caliphate in world politics were the first four *rāshidūn* (rightly guided) caliphs (632–661 CE), the second during the Umayyad dynasty (661–750 CE), and the third during the 'Abbasid (749–1258 CE) and Ottoman (1281–1922 CE) dynasties.

The system of governance in Islam, designed by Creator of the worlds, is the Caliphate form of government in which a Caliph is chosen by a *bay'ah*. It is traditional by the Quran, *Sunnah* of Messenger of Islam and *ijma* (consensus) of his *Sahabah* (deceples).

Allah (SWT) (SWT) says:

(So judge between them by that which Allah (SWT) has revealed and follow not their desires away from the truth that has come to you...) [5:48]



Map: The Ottoman Empire⁶ in 1908

He (SWT) also says:

(Judge between them by that which Allah (SWT) has revealed and follow not their desires and beware of them lest they seduce you from some part of that which Allah (SWT) has revealed to you...) [5:49]

This order is from Allah (SWT) (SWT) to the Messenger (SAW) about ruling by the guidance that which Allah (SWT) has ordained indication to the humanity. It denotes the Muslim *Ummah* have to employ a ruler following the Messenger of Allah (SWT) who ruled them by the indication of scripture. As Allah (SWT) has commanded in holy decisively Quran, so it has been mandatory (*Fard*) for the Muslim to follow regarding ruling issues. It is a definitive sign (*Qarinah*) by the science of *Usul* (principles of Islamic jurisprudence)

2.2.3 Islamic Evidence of Obligation to Appoint a Caliph by Divine Law

The *Imama* or leader at the same time heads of the state those governed the Muslim *Ummah* as a symbol of their unity traditionally following the Messenger of Islam with that which Allah (SWT) revealed, is historically identified as Caliphate in world politics which had a continuity strongly or weakly up to 1924. Most of the classical scholars and modern scholars accept Caliphate Form of Government is the traditional and real form of Islamic Political System or ruling system for which revival many Muslim leaders or groups or Islamic political parties continued their movement in Indian subcontinent, Middle East and Africa after the fall of Ottoman Caliphate in 1924 for example Khilafat Movement⁷ of Indian subcontinent. Additional proof is given from the fact that the implementation of legal punishments (*Hudud*) as well as different rules (*Ahkam*) becomes mandatory and those are not possible to implement without an Islamic ruler. Those which are urgent to implement an obligation are also mandatory in Islam. Subsequently employ a ruler who will establish divine rules (*Shara'*) is also obligatory. So, to appoint a Caliph and rule of Caliphate System also is mandatory by most of the classical scholars. Concerning the Sunnah it was narrated from Nafi' that Abdullah ibn Umar (Ra) said:

⁶ The source of the map is-

https://www.google.com/search?q=strategic&source=lnms&tbm=isch&sa=X&ved=0ahUKEwj1-vp0ZjQAhVKO48KHUytA1AQ_AUICSgC&biw=1093&bih=543#tbm=isch&q=ottoman+caliphate+egypt&imgre=cLjzfTmQOn3vM%3

⁷ In the 1920s, the Khilafat Movement (1919-1924), a movement launched by Muslims in British India to defend the Ottoman Caliphate, spread throughout the British colonial territories. It was particularly strong in British India where it formed a rallying point for some Indian Muslims as one of many anti-British Indian political movements. Its leaders included Maulana Mohammad Ali, his brother Shaukat Ali, and Abul Kalam Azad, Mukhtar Ahmed Ansari, and Barrister Muhammad Jan Abbasi. For a time it worked in alliance with Hindu communities and was supported by Mohandas Karamchand Gandhi, who was a member of the Central Khilafat Committee ("*The Khilafat Movement*". Indhistory.com. Retrieved 2011-06-05). However, the movement lost its momentum after the arrest or flight of its leaders, and a series of offshoots splintered off from the main organization.

"I heard the Messenger of Allah (SWT) (SAW) say: 'Whoever withdraws his hand from obedience (to the Amir) will find no proof for himself when he meets Allah (SWT) on the Day of Judgment, and whoever dies without having an oath of allegiance (Bai'ah) on his neck he would die the death of Jahiliyyah (ignorance).'" [Muslim, Sahih, #1851]

The prophet (SAW) of Islam gratified each Muslim to take a pledge of allegiance (*bay'ah*). Subsequent to the prophet of Allah (SWT) (SAW), a pledge of allegiance (*bay'ah*) is only specified to the Caliph. As the hadith indicates to continue of a pledge of allegiance (*bay'ah*) by every Muslim that obliges the Muslim community to appoint a Caliph.

Muslim narrated from Al-Araj on the authority of Abu Hurairah that the Prophet (SAW) said:

"Indeed the Imam is a shield, from behind whom one would fight, and by whom one would protect oneself." [Muslim, Sahih, #1841]

Muslim also reports on the say-so of Abu Hazim that he said: "I accompanied Abu Hurairah for five years, and he informed us of the Prophet saying:

"The Prophet (SAW) ruled over the children of Israel, whenever a Prophet died another Prophet succeeded him, but there will be no Prophet after me. There will soon be Khulafa' and they will number many." They asked: 'what then do you order us?' He said: "Fulfill the Bay'ah to them, one after the other and give them their dues for Allah (SWT) will verily account them about what he entrusted them with." [Bukhari, Sahih, #3455 and Muslim, Sahih, #4750]

In this verse of Hadith, Caliph is considered as a shield or protection for Muslim *Ummah*. The explanation or direction of the prophet to the Muslim about Imam or Caliph implies the continuity of Caliphate and the verse requesting to appoint a Caliph through *Bay'ah* to rule the community according to divine law. Furthermore, the prophet of Islam it indicates to obey the Caliph and to fight those who dispute with them about their unique authority.

"Whosoever gave a Bay'ah to an Imam, giving him the clasp of his hand, and the fruit of his heart shall obey him as long as he can, and if another comes to dispute with him, you must strike the neck of that man." [Muslim, Sahih, #1844]

But, how can the Caliph be obeyed if he does not exist? And how the people will do struggle for one Caliph's united ruling. The decisive documents proof that the existence or the

appointment of a Caliph for the Muslim is a mandatory order by divine authority. As for the *Ijma or concensus* of Sahaba, they (may Allah be pleased with them all) approved and elected or selected a Caliph as a successor of Messenger (SAW) of Islam after his death. They all unanimously agreed to appoint Abu Bakr (ra) as the Caliph as well as after his death to appoint Umar (ra) as his successor. Correspondingly they appointed Ali and Uthman (ra). The general consensus was of the companions of prophet on the significance of appointing the chief of the state and religion before the burial of the greatest Messenger of Allah. The general consensus of the *Sahaba* manifested this appointment was the most important job for the *Ummah*, even though the burial of the dead person after his death is obligatory. The *Sahaba* got obliged to arrange for the funeral of the Messenger (SAW) but instead were worried with the selection of the first Caliph. Some *Sahaba* remained quiet about this holdup for two nights, inspite of having the ability to bury the Messenger (SAW) sooner. The Messenger (SAW) passed away late on Monday morning and was not buried that day or night. Not until Tuesday night, after Abu Bakr (ra) was given the Bay'ah as well as became Caliph was the Messenger (SAW) buried. So, the burial was late for two nights. On this ground, this action of the *Sahaba* is a proof of *Ijma* (consensus) for engaging in the appointment of the Caliph instead of burying the dead person. This could not have been lawful unless the appointment of Caliph was obligatory and of higher concern than the burial of the dead person. Moreover all through the lives of the Sahabah, they approved to the obligation of appointing the Caliph. Although there were different opinions that who will be Caliph, they never disputed the fact that a Caliph must be appointed, whether after the death of the Messenger (SAW) or after the death of each of the Caliph. Therefore, the common consensus (*ijma*) of the Sahabah undoubtedly conforms that the appointment of a Caliph is mandatory.

2.2.4 Main Characteristics of Caliphate

The Islamic political system has a numeral of main standard; two of those are:

1. Legislation is produced from the divine scriptures i.e. the *Qur'an* and *Sunnah*, *Ijmaa as-Sahaba* (Consensus of the Companions of the Prophet) and *Qiyas* (Analogical reasoning) these ensure sovereignty of Allah or Shariah Law.
2. The authority lies with the people.

The previous opinion disregards the key principle of secular democracies, while the second issue challenges the key attribute of dictatorships.

2.2.4.1 Meaning of Authority Belongs to the People in Islam

This denotes that the people are the ones who have the authority of ruling. They do the agreement with the ruler (*Caliph*) to rule according to the *Qur'an* and *Sunnah*. The contract or *bai'ah* requires that the ruler is allowed to rule the people as long as he governs according to the *Quran* and *Sunnah*. The appointment of the ruler is hence through popular approval from the people via an electoral process.

A head of state must contain consent from the population or it will be considered illegitimate. This entirely places to rest the myth that the *Caliphate* State would be one sort of spiritual dictatorship forced upon the people throughout religious fiat. The Caliph is the man who correspond to the *Ummah* in ruling, power and in the execution of the Divine laws (Islamic Shariah Law). Islam gives the rights that ruling and authorities belong to the *Ummah*. It is consequently for the *Ummah* to employ a person to run that power and pertain the divine laws on her behalf.'

2.2.4.2 The Method of Appointing the Caliph

When *Shara* (Islamic Law) made it incumbent upon the *Ummah* to appoint a Caliph, it determined for her the method by which the Caliph is appointed. This method is proven in the Book and the *Sunnah*. The Muslims who must give the *bayah* are those that are citizens of the Caliphate at that time. In the case where there is no Caliphate, the Muslims responsible for giving the *bayah* are those living in the region where the Caliphate should be implemented.

The method of electing the Caliph through a *bayah* is proved from the example of the Bayah given by the Muslims to the Prophet (SAW), and from the order of the Messenger (SAW) to us, to pledge Bay'ah to the Imam. The Bayah of the Muslims to the Messenger (SAW) was not a Bayah on Prophet hood, but a Bayah over ruling, for it was regarding action not belief. Therefore, Rasool Allah (SAW) was pledged allegiance to as a ruler, and not as a Prophet or a Messenger. This is because acknowledging the Prophethood and Messengership is linked to belief (*Iman*), and not a Bayah. Hence the Bayah to him (SAW) was only in his capacity as the head of the state.

The Bayah is also mentioned in the *Qur'an* and *Hadith*. Allah (SW T) says:

"O Prophet! If the believers come to you to take the oath (Bay'ah) that they will not associate [in worship] anything with Allah (SWT), that they will not steal that they wit not commit adultery, that they will not kill their children, that they will not utter slander, intentionally

forging falsehood, and they will not disobey you in any just matter (Ma'roof), then receive their oath (Bayah). [TMQ: 60:12]

In another verse Allah (SWT) says:

"Verily those who pledge their allegiance to you do no less than pledge their allegiance to Allah: The Hand of Allah is over their hands."

[TMQ:48:10],

Al-Bukhari narrated on the authority of Ismail, who reported on the authority of Malik, who reported on the authority of Yahya bin Sa'id who said; "Ubadahbin Al-walid told me, that my father told me that Ubadah bin al-Samit said; "We have pledged allegiance to the Messenger of Allah to listen and obey in ease and in hardship and that we **do not dispute** the matter (authority) with its people **and that we stand** for and speak the truth wherever we are and that in the **service** of Allah we would fear the blame of no one." [Bukhari, Sahih, #7054 and Muslim, Sahi, # 4748]

Muslim has reported that Abdullah ibn Amru ibn al-As narrated that the Messenger of Allah (SAW) said:

"Whosoever pledges allegiance to an Imam by giving him the claps of his hand, let him obey him if he is able to do so, but if another comes a long to dispute with him, then kill the latter,"[Ahmad, Musnad, 3/10]

Also in Muslim it is narrated that Abu Saeed Ai-Kluidri reported that the Messenger of Allah (SAW) said:

"If two Khulafaa' were pledged allegiance, then them kill the latter of them,"

[Muslim, Sahih, #1853]

Muslim narrated on the authority of Abi Hazim who said: "I accompanied Abu Huraira for five years and I heard him talk of the Prophet's (SAW) saying: *"Banu Israel used to be governed by Prophet, every time a Prophet died, another came after him, and there is not Prophet after me. There will be Khulafa and they will number many.* They said: "What would you order us to do?" He (SAW) said; "Fulfil the Bayah to them one after the other, and give them their due right sureiv Allah (SWT) will account them for that which He entrusted them with [Bukhari, sahin, # 3455]

These texts from the Book and the Sunnah explicitly state that the method of appointing a Caliph is by the Bayah. This was understood and practiced by all of the Sahabaah. The bayah given to the rightly guided Khulafaa was clear in this regard.

2.2.4.3 Appointment of Four Rightly Guided Caliphs in Islamic History

Holy Quran, guidance of Prophet Muhammad (SAW) and the appointment of four rightly guided Caliphs are the main basis of Islamic political system and tradition of Islamic politics. Moreover, in the 1400 years history and tradition of successful Caliphs and Caliphate also can be consider as one of the basis of Islamic politics.

Abu Bakr's (ra) Bay'ah.

In the hall of *Bani Saa'idah* (Family of Sa'd ibn Ubadah (ra)) immediately after the passing away of the Messenger of Allah (SWT) (saw), the candidates were primarily Abu Bakr (ra), Umar (ra), Abu Ubaidah (ra) and Sa'd ibn Ubadah (ra). Nevertheless, Umar (ra) and Abu Ubaidah (ra) did not consider anybody equal to Abu Bakr (ra), so they did not challenge him. Thus contest was practically limited to Abu Bakr (ra) and Sa'd ibn Ubadah (ra). Then the prominent people present in the hall elected Abu Bakr (ra) and gave him the *Bay'ah* of contract. The next day, Muslims took the *Bay'ah* of obedience with Abu Bakr (ra).

Umar's (ra) Bay'ah.

Abu Bakr (ra) discussed with the Muslims before his death and got their opinion in favor of Umar (ra). Abu Bakr (ra) then nominated Umar (ra) to the Muslims for Caliphate, without getting any other candidate. The Muslims saw no disagreement with this nomination. On Abu Bakr's (ra) death the Muslims gave Umar (ra) the *Bay'ah* of contract and then the *Bay'ah* of obedience.

Uthman's (ra) Bay'ah.

Umar (ra) nominated six people to the Muslims and limited the Caliphate to them. Then Abdul-Rahman ibn Awf (ra) discussed with the remaining five. Thus short listing the nominees to two: Ali (ra) and Uthman (ra), after they delegated the matter to him. After probing the opinions of the people, the opinion settled on Uthman (ra) as Caliph.

Ali's (ra) Bay'ah.

For Imam Ali (ra), there was no other candidate for Caliphate beside him, so the majority of Muslims of al-Madinah and al-Kufah gave him the *Bay'ah*, and then he got the fourth Caliph.

2.2.4.4 Qualities and Conditions to Become a Caliph

1. The Caliph

The Caliph is the man who represents the *Ummah* in ruling, authority and in the implementation of the Divine laws (Shariah). Islam has decreed that ruling and authority belong to the *Ummah*. It is therefore for the *Ummah* to appoint an individual to administer that authority and apply the divine laws on her behalf. Allah (SWT) (SAW) made it obligatory upon the *Ummah* to execute all of the Shariah. Since the Caliph is appointed by the Muslims, this makes him a representative of the *Ummah* in terms of ruling, authority and in the implementation of the Shariah rules. No-one can become a Caliph unless the *Ummah* has given him the pledge of allegiance (Bayah) because ruling, authority and the implementation of the Shariah belong to the *Ummah* in origin. By giving Bay'ah to a man as Caliph, the *Ummah* effectively appoints him as her representative. Through this Bayah the Caliphate state is delegated to him, giving him the authority (Sultan) and obliging the *Ummah* to obey him.

The man who rules the Muslims does not become Caliph unless the Bay'ah is given to him by the influential people (Ahl al-Hall Wa'l-Aqd) from amongst the *Ummah*, without compulsion. He must fulfil certain obligatory conditions for a Caliph and should proceed after that in implementing the rules of the Shariah.

2. The title:

His title could be the Caliph, the "Imam" or the "Amir al-Mu'minin". These titles have been narrated in sound Ahadith and in the Ijma' of the Sahabah. The Khulafa' Al-Rashidin (first four Khulafa') have held such titles.

Abu Said Al-Khudri reported that the Messenger of Allah (SWT) (SAW) said: "If the pledge of allegiance (Bay'ah) has been taken for two Khulafaa' kill the latter of them." (Muslim, Sahih, #1842)

'Abdullah ibn Amr Ibn al-'Aas reported that he heard Allah (SWT)'s Messenger (SAW) say: "Whoever pledged allegiance to an Imam giving him the clasp of his hand and the fruit of his heart shall obey him as long as he can ..." [Muslim, Sahih, #1844]

Auf Ibn Malik reported that he heard the Messenger of Allah (SWT) (SAW) say: "The best of your Imams are those whom you love and they love you and who pray for you and you pray for them ..." [Muslim, Sahih, #4782].

In these ahadith the title of the ruler that executes the divine rules in Islam is the Caliph or the Imam.

The most authentic reports regarding the title “Amir al-Mu’mineen,” came from the hadith of Shihab Al-Zuhri reported by Al-Hakim in al-Mustadrak [vol.3, p.73, #4480], which was authenticated by al-Zahabi [in the Talkhis]. Al-Tabarani has reported a narration regarding which Al-Haythami declared all transmitters of sound character. Al-Hakim narrates the hadith as follows:

“Ibn Shihab narrated that ‘Umar ibn Abdul Aziz asked Abu Bakr ibn Suleiman ibn Abi Haythma... “Who was the first to write from Amir al-Mu’minin?” He said, “Ash-Shafa’ told me, who was from the first female emigrants, that ‘Umar ibn al-Khattab (ra) wrote to the governor of Iraq to request two strong men so as to ask them about Iraq and its people. He sent to him Labeed ibn Rabeeah and Adi ibn Hatim. When they arrived to al-Madinah they halted their two camel rides in the courtyard of the masjid and entered into the masjid. They suddenly saw Amr ibn al-Aas, and said, “Ask O Amr for us the permission to see Amir ul-Mu’mineen!” Amru said, “By Allah (SWT), you called him by his right name. He is the Amir, and we are the believers (mu’mineen).” Then Amru jumped and entered before ‘Umar, Amir ul-Mu’mineen and said, “Assalamu Alayka ya Amir ul-Mu’mineen (Peace be upon you O Amir of the believers).” ‘Umar said, “What made you think of this name, O ibn al-As? Allah (SWT) knows you have to justify that which you say.” He said, “Labeed ibn Rabeeah and Adi ibn Hatim arrived and they camped their two camel rides in the courtyard of the masjid and came to me and said ask O Amru for us the permission to see Amir al-Mu’minin!’ By Allah (SWT) they gave you the right name; we are the believers (mu’mineen) and you are our Amir.” Since then, they started using this title in writing.” Ash-Shifa’ was the grandmother of Abu Bakr ibn Suleiman. After this the Muslims continued to call the Khulafaa’ after ‘Umar (ra) by this title.” [See also Bukhari, Adab al-Mufrad, #780].

2.2.4.5 Obligatory Conditions for the Appointment of a Caliph

The Caliph must satisfy seven contractual conditions in order to qualify for the post and for the Bayah to be valid, if any one of the conditions is absent, the contract of appointing the Caliph would be nullified.

1. The Caliph must be Muslim

A disbeliever cannot be given bayah and it would not be allowed to obey him if he was. This is because Allah (SWT) says:

(And Allah (SWT) will never (Ilan) give the disbelievers any way (of authority) again the believers,) [TMQ; 4: 141]

Through his position a ruler has power over those whom he rules. The term 'Ilan' (never), means the categorical prohibition of the disbeliever (Kafir) for taking a post of authority over the Muslims, whether as Caliph or any other position in authority. This, therefore, forbids the Muslim to accept the Kafir to rule over them.

Allah (SWT) has specified that the person in charge of the affairs of Muslims must be Muslim. Allah (SWT) says in the Quran:

"O you who believe, obey Allah and obey the Messenger and those in authority (Ulil-Amr) from amongst you. " [TMQ; 4:59]

Allah (SWT) also says:

"When there comes to them some matter touching public safety or fear they divulge it. If they had only referred it to the Messenger or to the people of authority (Ulil-Amr) from among them" [TMQ; 4:38]

The phrase "Ulil-Amr" is only used when referring to Muslims and never when referring to non-Muslims. This provides further evidence that those in authority must be Muslim. Since the Caliph is in the highest position of authority and is responsible for appointing others to positions of authority such as his assistant Walis and 'amills, he himself, must be Muslim.

2. The Caliph must be male.

The Caliph must be a man, not a woman. It is narrated by Al-Bukhari that when the Messenger of Allah (SAW) heard that the people of Persia had appointed the daughter of Chosroes (Kisra) as queen, he said:

"People who appoint (Wallau) a woman as their leader will never succeed." [Bukhari, Sahih, #4425]

By associating failure with the appointment of a woman as ruler, the Messenger of Allah (SAW) indicates that it is forbidden for Muslims, This *hadith* is in the form of a request that admonished those who appointed a woman to run their affairs. This gives an indication (*qarinah*) that the request is decisive which means a prohibition on appointing a woman as a ruler.

The fact that this came in the form of a request, which came in the form of reproaching those who appoint a woman to run their affairs by denying them success, implies a meaning (*Qarinah*) which indicates decisiveness. Thus, the forbiddance from appointing a woman as a ruler came here linked with a connotation that indicates the decisive forbiddance. So the appointment of a woman as *wali amr* is prohibited (*haram*). This includes any post in ruling, whether it is the position of Caliph or any other post with delegated authority in ruling. This is because the subject of the *hadith* is the appointment of the daughter of Chosroes as a Queen, and is related to the issue of ruling itself but not specifically to Chosroes's daughter or the status of a Queen. The Hadith is also not general ('am) to cover everything related to ruling so it does not include positions within the judiciary, the *shura* council, accounting the rulers or the election of the ruler.

Rather, all of this is allowed for the woman as will be explained in the relevant sections.

3. The Caliph must be mature

It is forbidden to appoint a child as Caliph before he becomes mature, which is physically marked by passing puberty. Abu Dawud narrated from 'Ali Ibn Abi Talib who said that the Messenger of Allah (SAW) said:

"Accountability is lifted off three persons: The one who is asleep until he awakes, the boy (adolescent) until he reaches maturity and the deranged until he regains his mind." (Abu Dawud, Sunan, #4398),

Evidence is also derived from what Al-Bukhari narrated from Abu Aqil Zaharah Ibn Ma'bad who repeated on the authority of his grand-father Abdullah Ibn Hisham who lived during the time of

the Messenger of Allah (SAW), that his mother Zainab bit Hamid took him to the Messenger of Allah (SAW) and said;

“O Messenger of Allah, take a bayah from him. Upon this the Messenger of Allah said: He is young and he wiped over his head and prayed for him” [Bukhari, Sahih, #7210].

Therefore, if the Bay'ah of the little boy is not valid, and he cannot even give Bayah to a Caliph, he clearly cannot become Caliph himself,

4. The Caliph must be sane

It is unlawful to have a Caliph who has become is sane due to the hadith from Allah's Messenger (SAW) narrated in point 3 indicating that the "pen has been lifted..." from " ...the deranged in his mind until he restores his mind,"

5. Caliph must be a just

The person off whom the pen is raised is not accountable because the mind required for a person to be responsible for his actions. The Caliph enacts the rules and executes all the legal duties, it is therefore unlawful to have an insane because an insane person cannot even be responsible to look after the affairs of the People. The Caliph must be just ('adl).

It would not be right for the Caliph to be a 'Fasiq'. Integrity is an obligatory condition for contracting the Caliphate and is important for its continuity. This is because Allah (SWT) has stipulated that the witness must be just. He (SWT) says:

"And seek the witness of two just men from amongst you" [TMQ; 65:2]

So if the witness must be just, then the Caliph who holds a higher post and rules over the witness himself should, by greater reason, be just. For if justice was stipulated for the witness, its presence in the Caliph must exist by greater reason.

6. The Caliph must be a free man

Any slave is under his master's authority and so he cannot run his own affairs and therefore he cannot be given the power to run other people's affairs and rule over them.

7. The Caliph must be able to carry out the task of the Caliphate

One who is unable to perform the job for whatever reason cannot perform the duty of running the people's affairs by the Book and the *Sunnah* upon which he took the pledge of allegiance (Bayah). The Court of unjust acts has mandatory powers to determine whether a Caliph has the ability to perform his job and the types of "inability" that may exist.

2.2.4.6 Ruling Tenure and Condition in Islam

There is no permanent period limit for a leader. The Court of Unjust Acts can eliminate him at any time, if the Caliph breaks the legitimate contract of ruling or break any of the qualifying condition to rule. Islam does not allow a corrupt ruler for five years for the next election to remove him. Anas b. Malik reported that the Messenger of Allah (saw) said:

«اسمعوا وأطيعوا، وإن استعمل عبدٌ حبشيٌّ، كان رأسه زبيبة»

"Do hear and obey, even if you were ruled by an Abyssinian slave, whose hair is like the raisin".

In another narration He (saw) said:

«يقودكم بكتاب الله»

"...as long as he leads you by the Book of Allah".

Besides, all the Khulafa Rashideen were given an indefinite (mutlaq) bay'ah which is the one mentioned in the Ahadith. They were not of a limited period (in office). Each one of them assumed the post of Caliphate until he died; and this represents a general consensus from the Sahabah (r.a.), confirming that the Caliphate is not of a limited term of office but one unrestricted. Thus if a Caliph is given a bay'ah, he remains in office until he dies.

The code is embedded in divine law but can be observed as providing long term continuity as well as avoiding the conciliation and money reliance that short term electoral sequences carry in modern democracies.

2.2.4.7 The Unity of the Caliphate

Most of the classical scholars think that it is obligatory for the Muslims to live under one political leadership or single state and to be ruled by one Caliph and under one Caliphate. It is also urgent that the governance system in the Caliphate State be a system of unity, and it is forbidden for it to be a federal system. This is due to what Muslim narrated on the authority of Abdullah

b. Amru b. al- Aas who reported that he heard the Messenger of Allah (SWT) (SAW) say:

"Whoever pledged allegiance to an Imam giving him the clasp of his hand and the fruit of his heart, he should obey him as much as he can, and if another comes to dispute with him, you must strike the neck of the latter".

It has also been narrated by Muslim that Afrajah said: "I heard the Messenger of Allah (SAW) say:

"Whoever pledged allegiance to an Imam giving him the clasp of his hand and the fruit of his heart, he should obey him as much as he can, and comes to dispute with him, you must strike the neck of the latter".

It has also been narrated by Muslim that Afrajah said: "I heard the Messenger of Allah (SAW) say:

"Whoever comes to you while your affair has been united over one man, intending to divide your power or dissolve your unity, kill him". (Muslim., Sahih #1844)

It has also been reported by Muslim from Abu Said Al Khudri that the Messenger of Allah (SAW) said:

"If the Oath of Allegiance (bayah) has been taken for two Caliphs, kill the latter of them." [Muslim, Sahih, #1853]

Muslim also reported that Abu Hazim said, "I accompanied Abu Huraira for five years and heard him talking about the Prophet's (SAW) saying:

"The children of Israel have been governed by Prophet; whenever a Prophet died another Prophet succeeded him; but there will be no Prophet after me. There will soon be Khulafaa and they will number many; they asked: What then do you order us?"

He (SAW) said:

"Fulfill allegiance to them one after the other, and give them their dues; for verily Allah will ask them about what he entrusted them with". [Bukluiri,Sahih, #3455]

The first hadith reveals that if the Imamah (Caliphate) has been given to someone he should be obeyed, and if another man comes to dispute his authority, he should be fought and killed if he did not leave the clash.

The second hadith shows that when the Muslims are united under the leadership of one Amir, and a person comes along with the aim to split their power and break up their unity, his killing becomes

compulsory. The two hadiths undoubtedly point to prohibition of dismembering the State, the strong warning against its division, and preventing any breakaway effort even if it means raising the sword (force).

The third hadith points toward that in the case of the nonexistence of a Caliph, due to death, removal or resignation, and the contracting of the bayah to two Khulafaa, the latter of them should be killed. This means the Caliph is he who was given the first bayah, whilst the one that who was given the bayah after the first must be killed if he does not resign himself from Caliphate Post. If the bayah was taken to more than two, then all those, except the first person given the bayah must be fought and killed unless they leave from the bayah. This obviously indicates that the dismembering of the State is forbidden, which means that turning it into small Statelets is forbidden; it has to remain one single State.

The fourth hadith indicates that the Khulafaa would number many after the Messenger of Allah (SAW) and that the Sahabah asked him about what he ordered them to do when the Khulafaa numbered many, and he replied that they should fulfill their allegiance to the Khulafaa one after the other, starting by the first one they gave their bayah to, for he would be the legitimate one and he alone should be obeyed. As for the others, they are not to be obeyed for their bayah is void and null and unlawful, for it is forbidden for another Caliph to be given a bayah while there survives a Caliph already in office. This hadith also indicates that obedience to a single Caliph is obligatory. Therefore, it is forbidden for the Muslims to have more than one Caliph and more than one single State that contradicts the Modern Nation State concept (West Falliur System).

2.2.4.8 Majlis- ul-Ummah for Consulting the Ummah and Accounting the Caliph

The council of the ummah for *Shura* and accounting-

This is a Council formed by individuals representing the opinion of the Muslims at large, to which the Caliph can refer to in regards to consulting them on various issues. They in turn are the representatives of the Ummah in holding the rulers accountable. This is deduced from the Messenger of Allah's (saw) consultation with some men from the Ansar and the Muhajireen who represent their people. It is also derived from the Messenger's (saw) assigning some of his sahabah for shura, he used to refer to them more than to others for seeking an opinion, such as Abu Bakr, Umer, Hamza, Ali, Salman Al-Farisi, Hudhayfah,

It is also deduced from the fact that Abu Bakr (ra) designated some men from the Muhajireen and the Ansar to refer to them seeking their opinion when something happened. The people of

the Shura at the time of Abu Bakr (ra) were the Ulama and the people of Fatwa. Ibn Sa'ad reported from Al-Qasim that when something happened and Abu Bakr wanted to consult the people of opinion and the people of Fiqh, he called from the Muhajireen and the Ansar. 'Umar, 'Uthman, 'Ali, 'Abdur Rahman b. 'Awf, Mu'aadh b. Jabal, Ubai bin Ka'ab and Zaid b. Thabit. They all used to give their opinion during the Caliphate of Abu Bakr. People would also take their *Fatwa*. When 'Umar became Caliph he would also call these people. There are also evidences that call upon the Muslims to account the rulers. Muslims exercised such accounting as it happened at the time of khulafaa' rashidoon. As the ummah is allowed to be represented in shura she is allowed to be represented in accounting. All of this indicates it is allowed to have a special council that represents the ummah in accounting and in the shura which is established by the text of the Quran and Sunnah. It is called: the council of the ummah because it represents the ummah in shura and accounting.

It is permitted for non-Muslim citizens to be members of the Council, in order to file complaints against any injustice perpetrated against them by the rulers or against any mis-implementation of Islam upon them or the lack of services to them or the like.

The right of the *shura* in Caliphate

Shura is a right of all the Muslims which the Caliph should fulfil. They are entitled to be consulted and the Caliph should refer to them and consult them. Allah (swt) says:

وَشَاوِرْهُمْ فِي الْأَمْرِ فَإِذَا عَزَمْتَ فَتَوَكَّلْ عَلَى اللَّهِ (آل عمران: 159)

"And do consult them in the matter, and if you decide (on an action/on an opinion) put your trust in

Allah" [3:159]

Allah (swt) says also:

وَأْمُرْهُمْ شُورَىٰ بَيْنَهُمْ (الشورى: 38)

"And their matter is in consultation between them". [TMQ 42: 38]

The Messenger of Allah (saw) used to refer to people and consult with them. He (saw) consulted them on the day of Badr about the location of the battlefield, and he consulted them on the day of

Uhud about whether to fight inside or outside Madina. On the day of Badr he took the advice of Al-Habab Ibnu-l- Mundhir regarding a technical opinion voiced by an expert which he accepted. On the day of Uhud he accepted the opinion of the majority, despite the fact that his personal opinion was different.

Umar Ibnu Al-Khattab consulted the Muslims regarding the land of Iraq, whether to divide it among the Muslims because it was booty or to leave it in the hands of its people with the condition that they paid its Kharaj with the land remaining the property of the Treasury. He then acted according to his own ijtiḥad and the majority of the Sahabah approved of it, so he left the land in the hands of its people and ordered them to pay the Kharaj.

The right of accounting in Caliphate

Besides, the Muslims have the right to be consulted by the Caliph, they must also account the rulers regarding their actions and practices. Allah (swt) obliged the Muslims to account the rulers, and He commanded them in a decisive form to account them and change them if they transgressed against the rights of the citizens, failed in their duties towards them or neglected any of her affairs, or violated the rules of Islam, or governed by other than the rules of Allah. It was narrated by Muslim from Um Salamah (ra) that the Messenger of Allah (saw) said:

«ستكون أمراء فتعرفون وتنكرون، فمن عرف برئ، ومن أنكر سلم، ولكن من رضي وتابع، قالوا أفلا نقاتلهم؟ قال: لا، ما حنونا»

"There will be ameers, you would agree on some of what they do and reject some. So, whoever acknowledged (the truth of what they do) he would be free (of sin), and whoever rejected (the wrong) he would be safe (of responsibility), but what about the one that accepted and followed? (He would not be safe). They said: Should not we fight against them? He said: No, as long as they pray."

Prayer here is indication of ruling by Islam.

Muslims, led by Umer, denied at the beginning the decision of Abu Bakr regarding the fight against the apostates.

Al-Bukhari and Muslim narrated from Abu Hurayrah, he said: "When the Messenger of Allah (saw) passed away, and Abu Bakr (ra) became Caliph and some Arabs apostated, Umer (ra) said: How do you fight against the people when the Messenger of Allah (saw) said:

«أمرت أن أقاتل الناس حتى يقولوا لا إله إلا الله، فمن قالها فقد عصم مني ماله ونفسه إلا بحقه، وحسابه على الله.»

'I have been commanded to fight against the people till they say la ilaha illa Allah. Whoever said it he would have protected from me his wealth and blood except for its due right, and his account will be with Allah.'

He said: By Allah, I will fight against the one that differentiated between the prayer and the zakah, for the zakah is a right due on the wealth. By Allah, if they refused to pay me a young she-goat they used to pay to the Messenger of Allah (saw) I would fight against them for refusing to pay it. Umer (ra) said: By Allah, it was Allah that soon opened the heart of Abu Bakr, so I knew it was the truth."

Bilal ibn Rabah and Al-Zuabiy and others have also rejected that Umer did not divide the land of Iraq among the fighters. A bedouin also denied that Umer protected some land. Abu Ubayd narrated in Al- Amwal from 'Aamir ibn Abdullah ibn Al-Zubayr, I think from his father, he said: "A bedouin came to Umer and said: O ameer ul-mu'mineen. It is our land which we fought on it in jahiliyah, and we embraced Islam while we were on it; so why do you protect it? He said: Umer bowed his head, and started to blow and twist his moustach. He used to twist his moustach and blow when something worried him. When the bedouin saw that of him, he started to repeat the question to him. Umer said: The wealth belongs to Allah, and the people are the servants of Allah. By Allah, if I do not assume the burden of something fee sabeelillah I would not have protected an inch of land". Umer had then protected some of the public property lands for the horses of Muslims (used in jihad). A woman also challenged his forbiddance to the people of taking more than four hundred dirhams as mahr. He said to him: You have no right in that, O Umer. Hae you not heard the saying of Allah (swt):

وَأْتَيْتُمْ إِحْدَاهُنَّ قِنطَارًا فَلَا تَأْخُذُوا مِنْهُ شَيْئًا (النساء: 20)

"And you have given one of them a sum of money (however great), take nothing from it". [TMQ 4: 20] He responded by saying: A woman said the right and Umer did a mistake.

Ali (ra) also contested Uthman (ra) when he was ameer al-mu'mineen his view of completing the hajj and umrah. Ahmad narrated through saheeh narration from Abdullah ibn Al-Zubayr, he said:

"We were with Uthman in Al-Juhfah, while some people from Al-Sham were with him including Habeeb ibn Maslamah Al-Fahree. Uthman said when it was mentioned to him content with (tamattu') umrah till hajj: The best for hajj and umrah not to be both in months of hajj. It would be better to delay this umrah till you visit this house twice, for Allah (swt) made it spacious for goodness. Ali ibn Abu Talib was in the valley feeding his camels. He got knowledge of the view of Uthman, so he came till he stopped before Uthman and said: Do you turn to a sunnah recommended by the Messenger of Allah (saw) and a permission (rukhsah) Allah (swt) allowed to the servants in His Book, you restrict it to them and you forbid it, when it was permitted to a person of a need and to a person of distant home? Uthman turned to the people and said: Did I forbid it? I did not forbid it. It was only a view I advised it; so whoever willed he can take it, and whoever willed he can leave it".

Therefore, the council of the ummah has the right of shura and is obliged of accounting.

It is thus clear the difference between the shura and accounting. Shura is seeking an opinion or listening to it before taking the decision; while accounting is objection after taking the decision or execution of the work.

2.2.4.9 Difference between Caliphate and Other Systems

The shape of the ruling system in Islam (Caliphate) is distinguished from other ruling systems commonly found in the world today in its foundations, thoughts, concepts, criterion, the rules by which it manages its affairs, the constitution and laws enacted for implementation and execution, and in the structure that represents the Islamic state.

The shape of the Caliphate system is not monarchical. It neither agrees with the monarchical shape of government nor resembles it. This is because in the monarchical system the son becomes a king through inheritance without the Ummah having any say in it whereas in Islam the method of appointing a Caliph is through the enactment of the bay'ah. The monarchical system allows the monarch special privileges and he has rights exclusive to him which place him above the law. In some monarchical systems, the monarch becomes the symbol of the nation so he owns but, does not rule. In others he owns and rules, and thus runs the country and the people as he wishes. In both situations he is immune from being accounted by the people, no matter how severe his oppression and mistreatment of them. In contrast, the Caliphate system does not assign to the Caliph any special privileges over or above those afforded

to his citizens. Neither does the Caliph have any special rights that distinguish him from the common man before the judiciary. The Caliph is not the symbol of the Ummah as in monarchies. Rather, he is a representative of the Ummah in ruling and power, meaning that the Ummah selects him and gives him the pledge of allegiance willingly so as to implement the Law of Allah upon her. He is restricted in all of his actions, judgments and in looking after the interests and affairs of the Ummah by the divine rules.

The shape of the Islamic Ruling System is not imperial, and is completely inconsistent with imperialism. The regions ruled under an Islamic system, which comprise various nationalities and races are indeed linked to one but are governed in a manner completely different to that found in empires. The imperial system does not treat the regions of different races and nationalities equally. Instead it gives privileges, in ruling, finance and the economy to the centre of the empire.

The Islamic way of ruling aims to create equality between citizens in all regions of the state. Islam rejects tribalism, and grants non-Muslims who hold citizenship full rights and duties in accordance with the divine rules. Fairness afforded to non-Muslims must be equal to that afforded to Muslims and both are similarly accountable to the law. Every single citizen, regardless of his or her creed, enjoys the rights afforded by the state.

The Caliphate system is not federal where there are autonomous regions and unity only in general ruling. It is rather a system of unity, where Marrakesh in the West is considered to be the same as Khurasan in the East and the province of Al-Fayum is considered to be the same as Cairo, even if it were the Islamic capital.

The **Caliphate system is not republican**. The republican system emerged as a reaction to the tyranny of monarchies, where Kings governed their countries and people as they wished. So a king would implement laws as he liked. The republican system attempted to transfer sovereignty and authority to the people through democracy. So the people began to legislate and could permit or forbid whatever they liked. Practical authority was transferred to the hands of a republican president, his cabinet and the ministers of a republican house of representatives. There are also cases where authority was handed over to a first minister and his cabinet in some monarchies in which case the King or Queen becomes a figure head only.

Right of legislation Allah (SWT) and first ruling system of the world by people's representative

Capitalist democracy or modern liberal democracy are synonymously used by many scholars. Islam is distinct from all of these systems. In Islam, the right of legislation is not for the people. It is rather

for Allah (SWT) alone, and nobody other than Allah has the right to allow or forbid anything. Giving the right of legislation to people is a great crime in Islam. Allah (SWT) says in the Quran: ***(They have taken as lords beside Allah their rabbis and their monks), [TM Q 9 :3 1]***

The Messenger (SAW) explained this verse (ayah) describing that the people allowed rabbis and monks to legislate contrary to what Allah (SWT) had revealed in the scripture sent to them, where they obeyed them when they allowed and forbade things and obeyed them. This is the meaning of taking them (the rabbis and monks) as lords besides Allah (SWT). In Islam, taking anyone other than Allah (SWT) as Lord is called shirk and is the greatest of crime.

Therefore, this indicates the great crime of following people who legislate (making their own rules) instead of following Allah (SWT).

Tirmidhi reported through Adi ibn Hatira who said:

"I came to the Prophet (SM) wearing a cross of gold on my neck. He (SM) said: "O Adi, throw away this idol" (Tirm idhi, Sunan, #3095]. And I heard him read from surah of Bara'ah: (They took the rabbis and monks as lords beside Allah.) He (the Prophet) said: "They did not worship them, but what was forbidden for them they permitted and what was made lawful for them, they prohibited'.

Islam has laid out a specific mechanism for the election of the Caliph by the Ummah. Though sovereignty in Islam is for the shara', enacting the pledge to the Caliph by the Ummah is a fundamental condition for him to become a Caliph. The election of the Caliph has been occurring in Islam since the early 7th century C.E. while the rest of the world lived in the darkness of dictatorships and the tyranny of kings. If one were to study the election of the rightly guided khulafa, Abu Bakr 'Umar, 'Uthman and Ali (ra), it is very clear that the pledge was taken from the influential people of the Ummah and from the Muslims representatives so that each one of them became a Caliph to whom obedience became incumbent. Nearing the end of 'Umar's term, 'Abd al-Rahman ibn Awf (ra) was delegated to find out the opinion of the representative of the Muslims (at that time, the people of Madinah). He set out to gauge who the Muslims in Madinah thought should be nominated for the post of Caliph and visited many houses in that process. He asked the men and women who they would select as Caliph until he concluded that the overall consensus was in favor of 'Uthman, 'Uthman was then given the pledge (bayah).

(Indeed, ruling belongs to Allah) TMQ: 12:40]

(But no, by your lord, they can have no (real) faith until they make you judge in all disputes between them and find in their souls no resistance against your decisions, but accept them with them with the fullest submission) [4:65]

There are many famous evidences that confirm that legislation is for Allah alone.

2.2.4 9.1 The governmental institutions of the Caliphate state differ from others

The governmental institutions of the Caliphate state differ from those known in current applied ruling systems, even though some parts may appear to be similar. The institutions of the Caliphate state are derived from the institutions of the first Islamic State established by the Messenger of Allah in al-Madinah al-Munawwafah after his emigration from Mekkah. This ruling system was followed by the rightly guided khulafa' who succeeded him as heads of state.

Careful examination of the relevant Islamic texts reveals that the Caliphate state comprises the following institutions:

1. The Caliph
2. Use delegated assistants
3. The executive assistants
4. The governors (Wulah)
5. The Amir of Jihad
6. The department for internal security
7. The department of foreign affairs
8. The department for industry
9. The judiciary
10. The department for people's affairs
11. The bayt al-mal (state treasury)
12. The department of information (Ilam)
13. The Umman's council

The Caliphate is a unitary state not a federal state. Governing any state, especially one as large as the future Caliphate, cannot be done by one person from a central point. Ruling in the Caliphate is centralised in the hands of the Caliph, who then devolves his powers to various assistants (Mu'awinoon) and governors (Wulah) in order to practically manage people's affairs.

The vast territories which the Islamic State rules over are divided into provinces where each province is known as a Wiliyah. The Wilayaat are in turn divided into districts where each district

is known as an I'mala. The person appointed over the Wilayah is called a Waali (governor) or an Ameer (leader), and the person appointed over the I'mala is called an ‘Amil (mayor) or Hakim (ruler).

The & lsquo; Imalah is further sub-divided into administrative units, each known as a metropolis (Qasabah). The Qasabah is then divided into smaller administrative units, each known as a quarter (Hayy). The leader of the Qasabah as well as the Hayy is known as a manager, and their work is administrative. This structure, as with any pillar of the Islamic ruling system, is taken from the Shari'ah sources. From the sunnah we find that the Messenger of Allah (saw) appointed Wulah over the provinces, and ‘Amil's (mayors) over the cities.

The Messenger (saw) appointed ‘Attab ibn Aseed over Makkah; Bazan ibn Sasan as Waali over Yemen; Khalid ibn Sa'id ibn al-'Aas as ‘Amil over San'aa; Zayd ibn Labeed ibn Tha'laba al-Ansari over Hadramut; Abu Musa al-Ash'ari over Zabeed and Aden; ‘Amr ibn al-'Aas over Oman and Abu Dujana as ‘Amil for the Messenger (saw) over Medina. For the citizens of the Caliphate, their first point of contact with the leadership of the state is the Waali and the & lsquo;Amil. The Waali and the ‘Amil are managing people's day to day affairs on a local and regional level. If the Waali is oppressive then this affects people's daily lives more than any other government official including the Caliph. Historically, there were many oppressive Wulah in the Islamic State. The infamous Waali Hajjaj bin Yusuf of present Iraq.

2.2.4.9.2 Evidence of the Prohibition of Nationalism in Islam

Nationalism is a concept alien to Islam because it calls for unity based on family and tribalistic ties, whereas Islam binds people together on the *'aqeedah*, that is, belief in Allah (SWT) (swt) and His Messenger (saw). In other words, Islam calls for the ideological bond. Grouping together on tribalistic lines is clearly forbidden. It is narrated by Abu Dawud that the Messenger of Allah (SWT) (saw) said, **“He is not one of us who calls for *'asabiyyah*, (nationalism) or who fights for *'asabiyyah* or who dies for *'asabiyyah*.”** And in another hadith, the Messenger of Allah (SWT) (saw) describes the one who calls for nationalism as being like the worm that crawls in the bottom of the dung, and in the hadith recorded in Mishkat al-Masabih, the Messenger of Allah (SWT) (saw) said **“He who calls for *'asabiyyah* is as if he bit his father's genitals”**

There are many examples in the seerah where the Messenger of Allah (SWT) (saw) had rebuked those who upheld nationalism. On one occasion a party of Jews conspired to bring about disunity in the ranks of the Muslims after seeing the Aus and Khazraj within Islam. A youth from amongst them was sent to incite remembrance of the battle of Bu'ath where the Aus had been victorious over the Khazraj, and he recited poetry to bring about division between them. As a result there was

a call to arms. When the news reached the Messenger of Allah (SWT) (saw), he (saw) said, **“O Muslims, remember Allah (SWT), remember Allah (SWT). Will you act as pagans while I am present with you after Allah (SWT) has guided you to Islam, and honoured you thereby and made a clean break with paganism; delivered you thereby from disbelief; made you friends thereby?”**

When they heard this they wept, and embraced each other. This incident clearly highlights how the messenger of Allah (SWT) (saw) rebuked any forms of tribalism. Allah (SWT) then revealed,

“O you who believe! Fear Allah (SWT) as He should be feared and die not except in a state of Islam. And hold fast together all of you to the rope of Allah (SWT), and be not divided among yourselves; and remember with gratitude Allah (SWT)’s favours on you; for you were enemies and He joined your hearts in love, so that by His Grace you became brothers; and you were on the brink of the pit of fire, and He saved you from it. Thus Allah (SWT) make His signs clear to you that you may be guided.” [TMQ 3:102-103]

It is transmitted by at-Tabarani and al-Hakim that in one incident some people spoke very lowly about Salman al-Farsi. They spoke of the inferiority of the Persian in relation to the Arabs, and upon hearing this the Messenger of Allah (SWT) (saw) declared,

“Salman belongs to *ahl al-bayt* (the Prophet’s family).” This statement of the Messenger of Allah (saw) disassociates all links based on lineage and tribal considerations. It is also transmitted, in two different versions, by Ibn al-Mubarak in his two books, *Al-Birr* and *As-Salah*, that some disagreement occurred between Abu Dharr and Bilal and Abu Dharr said to Bilal, “You son of a black woman.” The Messenger of Allah (saw) was extremely upset by Abu Dharr’s comment, so he (saw) rebuked him by saying,

“That is too much, Abu Dharr. He who has a white mother has no advantage which makes him better than the son of a black mother.” This rebuke had a profound effect on Abu Dharr, who then put his head on the ground swearing that he would not raise it until Bilal had put his foot over it.

The incidents above demonstrate that tribal ties have no place in Islam. Muslims are commanded to stick together and not to disassociate themselves from each other just because they come from different tribes. The Messenger of Allah (SWT) (saw) also said,

“The Muslims are like a body, if one part of the body hurts, the rest of the body will also suffer” meaning that the Muslims, whether they are of Chinese, African,

European or Asian origin, are one *Ummah* and they cannot be separated from each other. No tribalistic ties should ever break their unity. Some people claim that the Messenger of Allah (SWT) (saw) approved of nationalism because

during the migration to Madinah, he (saw) said about Makkah with tears in his (saw) eyes, **“You are the most beloved land of Allah (SWT) to me.”** However, this saying has nothing to do with nationalism, and this can be seen from the full saying which people often do not quote, **“You are the most beloved land of Allah (SWT) to me because you are the most beloved land of Allah (SWT) to Allah (SWT).”** The Messenger of Allah (saw) loves for Makkah was based on the noble status that Allah (swt) has given to Makkah, and not because he (saw) was born there. All Muslims should have this love and affection for Makkah because it is the most beloved land in the sight of Allah (SWT) (swt). After all, the Muslims pray towards Makkah and go there to perform hajj there as it houses the Ka’ba. The above saying of the Messenger of Allah (SWT) (saw) therefore has nothing to do with nationalism.

2.2.4.11 Obligation of Establishing of Caliphate by Classical Scholars of Islam

Most of classical scholars have directly observed the politics of Caliphate, its importance and its problem. That is why their opinins has got priority in this research. This is a compilation of comments by classical scholars on the issue of *Caliphate*. By no means an exhaustive list, it is a selection of scholarly commentary which highlights the obligation and importance of the *Caliphate*. All quotes are fully referenced and the original Arabic text, along with a translation, is provided.

This compilation shows how the greatest minds of this *Ummah*, the best of its scholars, saw the issue of *Caliphate* as absolutely critical, referring to it as being, “from the necessities of the *shari’a* that simply cannot be left” (al-Ghazali), “from the greatest interests of the Muslims and greatest pillars of the *deen*” (al-Amidi), “a pillar from the pillars of the *deen*” (al-Qurtubi), “one of the greatest obligations of the *deen*” (Ibn Taymiyya), “the most important of obligations” (al-Haskafi), among other like statements.

“املاؤهم ومضروعة ناذلة ربناة في رحمة دلائل وسباسة الدين، وعاهق نذل رفير انا ق ملاة واجب ااجلااع...”

“The word *imamah* denotes the succession (*Caliphate*) of prophethood in the protection of the *deen* and the management of the worldly affairs, and its contracting to the one who fulfils it in the *Ummah* is an obligation by consensus...”

(Imam al-Mawardi [d. 450 AH], al-Ahkam al-Sultaniyyah, p.56)

رطبق فهد "وزلا ق الكين الذي عشر مضوا لانا نالذلة والامام نأ لالامام نض واديج دلع ملاة لأجل إقامة ملاما يرضب نيم
الانظر اداهتجلا" فلاضرا واءاعلا وريضط كورهم وزغى وريضمه ويبرم الذي بنمه ويضرب فلولهمه نيم اضربل وزالوا بن
ملاام لالامام ت هذه الأمل

“They (scholars of *ahl al-sunnah*) said regarding the *Caliphate* and *imamah* that the *Imamah* is an obligation obligated on the *Ummah* to the end of establishing the *imam* who would appoint for them judges and ministers, secure their frontiers, mobilise their armies, divide the *fay*, and give justice to the oppressed from the oppressors; and they said that the way of contracting the *imamah* for the *Ummah* is by their choice through exertion of effort.”

(Abd al-Qahir al-Baghdadi [d. 429 AH], *al-Farq bayn al-Firaq*, p.340)

وزارج بانهم "انك هيع اهل السنن، ووجع اولجوة، ووجع اشرعي، ووجع انوارج لعي وجوب لإمامة، وان الأمل واجب غيرهه الايدند
ويبرمه بأكجام رشاعة فلا نأ ايه رسول لها حاشا انذجات نيم
زولا: لا يلزم نلاس نض لإمامة، واندا لعيه نأ فواظا قما هذيب" ملاما عدل، فريم نيمه كحام لها،

“All of *ahl ul-sunnah* agreed, as did all the *murji'a*, all the *shi'a*, and all the *khawarij* upon the obligation of the *Imamah*, and that it is obligatory on the *Ummah* to submit to a just *imam*, who establishes upon them the *ahkam* of Allah (SWT), and manages their affairs by the *ahkam* of the *shari'a* with which the Messenger of Allah (SWT) (saw) came; except only the *najadat* from the *khawarij* who said: the people are not obliged with the *imamah*, rather what is upon them is to mutually practice the what is correct between them.”

(Ibn Hazm [d. 456 AH] *al-Fasl fi Milal wa 'l-Ahwaa' wa 'l-Nihal*, 4:87)

"املاام راسة حمة، وزعامة عامه، تلقى باصانة والامام، ق امهبت دلاين والدين. همبها فحظ ومزة، وزعامة رالجرة،
حوا: نزلوا ولواقم وعلاء ااقجم والس يذ، وكف ان في وام يذ، وانذاصفا المظولم بن نيم لاطه لنيم، واءالبنس وقمق نيم اربن نيم،
نالناشعهم هاقم نية" وانهاوهما دلع لعيه نحت... ماا صاحب رسول لها - دلص لها هيلع وسلم - رأوا بالدار اول يرضب ملاما
يلعب الاشرغل به يهتزر رسول لها ونقداه، هانية

“The *Imamah*⁸ is a complete authority and general leadership over all the people in all important religious and temporal affairs. Its roles includes the defense of the territory of *dar al-Islam*, looking after the interests of the community, establishing the Islamic *da'wah* by providing evidence and proof and by the sword, restraining deviation and inequity, providing help and support to the oppressed against transgressors and recovering dues from those who refuse to fulfill them and providing them to those who were deprived of them...the companions of the Messenger of Allah (SWT) (saw) saw that moving swiftly to appoint the *imam* was the right thing to do; thus they left the preparation of the Prophet's burial because of being engaged in this task, fearing lest a tribulation encompass them.”

(Imam al-Haramayn al-Juwayni [d. 478 AH], *Ghiyath al-Umam fi Tiyath al-Dhulam*, 1:22-23)

أدينا، ونظام ابدا لا ضروري ق نظام الذي، ونظام الدين ضروري ق وفاء حياجة
نظام، فكان وجوب نصب الإمام من ضرورات الشرع الذي لا سهل إلى نكته داغم ذلك. "لنا نأ امرضا ضروري ق نظام
الخرة وهو موصول الأدياء

“Hence it is clear that an executive authority (*sultan*) is necessary for the organisation of the *dunya*, and the organisation of the *dunya* is necessary for the organisation of the *deen*, and the organisation of the *deen* is necessary for success in the hereafter and that is the objective of the prophets without doubt. Therefore the obligation of appointing an *imam* is from the necessities of the *shari'a* that simply cannot be left, so know this.”

(Imam Sayf al-Din al-Amidi [d. 631 AH], *Ghayat al-Muram fi 'Ilm al-Kalam*, p.366)

⁸ *Imamah* and *khilafah* are synonymous terms, both referring to the political leadership of all Muslims entrusted with the duty of implementing Islam. *Imam* and *Caliphate* are also synonymous, referring to the person in whom this leadership is manifest, or in modern parlance, the head of state in the *khilafah*.

والتوقيع داخبا نالو، وانما من الرصعات ق رذائل وللماء
"فنا حطل ملا اقم بطل ونلر وانلنح ولا ن ارضة،
وارنوح وأوطال، وانوطى ساط رشاعة بالكل ق هذه اهملمات

"If the *Imamah* becomes void so too would the delegation (of authority). The judges would dissolve and join the ranks of the people. Proper legal disposal of rights with respect of life, blood, honour and wealth would be prevented, and application of the *shari'a* would end in all these important matters."

(Imam al-Ghazali [d. 505 AH], *al-Iqtisad fi al-I'tiqad*: 199 & *Fada'ih al-Batinah*: 105 respectively)

ةمناقلا دلع "وانسلون لا بد له نم امام رنوم ندي مهابحا وقامة ودحدم وسد رنوم ونيز ويخرمه وأخذ قد صانم ونوم
لا ولواي له ونمس الغلام." لتالبع والاصصة ووطاع اطرق وقامة لامع وادابعا ووطع اللزعات ولاقع بن دانعا وويل لشهادات
وقمق ونزوح الصغار والصغار غير ذلاين

"The Muslims must have an Imam, who carries out the implementation of their *ahkam*, the maintaining of their *hudud*, the guarding of their frontiers, the equipping of their armies, the receiving of their alms [*zakat*], the subjugation of those who rebel, thieves and highway robbers, the establishment of *jumu'a* and the two 'Eids, the settlement of disputes which take place amongst people, the receiving of evidence based on legal rights, the facilitation of the marriage of the young men and women who have no guardians, and the distribution of the booty."

(Imam al-Nasafi [d. 537AH], *al-Aqa'id al-Nasafiyyah*, p.354)

"وإرقت وداة دبا ريق لا: نشاوروا ق هذا رملا. ثم وصف عمر بصفات وعده بده واسبق رملا غيره، وما اندر ق فيه
وهم دصلا رلاق بلق أحد هنا وبق ولخ لأرض نم امام، وإرقت وبقا عمر لعج رملا ونرى بن ذرة، وكذا ذ نلاق دلع امين
لديل اقطع دلع وجوب رضي لها نعه، ودع لنك نلاقا دلع بلع رضي ادل نعه، بدل لنك لئه دلع نأ الصراحة رضون لها عليهم،
الأول كلون دلع ركة بايه بنه نم دلع هنا لاد نم امام.. فلذلك اقطع دلع هذا ولاجه
ملا اقم."

"When the death of Abu Bakr (ra) neared he said (to the *sahaba*), "Consult amongst yourselves about this matter (of *Caliphate*)". He then described the attributes of Umar (praising him) and chose him as successor. It did not occur to his heart, or that of anyone else, in the least, that it is permissible for there to be no *imam*. When the death of Umar (ra) neared he made the matter one of consultation between six, and they consented upon Uthman (ra), and after that upon Ali. All of this indicates that the *sahabah* (ra), the first and best of the Muslims,

consented that having an *imam* was necessary...This type of consensus is a definitive evidence for the obligation of the *imamah*.”

(Imam al-Shahrastani [d.548 AH], *Nihayat al-Iqdam fi 'Ilm al-Kalam*, 1:268)

رسالة... "إنما نصب لإمام ثم أهم مصالح المسلمين وأعظم عهد الدين وكفن وأبج ذبح رغبتهم مع ذاك ذلك مؤصرون

“Hence, appointing the Imam is from the most important interests of the Muslim and the greatest pillars of the *deen*. It is obligatory insofar as it is known by text that it is indicated upon as such by the revelation...”

(Imam Sayf al-Din al-Amidi [d. 631 AH], *Ghayat al-Muram fi 'Ilm al-Kalam*, p.366)

"هذه الآية صال في نصب إمام وخلافة رسول الله وطاع ندم مع كلاله ونفاهه اكلمه ذبنا ولا لا خفي وحوب ذلك في الأصل ولا ينفذ إلا إماما روي نبع لأصم ذبح لكان نبع رشوع أصم فذلك ذبح لاق رفته واهت ذبح رأيه ومذهب."

"وأذعهم لصياحة ذبح نديم نصليق ذبح فلا تخا ذبح نبع لهما جرين والاصرار في ذبيرة ذبح عسدة في الانبياء، حت زالت للأصرار: ندم يرمط ومكنم يرمط مع نذف لم رك وعمر وانها جرون ذبح ذك، ولولا منه ذبحا رفق لادتيه إل ذلك وجه يما ذبح رفقش، ورووا منه ذبح ذك، نبع غ وأطعوا رفقش. ثم ذك نبع ملامة غري واجب لا ق رفقش ولا ق يرفعهم الم ساذغ هذه المظرة والمباورة غلها، ولا ق ل نبق نهال نيس تو باهيج لا ق رفقش ولا ق رفقش، اف الشزعكم ولانا ندة في رما يسر نايح ثم ذبح نصليق رضي لها نيه الم رضخه ولانا ذبح إبل عمر ق البلامة، ومدلني له أحد هذا واجب الذبح ولا غلبي، نذل ذبح وجوبا وأنا لكان ذبح ألكذا دلاين ذلاي نيوام للمسلم نبي، وامجد لله رب العالمين" رما

“This ayah is an evidence for the appointment of an *imam* and Caliphate. He is listened to and obeyed, for the word is united through him, and the *ahkam* (laws) of the Caliphate are implemented through him, and there is no difference of opinion regarding the obligation of that between the *Ummah*, nor between the scholars, except what is narrated from al-Asamm (lit. the deaf), who was indeed deaf with regards to the *shari'a*, as were all those held his opinion and who followed it.”

“The *sahaba* all agreed on electing Abu Bakr (ra) after the difference that occurred between the *muhajireen* and *ansar* in the courtyard of Bani Sai'da, in which the *ansar* said, “One amir from us and one from you.” Abu Bakr, Umar and the *muhajireen* countered this, saying, “The Arabs will not submit to anyone other than Quraysh,” and they related narrations on this matter, so the *ansar* retracted and accepted. Had the *imamah* not been obligatory, neither in Quraysh nor in other than them, this discussion and debate would not have taken place at all, and someone would have said, “It is not obligatory, neither in Quraysh nor anyone else. Your disagreement has no basis or benefit,

since the matter is not obligatory.” Further, when death neared Abu Bakr (ra), he chose Umar (ra) for the *imamah* and no one said to him, “This matter was not obligatory upon us or on you.” All of this indicates that it [the *Caliphate*] is obligatory and is a pillar from the pillars of the deen by which the strength of the Muslims is realised, and all praise belongs to Allah (SWT), Lord of the Words.”

(Imam al-Qurtubi (d. 671), *al-Jami' li Ahkam al-Qur'an*, 1:264-265)

”وأوعدهم بالبعث يومئذ فيحذرونه، فلو لم يبعثوا لكانوا يمشون على رؤسهم”

كان "وإنهم أخروا ذلك لئلا يبعثوا يومئذ فيحذرونه، فلو لم يبعثوا لكانوا يمشون على رؤسهم" الإمام ربيع بن خديجة عن أبيه عن النبي صلى الله عليه وسلم أنه قال: "لو لم يبعثوا لكانوا يمشون على رؤسهم" وهذا ما رواه الإمام أحمد في مسنده.

“They (the scholars) consented that it is an obligation upon the Muslims to appoint a Caliphate, and that its obligation is by revelation, not reason”.

“And they (the *sahaba*) only delayed his (saw) burial from the day of Monday till the night of Wednesday, the end of the day of Tuesday, because of being occupied with the matter of the *bay'ah* so that there would be for them an *imam* to return to his decision if they differed in any matter of the funeral and burial, and so they would obey his command, so that dispute and disunity does not occur, and this was the most important of matters, and Allah (SWT) knows best.”

(Imam an-Nawawi [d. 676 AH], *Sharh Sahih Muslim*, 12:205 & 7:36 respectively)

”جاءني أن ريفي نأ ولاية رما تراس ذم عظم والبعث دلائل لب لا قيام للدين ولا للدين لا إله إلا الله، فلو لم يبعثوا لكانوا يمشون على رؤسهم” الإمام ربيع بن خديجة عن أبيه عن النبي صلى الله عليه وسلم: «إذا رجعوا إلى قريش فليعلموا أنهم لو لم يبعثوا لكانوا يمشون على رؤسهم» رواه أبو داود، ثم يدرج حديثاً عن أبيه عن النبي صلى الله عليه وسلم: «إذا رجعوا إلى قريش فليعلموا أنهم لو لم يبعثوا لكانوا يمشون على رؤسهم» وهذا ما رواه الإمام أحمد في مسنده.

ولأن لها نكاحاً واجباً وملأه ريفي وأبها للذم لملأه، ولا يتم ذلك إلا دفعة وإمارة. وكذلك أمر ما واجهه ذم هلال ذمك لسلف والعدل وإقامة جما والموع والأدب للظلم. وإقامة مادود لا يتم إلا بالقوة والإمارة؛ ولذا ريو: «أن لاسلطان لظ بامة وعلنا بها لسلطان». «لها قى لأرض» وزلاق "وتنقن تنس ذم مبام اجيز صالح ذم دليل واحدة لا بسلطان". والتوجه بذلك، ولذا كذا في الضمير لب ابعض وأدم بن نجل وعبرط - ريفيون: لو كان ذم وعة

“It is imperative to know that the office in charge of governing the people is one of the greatest obligations of the *deen*. Nay, there is no establishment of the *deen* or the *dunya* except by it. The interests of humans are not achieved except by social interaction due to their need of one another, and this social interaction necessarily requires a head, such that the Prophet (saw) said, “If three go out in travel, let them make one of them the leader” (Abu Dawud)...so he (saw) obligated making one a leader in a small and temporary social interaction in travel, drawing attention by this to all other types of social interaction.

Further, (appointing a leader is obligatory) because Allah (SWT) has obligated enjoining the good and forbidding the evil, and this is not executed except through a power and authority. The same applies to other obligations such as *jihad*, establishing justice, organising the *hajj*, *jumu'a* and the *eids*, assisting the oppressed, implementing the *hudud*; none of these are able to be executed except by a power and authority. For this reason, it has been narrated that, “The *sultan* is the shade of Allah (SWT) on Earth”, and it is said, “Sixty years of an oppressive *imam* is better than one night without any leader,” and experience substantiates this. Thus did the *salaf* – such as al-Fadl ibn ‘Iyad and Ahmad ibn Hanbal – used to say, “If we had on *du'a* guaranteed to be answered, we would supplicate for the *sultan*.”

(Ibn Taymiyyah [d. 728 AH], *al-Siyasah al-Shar'iyah*, p.129)

"رصب لإمام اندفع وادج غزرا عمدا... ذاهم تاتر إمامج لسلمابن ق دصلاز أولل نعد ودا: تازب ان نماع لبحو ولأيت ذع إمام
ذح لاق وبأ رك رضي لها نهم ق خطف لا إبن من دابق مات ولادب لغا دلاين نهم رفوقه دأتر أهل لدا رهاه ونكوا
له أهم ءأر شلا وهو نك رسول لها ويطي نلاس ذلع نلك ق لك رصب لدا زم نانا هذا ذم ذ صن إمام ذع ق لكر عضر."

“Our position on appointing the *Imam* is that it is obligatory by text...the consensus of the Muslims of the first generation after the passing of the Prophet (saw) to avoid being in a state of not having an *imam* has reached us by concurrent narration (*tawatur*). This was emphatic to the extent that Abu Bakr (ra) said in his sermon, “Behold, Muhammad (saw) has passed away, and it is necessary for this *deen* to have someone to lead and implement it,” so the companions all moved swiftly to accept him and leave for him to decide about the most important matter, namely, the burial of the Messenger of Allah (SWT) (saw). The Muslims have remained on this position in every age up till this time of ours, in appointing an *imam* who is followed.”

(Imam ‘Adud al-Din al-Iji [d. 756 AH], *al-Mawaqif fi ‘Ilm al-Kalam*, 3:579-580)

"هذا الاجماع دل على انما نصب ملائمة واج واج واثم في الازمان فلهذا لا بد من دل على انها تعالى او دل على انما يقبل بعزم او دل على
وانذهب اليه بعب عرى ان لى عسما، لؤونه عذبه السلام: ((من مات ولم يعرف امام زمانه مات ميتة جاهلية)) ولان الأمة تد
ولعل اهم اهمات بعد وفاة النبي عذبه السلام نصب الامام تاج زدوم عرى الدين، فكذا يد وحت كفل امام، ولان كدرنا
نم ولا بدت رشاع في يرف هولع"

“There is (scholarly) consensus on the appointment of an *imam* being obligatory. The difference of opinion is only on the question of whether the obligation is on Allah (SWT) or man, and whether is it by textual or rational evidence.² The correct position is that it is obligatory upon man by the text, due to his saying (saw), ‘Whosoever dies not knowing the *Imam* of his time dies the death of *jahilliyah*’, and because the *Ummah* (the companions) made the appointing of the *Imam* the most concerning of important matters after the death of the Prophet (saw) to the extent that they gave it priority over the burial; similarly after the death of every *imam*, and also because many of the other *shari’a* obligations depend upon it.”

(**Imam al-Taftazani** [d. 792AH], *Sharh al-Aqa'id al-Nasafiyyah*, p.353-354)

To understand what is being referred to here one must note that whilst all the scholars - barring literally a handful whose opinion carries no weight – held the appointment of a Caliphate to be an obligation, there was disagreement as to the nature of this obligation: is it established on the basis of revelation or reason, and is the obligation on Allah (SWT) or man? The majority held that the obligation was on man and on the basis of the revelation. This is the correct position. Others held that the obligation was on the basis of the mind and was on Allah (SWT), or that it was on the basis of the mind but on man.

“Indeed the appointment of the *Imam* is an obligation, whose obligatory nature is known in the revelation by the consensus of the *sahaba* and the *tabi'een*, because the companions of the Messenger (saw) rushed to the *bay'ah* of Abu Bakr (ra) and to submit the management of their affairs to him upon his (saw) death. Similarly in each age after that; the people were never left in anarchy in any era, and this persisted to be the case by a consensus indicative of the obligation of appointing an *imam*.”

(Ibn Khaldun [d. 808 AH], *al-Muqaddimah*, Chapter III, Section 26, 2nd para.)

فما لنا الصراحة رضوان الله عليهم أمجروا غي لنا نصب الإمام بعد انقضاء زمن رسوله واجتلاب وبيع أهم
والأخبار بحيث شكوا في نفعه فدفع رسول الله صلى الله عليه وآله وسلم إلى بيعه وسلمهم "إلخيم أو

“Know that the *sahabah*, Allah (SWT) be pleased with them, consented that selecting the *Imam* after the end of the era of prophethood was an obligation. Indeed they made it the most important of obligations as they were busy with it (giving it priority) over the burial of the Messenger of Allah (SWT) (saw).”

(Imam Ibn Hajar al-Haytami [d. 974 AH], *al-Sawaa'iq al-Muhriqah*, 1:25)

بصميمنا، لا شك في حال كونهما وإقامة ودخولهم وردت رؤوسهم وتهدير وبيعهم وأخذ
والإنصاف وإطاع الطريق وإطاع المنزعات واللافة بني ناصوم وبنو العلاء وغير ذلك، "وجب دفع الأيسر نصب إمام رقم
دفع الله إليه وأله وسلم دفع نصبه فجاء ولعب أهم أو اجدها، ورتوم دفع فخره دفع الله إليه نصبه منها ذاك فخرها وفخر الله
اجتلاب لصراحة الله وداه
واله وسلم ووافق الأيسر ذلك ربيع دفع ذلك."

“It is obligatory on the people to appoint an *imam* who looks after their interests – such as implementing the *ahkam*, executing the *hudud*, defending the frontiers, preparing the armies, collecting the *zakat* to distribute it, subjugating rebels, thieves and brigands, resolving disputes that arise amongst people, dividing the booty and the like – due to the consensus of the companions after the death of the Prophet (saw) on appointing him, to the extent that they considered it the most important of obligations and prioritised it over his (saw) burial, and the Muslims have remained on this (appointing an *imam*) in every age.”

(Imam Shams al-Din al-Ramli (d. 1004 AH), *Ghayat al-Bayan fi Sharah Zabd ibn Raslan*, 1:15)

"نصب لإمام علاظم دفع لسلامة دينه نص ذلك في"

“Appointing the greater *imam* (the Caliphate) upon the Muslims is an obligation of sufficiency.”

(Mansur ibn Yunus al-Buhuti [d. 1051 AH], *Kashshaf al-Qinaa' 'an Matn al-Iqnaa'*, 6:158

"قالون لى حدساق رستف اعم دلع نلالام، وثأبوه ق علم الللم، ورس، اهم ولا ايجت) أي دم هأما نونفكذير من
ير (.) "ولا ايجت رشلأ ي هلم، لذا ومدقه دلع ن فدي حاص جعلزات) باق - دلس لها هلم وسلم - نقر يم لالين وديتر يم
اللاذلا أو نلل لأرعه، وأر يم لأرعه ح ذع وللم، وهذه نسلة باقبة لدا لان لدم نذي خذبة نذح نير

“The major *imamah* (*Caliphate*) is the right of general disposal over the people. Its study is in scholastic theology and establishing it is the most important of obligations [it is of the most important obligations because the fulfillment of so many other *shari'a* obligations depends on it]. For this reason did they (the *sahaba*) give it priority over the burial of the Prophet (saw) [He (saw) passed away on Monday and was buried on the day of Tuesday or the night of Wednesday or its day (according to the different narrations), and this *sunnah* remains till this day such that the Caliphate is not buried until another is appointed].”

Imam al-Haskafi [d. 1088 AH] and Ibn Abidin [d. 1252 AH] (in square brackets), *Radd al-Muhtar, 'ala al-Durr al-Mukhtar*, 1: 548)

"اعلم هأ بيج ذأ ركهن ق جموع المسلميه نم خذبة لصالح لا نتم لا إيجوده..."

“Know that it is obligatory for there to be in the *jama'a* of the Muslims a Caliphate for interests that simply cannot be fulfilled except with his presence...”

(Shah Waliullah al-Dehlawi [d. 1152 AH], *Hujjat Allah (SWT)i al-Baligha*, 2:229)

رسول لها دلس لها هلم وسلم وحقاً رمأ صلاقم وجماعة لإمام دلع لك شيء ذح منها شان ولم
دلس لها لعيه وسلم...ب من عظم دلالة دلع وجوب رصب لأئمة وبذل ذبلا ليم ما أخرجهم هك "إن الصراحة الم امت
واين زخة وابن ايجن ق هديحص ذم ذ يدح امارت رعلاني بلنظ ذم امت واسي هلم مالم عظمة ذان وحنظلك ذع هتيرة
والنجدني
وجهة اجه ذبل ورواه لصلكم ذم حذيث ابن عمر ومن ذ يدح عاوية ورواه لبار ذم ذ يدح ذبا بهاس."

“When the Prophet (saw) passed away, the companions (ra) prioritised the matter of the political leadership (the *imamah*) and pledging alliance to an *imam* over everything else, to the extent that they were busy with it (giving it priority) over the funeral preparations of the Prophet (saw)...From the strongest evidences for the obligation of appointing an *imam* and pledging allegiance to him is what Ahmad, al-Tirmidhi, ibn Khuzayma and ibn Hibban in his *sahih* extracted of the hadith of al-Harith al-Ash’ari in the wording (that the Prophet (saw) said), “Whosoever dies whilst not having over him an *imam* of the *jama’ah*, then indeed his death is the death of *jahilliya*.” Al-Hakim also narrated it from Ibn ‘Umar and Mu’awiya and al-Bazzar narrated it from Ibn Abbas.”

(**Imam al-Shawkani** (d. 1250 AH), *al-Sayl al-Jarrar al-Mutadaffiq ‘ala Hada’iq al-Azhar*, 1:936)

“انك قمتلا رحمة لها غالى د لع: ذاملا المقرض واض اذ ب لزمه بلسم ذم مالم نريم شعائر لا لاون ورف صن لمظلم بن من
اظلام بل وعدل هنا لا يجوز ذام وكن د لع لسلاميون ق وبت واحد ق جوع اوند لا ما انذام لانا ذام ولا نردف ذام وعدل ان
لا ائمة ذم قش واض ريج لالم ذام ذام ذم سلف.”

“The Imams (of the four *madhabs*: Abu Hanifa, Malik, Shaf’i, Ahmad) - may Allah (SWT) have mercy on them – all consented that the *Imamah* is an obligation, and that the Muslims must appoint an *imam* who would implement the rites of the *deen*, and give the oppressed justice against the oppressors, and they agreed that it is not permitted that there be over the Muslims, at any one time, two *imams*, in agreement or discord, and that the *imams* are from Quraysh and that is permitted for the *imam* to choose a successor.”

(**Imam al-Juzayri** [d. 1360 AH], *al-Fiqh ‘ala al-Mathahib al-Arba’a*, 5:416.)

“Indeed the *jama’ah* is the rope of Allah (SWT), so hold on How many a darkness does Allah (SWT) repel by the *sultan* If not for the Caliphate, paths would not be safe for us to its grip, firm for him who professes Islam in our *deen* mercy results from him and in our *dunya* and the weak would be a source of pillage for the strong”

- **Ibn al-Mubarak** [d. 181 AH], *Hilyat al-‘Awliya*, 8:164

This is a compilation of comments by classical scholars on the issue of *Caliphate*. By no means an exhaustive list, it is a selection of scholarly commentary which highlights the obligation and importance of the *Caliphate*. All quotes are fully referenced and the original Arabic text, along with a translation, is provided.

This compilation shows how the greatest minds of this *Ummah*, the best of its scholars, saw the issue of *Caliphate* as absolutely critical, referring to it as being, “*from the necessities of the shari’a that simply cannot be left*” (al-Ghazali), “*from the greatest interests of the Muslims and greatest pillars of the deen*” (al-Amidi), “*a pillar from the pillars of the deen*” (al-Qurtubi), “*one of the greatest obligations of the deen*” (Ibn Taymiyya), “*the most important of obligations*” (al-Haskafi), among other like statements.

Our scholars remind us in these quotes about how the sahaba gave this issue of *Caliphate* such an importance that they delayed the burial of the best of creation, the Prophet (saw), due to being engaged with it. They also emphasise the great dangers of not having the *Caliphate*, something we have seen, and continue to see, first-hand since its destruction in the early 20th century, since when the *Ummah* has witnessed its darkest days.

Source of Motivation for Muslims to Return Caliphate State

ذِينَ مِنْ قَبْلِهِمْ وَعَدَّ اللَّهُ الَّذِينَ آمَنُوا مِنْكُمْ وَعَمِلُوا الصَّالِحَاتِ لِيَسْتَخْلِفَنَّهُمْ فِي الْأَرْضِ كَمَا اسْتَخْلَفَ الْأَ

"Allah has promised, to those among you who believe and work righteous deeds, that He will, of a surety, grant them succession (from the current rulers) in the land, as He granted it to those before them." [Surah An-Nur 24:55]

The Messenger of Allah (SWT) said:

"The Prophethood will last among you till Allah wishes it to last, and then Allah will raise it up. Afterwards there will be a Caliphate according to the way of the Prophethood so long as Allah wishes it to last, and then Allah will raise it up. Afterwards there will be a self supporting rule and it will last so long as Allah wishes it to last, and then Allah will raise it up. Afterwards there will be an oppressive rule, and it will last as long as Allah wishes it to last, and then Allah will raise it up. And then there will be a Caliphate according to the way of the Prophethood." [Ahmad in his Musnad, 4/273 (#18596) and al-Sunnah of ibn Abi 'Asim (#1166 & 1169).]

Conclusion

The concept of politics in Islam is completely different from capitalist (modern) democracy and socialistic democracy. It concerns mainly the looking after the Ummah (Community) and the society from the evil as a whole. Its holistic purpose is to ensure a peaceful society (goodness) through social reform. From the perspective of source of law, appointment of Caliph (Chief of the state and society) and conditions of ruling represents a unique system ensuring the representation of the citizens and accountability of the rulers.

2.3 Rise of Political Islam in the Muslim World

2.3.1 Introduction

Political Islam is an Islamic revival movement. Often it is distinguished by moral conservatism, literalism, and the attempt "to implement Islamic values in all spheres of life."¹ It is also known as Islamism. The different Islamist movement has been described as "oscillating between two poles": at one end is a strategy of Islamization of society through state power seized by revolution or invasion. At the other hand "reformist" or moderate "pole" Islamists work to re-Islamize society "from the bottom up"(Roy, 1994: p.24). The movements have "arguably altered the Middle East more than any trend since the modern states gained independence", redefining "politics and even borders" according to journalist Robin Wright.²

Islamists may give emphasis to the implementation of *Sharia* (Islamic law) of pan-Islamic political unity, including an Islamic state;(Soage, Belén, 2009) and of the selective removal of non-Muslim, particularly Western military, economic, political, social, or cultural influences in the Muslim world that they believe to be incompatible with Islam (Dale C. 2007, pp. 85-98).

Observer Graham Fuller suggests Islamism's doctrine is less strict, and can be defined as a form of identity politics or "support for [Muslim] identity, authenticity, broader regionalism, revivalism, [and] revitalization of the community" (Fuller, Graham E., 2003, p. 21). Following the Arab Spring, political Islam developed into heavily involved with political democracy but also generates "the most aggressive and ambitious Islamist militia".

Islamist or political Islamists generally opposes the use of the term, claiming that their political beliefs and goals are simply an expression of Islamic religious belief. Similarly, some experts (Bernard Lewis) favor the term "activist Islam" or "political Islam" (Stanley, 2005), and Robin Wright equates the term "militant Islam" with Islamism.

Prominent figures of modern Islamism include Hasan al-Banna, Sayyid Qutb, Abul Ala Maududi Taqiuddin un-Nabahni and Ruhollah Khomeini. Some of this promoter emphasizes peaceful political processes, whereas Sayyid Qutb in particular called for armed revolution and those followers are generally considered as Islamic extremists.

2.3.2 Definition of Political Islam

Berman and Sheri defined political Islam as "the belief that Islam should guide social and political as well as personal life". Some scholars viewed it as a movement of "supporters of government in

¹ American Heritage Dictionary of the English Language , p.927

² WRIGHT, ROBIN (10 January 2015). "A SHORT HISTORY OF ISLAMISM". *Newsweek*. Retrieved 23 December 2015

accord with the laws of Islam [and] who view the Quran as a political model" (Associated Press's (AP) original definition of "Islamist")³. Maajid Nawaz, a previous Islamic activist, defines it as "the [Islamic] ideology that guides society as a whole and that [teaches] law must be in conformity with the Islamic sharia". Osman Tarek have defined it both positive and negatively as a "progressive, moderate religious platform` for the affluent and liberal ... and at the extremes, a violent vehicle for rejectionists and radicals (Tarek 2010). F. Burgat describes as an Islamic "movement that seeks cultural differentiation from the West and reconnection with the pre-colonial symbolic universe" Some characterize political Islam as the movement of the prominent Islamic political parties as "the organised political trend, owing its modern origin to the founding of the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt in 1928, that seeks to solve modern political problems by reference to Muslim texts"⁴. Roy Olivier & Sfeir Antoine (2007) define as a movement of Muslims who seek to "Islamize" their social, workplace, and family "environment", whether through a violence or a gradual non-violent process. In non-Muslim majority countries this means rejecting assimilation.

It can be summarized as these types of group have thought which seeks to invest society with Islam which may be integrationist, but may also be traditionalist, reform-minded or even revolutionary. Their movement may draw upon the belief, symbols, and language of Islam to inspire, shape, and animate political activity which may contain moderate, tolerant, peaceful activists or those who "preach intolerance and espouse violence. Sometimes the Islamists "often violent and angry version" of Islam that "emerged largely in response to European imperialism".

But if the holy Quran and tradition of prophet Muhammad (SM) have the verses and guidance then Islamists get legitimacy to the Muslim community .

The fundamentals of this world view of Political Islamist

Simply stated, that Islam is/ has the answer not only to spiritual impulses or religious needs but for social and political order, as well. Islamism in this sense not only defines and regulates the relation between man and God but equally between man and man (and woman) and this includes the relation between the ruled and the ruler. The adherents also advocate that the ideal society is one in which Holy Prophet lived in Medina and there ought to be a reverting to the practices of that period. Governance according to the Islamic law, the sharia is a central tenet.

³ You are here: Home Press Center Press Releases CAIR Condemns Series of Terror Attacks in France, Tunisia and Kuwait CAIR Welcomes AP Stylebook Revision of 'Islamist'. Council on American-Islamic Relations (CAIR). 5 April 2013. Retrieved 29 June 2015

⁴ "Fred Halliday, from "The Left and the Jihad", Open Democracy 7 September 2006". *Opendemocracy.net*. 2011-04-06. Retrieved 2012-04-21 Internet- https://www.opendemocracy.net/globalization/left_jihad_3886.jsp

2.3.3 Categorization and Methods of Political Islamists

1. Islamism receives different forms and spans a wide range of strategies and tactics towards the powers in place -- "destruction, opposition, collaboration, indifference" that have varied as "circumstances have changed"—and thus is not a united movement.
2. Moderate and reformist Islamists who accept and work within the democratic process include parties like the Tunisian Ennahda Movement. Jamaat-e-Islami of Pakistan is in essence a socio-political and democratic Vanguard party but has also added political influence through military coup d'état in past.
3. The Islamist groups like Hezbollah in Lebanon and Hamas in Palestine participate in democratic and political process as well as armed attacks, seeking to abolish the state of Israel.
4. Radical Islamist organizations like al-Qaeda and the Egyptian Islamic Jihad, and groups such as the Taliban and Hizb-ut-Tahrir, entirely reject democracy, often declaring as *kuffar* those Muslims who support it as well as calling for violent/offensive jihad or urging and conducting attacks on a religious basis. Only Hizb-ut-Tahrir claim that they are a non violent international party working mainly to return Caliphate system but this group support election.
5. Another major division within Islamism is between what Graham E. Fuller has described as the fundamentalist⁵ "guardians of the tradition" (Salafis, such as those in the Wahhabi movement) and the "vanguard of change and Islamic reform" centered around the Muslim Brotherhood. Olivier Roy advocates that "Sunni pan-Islamism underwent a remarkable shift in the second half of the 20th century" when the Muslim Brotherhood movement and its focal point on Islamisation of pan-Arabism was covered by the Salafi movement with its emphasis on "sharia rather than the building of Islamic institutions," and rejection of Shia Islam. Following the Arab Spring, Roy has illustrated Islamism as "increasingly interdependent" with democracy in much of the Arab Muslim world, such that "neither can now survive without the other." While Islamist political culture itself may not be democratic, Islamists require democratic elections to sustain their legitimacy. At the same time, their

⁵ Islamic fundamentalism has been defined variously as a movement of Muslims who hark back to earlier times and seek to return to the fundamentals of the religion. Muslims who favor "a literal interpretation" of the primary sources of Islam (the Quran and Sunnah), and seek to eliminate (what they perceive to be) "corrupting" non-Islamic influences from every part of their lives and as a pejorative term used by outsiders for Islamic revivalism and Islamic activism. Fundamentalists are primarily interested in revolution, less interested in "modernity or by Western models in politics or economics," and less willing to associate with non-Muslims. It remains unfortunate and can be misleading. "Fundamentalist" is a Christian term. It seems to have come into use in the early years of last century, and denotes certain Protestant churches and organizations, more particularly those that maintain the literal divine origin and inerrancy of the Bible. In this they oppose the liberal and modernist theologians, who tend to a more critical, historical view of Scripture. Among Muslim theologians there is as yet no such liberal or modernist approach to the Qur'an, and all Muslims, in their attitude to the text of the Qur'an, are in principle at least fundamentalists.

popularity is such that no government can call itself democratic that keeps out mainstream Islamist groups.

2.3.4 Evolution of the Term

The term which initially denoted the religion of Islam, first appeared in English as *Islamismus* in 1696, and as *Islamism* in 1712 (Roy, 1994). By the turn of the twentieth century it had been started to be shifted by the shorter and purely Arabic term "Islam" and by 1938, when Orientalist scholars completed *The Encyclopaedia of Islam*, seems to have virtually disappeared from English usage.⁶

The term "Islamism" acquired its contemporary implications in French academia in the late 1970s and early 1980s. From French, it began to migrate to the English language in the mid-1980s. In recent years it has largely displaced the term Islamic fundamentalism in academic circles.

The use of the term Islamism was at first "a marker for scholars more likely to sympathize" with new Islamic movements. However, as the term gained popularity it became more particularly associated with political groups such as the Taliban or the Algerian Armed Islamic Group, as well as with highly publicized acts of violence.

"Islamists" who have spoken out against the use of the term insisting they are merely "Muslims", include Ayatollah Mohammad Hussein Fadlallah, the spiritual mentor of Hizbullah, and Abbassi Madani, leader of the Algerian Islamic Salvation Front.

An article in *Middle East Quarterly* (2003) states:

In summing up, the term Islamism enjoyed its first run, lasting from Voltaire to the First World War, as a synonym for Islam. Enlightened scholars and writers generally preferred it to Mohammedanism. Eventually both terms yielded to Islam, the Arabic name of the faith, and a word free of either negative or comparative associations. There was no requirement for any other term, until the rise of an ideological and political interpretation of Islam challenged scholars and commentators to come up with an alternative, to distinguish Islam as modern ideology from Islam as a faith... To all intents and purposes, Islamic fundamentalism and Islamism have become synonyms in contemporary American usage.⁷

The Council on American–Islamic Relations complained in 2013 that the Associated Press's definition of "Islamist"—a "supporter of government in accord with the laws of Islam [and] who view the Quran as a political model"—had become derogatory shorthand for "Muslims we don't like."

⁶ Martin Kramer, "Coming to Terms, Fundamentalists or Islamists?" originally in *Middle East Quarterly* (Spring 2003), pp. 65-77

⁷ Martin Kramer, "Coming to Terms, Fundamentalists or Islamists?" originally in *Middle East Quarterly* (Spring 2003), pp. 65-77

The AP Stylebook entry for Islamist now reads as follows:⁸

"An advocate or supporter of a political movement that favors reordering government and society in accordance with laws prescribed by Islam. Do not use as a synonym for Islamic fighters, militants, extremists or radicals, who may or may not be Islamists. Where possible, be specific and use the name of militant affiliations: al-Qaida-linked, Hezbollah, Taliban, etc. Those who view the Quran as a political model include a wide range of Muslims, from mainstream politicians to militants known as *jihadi*."

2.3.5 Relation to Islam

Islamism is a controversial concept not just because it conceives a political role for Islam but also because its supporters believe their views merely reflect Islam. While the contrary idea that Islam is, or can be, apolitical is an error. Scholars who do not believe that Islam is merely a political ideology include Fred Halliday, John Esposito and Muslim intellectuals like Javed Ahmad Ghamidi. Hayri Abaza argues the failure to differentiate between Islam and Islamism leads many in the West to support illiberal Islamic regimes to the detriment of progressive moderates who seek to separate religion from politics.

⁸ AP Stylebook revises 'Islamist' use". *Politico.Com*. Retrieved 2014-08-18.

Indicators	Islamic Politics	Political Islam
Change	Want to change the prevailing society.	Want to survive in prevailing system and society and being changed in the name of pragmatism as well as reform.
Method	Following Prophet's peaceful propagation and culturing the people (Ummah) opposing all un-Islamic system and culture.	Not fixed and following the Prophet's peaceful method, going or sharing the power is ultimate goal.
Participation	Does not participate in western or any secular political system for ideological stand.	Does not believe in secularism but participate in secular system or law making (parliamentary) election and want to go in power or entertain power sharing in name of change.
Propagation	Caliphate	Civil State
Nationalism	Is not accepted	Partially accepts
Tangible output of their politics	It established an Islamic Society and State.	It uses the Islamic sentiments of Muslim but does not establish the Islamic society and state. The target of their politics is attaining power (Power centric politics) either doing compromise with Islamic ideology or compromising benefits of <i>Ummah</i> .

Table: Differences between Islamic Politics and Political Islam

Islamists have asked the question, "If Islam is a way of life, how can we say that those who want to live by its principles in legal, social, political, economic, and political spheres of life are not Muslims, but Islamists and believe in Islamism, not [just] Islam?"⁹. Likewise, a writer for the International Crisis Group maintains that "the idea of 'political Islam'" is a creation of Americans to explain the Iranian Islamic Revolution and apolitical Islam was a historical coincidence of the "short-lived era of the heyday of secular Arab nationalism between 1945 and 1970".

On the other hand, Muslim-owned and run media (not just Western media) have used the terms "Islamist" and "Islamism" — as distinguished from Muslim and Islam — to distinguish groups such

⁹ Abid Ullah Jan (February 27, 2006). "Wikipedia: Good Intentions, Horrible Consequences By Abid Uallah Jan". Al-Jazeera. Archived from the original on July 16, 2012. Retrieved November 16, 2015.

as the Islamic Salvation Front in Algeria or Jamaa Islamiya in Egypt which actively seek to implement Islamic law, from mainstream Muslim groups.

According to historian Bernard Lewis (*Islamic Revolution*¹⁰), 'Islamism' along with "quietism," form two "particular ... political traditions" in Islam.

The argument in favor of both is based, as is the earliest Islamic arguments, on the Holy Book and on the actions and sayings of the Prophet. The quietist tradition obviously rests on the Prophet as sovereign, as judge and statesman. But before the Prophet became a head of state, he was a rebel. Before he traveled from Mecca to Medina, where he became sovereign, he was an challenger of the existing order. He directed an opposition against the pagan oligarchy of Mecca and at a certain point went into exile and formed what in modern language might be called a "government in exile,". By which finally he was able to return in triumph to his birthplace and establish the Islamic state in Mecca.

The Prophet as rebel has shown an Islamic method of revolution—opposition and rejection, withdrawal and departure, exile and return. Time and time again movements of opposition in Islamic history tried to repeat this pattern, a few of them successfully.

Daniel Pipes describes Islamism as a modern ideology that owes more to European utopian political ideologies and "isms" than to the traditional Islamic religion (*Pipes D, 2000*).

2.3.6 Control and Power of Political Islam in Muslim World

1. Few observers challenge the influence of Islamism in the Muslim world. Following the fall down of the Soviet Union, political movements based on the liberal ideology of free expression and democratic rule have led the opposition in other parts of the world such as Latin America, Eastern Europe and many parts of Asia. However, the simple fact is that political Islam presently reigns as the most powerful ideological force across the Muslim world today.

Even some of those (such as Olivier Roy) who observe Islamism as full with contradictory believe "the socioeconomic realities that sustained the Islamist wave are still here. These are not going to change: poverty, uprootedness, crises in values and identities, the decay of the educational systems, the North-South opposition, and the problem of immigrant integration into the host societies".

2. The strength of Islamism draws from the strength of religiosity in general in the Muslim world. Compared to Western societies, "what is striking about the Islamic world is that ... it seems to have been the least penetrated by irreligion".

¹⁰ See, <http://www.nybooks.com/articles/4557>

Where other peoples may look to the physical or social sciences for answers in areas which their ancestors regarded as best left to scripture, in the Muslim world, religion has become more encompassing, not less, as "in the last few decades. It has been the fundamentalists who have increasingly represented the cutting edge" of Muslim culture (Michael 2000). In Egypt and the rest of the Muslim world "the word secular, a label proudly worn 30 years ago, is rejected" and "used to slander" political opponent. The small secular opposition parties "cannot compare" with Islamists in terms of "determination, courage," "risk-taking" or "organizational skills".

In the Middle East and Pakistan, religious discourse dominates societies, the airwaves, and thinking about the world. Radical mosques have proliferated throughout Egypt. Book stores are dominated by works with religious themes ... The demand for *sharia*, the belief that their governments are disloyal to Islam and that Islam is the answer to all problems, and the certainty that the West has declared war on Islam. These are the arguments that dominate public discussion. Islamists may not control parliaments or government palaces, but they have occupied the popular imagination.¹¹

3. Moderate strains of Islamism have been described as "competing in the democratic public square in places like Turkey, Tunisia, Malaysia and Indonesia. In Morocco, the Islamist Justice and Development Party (PJD) supported King Muhammad VI's "*Mudawana*", a "startlingly progressive family law". It grants women the right to a divorce, raises the minimum age for marriage to 18, and, in the event of separation, and stipulates equal distribution of property.

Even prior to the Arab Spring, Islamists in Egypt and other Muslim countries had been described as "extremely influential. ... They determine how one dresses, what one eats. In these areas, they are incredibly successful. ... Even if the Islamists never come to power, they have changed their countries." Democratic, peaceful and political Islamists are now dominating the spectrum of Islamist ideology as well as the political system of the Muslim world.

2.3.7 Causes behind the Strength of Islamist in Muslim world

1. The history in Muslim societies of the many centuries of "cultural and institutional success" of Islamic civilization that have created an "intense resistance to an alternative 'civilization order'", such as Western civilization (Fuller 2003).

2. The nearness of the core of the Muslim world to Europe and Christendom where it first conquered and then was conquered. Iberia in the seventh century, the Crusades¹² which began in the eleventh century, then for centuries the Ottoman Caliphate (Empire), were all fields of war between Europe and Islam (Halliday, 2003).

¹¹ *The Age of Sacred Terror* by Daniel Benjamin and Steven Simon, Random House, 2002, p.172-3

¹² One of the religious wars (= crusades) fought by Christians, mostly against Muslims in Palestine, in the 11th, 12th, 13th, and 17th centuries. See, <http://dictionary.cambridge.org/dictionary/english/crusade>

In the words of Bernard Lewis:

For almost a thousand years, from the first Moorish landing in Spain to the second Turkish siege of Vienna, Europe was under constant threat from Islam. In the early centuries it was a double threat — not only of invasion and conquest, but also of conversion and assimilation. All but the easternmost provinces of the Islamic realm had been taken from Christian rulers. The vast majority of the first Muslims west of Iran and Arabia were converts from Christianity ... Their loss was deeply felt and it heightened the fear that a similar fate was in store for Europe.

The Islamic world was aware of this European fear and hatred and also felt its own anger and resentment at the much more recent technological superiority of westerners who, are the perpetual teachers. Generation after generation, this irregularity has generated an inferiority complex, forever intensify by the fact that their innovations progress at a faster pace than we can absorb them. ... The best tool to reverse the inferiority complex to a superiority complex ... Islam would give the whole culture a sense of dignity.¹³

3. For Islamists, the main threat of the West is cultural rather than political or economic. Cultural dependency takes from one of faith and identity and thus destroys Islam and the Islamic community (*ummah*) far more effectively than political rule.¹⁴

4. The ending of the Cold War and Soviet occupation of Afghanistan has abolished the common atheist Communist enemy uniting some religious Muslims and the capitalist west.

5. By the end of World War I, most Muslim states were seen to be dominated by the Christian-leaning Western states. It is argued that either the claims of Islam were false and the Christian or post-Christian West had finally come up with another system that was superior, or Islam had failed through not being true to itself. Thus, a redoubling of faith and devotion by Muslims was called for to reverse this tide.

6. As the Islamic revival gained momentum, governments such as Egypt's, which had previously repressed Islamists, joined the bandwagon. They banned alcohol and flooded the airwaves with religious programming giving the movement even more exposure.

2.3.8 Trends of Political Islam

Two trends of political Islam: During Islamic civilization or caliphate and after the caliphate

Two trends of political Islam is observed throughout the history in scholarly writing and movement.

First one was to protect and preserve the Islamic traditional state that is Caliphate the symbol of Islamic civilization. Second one is at the end of Ottoman Caliphate (1924) scholars and political and

¹³ Lewis, Bernard, *Islam and the West* Oxford University Press, p.13, (1993)

¹⁴ Hassan Hanafi, Islamist philosophy professor at Cairo University quoted in *Passion for Islam* by Caryle Murphy, p.172

social activists who tried to return the Caliphate system which was the main actor of the Muslims unity and security.

Extremism within Islam goes back to the 7th century to the Kharijites. From their really political position, they developed extreme doctrines that set them apart from both mainstream Sunni and Shi'a Muslims. The Kharijites were mostly noted for adopting a radical approach to *Takfir*, whereby they declared other Muslims to be unbelievers. Therefore, they deemed them worthy of death.

Shaikh Ahmad Sirhindi (1564–1624) was part of "a reassertion of orthodoxy within Sufism". He also was known to his followers as the 'renovator of the second millennium'. It has been said of *Sirhindi* that he 'gave to Indian Islam the rigid and conservative stamp it bears today.'

Ibn Taymiyyah is a Syrian Islamic jurist during the 13th and 14th centuries. He is often quoted by contemporary Islamists. Ibn Taymiyya argued against the shirking of Sharia law, and against practices such as the celebration of Muhammad's birthday or the construction of mosques around the tombs of Sufi sheikhs, believing that these were unacceptable borrowings from Christianity.'

Shah Waliullah of India and Muhammad ibn Abd-al-Wahhab of Arabia were contemporaries who met each other while studying in Mecca. Muhammad ibn Abd-al-Wahhab advocated doing away with the later accumulations like grave worship and getting back to the letter and the spirit of Islam as preached and practiced by Muhammad. He went on to establish Wahhabism. Shah Waliullah was a precursor of reformist Islamists like Muhammad Abduh, Muhammad Iqbal and Muhammad Asad. Waliullah believed that there was "a constant need for new *ijtihad* as the Muslim community progressed and expanded and new generations had to cope with new problems" and in his interest in the social and economic problems of the poor.

The end of the 19th century saw the cut into pieces of most of the Muslim Ottoman Empire by non-Muslim European colonial powers. The empire spent enormous sums on Western civilian and military technology to try to modernize and compete with the encroaching European powers, and in the process went deep into debt to these powers.

In this context, the writings of Jamal ad-din al-Afghani (1837–97), Muhammad Abduh (1849–1905) and Rashid Rida (1865–1935) advocates Islamic alternatives to the political, economic, and cultural decline of the empire. Muhammad Abduh and Rashid Rida formed the beginning of the Islamist movement,¹⁵ as well as the reformist Islamist movement.

Their thoughts included the creation of a truly Islamic society under *sharia* law, and the denial of *taqlid*, the blind imitation of earlier authorities, which they believed deviated from the true messages

¹⁵ *Encyclopedia of Islam and the Muslim World*, Macmillan Reference, 2004, v.2, p.609

of Islam.¹⁶ Unlike some later Islamists, Early Salafiyya¹⁷ strongly emphasized the restoration of the Caliphate (Roy 1994).

2.3.9 Political Islam and Muslim Brotherhood

Approximately contemporaneous with Maududi was the founding of the Muslim Brotherhood in Ismailiyah, Egypt in 1928 by Hassan al Banna. Muslim Brotherhood is arguably the first, largest and most influential modern Islamic political/religious organization. Under the motto "the Qur'an is our constitution,"¹⁸ It wanted Islamic revival through preaching and also by providing basic community services including schools, mosques, and workshops. Likewise Maududi, Al Banna believed in the necessity of government rule foundation on *Shariah* law implemented progressively and by persuasion, and of eliminating all imperialist influence in the Muslim world (*Andrea 2012*).

Some elements of the Brotherhood, though perhaps in opposition to orders, did engage in violence against the government. Its founder Al-Banna was assassinated in 1949 in revenge for the assassination of Egypt's premier Mahmud Fami Naqrashi three months earlier. The Brotherhood has suffered periodic suppression in Egypt and has been banned several times. In 1948 and several years later following confrontations with Egyptian president Gamal Abdul Nasser, who jailed thousands of members for several years.

Despite periodic repression, the Brotherhood has become one of the most influential movements in the Islamic world, mainly in the Arab world. For many years it was described as "semi-legal" and it was the only opponent group in Egypt able to field candidates during elections. In the Egyptian parliamentary election, 2011–2012, the political parties identified as "Islamist" (the Brotherhood's Freedom and Justice Party, Salafi Al-Nour Party and liberal Islamist Al-Wasat Party) won 75% of the total seats.¹⁹ Mohamed Morsi, an Islamist democrat of Muslim Brotherhood, was the first democratically elected president of Egypt. He was toppled during the 2013 Egyptian coup d'état.

Maududi's political thought influenced Sayyid Qutb, a leading member of the Muslim Brotherhood movement. He (Qutb) was one of the key philosophers of Islamism and highly influential thinkers of Islamic universalism (Qutb 1981). Qutb believed things had reached such a state that the Muslim community had literally ceased to exist. It "has been destroyed for a few centuries," having reverted to Godless ignorance (Jahiliyya).

¹⁶ *Passion for Islam: Shaping the Modern Middle East: the Egyptian Experience* by Caryle Murphy, p.46

¹⁷ A school of Sunni Islam that condemns theological innovation and advocates strict adherence to shari'a and to the social structures existing in the earliest days of Islam.

¹⁸ The Message of the Teachings – Hasan al-Banna Archived January 8, 2015 at the Wayback Machine

¹⁹ Islamists Win 70% of Seats in the Egyptian Parliament *The New York Times*. See, http://www.nytimes.com/2012/01/22/world/middleeast/muslim-brotherhood-wins-47-of-egypt-assembly-seats.html?_r=0

To eradicate *Jahiliyya*, Qutb argued *Sharia*, or Islamic law, must be established. *Sharia* law was not only reachable to humans and necessary to the existence of Islam, but also all-encompassing, precluding "evil and corrupt" non-Islamic ideologies like communism, nationalism, or secular democracy.

Qutb preached that Muslims must employ in a two-pronged attack of converting individuals through preaching Islam peacefully and also waging what he called militant jihad so as to forcibly remove the "power structures" of *Jahiliyya* – not only from the Islamic homeland but from the face of the earth.

Qutb was both a member of the brotherhood and enormously influential in the Muslim world at large. Qutb is considered by some (Fawaz A. Gerges) to be "the founding father and leading theoretician" of modern jihadists, such as Osama bin Laden. However, the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt and in Europe has not embrace his vision of undemocratic Islamic state and armed jihad, something for which they have been condemned by radical Islamists.

2.3.10 Political Islam and Hizb ut-Tahrir

Hizb ut-Tahrir (HT) is a dominant international Islamist movement, founded in 1953 by an Islamic Qadi (*judge*) Taqiuddin al-Nabhani. HT is unique from most other Islamist movements in that the party focuses not on implementation of *Sharia* on local level or on providing social services, rather on unifying the Muslim world under its vision. That is to establish a new Islamic caliphate spanning from North Africa and the Middle East to much of central and South Asia.

To this end, it has drawn up and published a constitution for its proposed caliphate state. The constitution's 187 articles specify specific policies such as *sharia* law, a "unitary ruling system" headed by a Caliph elected by Muslims, an economy based on the gold standard, public ownership of utilities, public transport, and energy resources, and Arabic as the "sole language of the State."²⁰

In its focus on the Caliphate, HT has a different view of Muslim history than some other Islamists such as Muhammad Qutb. HT sees Islam's fundamental turning point as occurring not with the death of Ali, or one of the other four rightly guided Caliphs in the 7th century, but with the destruction of the Ottoman Caliphate in 1924. This is believed to have ended the true Islamic system, something for which it blames "the disbelieving (*Kafir*) colonial powers" working through Turkish modernist Mustafa Kemal Atatürk. HT does not take on in armed *jihad* or a democratic system, but works to take power through "ideological struggle" to change Muslim public opinion. In particular through elites who will "facilitate" a "change of the government," i.e., launch a bloodless coup. It allegedly attempted and unsuccessful such coups in 1968 and 1969 in Jordan, and in 1974 in Egypt, and is now

²⁰ Draft Constitution Archived September 27, 2007 at the Wayback Machine, See, <http://www.hizb-ut-tahrir.info/english/constitution.htm>

forbidden in both countries. But many HT members have left on to join terrorist groups and many *jihadi* terrorists have cited HT as their key influence.

The party is sometimes described as "Leninist" and "rigidly restricted by its central leadership,"²¹ with its estimated one million members required to spend "at least two years studying party literature under the guidance of mentors (*Murshid*)" before taking "the party oath."²² HT is particularly on the go in the ex-soviet republics of Central Asia and in Europe.

In the UK its rallies have drawn thousands of Muslims, and the party has been explained by two observers (Robert S. Leiken and Steven Brooke) to have outpaced the Muslim Brotherhood in both membership and radicalism.²³

Reformist or radical all sorts of political Islamists carries a common goal that is to establish an Islamic state. Mainly they differ in methods to reestablish their dreamt state. Some are compromising (Muslim Brotherhood) with the present democratic world order but some are rigid (*Al-Qaeda* & HT) not to compromise with capitalist secular democracy.

Islamist source of motivation of returning Islam

In holy Quran Allah has promised--

"Allah has promised, to those among you who believe and work righteous deeds, that He will, of a surety, grant them in the land, inheritance (of power), as He granted it to those before them; that He will establish in authority their religion, the one which He has chosen for them; and that He will change (their state), after the fear in which they (lived), to one of security and peace: 'They will worship Me (alone) and not associate aught with Me.' If any do reject Faith after this, they are rebellious and wicked.)" [TMQ 24:55].

The Messenger of Allah (SWT) said:

"The Prophet hood will last among you till Allah wishes it to last, and then Allah will raise it up. Afterwards there will be a Caliphate according to the way of the Prophethood so long as Allah wishes it to last, and then Allah will raise it up. Afterwards there will be a self supporting rule and it will last so long as Allah wishes it to last, and then Allah will raise it up. Afterwards there will be an oppressive rule, and it will last as long as Allah wishes it to last, and then Allah will raise it up. And then there will be a Caliphate according to the way of the

²¹ Shiv, Malik (13 September 2004). "For Allah and the caliphate". *New Statesman*

²² Ibid

²³ "The Moderate Muslim Brotherhood", Robert S. Leiken and Steven Brooke| *Foreign Affairs*, | March/April 2007

Prophethood.” [Ahmad in his Musnad, 4/273 (#18596) and al-Sunnah of ibn Abi ‘Asim (#1166 & 1169).]

2.3.11 Conclusion

Seculars and Westerners view that role of Islam in polity negatively but historically and by the Islamic scripture, consensus of Prophet’s companions and later classical and many modern scholars think that Islam has a political role in society . Many Muslim intellectuals and scholars, since the beginning of the colonial era and the beginning of the enduring domination of the West over Muslim countries, have been nostalgic to the loss of Muslim Empire, Muslim power and Muslim glory.

“The key moment when the decline of Muslim power was crystallized in the Muslim psyche was when the Ottoman Empire disappeared and the Islamic Caliphate as an institution was abolished in 1924. Many Islamic movements have since emerged with the explicit goal to revive the Muslim *Ummah*, reform Muslim societies and restore them to their past glory (Voll & Esposito, 1991)”.

Actually the rise of political Islam is the reaction and conscious movement to restore the glorious past of the Muslim community. The recent trend of Islamists is getting only power centric²⁴. They are more concentrated to gain state power than the educating the people to the proper knowledge of Islam. They have compromised with their ideological basis of returning whole Islamic social and political culture in the society. Western both capitalists and socialist block view political Islamists negatively but for their strategic benefit they use the political Islamists.

²⁴ See the above table of this chapter for further clarification the difference between Islamic politics and political Islam.

2.4 Democratic Governance

2.4.1 Definition of Democracy

Democracy is a system of government in which all the people of a state are involved in make decisions about its affairs, generally by voting to elect representatives to a parliament or identical assembly. Democracy is also defined as (a:) "government by the people; especially : rule of the majority (b:) "a government in which the utmost power is vested in the people and exercised by them directly or indirectly through a system of representation usually involving periodically held free elections."¹

According to political scientist Larry Diamond, it consists of four key elements:

- (a) A political system for choosing and replacing the government through free and fair elections;
- (b) The active participation of the people, as citizens, in politics and civic life;
- (c) Protection of the human rights of all citizens, and
- (d) A rule of law, in which the laws and procedures apply equally to all citizens.¹

The term originates from the Greek '*dēmokratia*' "rule of the people", which was found from '*dēmos*' "people" and '*krátos*' "power" or "rule", in the 5th century BC to specify the political systems then existing in Greek city-states, notably Athens. The political system of Classical Athens, for example, approved democratic citizenship to an elite class of free men and excluded slaves and women from political participation. In virtually all democratic governments throughout ancient and modern history, democratic citizenship consists of an elite class until full enfranchisement was succeeded for all adult citizens in most modern democracies through the suffrage movements of the 19th and 20th centuries.

Democracy contradicts with forms of government where power is either held by an individual, as in an absolute monarchy, or where power is held by a small number of individuals, as in an oligarchy. Nevertheless, these oppositions, inherited from Greek philosophy are now ambiguous because present-day governments have mixed democratic, oligarchic, and monarchic elements. Karl Popper defined democracy in contrast to dictatorship or tyranny, thus focusing on opportunities for the people to control their leaders and to oust them without the call for a revolution.²

¹ Diamond, L., Lecture at Hilla University for Humanistic Studies January 21, 2004: "What is Democracy"; Diamond, L. and Morlino, L., The quality of democracy (2016). In Diamond, L., In Search of Democracy. London: Routledge. ISBN 978-0-415-78128-2

2.4.2 Characteristics of Democracy

No consensus remains on how to define democracy, but legal equality, political freedom and rule of law, secularism have been identified as important characteristics. These principles are echoed in all eligible citizens being equal before the law and having equal access to legislative processes. In a representative democracy, single vote has equal weight. No unreasonable restrictions can apply to anyone seeking to become a representative and the freedom of its eligible citizens is secured by legitimised rights and liberties which are normally protected by a constitution of the state.

One theory holds that democracy requires three fundamental principles:

- (1) upward control, i.e. sovereignty residing at the lowest levels of authority,
- (2) political equality, and
- (3) social norms by which individuals and institutions only consider acceptable acts that reflect the first two principles of upward control and political equality.³

Liberal Democracy:

The term "democracy" is sometimes used as shorthand for liberal democracy, which is a variant of representative democracy that may include Indicators such as-

- 1. Political pluralism;*
- 2. Equality before the law;*
- 3. The right to petition elected officials for redress of grievances;*
- 4. Due process;*
- 5. Civil liberties;*
- 6. Human rights;*
- 7. and elements of civil society outside the government.*

Parliamentary sovereignty:

In some countries, particularly in the United Kingdom which originated the Westminster system, the leading principle is that of parliamentary sovereignty, while maintaining judicial independence. In the United States, separation of powers is frequently cited as a central attribute. In India, parliamentary sovereignty is subject to the Constitution of India which incorporates judicial review.

Rule of Majority:

Majority rule is frequently listed as a characteristic of democracy. Therefore, democracy allows for political minorities to be oppressed by the "tyranny of the majority" in the absence of legal protections of individual or group rights.

Election:

An indispensable part of an "ideal" representative democracy is competitive elections that are substantively and procedurally "fair," i.e., just and equitable.

Secularism:

To separate religion and politics is one of the important elements of modern democracy because secularism ensures every one's access to law making (man-made law) process and sovereignty of the people over the Creator or religion.

Republic:

Representative democracy is now and then equated with the republican form of government. The term "republic" classically has encompassed both democracies and aristocracies. Many democracies are constitutional monarchies, such as the United Kingdom.

In some countries, freedom of political expression, freedom of speech, and freedom of the press are regarded as important to make sure that voters are well informed enabling them to vote according to their own interests. It has also been recommended by scholars that a basic feature of democracy is the capacity of all voters to participate freely and fully in the life of their society.

2.4.3 Origin of Democracy

Athenian democracy: The term "democracy" first came into view in ancient Greek political and philosophical thought in the city-state of Athens during classical antiquity. Led by Cleisthenes, Athenians establishes what is generally held as the first democracy in 508–507 BC. Cleisthenes is regarded as "the father of Athenian democracy."

Athenian democracy takes the form of a direct democracy, and it had two distinguishing features:

1. The random selection of ordinary citizens to plug the few existing government administrative and judicial offices and
2. A legislative assembly forming of all Athenian citizens. All eligible citizens were permitted to have a word and vote in the assembly, which put the laws of the city state. Nevertheless, Athenian citizenship excluded women, slaves, foreigners, non-landowners, and males under 20 years old.

Athenian democracy was not only *direct* in the sense those resolutions were made by the assembled people, but also the *most direct* in the sense that the people through the assembly and courts of law directed the entire political process and a large proportion of citizens were involved continuously in the public business.

Contribution of Roman Republic:

Even though the Roman Republic contributed significantly to many aspects of democracy. Only a marginal of Romans were citizens with votes in elections for representatives. The votes of the powerful were granted more weight through a system of gerrymandering. As a result, most high officials, including members of the Senate, came from a few wealthy and noble families. Furthermore, the Roman Republic was the first government in the western world to have a Republic as a nation-state though it didn't cover much of a democracy. The Romans made-up the concept of classics and many works from Ancient Greece were preserved. In addition, the Roman model of governance inspired many political thinkers over the centuries. Today's modern representative democracies copy more the Roman than the Greek models because it was a state in which highest power was held by the people and their elected representatives, and that had an elected or nominated leader.

Early modern period of democracy

During the early modern period, the power of the Parliament of England repeatedly increased. Passage of the Petition of Right in 1628 and Habeas Corpus Act in 1679 found certain liberties and remain in effect. The idea of a political party was formed with groups freely debating rights to political representation during the Putney Debates of 1647. After the English Civil Wars (1642–1651) and the Glorious Revolution of 1688, the Bill of Rights was enacted in 1689, which codified certain rights and liberties. The Bill set out the necessity for regular elections, rules for freedom of speech in Parliament and restricted the power of the monarch, ensuring that, unlike much of Europe at the time, royal absolutism would not prevail.

Democracy in 18th and 19th centuries

The founding of universal male suffrage in France in 1848 was a significant milestone in the history of democracy. The first Parliament of Great Britain was established in 1707, after the unification of the Kingdom of England and the Kingdom of Scotland under the Acts of Union. Though the monarch increasingly developed into a figurehead,² only a small minority truly had a voice.

² http://www.nationalarchives.gov.uk/pathways/citizenship/rise_parliament/citizenship2.htm

Parliament was elected by only a minority percent of the population. During the Age of Liberty in Sweden (1718-1772), civil rights were extended and power transferred from the monarch to parliament. The taxed peasantry was represent in parliament.

This Corsican Constitution was the first foundation on Enlightenment principles and included female suffrage. That was not granted in most other democracies until the 20th century.

In the American colonial period before 1776, and for some time after, often only adult white male property owners could vote. Enslaved Africans, most free black people and most women were not extended the franchise.³ On the American frontier, democracies grow to be a way of life, with more widespread social, economic and political equality. Although not defined as a democracy by the founding fathers, they shared a willpower to root the American experiment in the principles of natural freedom and equality.

The American Revolution led to the embracing of the United States Constitution in 1787, the oldest surviving, still active, governmental codified constitution. The Constitution offered for an elected government and protected civil rights and liberties for some but it did not end slavery nor expand voting rights in the United States beyond white male property owners (about 6% of the population).⁴ The Bill of Rights in 1791 set limits on government power to defend personal freedoms but had little impact on judgements by the courts for the first 130 years after ratification.⁵

In 1789, Revolutionary France adopted the Declaration of the Rights of Man and of the Citizen. Although short-lived, the National Convention was elected by all males in 1792.⁶

The United Kingdom's Slave Trade Act 1807 forbids the trade across the British Empire, which was enforced internationally by the Royal Navy under treaties Britain bargained with other nations.⁷ In 1833, the United Kingdom passed the Slavery Abolition Act which took effect across the British Empire.

Universal male suffrage was introduced in France in March 1848 in the wake of the French Revolution of 1848. In 1848, several revolutions brake out in Europe as rulers were confronted with popular demands for liberal constitutions and more democratic government.

In the 1860 United States Census, the slave population in the United States had increased to four million.⁸ Full enfranchisement of citizens was not protected until after the African-American Civil

³ "Voting in Early America". Colonial Williamsburg. Spring 2007. Retrieved April 21, 2015.

⁴ "Expansion of Rights and Liberties - The Right of Suffrage". Online Exhibit: The Charters of Freedom. National Archives. Retrieved 21 April 2015.

⁵ "The Bill Of Rights: A Brief History". ACLU. Retrieved 21 April 2015.

⁶ "The French Revolution II". Mars.wnec.edu. Retrieved 2010-08-22

⁷ Lovejoy, Paul E. (2000). Transformations in slavery: a history of slavery in Africa (2nd ed.). New York: Cambridge University Press. p. 290. ISBN 0521780128.

⁸ "Introduction – Social Aspects of the Civil War". ltd.nps.gov. Retrieved 2010-08-22

Rights Movement (1955–1968) gained passage by the United States Congress of the Voting Rights Act of 1965.

Development of democracy in 20th and 21st centuries

20th-century transitions to liberal democracy have become in successive "waves of democracy", in many ways resulting from wars, revolutions, decolonization, and religious and economic circumstances. World War I and the ending of the Ottoman and Austro-Hungarian empires resulted in the creation of new nation-states from Europe, most of them at least supposedly democratic.

In the 1920s democracy bloomed and women's suffrage advanced. But the Great Depression brought disappointment and most of the countries of Europe, Latin America, and Asia turned to strong-man rule or dictatorships.

A subsequent wave of democratization brought considerable gains toward true liberal democracy for many nations. Spain, Portugal (1974), and several of the military dictatorships in South America went back to civilian rule in the late 1970s and early 1980s (Argentina in 1983, Bolivia, Uruguay in 1984, Brazil in 1985, and Chile in the early 1990s). This was imitated by nations in East and South Asia by the mid-to-late 1980s.

Economic dissatisfaction in the 1980s, along with antipathy of Soviet oppression, contributed to the collapse of the Soviet Union, the associated end of the Cold War, and the democratisation and liberalisation of the previous Eastern bloc countries. The most triumphant of the new democracies were those geographically and culturally closest to western Europe. They are now members or candidate members of the European Union.

The liberal style spread to some nations in Africa in the 1990s, most prominently in South Africa. Some recent examples of efforts of liberalisation include the Indonesian Revolution of 1998, the Bulldozer Revolution in Yugoslavia, the Rose Revolution in Georgia, the Orange Revolution in Ukraine, the Cedar Revolution in Lebanon, the Tulip Revolution in Kyrgyzstan, and the Jasmine Revolution in Tunisia.

According to Freedom House, in 2007 there were 123 electoral democracies (up from 40 in 1972).⁹ According to *World Forum on Democracy*, electoral democracies now represent 120 of the 192 existing countries and comprise 58.2 percent of the world's population. At the same time liberal democracies i.e. countries Freedom House observes as free and respectful of basic human rights and the rule of law are 85 in number and represent 38 percent of the global population.¹⁰

In 2007 the United Nations declared September 15 the International Day of Democracy.

⁹ "Tables and Charts". Freedomhouse.org. 2004-05-10. Archived from the original on 22 January 2010. Retrieved 2010-08-22.

¹⁰ List of Electoral Democracies fordemocracy.net

2.4.4 Capitalist Democracy

Capitalist democracy is political, economic and social ideologies that involve the combination of a democratic political system with a capitalist economic system. It is based on a tripartite arrangement of a private sector-driven market economy based mainly on a democratic policy, economic incentives through free markets, fiscal responsibility and a liberal moral-cultural system which promote pluralism.¹¹ This ideology holds up a capitalist economy subject to control by a democratic political system that is supported by the mainstream. It places in contrast to authoritarian capitalism by limiting the influence of special interest groups, including corporate lobbyists, on politics.

The ideology of "democratic capitalism" or 'capitalist democracy' has been in continuation since medieval times. It is founded firmly on the principles of liberalism, which comprise liberty and equality. Some of its earliest supporters incorporate many of the American founding fathers and subsequent Jeffersonians.

It is argued that the coexistence of modern capitalism and democracy was the result of the creation of the modern welfare state in the post-war period. It has enabled a relatively stable political atmosphere and widespread support for capitalism. This period of history is often referred to as the "Golden Age of Capitalism".¹²

2.4.5 Types of Democracies

Democracy has turned into a number of forms, both in theory and practice. Some varieties of democracy offer superior representation and more freedom for their citizens than others. Nevertheless, if any democracy is not formed so as to prohibit the government from excluding the people from the legislative process, or any branch of government from altering the separation of powers in its own favour, then a branch of the system can mount up too much power and destroy the democracy.

Basic forms

Several variants of democracy exist, but there are two basic forms, both of which concern how the whole body of all qualified citizens executes its will. One form of democracy is direct democracy, in which all eligible citizens have dynamic participation in the political resolution making, for example voting on policy initiatives directly. In most modern democracies, the whole bodies of eligible citizens have the sovereign power but political power is done exercise indirectly through elected representatives. This is called a representative democracy.

¹¹ Benne, Robert, *The Ethic of Democratic Capitalism*, p. 97, ISBN 0-8006-1445-3

¹² Capitalism and Inequality, by Muller, Jerry Z. 2013. Foreign Affairs, March 2013

Direct democracy

Direct democracy is a political system where the citizens participate in the decision-making personally, contrary to depending on intermediaries or representatives. A characteristic of Athenian democracy, is unique to direct democracies. In this system, vital governmental and administrative duties are performed by citizens picked from a lottery.¹³ A direct democracy gives the voting population the power to:

1. Modify constitutional laws,
2. Place initiatives, referendums and suggestions for laws,
3. Giving binding orders to elective officials, such as revoking them before the end of their elected term, or introduce a lawsuit for breaking a campaign promise.

Within modern-day representative governments, certain electoral means like referendums, citizens' initiatives and recall elections are passed on as forms of direct democracy. Direct democracy as a government system presently only is present in the Swiss cantons of Appenzell Innerrhoden and Glarus.¹⁴

Representative democracy

Representative democracy engages the election of government officials by the citizens being represented. If the head of state is also democratically elected, then it is labeled a democratic republic.¹⁵ The most familiar mechanisms engage election of the contestant with a majority or a plurality of the votes. Most western countries cover representative systems.

Representatives may be elected or become diplomatic representatives by a particular constituency, or represent the whole electorate through proportional systems, with some using a mixture of the two. Some representative democracies also integrate elements of direct democracy, such as referendums. A feature of representative democracy is that while the representatives are voted by the people to act in the people's concern, they keep the freedom to apply their own judgment as how the best to do so.

Parliamentary system

Parliamentary democracy is a representative democracy where government is chosen by representatives as contrasting to a "presidential rule" wherein the president is both chief of state and

¹³ Bernard Manin. *Principles of Representative Government*. pp. 8-11 (1997)

¹⁴ Vincent Golay and Mix et Remix, *Swiss political institutions, Éditions loisirs et pédagogie*, 2008. ISBN 978-2-606-01295-3

¹⁵ "Radical Revolution - The Thermidorean Reaction". *Wsu.edu*. 1999-06-06. Archived from the original on 1999-02-03. Retrieved 2010-08-22

the chief of government. He is elected by the voters. Under a parliamentary democracy, government is worked out by delegation to an executive ministry and subject to ongoing review, checks and balances by the legislative parliament chosen by the populace.¹⁶

Parliamentary systems have the right to discharge a Prime Minister at any point in time that they think he or she is not doing their work to the anticipations of the legislature. This is done throughout a Vote of 'No Confidence' wherein the legislature takes decision whether or not to take out the Prime Minister from office by a greater part support for his or her discharge.¹⁷ In some countries, the Prime Minister can also call voting whenever he or she so chooses. Usually the Prime Minister will hold a voting when he or she recognizes that they are in good favor with the community as to be re-elected. In other parliamentary democracies additional elections are nearly never held, a minority government being chosen until the next common elections. A significant characteristic of the parliamentary democracy is the idea of the "loyal opposition". The spirit of the notion is that the second largest political party counters the governing party (or coalition), while still remaining faithful to the state and its democratic values.

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Presidential system


Presidential Democracy is a method wherein the community elects the president throughout free and fair elections. The president works as both the chief of state and chief of government controlling most of the executive powers. The president acts for a explicit term and cannot surpass that the time. Elections usually have a preset date and aren't easily changed. The president has direct influence over the cabinet, particularly appointing the cabinet members.

The president cannot be easily discharged from office by the legislature. He or she cannot take away members of the legislative branch any more easily. This gives some ways of separation of powers. In outcome however, the president and the legislature may finish up in the control of separate parties, allowing one to chunk the other and thus hinder with the orderly operation of the state. This may be the cause why presidential democracy is not very regular outside the Americas, Africa, and Central and Southeast Asia.

A semi-presidential system is a structure of democracy in which the government involves both a prime minister and a president. The picky powers held by the prime minister and president differs by country.

¹⁶ Brown, Charles H., *The Correspondents' War*. New York: Charles Scribners' Sons, 1967

¹⁷ O'Neil, Patrick H. *Essentials of Comparative Politics*. 3rd ed. New York: W. W. Norton &, 2010. Print



2.4.6 Indicators of Modern Democracy in This Study

Presently there are different form and types of democratic system of governance in the world. In this study the following indicators are taken into consideration to define and make a comparative analysis.

Indicators	Political Islam	Democracy
<i>Sovereignty</i>	Sovereignty of Allah (God)	Popular Sovereignty (human being)
<i>Source of law</i>	Islamic <i>Shariah</i>	Human consultation (man-made secular law)
<i>Form of government</i>	Caliphate or Islamic governance	Democracy: Parliamentary or Presidential
<i>Nationalism</i>	Islamic <i>Ummah</i>	Nation State
<i>Ideological perspective</i>	Islam	Secularism and Capitalism
Accountability (Constitution, Election, Parliament, the President in Democratization Process)	Rigid	Flexible and transparent
Representation (Political Parties)	Rigid	Flexible but rich and influential persons actually rule the country

2.4.7 Democratization Process

The Latin American and South European experiences show that the working of democracy over time reduces the coup attempts by politicized militaries and reduces their power and privileges. The militaries became less interested in confronting civilians and overthrowing their regimes, as it became more concerned with protecting its institutional well-being and privileges (Huntington, 1991a: 242-243; Droz-Vincent, 2013: 23). Those countries experienced an increased transparency in the defence area, greater supervisory over the military by its parliaments, replacement of military personnel in the defence ministry by civilian officials, a replacement of the top of the military and a more politically neutralized military (Huntington, 1995: 11). In order to establish such democratic civil-military relations a functioning civilian government is needed, which makes the prospects of returning to an authoritarian regime no longer a viable option by institutionalizing democratic control over the military and addressing shadow networks (Droz-Vincent, 2013: 18-23).

Democratic Civil-Military Relations

In order to establish democratic civil-military relations the defence sector needs to be reorganized. Huntington (1991a: 242-243; 1995: 11-13), Diamond and Plattner (1996), Pion Berlin (2009) and Droz-Vincent (2013: 18-23) mention a few measures a newly elected civilian government could take to implement this reorganization, which can be summarized in seven points. In the first place a newly elected civilian government could empower the ministry of defence by replacing the military officers by civilian officials. Secondly it could replace the top of the military by encouraging those in charge during the former regime to retire. Thirdly they could install judiciary and legislative control over the military. Fourthly they could reduce the manpower and finances of the military. The nation-building role and the economic development the military often provides for makes it however hard to cut back on their budget. Fifthly they could alter the military training and education system. Sixthly they could reorient the military on its core mission, external security, and get the military out of a wide range of activities which are not strictly related to the core business of the military. For instance by cutting back on their economic role by privatizing military enterprises. In order to keep the military satisfied they could instead invest in the modernization of their military equipment and make sure they uphold their respect and status. Either increasing or decreasing the economic benefits of the military is an option.

Finally international pressure from the United States and the European Union can play a major role in democratizing the civil-military relations. Academics (such as Cook, 2007 and Droz-Vincent, 2013) agree that the European Union is the primary actor for driving change in the civil-military relations in Turkey. Furthermore exposure to the military education in the United States has been a factor for acceptance by military officers of liberal democratic norms of military professionalism and civilian control (Huntington, 1991a: 242-243; 1995: 11-13).

¹ Democracy - Definition of Democracy by Merriam-Webster

² Jarvie, 2006, pp. 218-9

³ Kimber, Richard (September 1989). "On democracy" *Scandinavian Political Studies* (Wiley) 12 (3): 201, 199-219

2.5 Compatibility among Islamic System, Political Islam and Democracy

2.5.1 Introduction

'Are Islam and democracy compatible or suitable' is a long debated question. Huge number of writing and studies have been developed explaining that Islam has all the elements of modern state and society. Many Muslim thinkers are researching for to establish that Islam safeguards democratic values. But rather than direct the debate, they often follow it, interrupt their own study with references to Western scholars who, casting aside traditional Orientalism for the theories of the late theorist Edward Said, twist facts to fit their assumptions. Why are there such efforts? For Western scholars, the answer remains both in politics and the often beneficial desire to satisfy a wider Middle East audience. For Islamists, although, the inspiration is to eliminate suspicion about the nature and goals of Islamic movements such as the Muslim Brotherhood, Hizbuttaharir, Jamate Islami and, possibly, even Hezbollah.

Caliphate system, derived from the ruling tradition of Islamic Prophet Muhammad (SAW) which was introduced in Medina. In absence of him his close companions succeeded this system following Islamic rules, guidelines and tradition of Prophet Muhammad. The trace of Athenian democracy is found before the Islamic state of Medina besides Roman Empire also followed some sorts of democracy. But Islamic Caliphate was of completely different from ancient Athenian or present Representative democracy. Though some modern liberal Islamic scholars try to find out some similarities between Caliphate and representative electoral democracy but almost all the classical scholars disagreed with present democratic system.

2.5.2 Justifying Compatibility between Islamic System and Democracy

Some Western academicians support the Islamist argument that parliamentary democracy and representative elections are not only suitable with Islamic law, but Islam truly promotes democracy.

They make this in one of two ways:

1. *Either they twist meaning to make them suit the elements of Islamic government—terms such as democracy become relative — or*
2. *They bend the reality of life in Muslim countries to fit their theories.*

Amongst the best known campaigner of the idea that Islam both is 'compatible and encourages democracy' is John L. Esposito, founding director of the Alwaleed bin Talal Center for Muslim-Christian Understanding at Georgetown University and the author or editor of more than thirty books about Islam and Islamist movements.

Esposito and his various co-authors construct their opinions upon hypothesis and commonplace such as "democracy has many and varied meanings (Esposito, 1992: 211-12);" "every culture will mold an independent model of democratic government; (Esposito, 1992: 18-21)" and "there can develop a religious democracy (Esposito, 1992: 18-21)."

He advocates that "Islamic movements have internalized the democratic discourse through the concepts of *shura* [consultation], *ijma'* [consensus], and *ijtihad* [independent interpretive judgment]"¹ and bring to a close that democracy already subsists in the Muslim world, "whether the word democracy is used or not."² If Esposito's logics are true, then why is democracy not really visible in the Middle East? Freedom House frequently ranks Arab countries as among the least democratic anywhere³. Esposito accepts Said's conviction that Western scholarship and standards are inherently biased and criticize both scholars who give such conclusion without experience with Islamic movements⁴ and those who propagates a "secular bias" toward Islam.⁵

For example, in *Islam and Democracy*, Esposito and co-author John Voll, associate director of the Prince Alwaleed Center, query Western attempts to monopolize the definition of democracy as well as they propose the very concept shifts meanings over time and place. They squabble that every culture can shape an independent model of democratic government which may or may not draw a parallel to the Western liberal idea.⁶

Only after defining the sense of democracy as the idea built up and derived from Plato and Aristotle in ancient Greece through Thomas Jefferson and James Madison in eighteenth century America, can Esposito and his associate travelers advance theories of the compatibility of Islamism and democracy.

While Esposito's arguments may be popular within the Middle East Studies Association, democracy theorists lean to release such relativism. Larry Diamond, co-editor of the *Journal of Democracy*, and Leonardo Morlino, a specialist in comparative politics at the University of Florence, attribute seven characteristics to any democracy:

1. Individual freedoms and civil liberties;
2. Rule of the law;

¹ John L. Esposito and James Piscatory, "Democratization and Islam," *Middle East Journal*, Summer 1991, p. 434; John O. Voll and John L. Esposito "Islam's Democratic Essence," *Middle East Quarterly*, Sept. 1994, pp. 7-8; Voll and Esposito, *Islam and Democracy*, pp. 27-30, 186; Esposito and Voll, "*Islam and Democracy*": Esposito, *The Islamic Threat*, pp. 49-50; John L. Esposito, *Islam: The Straight Path* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1991), pp. 45, 83, 142-8.

² John L. Esposito, *What Everybody Needs to Know about Islam* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002), pp. 159-61; John L. Esposito, "Contemporary Islam," in John L. Esposito, ed., *The Oxford History of Islam* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1999), pp. 675-80; Esposito and Piscatory, "Democratization and Islam," p. 440.

³ "Table of Independent Countries 2006," *Freedom in the World, 2006* (Washington, D.C.: Freedom House, 2006)

⁴ Esposito, *The Islamic Threat*, pp. 203-4.

⁵ John L. Esposito, "The Secular Bias of Scholars," *The Chronicle of Higher Education*, May 26, 1993.

⁶ Voll and Esposito, *Islam and Democracy*, pp. 6-8, 27-30

3. Sovereignty resting upon the people;
4. Equality of all citizens before the law;
5. Vertical and horizontal accountability for government officials;
6. Transparency of the ruling systems to the demands of the citizens;
7. and equality of opportunity for citizens.

This approach is significant, since it highlights civil liberties, human rights and freedoms, instead of over-reliance on elections and the formal institutions of the state (Dahl 1998)

Esposito ignores this fundamental basis of democracy and instead describes motivation from men such as Indian philosopher Muhammad Iqbal (1877-1938), Sudanese religious leader Hasan al-Turabi (1932-), Iranian sociologist Ali Shariati (1933-77), and former Iranian president Muhammad Khatami (1943-), who advocate that Islam gives a structure for combining democracy with spirituality to remedy the alleged spiritual vacuum in Western democracies⁷. They support Khatami's view that democracies do not require to pursue a formula and can function not only in a liberal system but also in socialist or religious systems. They accept the disputed thought of twentieth century Indian (and, later, Pakistani) Abu al-A'la al-Mawdudi's concept of a "theo-democracy,"⁸ in which three principles: *tawhid* (unity of God), *risala* (prophethood) and *khilafa* (caliphate) underlie the Islamic political system⁹.

But Mawdudi advocates that any Islamic polity has to accept the supremacy of Islamic law over all aspects of political and religious life (Yusuf, 1997: 35). But hardly a democratic concept allows that any Islamic law provide for equality of all citizens under the law regardless of religion and gender. Such formulations also deny citizens a fundamental right to decide their laws, a fundamental idea of democracy. Although Mawdudi uses the phrase theo-democracy to suggest that Islam encompassed some democratic principles, Mawdudi himself asserted Islamic democracy to be a self-contradiction: the sovereignty of God and sovereignty of the people are mutually exclusive. An Islamic democracy would be the antithesis of secular Western democracy.¹⁰

Esposito and Voll react by saying that Mawdudi and his contemporaries did not so much refuse democracy as frame it under the concept of God's unity. Theo-democracy need not mean a dictatorship

⁷ Esposito, *The Oxford History of Islam*, pp. 661-7; Esposito, *Islam: The Straight Path*, pp. 137, 141, 181-3, 231, 245-6; Esposito and Piscatory, "Democratization and Islam," pp. 436-7.

⁸ Abu al-A'la al-Mawdudi, "Political Theory of Islam," in Khurshid Ahmad, ed., *Islam: Its Meaning and Message* (London: Islamic Council of Europe, 1976), pp. 159-61.

⁹ Abu al-A'la al-Mawdudi, *Islamic Way of Life* (Delhi: Markazi Maktaba Islami, 1967), p. 40; Esposito and Piscatory, "Democratization and Islam," pp. 436-7, 440; Esposito, *The Islamic Threat*, pp. 125-6; Voll and Esposito, *Islam and Democracy*, pp. 23-6.

¹⁰ Abu al-A'la al-Mawdudi, "Political Theory of Islam," in John J. Donahue and John L. Esposito, eds., *Islam in Transition: Muslim Perspective* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1982), p. 253.

of state. Rather could include joint sovereignty by all Muslims, including ordinary citizens¹¹. Esposito moves even further, arguing that Mawdudi's Islamist system could be democratic even if it avoids popular sovereignty, so long as it allows consultative assemblies subordinate to Islamic law.¹²

While Esposito and Voll advocates that Islamic democracy remain on conceptions of consultation (*shura*), consensus (*ijma'*), and independent interpretive judgment (*ijtihad*), other Muslim exegetes add *hakmiya* (sovereignty).¹³ To hold up such a conception of Islamic democracy, Esposito and Voll depend on Muhammad Hamidullah (1908-2002), an Indian Sufi scholar of Islam and international law; Ayatollah Baqir as-Sadr (1935-80), an Iraqi Shi'ite cleric; Muhammad Iqbal (1877-1938), an Indian Muslim poet, philosopher and politician; Khurshid Ahmad, a vice president of the Jama'at-e-Islami of Pakistan; and Taha al-Alwani, an Iraqi scholar of Islamic jurisprudence.¹⁴ The insertion of Alwani emphasizes the misleading notion of Esposito's theories. In 2003, the FBI identified Alwani as an unindicted co-conspirator in a trial of suspected Palestinian Islamic Jihad leaders and financiers.¹⁵

Just as Esposito disembowel the meaning of democracy to permit his thesis, so, too, does he twist Islamic concepts. *Shura* is an advisory council, not a participatory one. It is a heritage of tribalism, not sovereignty (Boseworth, 1960). Nor does *ijma'* articulates the consensus of the community at large but rather only the elders and established leaders (Bernard, 1960). As for independent judgment, many Sunni scholars think *ijtihad* closed in the eleventh century (Schacht, 1960).

Esposito's arguments have not only infused the Middle Eastern studies intellectual community but also attained grip with public intellectuals throughout books written by journalists and policy practitioners.

In both journal articles and book works as well as in underlying assumptions within her reporting, former *Los Angeles Times* and present *Washington Post* diplomatic reporter Robin Wright opines that Islamism or political Islam could change into more democratic forms. In 2000, for example, she advocated in *The Last Great Revolution* that a deep revolution was ongoing in Iran in which practicality replaced revolutionary values, superiority had ensured to realism, and the "government of God" was moving to secular statecraft (Wright, 2001: 257-73). Far from getting more democratic, though, the top

¹¹ Voll and Esposito, "Islam's Democratic Essence," p. 7.

¹² Esposito, *The Islamic Threat*, p. 126.

¹³ Taqi ad-Din Ibn Taymiyah, "*Mas'alah fil-'Aql wal-Nafs*," in A.A.M. Qasim and M.A.A. Qasim, eds., *Majmu'a fatawat Shaykh al-Islam Ibn Taymiyah* (Riyad: Matba'at al-Hukumah, 1996), vol. 9, pp. 47-9; Abu al-A'la al-Mawdudi, "Political Theory of Islam," in Ahmad, *Islam*, pp. 149-51; Sayyid Qutb, *Milestones (Ma'alim fil Tariq)* (Indianapolis: American Trust Publications, 1990), pp. 111-3, 130-7.

¹⁴ Voll and Esposito, *Islam and Democracy*, pp. 27-30, 186; Esposito, *The Islamic Threat*, pp. 49-50; Esposito, *Islam: The Straight Path*, pp. 45, 83; Esposito and Piscatory, "Democratization and Islam," p. 434.

¹⁵ J. Michael Waller, Annenberg Professor of International Communication, Institute of World Politics, statement before the Subcommittee on Terrorism, Technology, and Homeland Security, Senate Committee on the Judiciary, Oct. 14, 2003

leader and Revolutionary Guards united control; freedoms remain intangible, political prisoners imprisoned, and democracy imaginary.

Core Wright's work is the thought that neither Islam nor Muslim culture is a main barrier to political modernity. She recognized both the Esposito school's opinion that *shura*, *ijma'*, and *ijtihad* form a foundation on which to build Islam compatible with political pluralism (Wright, 1996: 165-167). She shares John Voll's idea that Islam is an primary part of the modern world. She explains the inner comedy of reform is the try to merge Islam and modernity by making a view compatible with both.¹⁶

In her commentary "Islam and Liberal Democracy," she outlined two well-known Islamist thinkers, Rachid al-Ghannouchi, the exiled leader of Tunisia's Hizb al-Nahda (Renaissance Party), and Iranian philosopher and analytical chemist Abdul-Karim Soroush. She opines that their thoughts stand for a pragmatic confluence of Islam and democracy.¹⁷ Ghannouchi applies democratic idioms without accepting them let alone understanding their implication. He is not a modernist but an unreformed Islamist.

Wright ignores that Soroush directed the wash out of liberal intellectuals from Iranian universities in the wake of the Islamic Revolution¹⁸. While Soroush explained of civil rights and tolerance, he relates such privileges only to those subscribing to Islamic democracy (Soroush, 2000:123-155). He also advocated that though Islam indicates "submission," there is no disagreement to the freedoms inherent in democracy. Islam and democracy are not only compatible but their connection certain. In a Muslim society, one lacking the other is defective. He opines that the willpower of the majority shapes the ideal Islamic state (Soroush, 2000:145-147). But, in practice, this does not happen. As in Iran, many Islamists limit democratic processes and squeeze civil society. Persons with guns, not numbers, form the state. Amongst Arab-Islamic states, there are only dictatorial regimes and leadership. Soroush, however, disagree with himself: Although Islam should be an open religion, it must keep hold of its spirit. He argues that Islamic law is flexible would be think blasphemous by many social groups who advocate that definite opinion within Islamic law are absolute. Upon falling out of favor with revolutionary authorities in Iran, he flees to the West.

What Ghannouchi and Soroush have in same, and what stay true with any number of other Islamist officials, is that, regardless of expression, they do not desire to reunite Islam and modernity but to modify the political order. It is easier to accept the oratory of democracy than its inner thoughts.

¹⁶ Wright, "Islam and Liberal Democracy," p. 67.

¹⁷ Wright, "Islam and Liberal Democracy," p. 67-75.

¹⁸ "Soroush among Those For and Against," interview, *Jameah* (Tehran), June 16, 17, 1998; John L. Esposito and John O. Voll, *Makers of Contemporary Islam* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001), ch. 7.

While time has demonstrated Wright's incorrectness, the perseverance of Esposito interpretation stays behind. Every few years, a fresh face appears to revitalize old logics. The latest accumulation is Noah Feldman, a media analyst and Arabic-speaking law professor at Harvard University. In 2003, Feldman brings out *After Jihad: America and the Struggle for Islamic Democracy*, which investigates the vision for democracy in the Muslim world¹⁹. His thesis repeats Esposito's 1992 book *The Islamic Threat: Myth or Reality?* and the 1996 Esposito-Voll teamwork *Islam and Democracy*. Even after the nine-eleven terrorist attacks, Feldman advocates so as to the age of aggressive *jihad* is past, moreover Islamism or political is developing in new, more peaceful, and democratic course²⁰. Incorporated in Feldman's listing of Islamic democrats²¹ is Yusuf al-Qaradawi, an Islamist scholar who has approved suicide bombing and the murder of homosexuals (Qaradawi, 2004: 78-80).

Whereas the majority scholarly arguments do not exit the classroom, the contest over the compatibility of Islam and democracy influence policy making as well. Feldman drives the ending that the Islamist peril is a false impression. Therefore, he opines that Islamist movements should have an opportunity to rule (Feldman, 2003: pp. 210-21, 228-30, 234). Feldman finishes off with the recommendation that U.S. policymakers should take up an all-encompassing approach toward political Islam. "An established religion that does not coerce religious belief and that treats religious minorities as equals may be perfectly compatible with democracy," he analyzed in a September 2003 interview²².

Shireen Hunter, an ex- Iranian diplomat who now is directing the Islam program at the Center for Strategic and International Studies, also repeats Esposito's common logics in her book, *The Future of Islam and the West: Clash of Civilizations or Peaceful Coexistence?*²³ In recent times, in *Modernization, Democracy, and Islam*,²⁴ her edited compilation with Huma Malik, the assistant director of Esposito's Prince Alwaleed Bin Talal Center for Muslim-Christian Understanding at Georgetown University. Both books reject the Islamist peril and endeavor to merge Islamic tradition with Western values. She tries to oppose Samuel Huntington's *Clash of Civilization* (Huntington, 1996) and provides a review of the comparative role of both conflicting and cooperative features of Muslim-Western intimacy. She advocates with the intention of the blend of the spiritual and the temporal in Islam is no superior to in other religions. For that reason, the time-consuming speed of democratization in Muslim countries cannot be recognized to Islam itself. Although Hunter admits, Muslim states have a poor evidence of

¹⁹ New York: Farrar, Straus & Giroux, 2003

²⁰ Feldman, *After Jihad*, pp. 222-7; "'Islamic Democracy' in a New Iraq: An Interview with Noah Feldman," *Frontline*, Public Broadcasting Service, Sept. 30, 2003

²¹ Feldman, *After Jihad*, pp. 222-7; "'Islamic Democracy' in a New Iraq: An Interview with Noah Feldman," *Frontline*, Public Broadcasting Service, Sept. 30, 2003

²² "'Islamic Democracy' in a New Iraq: An Interview with Noah Feldman."

²³ Praeger, 1998

²⁴ Praeger, 2005

modernization and democracy. She charges outside causes such as colonialism and the international economic system²⁵.

Other intellectuals get flattery to new levels. Anna Jordan argues that the Qur'an holds up the standard of Western democracy as they are identified by William Ebenstein and Edwin Fogelman, two professors of political science who spotlights on the ideologies that characterize democracy (Ebenstein and Fogelman, 1980: 170-178). By using different Qur'anic verses²⁶, Jordan uncovers that the Islamic sacred book supports rational empiricism and personal rights. Islam refuses the state as the ultimate authority and it support the freedom to correlate with any religious group, recognizes the thoughts that the state is subordinate to law, and admits due procedure and fundamental equal opportunity.

In the largest part of her quotes, though, do not hold up her end and, in some cases, recommend the opposite. Rather than hold up the concept of "rational empiricism," for example, Sura 17:36 consents absolute obedience to the authority of God.

Gudrun Kramer, chair of the Institute of Islamic Studies at the Free University in Berlin, also acknowledges the Esposito thesis. She has written that the innermost stream in Islam "has come to accept crucial elements of political democracy: pluralism, political participation, governmental accountability, the rule of law, and the protection of human rights." In her judgment, the Muslim move toward to human rights and freedom is more superior than many Westerners admit.^[49]

2.5.3 Incompatibility between Political Islam and Democracy

Paradoxically, while Western scholars make intellectual tumble to make obvious the compatibility of Islam and democracy, well-known Muslim scholars opines democracy to be incompatible with their religion. They support their ending on two fundamentals:

Firstly, the assurance that Islamic law conforms the believer's actions in every part of life.

Secondly, the Muslim society will achieve all its objectives only if the believers walk in the path of God (Mitchell, 1969:209-94).

Furthermore, some Muslim intellectuals refuse anything that does not have its origins in the Qur'an.^[51]

Hasan al-Banna (1906-49), the founder of the Muslim Brotherhood²⁷, wanted to wash out Western manipulations. He educated the people that Islam was the only solution and that democracy sum to unfaithfulness to Islam (al-Banna, 1978: 142-54).

²⁵ Hunter, *The Future of Islam and the West*, pp. 19-28, 106-14.

²⁶ Qur'an 2:190-3; 2:215; 2:272; 3:26; 3:159; 3:195; 4:49-50; 4:52-3; 4:73; 4:71; 4:76; 4:100; 4:135; 9:20; 9:120; 10:98-9; 17:36; 17:53; 25:55; 31:18-9; 38:22-4; 38:26; 42:38; 45:18; 49:11-3

²⁷ Hasan al-Banna, *Five Tracts of Hasan al-Banna* (Berkeley: California University Press, 1978), pp. 142-54. Al-Banna, H. (1999a) 'Our Movement' in *Selected Writings of Hasan al-Banna Shaheed*, trans. Qureshi, S.A. (New Delhi: Wajih Uddin)

Al-Banna's political ideologisation of Islam is deep-rooted in his passion that Islam is a 'perfect, "all-embracing system" that "covers all aspects of this world and the next one' (al-Banna, 1999). For al-Banna, religion itself formed part of, and was control by, the 'all-pervading system' of Islam which 'should manage all subjects in life' (al-Banna, 1999). Far from getting confined to pure individual piousness, 'Islam is an ideology and worship, country and nation, religion as well as government, action as well as spirituality and Holy Qur'an as well as sword' (al-Banna, 1999)

Islam must consequently be included in tangible social and political function as the ideological foundation of society, based on its exclusive capability to give solutions to all human matters. This main claim stemmed primarily from al-Banna's explanation of God's heavenly *rububiyya* (dominicality) and *hakimiyya* (sovereignty) over 'all the nooks and corners in life' (al-Banna, 1999). Expressively, al-Banna's calling for the *hakimiyya* of God in all the part of society was even reflected in his novel campaign of coffeehouse preaching. Al-Banna's accepting of God's universal *rububiyya* also significantly guided him to understand the Qur'an as the foundation for political philosophy and politics. This explanation thus provided Islam a political ideology which, united with God's *hakimiyya*, demanded the *Shari'ah*'s guideline of every part of state and society, be it political, social, economic, cultural, public or personal.

To quote the 20th century priest, Sayyid Qutb (1906-66), "It is Allah and not man who rules. Allah is the source of all authority, including legitimate political authority. Virtue, not freedom, is the highest value. Therefore, Allah's law, not man's, should govern the society." (WikiIslam, the online resource on Islam) To get rid of ignorance (*jahiliyya*), Qutb advocated *Sharia*, or Islamic law, must be instituted. *Sharia* law was not only easily reached to humans and indispensable to the existence of Islam, but also all-encompassing, preventing "evil and corrupt" non-Islamic ideologies like communism, nationalism, or secular democracy.

Sayyid Qutb, the principal doctrinaire of the Muslim Brotherhood, opposed to the idea of popular sovereignty. He had faith that the Islamic state obviously be founded upon the Qur'an, which he

al-Banna, H. (1999b) 'Our Invitation' in Selected Writings of Hasan al-Banna Shaheed, trans. Qureshi, S.A. (New Delhi: Wajih Uddin)

al-Banna, H. (1999c) 'Fifth Conference' in Selected Writings of Hasan al-Banna Shaheed, trans. Qureshi, S.A. (New Delhi: Wajih Uddin)

al-Banna, H. (1999d) 'Basic Teachings' in Selected Writings of Hasan al-Banna Shaheed, trans. Qureshi, S.A. (New Delhi: Wajih Uddin)

al-Banna, H. (2009) 'Some Steps Toward Practical Reform' in Euben, R.L. and Zaman, M.Q. (eds.) Princeton Readings in Islamist Thought: Text and Contexts from al-Banna to Bin Laden (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press)

advocated offer a complete and ethical system in need of no additional legislation²⁸. Consultation—in the conventional Islamic common sense rather than in the approach of Esposito's extrapolations—was enough.

Mawdudi, whereas used by Esposito, gave arguments that Islam was the exact opposite of any secular Western democracy that founded on sovereignty upon the people (Mawdudi, 1976: 13, 15-7, 38, 75-82) and opposed the fundamentals of Western democracy²⁹. More latest Islamists such as Qaradawi gives argument that democracy obviously be subsidiary to the acceptance of God as the foundation of sovereignty. Democratic elections are hence deviation, and as religion formulates law, there is no requirement for lawmaking institution (Abdo, 2000: 107-36). Quoting his idea to set up an Islamic state in Indonesia, Abu Bakar Bashir, a Muslim cleric and the leader of the Indonesian Mujahideen Council, assaulted democracy and the West and called on Muslims to do *jihad* against the rulers in the Muslim world. "It is not democracy that we want, but Allah-cracy," he clarifies³⁰.

Nor does receiving of fundamentals of Western configuration involve democracy. Under Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini, the Islamic Republic approved both a constitution and a parliament. Their continuation did not build Iran further democratic. Certainly, Khomeini carry on to exercise supreme power and made a figure of bodies—the revolutionary foundations, for example—which stay above constitutional law.

So, many scholars of west think that the Muslim world is not prepared to take up the fundamental ideals of modernization and democracy. The privilege of the ruling elite is still remaining in the leadership. Arab and Islamic leadership are hereditary, autocratic, and authoritarian. Such indispensable principles as sovereignty, legitimacy, political participation and pluralism, and those individual rights and freedoms natural in democracy do not subsist in a system where Islam is the ultimate source of law.

The malfunction of democracies to take grip in Gaza and Iraq rationalize both the 1984 statement by Samuel P. Huntington and the logic a decade later by Gilles Kepel, a famous French scholar and analyst of radical Islam, that Islamic cultural traditions may stop democratic development³¹.

Emeritus Princeton historian Bernard Lewis is also right in clearing up that the term democracy is often misrepresented. It has twisted up in astonishing places—the Spain of General Franco, the Greece of the

²⁸ Sayyid Qutb, *Ma'alim 'alal-Tariq* (Karachi: International Islamic publishers, 1988), pp. 73-8, 80-1, 112; Sayed Khatab, *The Political Thought of Sayyid Qutb: The Theory of Jahiliyah* (London: Routledge, 2006).

²⁹ Abu al-A'la al-Mawdudi, "Suicide of Western Civilization," in Wakar Ahmad Gardezi and Abdul Wahid Khan, eds., *West versus Islam* (New Delhi: International Islamic Publishers, 1992), pp. 61-73

³⁰ Middle East Media Research Institute (MEMRI), *Special Dispatch Series*, no. 1285, Sept. 8, 2006.

³¹ Samuel P. Huntington, "Will More Countries Become Democratic?" *Political Science Quarterly*, Summer 1984, p. 214; Gilles Kepel, *The Revenge of God* (University Park: Pennsylvania State University Press, 1994), p. 194.

colonels, the Pakistan of the generals, the Eastern Europe of the commissars—usually prefaced by some succeeding adjective such as "guided," "basic," "organic," "popular," or the like, which provide to dilute, deflect, or even reverse the meaning of the word (Lewis, 1996:52).

Islam may be compatible with democracy, but it is depended on what is perceived as Islam. Both Turkey and the West African country of Mali are democracies even though the greater part of their citizens is Muslim. But, the political Islam promoted by the Muslim Brotherhood and other Islamists is incompatible with liberal democracy.

Islamists themselves consider liberal democracy with dislike. They are ready to adopt it as a path to power not as ideals (Lewis, 1996:53-7). Hisham Sharabi (1927-2005), the leading Palestinian intellectual and political activist, has said that Islamic fundamentalism articulates mass emotion and faith as no nationalist or socialist ideology has been capable to do up still now (Sharabi, 1988: 136).

Question may arise that why then are so many Western scholars eager to demonstrate the compatibility between Islamism and democracy? The attractiveness of post-colonialism and post-modernism within the academy inclines intellectuals to accommodate Islamism. Political rightness hinders many from addressing the negative fact in foreign cultures. It is considered praiseworthy to establish the compatibility of Islam and democracy. It is branded "Islamophobic" or racist to suggest incompatibility or to distinguish between positive and negative interpretation of Islam.

Many policymakers are also conflict-adverse. Islamists use the Western cultural desire to have room for while Western thinkers and policymakers attempt to rearrange differences by seeking to find common ground in definitions if not reality.

Into the mix comes Islamist propaganda, portraying Islam as peace-loving, embracing of civil rights and, even in its less tolerant forms, compatible with all democratic values. The problem is that the free world ignores the option that political Islam can intimidate democracy not only in Middle Eastern societies but also in the West. The legitimization of political Islam has lent democratic uprightness to an ideology and political system at odds with the basic principles of democracy.

Esposito's statement is that "the United States must hold back its one-dimensional position to democracy and make out that the authentic roots of democracy exist in Islam"³² shows a basic ignorance of both democracy and Islamist teachings. These conclusions are intensified when Esposito places blame for the forcefulness and terrorism of Islamic fundamentalism on the West and on Said's "Orientalists." It is one thing to be wrong in the classroom, but it can be far more dangerous when such wrong-headed theories begin to affect policy (Bukay, 2007: 71-79).

³² Esposito and Voll, *Islam and Democracy*, p. 31

2.5.4 Fallacy of Islamic Democracy

The slogan “Islamic democracy” has been invented and recognized to Umar ibnul Khattab (ra), the second Caliph, and even to Muhammad (saw). It is supposed that consultation, or “*Shura*,” is a basic aspect of Islamic governance, and that it is, in reality, democratic. Nonetheless, those who explain democracy as being *Shura*, have clothed the proverbial “wolf in sheep’s clothing.” Once some light has been cast onto the reality of *Shura* and democracy, the wolf will be exposed. Firstly, let us look at the similarities.

Similarities between *Shura* and Democracy

Democracy requires ruling by the majority opinion. This is in terms of legislation through the parliament and the execution of ruling through a government, which works (in theory at least) for the majority.

Shura is the verbal noun of the verb “*shawara*,” or consulted. It reveals seeking an opinion from the one who is consulted. The Caliph or any lawful authority can carry out the *Shura*. Allah (swt) said to His Prophet (saw) in the Qur’an:

“And do consult them in the matter...” [Ale-Imran: 159].

Abu Hurairah (ra) said, **“I have not seen anyone more willing to consult others than the Messenger of Allah (saw) in the consultation of his companions.”**

Both *Shura* and democracy entail seeking an opinion from people. This is the only similarity.

Can it now state that democracy is *Shura*? Could it even articulate that democracy is Islamic? The answer to both these questions is matter of discussion. If the wolf has four legs just like the sheep, then are they the same? If the wolf is a warm-blooded mammal like the sheep, should they be placed together? Again, the answer deserves study. The wolf pup moves to its own mother for milk. Now visualize a newborn lamb that also drinks milk. Would it be sensible to view any source of milk as its loving mother? The wolf and the sheep are evidence that a similarity between any two matters does not confirm that these two things are the same.

To say that democracy is *Shura*, or that it is not *Shura*, requires a wide-ranging understanding of both realities. Then it can see if they are certainly the same. We will see, in fact, that they vary in some basic issues. The differences are of such a nature that for the Muslims to drink from the milk of democracy would require departure from Islam.

In modern democracy, the majority opinion is always compulsory. Nevertheless, in reality, opinions are of three types. Islam’s verdict on *Shura* is unlike for each of these three types of opinion³³.

³³ Dr Abdullah Robin, “Islamic Democracy – A Wolf in Sheep’s Clothing” <http://daarulislam.com/islamic-democracy-wolf-sheeps-clothing/>

- 1) **Shura is never considered in matters of legislation.**
- 2) **The specialist opinion is taken, regardless of the majority or minority, in matters where an intellectual judgment is required about some subject.**
- 3) **The majority opinion is taken for matters of action only.**

Let us examine the first point:

1) *Shura* is never considered in matters of legislation.

The opinions of people hold no value in the matters of *halal* and *haram* because it is Allah (swt) who has determined these matters for us in the Book and the Sunnah. Allah (swt) advises about deviation from His Book:

“Therefore fear not men but fear me and sell not my verses for a miserable price. And whosoever does not judge by what Allah has revealed, such are the disbelievers” [Al-Ma’idah: 44].

The ruler is specifically warned not to follow people’s opinions either major or minor in matters of revelation:

“Rule between them by that which Allah has revealed to you, and do not follow their vain desires” [Al-Ma’idah: 49].

Democracy is built upon following man’s desires, without any limit from the Creator. Democracy gives man the right to decide that sodomy or homosexuality is a crime, or that it is a respectable activity to that our children should be encouraged to respect and practice. Democracy, therefore, is not merely a Western forename for the Islamic principle of *Shura*!

The Prophet (saw) evidently refused to regard as the people sovereign. On one occasion, the noble Sahabah were anxious about the treaty of Hudaibiyah, before Allah’s (swt) word on the matter had been explained to them. They uttered their opinions very strongly to the Prophet (saw), because they thought that this treaty would disgrace the Muslims. However, he (saw) discarded the opinions of all the Sahabah in order to sign the treaty of Hudaibiyah in submission to the command of Allah (swt).

Sometimes the Caliph may not be definite what Allah’s (swt) rule is on a matter, and Ijtihad may be required. In such a situation, the Caliph may confer with people of knowledge. This type of discussion is considered next.

- 2) **The expert opinion is taken, regardless of the majority or minority, in matters where an intellectual judgment is required about some subject.**

Umar b. Al-Khattab (ra) asked the Muslims regarding the newly subjugated lands of Iraq, whether they should be divided amongst the Muslims as booty, or left in the hands of its people subject to disbursement of *Kharaj*. Bilal (ra), Abdur Rahman (ra) and Az-Zubayr (ra) thought that the territory should be alienated in the same way that the Prophet (saw) divided the land of Khaybar as booty. Umar, yet, made *Ijtihad* upon some verses in *Surah al Hashr* to realize that the land should be *Kharaji* land. Once Umar listened to the views and was convinced with his own *Ijtihad* in preference to that of the majority, he discarded all other opinions and pursued his own expert understanding of the text. During Umar's Caliphate, he consulted the *Sahabah* on many subjects related to understanding the rules of Islam for new situations, and he accepted the strongest opinion and never the majority opinion. The general agreement of the *Sahabah* upon this makes it clear that the Caliph can check with until he finds the strongest opinion. It is the Caliph who decides which is right on the basis of text and no one else.

The Prophet (saw) pursued the opinion of a single expert, Habab bin Munthir (ra), over the choice of the place of the Battle of Badr. It was narrated in the *Seerah of Ibnu Hisham* that, "when he (saw) camped at the near side of the water of Badr, Al-Habab bin Al-Munthir was not happy with this place. He said to the Messenger (saw), 'O Messenger of Allah! Did Allah make you camp in this place where we can't depart from it, or is it the opinion of war and strategy?' He (saw) said, 'It is rather the opinion of war and strategy.' Al Habab bin al-Munthir said, 'O Messenger of Allah, this is not the (right) place. Move the people till we come to the side of the water near to the people (enemy), we camp there..' The Messenger (saw) said, "**You gave the right opinion.**" At this point, the Prophet (saw) pursued the opinion of a single expert without asking for the majority view.

When a right judgement on a subject, whether technical or *Shari'ah*, is required the correct opinion not the majority that is followed. Only one man, the Caliph, has the right to decide which is correct. The verse of consultation continues:

"...**When you decided (azamta), put your trust in Allah**" [Al-'Imran: 159].

This specifies that the final decision is with ruler and not with the people. Here the verb "to decide" used in the text is "azamta" which implies you (singular) decided. If the judgment had been for the people then the verb would have been in the form "azamtum" meaning you (plural). Again, it is seen that *Shura* and democracy are not the same.

3) The majority opinion is taken for matters of action only.

There are many choices the Caliph can compose between actions that are Mubah (permissible). To invest in schools or hospitals, to appoint this man or that man, to build a motorway through cornfields on the east side of a town or to build it through pastureland to the west, are some examples. It is usual for people to vary when faced with a simple choice between two actions. A technical lesson would not come

up with a judgment that directs to only one right course of action. In such a case, a preference needs to be made which will be subjective to each person. The Caliph can consult the people, and this is optional but not mandatory according to Islam. The Prophet (saw) himself took many decisions on many matters like this, but he also consulted the people such as in the consultation before the Battle of Uhud. The *Mushrikeen* came to assault the Muslims that day, and the Prophet (saw) and the more important *Sahabah* wanted to fight from inside the city of Madina. Nevertheless, the majority of the people were ready to go outside to fight the enemy. The Prophet (saw) led the army out from Madinah into the encounter in accordance with the wishes of the majority.

In the democratic system of ruling, human being has the absolute right to do as he pleases in case of making law, state principle or for specific action. Those are decided by the majority opinion. Democracy is not compliance with Islam because it places man above his Creator! *Shura* “consultation” is not an absolute right of the people. The Caliph can consult with the people only in permitted matters (*Mubaah*). History is evidence that the majority is accepted only if the matter is one of action and not some specialist subject. If an opinion, such as a strategy of war is required, then the experts in this field are consulted, even if only one. This is because the “correct” opinion is sought, and the majority opinion has no worth here. The disparity between democracy and *Shura* is like the difference between water and fire.

Indicators	Islamic Politics	Political Islam
Change	Want to change the prevailing society.	Want to survive in prevailing system and society and being changed in the name of pragmatism as well as reform. Compromise is there main technique.
Method	Following Prophet’s peaceful propagation and culturing the people (<i>Ummah</i>) opposing all un-Islamic system and culture	Not fixed and following the Prophet’s peaceful method, attaining or sharing the power is ultimate goal. Only power centric propagation and movement, not culturing the whole Muslim community on the basis of authentic Islamic knowledge, tradition and culture.
Participation	Does not participate in western or any secular political system for ideological	Does not believe in secularism but participate in secular system or law making (parliamentary) election and

	stand	want to go in power or entertain power sharing in name of change.
Propagation	Islamic state or Caliphate	Civil state or Muslim state
Nationalism	Global Islamic brotherhood and don't believe in western nation state.	Believe in nationalism
Appointment of chief of the state or Caliph	Mass election is not the main tool and <i>Bayat</i> (pledge of allegiance) of loyalty is an important part of the appointment of Caliph.	Participate in capitalist secular legislative election for going to power or even they compromise with their Islamic ideology for power sharing with an un-Islamic party.
Sovereignty and rule of law	Sovereignty is only for Creator Allah and it ensure rule of <i>Sharia</i> Law	Orally believe in sovereignty of Allah and in rule of <i>Sharia</i> Law but practically they don't ensure implement of Islamic Laws, i.e. Brotherhood in Egypt or AK party in Turkey.

Table: Difference between Islamic politics and political Islam

2.5.5 Equality and Freedom is limited in Islamic State

The command for Muslims to spread Islamic rule by force, subjugating others until they either convert to Islam or pay money appears eternal.

"He who withholds the Jizya is an enemy of Allah and His apostle." (Ishaq, 956 & 962)

These are the words of Muhammad.

"If they refuse to accept Islam, demand from them the Jizya. If they agree to pay, accept it from them and hold off your hands. If they refuse to pay the tax, seek Allah's help and fight them." (Sahih Muslim, 19:4294)

Here he lays down the rule that it is to be extorted by force. It does not mean that there are not legitimate and sincere friendships between Muslims and Christians in the Muslim world. Nonetheless, this is based on the kindness of individuals, and a natural human desire to go beyond boundaries of religion or ethnic groups regardless of what Islamic law states. Most of the Muslim scholar's opinion is that every capable citizen has to give tax and Zakat to the Caliphate government but for the non-Muslims the

condition is different as they don't give *Zakat*. Moreover, some general tax is equally imposed on every capable citizen either Muslim or non-Muslim as state needs fund for the development activities and ensuring security equally for all.

In terms of democracy, it requires that all groups are not distinguished in anyway, whether they be ethnic, religious or otherwise. This seems to be antithetical to the law, spirit, and tradition of Islam.

Reform-minded Muslims (who prefer to ignore all of this) as a substitute point to Qur'an 42:38, where the phrase "*[Muslims] who (conduct) their affairs by mutual consultation*" is used as evidence that Islam is well-matched with democracy. Also recruited to this end is an oft-repeated *hadith* that has Muhammad saying, "*My community will never agree on an error.*" On this is based concept of "*ijma*" or consensus among Muslims for determining matters of Islamic law.

But *ijma*, has always been contentious and rarely practiced within Islam. Some understand it to mean "consensus of the scholars" - having nothing to do with the view of the community at large. Even when its legality is acknowledged, *ijma* is accepted only as a secondary (or tertiary) form of authority, behind the *fiqh* councils. Also, it bears indicating to that *ijma* and consultation are valid only within the Muslim community, so how can there be democracy if Muslims live with non-Muslims?

Muhammad (SAW) ruled on Allah's authority and did not put forward his decisions to the will of the people. Even if the entire world became Muslim at once, it is highly doubtful that democracy would last, since it would be valid only to the most ordinary of matters not already decided by Islamic law.

As cleric, Sufi Muhammad, recently put it, "True Islam permits neither elections, nor democracy."

If this is at all representative of *Shariah*, how could democracy ever succeed in a Muslim country?

According to Islam, a Muslim man's religion always control over anyone else's. In a democracy, even minorities have sheltered rights. This example clearly shows that that is not truly possible in Islam.

What does the Qu'ran and Hadith say on the matter?

The Qur'an

"What! Do those who seek after evil ways think that We shall hold them equal with those who believe and do righteous deeds,- that equal will be their life and their death? Ill is the judgment that they make." Qur'an 45:21

Nonbelievers are not equivalent to Muslims. This is obediently reflected in Islamic law.

"...And never will Allah grant to the unbelievers a way (to triumphs) over the believers." Qur'an 4:141

This is at unusual with democracy, which allows anyone to serve in a position of power over others regardless of religious belief.

"...might belongeth to Allah and to His messenger and to the believers;"

Qur'an 63:8

"It is not fitting for a Believer, man or woman, when a matter has been decided by Allah and His Messenger to have any option about their decision." Qur'an 33:36

Of course, this is for all time.

"So judge between them by that which Allah hath revealed, and follow not their desires, but beware of them lest they seduce thee from some part of that which Allah hath revealed unto thee" Qur'an 5:49

Allah's Qur'an takes precedence over the wish of the people. A democratic nation is by nature one that is not governed by Islamic law, meaning that a Muslim citizen would have divided allegiance. It's clear from this stanza which side he must prefer.

"Not your desires, nor those of the People of the Book (can prevail): whoever works evil, will be requited accordingly. Nor will he find, besides Allah, any protector or helper." Qur'an 4:123

"O you who believe! Obey Allah and obey the Messenger and those in authority from among you..." Qur'an 4:59

Compliance is strictly limited to the government strained only from the group of believers, not from the other community.

"...Allah and his messenger are free from obligation to the unbelievers..."

Qur'an 9:3

Muhammad (SAW) used this "revelation" to liquefy a standing treaty and chase non-Muslims from their homes if they wouldn't accept Islam. This carry out would be incompatible with democratic rule, in which everyone is considered identical.

From the Hadith

"When you meet your enemies who are polytheists [Christians...], invite them to three courses of action. If they respond to any one of these, you also accept it and withhold yourself from doing them any harm. Invite them to (accept) Islam; if they respond to you, accept it from them and desist from fighting against them ... If they refuse to accept Islam, demand from them the Jizya. If they agree to

pay, accept it from them and hold off your hands. If they refuse to pay the tax, seek Allah's help and fight them." Sahih Muslim 19:4294

Clearly, non-Muslims are wished-for to be inferior to Muslims.

Dr. Zakir Naik, a prominent and disputed Islamic preacher from India has stated:

"as far as the matters of religion are concerned we know for sure that only Islam is the true religion in the eyes of God. In 3:85 it is mentioned that God will never accept any religion other than Islam. As far as The building of churches or temples is concerned, how can we allow this when their religion is wrong? And when worship is also wrong? Thus we will surely not allow such wrong things in our (i.e. an Islamic) country."

He added on homosexuality issue.

"Islam doesn't approves democracy"

"We don't believe in democracy. Democracy means majority wins." Islam does not believe in majority must be win. Islam does not support in homosexuality even also Christianity."³⁴

Allah's Apostle said,

"Whoever obeys me, obeys Allah, and whoever disobeys me, disobeys Allah, and whoever obeys the ruler I appoint, obeys me, and whoever disobeys him, disobeys me." Sahih Bukhari 9:89:251

The ruler referred to here is the Caliph, who is appointed by Allah, not by popular election. Democratic rule has no legitimacy against the will of the Caliph who, as we see by chain of reference, has the authority of Allah.

2.5.6 Dilemma between Political Islam and Democracy

Are 'Political Islam' and democracy compatible? This is a challenging question that is being debated by scholars of Islam, students of political theory or analysts in West Asia. It is not a new question, but the contemptuous of the Arab spring adds an element of topicality.

The fundamentals of this world view of Political Islamist

Islam is/ has the answer not only to spiritual impulses or religious needs but for social and political order, as well. Islamism in this common sense not only identifies and regulates the relation between man and God but equally between man and man (and woman) and this involves the relation between the ruled and the ruler. The devotees also support that the ideal society is one in which Holy Prophet lived in

³⁴ See Utube, Zakir Naik, Homosexuality

Medina and there ought to be a reverting to the practices of that period. Governance according to the Islamic law, the *sharia* is a fundamental principle (Prakash 2013).

First, a difference needs to be made between a country with a large Muslim population, whether majority or minority, and an 'Islamist' country. Second, the 'manner' in which a country is Islamist, whether only by name, or in spirit, or in actual practice. If so, the degree of element and strictness is at the center of this debate. The current arguments whirl around the Arab world and West Asia region since the ideologues of 'political Islam' of various shadows have their origins there, in Egypt, Saudi Arabia or Iran. A positive view of the force of Islam on governance has been developed and it is seen its fierce advocates emanating from that region.

The governments in Turkey, Bangladesh or Indonesia may give curtsy to Islam but are far less concerned in a statement and endorsement of the principles of political Islam. But what is 'political Islam,' a much bandied around term these days? By using this term, it is referring not to the personal faith of Muslims, but at a belief - system that look for to systematize the society and the polity foundation on principles of Islam. To administer a nation according to Islamic beliefs and laws is the purpose of Muslim brotherhood, a political party which went to power although briefly through elections in Egypt. Another foremost example is the Islamist Salvation Front (FIS) in Algeria which had won the elections in 1991, but was in no way permitted to appearance the government with the dispute that if it came to power, it would not again permit other elections. Iran's polity, with its three decades of stability too is a shape of political Islam. Before to look at the insinuation of this belief-system for a democratic political order, it is needed to be obvious about what is meant by 'democracy.' It is essentially in terms of a picky model, Jeffersonian, or Westminster, or another; or essentially as consisting of transform of governments by elections. It should be also kept in mind other attributes: the room for different beliefs, possibility of differ, assertion of pluralism, minority rights, and individual liberties.³⁵

With this perception, it can be seen at the interaction between the two lumps in the equation, the 'Islamist' and the 'democratic' character of the polity. Reviewers within these countries often contend

³⁵ B S Prakash (2013), "A question of compatibility"

<http://www.deccanherald.com/content/364406/a-question-compatibility.html>

(The writer is a former ambassador and currently a visiting professor at the Jamia Milia Central University)

that their polity is not sufficiently 'Islamic' or sufficiently 'democratic.' Study shows that it is when someone wants to move towards the intrinsic logical extremities of either of these nodes that problems occur.

Supporters of an absolutist type of political Islam challenge that answers to all dimensions of life -- personal, social and political -- are already obtainable and should be wanted in Islamic texts and perfect practices. There is no room for compromise, mistakes, imperfection of beliefs or dissent in such a view.

It must be noted that there are scholars who argue that such an absolutist view is unnecessary and that there is room in the Islamic tradition for explanation of texts (*ijitihad*), for consultation (*shura*), and that in common space exists for adjustment of social practices reliant on contemporary realities. But such views are discarded. A roll back to original, pure, and no deviationist practice is advocated by the strict devotees. This is a debate within Islamism.

An absolutist view as explained above does not sit well with expectations under a democracy such as compromises, dissent, deviant behavior that is tolerated, and unusual personal practices. If by democracy, it is meant expression of popular will alone, there is no natural conflict. If it includes value for all forms of freedom and for all kinds of individuals, problems arise between the two systems. Issues relating to gender, minorities, blasphemy, and punitive code are obvious examples (Prakash 2013). Democracy ensures the rule of the *demos*, the common people, or what is now known as popular or national sovereignty. In Islam, however, power belongs only to God: *al-hukm l'illah*. The man who implements that power on Earth is recognized as *Khalifat al-Allah*, the representative of God. Even the Caliph, cannot perform as lawmaker. The basic law for human life has already been given by God (Taheri 2004).

In case of new problem the only task remains that is discovery, interpretation and application. That, of course, permits for a considerable space in which diverse styles of rule could build up. But the base line is that no Islamic administration can be democratic in the sense of allowing the common people equal shares in law making. Islam has divided human activities into five categories from the permitted to the sinful, leaving little room for human interpretation, let alone ethical innovations. So, how can it be told that Islam is compatible with democracy? On the contrary, many Muslims would see it as a compliment because they believe that their concept of rule by God is superior to that of rule by human being, which is democracy (Taheri 2004).

The great Persian poet Rumi pleads thus:

**“Oh, God, do not leave our affairs to us
For, if You do, woe is us.”**

Islamic tradition holds that God has always intervened in the affairs of human life, particularly by dispatching 124,000 prophets or emissaries to inform the mortals of his wishes and warnings.

Many Islamist thinkers regard democracy with horror.

The late Ayatollah Khomeini labeled democracy as *"a form of prostitution"*³⁶, because he who gets the most votes attains the power that belongs only to God.

Sayyid Qutb, the Egyptian who has appeared as the ideological guru of *Salafists*³⁷ past a year in the United States in the 1950s. According to his realization about American system as *"a nation that has forgotten God and been forsaken by Him; an arrogant nation that wants to rule itself"*³⁸.

In 2013, Yussuf al-Ayyeri, one of the most important scholars of today's Islamist movement, published a book in which he advised that the actual threat to Islam did not approach from American tanks and helicopter gunships in Iraq but from the concept of democracy and the government of the people³⁹.

Maudoodi, another of the Islamist theoreticians now designer, dreamt of a political system in which humans would proceed as automatons in accordance with rules set by God. He said that God has set man's biological functions in such a way that their function is beyond human control. For our non-biological functions, particularly our politics, God has also set rules that we have to discover and apply once and for all so that our societies can be on autopilot, so to speak⁴⁰.

The late Saudi theologian, Sheikh Muhammad bin Ibrahim al-Jubair, believed that the root cause of contemporary ills was the spread of democracy. "Only one ambition is worthy of Islam," he liked to say, *"to save the world from the curse of democracy: to teach men that they cannot rule themselves on the basis of man-made laws. Mankind has strayed from the path of God, we must return to that path or face certain annihilation."*⁴¹

Those who claim that Islam is compatible with democracy should know that they are not flattering Muslims. In the past 14 centuries Muslims have, on occasions, succeeded in creating successful

³⁶ Amir Taheri (2004), *"Islam and democracy: the impossible union"* Copyright 2004 Times Newspapers Ltd. <http://www.benadorassociates.com/article/4585>

³⁷ Fundamentalists who want to return to the idyllic Islamic state of their forebears

³⁸ Amir Taheri (2004), *ibid*

³⁹ Amir Taheri (2004), *ibid*

⁴⁰ Amir Taheri (2004), *ibid*

⁴¹ Amir Taheri (2004), *ibid*

societies without democracy (Amir Taheri 2004). And there is no guarantee that democracy never produces disastrous results (after all, Hitler was democratically elected). That means only fair election does not ensure democracy.

The fact that almost all Muslim states today can be rated as failures or, at least, underachievers, is not because they are Islamic but because they are ruled by corrupt and despotic elites that, even when they proclaim an Islamist ideology, are, in fact, secular dictators (Amir Taheri 2004).

Socrates ridiculed the myth of democracy by pointing out that men always call on experts to deal with specific tasks, but when it comes to the more important matters concerning the community, they allow every Tom, Dick and Harry an equal say.

In response his contemporary, Protagoras, one of the original defenders of democracy, argued: "People in the cities, especially in Athens, listen only to experts in matters of expertise, but when they meet for consultation on the political art, ie of the general question of government, everybody participates."⁴²

Traditional Islamic political thought is closer to Socrates than to Protagoras. The common folk, *al-awwam*, are considered as "animals". The "common folk", however, must do as they are told either by the text and tradition or by *fatwas* (edicts) issued by the experts. Khomeini used the word "*mustazafeen*"⁴³ (the feeble ones) to describe the general population.

Islam is about certainty (*iqan*) while democracy is about doubt. Islam cannot allow people to do as they please, even in the privacy of their bedrooms, because God is always present, all-hearing and all-seeing (Amir Taheri 2004). There is consultation in Islam: *wa shawerhum fil amr* (and consult them in matters). But, here, consultation is about specifics only, never about the overall design of society. In democracy there is a constitution that can be amended or changed. The Koran, however, is the absolute word of God, beyond amendment or change. This debate is not an easy one to have, because Islam has developed into an issue of political controversy in the West and the East everywhere.

⁴² Amir Taheri (2004), "*Islam and democracy: the impossible union*" Copyright 2004 Times Newspapers Ltd. <http://www.benadorassociates.com/article/4585>

⁴³ Amir Taheri (2004), *Ibid*

Chapter 3
Political Islam and Democracy in Egyptian Political System

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3.1 Egyptian Political System and Dilemma of Democratization in Egypt

3.1.1 Introduction

The modern Egyptian state started its journey by its military (Kamrava, 2000: 73). On July 23, 1952 the Free Officers¹ did a coup d'état by throwing out king Farouk. They dissolved the parliament and outlawed political parties. The officers under the leadership of general Gamal Abdel Nasser concerted the political power in their hands (Cook, 2007: 63-65; Karawan, 2011: 44). Nasser gained enormous popular legitimacy in 10 years where nationalism was on the rise. He made alive the Arab nationalism which is widely known as pan-Arabism and under Nasser Egypt got one of the leading countries in the region (Woltering, 2013). In 1970 Nasser breathed his last and was succeeded by Mohammed Anwar al-Sadat. Sadat was a senior officer of the Free Officers and he served twice as vice president under Nasser. He is known for his economic liberalization, pact with Western allies and peace treaty with Israel. His economic modification resulted in more unemployment, more inequality and the raise of corruption. As a consequence Islamic organizations like Muslim Brotherhood attained huge support for their charity work to the poor (Woltering, 2013). On October 6, 1981, Sadat was gunned down by a group of men who were connected to the Islamic Jihad (the New York Times, 2011). Hosni Mubarak was vice president under Sadat from 1975 until his death. After Sadat's death he succeeded as president. Mubarak continued Sadat's earlier economic reforms.

The rise of mass media as Al Jazeera and Al Arabiya, Internet access and access of a larger group of youngsters to the universities created greater societal awareness in Egypt. Moreover, the fact that one fourth of Egypt's population is between 18 and 29 years old. The youth unemployment rate became 25% (age between 15 and 24) (UNDP, 2010; CIA, 2010) had led to growing youth activities since 2000 (Droz-Vincent, 2011: 10-12). The frantic socio-economic condition, the gap between the ruling (business) elite and the majority of the Egyptian population, corruption and the widespread atrocious repression and torture by the security forces got the key issues to take the people on the streets on January 25, 2011. This day is called for bread, freedom and social justice and no to corruption (Droz-Vincent, 2011: 10-15). This eventually led to the dismissal of Mubarak on February 10, 2011 by the Supreme Council of Armed Forces (SCAF). For the first time in the history of Egypt through free and fair election Islamists came in power.

The oldest and largest Islamic party, Muslim Brotherhood was founded in Ismailia, Egypt by Hassan al-Banna in March 1928 as an Islamist religious, political, and social movement (Valeri 2009). The

¹ midlevel Egyptian army officers.

group spread to other Muslim countries but has its largest, or one of its largest, organizations in Egypt, where for many years it has been the largest, best-organized, and most disciplined political opposition force,² despite a succession of government crackdowns in 1948, 1954, 1965 after plots, or alleged plots, of assassination and overthrow were uncovered. Following the 2011 Revolution the group was legalized, and in April 2011 it launched a civic political party called the Freedom and Justice Party (Egypt) to contest elections, including the 2012 presidential election when its candidate Mohamed Morsi became Egypt's first democratically elected president. One year later, however, following massive demonstrations, Morsi was overthrown by the military and arrested.

3.1.2 Political background of Egypt

Officially Egypt is named as the Arab Republic of Egypt. It is a transcontinental country across the northeast corner of Africa and southwest corner of Asia by a land bridge shaped by the Sinai Peninsula. Egypt is a Mediterranean country surrounded by the Gaza Strip and Israel to the northeast, the Gulf of Aqaba to the east, the Red Sea to the east and south, Sudan to the south, and Libya to the west. Crossways the Gulf of Aqaba lies Jordan, and across from the Sinai Peninsula lies Saudi Arabia, though Jordan and Saudi Arabia do not split a land border with it. Egypt is the world's only adjacent Afrasian nation. Many nations easily could come here for its multi connectivity. Egypt has among the longest histories of any modern country, emerging as one of the world's first nation states in the tenth millennium BC.³ Probably this is why Egypt is well thought-out a cradle of civilization⁴. Ancient Egypt attained the experience of the earliest initiatives of writing, agriculture, urbanization, organized religion and central government.

Iconic monuments such as the Giza Necropolis and its Great Sphinx, as well the ruins of Memphis, Thebes, Karnak and the Valley of the Kings reflect the intellectual excellence of this nation which is a focus of archaeological study and popular interest worldwide. Egypt's rich cultural heritage is an integral part of its national identity, which has endured, and at times assimilated, various foreign influences, including Greek, Persian, Roman, Arab, Ottoman, and European. One of the earliest centers of Christianity, Egypt was Islamised in the seventh century and remains a predominantly Muslim country, albeit with a significant Christian minority.

With over 90 million inhabitants, Egypt is the most populous country in North Africa and the Arab world, the third-most populous in Africa (after Nigeria and Ethiopia), and the fifteenth-most populous in the world. The great majority of its people live near the banks of the Nile River, an area of about 40,000 square kilometres (15,000 sq mi), where the only arable land is found. The large

² U.S. Department of State. "Chapter 6 -- Terrorist Organizations". Country Reports on Terrorism. Retrieved 14 November 2015.

³ Midant-Reynes, Béatrix. *The Prehistory of Egypt: From the First Egyptians to the First Kings*. Oxford: Blackwell Publishers.

⁴ See, Wikipedia encyclopedia.

regions of the Sahara desert, which constitute most of Egypt's territory, are sparsely inhabited. About half of Egypt's residents live in urban areas, with most spread across the densely populated centers of greater Cairo, Alexandria and other major cities in the Nile Delta.

Modern Egypt is considered to be a regional and middle power, with significant cultural, political, and military influence in North Africa, the Middle East and the Muslim world.⁵ Egypt's economy is one of the largest and most diversified in the Middle East, and is projected to become one of the largest in the 21st century. Egypt is a member of the United Nations, Non-Aligned Movement, Arab League, African Union, and Organization of Islamic Cooperation.

Ottoman and Europeans Egypt (1517–1953)

Egypt was subjugated by the Ottoman Turks in 1517 and later it turned into a province of the Ottoman Empire. Egypt was always a complicated province for the Ottoman Sultans to have power over because of the continuing power and influence of the Mamluks⁶. Napoleon crushed Mamluk troops in the Battle of the Pyramids on 21 July 1798.

After the French were beaten by the British, a power vacuum was created in Egypt. A three-way power fight developed between the Ottoman Turks, Egyptian Mamluks who had ruled Egypt for centuries, and Albanian armed force in the service of the Ottomans.

Muhammad Ali dynasty

Muhammad Ali Pasha was the initiator of the Muhammad Ali dynasty and the first Khedive⁷ of Egypt and Sudan. After the French were expelled, power was seized in 1805 by Muhammad Ali Pasha, an Albanian military commander of the Ottoman army in Egypt. Muhammad Ali founded a reign that was to administer Egypt until the revolution of 1952. In 1841 the European powers were scared if he topples the Ottoman Empire itself. They forced him to return most of his conquests to the Ottomans.

European invasion (1867–1914)

Egypt under the Muhammad Ali dynasty was nominally an Ottoman province. It was contracted the position of an autonomous vassal state or *Khedivate* in 1867. This status remained in place up to 1914. The Suez Canal was dug in corporation with the French that was completed in 1869. Its building led to huge debt to European banks. It caused popular dissatisfaction because of the burdensome taxation it required. In 1875 Ismail became bound to sell Egypt's share in the canal to the British government. Within three years, this led to the imposition of British and French

⁵ Andrew F. Cooper, Agata Antkiewicz and Timothy M. Shaw, 'Lessons from/for BRICSAM about South-North Relations at the Start of the 21st Century: Economic Size Trumps All Else?', *International Studies Review*, Vol. 9, No. 4 (Winter, 2007), pp. 675, 687

⁶ Mamluks were the Egyptian military caste who had ruled the country for centuries.

⁷ A autonomous vassal state.

controllers who sat in the Egyptian cabinet. "With the financial power of the bondholders their supported persons became the real power in the Government" (Izzeddin).

In later years, the dynasty became a British puppet (Jörg 2016). Isma'il and Tewfik Pasha governed Egypt as a quasi-independent state under Ottoman suzerainty until the British occupation of 1882.

British colony

The Khedivate of Egypt hanged about a de jure Ottoman state up to 5 November 1914,⁸ when it was affirmed a British colony in response to the pronouncement of the Young Turks of the Ottoman Empire to take part in World War I on the side of the Central Powers.

In 1914, the territory was prepared official, and the title of the head of state was changed to *sultan*. The aim was to deny the vestigial suzerainty of the Ottoman sultan, who was patronizing the Central powers in World War I. Saad Zaghlul and the Wafd Party carried on the Egyptian nationalist movement to a majority at the local Legislative Assembly after World War I. When the British expelled Zaghlul and his associates to Malta on 8 March 1919, the country faced its first modern revolution. The rebellion led the UK government to proclaim a unilateral declaration of Egypt's independence on 22 February 1922 (Jankowski & James).

The new government outlined and applied a constitution in 1923 and started a parliamentary system. Saad Zaghlul was popularly voted as Prime Minister of Egypt in 1924. In 1936, the Anglo-Egyptian Treaty was concluded. Constant instability continued due to existing British influence and rising political connection by the king led to the ending of the parliament in a military *coup d'état* known as the 1952 Revolution. The Free Officers Movement enforced King Farouk to renounce in support of his son Fuad. British army was there in Egypt until 1954.⁹

Arab Republic of Egypt (1953–)

After the 1952 Revolution by the Free Officers Movement, the ruling of Egypt went to the hands of military. The Egyptian Republic was affirmed, with General Muhammad Naguib as the first President of the Republic on 18 June 1953.

Reign of President Nasser (1956–1970)

Naguib was pressurized to quit in 1954 by Gamal Abdel Nasser who was the real originator of the 1952 movement. Nasser occupied power as President in June 1956. On 13 June 1956 British forces concluded their withdrawal from the occupied Suez Canal Zone. He nationalized the Suez Canal on 26 July 1956, prompting the 1956 Suez Crisis.

⁸ "Treaty of Lausanne (1923): Article 17 of the treaty refers to Egypt and Sudan" byu.edu.

⁹ "Egypt". The World Factbook. CIA. Retrieved 2 February 2011

In 1958, Egypt and Syria created an independent union known as the United Arab Republic. The union was short-lived, ending in 1961 when Syria was separated. Thus the union came to an end. During most of its life, the United Arab Republic was also in a loose confederation with North Yemen, known as the United Arab States. In 1959, the All-Palestine Government of the Gaza Strip, an Egyptian client state, was included into the United Arab Republic by the excuse of Arab union, and was re-established in no ways.

The Soviet Union warned Nasser of an imminent Israeli attack on Syria in mid May 1967. Nasser decided to take three consecutive steps that enhanced the war practically unavoidable: On 14 May he arranged his army in Sinai near the border with Israel, on 19 May he excluded the UN peacekeepers stationed in the Sinai Peninsula border with Israel, and on 23 May he blocked the Straits of Tiran to Israeli shipping (Shlaim & Rogan 2012). On 26 May Nasser declared, "*The battle will be a general one and our basic objective will be to destroy Israel*" (Mutawi 2002).

In the 1967 Six Day War, Israel assaults Egypt, and occupied Sinai Peninsula and the Gaza Strip, which Egypt had occupied since the 1948 Arab–Israeli War. During the 1967 war, an Emergency Law was ratified, and continued in effect until 2012, with the exception of an 18-month break in 1980/81¹⁰.

Rule of President Sadat (1970–1981)

President Nasser died and was succeeded by Anwar Sadat in 1970. Sadat changed Egypt's Cold War commitment from the Soviet Union to the United States, expelling Soviet advisors in 1972. In 1973, Egypt, along with Syria, started the October War, a sudden attack to get back part of the Sinai region Israel had captured 6 years prior. It represented Sadat with a victory that allowed him to recover the Sinai later in return for peace with Israel (Jordan 1997). In 1977 Sadat started a historic visit to Israel, which led to the 1979 peace treaty in exchange for Israeli removal from Sinai. Sadat's scheme sparks enormous controversy in the Arab world and led to Egypt's expulsion from the Arab League, but it was supported by most Egyptians (Vatikiotis 1991). Sadat was assassinated by an Islamic extremist in October 1981.

Rule of President Mubarak (1981–2011)

Hosni Mubarak came to power after the assassination of Sadat in a referendum in which he was the only candidate (Cambanis & Thanassis 2010). During Mubarak's rule, the political picture was subjugated by the National Democratic Party, which was formed by Sadat in 1978. It approved the 1993 Syndicates Law, 1995 Press Law, and 1999 Nongovernmental Associations Law which hindered freedoms of association and expression by imposing new regulations and inhuman penalties on violations.

¹⁰ "The Emergency Law in Egypt". International Federation for Human Rights. Retrieved 2 February 2011.

In late February 2005, Mubarak declared a modification of the presidential election law, paving the way for multi-candidate polls for the first time since the 1952 movement¹¹. Nonetheless, the new law gave restrictions on the candidates, and led to Mubarak's easy re-election victory¹². Voter turnout was less than 25% (Gomez & Edward 2005). Election observers also suspected government interfering in the election process¹³.

Constitutional amendments voted on 19 March 2007 banned parties from using religion as a basis for political activity. He permitted the drafting of a new anti-terrorism law, authorized broad police powers of arrest and surveillance, and ensured the president power to close parliament and end judicial election monitoring¹⁴. In 2009, Dr. Ali El Deen Hilal Dessouki, Media Secretary of the National Democratic Party (NDP), described Egypt as a "pharaonic" political system, and democracy as a "long-term goal". Dessouki also stated that "the real center of power in Egypt is the military"¹⁵.

Revolution and Consequences

Extensive protests started against Mubarak's autocratic rule on 25 January 2011 for his resignation. Mubarak resigned and took off at Cairo on 11 February 2011. Triumphant celebrations spread out in Cairo's Tahrir Square at the news¹⁶. The Egyptian military then took the power to govern¹⁷. Mohamed Hussein Tantawi, chairman of the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces, turned into the *de facto* provisional head of state¹⁸. The military suspended the parliament as well as the constitution on 13 February 2011¹⁹.

A constitutional referendum was taken place on 19 March 2011. Egypt held its first parliamentary election on 28 November 2011, since the earlier government had been in power. Attendance was high in the election along with there were no incidence of major irregularities or violence²⁰. On 24 June 2012 Mohamed Morsi became the first elected president of the country from the Freedom and Justice Party, a political branch of the Muslim Brotherhood²¹. On 2 August 2012, Egypt's Prime

¹¹ "Mubarak throws presidential race wide open". *Business Today Egypt*. 10 March 2005. Retrieved 8 February 2013

¹² "Democracy on the Nile: The story of Ayman Nour and Egypt's problematic attempt at free elections".

Weeklistandard.com. 27 March 2006. Retrieved 3 November 2011

¹³ "Egyptian vote marred by violence". *Christian Science Monitor*. 26 May 2005. Retrieved 8 February 2013

¹⁴ "Anger over Egypt vote timetable". *BBC News*. 20 March 2007. Retrieved 3 November 2011

¹⁵ "NDP Insider: Military will ensure transfer of power". *US Department of State*. 30 July 2009

¹⁶ "Mubarak Resigns As Egypt's President, Armed Forces To Take Control". *Huffington Post*. 11 February 2011.

Retrieved 8 February 2013. http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2011/02/11/mubarak-red-sea-egypt_n_821812.html

¹⁷ "Egypt crisis: President Hosni Mubarak resigns as leader". *BBC*. 11 February 2010. Retrieved 11 February 2011.

<http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-12433045>

¹⁸ Hope, Christopher; Swinford, Steven (15 February 2011). "WikiLeaks: Egypt's new man at the top 'was against reform'". *The Daily Telegraph*. Retrieved 5 March 2011.

<http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/wikileaks/8326225/WikiLeaks-Egypt-s-new-man-at-the-top-was-against-reform.html>

¹⁹ "Egyptian Parliament dissolved, constitution suspended". *BBC*. 13 February 2011. Retrieved 13 February 2011.

<http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-12443678>

²⁰ Memmott, Mark (28 November 2011). "Egypt's Historic Day Proceeds Peacefully, Turnout High For Elections".

Npr.org. Retrieved 8 February 2013. <http://www.npr.org/blogs/thetwo-way/2011/11/28/142840895/egypts-historic-day-begins-peacefully-turnout-high-for-elections>

²¹ "Egypt's new president moves into his offices, begins choosing a Cabinet". *CNN*. 25 June 2012. Retrieved 13 February 2013. <http://edition.cnn.com/2012/06/25/world/africa/egypt-politics>

Minister Hisham Qandil declared his 35-member cabinet comprising 28 newcomers including four from the Muslim Brotherhood.

Liberal and secular groups walked out of the constituent assembly as they thought that it would enforce strict Islamic practices, while Muslim Brotherhood backers threw their hold up behind Morsi. On 22 November 2012, President Morsi issued a temporary pronouncement immunizing his decrees from challenge and seeking to defend the work of the constituent assembly²².

The shift led to immense protests and violent action throughout Egypt. On 5 December 2012, tens of thousands of supporters and opponents of president Morsi conflicts, in what was described as the largest violent battle between Islamists and their foes since the country's revolution²³. Mohamed Morsi offered a "national dialogue" with opponent leaders but rejected to stop the December 2012 constitutional referendum²⁴.

On 3 July 2013, the military detached President Morsi from power in a coup d'état and set up an interim government²⁵. On 4 July 2013, 68-year-old Chief Justice of the Supreme Constitutional Court of Egypt Adly Mansour was on oath in as temporary president over the new government subsequent removal of Morsi. The military-backed Egyptian authorities cracked down on the Muslim Brotherhood and its supporters, jailing thousands and killing hundreds of street protesters²⁶. Many of the Muslim Brotherhood leaders and activists have either been sentenced to death or life imprisonment in a series of mass trials²⁷.

Government and Representation

The House of Representatives, whose members are elected to serve five-year terms, specializes in legislation. Elections were last held between November 2011 and January 2012 which was later dissolved. The next parliamentary election will be held within 6 months of the constitution's ratification on 18 January 2014. Originally, the parliament was to be formed before the president was elected, but interim president Adly Mansour pushed the date. The Egyptian presidential election, 2014, took place on 26–28 May 2014. Official figures showed a turnout of 25,578,233 or 47.5%,

²² "Egypt's President Mursi assumes sweeping powers". *BBC News*. 22 November 2012. Retrieved 23 November 2012. <http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-20451208>

²³ "Egypt Sees Largest Clash Since Revolution". *Wall Street Journal*. 6 December 2012. Retrieved 8 December 2012. <http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424127887324640104578160902530961768.html>

²⁴ Fleishman, Jeffrey (6 December 2012). "Morsi refuses to cancel Egypt's vote on constitution". *Los Angeles Times*. Retrieved 8 December 2012. <http://www.latimes.com/news/nationworld/world/la-fg-egypt-morsi-20121207,0,2119116.story>

²⁵ Kirkpatrick, David D. (3 July 2013). "Army Ousts Egypt's President; Morsi Denounces 'Military Coup'". *New York Times*. Retrieved 3 July 2013. <http://www.nytimes.com/2013/07/04/world/middleeast/egypt.html?hp>

²⁶ "Abuse claims rife as Egypt admits jailing 16,000 Islamists in eight months". *The Independent*. 16 March 2014. Retrieved 29 July 2014. <http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/africa/abuse-claims-rife-as-egypt-admits-jailing-16000-islamists-in-eight-months-9195824.html>

²⁷ "Egypt sentences 683 to death in latest mass trial of dissidents". *The Washington Post*. 28 April 2014. Retrieved 29 July 2014. http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/middle_east/egypt-sentences-683-to-death-in-latest-mass-trial-of-dissidents/2014/04/28/34e0ca2c-e8eb-4a85-8fa8-a7300ab11687_story.html

"Egyptian court sentences Muslim Brotherhood leader to life in prison". *Reuters*. 4 July 2014. Retrieved 29 July 2014. <http://af.reuters.com/article/topNews/idAFKBN0FA0BL20140705>

with Abdel Fattah el-Sisi winning with 23.78 million votes, or 96.91% compared to 757,511 (3.09%) for Hamdeen Sabahi²⁸. On 3 July 2013, General Abdul Fatah el-Sisi announced the removal of President Mohamed Morsi from office and the suspension of the constitution.

Egyptian nationalism predates its Arab counterpart by many decades, having roots in the 19th century and becoming the dominant mode of expression of Egyptian anti-colonial activists and intellectuals until the early 20th century (James, 1990: 244-45). The ideology espoused by Islamists such as the Muslim Brotherhood is mostly supported by the lower-middle strata of Egyptian society (Adeed, 2003:264-65).

Legal System and Shariah Law

The legal system is based on Islamic and civil law (particularly Napoleonic codes); and judicial review by a Supreme Court, which accepts compulsory International Court of Justice jurisdiction only with reservations.²⁹

Islamic jurisprudence is the principal source of legislation. Sharia courts and *qadis* are run and licensed by the Ministry of Justice³⁰. The personal status law that regulates matters such as marriage, divorce and child custody is governed by Sharia. In a family court, a woman's testimony is worth half of a man's testimony³¹.

The Muslim Brotherhood endeavored to institutionalize a controversial new constitution On 26 December 2012. It was approved by the public in a referendum held 15–22 December 2012 with 64% support, but with only 33% electorate participation³². It replaced the 2011 Provisional Constitution of Egypt, adopted following the revolution.

The Penal code was unique as it contains a "Blasphemy Law."The present court system allows a death penalty including against an absent individual tried *in absentia*. Several Americans and Canadians were sentenced to death in 2012.

On 18 January 2014, the interim government successfully institutionalized a more secular constitution. The president is elected to a four-year term and may serve 2 terms³³. The parliament may impeach the president³⁴. Under the constitution, there is a guarantee of gender equality and absolute freedom of thought³⁵. The military retains the ability to appoint the national Minister of

²⁸ "El-Sisi wins Egypt's presidential race with 96.91%". *English.Ahram.org. Ahram Online. Retrieved 28 July 2014.*

²⁹ "Egypt". *The World Factbook. CIA. Retrieved 2 February 2011*

³⁰ "Incorporating Sharia into legal systems". *BBC News. 8 February 2008. Retrieved 18 February 2013*

³¹ "Egypt Gender Equality Profile" (PDF). *UNICEF*

³² "Egyptian constitution 'approved' in referendum". *BBC News. 23 December 2012. Retrieved 23 December 2012*

³³ BBC (18 January 2014). "BBC News – Egypt referendum: '98% back new constitution'". *BBC Online. Retrieved 19 January 2014*

³⁴ BBC (18 January 2014). "BBC News – Egypt referendum: '98% back new constitution'". *BBC Online. Retrieved 19 January 2014*

³⁵ BBC (18 January 2014). "BBC News – Egypt referendum: '98% back new constitution'". *BBC Online. Retrieved 19 January 2014*

Defence for the next 8 years³⁶. Under the constitution, political parties may not be based on "religion, race, gender or geography"³⁷.

3.1.3 Military in Egyptian Politics

The coup against the Muslim Brotherhood (MB) government in Egypt once again brought to light the influential role the military has been playing in the country for long. Muhammad Morsi and the MB were powerless as General Abdul Fatah al-Sisi declared the exclusion of the democratically elected government. Over 300 MB officials were closed at once and effectively kept under arrest. The military had already organized with the opposition, secular elements and Coptic Christians, as well as Al-Azhar on the post MB arrangement³⁸. The army once again established that it was the actual power in the country, although the elected government's won at the election just a year ago. This control can be observed from a number of factors crossways of the country.

The Egyptian Army seized power in July 1952 in a US supported coup d'état to overthrow the British loyal King Farooq. The CIA project was summarized by Miles Copeland, a CIA operative, in his 1970 book 'The Game of Nations,' and later in his memoirs in 1989, 'The Game Player.'³⁹ The Free Officers Movement, a group of largely junior military officers, established a new political system which changed the military into the most ordered and vital institution in the country. In 1956 Gamal Abdul Nasser took on the role of president of Egypt. Nasser nationalized the Suez Canal, which gave lead to warfare with Britain, France, and Israel. This created Nasser a national hero which improved his stature in the wider Arab world⁴⁰. The defeat to Israel in the six day war of 1967 proceeded to a choice by the military leadership to shift away from real day-to-day governance. Leaving this in the hands of a civilian leadership, military kept foreign policy, defense and the national budget firmly under their control. Still now, promotions to senior ranks are only ensured after profound screening for political and Islamic links.

Presently, the Egyptian armed forces are the largest in Africa and the Middle East, and the 10th largest army in the world⁴¹. The military is concerned in the industrial and service sectors, including armaments, electronics, consumer products, infrastructure development, agribusinesses, aviation,

³⁶ BBC (18 January 2014). "BBC News – Egypt referendum: '98% back new constitution'". BBC Online. Retrieved 19 January 2014

³⁷ BBC (18 January 2014). "BBC News – Egypt referendum: '98% back new constitution'". BBC Online. Retrieved 19 January 2014

³⁸ <http://www.themalaysianinsider.com/world/article/egypt-orders-arrest-of-300-islamists>

³⁹ Adnan Khan, *The Politics of Egypt's Military*, 2013. <http://www.revolutionobserver.com/2013/07/the-politics-of-egypts-military.html>

⁴⁰ http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Gamal_Abdel_Nasser

⁴¹ https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Egyptian_Armed_Forces

tourism and security⁴². Likewise the most of the Egypt's provincial governors are retired army officers. Many of the large civilian institutions and public sector corporations are administered by former army officers. The army is heavily involved in the national economy; according to some estimates as much as 40% of the Egyptian economy is controlled by the military and they would for obvious reasons want to maintain such a position⁴³.

The Egyptian military is also playing a central role in protecting US interests in the region⁴⁴. Ever since the military coup in 1952, the US has showered the Egyptian military with aid in excess of \$30 billion⁴⁵. This US aid is in effect bribe money to maintain the regional balance, which Egypt's military leaders have been more than happy to implement (Khan 2013). Egypt's current defense chief, Abdel Fattah al-Sisi, is an alumnus of the US Army War College in Pennsylvania, while the head of Egypt's air force, Reda Mahmoud Hafez Mohamed, had a tour in the United States as a cooperation officer. More than 500 Egyptian military officers train at American military graduate schools every year.⁴⁶ The peace treaty with Israel, signed in 1979 under US support, is the foundation of the regional balance of power. It ruined the state of war with Israel as well as chosen the Sinai as a demilitarized buffer zone between the two countries, effectively eliminating the threat of nation-to-nation war, and thus strengthening Israel⁴⁷.

The military's role in Egypt has ensured no other rival institution could ever develop. As a result, most of the institutions of state are either corrupt or dripping in cronyism. This architecture helped the leadership of the Egyptian military maintain loyalty within the ranks; as only officers trained in the US and filtered carefully can reach senior positions (Khan 2013).

Former president Morsi's removal of the military's two top generals early in his presidency was seen as a brave move that asserted his position as the supreme leader of the armed forces. But the fact of the matter was that Morsi didn't actually take control of the army. The General that Morsi chosen, Abdul Fattah al-Sisi, was the military's next-in-line, and was, in the end, the man who handed to Morsi his pink slip. The Muslim Brotherhood therefore never could build real power, as they never changed this political reality. With the Egyptian army's monopoly of power and economy, the only way to effect actual change is an repair of the military's architecture that abolishes the current system and returns the military to its natural functions.

⁴² <http://www.jadaliyya.com/pages/index/3732/>

⁴³ <http://www.nybooks.com/articles/archives/2011/aug/18/egypt-who-calls-shots/>

⁴⁴ Jeremy M. Sharp. Egypt: Background and US Relations. <http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/mideast/RL33003.pdf>

⁴⁵ <http://news.nationalgeographic.com/news/2013/07/130705-egypt-morsi-government-overthrow-military-revolution-independence-history/>

⁴⁶ http://killerapps.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2013/07/02/soldiers_trained_by_us_threatening_to_overthrow_egypt

⁴⁷ https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Israel-Egypt_Peace_Treaty

3.1.4 Political System of Egypt

Egypt's political system from 1952 until 2011 can be best described as hybrid/authoritarian: democratic institutions and civic organizations coexisted with repression and co-optation by the regime. Multiparty politics for example was accepted, as long as the opposition parties did not pose a serious threat to the ruling establishment. Opposition parties which were seen as serious competitors were suppressed and outlawed (Miller et al., 2012: 80-85).

3.1.4.1 Accountability and Representation

Political parties

After 1977 a law enabled the establishment of political parties. Until then only one party was allowed, which was renamed the National Democratic Party (NDP) in 1978 (Cook, 2007: 69). Establishing a new party proved however to be difficult. Political parties were not allowed to have a religious basis, excluding the Muslim Brotherhood, or to be similar to existing parties, excluding liberal democratic parties (Miller et al, 2012: 91-92). The Committee for Affairs of Political Parties further restricted the establishment and manoeuvrability of political parties. This committee was dominated by members of the ruling NDP and had the power to decide on the applications of political parties, to shut down a party or to suspend its activities (Cook, 2007: 69-71). The political parties that *were* allowed became co-opted by the regime (Miller et al, 2012: 91-92).

Representative Institutions: the People's Assembly, Shura Council and Presidency

The Egyptian political system has three official representative institutions which are elected by secret balloting. These institutions are the People's Assembly, the Shura Council and the presidency. The People's Assembly, Egypt's lower house consisted of 518 members in 2010. Ten of the members were appointed by the president, the rest, mainly independent candidates, were elected by popular vote. The members served for a six-year term (Freedom House, 2011; Polity IV, 2010). The People's Assembly had a legislative function and was tasked with overseeing the functioning of the government, the government's budget, and had the right to question ministers and initiate discussions. They were furthermore endowed with the right to withdraw confidence in the cabinet and to nominate a president (Cook, 2007: 63-65). In practice the People's Assembly was an extension of the regime. Questioning of ministers and nominating a president have been rare.

Furthermore the Assembly had no say in important policy areas, only less important areas such as agriculture, local policy, youth and the bourgeoisie (Polity IV, 2010).

The lower house has been consistently dominated by the NDP and retired military officers. The NDP was financed by the regime, had unlimited access to state media and was backed by electoral laws and fraud, severely limiting the influence of opposition parties (Cook, 2007: 70). The electoral law furthermore decreed that half of the seats in the People's Assembly should be reserved for 'farmers' and 'workers'. In reality 90 per cent of those 'farmers' and 'workers' were retired military officers and security personnel who subsequently took seat in the Defence and National Security Committee, the only committee that nominally was tasked with overseeing the military budget (Martini & Taylor, 2011).

The second 'representative' institution is the Shura Council, better known as Egypt's Upper House. The upper house has a consultative function and has 264 members of which two third are directly elected and one third is appointed by the president (Cook, 2007: 68). The upper house is tasked with ratifying constitutional amendments and international treaties. It has consultative tasks on the subjects of drafts, bills and on all general policies. Like the People's Assembly the Shura Council has been dominated by the NDP (Freedom House, 2011).

The third officially representative institution is the presidency, which after 1967 became the most significant actor in Egypt's political system. The constitution of 1971 formally restricted the presidency to two terms of six years. Those restrictions were revoked in the amended constitution of 1980, giving the presidency an unlimited term (Cook, 2007:

72). Under pressure of the Bush administration multiparty presidential elections were for the first time organized in 2005 (Droz-Vincent, 2011: 9). Constitutional amendments made it however very difficult for other candidates than Mubarak himself, to run for presidential elections. First of all only political parties which had been established for more than five years and had obtained at least 3% of the seats in as well the People's Assembly as the Shura Council were allowed to put forward a candidate. Secondly, independent candidates needed at least 250 signatures from regime officials from different government layers in order to be able to run (Egypt's State Information Service (ESIS), 2009). The majority of government institutions were dominated by the ruling NDP party, leaving the other candidates no chance of winning (Cook, 2007: 72; Droz-Vincent, 2011: 9).

3.1.4.2 Law and Rights

Civil and Political Liberties

In both the constitutions of 1956 and 1971 political and civil rights were formally granted to Egypt's population. Included in the constitutions are equality for the law, the right of freedom

of opinion, expression, press, assembly and association and the right to vote (ESIS, 2009). However, since 1967 the emergency law has been almost continuously in place, stripping citizens from most of their constitutional rights (UNDP, 2005). Newspapers were subjected to censorship and even to prison terms and heavy fines for publishing misinformation, workers were forbidden to strike and political organizations were only allowed to assemble with the approval of the Ministry of Interior (Cook, 2007: 71-71; Karawan, 2011: 45). Political activists have been tried under the Emergency law and been detained without charge. Furthermore the state has repressed and detained journalists and bloggers (Freedom House, 2006; 2011).

Independency of the judiciary

The constitution formally established the independence of judiciary. During the years the judiciary has fought to remain independent, although the Ministry of Justice has controlled promotions and compensation of the judiciary, favouring judges that deliver favourable verdicts (Freedom House, 2011; Stacher, 2012). The emergency law has led to the installation of a parallel judicial system, referring civilians to the Supreme State Security Court and from

1992 to military courts. Those courts have initially been established to trial crimes related to national security, for instance terrorism. Because of the judiciary's fight to remain independent, the state started to heavily rely on its military courts. Military courts lack basic guarantees as the right to appeal (Cook, 2007: 71-71; Karawan, 2011: 45). Furthermore military judiciaries have been appointed directly by the president and verdicts have been subject to ratification by the president (Freedom House, 2011).

3.1.4.3 Civil-Military Relations in Egypt

The military has been a privileged group in Egypt since the sixties, as senior officers served in high executive functions (Frisch, 2013: 183). Furthermore the military gained a number of significant economic functions since the seventies, which made them economic actors in their own right (Kamrava, 2000: 80). Placed in Finer's (1962) typology, the Egyptian regime could be defined as quasi-civilianized direct military rule under Nasser and as indirect continuous military rule under Sadat and Mubarak. Under Nasser the military was directly involved in governing, but after the defeat of the military in the 1967 war with Israel, the military's political role was downsized (Springborg, 1987: 5; Cook, 2007: 63; Karawan, 2011: 44). The proportion of politicians with a military background decreased from 66 per cent in 1967 to 15 per cent in 1975 (Karawan, 2011: 45). Furthermore in 1980 less than five regional governors had a military background, contrary to 22 of the 26 governors in 1964. Under Nasser the military was the strongest element of the political

system (Springborg, 1987: 5-6). Under Sadat and Mubarak the military did dominate the political system, but did not directly govern (Cook, 2007: 64; Karawan, 2011: 44). However, in the latest round of Mubarak's appointments of governors in 2008 20 of the 28 governors had a military or security background (Miller et al, 2012: 82; Martini & Taylor, 2011).

The military dominated political system becomes visible in four ways. In the first place all four Egypt's presidents until 2011 have been hauled from the military and were both president and Supreme Commander of the military. The presidency has been the most important institutionalization of the military in the regime. "It's the military's crucial and intimate association with the presidency that ensure the continuity of Egypt's political system (...) this mutually reinforcing relationship with the president has allowed the officers to remove themselves from day to day governance" (Cook, 2007: 73). In the second place the military dominated system becomes visible through the multiple officers who have held high- ranking political and bureaucratic positions, as cabinet members, members of parliament or as regional governors. In the third place the ministry of defence and the Defence and National Security Committee consisted mainly of retired military and police officers. This way the military had a major influence on foreign and security policy. In the fourth place it becomes visible through the vast economic complex which the military owns (Albrecht & Bishara, 2011; Cook, 2007: 18).

Through those four structures, the Egyptian officers have been able to rule without having to govern. They served as the ultimate backbone of the regime. The democratic 'façade' and authoritarian institutions ensured their predominance and satisfied the military's demands: political influence and economic privileges (Cook, 2007: 2, 8; Albrecht & Bishara, 2011: 14, 18; Droz-Vincent, 2011: 18). There has however always been a fine, but essential, line between military integrated in the political regime and military as institutional part of the state. The military as corps did not have a direct political role, only the military top held executive positions within the regime (Droz-Vincent, 2011: 6, 18). The military as corps is highly institutionalized, professionalized and has a strong sense of corporatism (Droz- Vincent, 2011: 18). Furthermore it consists of Egyptians from all layers in society, as the Egyptian military has service obligation for all Egyptian males between the age of 18 to 30 for a year and a half up to three years and a nine-year reserve obligation (CIA, 2010; Azzam, 2012: 2).

After 1967 the Egyptian presidents started to keep a close eye on the military and have only relied on a few high ranking officers in executive positions (Droz-Vincent, 2011: 7). Especially Mubarak weakened the military establishment compared to his predecessors. He invested in the security forces of the Ministry of Interior: the police and the intelligence services (Droz-Vincent, 2011:

10-12). As the military was not directly involved in the 'dirty task' of repression and torture by the security forces, except for the suppression of the Muslim Brotherhood in 1997, it has never been target of widespread criticism. The military enjoys a certain degree of popularity among the Egyptian public as it is seen as the victorious force of the 1973 war with Israel and as the guardian of the people (Droz-Vincent, 2011: 18 & 2013: 6). In order to keep the military satisfied and in its 'barracks' Mubarak invested in large military budgets, modernization programs and economic activities (Droz-Vincent, 2011: 10-12).

The son of Mubarak, Gamal Mubarak joined the ruling National Democratic Party in 2000 and was appointed head of policies secretariat, a board of businessman and liberal economist. With Gamal assuming power the military would see its political influence diminishing (Frisch, 2013: 187). Furthermore the economic agenda of Gamal was based on macro economic stabilization and mainly focused on benefits for the business elite. This threatened the economic interests of the military, which is committed to the economic ideas of Nasser; a state controlled economy (Albrecht & Bishara, 2011: 18). According to the article in the New York Times military officers feared that Gamal would "erode the military's institutional powers" (Cambanis, 2010).

3.1.5 The Military's Economic Interests

Since the seventies there has been a horizontal expansion of the military into the national economy. In the eighties the budget of the military was reduced, therefore the military started to look for funding through other channels. Facilitated by the government the military assumed activities in the market place through military organizations and companies, under the supervision of the Ministry of Military Production (Barany, 2011: 32; Frish, 2013: 183-186). The military did not only assume economic activities in the field of military and security production, but as well production geared towards the civilian market. The military industrial enterprise exists of weapon production, agricultural machines, cables, medications, pumps, ovens, water management, production of electricity, land development deals, services in aviation and a share in the tourism sector (Cook, 2007: 18; Albrecht & Bishara, 2011: 14; Frisch, 2013: 183-186). They are even involved in the production of olive oil, bottled spring water and the export of refrigerators (Cambanis, 2010). The military holds a vast economic complex from which military officers profit through relatively high salaries and other economic privileges, as free medical care, foreign travel allowances, subsidized housing and duty free imports (Kamrava, 2000: 80-81; Barany, 2011: 32).

The extent of the military's economic empire in relation to the country's gross domestic product (GDP) remains unknown, as the military's budget has never been subjected to state control (Cook, 2007: 18; Albrecht & Bishara, 2011: 14; Barany, 2011: 32). The estimates differ from 20% up to 40% of Egypt's GDP (Ashour, 2013). The extensive economic network has turned the military into a financial and industrial force. Mehran Kamrava already in 2000 noted that: "With their political and economic interest firmly grounded into the status quo, overthrowing the seemingly civilianized military rulers becomes exceedingly difficult, while at the same time compelling those in power to fend off potential challengers with even greater zeal" (Kamrava, 2000: 81).

3.1.6 Growth of Political Islamists, Civil and Political Society

Under Mubarak the amount of registered nongovernmental organisations (NGOs) has increased from 12,000 in 1991 to 16,800 in 2011 (Miller et al, 2012: 81). Egypt's NGO's have however not been effective in channelling the main interests and demands of the society. This is in the first place caused by the either religious or secular basis of the NGO's. The former promote Islamization of society, while the latter advocates for the banning of religious expression in public life. Instead of working together, these NGO's have excluded each other (Miller et al, 2012: 89-91). Secondly, civic organizations have been subjected to state control. In 2002 a law decreed that all NGO's had to be apolitical, that their activities would be monitored by the Ministry of Social Affairs and that they had to report on their membership composition and sources of funding. The law restricts international funding and allows the government to dissolve a NGO at any time (Abdalla, 2008: 25-28).

The only civic and political organisation that has posed serious threats to the established regime was the Muslim Brotherhood, the *Ikhwan*. In order to reduce their organized demonstrations and strikes and to decrease the support for more extreme and militant Islamist organizations the regime decided to accommodate the brotherhood during the eighties (Cook, 2007: 76-80). The brotherhood was not formally legalized, but was allowed to preach, organize and mobilize. The unintended consequence was however that the brotherhood gained more support and significant political power (Cook, 2007: 76-88). In 1992 the Muslim Brotherhood succeeded to form the largest opposition group of independent candidates affiliated with the Ikhwan in the lower house (Cook, 2007: 80-89). Especially the Brotherhood's success in infiltrating university boards and professional syndicates posed a threat to the regime (Campagna, 1996: 290-291). The regime ended the Muslim Brotherhood's accommodated position in 1992 and leaders and political activists of the brotherhood were referred to the Supreme State Security court and later on to military tribunals (Cook, 2007: 80-91).

Due to the brotherhood's success the regime adopted a series of laws to make it even harder for opposition groups to demand political reform. Financing from abroad became illegal, syndicates

were placed under judicial supervision, the autonomy of the universities was terminated and municipal elections were terminated (Cook, 2007: 91). In 2005 the Muslim Brotherhood made a comeback by winning 87 seats in the People's Assembly. Their comeback was however short-lived. In 2006 the regime again cracked down on the brotherhood, preventing it from running for the Shura Council elections and for the municipal elections which were reinstated in 2008. Members were detained and got long-term prison sentences. In the 2010 election for the lower house, the Muslim brotherhood won no seats (Freedom House, 2011).

As has been mentioned in 4.1 recent years have seen a rising of youth activism due to an increase of Internet access and the rise of Arabic mass media. Calls for demonstrations on January 25, 2011, the first day of the Egyptian uprising, were made through Facebook groups of which the most significant were the April 6th Movement, 'We Are All Khalid Sa'id', and 'Youth for Justice and Freedom'. The Kifaya Movement, a movement that already in 2004 protested for the step-down of Mubarak (Freedom House, 2006) and several syndicates joined those groups on January 25. Clearly missing in the initial demonstrations were the opposition parties, as for instance the Tagammu and the Muslim Brotherhood (the Muslim Brotherhood joined on January 28) (Miller et al., 2012: 92-96).

The April 6th movement and Kifaya (Enough) were the only movements which had organized civil disobedience before. On April 6th, 2008 the April 6th movement supported the textile workers strikes in the industrial town El-Mahalla El-Kubra. In 2009 it again organized strikes, but those were less successful (Miller et al, 2012: 93). The 'We Are All Khalid Sa'id' Facebook group was established by Wael Ghoneim, Google executive in Egypt, in response to blatantly police brutality. Police officers beat Khalid Sa'id to death, after he tried to upload pictures of police splitting a drug bust. The group attracted more than 200.000 members in the first ten days (Miller et al, 2012: 95). These online communities can be more seen as social movements, rather than organized civic organizations.

3.1.7 Nature of Transition to Democracy

On January 25, 2011 nonviolent demonstrations erupted in Cairo and other major Egyptian cities, calling for reforms. Demonstrators came from all sectors of society, crossing ideological, socio-economic and sectarian lines. The New York Times reported on January 25, 2011 that "the protests represented the largest display of popular dissatisfaction in recent memory, perhaps since 1977" (Fahim & El-Naggar, 2011). The masses grew during the days and on January 28 the Muslim Brotherhood officially joined the demonstrations. Police forces clashed with the demonstrators, but could not contain the demonstrations any longer, as they were overrun by the protestors. On January 29, 2011 Mubarak ordered a nationwide deployment of the military (Albrecht & Bishara, 2011: 15; Droz-Vincent, 2011: 15). The military was deployed, but on January 31, 2011

field marshal and minister of defence Husayn Tantawi declared that the military will not use force against protestors and that the military recognizes the legitimacy of the protestor's demands (Reuters, 2011).

On February 11, 2011 the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces (SCAF)⁴⁸ intervened and announced that it would protect 'what the protestors have achieved' and would oversee a transition to a new constitution, free elections and an eventual end to the state of emergency (New York Times, 2011). Mubarak resigned and was replaced by field marshal Husayn Tantawi, minister of defence since 1991 and Commander of the Armed Forces.

The eruption of mass demonstrations and consequently ousting of president Mubarak was rather abrupt than gradual. The size, cross-class and nonviolent character of the demonstrations proved to be political game changers. Like in Tunisia, but unlike in Syria and Bahrain, the Egyptian military declined to use lethal force against protestors. The question if the military would shoot had the world at the edge of its seat at the beginning of 2011 (Bellin, 2011: 134). Apparently the SCAF decided that shooting at such a large group of protestors was even less in their interest than saving Mubarak. It would have undermined their institutional integrity as "Egypt's conscript army has so many ties to society at large that, even had the generals been willing to shoot demonstrators, many officers and enlisted men would probably have refused to obey such an order" (Barany, 2011: 32). Furthermore it would have undermined their prestige and national legitimacy as defender of the nation (Bellin, 2011: 132; Azzam, 2012: 3).

3.1.8 International Actors

From the seventies on Egypt has been the United State's second main ally in the Middle East. As a consequence of signing the peace treaty with Israel, Egypt has received 1.3 billion dollar a year in military aid and 450 million dollar in economic support funds since 1979. The 1.3 billion dollar in military aid is intended for the operation and modernization of Egypt's military and includes a reciprocal commitment from Egypt to the United States (Cook, 2007:

145; Barany, 2011: 32; Droz-Vincent, 2011: 7). Martini and Taylor (2011) have indicated that the financial aid covers 80 per cent of the military's procurement costs. Furthermore Egyptian military officers receive training in the United State's war colleges, fostering close relationships between American and Egyptian military officers (Abul-Magd, 2013). European Union also is working here to establish Human Rights and Women Rights. These international actors are playing vital role to democratize Egypt but US and Israel's role is subject to question to many scholars that are they

⁴⁸ The SCAF consisted of nineteen military officers who had not played an active role in the making of political decisions before the uprising on January 25, 2011. The SCAF had existed before the uprising, but only met on irregular basis to discuss political issues on which it made recommendations to the president (Albrecht and Bishara, 2011).

really cordial to establish democratic strong rule in Egypt? Or they purposely keeping the authoritarian puppet ruler to ensure their geopolitical interests

3.1.9 Growth of Muslim Brotherhood Growth and Democratization in Egypt

The Society of the Muslim Brothers (*Jami'ah al-Ikhwān al-Muslimūn*), abbreviated to the Muslim Brotherhood (*al-Ikhwān al-Muslimūn*), is a transnational Sunni Islamist organization. It was founded in Egypt by Islamic scholar and schoolteacher Hassan al-Banna in 1928. The organization increased supporters throughout the Arab world and influenced other Islamist groups such as Hamas with its "model of political activism combined with Islamic charity work". In 2012 the organization sponsored the elected political party in Egypt after the January Revolution in 2011. Nevertheless, it suffered from periodic government crackdowns for alleged terrorist activities and as of 2015 is considered a terrorist organization by the governments of Bahrain, Egypt, Russia, Syria, Saudi Arabia and United Arab Emirates.

The Brotherhood's stated goal is to implant the Quran and Sunnah as the "sole reference point for ... ordering the life of the Muslim family, individual, community ... and state"⁴⁹. Its mottos include "Believers are but Brothers", "Islam is the Solution", and "Allah is our objective; the Qur'an is the Constitution; the Prophet is our leader; jihad is our way; death for the sake of Allah is our wish".⁵⁰

As a Pan-Islamic, religious, and social movement, Brotherhood preached Islam, taught the illiterate, set up hospitals and business enterprises. The group extend to other Muslim countries but has its largest, or one of its largest, organizations in Egypt despite a succession of government crackdowns in 1948, 1954, 1965, and 2013 after plots, or alleged plots, of assassination and overthrow were uncovered.

The Arab Spring brought the group legalization and substantial political power at first, but as of 2013 it has suffered severe reversals. The Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood was legalized in 2011 and won several elections, including the 2012 presidential election when its candidate Mohamed Morsi became Egypt's first elected president after the 2011 Egyptian Revolution.

One year later, conversely, following massive demonstrations, anger at perceived discrimination and disenfranchisement against religious minorities and economic instability, Morsi was overthrown by the military and arrested.

⁴⁹ Kull, Steven (2011). *Feeling Betrayed: The Roots of Muslim Anger at America*. Brookings Institution Press. p. 167. *The Muslim Brotherhood's stated goal has been to instill the Quran and sunnah as the 'sole reference point for ... ordering the life of the Muslim family, individual, community ... and state.'*

⁵⁰ Yusuf, Khalil (19 December 2013). "Does the Muslim Brotherhood still have a role to play in Egypt's revolutionary politics?". *memo: middle east monitor*. Retrieved 22 April 2015. Helbawy, K., (2009) *The Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt: Historical Evolution and Future Prospects*, p.65 . Ikwonline, 2013

The Brotherhood itself claims it is a peaceful, democratic organization,⁵¹ and its leader "condemns violence and violent acts".⁵²

The Brotherhood grew rapidly going from 800 members in 1936, to 200,000 by 1938 and over 2 million by 1948.

As its influence grew, it opposed British rule in Egypt starting in 1936 but was banned after being accused of violent killings including the assassination of a Prime Minister by a young Brotherhood member.

Ideological Stand

The Brotherhood's English language website describes the principles of the Muslim Brotherhood as including-

Firstly- the introduction of the Islamic Sharia as "the basis for controlling the affairs of state and society" and

Secondly- work to unify "Islamic countries and states, mainly among the Arab states, and liberating them from foreign imperialism".

According to a spokesman, the Muslim Brotherhood believe in reform, democracy, freedom of assembly, press, etc.

*"We believe that the political reform is the true and natural gateway for all other kinds of reform. We have announced our acceptance of democracy that acknowledges political pluralism, the peaceful rotation of power and the fact that the nation is the source of all powers. As we see it, political reform includes the termination of the state of emergency, restoring public freedoms, including the right to establish political parties, whatever their tendencies may be, and the freedom of the press, freedom of criticism and thought, freedom of peaceful demonstrations, freedom of assembly, etc. It also includes the dismantling of all exceptional courts and the annulment of all exceptional laws, establishing the independence of the judiciary, enabling the judiciary to fully and truly supervise general elections so as to ensure that they authentically express people's will, removing all obstacles that restrict the functioning of civil society organizations, etc"*⁵³.

Its founder, Hassan Al-Banna, was influenced by Islamic modernist reformers Muhammad Abduh and Rashid Rida (attacking the *taqlid* of the official *ulama*, insisting that only the Quran and the best-attested hadiths should be sources of the *Sharia*), with the group structure and approach being influenced by Sufism. As Islamic Modernist beliefs were co-opted by secularist rulers and official *ulama*, the Brotherhood has become traditionalist and conservative, "being the only available outlet

⁵¹ "Muslim Brotherhood Rejects Al-Sisi As True Tyrant; Vows to Continue Peaceful Protest Action - Ikhwanweb". Retrieved 3 November 2014.

⁵² "Pro-Democracy National Alliance Vows Escalated Peaceful Protests Across Egypt - Ikhwanweb". Retrieved 3 November 2014

⁵³ "Muslim Brotherhood Leader Badie Reiterates: Group Denounces Violence - Ikhwanweb". Retrieved 3 November 2014.

⁵⁴ "interview w/Dr. Mohamed El-Sayed Habib". Ikhwan Web. Retrieved 28 November 2012 <http://www.ikhwanweb.com/faq.php>

for those whose religious and cultural sensibilities had been outraged by the impact of Westernisation". Al-Banna believed the Quran and Sunnah constitute a perfect way of life and social and political organization that God has set out for man. Islamic governments must be based on this system and eventually unified in a Caliphate. The Muslim Brotherhood's goal, as stated by its founder al-Banna was to drive out British colonial and other Western influences, reclaim Islam's manifest destiny—an empire, stretching from Spain to Indonesia. The Brotherhood preaches that Islam will bring social justice, the eradication of poverty, corruption and sinful behavior, and political freedom (to the extent allowed by the laws of Islam).

On the issue of women and gender the Muslim Brotherhood interprets Islam conservatively. Its founder called for "a campaign against ostentation in dress and loose behavior", "segregation of male and female students", a separate curriculum for girls, and "the prohibition of dancing and other such pastimes ..."⁵⁴

Prominent figures of the Brotherhood include Sayyid Qutb, a highly influential and anti-Semitic thinker of Islamic supremacism, and the author of *Milestones*. Osama bin Laden criticized the Brotherhood, and accused it of betraying jihad and the ideals of Qutb.⁵⁵

According to al-Banna, contemporary Islam had lost its social dominance, because most Muslims had been corrupted by Western influences. Sharia law based on the Qur'an and the Sunnah were seen as laws passed down by God that should be applied to all parts of life, including the organization of the government and the handling of everyday problems.

Al-Banna was populist in his message of protecting workers against the tyranny of foreign and monopolist companies. It founded social institutions such as hospitals, pharmacies, schools, etc. Al-Banna held highly conservative views on issues such as women's rights, opposing equal rights for women, but supporting the establishment of justice towards women.

Slogans

The Brotherhood's "most frequently used slogan" (according to the BBC) is "Islam is the Solution".⁵⁶ Another well known slogan is "God is our objective. The Prophet is our leader. The Qur'an is our law. *Jihad* is our way. Dying in the way of God is our highest hope. God is greater!"⁵⁷ On the Brotherhood's green logo is emblazoned ("And prepare") - taken from *sūrat l-anfāl* ("spoils of war",

⁵⁴ "Toward the Light" in *Five Tracts of Hasan Al-Banna*, trans. by Charles Wendell (Berkeley, 1978), ISBN 0-520-09584-7 pp. 126f.

⁵⁵ <http://www.nefafoundation.org/miscellaneous/FeaturedDocs/nefambexecbureaurejectubltape1207.pdf>
<http://www.ikhwanweb.com/article.php?id=22699>

⁵⁶ "Profile: Egypt's Muslim Brotherhood". 25 December 2013. BBC. Retrieved 3 April 2014. <http://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-12313405>

⁵⁷ Helbawy, K., (2009) *The Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt: Historical Evolution and Future Prospects*, p.65. and Ikwanonline, 2013

the 8th "chapter" of the Quran).⁵⁸ According to academic Khalil Yusuf its motto "was traditionally" "Believers are but Brothers".⁵⁹

Mubarak-era

During the Mubarak era, observers both defended and criticized the Brotherhood. It was the largest opposition group in Egypt, calling for "Islamic reform", and a democratic system in Egypt. It had built a vast network of support through Islamic charities working among poor Egyptians. According to ex-Knesset member and author Uri Avnery the Brotherhood was religious but pragmatic, "deeply embedded in Egyptian history, more Arab and more Egyptian than fundamentalist". It formed "an old established party which has earned much respect with its steadfastness in the face of recurrent persecution, torture, mass arrests and occasional executions. Its leaders are untainted by the prevalent corruption, and admired for their commitment to social work". It also developed a significant movement online.

In the 2005 parliamentary elections, the Brotherhood became "in effect, the first opposition party of Egypt's modern era". Despite electoral irregularities, including the arrest of hundreds of Brotherhood members, and having to run its candidates as independents (the party being technically illegal), the Brotherhood won 88 seats (20% of the total) compared to 14 seats for the legal opposition.

During its term in parliament the Brotherhood "posed a democratic political challenge to the regime, not a theological one", according to one *The New York Times* journalist, while another report praised it for attempting to transform "the Egyptian parliament into a real legislative body", that represented citizens and kept the government "accountable".

But fears remained about its commitment to democracy, equal rights, and freedom of expression and belief—or lack thereof. In December 2006, a campus demonstration by Brotherhood students in uniforms, demonstrating martial arts drills, betrayed to some such as Jameel Theyabi "the group's intent to plan for the creation of militia structures, and a return by the group to the era of 'secret cells'". Another report highlighted the Muslim Brotherhood's efforts in Parliament to combat what one member called the 'current US-led war against Islamic culture and identity', forcing the Minister of Culture (Farouk Hosny) to ban the publication of three novels on the ground they promoted blasphemy and unacceptable sexual practices. In October 2007, the Muslim Brotherhood issued a detailed political platform. Amongst other things it called for a board of Muslim clerics to oversee the government, and limiting the office of the presidency to Muslim men. In the "Issues and Problems" chapter of the platform, it declared that a woman was not suited to be president because the post's religious and military duties "conflict with her nature, social and other humanitarian roles".

⁵⁸ <http://corpus.quran.com/wordmorphology.jsp?location=%288:60:1%29>

⁵⁹ Yusuf, Khalil (19 December 2013). "Does the Muslim Brotherhood still have a role to play in Egypt's revolutionary politics?". memo: middle east monitor. Retrieved 22 April 2015.

While proclaiming "equality between men and women in terms of their human dignity", the document warned against "burdening women with duties against their nature or role in the family". Internally, some leaders in the Brotherhood disagreed on whether to adhere to Egypt's 32-year peace treaty with Israel. A deputy leader declared the Brotherhood would seek dissolution of the treaty, while a Brotherhood spokesman stated the Brotherhood would respect the treaty as long as "Israel shows real progress on improving the lot of the Palestinians".

Pre and Post Revolution Role of Muslim Brotherhood

Following the Egyptian Revolution of 2011 and fall of Hosni Mubarak, the Brotherhood was legalized and was at first very successful, dominating the 2011 parliamentary election and winning the 2012 presidential election, before the overthrow of President Mohamed Morsi a year later, leading to a crackdown on the Brotherhood again.

On 30 April 2011, the Brotherhood launched a new party called the Freedom and Justice Party, which won 235 of the 498 seats in the 2011 Egyptian parliamentary elections, far more than any other party. The party rejected the "candidacy of women or Copts for Egypt's presidency", but not for cabinet positions.

The Muslim Brotherhood's candidate for Egypt's 2012 presidential election was Mohamed Morsi, who defeated Ahmed Shafiq—the last prime minister under Mubarak's rule—with 51.73% of the vote.

Within a short period, serious public opposition developed to President Morsi. In late November 2012 he 'temporarily' granted himself the power to legislate without judicial oversight or review of his acts, on the grounds that he needed to "protect" the nation from the Mubarak-era power structure. He also put a draft constitution to a referendum that opponents complained was "an Islamist coup". These issues and concerns over the prosecutions of journalists, the unleashing of pro-Brotherhood gangs on nonviolent demonstrators, the continuation of military trials, new laws that permitted detention without judicial review for up to 30 days, and the seeming impunity given to Islamist radical attacks on Christians and other minorities—brought hundreds of thousands of protesters to the streets starting in November 2012.

By April 2013, Egypt had "become increasingly divided" between President Mohamed Morsi and "Islamist allies" and an opposition of "moderate Muslims, Christians and liberals". Opponents accused "Morsi and the Muslim Brotherhood of seeking to monopolize power, while Morsi's allies say the opposition is trying to destabilize the country to derail the elected leadership". Adding to the unrest were severe fuel shortages and electricity outages, which raised suspicions among some Egyptians that the end of gas and electricity shortages since the ouster of President Mohamed Morsi

was evidence of a conspiracy to undermine him, although other Egyptians say it was evidence of Morsi's mismanagement of the economy.

On 3 July 2013 Mohamed Morsi was arrested and detained by the military, following a popular uprising of millions of Egyptians demanding the resignation of Morsi. There were also limited counter-protests in support of Morsi. On 14 August, the military declared a month-long state of emergency and commenced raids against Brotherhood protest encampments. Violence escalated rapidly and led to the deaths of over 600 people and injury of some 4,000, with the incident resulting in the most casualties in Egypt's modern history. In retaliation Brotherhood supporters looted and burned police stations and dozens of churches. The crackdown that followed has been called the worst for the Brotherhood's organization "in eight decades". By 19 August, al Jazeera reported that "most" of the Brotherhood's leaders were in custody. On that day Supreme Leader Mohammed Badie was arrested, crossing a "red line", as even Hosni Mubarak had never arrested him. On 23 September, a court ordered the group outlawed and its assets seized. Prime Minister, Hazem Al Beblawi on 21 December 2013, declared the Muslim Brotherhood as a terrorist organisation after a car bomb ripped through a police building and killed at least 14 people in the city of Mansoura, which the government blamed on the Muslim Brotherhood, despite no evidence and a Sinai-based terror group claiming responsibility for the attack.

Status of non-Muslims

In 1997 Muslim Brotherhood Supreme Guide Mustafa Mashhur told journalist Khalid Daoud that he thought Egypt's Coptic Christians and Orthodox Jews should pay the long-abandoned *jizya* poll tax, levied on non-Muslims in exchange for protection from the state, rationalized by the fact that non-Muslims are exempt from military service while it is compulsory for Muslims. He went on to say, "we do not mind having Christian members in the People's Assembly... [T]he top officials, especially in the army, should be Muslims since we are a Muslim country... This is necessary because when a Christian country attacks the Muslim country and the army has Christian elements, they can facilitate our defeat by the enemy". According to *The Guardian* newspaper, the proposal caused an "uproar" among Egypt's six million Coptic Christians and "the movement later backtracked".

3.2.10 Role of Major Political Islamic Parties in the Election 2011

The FJP, al-Noor, the CDP, and al-Wasat party were formed after the 25th January revolution. FJP is the political wing of MB. Al-Noor party is the main Salafi party, and it considers the Salafi Da'wa as its main religious reference. Al-Wasat party was formed by ex-MB members, but it considers itself as liberal party.




Chart: Different political parties and their alliance participated in Egyptian parliament election 2011

Al-Wasat and FJP can be considered as the party most open to all Egyptians. FJP accepts non-MB members and sisters as members in the party, including Christians. But it doesn't allow the MB members to be members in other parties. This openness enabled the FJP to form the Democratic Coalition with other non-Islamic parties during the parliamentary elections. It included leftist and liberal parties like: the Karama party, al-Jeel, al-Nahda, Ghad al-Thawra, and the Hadara party. On the other hand, al-Noor, al-Asala and the CDP formed another coalition called the 'Islamic coalition'.

The FJP and al-Wasat are more open to dialogue with western and other foreign countries, unlike the CDP and al-Noor. Since the parliamentary elections, they welcomed many western delegates and participated in many events organized by western countries.

Party name	Leader (L) Spokesman (S)	Policy priorities	Openness to dialogue with Western actors
FJP	L: Mohamed Morsy S: Ameen Hegazy	Social and economic development in the framework of Islamic Shari'a	Open
Al-Noor	L: Emad abdel ghafour S: Nader Bakar	Applying Shari'a	Not open
Al-Wasat	L: Abo al-Ela Madhy S: Tareq al-Malt	Justice and freedom	Open
CDP	L: Nassr abdelSalam S: Safwat abdel Ghany	Applying Shari'a	Not open

Table: Policy Priorities of Major four Islamic Political Parties⁶⁰

Human rights

All four parties in their platform call for respecting human rights and human dignity. Their platforms focus on the right to assembly and freedom of speech and expression. However, it is not very elaborated in their platforms, and it is unclear which bills in the Egyptian parliament they would support to protect these rights. The FJP platform respects international law and conventions on human rights, and calls for respecting freedom of opinion and expression, and the right to association.

Al-Wasat party respects all political, social, economic, cultural rights as mentioned in international conventions and in all heavenly religions. Al-Noor and the CDP respect all human rights as mentioned in international conventions – as long as it is in accordance with *shari'a* – and calls for respecting the right to political participation, the right to association, and freedom of expression and opinion where it falls within the framework of *shari'a*.

The political practices of these parties in the People's Assembly tend toward restricting these rights, especially the right to protest. During March-May 2012, these parties supported a bill restricting the right to protest; one which would impose penalties on those who broke it. It includes six months imprisonment for those who called for the protest without gaining the permissions and paying a fine of 5000 L.E. The bill has proven particularly controversial, and it has raised criticism from NGOs, as they perceive it as restricting this right as provided by SCAF.

⁶⁰ <http://media.leidenuniv.nl/legacy/policy-brief---islamic-political-parties-in-egypt.pdf>, Netherlands-Flemish Institute in Cairo (NVIC)

Alliances




Chart: Four major alliances in the revolution

Women's rights

Debates in post-revolutionary Egypt on women's rights focus on women's political and social rights, and personal freedom. During Mubarak's regime, women's right to be presented in the parliament and government were guaranteed. The National Council for Women Rights played an important role in empowering women to participate in politics and suggested many laws to the parliament to protect women's political and social rights. Islamic political parties covered in this brief challenge these rights using religious justifications that reflect their interpretation of Islamic *shari'a*.

Al-Noor party and the CDP both hold a more conservative position on women's rights in comparison to the FJP and al-Wasat. Al-Noor doesn't believe in a woman's right to run for election, but does allow them to vote. It permitted women to appear on their candidate lists in the parliamentary elections, but this was only to comply with an electoral law requiring that they do so. However, they intentionally placed female candidates at the end of their list, which made it less likely for them to

win a seat according to the law.⁶¹ Thus, al-Noor does not have any female member in the People's Assembly. Also, in its electoral campaign in Cairo, it refused to put female candidates' pictures on their posters, opting instead for an image of a rose, the party's slogan, or a picture of the woman's husband. After facing staunch criticism by many public figures, they allowed images of women to appear on their posters in one governorate. Al-Noor platform outlines the importance of supporting divorced women financially, and protecting her from gender based violence.

The CDP considers women as different from men biologically, and therefore also in her social role. It accepts the idea that a woman can leave the home and go to school and/or work, but when outside the home she must adhere to wearing the *hejab share'i*, not wearing perfumes, and not being alone with men who aren't relatives. Women's political rights are not recognized by the CDP. It also argues, along with al-Noor, that the main role for women in life is raising children and taking care of the family.

The FJP recognizes limited political rights for women: they have the right to participate in elections, to be a minister, but not to be president. It included women on its electoral lists in the parliamentary elections, and they have four female members in the People's Assembly. That some political rights for women are recognized by the FJP, is derived from its role in the MB, the parent organization of the FJP. Women are not allowed to be at the head of the MB organization or to be a member of the MB Guidance Bureau. They can be leaders of other sisters, but not brothers. Al-Wasat party, as stated in its party platform, recognizes full equality between men and women in all rights, including a woman's right to become president.

FJP, CDP, and al-Noor party consider stability of the family, and not the empowerment of women, as the core of society. Building on that stance, they are against the internationally agreed Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW), and the Convention on the Rights of the Child. The FJP calls for reviewing these two agreements, as they think they destroy the family and contradict *shari'a* law. Moreover, it is against a set of laws supported by the High Council for Women Rights, and National Council for Motherhood and Childhood in Egypt. The FJP, instead, calls for establishing a High Council for Family Rights. The three parties recently lobbied to abolish a law that allows women to request divorce, but al-Azhar⁶² rejected that because it is against *shari'a*.

⁶¹ Each list has eight candidates. According to the law, the first two should be representing the laborers and *fea'at*. For more information on the list system, refer to: <http://www.dakahliaikhwan.com/viewarticle.php?id=10760>

⁶² Al-Azhar is one of the official Islamic actors in Egypt that are part of the state apparatus and which are sanctioned by the state to give religious opinions and to undertake religious functions and responsibilities. Al-Azhar plays according to the 1971 constitution a role in the legislation process. It has the right upon the request of the parliament to reject or support any bill if it is inconsistent with Islamic *shari'a*. For more information, see: Dina Shehata and others, 'Mapping Islamic Actors in Egypt', Netherlands- Flemish Institute in Cairo and Al-Ahram Center for Political and Strategic Studies, A report commissioned by the Project Office Islam Research Program on behalf of the Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs, within the Research Programme 'Strengthening knowledge of and dialogue with the Islamic/Arab World' - Programme Cairo, March 2012. Netherlands-Flemish Institute in Cairo (NVIC)

3.1.11 Conclusions

Based on the character of the military, the civil-military relations and the contextual factors in Egypt prior to the ousting of Mubarak, expectations can be derived on the willingness of the Egyptian military to allow for democratization during the political transition.

Due to as well an institutionalized as a patrimonial character of the Egyptian armed forces, it has to be seen which direction the military chooses. The patrimonial character of those linked to the regime suggests that the officers will be resistant to democratization. The officers have however not been linked by blood or ethnicity to Mubarak, so they might allow for some degree of democratization which does not threaten their interests. At the same time the Egyptian military has not been directly involved in governing and repressing the population, which makes them more willing to allow for democratization. Lastly the military has not been backed by a legal framework, but by the emergency law. If they want to continue to play a role in politics they might seek to legitimize their political rule within a new constitution or by extending the emergency law.

The main obstacle for installing democratic civil-military relations in Egypt seems to be its weak civil and political society. Furthermore the ousting of Mubarak has been quite abrupt. Both factors increase the likelihood of the formation of a caretaker military junta or the installation of an authoritarian leader. International pressure by the United States could play a role during the transition, but is limited due the fact that America's financial aid is based on the condition that Egypt maintains its peace with Israel.

Taking both the extent to which the military is involved in the regime and the contextual factors together the most likely outcome would be that the military seeks to restore its privileged position under Mubarak. In the past the military has been comfortable with staying out of the daily governing of the country. It will probably seek to regain the construction between Mubarak and the military; a construction in which it can still rule from behind the scenes.

Another factor which could play a decisive role in the Egyptian case, but less in cases discussed in the theoretical framework, is the economic interest of the military. The military might be willing to give up some political power as long as their economical power is not impaired.

3.1 Democratization, Military and Political Islam in Egypt

3.2.1 Introduction

This chapter will discuss the extent to which the military has been willing to allow for democratization since it took a leading role in the transition on February 11, 2011. The chapter will be constructed along the lines of the key indicators for measuring democratization: (1) accountability (the constitutions) and (2) representation (political parties, elections, the parliament and the president). In discussing those indicators the emphasis will be on the role of the military and ruling period of Morsi government (Islamists).

3.2.2 Democratic Transition of Egypt

“The generals who were given a free hand to steer the transition in February 2011 did so in a way that guarded their institutional interests. No one should have expected the military to give up its institutional self-interest” (Brown, 2013: 56).

The first step the SCAF undertook after the ousting of Mubarak was suspending the 1971 constitution and dissolving the People’s Assembly and Shura Council on February 13, 2011. In its statement on February 13 it stated that the SCAF had the intention to “temporarily administer the affairs of the country for a period of six months or until People’s Assembly, Shura Council and Presidential elections are held” (The New York Times, 2011). The statement concluded that in the transitional period the SCAF would issue laws and that the government of Ahmed Mohamed Shafiq would continue to work until a new government would be formed. Elections were to be held for the People’s Assembly, the Shura council and the Presidency. The SCAF furthermore installed a body of legal experts to amend the articles regulating presidential elections of the 1971 constitution (Lang, 2013).

The amendments to the constitution were put to a popular vote by a referendum on March 19, 2011, and with a voter turnout of 41% the amendments were passed with 77% of the votes in favour (Ahram Online, 2011). Two weeks later the SCAF however issued its own constitutional declaration granting itself all legislative and executive powers (Albrecht & Bishara, 2011: 16-17). The initially planned elections for the lower and upper house within three months were held nine months later in November 2011 and January 2012. The SCAF remained the executive and legislative

power for over fifteen months after the ouster of Mubarak, until the presidential elections in June 2012. The SCAF shared its legislative power with a cabinet it appointed, of which many ministers remained the same ones as under the rule of Mubarak (Miller et al, 2012: 96-99). Civilians played a limited role in directing the transition, leading to regular protests against the 'military regime' (Elshami, 2011; Sayigh, 2013). In the meantime the Brotherhood was willing to compromise and negotiate with the generals and entered a tacit deal with the SCAF. In return for ceasing its protest it gained political rights (Albrecht & Bishara, 2011: 23; Stacher, 2012). The Muslim Brotherhood has subsequently backed the SCAF by boycotting protests, calling those protests illegitimate and by organizing pro-government demonstrations (Martini & Taylor, 2011). The SCAF and police forces have brutally oppressed the anti-government demonstrations and detained many protestors without charge, leading Amnesty International (2011) to declare the human rights situation in Egypt in 2011 worse than under Mubarak.

In the months ahead of the parliamentary elections several liberal groups demanded that the constitution would be written first, as they preferred a nonpartisan constitutional college and feared that elections would lead to Islamists domination in the drafting process (Albrecht & Bishara, 2011: 23). The SCAF was not willing to change their schedule, but interim deputy prime minister Selmy took the task upon itself of drafting a list of fundamental principles which would be guiding in the writing of the new constitution by the constitutional assembly (Sayigh, 2011). The draft version was circulated in November 2011 and granted the military a 'supra-constitutional status' (Elshami, 2011). The document and the impending parliamentary elections lead to mass protests across Cairo in November 2011. This prompted the interim civilian government of Prime Minister Esam Sharaf to resign (Elshami, 2011). The SCAF appointed Kamal al-Ganzouri, former prime minister under Mubarak, as new prime minister and promised to organize presidential elections in June 2012, instead of April 2013. It did however not reject the Selmy document officially and it has tried to retain its most important provisions (Sayigh, 2013).

The elections for the lower and upper house at the end of 2011 and beginning of 2012 were broadly perceived as being free and fair, despite the SCAF's manipulation and role as gatekeeper (Freedom House, 2012; Stacher, 2012; IFES, 2013). Participation was broad, there was less restraint on the registration of political parties and voter turnouts for the lower house were historically high for Egypt (65% in first round, 43% in second round, 62% in third round) (IFES, 2013; Azzam, 2012; Irshad, 2012). The Islamists parties mainly profited as they won with 75% in the lower house and with 60% in the upper house (Azzam, 2012: 4; Stacher, 2012). The electoral triumph was however short-lived. In April and June 2012 the Supreme Constitutional Court (SCC) declared first the upper and subsequently the lower house elections unconstitutional, leading to the dissolution of both houses (Droz-Vincent, 2013: 16).

In May and June 2012 presidential elections took place, in which Mohamed Morsi, the Muslim Brotherhood's candidate, won 51,7% of the votes in the second round (International Foundation for Electoral Systems (IFES), 2013). Under Morsi a new constitution was drafted and the top military generals were retired and appointed new positions within the cabinet (Freedom House, 2013). Morsi's inability to unite the different political fractions, the severe economic circumstances and his power grab, led to public unrest. Protests against his regime swelled after June 30, 2013, prompting the military to dispose Morsi on July 3, 2013 and to suspend the constitution (Freedom House, 2014).

Since the ousting of Morsi the military and judiciary have been in firm control of the country. Adli Mansour, the chairman of the Supreme Constitutional Court, was appointed as head of the interim government. A panel of jurists was tasked with drafting the new constitution, which was adopted in January 2014. In May 2014 former minister of defence and commander of the armed forces Abdel Fattah Al-Sisi was elected Egypt's new president (Freedom House, 2014).

After the ousting of the Muslim Brotherhood the military initiated a harsh crackdown on the organisation and declared the organization a terrorist organization (Freedom House, 2014). According to Freedom House (2014) last year has seen extreme political repression. 1200 Muslim Brothers have been given the death penalty or life imprisonment for the killing of two policemen. According to a report of Human Rights Watch (2014) 16.000 political activists have been jailed and since the ouster of Morsi more than 900 civilians have been tried in military courts.

3.2.3 The Military and the Constitutions

"The military should be granted some kind of insurance under Egypt's new constitution so that it is not under the whim of a president and the military should not be subjected to parliamentary scrutiny" – SCAF member (in Martini & Taylor, 2011)

Three and a half year after president Mubarak was ousted Egypt has had three constitutions. The first, SCAF's Constitutional Declaration, entered into force in March 2011 and lasted until the permanent constitution at the beginning of 2012 was adopted. An Islamists dominated constitutional assembly under Morsi's presidency drafted the second constitution. The military suspended this constitution with the ousting of Morsi in July 2013. A new constitution was drafted by a group of legal experts and has been adopted after it has been put to a popular vote in January 2014. In all three constitutions the SCAF has clearly tried to legitimize its own position in the political system, has demanded certain prerogatives and ensured its autonomy.

As Morsi and the MB took the reins of power the electoral victory in reality took place in an environment, where the powers of the president were not defined and the nation's constitution had also not been written. During his ruling the power much of the old system remains intact. Morsi and the MB have not presented any grand vision for the country. It has used slogans such as 'Islam is the solution,' which it is dropped, however what has been notably absent is where they plan to take the people and exactly how they plan to enrich the nation. Indeed in its rush to placate international opinion, they abandoned all pretence to Islamic politics. In doing so, they think they are being pragmatic, smart and politically savvy. When it comes to applying Islamic politics they cite constitutional barriers and the need to keep minorities onside. When it comes to applying Islamic economics, they cite the need to avoid scaring international investors and tourists. When it comes to applying the Islamic foreign policy, they cite the need to show a moderate image and to appease the West.

3.2.3.1 The Constitutional Declaration

The first interim constitution, the constitutional declaration of the SCAF, was issued after the Egyptian population had voted on amendments of the 1971 constitution two weeks earlier. Although the SCAF included most of these amendments in its own declaration, it seemed like the SCAF issued its own declaration in order to legitimize its position. The declaration for the first time provided the military with a legal basis to rule, as former constitutions have never mentioned the military as a political actor (Stacher, 2012). In fact the constitutional declaration placed the SCAF above the constitution (Droz-Vincent, 2013: 16; Albrecht and Bishara, 2011: 16-17).

The declaration, consisting of 63 articles, would act as the temporary legal framework until a new constitution would be drafted (Albrecht & Bishara, 2011: 16-17). The amendments proposed by the legal committee to reduce the presidential term from six to four years, with a two-term limit; to ease the presidential candidate registration procedures; to obligate the installation of a vice-president; and to restore the role of the judiciary as supervisor of the electoral process were incorporated (IFES, 2011). Striking is article 56, which gave the SCAF overwhelming executive and legislative powers, even after a new parliament and council would have been elected. The SCAF authorized itself to: issue legislation; implement policy; call and adjourn the sessions of the assembly and council; promulgate laws and object them; appoint the head of the cabinet and ministers; appoint civilian and military employees (Egyptian Government Services Portal (EGSP), 2011; El-Din, 2011). It furthermore decreed that drafting a permanent constitution was the responsibility of a hundred-member constitutional assembly which would be appointed by an elected parliament (El-Din, 2011; IFES, 2013).

3.2.3.2 The Selmy Document

The first document which shaped the civil-military relations in the permanent constitution was issued in November 2011 by then deputy Prime Minister Selmy. He drafted a list of fundamental principles which would be guiding in the writing of a new constitution by the constitutional assembly (Sayigh, 2011). The list granted the SCAF as well tremendous powers in the defense area as in overseeing the drafting of the new constitution. In the defense area the list suggested that the SCAF would be the only authority responsible for matters concerning the military, including the budget and all bills related to the armed forces. It also stated that the president needed to consult the SCAF before it declared war. It furthermore proposed to revive the National Defence Council, a council which had not been in action since Sadat's presidency (Al-Masry Al-Youm, 2012). In overseeing the drafting of the constitution the document stated that the SCAF would have the power to overrule any passage that "contradicts the basic tenets of the Egyptian state and society" (International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance (IDEA), 2011). It furthermore gave the SCAF the right to form a new constitutional assembly if the former failed to draft a constitution within six months (International IDEA, 2011).

The Selmy document did not become binding and its provisions on the role of the SCAF in overseeing and appointing the constitutional assembly were later on annulled by President Mohamed Morsi. Its provisions on Egypt's civil-military relations became however part of both the 2012 and 2013 constitutions.

3.2.3.3 The 2012 Constitution

The drafting of the permanent constitution has been dominated by political struggles between the Islamists, secularist, liberalist, the SCAF and the judiciary. The constitutional assembly was appointed in March 2012 and was heavily dominated by the Islamist parties. In April an administrative court ruled the constitutional assembly unconstitutional, because fifty of its members were elected members of the lower house, which was not in line with the interim constitution (IFES, 2013: 7). This move is widely seen as an institutional competition, as the judiciary is aligned with the military and anti-Islamists (IFES, 2013: 8). In June the lower and upper house elected a new constitutional assembly. The political struggles continued, but the constitutional assembly succeed in putting forward a draft constitution at the beginning of December (Freedom House 2013). The constitution was put to a vote through a referendum on December 15, 2012. There were allegations of fraud and vote rigging, however no official irregularities were found. The constitution was adopted on December 26, 2012 with 64% of the votes in favour (voter turnout was 33%). The political legitimacy of the constitution was however seriously questioned (IFES, 2013: 9).

The powers the 2012 constitution granted to the military were extensive and similar to those set out in the list of fundamental principles of 2011. In the first place the constitution dictated that the minister of defence would be as well the Commander in Chief and has to be appointed from among the military officers. It is common that the Ministry of Defence is granted to the military in a transition, but not that this is stipulated in the constitution (Sayigh, 2013). Secondly, the constitution revived the National Defence Council (NDC). The NDC would consist of both civilian and military officials, but tilted the balance towards the military: eight out of the fifteen seats would be filled with military officers (Sayigh, 2013). The NDC was tasked with discussing the methods of ensuring safety and security, discussing the military budget and all draft laws related to the armed forces. The constitution furthermore dictated that the president could only declare war after consulting the NDC (Egypt Independent, 2012). Finally, the trying of civilians in military courts was not banned and remained vaguely described. "Civilians shall not stand trial except for crimes that harm the Armed Forces. The law shall define such crimes" (article 198) (Egypt Independent, 2012).

3.2.3.4 The 2014 Constitution

The ousting of Mubarak led to the suspension of the 2012 constitution and the drafting of a new constitution at the end of 2013 by a panel of jurists. This constitution was adopted in the beginning of January 2014, after a referendum in which 98% voted in favor (turnout was 37%). How free and fair this referendum was, is questionable (Freedom House, 2014). In the 2014 constitution the powers of the military are even more entrenched than in the previous constitution. Apart from the notion that the minister of Defense needs to be an officer, the approval of the SCAF for his appointment is as well needed, at least for the coming two full presidential terms. Main difference with the 2012 constitution is the addition that the military budget will be incorporated as a single figure in the state budget. As a consequence the civilian officials cannot exert control on the different aspects of the military budget. At the same time the constitution stipulates that in discussions on the budget of the armed forces the head of financial affairs from the armed forces and the heads of the planning and budgeting committee and of the national security committee of the lower house need to be included (ESIS, 2014). This seems to include some weak form of civilian oversight – at least a form of civilian involvement in budgetary discussion. Concerning the military courts, the constitution has become even more vague and broad. It stipulates that: "civilians cannot stand trial before military courts except for crimes that represent a direct assault against military courts, except for crimes that represent a direct assault against military facilities, barracks or whatever falls under their authority (...) or crimes that represent a direct assault against its officers or personnel" (ESIS, 2014).

3.2.4 Political Parties and Electoral Laws

The most important change in the first months of SCAF's ruling in comparison to elections under Mubarak was the strengthening of the role of the judiciary in overseeing elections and allowing for political pluralism (Martini & Taylor, 2011; Freedom House, 2012). The SCAF issued a decree in March 2011 establishing the High Judicial Committee in charge of supervising elections. Furthermore the registration of political parties became more transparent. Banned political parties were legalized and new ones were allowed to organize

themselves (Martini & Taylor, 2011)⁷. The Justice and Freedom Party (JFP), the Muslim Brotherhood's political party, was for instance formally legalized on June 6, 2011 (Irshad, 2012)⁸. The NDP, the ruling party under Mubarak, was dissolved by an administrative court in April 2011. Its affiliates were however not banned from running in elections (Freedom House, 2012).

On May 29, 2011 the SCAF circulated the election law for the lower house and allowed political groups to submit proposed amendments and met with representatives of political groups (Albrecht & Bishara, 2011: 21-22). As a consequence SCAF amended the electoral system to a mix of two third based on closed party list and one third based on individual candidacy with two seat constituencies. This favoured political parties over individual candidacies, something the reformist advocated for as the individual candidacy system was in the benefit of candidates close to the old regime (Democracy Reporting International (DRI), 2011; IFES, 2013; Freedom House, 2012). The candidates from single- member districts have often been 'local power brokers' who during the former regime ran independently and once elected joined the ruling NDP (Martini & Taylor, 2011). The SCAF amended the electoral system to a mix of two third based on closed party list and one third based on individual candidacy. The constitutional provision that 50 per cent of the candidates had to be 'workers and farmers' remained in place (IFES, 2013).

The same mixed electoral system was applied to the elections for the Shura Council; out of the 180 elected seats one third was elected on basis of closed party lists and one third on the basis of individual candidacy. The People's Assembly was set to consist of 508 members, of which ten would be appointed by the president. The Shura Council would consist

⁷ The new constitution adopted in January 2014 banned religious parties from running (FH, 2014).

⁸ Note: the JFP has been banned since the ousting of Morsi in July 2013. The Muslim Brotherhood was declared a terrorist organization at the end of 2013.

of 270 members of which 90 members would be appointed by the president (Freedom House, 2012). The mixed electoral system and increased transparency in the registration of political parties improved political pluralism. This however mainly benefitted existing political parties, as the timetable of the SCAF made it difficult for new political parties to organize themselves and to set up a campaign in time for the elections (Martini & Taylor, 2011; Stacher, 2012). Furthermore the political parties law dictated that new political parties needed to collect five thousand signatures instead of the initial one thousand and required the founders to publish their names in a state led newspaper, which costs are estimated to be around 150 dollar (El- Din, 2011).

3.2.5 Free and Fair Elections

3.2.5.1 Parliamentary Election

Despite the manipulation of the SCAF on the electoral process and its gatekeeper function in allowing political parties to run in elections, the parliamentary elections have been considered to meet international standards. The elections were for a great part free, fair and enjoyed broad participation (Freedom House, 2012; Stacher, 2012; IFES, 2013). The total number of seats of House of Representatives (Maglis El Nowwab) were **489**. The majority of the votes went to Islamist parties; the JFP got 47% of the votes, and the Salafist Al-Nour party 25%. The remaining seats went to the liberal Wafd party (8%), the Egyptian Bloc Coalition (7%), which is an alliance of liberal, social democratic and leftist political parties, and the other smaller parties (Azzam, 2012: 4; Stacher, 2012). The elections took place in three rounds. Voter turnouts have been historically high for Egypt. In the first round the voter turnout was 65%, in the second round 43% and in the last round 62% (IFES, 2013; Azzam, 2012; Irshad, 2012).

Following the lower house elections, the upper house elections were held in January and February 2012. Again the majority of the votes went to Islamist parties: 60% to Freedom and Justice Party, 25% to Al-Nour, 14% to Wafd and 8% to the Egyptian Bloc. Voter turnout was however very low, around the 15% (Freedom House, 2013). Apart from some irregularities and the low voter turnout, the elections have been considered free and fair (IFES, 2013).

Distribution of Seats in the People's Assembly November, 2011




Chart: Distribution of seats in the people’s assembly of Egypt in 2011

3.2.5.1 Presidential Election

The first post-Mubarak presidential elections were planned in May 2012. The elections were, although not perfect, close to international standards (Freedom House, 2013). The fairness of the registration of the candidates is however contested. The Presidential Election Commission, installed by the SCAF, disqualified ten candidates, including the most popular Islamist candidates. Their decision was final and could not be appealed (Freedom House, 2013). According to Frisch (2013: 189) Hazem Salah Abu Ismail, a Salafi preacher, was rejected because he was the least co-optable and Khairat al-Shater, the Muslim Brotherhood’s candidate, was rejected because his good relations with the United States Department of State and American business leaders posed a threat to SCAF’s monopoly on those relations.

In the first round of presidential elections in May the population could vote for thirteen candidates. In June Morsi and Shafiq competed against each other in the second round of presidential elections. Morsi won the elections with 51,7% of the votes. The voter turnout in the first round was 46,6% and in the second round 52% (Irshad, 2012). The SCAF would have preferred Ahmed Shafiq as president, as he has been a commander in the Egyptian Air Force and was appointed by Mubarak as Prime Minister a few days before Mubarak’s ousting (Hellyer, 2012; Egypt Independent, 2012). The SCC made Shafiq’s candidacy possible by ruling out a law which was passed by the People’s Assembly banning political figures from the former regime to run for office for at least ten years (Freedom House, 2013).

3.2.6 The Parliament

According to Frisch (2013: 189) the SCAF had a clear strategy by firstly organizing parliamentary elections and only afterwards presidential elections. This way the SCAF could already weaken and divide the ranks of parliament before a president was elected. This became clear when the Muslim Brotherhood, despite its electoral success, was unable to form a government as the SCAF refused to withdraw its support from the Ganzouri government, which it had appointed as interim government until a new president would be sworn in (Azzam, 2012: 6, Sayigh, 2011). Furthermore the parliament soon discovered it had no real power, as the SCAF had ensured in the interim constitution that the parliament could not pass legislation without the approval of the SCAF (Brown, 2013: 47). On the other hand the FJP succeeded in gaining the speaker's position and heading twelve of the nineteen lower house committees, of which as well the more important ones as foreign relations and defense and national security (Miller et al, 2012: 99).

The People's Assembly did not function for long, as in June 2012 the SCC dissolved lower house (Droz-Vincent, 2013: 16). The SCC ruled that it was unconstitutional that as well party backed as independent candidates competed for individual candidate seats, while this was not possible the other way around (IFES, 2013: 7). Once Morsi was inaugurated on June 30, 2012 he recalled the resolved parliament. The SCC however suspended Morsi's decree, leaving the parliament suspended for the rest of the year (Sayigh, 2013; IFES, 2013: 7). The move by the SCC is seen as enforced by the SCAF to harm Islamists (Stacher, 2012; Azzam, 2012: 6). Shenker (2011) already before the dissolution mentioned in the Guardian that: "Although the SCAF knew that throughout the transition period it needed to partially accommodate the most important political player, the Muslim Brotherhood, it is trying to out manoeuvre and undermine it".

3.2.7 The President

Two weeks before Mohamed Morsi was inaugurated as Egypt's first democratically elected president, the SCAF issued an interim constitutional decree limiting the powers of the newly elected president and expanding its own powers (Brown, 2013: 48; Droz-Vincent, 2013: 16-17; Sayigh, 2013). The decree granted the SCAF power over the new constitution writing process, the right to assume the responsibilities of the parliament as long as no new parliament is elected, and "the upper hand in running the armed forces" (Egypt Independent, 2012). The president was prevented from declaring war without the SCAF's approval and "the current head of the SCAF is to act as commander-in-chief of the armed forces and minister of defence until a new constitution is drafted" (Ahram Online, 2012). Furthermore the SCAF appointed the SCC to have the last word on

the constitution in case the SCAF and other actors would disagree on its content (Ahram Online, 2012).

Once in office, president Morsi nullified the decree of the SCAF, and issued a constitutional declaration giving him full executive and legislative powers, including the right to form a new constitutional assembly (IFES, 2013: 8). On August 12, 2012 he sacked minister of defence and chief of the armed forces, Mohamed Hussein Tantawi and deputy chief of staff Sami Anan and appointed them as presidential advisors (Sayigh, 2013; Freedom House 2013). He furthermore dismissed the commanders of the air force, air defence and navy. Morsi appointed General Abdel Fattah Al-Sisi as minister of defence and commander of the armed forces. Al-Sissi had been head of the military intelligence and part of the SCAF. General Mohammed el-Asser was appointed as deputy defence minister (Londono, 2012). Upon leaving office, Tantawi and Anan were honoured with accolades. Morsi appointed the navy commander as Chairman of the Suez Canal Authority, the air defence commander as Chairman of the Arab Organization for Industrialization and the air force commander as Minister of Military Production; all top civilian posts (Hussein, 2012; Aboulenein, 2012).

As a reaction on the dismissal of the top generals el-Asser told Reuters: “the decision was based on consultation with the field marshal and the rest of the military council” (Blair, 2012). The deputy director of Egypt’s Organization for Human Rights commented: “What is happening now was planned once the SCAF realised they had to make a deal with the Muslim Brotherhood anyway” (Hussein, 2012). According to Droz-Vincent (2013: 12) this decision was a blow to the military in some sense, but it was mainly a way out of a ‘prisoners dilemma’, as the military had a strong desire to quite governing but did not find a ‘safe exit’. A safe exit refers to immunity from legal prosecution and independence (Azzam, 2012: 6-7).

In November 2012 Morsi caused stirring among the Egyptian public by expanding his presidential power in a ‘dramatic way’ (Brown, 2013: 49). He decreed that his decisions were above judicial review, and that the constitutional assembly and Shura council were immune for dissolution by the SCC (Freedom House, 2013). This led to massive demonstrations in Cairo. Later in December 2012 he rescinded the decree, but only after he had protected an Islamist-dominated constitution assembly from dissolution, enabling the panel to pass a controversial draft constitution (Mccrummen, 2012).

During Morsi’s year in office his relationship with Egypt’s population and the military soured. In the spring of 2013 activists started to campaign against his presidency, leading to mass protests on June 30, a year after his inauguration. The military detained him on July 3, 2013 and suspended the constitution. Instead of the SCAF, the SCC was now tasked with executive power (Freedom House, 2014).

3.2.8 Scope of Political Islamists

Role of Islamists was actually confined in their movements and struggle to survive in a long time autocratic ruling apparatus. The long ruling military did not kept any scope the civilians or the politicians either the Islamist or the seculars in state building and nation building process or in constitutional legality. Actual Morsi's short term rule was established on military regimes superstructure which kept his hand everywhere limited. The revolution actually could not bring any radical change in the power structure of the military regimes. The change of Mubarak was a change of a person but was not a change of political system and administration. Election does not always ensure democracy or majority rule. The democratic institution or representative body was kept very weak and under the military control directly or indirectly in Egyptian political system. Moreover, Morsi's compromising policies with military also made Islamists to bring radical change either in Islamization or in democratization.

In all the democratic institution Morsi or Islamists government could play very minimal role because of the influence of SCAF (Military) and SSC (Judiciary). Though in their party and election manifesto they showed their intention to democratize the ruling system but they have not got enough internal and external support.

3.2.9 Rule of Brotherhood: Neither Islamic nor Democratic

The overthrow of the Muslim Brotherhood's presidency in Egypt by an unprecedented partnership between the army and rebellion, followed by the brutal repression of the Brotherhood, has left observers shocked and puzzled. The speed and savageness with which democracy, and perhaps even the hope for democracy, has been smashed in Egypt was unexpected and harrowing to watch. This episode may cast a long shadow on how Egyptian and regional polities negotiate with endemic authoritarianism (Shabi 2013). It will also have a profound impact on how political Islam, especially in the Arab world, evolves. Some commentators are forecasting the end of political Islam (Nassar 2013); others have limited their obituaries to the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt (Sabry 2013). Some opine that perhaps the Muslim world is not ready for democracy; others claim the contention that Islam and democracy are not compatible has been vindicated (Ben-Mier 2013).

The election of the Muslim Brotherhood was not only a pathway to democracy and away from decades of authoritarianism; it was also seen as a vehicle to demonstrate the compatibility of Islam and democracy (Khan M 2012). The examples of Malaysia and Turkey had already made the case that, indeed, Muslims were compatible with democratic norms. The case of Egypt, however, was

more compelling: political Islam was in the driver's seat and was going to design a polity and write a constitution. In Tunisia, the political parameters were similar, but Al-Nahda did not enjoy the same degree of electoral success that the Muslim Brotherhood had garnered, thus placing Egypt in a position to settle, once and for all, the question of the compatibility of Islam and democracy.

After the overthrow of President Mohamed Morsi, the Muslim Brotherhood and its Islamist allies donned the mantle of "champions of democracy and constitutional legitimacy." They compared their tenure at the helm with American democracy and argued that President Morsi had democratic legitimacy and hence could not be removed from power but had to be allowed to complete his term. Anything else they deemed undemocratic. They ignored the mass protests on June 30 and characterized the overthrow as a military coup against democracy. Yes, elements of the old regime and the military did take advantage of a political opportunity, but the opportunity came their way only because the failure of governance under Muslim Brotherhood was seen as so severe that millions came out and demanded its overthrow (Brown 2013: 45-58).

Perhaps their claims would be valid in an established and stable constitutional democracy, but the regime in Egypt had many problems. There was no parliament in place that might have provided checks and balances to a presidency gone awry. In an established system, a president despised by so many could test his legitimacy through an impeachment procedure or vote of confidence. In the absence of a parliament, there was no constitutional counterbalance to the executive. A new constitution was indeed ratified. The passage of the constitution should have warranted new parliamentary and presidential elections; otherwise, for three years, Egypt would have a president whose authority did not stem from the current constitution. Additionally, many protesters against the Morsi regime were not confident that the ousted president would hold elections when the time came (Khan M 2014). They figured that there was no point in waiting for three more years, if there was no guarantee that there would be an election after that interval. Morsi, in their view, had already demonstrated the instinct of a dictator when, in November 2012, he passed a decree that placed him above judicial review — a decree that was rescinded only after mass demonstrations and the deaths of hundreds of protesters (El Shamoubi 2013). Many critics also pointed to a lack of credibility on the part of the Muslim Brothers, who had first promised not to contest the presidential elections and then had reneged on it (Kirkpatrick 2013). They said they were not ready to trust any promises made by Morsi. Anti-Morsi protests had, according to them, become the only check against presidential power.

For decades, ideologues of political Islam like Sayyid Qutb and many rank-and-file speakers and writers have constructed a vision of an Islamic state by demonizing secular democratic governance as "Godless" and immoral. Democracy, they argued, legitimized the whims and fancies of the masses, especially those morally capricious preferences emanating from the promiscuous culture of

the modern West¹. They are vehemently opposed to many of the human rights that are necessary to any democratic infrastructure: women's equality, especially in matters of marriage, divorce, work and travel; freedom of religion allowing one to leave Islam; equality of all under the law for Muslims and non-Muslims; and the supremacy of the will of people in making laws. The constitutional caveats that Islamists insist on — that Islam is the source of all laws and that laws shall not violate the *shariah* — are designed to preempt many of these human-rights principles².

Maulana Maududi of Pakistan, who articulated the concept of theo-democracy, and Rachid Ghannouchi of Tunisia, who advocates pragmatism as a political virtue and accepts power sharing with non-Islamists, have provided some nuance to the Islamist discourse on democracy (Khan M 1999). These subtle ideas made democratic governance more acceptable to Islamists, but they did not transform their strongly held belief that the Islamic *shariah* was superior to any form of man-made law and must be implemented, with or without the consent of the people. The only progress shown was that, rather than imposing *shariah* on people without their consent, as they did in Pakistan with the help of President Muhammad Zia-ul-Haq, Islamists were now happy to enforce their understanding of *shariah* with the help of an electoral majority. The Islamist understanding of democracy apparently allows majoritarian beliefs to override the religious freedom of others.

Islamists also hold that the sovereignty of the people as exercised in any democracy was unacceptable in Islam, which is based on the exclusive sovereignty of God. Man-made laws would allow women to rule, gay couples to get married and minorities to have the same rights and duties as Muslims, none of which was consistent with the Islamist notions of the *shariah*. Unlike Islamic modernists such as Fazlur Rahman and Tariq Ramadan, Islamists have not fully understood that the *shariah* is socially and historically constructed. They act as if its rulings are all divinely articulated, uncontested, fully accepted, agreed upon and remorselessly clear. Muslims who disagree are often demonized and blackballed³.

Nevertheless, in spite of their fear of and reservations about secular and liberal democracy, Islamists have more or less embraced democracy as a means to acquiring and transferring power. For over half a century now, Islamists in most authoritarian Muslim countries, where they were systematically oppressed, have advocated for democratization. The growing international legitimacy of democracy

¹ M. A. Muqtedar Khan, "The Political Philosophy of Islamic Resurgence," *Cultural Dynamics* 13, no. 2 (Summer 2001): 211-229; M. A. Muqtedar Khan, "The Politics, Theory and Philosophy of Islamic Democracy," in M. A. Muqtedar Khan (ed.), *Islamic Democratic Discourse: Theory, Debates and Philosophical Perspectives* (Lexington Press, March 2006), 149-172.

² To get a sense of Islamist attitudes towards democracy, see *Islamic Democratic Discourse: Theory, Debates, and Philosophical Perspectives*, ed. M.A. Muqtedar Khan (Lanham, MD: Lexington Books, April 2006). See also, Muqtedar Khan, "Three Dimensions of the Emerging Political Philosophy of Islam," in *Handbook of Political Islam*, ed. Shahram Akberzadeh (New York: Routledge, 2011), 27-34.

³ See Abdelwahab El-Affendi, "Democracy and Its (Muslim) Critics: An Islamic Alternative to Democracy?" in *Islamic Democratic Discourse: Theory, Debates, and Philosophical Perspectives*, ed. M.A. Muqtedar Khan (Lexington Books, April 2006), 227-256.

as a desired form of government was difficult for the Islamists to resist, particularly since their critics accused them of aspiring to theocratic fascism. Additionally, they realized that, over time, their political activism had made them popular among the masses, who were alienated by the corruption of secular elites and had become more religious. Thus, Islamists found that acceptance of democracy in principle provided international legitimacy and also made strategic sense as their popularity increased. This was borne out in Egypt as Islamists won every election they contested.

The Islamist commitment to the ideal of democracy remained procedural, however, not substantive and normative. Islamists were willing to accept elections and referendums as a way of determining who acquires power and how political disputes may be settled in the public sphere. But they never accepted many of the fundamental principles that constitute the normative package called democracy (Khan M 2003). The idea that democracy is not the dictatorship of the majority, but a process that seeks to find a middle ground and ultimately aspires for consensus, escaped them. The notion that one of the virtues of contemporary democracy is that it uses constitutional instruments to protect and guarantee minorities equal rights and equal access to governance also escaped them. Democracy gains its legitimacy not just from periodic elections, but also from sustained, systematic, deliberative policy making that consults and includes the views and concerns of everyone in the society. Democracies increasingly celebrate intellectual diversity and religious pluralism, neither of which seems to be important to Islamists (Held 2006).

As a result of the popular uprising called the Arab Spring, the Islamists found an opportunity to gain power in Tunisia and Egypt. This upheaval was neither initiated by the Islamists, nor were they the dominant force behind it. They were, however, its principle beneficiaries. The Arab Spring was not a demand for Islamist rule or an Islamic state. It was a demand for dignity and an exasperated rejection of the terrible economic conditions in these societies. The Islamists entered the political process by embracing democratic procedures, especially elections, and succeeded because they were more organized than any other group in Egypt, while the newly formed non-Islamist political parties were disorganized and divided.

Once Islamists won the elections in Egypt and it was time to write the constitution, the discomfort with democratic values of universal equality and progressive laws based on evolving norms of human rights and dignity resurfaced (Albrecht 2013). The Egyptian constitution, passed by the Islamists, fudged on the equality of all citizens by privileging one religion, Islam, over others (Articles 1 and 2), and subverting the equal status of women and minorities. Even the status of democratic legislation was undercut by making Al-Azhar University the arbiter of the Islamic laws that inform the normative framework of the constitution (Articles 4 and 219). Thus, the legislature

was not fully empowered to write laws; an unelected academic institution could overturn them. The constitution did state that there would be no discrimination based on gender or religion, but Article 2 in the constitution, declaring Islam the primary source of law, opened the door for discrimination against religious minorities and women, especially if law making was in the hands of groups that did not subscribe to the principle of fundamental equality for all people. The loophole could have been explicitly closed, but it was not (Albrecht 2013). The contrast can be seen starkly when one looks at the constitution written by Islamists in Egypt and the one written by Islamists and others in Tunisia.

3.2.10 Absence of Islamic System in the Politics and Rule of Muslim Brotherhood

Ideologically, historically and systematically it is completely impractical to establish traditional and authentic Islamic system in an authoritarian, secular democratic system or capitalist democratic system without radical change. That is which Muslim Brotherhood has tried in Egypt.

They did not declare to establish an Islamic state or Caliphate rather declared to establish Civil State. On Friday 24 June 2012, the Egyptian presidential election committee announced the victory of the candidate Mohamed Morsi over Ahmed Shafik. Mohammad Morsi, the new President of the Arab Republic of Egypt declared in the first principle statement made by the new president is his call for the democratic ‘Civil State⁴’ and he declared that Egypt agrees to abide with its international agreements, and under its cover, of course, is the abiding by the Camp David agreement, a treacherous agreement that recognizes the Jewish occupation of the land of *Isra'a and Miraaj*, the blessed land of Palestine. Many scholars viewed it is a clear deception with the Muslim Ummah.

Their declaration of civil state is completely a treacherous act against the Islamic Ummah of Egypt. It also goes against ideology of Islamic politics. In chapter two, in the part of “ Principle of Islamic Political System” the study has found that the appointment of Caliph, his qualities, rule of Shariah law, nationalism, tradition and principle of Islamic governance everything is absent in the politics and ruling of Muslim Brotherhood. They are busier to power broking than culturing the nation or *Ummah* to Islamic politics and governance. As without culturing the people correctly, the military and the influential people, they could not sustain in the power because they failed to make

⁴ The concept of the civil state has cropped up recently as a result of the cultural deception that America has been spreading in the region. Many Muslims from among the elites and the mass public have been influenced by this concept and endorsed it in its quality as an alternative to the military and tyrannical rule and as a reflection of the wishes of society. Others deemed it as the healing remedy to what is existent in society in terms of cultural, political, ethnic and religious plurality. They placed the civil state against the “religious state”; they mean by “religious state” the state that is based upon the theory of the divine right or the “church-based state”. Then they attributed this to the state that is based upon the religion of Islam. They also mean by “civil state” the state that separates religion from life’s affairs.

understand the importance of the implementation Islam in the political and social life. Greater portion of the people were not introduced with Islamic politics and ruling. They thought only voting to an Islamic party is their responsibility. Actually to restrain the Islamic life collectively in the society is also an important religious duty for an Islamic *Ummah* which the general people were unaware of.

The Muslim Brotherhood did cultured their activists and supporters neither towards secular democracy, nor towards a comprehensive Islamic system of ruling with Islamic political culture. Neither their activists were taught about the Caliphate system nor did they have any specific Islamic manifesto or principles to establish an ideal Islamic polity. If some man-made of secular laws are incorporated in an Islamic State or in a Caliphate, it will not be a democratic state because for an ideal democracy it needs some specific secular culture and some institutions. Accordingly, if in an authoritarian regime or a hybrid-democratic system some Islamic laws are incorporated, it will not be turned into an Islamic state that the Muslim Brotherhood or some Islamists are trying in many countries in the world. According to some modern scholars if the appointment procedure of a Caliph, ideal Caliphate form of government, rights of *Ummah* and non-Muslims and principles of governance are considered, no ideal Islamic State is found in present world even it is not Madina model (Saudi Arabia), Turkey or Iran.

The Muslim Brotherhood's politics was not purely an Islamic politics and their politics of 80 years could be able to establish an authentic Islamic state. Ultimately the *Ummah* were confused about their power centric politics rather an Islamic cultural change in the state and society.

Islamic *Sharia Law* was partially implemented though the election and different survey shows that people have a thrust of Islamic life in Egypt. If the ruling tenure and system is compared with the Caliphate, the ideal governance system of Islam, many contradictions are observed. In case of the method, condition and quality of Caliphate were not followed. Many illegal practices were observed which was completely prohibited in Islam was abandoned in Morsi's reign.

Brotherhood and governance

In the one year during which President Morsi governed, he rushed through a hastily written constitution, tried to assume extra-constitutional powers to preempt the judiciary, and focused more on consolidating his party's power over government institutions than providing good governance. The constitution passed the constitutional referendum with a significant majority. But critics argue that many of those who voted for it do not fully understand the scope and meaning of all of its

articles, since there was no time to fully discuss and debate them in the public sphere⁵. Additionally, the Constituent Assembly, which wrote the constitution, was not very representative of the society. Many non-Islamists had resigned from the constitution committee; there were very few women (six or seven, depending on when in the process you counted) and members of religious minorities. While it did garner a majority in the referendum, it alienated a significant portion of society, who felt cheated by the text as well as by the process. A constitution is a social contract, and if there is no buy-in by a large segment of the population, it is barely legitimate; 66 percent of the 33 percent that voted was tantamount to an approval by only 22 percent of the population. Constitutions need a higher degree of agreement by a society in order to become its foundational document. Constitutions that are not approved by overwhelming majorities will divide rather than unite a country in pursuit of a common purpose. The Egyptian constitution, whose final draft was written entirely by Islamists and rushed to the ballot box, failed to unite all citizens behind a common purpose or engender a common vision quite the contrary⁶.

As far as governance was concerned, the Muslim Brotherhood failed miserably. The economy declined, the crime rate rose precipitously, social divisions became more pronounced and the quality of life fell significantly. Clearly, there is evidence that the previous regime had worked to subvert the Morsi government, but that should have been evident to those wielding the levers of power. The biggest source of resentment against the Morsi regime was that it failed to include others in the circle of power; it worked actively to marginalize non-Islamists, even those who had supported it, and it was pushing an Islamist agenda that allowed demonization of Christians, Jews, Shias, Sufis and other dissenters. The overall impression they conveyed was that ideological consolidation of power was more important to them than the welfare of the state and society.

Does the failure of the Muslim Brotherhood to provide good governance in Egypt mean that Islam and democracy are not compatible? Or is it that Egyptians have rejected democracy and prefer military authoritarianism? Does it perhaps mean that the Muslim Brotherhood cannot govern and that this is the end of political Islam?

The failure of the Brotherhood to provide good governance, and its inability to unite Egyptian society in a common purpose, does not imply that Islam and democracy are incompatible. There are many reasons this is the case, the most important being that the Muslim Brotherhood does not have a monopoly on Islam. Its failure is not the failure of Islamic values (Feldman 2013). In Egypt itself, there are other manifestations of Islam — salafi and sufi, for example — both of which have entered

⁵ Nathan Brown, "Egypt's Failed Transition," *Journal of Democracy*.

⁶ Ibid

the public sphere. The Al-Nour party has a strong salafi orientation, and the leadership of Al-Azhar University has once again begun to revert to its sufi heritage. Both Islamic alternatives to the Brotherhood have in the past two years demonstrated a willingness to work within a democratic context and be less politically rigid than the Brotherhood.

Moreover, the Brotherhood lost much of its support among non-members through its partisanship, not because they were seen as representing Islam. Those who rejected the Brotherhood rejected it *per se*; they did not reject Islam. Two other developments continue to keep optimism about Islam and democracy high. People in the countries that experienced the so-called Arab Spring (Tunisia, Egypt and Libya) had all chosen a democratic alternative as their first choice after their moments of liberation from dictatorships. Countries such as Indonesia, Malaysia, Pakistan, Iran, Turkey and Bangladesh, with various degrees of coexistence between resurgent Islamic identity and emerging democratic political structures, assure us that the future of democracy in the Muslim world is bright. The democratic principle has triumphed; its realization in practice, however, remains uncertain (Mogahed 2006).

The counterrevolution of June 30, 2013, and the enormous support for the military — from ordinary people, the secular and liberal intelligentsia, the media, the economic sector, the police and the army, and members of the Christian community and Muslim denominations not affiliated with the Muslim Brotherhood — have prompted many observers to conclude that Egyptians have rejected democracy. The secular and liberal elite were in an uproar over the Brotherhood's systematic efforts to consolidate power and exclude even those who had supported them during elections. The counterrevolution was not a rejection of democracy and an endorsement of military rule; it was a resounding rejection of the Muslim Brotherhood — not a rejection of Islam or democracy, just the Brotherhood. The near-complete isolation of the Brotherhood as the army proceeded to crush their counter protests — egged on by the rest of the country — is testimony to the failed governance of the Brotherhood. Egyptians preferred anything, even a military dictatorship and the loss of their incipient democracy, over the Brotherhood.

Ironically, some supporters and some critics of the Brotherhood are sending the same message in the aftermath of the overthrow of President Morsi. Frustrated supporters are blaming democracy for the actions of the Egyptian military. Many of them have been shouting slogans such as "No more elections after today" Reeve (2013). Are they suggesting that, if the Brotherhood had not adopted democracy, it would still be in power, or are they threatening to abandon democracy if Morsi is not restored as president by international intervention? The message was reinforced by Essam el-

Haddad, spokesperson for the Muslim Brotherhood, who told the press, "The message will resonate throughout the Muslim World loud and clear that democracy is not for Muslims" Reeve (2013).

Critics of the Brotherhood, like Youssef Rakha, also argue that democracy is perhaps not for Muslims, but from the standpoint that political Islam and democracy are not compatible. In an essay in *The New York Times*, he provides a laundry list of undemocratic practices and policies of Islamists and Morsi to make his point: while Islamists espouse democracy, they have no intention in upholding its principles. Among his grievances he includes examples of a man killed for walking with his girl friend, Morsi's concern for terrorists who kidnapped army personnel, sexual harassment of women who did not wear the hijab, initiatives in the Islamist-led Parliament to legalize female genital mutilation, and violence against Shias and Copts. The most worrying thing for advocates of democracy is the disenchantment with democracy itself that is taking root in Egypt. Islamists argue that democracy has failed them; secularists fear democracy because it brings with it an end to their freedoms, via Islamist government. In spite of everything, I am convinced that Egyptians have not given up on democracy. Both Islamists and secularists are now protesting against undemocratic measures by the popular military regime. The spark of democracy is still burning (Rakha 2013).

Does the return of the military and the political marginalization of the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt herald the end of political Islam? Probably not. The various groups that can be included under the broad rubric of political Islam may have suffered a setback in Egypt, but they remain a significant force in Tunisia, Morocco, Jordan, Palestine, Pakistan and Turkey. Indeed the brutal suppression of the Brotherhood in Egypt has helped strengthen the resolve and vindicated the feeling of victimhood among Islamists everywhere. Even in Egypt, Islamists are in disarray and leaderless, but they still have a very dedicated constituency. If they undergo a process of reform and learn from the mistakes they made when in power, it is possible that the Brotherhood will once again become a major force in Egyptian politics and even contribute to the democratization of Egypt and the region (Pioppi 2013).

3.2.11 Fundamental Conflict between Political Islam and Democratization in Egypt

There are immense debate about the compatibility between political Islam and democracy. Some scholars are advocating that both are compatible, some are disagreeing that these are incompatible. In this writing it will be reviewed in case of Egyptian politics. Conflict between two ideologies is universal fact which is observed in case of capitalism and socialism in recent world politics. Political Islam is emanated from Islamic ideology and modern democracy is originated from secularism and capitalism. Accordingly, political Islam and liberal democracy prescribe different polity and society as well as both has different purpose of the state and society which is the fundamental ground of conflict between two ideologies. Egypt is the practical field of this battle. In Egypt the secular

military, judicial elites and political parties never want that Muslim Brotherhood or Islamists rule the country but through a long time movement against authoritarian ruler of Egypt the Islamists have gained popularity.

Political Islam developed in Egypt in the consequence of destruction of Caliphate to revive it struggling against the British or western colonial hegemony in both Egypt and in the Muslim World. On the basis of its Islamic ideology, it wants to return Islamic political system in the Muslim world. According to many scholars Islamic political system has some fundamental conflict with modern or liberal democracy such as Islam does not support popular sovereignty that is reflected in the Islamists political principles. Islamists of Egypt also don't believe in secularism, man-made law and western concept of freedom and personal freedom (for example- homosexuality, drinking wine). They prescribe politics, social policy and culture in the light of the guide line of the Quran, Hadith and Islamic tradition.

Islamists participates in democratic election or democratic process to attain state power. They take part election or democratic process as means to attain their purpose. Therefore, to establish democracy is not their purpose. Hasan-al- Banna ,the founding leaders of Muslim Brotherhood, Moududi of Jamati Islami and Taqiuddin Nabahni of Hizbut-Tahrir entirely disagreed with the western secular democracy, modernization and liberal thoughts. All of them supported the Caliphate form of government primarily.

Historically the alliance between Islamists and military is observed which sometimes hinders democratization process. In 1952 Egypt's monarchy was overthrown by a group of nationalist military officers (Free Officers Movement) who had formed a cell within the Brotherhood during the first war against Israel in 1948.⁷

The initially planned elections for the lower and upper house within three months were held nine months later in November 2011 and January 2012. The SCAF remained the executive and legislative power for over fifteen months after the ouster of Mubarak, until the presidential elections in June 2012. Civilians played a limited role in directing the transition, leading to regular protests against the 'military regime' (Elshami, 2011; Sayigh, 2013). In the meantime the Brotherhood was willing to compromise and negotiate with the generals and entered a tacit deal with the SCAF. In return for ceasing its protest it gained political rights (Albrecht & Bishara, 2011: 23; Stacher, 2012). The Muslim Brotherhood has subsequently backed the SCAF by boycotting protests, calling those

⁷ <http://www.goodreads.com/book/show/9434122>

protests illegitimate and by organizing pro-government demonstrations (Martini & Taylor, 2011). The SCAF and police forces have brutally oppressed the anti-government demonstrations and detained many protestors without charge, leading Amnesty International (2011) to declare the human rights situation in Egypt in 2011 worse than under Mubarak.

International actors USA, Israel, European Union and Saudi Arabia don't want to witness Islamists or a strong representative government is in power which is threat to control the 10th largest Egyptian military in the world that is a factor of balance of power in this region. Actually, imperialist UK, USA and Russia have kept dictators in power not only middle east but also many other part of the world for their strategic interests.

Attaining power Islamists show their autocratic attitude towards opposition and minorities. In the one year during which President Morsi rushed through a hastily written constitution. He tried to assume extra-constitutional powers to block the judiciary, and focused more on consolidating his party's power over government institutions than providing good governance. The constitution passed the constitutional referendum with a significant majority. Additionally, the Constituent Assembly, which wrote the constitution, was not very representative of the society. Many non-Islamists had resigned from the constitution committee; there were very few women (six or seven) and members of religious minorities. While it did garner a majority in the referendum, it alienated a significant portion of society, who felt cheated by the text as well as by the process. The Egyptian constitution, whose final draft was written entirely by Islamists and rushed to the ballot box, failed to unite all citizens behind a common purpose or produce a common vision (Khan M, 2014)⁸.

The comeback and empowerment of hard core Islamists and the less radical Muslim Brotherhood, which has deplored its past terrorist practices, in the Egyptian scene during the last decades was another political factor worth mentioning as it provoked alarm to some reformers and offered an excuse for the intervention and brutal means of the administration in the realization of liberal citizens. The radicals (e.g. Takfir wal-Hijza, al-Jihad, Jama'a al-Islamiya) used their perception of "ideology" to attack the state, "Judeo-Christians", the "West" as well as whoever actually was or thought to be pro-Israeli. They followed writings such as those of Sayid Qutb, a former Muslim

⁸ Muqtedar Khan (2014), Journal Essay: *Islam, Democracy and Islamism after the Counterrevolution in Egypt* Middle East Policy Council, Spring 2014, Volume XXI, Number 1

<http://www.mepc.org/journal/middle-east-policy-archives/islam-democracy-and-islamism-after-counterrevolution-egypt> [He does not have any surveys to back this claim but it is based on conversations with academics, intellectuals and ordinary people in Turkey and Morocco, and engagements with Islamists in the United States, Pakistan, Egypt and India via social media, since the fall of the Morsi regime.]

Brother, and supported force in order to establish *Sharia law* and their perception of Islam which they thought to be a complete and perfect system for all aspects of governance.

During the government of Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt they introduced *Islamic Sharia Law* in the constitution of 2012 where the equal and proportionate participation of women, Coptic Christians and other minorities it is not provided which a proof of their unbelief in democracy. The referred ground depicts a conflicting nature between political Islam and democracy in Egypt and many other part of Muslim world.

Chapter-4
Conclusion

Chapter-4: Conclusion

The study sets a theoretical frame work including seven indicators, two hypotheses and two research questions and a case study qualitative method which is detailed in its first chapter. In this frame of study, second chapter clearly has discussed concept of Islamic political system. Two types of governance are found in the discourse of scholars- firstly, Caliphate system and secondly, Islamic democracy that means to follow major principles in a democratic system. It may be called a hybrid system. Evidently, according to the Quranic text, *hadith* [tradition of prophet (SAW)] and *ijma* (consensus) of Sahaba, Caliphate form of government is the correct or mostly acceptable Islamic government which carries significant fundamental conflict or difference with modern democratic form of government.

Third chapter of the study shows pattern of interaction between political Islamists and democratic process in the case study of Egypt. The interference of political military in Egyptian politics is the main hindrance to democratization. Influence of Islamic political system is deeply observed in Egyptian Islamic political parties and among the mass people who has a strong desire to be ruled by Islamic *Shariah*. The participation in the democratic process is one kind of support by the Islamists but Election-democracy or election does not ensure a democratic polity and society because democracy carries a philosophy, culture and system of governance which encompasses huge institutional, ideological and cultural change based on secular policies of the state and society. From this perception, political Islamists of Egypt have huge barriers in democratization their parties and the state institutions.

Major area of conflict between Islamic system and democratic system is found in case of sovereignty. Islam attributes sovereignty of Allah (creator of the universe) in all the sphere of society. In broader sense, all the aspects of social, economic and political system will be run by the guide line of Allah and his Messenger (SAW). The good or bad, legality or illegality and mandatory duties of the ruler and the ruled is defined by the guide line of Islam. Therefore, source of law will be religious scriptures, tradition of prophet and consensus of his *Sahaba*. Form of government, Caliphate, is also shown by the Messenger of Allah (SWT) and his rightly guided Caliphs in their ruling.

It is explored that according to most of the classical and modern scholars, the main aspect of conflict is secularism, sovereignty and source of law. Democracy implies man-made law. Human mind or reason

of majority people is the basis of law in democratic system. Contrarily, Islam and political Islamists consider that human beings are Allah's creation that has many limitations for making proper law for others on the basis of limited life and knowledge. Human beings are not neutral. They are always diverted towards their self or group interests either in political benefit or economic.

Most of the Political Islamists believe the above mentioned ideas but they have different interpretations and practice which are also applicable for Muslim Brotherhood of Egypt.

It seems that Finer (1962) was right. The only way to reach military neutrality is when the military believes in the basic principle of civil supremacy. The military did not protect the revolution, but rather 'made it happen' and it is also correct that the protestors left the square before the power was in their hands. The Egyptian case it has become clear that the mass demonstrations across Egypt at the beginning of 2011 toppled Mubarak, but left the 'deep state', of which the military is part, intact. Main challenge for both democratic rule and political Islam is military in Egypt and their colonial masters who kept them in power. For a standard Islamization Islamists have limitations from international community and internal secular opposition. A Strong and popular based Islamic government is a threat for the interests of Imperialists. For democratization also USA, Saudi & Israel backed military is a barrier besides seculars' influenced judiciary also playing an opposition role for their group interest.

Muslim Brotherhood (MB) by their political organization FJP established a short time rule which actually replaced an autocratic region (Military). Moreover, during their rule military control on politics, administration and economic sectors was immense by SCAF. 25 January revolution could not bring any revolutionary changes in the political system or form of government and in the organs of the government. There should be a pro-people revolutionary government after the success of revolution rather it is observed only some faces change took place in old state apparatus controlled by the military and military elites. Occasionally, Military used MB and MB took support in power negotiation. Basically, both are power centric non democratic forces because in their ruling time no significant change is observed in the indicators of the study except a free election in 2011. But, election does not always ensure democracy which is observed in Egyptian political system also. It is clearly identified that election is a means to go to power to Islamists and the military and democracy is not their purpose which is another significant ground of the conflict between political Islam and democracy in Egypt.

Analyzing all aspects, the role of political Islam in democratization is very minor in Egypt. The opportunity or the scope of politics and ruling they got that is also limited by autocratic regimes.

Moreover, their ideological stand, political principles or manifesto and ground politics shows many contradictions either with the modern concept of democracy and the prophetic Islamic rule, the Caliphate system. Analysis of the indicators “accountability” and “representation” shows that the short term rule of MB is neither Islamic nor democratic in nature.

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




Appendices











List-1: List of Egyptian political parties with basic information

List of political formations with basic information

PARTY	FANS (Facebook)	Alliance	Registration	Leader or prominent figures	Notes	Candidates in the following governorates:	Website
Al-Nour Party	51214	Islamist Alliance	Yes June 2011	Emad Eddine Abdel Ghaffour	Salafi	Cairo / Alexandria/ Assiut/Luxor/ Fayoum/ Port Said / Damietta/ Kafr ElSheikh/	http://www.alnourparty.org/ https://www.facebook.com/AlnourParty
Al-Asala Party	7319	Islamist Alliance	Yes Aug 2011	Adel abd al-Maqsoud Afify	Salafi,	See Al-Nour Party	http://www.alasalah.org/pages/home.html http://www.facebook.com/alasala.party
Al-Fadila Party	26071	Islamist Alliance	Yes Oct 2011		Salafi, no candidates in the coming elections	See Al-Nour Party	http://www.alfadyla.com/ https://www.facebook.com/alfadvla
Building and Development Party	375	Islamist Alliance	Yes Sep 2011	Tareq al-Zumr, Safwat Abd al-Ghani	Official Party of the Al-Gama'a al-Islamiyya	See Al-Nour Party	https://www.facebook.com/pages/الحزب الديمقراطي للتنمية والتنمية/117564535010327
Reform and Renaissance Party	11800	Democratic Alliance	Yes July 2011	Hesham Mostafa Abdel Aziz	Linked to a Muslim Brotherhood dissident group	See Freedom and Justice Party	http://www.eslah-nahda.org https://www.facebook.com/eslah.nahda.Party
Justice Party	77172	Democratic Alliance	Yes June 2011	Mohamed Mosry, Mohammad Sa'd al-Katani	Muslim Brotherhood	Cairo / Alexandria/ Assiut/Luxor/ Fayoum/ Port Said / Damietta/ Kafr ElSheikh/ Red Sea	http://www.hurryh.com/ https://www.facebook.com/FJParty.Official
Young Muslim Brotherhood Party	9476	Completing Revolution	Pending	Mohammed Al Kassas, Islam Lotfy	Youth Muslim Brotherhood	See Socialist Popular Alliance Party	http://www.tavarmasry.com/ https://www.facebook.com/TMParty/
Revolution Party	154837 (?)		Yes Oct 2011	Ahmed el-Sokary	Islamist party, emerged from Revolution movements.	Cairo / Alexandria	https://www.facebook.com/EgyptRevolutionParty
	31		Yes Oct 2011		New islamist party	Cairo/ Alexandria/ Port Said / Damietta/	https://www.facebook.com/pages/حزب الحرية والديمقراطية/242177102503378?sk=info
El-Wasat	26193		Yes Feb 2011	Abul-Ela Madi	Moderate islamists' most important party His model is the Turkish AKP, close contact with M. El Baradei	Cairo / Assiut /Luxor/ Fayoum/ Port Said / Damietta/ Kafr ElSheikh/ / Red Sea	http://www.alwasatparty.com/ https://www.facebook.com/alwasatparty

	2638	Democratic Alliance	Yes Oct 2011	Mohamed Ahmed Hussein	Islamic and nationalistic positions, funded in 1978 and suspended in 2000. It has restarted its activities a few months ago	See Freedom and Justice Party	http://www.el-3amal.com/news/ https://www.facebook.com/pages/حزب الإخوان المسلمون/121287574561635?sk=info
	335	Democratic Alliance	Yes 1992	Waheed Fakhry Al Aksary	Baathist nationalist party	See Freedom and Justice Party	http://www.misrelaraby.net/ https://www.facebook.com/MisrElaraby
	1901		Yes Sep 2011	Talaat Saddat	Former NDP members Nationalistic and right-wing positions	Cairo / Alexandria/ Port Said / Damietta/ Kafr ElSheikh/	http://www.np-egypt.com/ https://www.facebook.com/pages/الجمهورية الجديدة/131706413567716
	20926		Yes Mai 2011	Talaat Saddat's family	Former NDP members, created in 2009, good dialogue with MB	Cairo / Alexandria/ Assiut/Luxor/ Fayoum/ Port Said / Damietta/ Kafr ElSheikh/	http://www.rdpegypt.org/ https://www.facebook.com/rdpegypt
	601		Yes Sep 2011	President Salah Hassabullah; Mohammad Ragab (former NDP Secretary General)	Former NDP members	Cairo / Alexandria/ Kafr ElSheikh/ / Red Sea	https://www.facebook.com/Egyptian.Citizen.Party
	532		Pending	Dr. Abdullah El-Ashaal	Former NDP members	Cairo / Assiut/Luxor/ Fayoum/ Damietta// Red Sea	https://www.facebook.com/masralhura?sk=info
	221420 (?)		Yes July 2011	Nabil De'bes, former member of NDP	Former NDP members	Cairo / Alexandria (/Luxor/ Port Said /	http://www.masrelnadya.org/ https://www.facebook.com/masrelhadytha?sk=wall
	909		Yes Sep 2011	Hossam Badrawy (former NDP Secretary General)	Former NDP members	Alexandria/ Assiut / Fayoum/ Port Said / Kafr ElSheikh/	http://www.eauparty.com/ https://www.facebook.com/eauparty?sk=info
	147		Yes 2006	Ahmed Abdulhady	Former NDP members	Cairo / Alexandria/ Assiut/Luxor/ Fayoum/ Port Said / Damietta	http://mohafizen.forumegypt.net/ https://www.facebook.com/pages/حزب المحافظين/121379187945070
	310		Pending		Former NDP members	Cairo	http://www.almostklenalgodod.org/ https://www.facebook.com/pages/الحزب المصري/14149945277843

Arab Equality and Justice Party		177		Yes Oct 2011		Former NDP members	Assiut	https://www.facebook.com/elhezbe3arab/
Karama		5289	Democratic Alliance	Yes Aug 2011	Hamdeen Sabahi, Amin Iskandar	Nasserist and socialist positions	See Freedom and Justice Party	https://www.facebook.com/pages/الحرية/1566795710528167?sk=info
Nasserist Party		222		Yes 1992	Sameh Ashour	Nasserist and socialist positions	Cairo / Assiut/ Damietta// Red Sea	https://www.facebook.com/pages/الجمهورية/133933866659857
Socialist Popular Alliance Party		40573	Completing Revolution	Yes Oct 2011	Abu al-Ezz al-Hariri, Abd al-Ghaffar Shukur, Ibrahim al-Esaw	Socialist alliance group	Cairo / Alexandria/ Assiut Fayoum/ Port Said / Damietta/ Kafr ElSheikh/ / Red Sea	http://egyleftparty.org/ https://www.facebook.com/popular.alliance.party
Egyptian Socialist Party		1713	Completing Revolution	Pending		Marxist-socialist groups	See Freedom and Justice Party	https://www.facebook.com/Socialist.Party.of.Egypt
Free Constitutional Social Party		387		Yes 2008	Manduh El-Nawi	One of the funding member in 2010 of Baradei's National Association for Change; socialist background	Cairo / Kafr ElSheikh	http://www.aldostory.org/ https://www.facebook.com/group.php?gid=39009681202
Social Democratic Party		19040	Egyptian Bloc	Yes July 2011	Mohamed Abu-al-Ghar	Liberal and leftist tendencies. A lot of intellectuals joined this party	Cairo / Alexandria/ Assiut/Luxor/ Fayoum/ Port Said / Damietta/ Kafr ElSheikh// Red Sea	http://www.egytdp.com/ https://www.facebook.com/egytdp
Revolutionary Guards Party		5559		Pending	Magdy El-Sherif	Revolutionary youths, left positions	Luxor	http://www.horasalthawra.com https://www.facebook.com/Horas.ElThawra
Equality and Development Party		32689	Completing Revolution	Yes Oct 2011	Taisser Fahmi	Social welfare and center left positions, close to revolutionary youth. The head of the party is a Coptic actress.	See Socialist Popular Alliance Party	http://www.almosawahwaeltanmia.com https://www.facebook.com/elmoswaweltanmia
Tagammu'		2769	Egyptian Bloc	Yes 1992	Refaat-al-Said	Nasserist socialism	See Socialist Democratic Party or Free Egyptians Party	https://www.facebook.com/pages/الجمهورية/145885284538?sk=info
ElAdl Party		19440		Yes Jun 2011		Centrist positions, supporting Baradei for the presidency	Cairo / Alexandria//Luxor/ Fayoum/ Damietta/ / Red Sea	http://eladi.org/ https://www.facebook.com/eladiparty?ref=ts

Civilization Party		8994	Democratic Alliance	Yes July 2011	Hatem 'Azzam, Mohammed El Sawi	New Party: liberal, centrist positions	See Freedom and Justice Party	https://www.facebook.com/alhadaradar
Egyptian Alliance Party		2469	Completing Revolution	Pending		Liberal positions, endorsement of El-Baradei as candidate for the Republic presidency	See Socialist Popular Alliance Party	http://www.eltharf.com https://www.facebook.com/groups/EgyptianAllianceParty/
Alwa'l Awareness		568		Pending	Shady Ghazali Harb,	Centrist positions	Cairo	http://www.elwa3i.com/ https://www.facebook.com/Elwaei
Human Rights and Citizenship Party		2248		Pending	Gamal El-Tohami	Centrist positions	Alexandria/Assiut	https://www.facebook.com/hrcparty?sk=info
Peace Democratic Party		73		Yes 2005			Cairo / Assiut/ Kafr ElSheikh	http://www.hezbalsalam.com/index.php https://www.facebook.com/pages/-ج-الذي-يؤيد-البرلمان/183044795066782
New Wafd		18002		Yes 1983	Al Sayed Al Badawi	The oldest Egyptian party: liberal/nationalistic positions	Cairo / Alexandria/ Assiut/Luxor/ Fayoum/ Port Said / Damietta/ Kafr ElSheikh// Red Sea	https://www.facebook.com/Alwafdparty http://www.alwafdparty.com/
Free Egyptians Party		81189	Egyptian Bloc	Yes Jul 2011	Naguib Sawiris	Liberal party, success among the Egyptian Diaspora abroad, strong opposition to MB	Cairo / Alexandria/ Assiut/Luxor/ Fayoum/ Port Said / Damietta/ Kafr ElSheikh// Red Sea	http://www.almasreyeenalahrrar.org/ https://www.facebook.com/almasreyeenalahrrar
Masr Alhuryya Party		14355	Completing Revolution	Yes Mai 2011	Amr Hamzawi	Centrist and social-liberal party advocating social justice and equality between citizens	See Socialist Popular Alliance Party	http://www.masraihureyya.org/ https://www.facebook.com/MasrAlHureyya
Ghad Party		55265	Democratic Alliance	Yes Oct 2011	Ayman Nour	Created in 2004: active opposition to Mubarak regime Centrist positions, economic liberalism	Cairo / Alexandria/ Assiut/Luxor	http://www.aymannour.net/ https://www.facebook.com/dr.Aymannour
Democratic Front Party		6077		Yes 2007	Osama El Ghazali Garb, Mohamed Nosseir	One of the few opposition's parties allowed in Mubarak's era.	Alexandria/ Assiut/ Kafr ElSheikh// Red Sea	http://www.democraticfront.org/ https://www.facebook.com/elgabha-party

List-2: Proportional representation: Parties lists/ governorates

First Phase of Parliamentary Elections: 28 November

**9 Governorates:
Cairo, Alexandria, Kafr ElSheikh, Port Said, Assiut, Damietta, Fayoum, Luxor,
Red Sea**

- **Proportional representation: Parties lists¹ / governorates**

- **Democratic Alliance** (headed by **Freedom and Justice Party**): 9 governorates (Cairo, Alexandria, Kafr ElSheikh, Port Said, Assiut, Damietta, Fayoum, Luxor, Red Sea)
- **Wafd Party**: 9 governorates (Cairo, Alexandria, Kafr ElSheikh, Port Said, Assiut, Damietta, Fayoum, Luxor, Red Sea)
- **Egyptian Bloc** (composed by Free Egyptians, Social Democratic and Tagammu: 8 governorates (Cairo, Alexandria, Kafr ElSheikh, Port Said, Assiut, Damietta, Fayoum, Luxor, Red Sea)
- **Islamist Alliance** (headed by **El Nour Party**): 8 governorates (Cairo, Alexandria, Kafr ElSheikh, Port Said, Assiut, Damietta, Fayoum, Luxor)
- **Continuing the Revolution Alliance** (composed by Socialist Popular Alliance, Eltayar Elmasri, Masr Al-Hurryya, Egyptian Socialist, Egyptian Alliance, Equality and Development: 8 governorates: Cairo, Alexandria, Kafr ElSheikh, Port Said, Assiut, Damietta, Fayoum, Red Sea)
- **Reform and Development Party**: 8 governorates (Cairo, Alexandria, Kafr ElSheikh, Port Said, Assiut, Damietta, Fayoum, Luxor)
- **Conservatives Party**: 7 governorates (Cairo, Alexandria, Assiut, Luxor, Fayoum, Port Said, Damietta)
- **Wasat Party**: 7 governorates (Cairo, Kafr ElSheikh, Port Said, Assiut, Damietta, Fayoum, Luxor, Red Sea)
- **El Adl Party**: 6 governorates (Cairo, Alexandria, Luxor, Fayoum, Damietta, Red Sea)
- **Egyptian Freedom Party**: 6 governorates (Cairo, Assiut, Luxor, Fayoum, Damietta, Red Sea)

¹http://www.europarl.europa.eu/meetdocs/2009_2014/documents/dmas/dv/dmas20120125_02_/dmas20120125_02_en.pdf

- **Egyptian National Party:** 6 governorates (Cairo, Alexandria, Port Said, Damietta, Fayoum,, Red Sea)
- **Democratic Front Party:** 5 governorates (Alexandria, Assiut, Kafr ElSheikh, Red Sea)
- **Egyptian Citizen Party:** 4 governorates (Cairo, Alexandria, Kafr ElSheikh, Red Sea)
- **Ghad Party:** 4 governorates (Cairo, Alexandria, Assiut, Luxor)
- **Nasserist Party:** 4 governorates (Cairo, Assiut, Damietta, Red Sea)
- **Egypt Revolution Party :** 4 governorates(Cairo, Alexandria, Port Said, Damietta)
- **Modern Egypt Party:** 3 governorates (Cairo, Luxor, Port Said)
- **Peace Democratic Party:** 3 governorates (Cairo, Assiut, Kafr ElSheikh)
- **Egyptian Revolution Party:** 2 governorates (Cairo, Alexandria)
- **Free Constitutional Party:** 2 governorates (Cairo, Kafr ElSheikh)
- **New Independents Party:** 1 governorate (Cairo)
- **Revolutionary Guards party:** 1 governorate (Cairo)
- **Arab Equality and Justice Party:** 1 governorate (Assiut)
- **Alwa'I Party:** 1 governorate (Cairo)
- **Human Rights and Citizenship Party:** 1 governorate (Alexandria)

Drafting a categorization of Egyptian political forces is a complex but at the same time essential exercise after the 25 of January Revolution. This map aims to fill a gap and offers a first picture of the Egyptian political landscape. In the first round of Parliamentary Election (28 November 2011) there will be 26 lists of parties/alliances of parties, according to the official electoral lists published on November 16th 2011.

Political parties have been divided following 4 main axes: religion oriented, secular, right and left cleavages. This framework seems relevant to depict the Egyptian situation since the country has been characterized in the last 30 years by a dominant party system. The former ruling party (NDP) was the privileged player in a situation where official political parties were subjected to restrictive rules. The majority of new parties received the official authorization and a few of them have not formalized it but we decided to insert them in the map. The categorization has been established by an analysis of the programs of the parties and by statements of the party leaders.

Jacopo Carbonari

