

A NON-VIOLENT APPROACH TO CHANGING THE WESTERN PERCEPTION TOWARD ISLAM IN RESOLVING CONFLICT.



A Thesis

Submitted to the Department of Peace and Conflict Studies, University of Dhaka, in Partial Fulfillment for the Requirements of the Degree of Master of Philosophy in Peace and Conflict Studies.




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Date of Submission : November 01, 2010

DECLARATION

This is to declare that this thesis on “**A non-violent approach to changing the Western perception toward Islam in resolving conflicts**” is wholly based on my self research. To my knowledge, nobody researched before with this title. I also never presented wholly or partially this research work to any university or institute for earning degree or for publication.

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CERTIFICATION


This is to certify that this dissertation on “**A non-violent approach to changing the Western perception toward Islam in resolving conflicts**” by Shams Mohammed Shoeb Pervez is a fundamental and unique research work which is prepared by himself only under my supervision. To my knowledge, under this title, no dissertation was presented in the past to any university or institute for earning degree or for publication.



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PREFACE

The main purpose of this research paper is to fulfill partially the degree requirement of Masters of Philosophy. Along with that, another intention is to take a small step to address the most challenging problem after cold war and to bring about a non-violent solution to that.

A wrong perception generates wrong foreign policy. A wrong foreign policy and action generates conflicts and war. So is the case in the present West-Islamic relation. Many of the present West-Islamic conflicts take place due to wrong perception of some Western quarters. But in this age of globalization and sophistication, a conflict or war is not likely to benefit either of conflicting party or all. As war is not likely to either of the conflicting party, hence, it is not gun but man behind the gun should get importance, sword of intellect should dominate sword of metal. Battle should be fought across the table rather than the field. In order to do so, the root cause, that is, the wrong perception of some western societies about Islam needs to be changed with logic and reason. Hence, many of the prevailing conflicts may be resolved by changing this wrong perception with logic and reason in a non-violent way.

In this study, attempts have been made to analyze and project the background and historical dynamics of western perception toward Islam both on theoretical and physical thread. At the same time, an effort has been made to present the true Islam, and way forward into future in a non-violent way to resolve prevailing conflicts.

In putting together all these ideas, I have taken much help from many books, journals, publications, articles and other scholarly materials. So I am deeply grateful to all the authors, writers and publishers of those scholarly publications.

I do not know how far I am successful in my attempt. But I have made serious efforts to make it worthwhile.

Date

Shams Mohammed Shoeb Pervez

November 01, 2010

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

The present work is predominantly the output of the inspiration molded by sympathetic spirit and intellectual guidance of my teacher, Dr. Md. Rafiqul Islam, Chairperson, Department of Peace and Conflict Studies, University of Dhaka, Dhaka, Bangladesh. I find myself unworthy to show my gratefulness to him when I think of his unparalleled attention with deep insight to lead me to the end. He did not only guide my research work but also gave me a guideline for my future life, intellectual and personal which I think the most valuable asset for me. With all my limitations, I am grateful to him to the highest extent. I found myself fortunate to be interacted by a good number of friends and well-wishers of Peace and Conflict Studies Department of the University of Dhaka who would always intend strong desire to see my work completed. I must thank them for their wishes and mental attachment with my task.

As of my personal life is concerned, the person to whom I am indebted mostly is my wife Tamina Pervez. She has always been the most powerful source of my inspiration for academic line in my family and who would always dream to see me to complete this research work successfully. She sacrificed a lot of her valuable time, took the burden of all family affairs and let me the opportunity to involve in the research work seriously. If I could not enjoy this freedom based on her cooperation, love and inspiration, I doubt, the work would have been completed or not, for which I am really grateful to her.

Above all, I am grateful to Almighty who controls human conscious, intelligence, memory and health, for blessing me, choosing me and showing me the right path and the ultimate path. This research is a small step in that direction.

Shams Mohammed Shoeb Pervez

Dhaka:

DEDICATION

I would like to dedicate this effort in memory of my late father Md Motahar Hossain, by whose blessing, Allah has brought me up to this.

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ABSTRACT

The wrong perception about Islam by some western quarters is a millennium case. It came into being both theoretically and physically. Most of the times, this misperception was backed by deliberate interest and intention. Due to this intention history witnessed faulty foreign policies and actions. As a result, many of the wars and conflicts of past and present have taken place. Looking back in the history it appears, many a times, Muslims were more interested to react arrogantly to this misperception. A very few attempts were made to clear it intellectually by projecting true Islam in front of west. The international relation was more conflicting or militaristic rather than non-violent one. Medieval tribal world could accommodate that conflicting relation. But globalized world of the 21st century neither can afford it as national boundary nor can stop the adverse effect of conflict. It affects both the conflicting parties and all. Here comes the necessity of an alternative approach for resolving conflicts. I prefer it to be a non-violent approach whose main theme should be to change the wrong perception by dialogue, diplomacy between religions and civilizations, also to reform in the field of foreign policy, media, education and politics. In this approach, use of force should be the ultimate last resort only within multilateral framework. Data from the West-Muslim survey indicate the prevalence of that wrong perception and gap between West-Muslim perception. Along with west-Muslim survey, Survey of Dhaka city also discloses that there is wrong perception of West about Islam. Hence, to ensure the change to happen, interest for this non-violent approach should come from both sides or all sides of conflicts. Only then we can expect a credible result, a credible resolution of conflicts.

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ACRONYMS

GM--General Motors

AOC-- Alliance of Civilizations

NATO- North Atlantic Treaty Organization

CIA-- Central Intelligence Agency

UDHR- Universal Declaration of Human Rights

ICCPR- International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights

ICESCR- International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights

ICESCP- The International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights

CEDAW- Convention of Elimination of Discrimination against Women

UIDHR- Universal Islamic Declaration of Human Rights

IRA--Irish Republican Army

ETA—Euskadi Ta Askatasuna

LRA-- Lord Resistance Army

ATTF- All Tripura Tiger force

ULFA--United Liberation Front of Assam

INGO- International Non-Governmental Organization

NGO--Non- Governmental Organization

OSCE— Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe

IRCICA- Istanbul: Research Center for Islamic History, Art, and Culture

FIS- Islamic Salvation Front

ABC--American Broad Casting Corporation

CNN-- Cable News Network

FM-- Field Manual

HLG-- High Level group

CIVIS-A European media prize

UPEACE--University of Peace

BBC-- British Broad Casting Corporation

NBC--National Broad Casting Company

MTV--Music Television

EU--- European Union

UNESCO--United Nation Educational Scientific and Cultural Organization

OIC--- Organization of Islamic Conference

ISESCO-- Islamic Educational Scientific and Cultural Organization

UNWTO-- World Tourism Organization

UCLG-- United Cities and Local Governments

CSIS-- Center for Strategic and International Studies

AFK-- Arbeitsgemeinschaft für Friedens- und Konfliktforschung

1.1 Introduction

With the demise of cold war, and with the introduction of clash of civilization and attack of 9/11, a new orientation of world has emerged, where a negative perception of Islamic as well as western world is increasing. Some Western quarters view Islamic world as primitive, promotes terrorism, Jihad, restricts human rights or woman rights. Few believes, Islam is historically anti-Western and supports religious politics. In the same manner, as a matter of reaction to Western negative perception, there prevails a counter negative perception in the Islamic world about West. The Islamic world in general feels, the West is determined to contain the Islamic world, the western media is biased and play against Islam. Analyzing this perception and counter perception dynamics, it appears, it is some western wrong perception about Islamic world which generates a counter negative perception about west in the Islamic world as a matter of reaction. This perception and counter perception is generating most of the prevailing conflicts of the present world. With this international relation in background, to have a safer world in the 21st century, to resolve most of the conflicts peacefully, this western wrong perception about Islamic world needs to be changed. This wrong perception is generating wrong foreign policy.

Due to this wrong foreign policy the world is witnessing many of the prevailing conflicts. Foreign policy deals with “foreign” people, foreign governments and political actors. It implies, dealing with other cultures, traditions, religions and values. Our perception about “the other” necessarily is being shaped by our perception about ourselves, of our own identity. Feelings of inferiority or superiority, of cultural distinctiveness, or of insecurity do shape the way foreign policy is conducted. India will deal with China differently than the Bangladesh, Nepal or Bhutan Governments. Nobody in Dhaka, Katmandu or Thimpu would seriously expect to be treated on equal footing with Beijing. Obviously, here is a link between culture and power; different cultures can hardly treat each other in a balanced way, as long as their (economic, military, political and ideological) powers are extremely unbalanced.

Foreign relations involve interaction between players with differing powers and status. They happen in the context of history, with its traditions and experiences of war, domination, colonialism, slavery, and the struggles against them (Hippler 2000). These experiences of unequal relationships have undercut any ability to perceive “the other” as equal. Perception is colored by a sense of one’s own superiority, by suspicion, paternalism, ethnocentrism, arrogance, mental blockades, aggressiveness or a feeling of frustration and inferiority. Equality is rare, either in the reality of power relations or in the mutual perception (Hippler 2000).

Again, country’s own interest also plays an important role in formulating a biased or wrong perception against a particular country or some countries. For example, China’s perceptions about Myanmar or Russia’s perceptions about Georgia are likely to be based on their own interests. In the same way, both Iran and Israel’s nuclear ambitions are threat to world peace, but these two countries are perceived by some western countries in an opposing way. It might happen due to the varying interests. Therefore, it is the perception of each party, how it sees it’s challenges, interests and positions. These factors influence to make allies or enemies with the other.

To address this urgent problem, in search of answers to many questions posed by this theoretical problem of wrong perception, multi-dimensional efforts need to be made to get some theoretical solutions. With this view in mind, in this paper, efforts will be taken to analyze various dynamics of western perception toward Islam and how a change in that can influence substantially in resolving most of the post-cold war conflicts.

1.2 Significance of the Study

In a globalized world of the 21st century, the study of non-violent approach to changing the Western perception towards Islam for conflict resolution is of immense importance. Because, the world has very limited scope of resolving conflicts in a violent or militaristic way. As no action is confined to specific boundary, spillover effect also affects all

actors. In the future world of sophistication, only hope of global peace is this non-violent approach. More so, there prevails wrong perception of one civilization about other. So due to this wrong perception many believes there is likely to be a clash of civilizations. If that happens then the very existence of this world may be at stake.

Only by stopping or starting the war may ensure negative peace for the time being but may not ensure positive or lasting peace. To get that lasting or structural peace, consolation of mind and addressing the grievance of conflicting groups is of prime importance. These grievances of different conflicting groups can only be addressed by a non-violent approach. Hence, for the greater interest of lasting peace, study of non-violence is very essential.

Due to the wrong perception of the West, the true picture of Islam is going to be tarnished. Islam, which is a religion of peace and non-violence, is now depicted by many in the West as religion of terrorism and violence. Hence to recover the true picture of Islam and it's honor the western wrong perception needs to be changed. And to change this wrong perception, study of non-violent approach is very significant..Because non-violent approach is an important method of conflict resolution through which the negative perception of the Western world toward Islam can be changed that in fact will help resolve conflict between the West and the Muslims.In fact, for a variety of reasons, the study of non-violence approach to changing the wrong perception in resolving conflicts is of great significance.

1.3 Rationale for the Study

Since the ancient time and till to-date, the international relation has been more of a conflicting or militaristic phenomenon rather than non-violent one. Means of conflict resolution was a militaristic one in most of the cases. Medieval tribal world could accommodate that conflicting relation. But the globalised world of the 21st century can't afford it as national boundary can't stop the adverse effect of a conflict. It affects both the conflicting parties and all.

Here comes the rationality for an alternative approach to resolving conflicts. In addition, it is well known that violence brings violence. In some cases, it might apparently help bringing peace for the time being, but again violence comes back due to mental unease situation. Hence, addressing the mental agony of the conflicting parties is of utmost importance. Because consoling and treating the mind can only ensure lasting and positive peace. As a non-violent approach is all about mental treatment and mental healing, it is an important strategy for changing the wrong perception of the conflict parties to resolve conflict. It is important to mention that Islam is a religion of peace and non-violence.

1.4 Scope and Limitation of Research

This study is based on review of literature and various local and worldwide West – Muslim interaction survey. Indeed because of present global inter-cultural, inter-religious conflicting relation, research on this subject has got wider scope. The very juncture of history also permits large scope of study on this subject. After the cold war, global relation is defined by many as ‘Clash of Civilizations’, where boundaries of civilizations are thought to be the faultiness of conflicts. This new global relation demands and provides a wider scope for research on this subject. However, one of the main limitations of research was difficulty in collecting data. the type of research does not have adequate scope of collecting data locally. As it is very difficult to collect primary data from international sources, the secondary worldwide West-Muslim survey data have been analyzed in this study. Different Quranic verses have been used to analyze the Western perception about Islam. Moreover, despite time constraint for this study, a considerable number(180) individuals from Dhaka city have been interviewed in this study.

1.5 Organization of Study

To arrive to well thought deduction after systematic review, survey, analysis and findings this paper is organized in a logical order. To accommodate all these segments this

paper is constructed with seven chapters. To begin with, chapter 1 introduces the subject with significance, scope, limitation and rationale of the study. Chapter 2 deals with discussion of the literature regarding Western perception towards Islam in relation to peace and conflicts. For better understanding this chapter is sub-divided into theoretical western perception and physical western perception. Chapter 3 of this paper discusses regarding Islam and non-violence, Islam with true perception and picture. For easy assimilation, it is sub-divided into several parts like Islam in response to misperception, non-violence in Islam, non-violence in other religions etc. Chapter 4 describes various non-violent approaches to change the western perception and thereby resolving many of the prevailing conflicts. This chapter is again sub-divided into two parts. First part deals with non-violent approaches for changing the perception and the second part deals with the options of conflict resolutions by changing the perception. Non-violent part is also further divided into dialogue, media regulation and others, conflict resolution part is also further divided into true religion, faith-based diplomacy, reconciliation, cultural pluralism etc. Chapter 5 introduces Hypotheses and Research Methodology. In this chapter, along with stating the hypotheses, detail primary and secondary data collection methods are being presented chronologically. Chapter 6 deals with analysis and discussion of secondary and primary survey data. This chapter is also sub-divided into three parts that include hypothesis 1, hypothesis 2 and hypothesis 3. Finally, Chapter 7 summarizes all findings, all probable recommendations are being accommodated and the ultimate implication of this research is being concluded.

Chapter 2 The Wrong Western Perception Toward Islam Regarding Peace and Conflicts

2.1 The Wrong Western Perception Toward Islam

Since the inception of Islam, multilateral Western perceptions were developing in the Western front. Some of which are wrong, some others are misrepresented. Many of these perceptions came along with Western literature, Western media, Christian theology and others.

One Western perception is Mohammed (SM) was not only a prophet and a teacher, like the founders of other religions; he was also the head of a polity and of a community, a ruler and a soldier. Hence his struggle involved a state and its armed forces. If the fighters in the war for Islam, the holy war in the path of God, are fighting for God, it follows that their opponents are fighting against God (Kelsay 1993, p 43). And since God is in principle the sovereign, the supreme head of the Islamic state. After God there comes the Prophet as God's messengers, next comes the caliphs as deputy of Prophet. Hence, the army of an Islamic state is God's army and the enemy is God's enemy (Kelsay 1993, p 43). The duty of God's soldiers is to dispatch God's enemies as quickly as possible to the place where God will chastise them. Western historian Bernard Lewis (1990) perceives that the struggle of Islam is against two enemies, secularism and modernism. The war against secularism is conscious and explicit, and there is by now a whole literature denouncing secularism as an evil neo-pagan force in the modern world and attributing it variously to the Jews, the West, and the United States. According to him, the war against modernity is for the most part neither conscious nor explicit, and is directed against the whole process of change that has taken place in the Islamic world in the past century or more and has transformed the political, economic, social, and even cultural structures of Muslim countries (Lewis 1990). He concluded that Islamic fundamentalism has given an aim and a form to the otherwise aimless and formless resentment and anger of the Muslim masses. According to Lewis this resentment of Muslim

mass is against the forces that have devalued their traditional values and loyalties, robbed them of their beliefs, their aspirations, their dignity, and to an increasing extent even their livelihood (Lewis 1990).

In the modern period, by which we mean the twentieth and the present century, the relation between the Islamic world and the West continues to be screened through inherited images and stereotypes. The depiction of Islamic societies as sensual, despotic, backward, underdeveloped, tribal, promiscuous, aberrant, irrational, and mysterious collectivities have found its way into some American popular culture (Kalin 2008). Such movies as *Navy SEALs* (1990), *Killing Streets* (1991), *The Human Shield* (1992), *The Son of the Pink Panther* (1993), *True Lies* (1994), and *Executive Decision* (1996) provide ample evidences for the persistence of monolithic and violent images of Arabs and Muslims (Kalin 2008). The uncontrolled use of stereotypes in the entertainment industry has a powerful impact on how ordinary movie-goers come to perceive hundreds of millions of people of Middle Eastern and

Asian descent. Thinking through stereotypes and fixed identities creates the delusion of “seen one of ’em, seen ’em all,” and uninformed or misinformed readers hastily associate these wild images with what they read in the print media about the Islamic world, the Middle East, and Muslims in general (Hudson & Wolfe 1980). To use Sam Keen’s analogy, the vilification of Arabs, which in the eyes of many Americans represents quintessential Islam because a great majority of them cannot tell the difference between an Arab and non-Arab Muslim, becomes a free ride for portraying the other as villains and extremists: “You can hit an Arab free; they are free enemies, free villains—where you couldn’t do it to a Jew or you can’t do it to a black anymore” (Keen 1986, p 29).

These violent images have too often become props for the construction of Islamophobic political discourses. The narrative of political, militant, and fundamentalist Islam, produced and sustained by an enormous network of writers, policy makers, journalists, and speakers, is no less damaging and insidious than their counterparts in the entertainment

world (Shaheen 1984). This narrative relegates the word “Islam” to political and military confrontation and has the debilitating effect of reducing the Muslim world to a subcategory of the Middle East conflict. Ironically, or perhaps we should say tragically, many people in Europe and America turn to Islam as a way of understanding the causes of the Middle East conflict. This approach, perpetuated in some Western media on a daily basis, reinforces the image of Islam as a distant and foreign phenomenon, as a violent and militant faith, and as a monolithic world prone to extremism of all kinds (Shaheen 1984). According to a survey conducted by the National Conferences in 1994, forty-two percent of the 3000 Americans interviewed believe that “Muslims belong to a religion that condones or supports terrorism.” Forty-seven percent accept the view that Muslims are “anti-Western and anti-American” (Shaheen 1984, p12). Until recently, this was the dominant view even among high school students in the US who have either never been exposed to Islam or have only been exposed to a distortion of it (Suleiman 1983, p21). As became clear after September 11, political realities of the Islamic world are now seen through the lens of cultural stereotypes and amorphous collectivities, and this has become part of the public knowledge about Islam and Muslims. In presenting Bernard Lewis’ book *What Went Wrong*, for instance, an anonymous reporter broached the subject by saying that “the world wants to understand the culture that produced those who one fine day chose to incinerate themselves along with some 3,000 innocent Americans.” In fact, Lewis’ epigraphic statement from his book sums up this sentiment in condescending language: “If the peoples of the Middle East continue on their present path, the suicide bomber may become a met-aphor for the whole region, and there will be no escape from a downward spiral of hate and spite, rage and self-pity, poverty and oppression” (Jerusalem Post 2002).

The confrontation between Islam and the West, already revitalized by Huntington’s (Huntington 1993) “clash of civilizations” hypothesis, was thrown into full weight after the

tragic and deplorable attacks on New York and Washington. Two main attitudes towards Islam have crystallized in the aftermath of September 11 (Kalin 2008). The first is the resurfacing of the medieval descriptions of Islam as the religion of the sword, the Prophet as a violent person, Muslim societies as monolithic, violent, and power-driven collectivities, etc. The second attitude is to identify Islam as a code of belief and action that is obstinately irrational, anti-modern, aberrant, rigid, religious, and traditional. As expected, all of these stereotypes and attitudes have been employed to account for the root causes of the current confrontation between the Islamic and Western worlds. The identification of Islam with violence and militancy on the one hand, and with intolerance and tyranny on the other, is now a powerful image by which Islamic societies are understood and judged by some in the Western hemisphere. A typical example is Paul Johnson's essay published in the *National Review* as a response to the September 11 attacks. Johnson, who cannot even claim to be a lay reader of Islam but sees himself entitled to speak as an authority on Islamic history, argues that "Islam is an imperialist religion.... Islam remains a religion of the Dark Ages.... mainstream Islam is essentially akin to the most extreme form of Biblical fundamentalism.... the history of Islam has been a history of conquest and reconquest" (Johnson 2001, p20). Johnson's (p172) militant language is indicative of the extent to which the narrative of political Islam and terrorism contributes to the antagonistic representations of Islam as the "other" of the West. In a similar spirit, Francis Fukuyama claimed that "Islam, by contrast, is the only cultural system that seems regularly to produce people like Osama bin Laden or the Taliban who reject modernity. This raises the question of how representative such people are of the larger Muslim community, and whether this rejection is somehow inherent in Islam" (Fukuyama 2001).

In the decades leading up to September 11, many academics, policy-makers, and the so-called terrorism experts have repeatedly portrayed Islam as a religion that condones and produces violence on a consistent basis. The images of suicide bombers, hijackings,

assassinations, street riots and uprisings, which have a profound impact on the European and American perceptions of the Islamic world, inform the coded language of “militant Islam.” and their *raison d’être* is attributed in an astonishingly simplistic way to the religion of Islam or Muslim culture rather than to the particular political circumstances that have given rise to them (Kalin 2008). In some cases, religious elements have been openly brought into the debate to explain the anti-Western and anti-American sentiments in the Islamic world. In an interview given to *Time* magazine after his 1980 election, President Reagan claimed that “Muslims were reverting to their belief that unless they killed a Christian or a Jew they would not go to heaven” (Gerges 1999, p 9-70). Twenty-some years later, the situation has not changed very much as we read in Pat Robertson’s denouncement of Islam as “a violent religion bent on world domination” and Patrick J. Buchanan’s defense of “America against Islam.” In one of his messianic talks, Robertson took issue with President Bush’s assertion that Islam is a peaceful religion. Instead, Robertson argued that Islam is “not a peaceful religion that wants to coexist. They want to coexist until they can control, dominate, and then, if need be, destroy” (Robertson 2002, p 21). Echoing Reagan’s remarks, he added that “the Koran makes it very clear that if you see an infidel, you are to kill him,” the “infidel” in the quotation being Jews and Christians (Kalin 2008). The same view was expressed in a more militant fashion by Victor Taros (Lumbard 2009) in an essay called “Islam Unveiled”. “Unveiling” now becoming the buzzword for all those who have come to realize the “true nature of Islam.” Presenting himself as “Arabic/English translator” on the internet pages of the Texas Christian University where the piece is posted, Tadros reveals his wisdom of unveiling by saying that:

“Most of the Western nations are unaware of the fact that the spirit of Islam is one of enmity, hostility, and Holy War (*jihad*) against both Jews and Christians. There is no other religion but Islam, that commands, in a crystal clear and emphatic way, its true-blue followers to kill both Jews and Christians and destroy their properties” (Lumbard 2009, p167).

One can easily discard such views as grossly exaggerated and fanatical, having no value and relevance for the mainstream views concerning Islam. It is, however, a strong indication of the widespread misconceptions of Islam, especially among conservative Christians in the US (Morey 1991) and does not appear to be confined to a few aberrant voices. After September 11, for instance, evangelist Rev. Franklin Graham, the son of Billy Graham, called Islam “a very evil and wicked religion” and Rev. Jerry Vines, the past president of the Southern Baptist Convention, called the Prophet of Islam “a demon obsessed pedophile” (Kristof 2002,p 9).

The conflict between Islam and Christianity on predominantly religious grounds is conceived to be a struggle of the “Cross over the Crescent”, to use the title of Samuel Zwemer’s famous book (Esposito 2001). In a speech given on Dec 7, 2001, Patrick Buchanan, for instance, spoke on the “survival of Islam” as if speaking of an epidemic that needs to be eradicated. Upgrading Huntington’s “clash of civilizations” to a “war of civilizations,” (Buchanan 2001). Buchanan asked if ... a war of civilizations is coming? Clearly, not a few in the Islamic world and the West so believe, and ardently desire, for no matter how many deaths or defeats we inflict, we cannot kill Islam as we did Nazism, Japanese militarism and Soviet Bolshevism. If belief is decisive, Islam is militant, Christianity milquetoast. In population, Islam is exploding, the West dying. Islamic warriors are willing to suffer defeat and death, the West recoils at casualties. They are full of grievance, we are full of guilt. Where Islam prevails, it asserts a right to impose its dogma, while the West preaches equality. Islam is assertive, the West apologetic—about its crusaders, conquerors and empires. Buchanan reiterated not to count Islam out. It is the fastest growing faith in Europe and has surpassed Catholicism worldwide as Christianity expires in the West and the churches empty out, the mosques are going up. While the title of another essay by Buchanan (Kalin 2008).

“Why Does Islam hate America” (Buchanan 2002). is a good summary of this kind of discourse. the finest and most informed example of analyzing the contemporary Islamic world through essentialist categories and stereotypes on the one hand, and the narrative of confrontation on the other, has been given by Bernard Lewis in his famous article “The Roots of Muslim Rage”(Kalin 2008), published almost ten years before September 11. Purporting to be an account of the contemporary Islamic world, Lewis’(1990) article sums up the main trait of Muslims with such words as rage, resentment, bitterness, revulsion, hatred, revenge, “holy war against the infidel enemy,” struggles, attacks, hostility, and rejection. Lewis (Lewis 1990) considers the “problem of the Islamic world:” i.e., extremism and fundamentalism, to be deeply rooted in its history and cultural preferences. Thus he locates the roots of what he labels as the “Muslim rage” in the cultural and civilizational realities of the Islamic world:

“Clearly, something deeper is involved than these specific grievances, numerous and important as they may be—something deeper that turns every disagreement into a problem and makes every problem insoluble. It should by now be clear that we are facing a mood and a movement far transcending the level of issues and policies and the governments that pursue them. This is no less than a clash of civilizations—the perhaps irrational but surely historic reaction of an ancient rival against our Judeo-Christian heritage, our secular present, and the worldwide expansion of both”(Lewis 1990,p 46-60).

Seen in this light, the history of Islam and the West becomes, in Lewis(1990) words, “a long series of attacks and counterattacks, *jihds* and crusades, conquests and reconquests.” It is remarkable that such a prominent historian as Lewis should reduce at one stroke the 1400 years history of Islamic and Western worlds to “attacks and conquests” and contribute to the *monolithic* perception of Islam as a menacing power bent on destroying Western civilization (Kalin 2008). Lewis’s attempt to summarize the present reality of the Islamic world in terms of rage and resentment against the West leads to gross generalizations and

misrepresentations that one would normally expect only from an uninformed or deliberately misleading historian. Throughout this essay and his other works, Lewis looks at history through patterns and categories that culminate in his depiction of Islam and Muslims as immersed in rage, hatred, and a sense of revenge. This is not only to misunderstand the present conditions of the Muslim world but also to misinform and mislead the public at large into thinking that Muslims in the Muslim world, Europe, and America are part of a larger force directed against the foundations of Western civilization. Furthermore, Lewis, like many of his followers, uses the blanket term “Islamic fundamentalism” to discredit and categorize all of the socio-political organizations in the Islamic world as militarist and terrorist structures. This becomes poignantly clear and alarming when Lewis presents his modern version of *jihad* as the “holy war against the infidel West”(Kalin 2008).

In addition to the charges of militancy and terrorism, the current perceptions of Islam in Europe and the US are also paralyzed by the lack of democracy and secularism in Muslim countries. As we have seen in the above quotes from Lewis and Huntington, it is argued that the absence of a civic culture to promote democracy, freedom, and women’s rights is attributed to traditional Islamic culture, which is portrayed as oppressive, backward, irrational, patriarchal, etc. Although Lewis envisions no essential clash between the principles of Islam and the ideals and procedures of democracy, he nevertheless blames “Islamic fundamentalists” for “exploiting the opportunities that a self-proclaimed democratic system by its own logic is bound to offer them”(Lewis 1993,p93).

Gilles Kepel takes a more radical approach and argues for the essential incompatibility of Islam and democratic principles when he says that “the rejection of even a chimerical notion of democracy is actually inherent in Islamic religious doctrine” (Kepel 1994. p194).

It is remarkable that Western observers such as Kepel should present a narrow and minimalist reading of the debate over democracy in the Islamic world that has been going on for the last three or four decades, and relegate it to the views of few extremist religious figures (Kalin 2008). As Pippa Norris and Ronald Inglehart (Norris & Ronald 2002) have demonstrated, most Muslims oppose the secular character of Western democracy, not the ideals of democracy itself. Debate over the absence of secularism in Muslim countries presents a case similar to the question of democracy. Islamic claims to political rule and the unexpected successes of the so-called Islamists in such countries as Turkey, Malaysia, Iran, and Algeria are usually explained as an anomaly that arises out of the lack of a secular tradition in the Islamic world. The Western-style separation between church and state does not have any historical precedence in Islam, and the attempts to reconcile religion and politics are considered to be cases of religious extremism and fanaticism (Lumbard 2009). By the same token, the rise of Islamic fundamentalism in the Muslim world is attributed to the absence of secularism on the one hand, and the failure of secularist governments on the other. Turkey is mentioned as an exception to the rule due to its program of secularism and Westernization launched in 1923 under the leadership of Kemal Ataturk, the founder of the modern Turkish Republic.

In recent years, this has led to a lively debate over the so-called "Turkish model" with its secularist, modern, and pro-Western predilections that can be exported to other Muslim countries (Lumbard 2009). This view not only grossly simplifies the problem of secularism in the Islamic world but also presents a distorted picture in which any or all attempts to overcome the misdeeds of secularism are interpreted as turning the clocks back and obliterating the principles of democracy and human rights. As a result, the secularist regimes in the Islamic world are supported at all costs, otherwise the threat of religious fundamentalism and fanaticism would become a reality. This assumption, however, obscures

the fact that the secular authority of the state in countries like Turkey is used as a shield against religion rather than guaranteeing the rights of various religious groups against each other and against the overwhelming power of the state (Lumbard 2009). As Graham Fuller (2002, p 59) points out, Turkey is an example that merits consideration not because “Turkey is ‘secular’.” in fact, Turkish ‘secularism’ is actually based on total state control and even repression of religion. Turkey is becoming a model precisely because Turkish democracy is beating back rigid state ideology and slowly and reluctantly permitting the emergence of Islamist movements and parties that reflect tradition, a large segment of public opinion, and the country’s developing democratic spirit (Berger 1999).

In spite of the widespread perceptions of Islam as the menacing “other” of the West, whether conceived as Judeo-Christian, secular, or both, there is an alternative view that considers Islam and the Islamic world as a sister civilization to the West and as part of the Abrahamic tradition which includes Judaism, Christianity, and Islam. Voiced by many European and American scholars and intellectuals, this view, whose full analysis we must leave for another study, takes the approach of accommodation, co-existence, and dialogue as its starting point (Kalin 2008). They vehemently denies the demonization of Islam through the narrative of Islamic fundamentalism, radicalism, and terrorism. The proponents of this view, such as Edward Said(2001), John Esposito(2001), John Val(Esposito & John 1996), Bruce Lawrence(1998), James Piscatorial(1986), Graham Fuller(2002), and Richard Bulliet(2004), consider the Islamic world not as a monolithic unit but as a diverse, dynamic, and multi-faceted reality. Rather than looking through the mirror of fixed identities and stereotypes, they identify the problems of Muslim countries vis--vis themselves and the West within the context of their social and political circumstances (Kalin 2008).

While admitting the existence of some radical voices in the Islamic world as a small minority, they see the Islamic vision of life as essentially tolerant, democratic, and not necessarily anti-Western and anti-American. Although they acknowledge that there are cultural differences between the Islamic world and the West, they do not conceive an essential clash between the two and see Islam as an intellectual and spiritual challenge rather than a military threat to the West. They also stress the fact that most of the anti-American sentiment in the Islamic world emanates from American foreign policy, which adopts a double standard on the question of democracy in Muslim countries and especially in the Middle East, and provides unconditional and one-sided support to Israel. They also recognize the experience of Muslim minorities in Europe and the US as a valuable chapter in the history of the two worlds with tremendous potentials for dialogue and co-existence between Islam and the West (Kalin 2008). It would not be a stretch to say that the sharp contrast between the confrontationalist and accommodationist perspectives represents a new chapter in the history of Islam and the West, both at the level of civilizational co-existence and policy decisions.

2.2 Background of the Wrong Perception

The Western perception was not built in a day, rather it is a story of millennium stretched up to the beginning of Islam. As a new dispensation from Heaven which claimed to have completed the cycle of Abrahamic revelations, Islam was seen as a major challenge to Christianity from the outset. References to Jewish and Christian Prophets, stories and other themes in the Quran and the Prophetic traditions (*Hadith*), sometimes concurring with and sometimes diverging from the Biblical accounts, contributed to both a sense of consternation and insecurity and urgency in responding to the Islamic claims of authenticity (Kalin 2008). The earliest polemics between Muslim scholars and Christian theologians attest to the zeal of the two communities to defend their faiths against one another. Baghdad and Syria from the eighth through tenth centuries were the two main centers of intellectual exchange and

theological polemics between Muslims and Christians. Even though theological rivalry is a constant of this period, many ideas were exchanged on philosophy, logic, and theology which went beyond theological bickering. In fact, Eastern Christian theologians posed a serious challenge to their Muslim counterparts because they were a step ahead in cultivating a full-fledged theological vocabulary by using the lore of ancient Greek and Hellenistic culture. The reception of Islam as a religious challenge for Christianity was not because Islam was different and claimed to be a new religion. On the contrary, the message of Islam was too similar to both Judaism and Christianity in its essential outlook, in spite of the Quranic criticisms of certain Judaic and Christian beliefs (Lumbard 2009).

The other important factor was the rapid spread of Islam into areas that had been previously under Christian rule. Within a century after the conquest of Mecca, Islam had already spread outside the Arabian peninsula, bringing with it the conversion of large numbers of people in areas extending from Egypt and Jerusalem to Syria, the Caspian Sea and North Africa (Shaban, 1991). While Jews and Christians were granted religious freedom as the People of the Book (*ahl al-kitb*) under Islamic law and did not face conversion by force, the unexpected pace with which Islam spread sent alarms to those living in Western Christendom. A few centuries later, this very fact would be used as a base for launching the Crusades against Muslims. Furthermore, the westward march of Muslim armies under the banner of the Umayyads, the Abbasids, and then the Ottomans added to the sense of urgency until the decline of the Ottoman Empire as a major political force in the Balkans and the Middle East. The spread of Islam, which was a riddle for many European Christians, was attributed to two main reasons: the spread of the religion by the sword and the Prophet's appealing to animal desires through polygamy and concubines. As we shall see below in the words of the seventeenth century traveler George Sandys, the simplicity of the Islamic faith

was occasionally added to this list, referring, in a quasi-racist way, to the simple-mindedness of Muslim converts (Shaban 1991).

The combination of Islam as a religion with its own theological premises and the expansion of Muslim borders in such a short period of time played a key role in shaping the anti-Islamic sentiment of the middle Ages. No single figure can illustrate this situation better than St. John (Sahas 1972,p 68) of Damascus known in Arabic as Yuhanna al-Dimashq and in Latin as Jo-hannes Damascenus. St. John was a crucial figure not only for the formation of Orthodox theology and the fight against the iconoclast movement of the eighth century, but also for the history of Christian polemics against the "Saracens." In all likelihood, this pejorative name, used for Muslims in most of the anti-Islamic polemics, goes back to St. John himself (Grabar 1959,p 44). St. John's polemics, together with those of Bede and Theodore (Khoury 1969), against Islam as an essentially Christian heresy, St. John was also the first Christian polemicist to call the Prophet of Islam an imposter and a false prophet: "Muhammad, the founder of Islam, is a false prophet who, by chance, came across the Old and New Testament and who, also, pretended that he encountered an Arian monk and thus he devised his own heresy" (Sahas 1972,p 68).

What is important about St. John's anti-Islamic polemics is that he had a direct knowledge of the language and ideas of Muslims which was radically absent among his followers in the West. R. W. Southern has rightly called this the "historical problem of Christianity" vis--vis Islam in the Middle Ages the lack of first-hand knowledge of Islamic beliefs and practices as a precaution or deliberate choice to dissuade and prevent Christians from contaminating themselves with a heretical offshoot of Christianity (Southern 1962,p8). The absence of direct contact and reliable sources of knowledge led to a long scholarship against Islam and the Prophet Muhammad in Western Christianity, resulting in the forging of Islam as an entire foe in the European consciousness for a good part of the middle Ages. The problem was further compounded by the Byzantine opposition to Islam and the decidedly inimical literature produced by Byzantine theologians between the eighth and tenth centuries on mostly theological grounds. The anti-Islamic Byzantine literature displays considerable first-hand knowledge of Islamic faith and practices (Kedar 1984), including specific criticisms

of some verses of the Qurn, the perception of Islam as a theological rival and heresy was its leitmotif and provided a solid historical and theological basis for later critiques of Islam (Khoury 1969, p 83-105).

If deliberate ignorance was the cherished strategy of the period, the out-and-out rejection of Islam as a theological challenge was no less prevalent. The Qurnic assertion of Divine unity without the Trinity, the countenance of Jesus Christ as God's Prophet divested of divinity, and the presence of a religious community without clergy and a church-like authority were some of the challenges that did not go unnoticed in Western Christendom (Kalin2008). Unlike Eastern Christianity, which had a presence in the midst of the Muslim world and better access to the Islamic faith, the image of Islam in the West was relegated to an unqualified heresy and regarded as no different than paganism or the Manichaeism from which St. Augustine had his historical conversion to Christianity (Kalin2008). In contrast to Spain where the three Abrahamic faiths had a remarkable period of intellectual and cultural exchange, the vacuum created by the spatial and intellectual confinement of Western Christianity was filled in by folk tales about Islam and Muslims, paving the way for the new store of images, ideas, stories, myths, and tropes brought by the Crusaders. Paradoxically, the Crusades did not bring any new or more reliable knowledge about Islam, but instead reinforced its image as paganism.

2.3 Theoretical Wrong Perception

2.3.1 The Orientalism Theory

'Orientalism' terminology was first used in a negative sense by the 20th century scholar Edward Said in his controversial book *Orientalism* (2009). He used the term to describe a negative western tradition of prejudiced interpretations of the East, specially of Islamic world and Middle East. He assumed that this negative idea might be shaped by the attitudes of European imperialism in the 18th and 19th centuries. Said was critical of this

scholarly tradition and also of certain modern scholars, particularly Bernard Lewis (1990). A central idea of Edward Said (1979) is that some Western knowledge about the East and Islamic world is not generated from facts or reality, but from preconceived idea which envision all "Eastern and Islamic" societies as fundamentally similar to one another, and fundamentally dissimilar to "Western" societies. Such knowledge of Islamic world is constructed with literary texts and historical records that often are of limited understanding of the facts of life in the Middle East (Said 1978).

The word "Orient" fell into disrepute after the word "Orientalism" was coined with the publication of Said's book. Said emphasized the relationship between power and knowledge in scholarly and popular thinking, in particular regarding European views of the Islamic Arab world. Said argued that Orient and Occident worked as oppositional terms, so that the "Orient" was constructed as a negative inversion of Western culture (Orientalism 2009).

Although Edward Said limited his discussion to academic study of Middle Eastern, African and Asian history and culture, he asserted that "Orientalism is, and does not merely represent, a significant dimension of modern political and intellectual culture." Said's discussion of academic Orientalism is almost entirely limited to late 19th and early 20th century scholarship. Most academic Area Studies departments had already abandoned an imperialist or colonialist paradigm of scholarship. He names the work of Bernard Lewis as an example of the continued existence of this paradigm, but acknowledges that it was already somewhat of an exception by the time of his writing (1977). The idea of an "Orient" is a crucial aspect of attempts to define "the West."

Taking a comparative and historical literary review of European, mainly British and French, scholars and writers looking at, thinking about, talking about, and writing about the peoples of the Middle East, Said sought to display the relations of power between the colonizer and the colonized in those texts. It was one of the foundational texts of postcolonial

studies. Said later developed and modified his ideas in his book *Culture and Imperialism* (Said 1993).

Many scholars now use Said's work to attempt to overturn long-held, often taken-for-granted Western ideological biases regarding non-Westerners in scholarly thought. Some post-colonial scholars would even say that the West's idea of itself was constructed largely by saying what others were not. Said puts forward several definitions of 'Orientalism' in the introduction to *Orientalism* (Said 1978). Some of these have been more widely quoted and influential than others:

- "A way of coming to terms with the Orient that is based on the Orient's special place in European Western experience."
- "a style of thought based upon an ontological and epistemological distinction made between 'the Orient' and (most of the time) 'the Occident'."
- "A Western style for dominating, restructuring, and having authority over the Orient."
- "...particularly valuable as a sign of European-Atlantic power over the Orient than it is as a veridic discourse about the Orient."
- "A distribution of geopolitical awareness into aesthetic, scholarly, economic, sociological, historical, and philological texts."

Said asserts that much western study of Islamic civilization was political intellectualism bent on self-affirmation rather than objective study, a form of racism, and a tool of imperialist domination. *Orientalism* had an impact on the fields of literary theory, cultural studies and human geography, and to a lesser extent on those of history and oriental studies. Taking his cue from the work of Jacques Derrida and Michel Foucault, and from earlier critics of western Orientalism such as A. L. Tibawi, Anouar Abdel-Malek, Maxime Rodinson, and Richard William Southern, Said argued that Western writings on the Orient, and the perceptions of the East purveyed in them, are suspect, and cannot be taken at face

value. According to Said, the history of European colonial rule and political domination over the East distorts the writings of even the most knowledgeable, well-meaning and sympathetic Western 'Orientalists'(Said 1978).

Said argued that the much of the West had dominated the East and Middle East for more than 2,000 years, since the composition of *The Persians* by Aeschylus. Europe had dominated Asia politically so completely for so long that even the most outwardly objective Western texts on the East were permeated with a bias that even most Western scholars could not recognize. His contention was not only that the West has conquered the East and Middle East politically but also that Western scholars have appropriated the exploration and interpretation of the Orient's languages, history and culture for themselves(Said 1978).

Said concludes that some Western writings about the Orient depict it as an irrational, weak, feminized "Other", contrasted with the rational, strong, masculine West, a contrast he suggests derives from the need to create "difference" between West and East, specially Islamic world (Said 1978).

2.3.2 The Clash of Civilization Theory

The Clash of Civilizations is a theory, proposed by political scientist Samuel P. Huntington(1993), that people's cultural and religious identities will be the primary source of conflict in the post-Cold War world(Clash 2009). While presenting religious identities in his theory and thesis, he emphasized mostly on fault lines between Western civilization based on Christian culture and identities and Islamic civilization based on Islamic culture and identities. The term 'Clash of Civilization' itself was first used by Bernard Lewis in an article in the September 1990 issue of *The Atlantic Monthly* titled *The Roots of Muslim Rage* (Lewis1990). And Huntington was influenced by anti Islamic rhetoric of Lewis which inspired him to formulate this 'Clash of Civilization' theory. So naturally this theory is based on wrong and anti Islamic perception of West.

The theory was originally formulated in a 1992 lecture at the American Enterprise Institute, which was then developed in a 1993 *Foreign Affairs* article titled "The Clash of Civilizations?" in response to Francis Fukuyama's 1992 book, *The End of History and the Last Man*. Huntington later expanded his thesis in a 1996 book *The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order* (Huntington 1996).

Huntington began his thinking by surveying the diverse theories about the nature of global politics in the post-Cold War period. Some theorists and writers argued that human rights, liberal democracy and capitalist free market economy had become the only remaining ideological alternative for nations in the post-Cold War world. Specifically, Francis Fukuyama argued that the world had reached the 'end of history' in a Hegelian sense (Fukuyama 1992). Huntington believed that while the age of ideology had ended, the world had only reverted to a normal state of affairs characterized by cultural conflict. In his thesis, he argued that the primary axis of conflict in the future will be along cultural and religious lines (See Fig 2.1). As an extension, he posits that the concept of different civilizations, as the highest rank of cultural identity, will become increasingly useful in analyzing the potential for conflict (Clash 2009).

The Clash of Civilizations as per Huntington's thesis (1996)




Figure 2.1

In the 1993 *Foreign Affairs* article, Huntington writes:

It is my hypothesis that the fundamental source of conflict in this new world will not be primarily ideological or primarily economic. The great divisions among humankind and the dominating source of conflict will be cultural. Nation states will remain the most powerful actors in world affairs, but the principal conflicts of global politics will occur between nations and groups of different civilizations. The clash of civilizations will dominate global politics. The fault lines between civilizations will be the battle lines of the future (Huntington 1996, p 22).

2.3.3 The Clash of Identity Theory

The globalization regarded as one of the most significant threats to religious identity. Such arguments maintain that this results in the fragmentation of religious identity at local, regional and global levels, and in the emergence of hybrid and undetermined forms of cultural identity. It may therefore be argued that the fundamental relationship of Islamic values to a sense of belonging to a material community and homeland is becoming diluted through globalization (INAES 2005).

Samuel Huntington, the author of seminal work on international relations in which he predicts that the reaction to the challenges of globalization will be a “clash of civilizations.” His book, by this same name, begins with a quote from Michael Dibdin’s novel, *Dead Lagoon*: “There can be no true friends without true enemies. Unless we hate what we are not, we cannot love what we are” (Huntington 1996). This becomes an assumption about human nature that believes “enemies are essential” in the formation of identity. Therefore, if new identities are emerging in an age of globalization, it is inevitable that enemies will be created in the process. As for religion’s role in this, overall Huntington sees the religious influence as one of complicity and convenience rather than arising out of the core of religious doctrines. “Religion is a central defining characteristic of civilizations,” and because of this, it is one of

principal cultural resources for shaping identity. In this case, Western civilization and Islamic civilization are believed to be enemies of one another (Huntington 1996).

As a global age has brought increased exposure to other cultures and religions, an identity crisis is forming; and “In coping with identity crisis, what counts for people are blood and belief, faith and family.” In the end, the pervasiveness of religion means that psychologically and practically, it provides the broadest and most supportive base to justify conflict with those we have fashioned as our enemies. Religion, according to Huntington, is the broadest canopy under which a culture can gather to defend its identity, and it has the added incentive of being able to ascribe divine sanction to conflict with “godless” others (Bos 2006).

In the following figures 2.2 & 2.3 it is explained how identity, specially religious identity is formed and goes for conflict with globalization-----

**Religious Identity and the Propensity for Group Violence
a Hierarchy of Underlying Factors (Yamin 2008).**



Figure 2.2

Religio-psychological contextualization of dispute: role of religious leadership, cultural religiosity, dispute over religious sites and territory; manipulation or selective use of religious text.

Psychological factors: communication, media, perceptions, collective history, historical grievance, pseudospeciation, insecurity, mistrust and suspicion

Socio-economic and political factors: rank disequilibrium, political participation, economic factors

Demographic: relative strength of groups, ability to consolidate and mobilize alliances: sources of support and funding: providing fuel and vigor

Elements Contributing to Religious Identity and Group Violence (Yamin 2008)




Fig-2.3

2.3.4 Westernization or Universalism Theory

Westernisation or Universalism is a process whereby societies come under or adopt the Western culture in such matters as industry, technology, law, politics, economics, lifestyle, diet, language, alphabet, religion, philosophy, values (Phillip 2005). Westernisation has been a pervasive and accelerating influence across the world in the last few centuries, in which western culture influences or imposes upon the non-western society to change towards a more westernized society. According to Conrad Phillip, the Westerners "will attempt to remake the native culture within their own image, ignoring the fact that the models of culture that they have created are inappropriate for settings outside of Western civilisation" (Phillip 2005, p 57).

In the above situation, the native culture believed to be Islamic culture which the Westerners are trying to remake within their own image. Ignoring the fact that their own culture is inappropriate for setting outside of their own civilization (Phillip 2005). However, for almost 2,500 years, in Western civilization, there was an alternative to tribalism, offered by one of the great philosophers of all time: Plato. It may be called as universalism. We will try to find that universalism is also inadequate to our human condition. What Plato argued in 'The Republic' is that this world of the senses, of things we can see and hear and feel, the world of particular things, isn't the source of knowledge or truth or reality. How is one to understand what a tree is, if trees are always changing from day to day and there are so many different kinds of them? How can one define a table if tables come in all shapes and sizes — big, small, old, new, wood, other materials? How does one understand reality in this world of messy particulars? Plato said that all these particulars are just shadows on a wall. What is real is the world of forms and ideas: the idea of a table, the form of a tree. Those are the things that are universal. Truth is to move from particularity to universality. Truth is the same for everyone, everywhere, at all times. Whatever is local, particular, and unique is insubstantial, even illusory (Sacks 2002).

Universalism further implies that all differences lead to tribalism and then to war, and that the best alternative therefore is to eliminate differences and impose on the world a single, universal truth (Sacks 2002). If this is true, then when two persons disagree over a matter, if one is right, then another is supposed to be wrong. If first person care about truth, he must convert the later into truth. If he (first person) can't convert, may be he can conquer him (second person). And if he can't conquer, then maybe he has to kill him, in the name of that truth. From this flows the blood of human sacrifice through the ages (Sacks 2002). Hence, this forced westernization or universalism is a dangerous idea. It is based on wrong Western perception towards other civilizations. In this case towards Islam and Islamic civilization. As a result, the unilateral actions and western style democratizations are taking place in the Middle East and else where. Here western actors might forget, Islam has got it's own version of democracy, culture and human rights introduced around 1400 years ago.

2.4 Physical Wrong Perception

2.4.1 Primitive or Less Modern

Some Western perspective reveal that Islamists and traditionalists reject *modernity*, western secularism are considered by Islamists as new devils, modern blasphemies because they dare to set man up as equal to God. The original sin of modern man is therefore to have rejected the sovereignty of God and put in its place the sovereignty of the Individual (IBA 2003).

According to some western views, the very words *secular* and *individualism* are anathema to many of today's Islamists. They think, most Muslims do not really think of Modernity in terms of a break with the Past. Modernity means new and better technology and an improved standard of living. But unlike in Western societies, it also means a *renewal* with the Past, a return to the original ethos of Islam, of Mecca and Medina. If that society remains

the perfect society, which must be copied in the late Twentieth century, then the idea of progress, or a break with the past is a nonsense (FAIS 1998).

Non Muslims believe that, the mindset of Muslim has other subtle and important implications. Universal suffrage is welcomed, but not necessarily the idea that individual freedom or freedom of opinion is essential preconditions for the exercise of democracy. An Islamist would understand freedom of opinion as the right to think what you like but only within the boundaries of what is permitted in Islam. Too often, it seemed to them, Islam is defined in a narrow and restrictive sense (FAIS 1998).

Western cultures, in varying degrees claim that, human beings should act and think according to their own desires and beliefs. But for many traditionalist Muslims, individualism thus defined also opens the door to selfishness, a denial of God, must therefore be tightly circumscribed (IBA 2003).

2.4.2 Lack of Democracy, Equality, Liberty and Justice

Non-Muslims who argue that Islam and democracy are incompatible fall in two subcategories. One group feels this way to assert or underscore that democracy is a new, *western* value and institution. Some also are afraid that a democratic outfit of the Muslim world might undermine the current western domination (Farooq 2002). After all, these are barbaric and backward people. Modern ideas are unsuitable to them. These people are better suited for autocratic, repressive rules either under current despots or the western puppets. This group of non-Muslims suffers from acute Islamophobia based on their stereotypical understanding of Islam and prejudiced viewpoint of the western interest. Some non-Muslim scholars such as Samuel Huntington and Bernard Lewis, take a pessimistic scholarly view that historically the Muslim world has been under non-democratic rules for nearly fourteen centuries, going back to the period that ended with the Rightly Guided Caliphs, and thus a democratic culture has not been internally in existence in the Muslim world. Also, from their

perspective. they find little support in the scripture or ideology of Islam to be optimistic (Slatt 2006).

The Muslims who agree with the above group that Islam and democracy are incompatible have a different reason. They basically find any idea or institution of western origin to be unpalatable. But going one step further, they argue that democracy and Islam are fundamentally incompatible because of the difference in the concept of sovereignty. According to them, in Islam sovereignty belongs to God alone. Human beings are mere executors of His Will. On the other hand, in democracy (or, to be precise, secular, western democracy), sovereignty belongs to people, which in the view of these Muslims constitutes *shirk* or polytheism. Many notable Muslim personalities, including Sayyid Abul Ala Maududi (in his earlier writings), have rejected the secular western democracy, at least at the philosophical level. According to such perspective, Islam, speaking from the view-point of political philosophy, is the very antithesis of secular Western democracy (Sullivan 2002). Islam altogether repudiates the philosophy of popular sovereignty and rears its polity on the foundations of the sovereignty of God and the vicegerency (*Khilafah*) of man. Unfortunately, even though in his later life his view about the compatibility between Islamic political system and democracy was much more favorable and positive, what Maududi articulated earlier as a philosophical rejection of secular western democracy has been perceived or upheld by many Muslims and non-Muslims as rejection of democracy *per se*. It is not all too uncommon among Muslims, especially among revivalist Muslims that *Khilafat* is what defines the Islamic political system, and they are not willing to trade or adjust *Khilafat* with democracy in any way (Ahmed 1976).

2.4.3 Lesser Human Rights

The right wing non Muslims believe, the very notion of apostasy has vanished from the West. Where one would talk of being a lapsed Catholic or non-practicing Christian rather

than an apostate. There are certainly no penal sanctions for converting from Christianity to any other religion. In Islamic countries, on the other hand, the issue is far from dead. Apart from apostasy, Non Muslims considers, there are lack of liberty, Freedom of expression and democratic right prevailing in the Islamic countries (Bostom 2003).

2.4.4 Lack of Woman Rights

The topic which is most misrepresented in the western world is probably woman rights in Islam. Western world feels that Muslim women are oppressed and deprived of their due rights and respect in the society. Moreover, they have the impression that male in the Islamic society is oppressing and dominating woman in various ways (Saimah 1998).

2.4.5 Patronises Religious Violence and Terrorism

Many non-Muslims believe that terrorism is firmly rooted in the very 'lofty' doctrine of an Islamic world visioned by Muhammad. This use of terror tactic is nothing new in Islam; it was the lifeblood through which Muhammad forced his concept of a unipolar world, devoted only to one Semitic God, Allah. In this lengthy treatise, he has exercised all the events of terror, murder, deceit, lies, intrigue and warfare that had been used to nurture, advance and propagate the very essence of Islam: accept Islam, pay protection money (*Jizya*) or die (Kasem 2005).

Some right wing non-Muslims have the perception that, the religion of Islam fulfills each and every criteria of the definition of terrorism. Ever since Islam was founded it has left behind a legacy of violent atrocities and horrible crimes. The holy book of the Muslims, the Koran, contains specific instructions on how to loot, pillage, plunder, rape, torture and murder in order to further the interests of Islam . It can clearly be called a specific instruction manual of terrorism (Illusion 2007).

Some non-Muslims believe that the Holy Koran is full of very unholy and terrorist ambitions. According to them it is a journal and collection of a terrorist's criminal activities

and ideas. Mohammed, the prophet of Islam organized at least 86 expeditions against people who either refused to follow his teachings or simply came in the way of his power crazed ambitions. Along with the pagan Arabs, many Jews and Christians were victims of this mindless terrorist. Non-Muslims also believe, Mohammed was a man who destroyed peace wherever he went, and in its place brought terror, carnage and death. And he did all this in the name of God in order to further the interests of Islam (Maharaj 2003).

Few non-Muslims also believe that it is a religious duty of every Muslim to murder anyone who comes in the way of Islam. Since it is also the duty of every Muslim to ensure that the entire world is converted to Islam by force if necessary, one must directly conclude that it is the religious duty of Muslims to kill all those who are non-Muslim. This conclusion is derived directly from the supreme edict of Allah, who admonishes that even the Muslim who feels it is wrong to kill, must murder in the name of Allah, otherwise he is not a true Muslim. Over and above this, Mohammed is hypocritically implying that warfare is hateful to him, but he participated in it because God ordained it (Forte 2001).

Some non-Muslims also believe---today, many followers of Islam such as Saddam Hussein, Idi Amin, Momar Gaddafi, Louis Farrakhan, Yasser Arafat, Dawood Ibrahim, Abu Nidal, etc. are famed for the brutality of their crimes and terrorism. The entire world is marred by violence and murder, wherever Muslims reside. The entire world is suffering due to the barbaric activities of Islamic terrorists. Pick up a newspaper today and you will note that 98% of terrorist activities that occur involve Muslims. They argue that, Muslims are actively committing acts of terrorism in many other parts of the world and justifying it by pointing towards the Koran. Even the West is not untouched anymore. Countries such as the U.K., U.S.A and France have already experienced Islamic terrorism first hand (Maharaj).

2.4.6 Approves Polygamy

Islam is criticized for allowing polygamy. According to the popular culture in the West, polygamy is viewed as relatively backward and impoverished. For many Christians, it is a license to promiscuity, and feminists consider it a violation of women's rights and demeaning to women. A crucial point that needs to be understood is that for Muslims, standards of morality are not set by prevalent Western thought, but by divine revelation. A few simple facts should be borne in mind before any talk of polygamy in Islam (Religion of Islam 2006).

2.4.7 Supports Holy War and Jihad

Many people believe that Islamic fundamentalists are an accurate portrayal of true Islam. Salmon Rushdie wrote a November 2, 2001, *New York Times* opinion piece, "Yes, This is About Islam," in which he spoke of the need for a "depoliticized Islam" that would assume the secularist-humanist principles combined with modernity (Rushdie 2001). Novelist and Nobel prize-winner V.S. Naipaul, long a critic of Islam, analyzed the religion once again in an interview published in the October 28, 2001, issue of *The New York Times Magazine*, implying that a non-fundamentalist Islam was a contradiction in terms. More recently, *New York Times* columnist Thomas L. Friedman, argued, "This is not about terrorism. Terrorism is just a tool. We're fighting to defeat an ideology: religious totalitarianism" (Friedman 2001, p 27). There are many critics of Islam in the twenty-first century who feel that Islam can be rightly judged based on the fundamentalists of the religion. Many people feel that the Muslim who is found on television representing violence is an accurate representation of all Muslims as well. Ibn Warraq differentiated,

There may be moderate Muslims, but Islam itself is not moderate. There is no difference between Islam and Islamic fundamentalism: at most there is a difference of degree but not of kind. There is a well-known saying which

asks. 'What is the difference between a moderate Islamist and a fundamentalist Islamist?' The answer is: the moderate is the one who has run out of ammunition (Warraq 2005, p 29).

Ibn Warraq is an example of a current non-apologist of Islam who suggests that there is no difference between a fundamentalist's ideologies and those of a moderate Muslim. Margot Patterson also wrote of her impressions of Islam and its ability to reflect terrorism. "That image of Islam as a defiant force against the West, as a militant body seeking to overthrow democratic values, is precisely what the Islamic extremists want us to believe. It's a small part of the larger, more complex picture of Islam"(Patterson 2005). Some critics suggest that Muslims are united through common views towards war, violence, and political ideologies. Especially after the attacks on the World Trade Center, many North Americans are convinced that extremists of Islam are a reflection of all Muslims. A negative connotation has also been given to the word "Islam" as many people believe that its scriptures promote violence (Russel & Nicolson 2005). Jonathan Bloom and Sheila Blair, university professors of Islamic Art and Culture wrote,

To most Americans at the end of the second millennium, the word 'Islam' evokes a range of negative images, from turbaned terrorists to stern-faced mullahs exhorting the faithful to shun the temptations of Western civilization. News reports from Jerusalem and Gronzy hint that the Muslims there are somehow different from us. The constant barrage of inflammatory news reports, designed to make news even when there isn't any, has colored Western perceptions of a faith followed by over a billion people, approximately one fifth of the earth's population (Bloom & Blair 2000, p 11).

One Western perception of Islam has developed with negative images of Islam such as violence and terrorism. The hatred for the religion as a whole is extensive and seems to be growing over time. The blame for this image has been pointed to the Qur'an itself, which does in fact contain verses which discuss fighting. The Qur'an reads, "Whether unarmed or

well-equipped. march on and fight for the cause of Allah, with your wealth and your persons. This is best for you, if you but knew it" (Q 9: 41). Such verses in the Qur'an have been used out of context to vindicate violence committed by Islamic people. Not only have Qur'anic verses been used out of context in attempts to prove that Islamic doctrine fosters terrorism, but other Islamic texts have been used out of context as well. An example of such a verse is found in the *hadiths*, which elaborates on the guidance of the Qur'an. The *hadiths* read,

Jihad is your duty under any ruler, be he godly or wicked. A day and a night of fighting on the frontier are better than a month of fasting and prayer. The nip of an ant hurts a martyr more than the thrust of a weapon, for these are more welcome to him than sweet, cold water on a hot summer day. He who dies without having taken part in a campaign dies in a kind of unbelief. God marvels at people (those to whom Islam is brought by conquest) who are dragged to Paradise in chains. Learn to shoot, for the space between the mark and the archer is one of the gardens Paradise. Paradise in the shadow of the swords (Bloom & Blair 2000, p11).

2.4.8 Historically anti-Western

There is a perception that, whatever change the west bring into their policy and action towards Islamic world, it (Islamic world) will remain anti western because this anti western sentiment is deep rooted in Islam(Ye'or 1985).

2.4.9 Supports Religious Politics

Where West believes in separation of state and church, but Islam is a religion which covers complete way of life. That includes social & political, here comes the conflict with West, who blames Islamic world for religious politics (Tessler 2009).

Chapter 3

Islam, Non-violence and Conflict Resolution

3.1 Islam in Response to Misperception

The history of Islam is only fourteen hundred years old and it could be said to be the latest in the series of great world religions. Nobody can deny its contribution to world civilization except those with prejudiced eyes. Arnold Toynbee has rightly observed that, “the prevalent depreciation of Islam in the West is a relic of anti-Islamic Christian prejudice” (Toynbee 1962, p 472). There is no need to describe the achievements of the Muslims, as every detail of their rise and fall is available. Their mark on world history by way of their contribution to human civilization is a recorded fact. As H. A. L. Fisher notes: “From one end of Europe to the other, Christian states found themselves confronted with the challenge of a new oriental civilization founded on a new oriental faith” (Fisher 1936, p 137). This unprecedented success of Islam was “due to revolutionary significance and its ability to lead the masses out of the hopeless situation created by the decay of the antique civilizations not only of Greece and Rome but of Persia and China and of India” (Roy 1974, p 7). Within a short span of time the disunited Arabs were united under one banner. They demolished the edifices of Caesars and Kaisers and out of that ruin they accumulated treasures of knowledge and preserved and multiplied them for the benefit of future generations. The military victories of the Muslims were a prelude to a more magnificent and lasting performance in the social and cultural fields. Political unity provided opportunities for economic prosperity which in the long run resulted in cultural and spiritual progress. A new social order, based on new ideas, was inaugurated. M. N. Roy writes:

“ The rich spiritual legacy of the glorious civilization of ancient Greece was almost buried under the dreary ruins of the Roman Empire, and lost in the darkness of Christian superstition. The grand mission of rescuing the invaluable patrimony which eventually enabled the peoples of Europe to emerge from the depressing gloom of the holy middle ages

and build the marvelous monument of modern civilization, belong to the Saracen arms, and to the sociopolitical structure erected on the basis of Islamic monotheism. The sword of Islam, wielded ostensibly in the service of God, actually contributed to the victory of a new intellectual life which eventually dug the grave of all religions and faiths”(Roy 1974, p 8).

3.2 Non-violence in Islam

In order to understand the theological background of nonviolence in Islam, it is necessary to understand how peace is conceptualized in the Quran. Many references to peace (e.g., *salam, silm, sulh*) in Quranic discourse suggest that peace is a central theme in Islamic precepts. According to Quranic discourse, peace in Islam begins with God, since *as-Salam* (peace) is one of the Most Beautiful ninety-nine names of God: "Allah is the source of Peace (and perfection)" (Q 59:23). The Quran refers to peace as "Peace! - a word (of salutation) from a Lord Most Merciful!" (Q 36:58). God calls believers to the "abode of peace" by stating in the Quran that "But Allah doth call to the Home of Peace: He doth guide whom He pleaseth to a way that is straight" (Q10: 25).

Various uses of the term "peace" in the Quran suggest that the Islamic concept of peace is wider than the absence of war. These uses recommend that peace is a positive state of safety or security, which includes being at peace with one-self, with fellow human beings, nature, and God. Based on these verses, Islamic scholars associate peace with a wide range of concepts. These concepts include, but are not limited to, justice and human development, wholeness, salvation, perfection and harmony. This understanding of peace is similar to the way peace is defined by the scholars of nonviolence in other religious and secular traditions(Orellana 2008).

Justice has been an integral aspect of the Islamic discourse of peace, since the Quran clearly states that the aim of religion is to bring justice. This is evident in Quranic verses such as: "We sent aforetime our messengers with clear signs and sent down with them the Book

and the Balance (of right and wrong), that men may stand forth in justice" (Q57: 25). Without justice, there can be no peace. Therefore justice is the essential component of peace according to the Quranic message. Furthermore, it is stated in the Quran that "O ye who believe! Stand firmly for justice as witnesses to Allah to even as against yourselves, your parents, your kin, and whether it be (against) the rich and poor... (Q4: 35); and "... to fair dealing, and let not the hatred of others to you make you swerve to wrong and depart from justice. Be just for it is next to peity..." (Q5: 8). Thus, the Islamic understanding of peace suggests that justice is the overriding principle and it must transcend any consideration of religion, animosity, race, or creed. Consequently, tyranny, which is a system that perpetuates injustice, is viewed as one of the greatest evils that must be removed.

Although often mistranslated as "holy war" against external forces, *jihad*, which asks every Muslim to "strive in the cause of God," indeed asks Muslims to strive for justice. Based on the Quranic verse " We did raise among every people a Messenger (with a teaching): Worship God and Shun the Evil one" (Q16: 36), scholars, such as Jawdat Sa'id, argue that "the Prophets came with the message to avoid wicked tyranny and they disclosed that the tyrant could not continue to exist without our obedience to him"(Said1997,p5). Similar to the modern understanding of nonviolence, this statement rests on the contention that people have the power to nonviolently resist tyranny and injustice, thus transform unjust structures by withdrawing consent. Thus, according to Sa'id, the message of the Prophets is "the sign of a tremendous nonviolent peaceful economic message" (Said 1997,p5).

It is clear, then, that peace, based on justice for all, is the central tenet of Islam. But how do we attain this peace according to Islam? Based on their reading of the Quran and the *Hadith*, proponents of the Islamic nonviolence approach hold that Islam seeks to attain peace through nonviolent means rather than violence, as it is believed to be the preferred way by God. In support of this view Jawdat Sa'id, an eminent Islamic scholar suggests the *Hadith* "whenever violence enters into something it disgraces it, and whenever, 'gentle-civility' enters

into something it graces it. Truly, God bestows on account of gentle conduct what he does not bestow on account of violent conduct"(Said,1997). Also, the Quranic verse "God commands you to treat (everyone) justly, generously and with kindness" (Q16: 90) is used to substantiate this stance. Still, in the Quran, there are various verses that permit war as a legitimate conduct to correct injustice and overthrow tyranny and oppression. Prophet would prefer peace over war and negotiation over confrontation and limited action over an outright plunder, but adds that Islamic just war theory permits to defend Islamic lands when attacked. However, a closer look at Quranic discourse indicates that "there is a clearly articulated preference in Islam for nonviolence over violence, and forgiveness (*afu*) over retribution. The verse, "the recompense of an injury the like thereof; but whosoever forgives and thereby brings about a reestablishment of harmony, his reward is with God; and God loves not the wrongdoers" (Q42: 40), advocates sincere forgiveness as the preferred option to establish God's harmony on earth. Hence, it is clear that the Islamic notion of peace suggests a condition of internal and external order, where peace is a responsibility of every Muslim, and the best way to attain that goal is through nonviolent means.

When articulating the Islamic perspective of nonviolence scholars agree on some major points. One such point is the sacredness of human life: i.e. the single origin of and equality among humankind. Sacredness of human life is stated clearly in the Quranic verse 5:32, which reads: "And if any one saved one life, it would be as if he saved the whole people." Thus destroying life (including one's own life) is strictly forbidden. Consequently, protecting human life and respecting human dignity is sacred in Islam.

According to Islamic tradition, the individual's responsibility to uphold peace emerges out of the original constitution of human beings (*fitrah*), which is good and Muslim in character. Consequently, every human being is created in accordance with the form and image of God, as the Divine Names or Qualities are manifested in their entirety in the human form. Thus, each individual is a representative of God on earth and responsible for the order

thereof. This belief is based on the Quranic verse "Verily, we have honored every human being" (Q17: 70). It is also stated in the Quran that every human being is worthy of respect because she/he is made "in the best of molds"(Q 95:4).

Islamic scholars of nonviolence also agree that Islam incorporates several values and principles that constitute the basis of nonviolent action. For example, Kishtany identifies tolerance, persuasion, arguing, suffering, patience, civil disobedience and withdrawal of cooperation, rejecting injustice, strikes, emigration, boycotting, diplomacy, publicity, propaganda, and rituals like fasting, chanting and praying as some of such principles. In that respect, Maulana Wahiduddin Khan identifies patience (*sabr*) as one of the essential values that supports nonviolence. According to Wahiduddin Khan, patience is the focus of about 200 verses of the Quran and referred to indirectly in many others (Orellana 2008).

Therefore, it is one of the core themes of the Scriptures. Patience (*sabr*), according to Wahiduddin Khan, makes a person capable of finding a positive and successful solution to a problem. Based on the verses such as "And endure patiently whatever may befall thee." (Q31: 17), he states that patience is set above all other Islamic virtues with the exceptional promise of reward beyond measure. As mentioned in Quran "Say, O ye my servants who believe! Fear your Lord, good is (the reward) for those who do good in this world. Spacious is Allah's earth! those who patiently persevere will truly receive a reward without measure!" (Q39: 10).

Wahiduddin Khan furthermore, states that the entire spirit of the Quran is in consonance with the concept of patience. Patience, he states, implies a peaceful response or reaction, whereas impatience implies a violent response. He continues by adding that the word *sabr* expresses the notion of nonviolence, as it is understood in modern times. In this context, "*jihad*" refers to nonviolent activism, while "*qital*" is violent activism. He invokes the Quranic verse "perform *jihad* with this (i.e. the word of the Quran) most strenuously." (Q25: 52) to support this view. Because the Quran is not a sword or a gun, but a book of

ideology, he concludes that performing *jihad* could only mean an ideological struggle to conquer peoples' hearts and minds through Islam's superior philosophy.

Moreover, Wahiduddin Khan argues that all of the greatest successes of Islam were achieved by nonviolent methods. His primary example is the Prophet's life. Wahiduddin Khan states that of the 23 year period of his prophethood, the initial 13 years, when Muhammad was in Mecca, the Prophet adopted nonviolence. Even, when Meccans waged war against Him, the Prophet chose to immigrate to Medina, which is a form of nonviolent activism. When the Meccan unilaterally waged war against Him, the battles of *Badr* and *Uhud* took place but the Prophet made a 10 year treaty called the *Sulh al-Hudaybiyah*, accepting all the conditions of his opponents. This peace treaty paved the way for peaceful, constructive activities (Khan 1998).

Scholars of nonviolence also agree that although there are certain verses in the Quran that command *qital*, they require crucial circumstances to be present. In that respect, Wahiduddin Khan states that aggression, launching an offensive war by the believers is totally forbidden. The Quran commands: "Fight for the sake of those that fight against you, but do not be aggressive (Q2: 190). Since initiating hostility is not allowed in Islam, only certain defensive wars can be permitted: "when they attack you" (Q9: 13), he states that according to Quran there was one form of war which was time-bound strictly in retaliation to its purpose. This was to end *fitna*, since the Quran states: "Fight against them until *fitna* is no more" (Q2: 193). Wahiduddin Khan reads *fitna* to mean "that coercive system which had reached the extremes of religious persecution." He also states that *fitna* refers to the ancient times when a political system dominated by coercion prevailed around the world, closing the doors to material and spiritual progress. Believers were urged to break this coercive system in order to usher freedom for material and spiritual progress.

Wahiduddin Khan also notes that there were only three real instances that Muslims entered a battle, referring to the Battles of *Badr*, *Uhud*, and *Hunayn*- undertaken by the

Prophet, when it became absolutely inevitable. He also states that these battles lasted only for half a day, each beginning from noon and ending with the setting of the sun. Therefore, it is possible to say that the Prophet had actively engaged in war for a total of a day and half, and observed the principle of nonviolence throughout his 23-year prophetic career (Khan 1998).

Islamic scholars of nonviolence also agree that there is also a clear preference for forgiveness in Islam, especially when one repents. According to Sa'id, the notion of forgiveness is the basis of nonviolence in Islam. Building his argument on this basis, he insists that violence is illegitimate and forgiveness is the norm. To support his position, he refers to a famous *Hadith* that states: "Whenever violence enters into something it disgraces it, whenever 'gentle-civility' enters something it graces it. Truly God bestows on account of gentle conduct what he does not bestow on account of violent conduct" (Orellana 2008).

Another important aspect of nonviolence in Islam is the concept of power. According to Rabia Terri Harris, power in Islamic understanding of nonviolence accumulates to people through the unarmed struggle and continues to reside there. Armed struggle is only a branch, which dies if torn from its root- for it is only unarmed struggle that teaches reliance on God." This is based on the assumption that power in its essence is non-coercive, but consensual. It is only dissipated, never generated through coercion. Sa'id, for example, states that responding to violence with violence is to actually empower the position of the violent person. By withdrawing consent, people render power and tyranny ineffective. Observed from this point of view, power, from the perspective of the Islamic tradition of nonviolence, becomes an infinite spiritual resource, which infuses into those who abandon their own objectives for the objectives of their Creator (Said 1997).

Islamic scholars of nonviolence also hold that the historical period has changed and new technology has introduced, weapons that cannot distinguish between the combatants and non-combatants. Scholars like Chaiwat Satha-Anand, Sa'id, and Wahiduddin Khan assert that killing of non-combatants is clearly against the Islam, therefore violence cannot be

permissible. Hence Muslims should adopt nonviolence. In support of this argument Jawdat Sa'id states: What is in the order of the world is that it has reached an extent that world problems can no longer be solved by violence (*bi-l- 'unf*). The evidence for this that the great powers themselves cannot use violence anymore to solve their conflicts. As for the weak and the oppressed (*al-mustad 'afiri*) among small states, their violence will only turn in favor of the great powers whenever they attempt to solve their problems by such means (Anand 1987).

Based on the *Sunna* of the Prophet, Chaiwat Satha Anand argues that *jihad* aims to end "structural violence," but the means used are not independent of moral scrutiny. On the basis of Quran and *Sunna*, he states that Islam forbids killing noncombatants and refers to the *Hadith*: "Go in God's name trusting in God, and adhering to the religion of God's messenger. Do not kill a decrepit old man, or a young infant, or a woman: do not be dishonest about booty, but collect your spoils, do right and act well, for God loves who do well." These rules of engagement are also clearly put down by the first Caliph. Before a battle, the first Caliph is recorded to have said: Stop, O, people, that I may give you ten rules for your guidance in the battlefield. Do not commit treachery or deviate from the right path. You must not mutilate dead bodies. Neither kill a child, or a women, or an aged man. Bring no harm to the trees, nor burn them with fire, especially those, which are fruitful. Slay not the enemy's flock, save for your food. You are likely to pass people who have devoted their lives to monastic services, leave them alone (Anand 1987).

Based on these strict Islamic rules of conduct Satha-Anand (1987) asserts that modern warfare, which cannot distinguish between combatants and noncombatants, and which includes weapons of mass destruction, is not permitted according to Islam. Inamullah Khan supports this view and states that although at a minimal level Islam permits war, conduct of war must be as humane as possible. Subsequently, Satha-Anand articulates eight theses on Muslim nonviolent action that are rooted in the original vision of Islam and 'true' meaning of

peace thereof. The first thesis is that the problem of violence is an integral part of the Islamic moral sphere. Violence, if used by Muslims, must be governed by the rules prescribed in the Quran and the *Hadith*. If violence cannot discriminate between combatants and noncombatants, it is not acceptable according to Islam. Modern technology of destruction renders discrimination virtually impossible.

Therefore Muslims cannot use violence in the modern world. Islam teaches Muslims to fight for justice with the understanding that human life -as is all God's creation- has a purpose and is sacred. For that reason to be true to Islam requires Muslims to utilize nonviolent action as the mode of struggle. Moreover, Satha-Anand argues that Islam itself is a fertile soil for nonviolence because of its potential for disobedience, strong discipline, sharing and social responsibility, perseverance, self-sacrifice, the belief in the unity of the Muslim community, and the oneness of mankind. Accordingly, Satha-Anand suggests that principles of nonviolence in Islam are derived from the five pillars of Islam. These include to obey God and his Prophet only and disobey the others if necessary; practice discipline through prayers; solidarity and support of the poor through *zakat*; self sacrifice, suffering and patience through fasting; unity and brotherhood through pilgrimage. These pillars also become the basis to undertake nonviolent acts of resistance such as civil disobedience, vigils, protests, refusal to pay taxes, among others (Anand 1987).

Other scholars, such as Johansen, Crow, Grant, and Ibrahim," also identify various Islamic rituals and traditions as effective sources of nonviolent action in Islam. These include "fasting rituals, which are excellent training for hunger strikes; ritualistic prayers, for the habituated formation of worshipers into parallel lines to prepare people for engagement in disciplined actions; religious chanting, which can become an outlet for peaceful marches, meetings and sittings." These traditions and rituals are in line with nonviolent action strategies employed in various movements around the globe. Values, beliefs, rituals and practices presented here indicate that Islamic tradition not only incorporates vast resources

for mobilizing the population toward nonviolent action, but also suggest that Islam privileges nonviolent action to resolve conflicts and to remove unjust social, political and economic structures with just ones (Orellana 2008).

3.3 Non-violence in other Religions and Ideologies

Religions envisage a quest for the meaning of life, truth, and ultimate end. But with the passage of time religion has lost its dynamism and has tended to become a set of rituals and dogmas. Though these various drawbacks and weaknesses have crept in, the vital role of religion in nourishing the development of human civilization cannot be denied. In this long process the instinct of nonviolence has played a significant role. In one form or another, the principle of nonviolence has an important place in every religion. Some religions limit its practice to human beings; others encompass the entire world of living beings. Some consider it the highest virtue, and others regard it as second only to social justice.

3.3.1 Non-Violence in Hinduism

In Hinduism non-violence is represented by the term “Ahimsa”. Quoting T. W. Rhys Davids, O. P. Jaggi says that in Hindu literature the word *ahimsa* is found first in the Chandogya Upanishad. *Ahimsa* is an important element in other Upanishads as well, along with such qualities as restraint, truthfulness, nonstealing, celibacy, compassion, rectitude, forbearance, temperance in food, and cleanliness. In the Mahabharata *ahimsa* gains prominence. But if a choice is to be made between *ahimsa* and duty, the latter is to be given priority. The Bhagavad Gita is more categorical about duty coming first, *ahimsa* second. The Laws of Manu adds that the *himsa* prescribed in the Vedas should be construed to mean *ahimsa*, because moral duties arise from the Vedas. (Jaggi 1974, p1).

3.3.2 Non-Violence in Jainism

Jainism advocates a wider version of non-violence. Vardhaman Mahavir, the twenty-fourth Tirthankara in the line of the great Jain teachers, went much further than the established Hindu conception of *ahimsa* and preached strict observance of nonviolence towards all living creatures. For the attainment of nirvana of the soul, observance of nonviolence was considered to be the “highest ideal” of life. Therefore, the Jain approach to nonviolence is very broad, covering both physical and metaphysical aspects. The ethical principles of Jainism are also based on nonviolence (Suriji 1974). A believer in Jainism has to observe the following six rules (*anuvrata*):

1. I will not kill innocent moving animals voluntarily.
2. I will not commit suicide.
3. I will not commit abortion.
4. I will neither join any organization or party whose aim is violence and destruction; nor will I participate in such activities.
5. I will not consider any individual an untouchable

3.3.3 Non-Violence in Buddhism

Buddhism was a revolt against the intolerant social order that had been allowed to grow up under the priestly class of Brahmins. In the name of religion many distortions had developed which violated the spirit of the scriptures. Buddha, himself a crown prince, realized the agony of the masses. In reaching self-realization he came to understand that ignorance was the root of all suffering. According to Buddhism, when the flame of desire and lust is extinguished the state of nirvana is reached. Buddha started preaching his revolutionary ideas and within a short period there was an atmosphere ready to welcome the gospel of truth.. Now, right speech, right action, right means of livelihood, right exertion,

right mindedness, right meditation, right thinking, and right point of view became the foundation of nirvana (Ahmad 2008).

3.3.4 Non-Violence in Judaism

The Jews attach more importance to social justice than to nonviolence. Their credo is “Evil for evil, good for good.” According to the Old Testament, “Who sheddeth man’s blood, by man shall his blood be shed . . . He that smiteth a man, so that he die, shall be surely put to death. . . . And if any mischief follows, then thou shalt give life for life, eye for eye, tooth for tooth, hand for hand, foot for foot, burning for burning, wound for wound, stripe for stripe”. However, the Hebrew Bible also describes nonviolent resistance of Judaism to Babylonian and Persian power:

Jeremiah warns against using violence and military alliances to oppose the Babylonian Conquest, and argues instead that God will protect the people if Judah acts in accord with the ethical demands of Torah – freeing slaves, letting the land rest, the Biblical model of Jewish life preserved some limits on war. Even in wartime, the Israelite army was forbidden to cut down fruit trees, unless they were actually being used as bulwarks in defending against a siege. And the Torah provided for individual exemptions from the army for young people in the earliest journey of making a family, building a house, creating a vineyard, feeling fear of death in battle, or fearing to become a killer. The Maccabees actually applied these rules, even in the midst of a war to resist an occupying power that had desecrated the Temple and was forcing people to worship idols (Ahmad 2008).

3.3.5 Non-Violence in Christianity

Christianity goes to the extreme form of non-violence. As Christ said:
Ye have heard that it was said, “an eye for an eye and a tooth for a tooth,” but I say unto you, resist not him that is evil but

whosoever smiteth thee on thy right cheek, turn to him the other also. And if any man would go to law with thee, and take away thy coat, let him have thy cloak also (Matt. 5:39–40).

This approach is a departure from the teachings of Judaism. For Jesus Christ, God is a Loving Father. Christ, according to whatever little is known about him, stood for justice, love, nonviolence, and compassion. Jesus emphasized love of God and love of fellow human beings. As he said,

Love your enemies. . . . pray for your persecutors, so that you may show yourself true sons of your Father in Heaven, for He makes His Sun rise on bad and good alike, and makes the rain fall on both upright and wrong doers, For if you love only those who love you, what is there remarkable in that? (Matt. 5:44–46)

In A.D. 313 Constantine, the emperor of Rome, embraced Christianity and declared it a legal religion. Before that, Christians had not been allowed openly to observe their religious rites. They had been tortured and persecuted. But with the conversion of the emperor, the course changed. Christians were not only granted full religious liberty but all avenues were opened for the propagation of Christianity. Within a short period the number of followers increased tremendously. But with the influx of men and women with worldly passions, there also developed a large degree of corruption and misinterpretation. The Cross, a symbol of love and compassion, now became an emblem of imperial authority and the Roman Army. These developments changed the basic conception of “love” and “nonviolence.” Church leaders started to give new meanings to the basic principles and a compromising attitude developed. A theory of “just war” was worked out. When the Roman Pope claimed his temporal power, a further drastic change occurred. He now became the de facto head of the State as well as the Church. He was now more interested in power than in the teachings of Jesus Christ. The principles of love, compassion, and resist-not-evil were neglected and by

stages rejected. Religious people who disagreed with the Pope were harassed. The story of the crusades is a story of the negation of the principles for which Christianity stood. But with the dawn of the Renaissance and Reformation, the introduction of the reforms initiated by Martin Luther, and the advent of the Industrial Revolution, a new chapter opened. The history of groups like the Mennonites and the Quakers in the years that followed is the story of the reshaping of Christian thought, along with a revival of interest in nonviolence and peace (Ahmad 2008).

3.3.6 The Nonviolence of Gandhi

Gandhi is considered to be the twentieth century proponent of nonviolence; as a matter of fact nonviolence and Gandhi have become synonyms today. Gandhi was a religious man and took keen interest in the teachings of different religions. During his student days in India and England he was deeply influenced by friends adhering to different religions. Under these various influences he developed a new conception of religion based on tolerance and human fellowship. He considered man holistically and never divided human life and behavior into compartments. Therefore, in his teaching we find the spirit of integration. Committed to religion, Gandhi tried to mold his life and program in the true spirit of religion. In other words, we can say that the spiritual aspect of religion remained his guide. He saw more similarities between religions than differences. For the first time in recent human history we find in him a public figure who proclaimed *sarva dharma sambhava*—equal regard towards all religions (Bose 1948). He says, “religions are different roads converging on the same point. What does it matter that we take different roads, so long as we reach the same goal? In reality, there are as many religions as there are individuals.” He explained his conception of religion in the following way: “By religion, I do not mean formal religion, or customary religion, but that religion which underlies all religions, which brings us face to face with our maker.” The deep impact of religion inspired him to search for truth. And in this process of

searching for truth he discovered nonviolence. He says, "To me Truth is God and there is no way to find Truth except the way of nonviolence." Nonviolence is refraining from killing anyone out of anger or selfish motives or from causing pain to others. Only with complete selflessness can one aspire to achieve such a goal (Bose 1948, p 224).

3.4 Islamic Non-Violence Versus Other Non -Violence Approaches

From the above discussion one could orient with the concept of nonviolence as envisaged by other religions and traditions. It has also been observed that some religions or ideologies went to an extreme length of counter action in response to an action. On the other hand, some religions speak of absolute non-violence where there is no scope of violent action even in self defense by passing the practical aspects of human aspirations and limitations. But if some one analyzes the actions of followers of those religions and traditions in the present world, he will find that they are violating their religious and traditional non-violence concept. He will also find that, followers can't be blamed for this violation, because, in real world, this absolute non-violence is not workable, main limitation of absolute non-violence movement is, it can't defeat a tyrant or dictator. Ghandi did succeed not only for his absolute non-violence but the change scenario of second world war favored him. Dr. Martin Luther king could not succeed, Dalai Lama yet to see success. That is why President Barak Obama, being the follower of Ghandi, Dr. King, approved war for self defense in his acceptance speech for Nobel Peace prize in 2009.

On the other hand, Islam being the realistic religion has adopted a realistic attitude and expects it's adherents to adopt a middle course in solving day-to-day issues, keeping in mind the spirit of equality, brotherhood, love, and purity of character. No one is allowed to kill anybody except under certain specified conditions. The Holy Qur'an says:

We ordained

For the Children of Israel

That if anyone slew
A person—unless it be
For murder or for spreading
Mischief in the land—
It would be as if
He slew the whole people:
And if anyone saved a life,
It would be as if he saved
The life of the whole people. (Q 5:35)

But, at the same time, Islam gives full consideration to human weakness. While love is the ideal, a common man cannot love his enemy. Unless a man reaches a spiritual height he is bound to react and “good for good” and “bad for bad” is all that will satisfy him. Also to defeat oppressor and Tyrant one needs limited violent actions. Hence Islam permits limited violent action for extreme self defense. Due to this limited approval of violent action Islam had to swallow or digest huge criticism from non-Islamic world for the last 14 hundred years. But now like Barak Obama, they could understand, Islamic non-violence is the right way, real way. That proves once again, concept and idea of Islam and Quran are not Earthly but a divine revelation. Because a man can't envision the need for a such a realistic concept, it is only possible for the Creator of this human kind, this world.

One thing needs to be cleared, by limited violence in self defense, no way meant the present terrorism, Talibanism, Al-Quidaim we see in the present world in the name of Islam. True Islam never supported or approved these types of killing and violence. If some one analyzes the battles the Prophet Mohammed(SM) had to fight, one can easily understand what is violent action in self defense. Every time, the Prophet acted when enemy attacked him or his followers. He also compromised with enemy, did peace treaty even after enemy attacked for greater peace and non-violence

3.5 Islam in Response to Orientalism Theory

Though colonialization influenced orientalism to a great extent, but every orientalist was not a conscious agent of imperialism or every research was not to justify the legitimacy of colonialism. There was never an entirely monolithic European stance toward Muslims. However, Muslims are the direct victims of many of the Western countries (Lockman 2005). For this reason, it is not easy to find Muslims who respond to the orientalism in an objective and academic manner. Orientalism became a taboo to them, which led to the extensive approach of generalizing all whose views are against Islamic values. In general, the common response from Muslims is in the language of victim and defensive manner (Saif 2009).

In order to justify the discussion, we would like to divide the Muslim response to Orientalism into two major categories:

1. Response given by Muslim scholars and preachers and other prominent figures from the background of Islamic Studies.
2. Response given by Muslim scholars and other influential figures from the background of Human Sciences and other disciplines outside the field of Islamic Studies.

This categorization is not intended to generalize the many types of Muslim responses but more or less, to offer a better treatment to the subject within the limit.

Muslim scholars from the background of the Islamic Studies were very much bothered by the fact that many of the Orientalists gave the wrong presentation of Islam from their study. This was due to the fact that the Orientalists were trying to express Islam within their own understanding which might not be compatible with the dualism of Islam world view. Either the shortcoming emerged from their lack of appropriate methodology to study Islam, or simply because of the devilish idea against Islam (Saif 2009). Due to this reason, we found that Muslim scholars were in general gave a strong rejection against Orientalism. This idea is very much accepted by the preachers and laymen because they were observing the social and

intellectual illness occurred among the Muslim society members, which Orientalism fits the criteria to take the blame (Saif 2009).

The pattern was significantly different from the approach taken by the Muslims who came from the background of Human Sciences' discipline. Many viewed Orientalism in a more objective way and carefully distinguish the Orientalists who served the colonial authorities and those who study the East simply because of their admiration to the neighboring civilizations. This is also due to the fact that many of the contemporary Human Sciences disciplines like psychology, sociology, anthropology and history emerged from the tradition of the West. Orientalism as an academic discourse which claimed by Bernard Lewis to be emerged from the humanism tradition of the Enlightenment, is more familiar to the Muslim social scientists compared to those who solely came from the background of Islamic Revealed Knowledge.

Maryam Jamilah as a figure thought to be among the first category of Muslims towards Orientalism due to her association with the Muslims in Pakistan and Islam. Even though she recognized some of the positive sides of Orientalism, but many or the majority of her works would fall within the first category. She gave a good treatment against the Orientalism which can be viewed from many of her writing such as *Islam and Orientalism*, *Islam Versus the West* and others. In 1980, Maryam Jamilah wrote a book, titled as *Islam and Orientalism*. She made clear in her introduction of the book, that the reason she wrote the book was to help rescue the modern educated Muslims from the fallacy of accepting these unscrupulous scholars as the supreme authorities on Islam. She also admitted that her book was intended to show the Muslim reader how the West sees the Muslims.

Firstly, Maryam Jamilah did not reject the tradition of Orientalism as a whole. She acknowledged some positive contributions produced by some Orientalists. In this case, Maryam Jamilah appreciated the work of European Orientalists like Nicholson and Arberry who were far from the colonialization interest. Maryam Jamilah suggested that Orientalists

do their best work in the field of translation. She might suggest that because the field of translation does not interfere with the content of the text or perhaps try to impose their (Orientalists) authority in presenting Islam. Maryam Jamilah was very sensitive with the superior attitude of the West over Muslims.

Maryam Jamilah's Suggestions: Maryam Jamilah emphasized in her introduction that the only way to crush a false idea is with a better idea based in logical and persuasive reasoning (Jamilah 2007, p 21). This is a very important suggestion given by Maryam Jamilah to the attention of those who want to defend Islam from Orientalism. The tradition of Orientalism emerged in the West particularly during and after the Renaissance as a systematic field of study and had its own way in dealing with the subjects. Muslims cannot face Orientalism with slogans and rhetoric but they need to offer a better idea based on good and well structured form of intellectual qualification.

For this reason, Muslims need to develop a kind of discipline to counter the idea of Orientalism. If Orientalism is a Western way of presenting Islam, from the Western perspective, Muslims should lead the intellectual movement to build the field of Occidentalism, and that is to present the West from Eastern and perhaps Islamic point of view. Maryam Jamilah also urged all Islam-loving scholars to assert the absolute eternity, universality, self sufficiency and total independence of Islam from man made philosophies (Jamilah 2007, p 21). This led to a very complicated issue regarding the need of Islamic methodology in Social Sciences. In order for Islam to stand independently from the Western framework, Muslims need to dig out their legacy in historiography, and many other field in Human Sciences and presenting them in the contemporary well documented format. The challenge is huge and perhaps Muslims should move forward from simply reactively refuting the Orientalists, from one issue to another, to produce a genuine interpretation of the issue dealt. Muslims should work on building the methodology which can be applied to study the West and global issue from Islamic values and points of view. Perhaps this is the reason why

Maryam Jamilah encouraged Muslim scholars to produce an entire library on History, Sociology, Anthropology, Psychology and Biology from the Islamic viewpoint and expose the fallacies and defective scholarship of the Orientalists.

Maryam Jamilah also disagreed with the approach taken by Muslim authorities to ban materials of the Orientalists from Muslims hand. She viewed that banning books will only make forbidden fruit more alluring. Such purely negative measures are not only futile and ineffective but by making these inaccessible to mature intellectuals, writers and leaders, they defeat their own purpose by keeping them ignorant of what is being thought and done in the West. Thus, encourages an attitude of isolationism, complacency and apathy. She urged Muslim to produce a better work compared to the book of Phillip K. Hitti, *History of the Arabs*. Otherwise, no matter how prejudice the book was, it cannot be dislodged as the standard works preference on the subject by mere Government decree. In her point of view, the standard of Hitti's work will continue to be regarded as the final authorities (Jamilah 2007, p146).

3.6 Islam in Response to Clash of Civilization

Islam and many Muslim and non-Muslim scholars do not approve and support the 'Clash of Civilization' theory of Huntington. Because Islam from its inception did not believe in clash but of co-existence with other religions and cultures. History of Islam bears witness of this co-existence in various ages and areas.

Paul Berman (2003), in his book '*Terror and Liberalism*' proposes another criticism of the civilization clash hypothesis. According to Berman, distinct cultural boundaries do not exist in the present day. He argues there is neither "Islamic civilization" nor a "Western civilization", and that the evidence for a civilization clash is not convincing, especially when considering relationships such as that between the United States and Saudi Arabia. In

addition, he cites the fact that many Islamic extremists spent a significant amount of time living and/or studying in the western world. According to Berman conflict arises because of philosophical beliefs between groups, regardless of cultural or religious identity (Berman 2003).

Amartya Sen wrote a book called "Identity and Violence: The illusion of destiny" in critique of Huntington's main concept of an inevitable clash along civilizational lines. In this book he argues that a root cause of violence is when people see each other as having a singular affiliation, ie: Hindu or Muslim, as opposed to multiple affiliations: Hindu, woman, housewife, mother, artist, daughter, member of a particular socio-economic class...etc. all of which can be a source of a person's identity (Clash 2009).

It has been claimed that values are more easily transmitted and altered than Huntington proposes. Nations such as Taiwan, Turkey and South Korea as well as many Eastern European countries and Latin American countries, have become democracies in the recent period, while many Western nations remain as Constitutional monarchies. Some also see Huntington's thesis as creating a self-fulfilling prophecy and reasserting differences between civilizations. Edward Said issued a response to Huntington's thesis in his own essay entitled "The Clash of Ignorance." Said argues that Huntington's categorization of the world's fixed "civilizations" omits the dynamic interdependency and interaction of culture. All his ideas are based not on harmony but on the clash or conflict between worlds. The theory that each world is "self-enclosed" is applied to the world map, to the structure of civilizations, to the notion that each race has a special destiny and psychology. According to Said, it is an example of an imagined geography, where the presentation of the world in a certain way legitimates certain politics. Interventionist and aggressive, the concept of civilizational clash is aimed at maintaining a war time status in the minds of the Americans against self made enemy, in this case Islam and Muslims. Thus, it continues to expand the Cold War by other means rather than advancing ideas that might help us understand the current scene or that

could reconcile the two cultures (Said 2001). As a genuine advocate of the often-elusive dialogue of religions and cultures, Pope John Paul II once observed: “A clash ensues only when Islam or Christianity is misconstrued or manipulated for political or ideological ends.” This insight – most applicable to the current crisis – perfectly mirrors that of Edward Said dispelling the myth of the Clash of Civilizations as a mere clash of ignorance (Salih 2007).

Critics in *Le Monde Diplomatique* articles call *The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order* the theoretical legitimization of American-led Western aggression against China and the world's Islamic cultures. Nevertheless, this post–Cold War shift in geopolitical organization and structure requires that the West internally strengthen itself culturally, by abandoning the imposition of its ideal of democratic universalism and its incessant military interventionism. Other critics argue that Huntington's taxonomy is simplistic and arbitrary, and does not take account of the internal dynamics and partisan tensions within civilizations. Huntington's influence upon U.S. policy has been likened to that of British historian A.J. Toynbee's controversial religious theories about Asian leaders in the early twentieth century.

Giandomenico Picco, Personal Representative of the Secretary-General for the UN Year of Dialogue among Civilizations, has said-

- *History does not kill. Religion does not rape women, the purity of blood does not destroy, buildings and institutions do not fail. Only individuals do those things (Picco 2008).*

Mr. Picco was appointed to his UN position in 1999 to facilitate discussions on diversity, through organizing conferences and seminars and disseminating information and scholarly materials. Having served the United Nations for two decades, Mr. Picco is most recognized for participating in UN efforts to negotiate the Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan and in

bringing an end to the Iran-Iraq war. He believes that people should take responsibility for who they are, what they do, what they value, and what they believe in.

Huntington's piece in *Foreign Affairs* created more responses than almost any other essay ever published in that journal. The thesis has received much criticism from wildly different paradigms, with implications, methodology, and even the basic concepts being questioned. In his book, Huntington relies mostly on anecdotal evidence. Despite his expectations, more rigorous empirical studies have not shown any particular increase in the frequency of intercivilizational conflicts in the post-Cold War period. In fact, regional war and conflict spiked immediately after the end of Cold War, and then it has declined slowly and steadily since then. However, what proportion of existing conflict can be attributed to "intercivilizational conflict" and whether such conflict increase in proportion to the overall conflict would remain to be seen (Huntington 1993).

Some have argued that his identified civilizations are fractured and show little internal unity. The Muslim world is severely fractured along ethnic lines with Arabs, Persians, Turks, Pakistanis, Kurds, Berbers, Albanians, Bosnians, Africans and Indonesians all having very different world views. Moreover, the criteria of the proposed delineation are not clear. One can argue, for instance, that cultural differences between China and Japan are not more important than between China and Vietnam. However, Vietnam is put together with China under the label of the Sinic civilization while Japan is supposed to form a separate civilization. Whereas, Western civilization includes both Protestant and Catholic branches; and the Germanic (which would include Anglo Saxon) and Romance cultural differences in Western Europe are also disregarded, as well as Anglo-Saxon countries (Britain, U.S., Canada, Australia, etc.) and Continental Europe. The distinction between the Western and Orthodox civilizations excludes non-religious factors, such as the post-Communist legacy or the level of economic development. It also ignores differences within Muslim communities (Esposito 2001). In the case of Islamic societies, the "clash" may be with notions of

"modernity" rather than with other comparable, religiously based societies or groups. Conflict arises between the values of traditional religion and those of consumerism and the entertainment world.

Oppositional Concepts: In recent years, the theory of Dialogue among Civilizations, a response to Huntington's Clash of Civilizations, has become the center of some international attention. The concept, which was introduced by former Iranian president Mohammad Khatami, was the basis for United Nation's resolution to name the year 2001 as the Year of Dialogue among Civilizations (Wikipedia 2009).

The Alliance of Civilizations (AOC) initiative was proposed at the 59th General Assembly of the United Nations (UN) in 2005 by the President of the Spanish Government, José Luis Rodríguez Zapatero and co-sponsored by the Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan (Wikipedia 2009). The initiative is intended to galvanize collective action across diverse societies to combat extremism, to overcome cultural and social barriers mainly between the Western and predominantly Muslim worlds, and to reduce the tensions and polarization between societies which differ in religious and cultural values.

3.7 Islam in Response to Clash of Identity

One of the critical observations that may be directed at Islam, as well as all religions, is that those who embrace a *Global Ethic* are progressive thinkers who are willing to break from the strictures of a traditional Islamic approach. This is another way of saying that embracing religious pluralism and interfaith cooperation is a foreign influence upon Islamic identity rather than emanating from within the religion itself (Gomez-Ibanez 1993). Therefore it is concluded that such initiatives are symbolic in nature and do not represent a sustainable identity within an Islamic populace. However, if one looks at Islamic history, there exists a heritage of positively engaging a religiously plural world.

It may be helpful to look at two overarching principles that assess how religious identity is sustained in a changing world. The first is the *principle of movement*, which is what allows a tradition to engage the other, incorporate new understandings, and address the challenges of contemporary society in a positive way. In the rapid growth of the Islamic empire, it found itself governing and engaging other cultures and religious traditions by developing categories of relationship, with concurrent laws, that would allow the coexistence of other religions within its territory. This points to the principle of movement at work. At a more fundamental level, this principle is represented in the relationship of *Shariah* and *Fiqh*. It is the fundamental purposes and principles of the Islamic law (the *Shariah*) which are God-given, not their detailed implementation (the *fiqh*). The latter is the product of particular contexts of time and place. It is therefore possible for the provisions of the law to change and develop as necessary and appropriate. This dynamic is important because in the face of modernization, one may perceive a gap between *fiqh* and contemporary issues and too quickly conclude that relating timeless truths to changing times is a new phenomenon to Islam. It then appears that modernity is introducing the principle of movement to Islam, when, as we have seen, it is part of Islam's earliest self-understanding (Bos 2004).

What history does reveal is that there were periods when Muslims lived on the *fiqh* heritage of their forefathers instead of engaging the practical problems of contemporary life-- a central issue all religions face in their own way. This does not reveal an absence of the principle of movement but relates to a second principle at work. The second principle of religious identity is the *principle of continuity*, which necessitates that one's religious identity is rooted in the sacred texts and traditions of the faith. This has important implications in how one derives identity and orientation to the world. Where modern and post-modern approaches to contemporary issues are situational, i.e., governed by whatever values are held by the prevailing culture at that time, religious identity must be rooted in its own heritage. Therefore a new religious identity must be consistent with one's understanding of the tradition from

which one comes. It is clear that Islam holds this as a central principle in religious identity (Robinson 2003).

These two principles represent the tension that exists in the establishment of a religious identity. When the principle of continuity is emphasized to the exclusion of the principle of movement, a traditionalist approach results, such as in medieval Islam where “knowledge is better *conserved* than *created*.” Here there is a distrust of things new and a confidence in the veracity of a particular past that one embraces as the Golden Age. On the other hand, if the principle of movement is emphasized to the exclusion of continuity, religious identity may be in name only and becomes the cloak over contemporary ideologies that have replaced the religious heritage from which one comes. In the end, religious identity becomes indistinguishable from secular orientations. If one jettisons continuity with sacred texts and traditions, it threatens to reduce him to a hand-to-mouth existence in the moral sphere which may effectively sterilize his efforts at understanding events in a long-range perspective. With this in mind, we can look at a more specific application of these principles within Islamic history. As its empire first grew, religious pluralism concerned primarily Jews and Christians. Based on the Qur’anic concept “People of the Book,” Islam viewed these religions as *dhimmi* (protected scriptural minorities). This is well known. What is less often discussed is how an ever-growing empire addressed a broader range of religions. Besides Jews and Christians, the category of *ahl al-kitab* was often extended to cover Zoroastrians, sometimes members of other faiths were included (e.g., Hindus). This extending of covenant to other faiths did not represent an abandonment of continuity from Islamic tradition (Bos 2004). When we turn to the exegesis of Qur’anic texts about the Sabians, also mentioned in the Qur’an as one of the revealed religions, this religious group is employed as a way to address an expanding religious pluralism within a Qur’anic frame of reference. Because the identity of the original Qur’anic Sabians is uncertain, it created exegetical space within which application of the term could be made. It was natural in the course of time for Muslim authors

to extend the application of the term Sabian to cover not only communities from a far distant past, but also contemporary communities with which they themselves came in contact, including some in Africa. Clearly, the term Sabian had by now proved to be the most meaningful and attractive nomenclature for comprehending foreign religiosities within what could still be considered a Qur'anic world view. This becomes important because it counters the assumption that modern-day approaches to religious pluralism by many Islamic States have broken with past tradition. History contains examples that show it can also be viewed as an extension of Islamic heritage, demonstrating the principles of movement and continuity being held in equilibrium to engage a changing world. This is not to say that one would want to reinstate the framework of relationships from the past, but only to show that the principles are at hand to adapt to changing needs (Bos 2004).

Religious affiliations have often gone through transformations and redefinitions; religion has historically often been an area of fragmentation and conflict; and religious identity often breaks down into distinct and even contradictory shades in practice. In following this line it might be concluded that globalization has allowed empowers and extends the scope of religious identity. Those examining this possibility often look at evidence of religious groups and institutions which are extending their operations and networks beyond traditional boundaries by embracing the increasingly global access of communication, and by reorienting their sense of religious identity accordingly, this may result in the emergence of an all-the-stronger Islamic identity which lays allegiance to a virtual Islamic homeland embracing the globe (Bos 2004).

3.8 Islam in Response to Westernization or Universalism

Islam does not approve the idea that Western culture, Western human rights, Western knowledge and Western democracy are supreme, other cultures, human rights, knowledge and democracy are faulty and inferior. Islam believes it has an equal, in some cases better record

and version of cultures, human rights, knowledge and democracy. If someone analyzes pre-Islamic human rights, knowledge and democracy with the human rights, democracy and knowledge during the Islamic role of Prophet Mohammed(SM) and his companions, he can realize that Islam was pioneer and rich regarding human rights and democracy since it's inception, when Western human rights and democracy were far behind. Thorough analysis of response has been given regarding culture, human rights and democracy separately in the data analysis section of this paper. Hence, no need to repeat it, but one thing to mention, that is, which version of culture, human rights and democracy is supreme, history should judge that, in no way one group of people should judge it. In case of people's judgement, universalism instead of tribalism is going to dominate. When universalism dominates tribalism, clash and conflicts arises, war breaks up, peace and co-existence are hampered.

Recent example of Universalism or Westernisation is the Iraq War. Whatever motives were behind the curtain, we were presented that this war was for greater democracy and human rights in Iraq. That means Western world wants to export western version of democracy and human rights to the Islamic world. But is it possible to export or impose democracy and human rights to another country or another civilizations? Lets see what the mentors of Western ideology say about it. Samuel P. Huntington mentioned in an interview, that Western intervention in the affairs of other civilization is probably the single most dangerous source of instability and potential global conflicts in a multi-civilizational world. He also mentioned, for the relevant future, there will be no universal civilizations, but a world of different civilizations, each of which will have to learn to co-exist with other (Huntington 1996, p 311-12).

Critics of Western universalism or Unilateralism point to the ethical implications of engaging in armed conflicts that may inevitably draw in combatants from other nations, as well as the undermining of the international ability to protect small nations from aggressors. Unilateralism, it is argued, can be considered nothing more than a positively-sold version of

the very actions that would earn other states the title of aggressor or rogue nation. Opponents of unilateralism say that it rejects the essential interwoven nature of modern global politics and perhaps underestimates the extent to which a conflict in one country can affect civilians in others (Wikipedia 2010).

Proponents of multilateralism argue that it would provide a country with greater resources, both militarily and economically, and would help in defraying the cost of military action.. Multilateralists argue that co-operations strengthens the bonds between nations and peoples, paints the west in a more responsible and respected light, and reduces the risk of wildfire conflicts by increasing the size and unity of the enemy such a rogue nation would face (Wikipedia 2010).

3.9 Islam and Democracy

• The Qur'an has elaborately and repeatedly emphasized freedom of conscience. Faith and conviction are matters of conscience and no compulsion is allowed in this regard (Farooq 2002). We find several verses in the Qur'an clarifying this point. For example:

“Let there be no compulsion

In religion. Truth stands out

Clear from Error” (Q 2:256).

There are many among non-Muslims (individuals and institutions) who see no conflict between Islam and democracy and they would like to see the Muslim world pursue a path of change and transformation toward democracy. Robin Wright, a well-known American expert on the Middle East and the Muslim world writes: neither Islam nor its culture is the major obstacle to political modernity (Wright 1996, p 67).

In his magnum opus *Asian Drama*, Nobel Laureate Gunnar Myrdal identified a set of modernization ideals that included democracy. In regard to religion in general and Islam in

particular, he had this to say: The basic doctrine of the old religions in the region Hinduism, Islam and Buddhism are not necessarily inimical to modernization. For example, Islamic, and less explicitly, Buddhist doctrines are advanced to support reforms along the lines of modernization ideals. If democracy is intimately related to egalitarianism, he further comments: Islam and Buddhism can provide support for one of the modernization ideals in particular: egalitarian reforms (Farooq 2002). Confronting the view of those who suggest the incompatibility, John . Val and John L. Esposito, two bridge-builders between Islam and the West articulate: The Islamic heritage, in fact, contains concepts that provide a foundation for contemporary Muslims to develop authentically Islamic programs of democracy (Val & Esposito 1994).

In explaining some common western misperception, Graham E. Fuller (former Vice-Chairman of the National Intelligence Council at the CIA) writes: Most western observers tend to look at the phenomenon of political Islam as if it were butterfly in a collection box, captured and skewered for eternity, or as a set of texts unbendingly prescribing a single path. This is why some scholars who examine it's core writings proclaim Islam to be incompatible with democracy as if any religion in its origins was about democracy at all (Fuller 2002).

Turning to their own Islamic root and heritage, there are now a growing number of voices among Muslims who are convincingly making the case that Islam and democracy are not just compatible; rather, their association is inevitable, because Islamic political system is based on *Shura* (mutual consultation). Khaled Abou el-Fadl, Ziauddin Sardar, Rachid Ghannoushi, Hasan Turabi, Khurshid Ahmad, Fathi Osman and most notably, Shaikh Yusuf al-Qaradawi, are just to name a few among the contemporary Islamic scholars and intellectuals who are arduously working to move both the Muslim world and the West toward better mutual understanding in regard to the relationship between Islam and democracy (Farooq 2002). Democracy can be defined as government by the people; *especially*, rule of the majority; a Government in which the supreme power is vested in the people and exercised by

them directly or indirectly through a system of representation usually involving periodically held free elections; the common people especially when constituting the source of political authority; the absence of hereditary or arbitrary class distinctions or privileges .

The reality is that Islam is not only compatible with the above aspects that define or describe democracy, but also that those aspects are essential to Islam. If we can cut through the labels and semantics, we find that Islamic governance, when distilled from all the extraneous aspects, has at least three core features, based on the Quranic vision and guidance on one hand and the experience under the Prophet (s) and the Rightly Guided Caliphs on the other (Farooq 2002).

a. Constitutional: Islamic government is essentially a "constitutional" government, where constitution represents the agreement of the governed to govern by a defined and agreed upon framework of rights and duties. For Muslims, the source of the constitution is the Qur'an, the Sunnah, and anything deemed relevant, effective, but not inconsistent with Islam. No authority, except the governed, has the right to put away (abrogate) or change such a constitution. Thus, Islamic governance can't be an autocratic, hereditary or military rule. Such a system of governance is egalitarian in nature, and egalitarianism is one of the hallmarks of Islam. It is also widely acknowledged that the beginning of the Islamic polity in Madinah was based on a constitutional foundation and pluralistic framework involving non-Muslims as well (Sullivan 2002).

b. Participatory: An Islamic political system is participatory. From establishing the institutional structure of governance to operating it, the system is participatory. It means that the leadership and the policies will be conducted on the basis of full, gender-neutral participation of the governed through a popular electoral process. Muslims can use their creativity using the Islamic guidelines and human experience to date to institute, and continuously refine, their processes. This participatory aspect is the Islamic process of *Shura* (mutual consultation) (Slatt 2006).

c. Accountable: This is an essential corollary to a constitutional/participatory system. The leadership and the holders of authority are accountable to people within an Islamic framework. Islamic framework here means that all Muslims are accountable to Allah and his divine guidance. But that is more in a theological sense. The practical accountability relates to people. Thus, the *Khulafa ar-Rashidoon* were both *Khalifatur Rasool* (representative of the Messenger) as well as *Khalifatul Muslimeen* (representative of the Muslims) (Sullivan 2002).

This point needs further examination because a key and stubborn misperception of Muslims in regard to democracy is based on the notion that in Islam sovereignty belongs to God, while in democracy it belongs to people. This is a naive and erroneous notion or interpretation. God is the true and ultimate Sovereign, but he has bestowed a level of freedom and responsibility upon the human beings in this world. God has decided not to function as the Sovereign in *this* world. He has blessed humanity with revelations and his essential guidance. Muslims are to shape and conduct their lives, individually and collectively, according to that guidance. But even though essentially this guidance is based on divine revelation, its interpretation and implementation are human (Farooq 2002). Whether people will choose the path to heaven or hell is a human decision. Whether they will choose Islam or another path, it is a human decision. Whether people will choose to organize their lives based on Islam or not is a human decision. Whether Muslims would choose an Islamic form of governance or not is a human decision. It can be argued that for making wrong choices in this world, Muslims might be facing negative consequences in the life hereafter. But, still it is a matter of *choice*; there is no room for compulsion or imposition (Farooq 2002).

What happens when the society and leadership faces a conflict? For example, if the majority of the society does not want to uphold Islam, the leadership cannot coerce the society into what it does not want. There is no compulsion or coercion in Islam. Coercion never delivers sustainable results, and the foundation of Islam cannot be based on coercion. God is the sovereign from the viewpoint of Islamic reality, but not from practical standpoint. When our decisions are to be made based on *Ijtihad* (and we could be wrong), where our

constitution and policies would be formulated through human consultation (and we can err), when our judicial system would be guided by the revealed guidance, yet, based on the evidence presented, there would be chance for an innocent to get convicted and a guilty to go free. God is not acting as a sovereign in this world. To think like that is not to show due and full respect to the very freedom and responsibility that God has entrusted us with (Slatt 2006).

Indeed, thinking like this leaves room for big abuse, as someone or some institution declares that God is the sovereign, and then they impose their own rule or whims in the name of the sovereign. History is full of such abuses, where Shariah has been enforced or allowed for the people, but some powerful or privileged people remained above the Shariah. Even if one person remains above such Shariah, that is not true rule of law or Shariah at all (Slatt 2006).

Thus, based on the above core features, it is important to recognize that Islam is incompatible with monarchy, military rule, dictatorship, or any other type of authoritarian political system. Islam envisions a constitutional, participatory, and accountable system of governance. This is the Islamic concept of *Khilafat*. However, we need to be less concerned about terminology, label or semantics than substance (Slatt 2006). In its fundamental character based on those core features, there is no conflict between democracy and Islamic political system, except that in an Islamic political system people cannot call themselves Islamic while themselves being in conflict with Islam. That is why Muslims should not shun democracy in a general sense as conflicting with Islam; rather, they should welcome it. , As Dr. Fathi Osman, one of the leading Muslim intellectuals of our time, remarked: "Democracy is the best application of *Shura*" (Farooq 2002, np).

This issue of Islam and democracy is important not just for Muslims, but also for the West. As Esposito argues, democracy in the west is arguably not a model of perfection at the *end of history* (qtd in Farooq 2002), rather, a reconceptualization of democracy is viewed as a continuous imperative. Since we are not at the end of history and the United States has not

yet solved all of the problems of survival in a heterogeneous world, it is as important for us to continually adapt to changing conditions as it is for Muslims. Esposito's (Esposito 1996, p34) well-articulated views are based on a common-ground-seeking approach, not on a sophomoric us vs. them, or good vs. evil. Rather, Esposito contends, we all have something to benefit from each other in light of our human experience (Esposito 1996).

The Challenges Ahead: The Muslims who consider Islam and democracy to be incompatible need to discard their biased position based on misperceptions. In addition, those who consider these to be compatible need to jettison their apologetic approach. If Muslims find adequate convergence between Islam and democracy, it is not because some or many scholars Muslims or non-Muslims think so and that they would like us to tread the path of democracy. Rather, Islamic governance, a constitutional, participatory and accountable form is essentially based on the consent of the people or those who are governed, and thus democratic. The benefits of accumulated human experience are important to us Muslims as well. However, our interest in Islamic governance, based on people's consent, is not and should not be because the west wants us to follow them or because we need to modernize ourselves; rather, because we need to cherish and uphold consent-based governance, founded on the core principles and values of Islam (Kelly 2003).

Muslims must also recognize the historical fact that for nearly fourteen centuries the system of governance, though progressive and dynamic compared to the other contemporary societies and civilizations of the time, has been based not on what is popularly described as Khilafat. Since the time to Muawiya, the Khilafat turned into Mulukiyaah (hereditary monarchy). That was an important turning point, because this replacement of Khilafat with Mulukiyyah was actually a counter-revolution against the revolution of the Prophet Muhammad (Kelly 2003). The political legacy that followed and on the basis of which has evolved our current dysfunctional state is rooted in that counter-revolution, not the revolution of the Prophet and the legacy of the Rightly-Guided Caliphs. One may find things to disagree

about some of the thoughts of Sayyid Abul Ala Maududi, but his characterization of this crucial turning point as a counter-revolution is an important contribution toward understanding the hereditary political institutions in the Muslim world that stands in contradiction to the vision and values of the Quran and the legacy and heritage of the Prophet and the Rightly Guided Caliphs (Kelly 2003).

There is also a constructive role to be played by the non-Muslim world. Whenever Muslims find such convergence with democracy, those among the non-Muslims who care about democracy should desist the characterization that now Muslims are modernizing themselves and deviating from Islam. Such characterization only serves to legitimize and reinforce the radicals and the traditionalists, and their radical/traditional interpretations. Moreover, there is no short-cut to a presumably monolithic, mature democracy. As Graham Fuller writes: Modern liberal governance is more likely to take root through organically evolving liberal Islamist trends at the grass root level than from imported Western modules of instant democracy (Fuller 2002). Fuller admonishes his fellow westerners: Non-Muslims should understand that democratic values are latent in Islamic thought if one wants to look for them, and that it would not be more natural and organic for the Muslim world to derive contemporary liberal practices from its own sources than to import them wholesale from foreign cultures (Fuller 2002).

On another front, a mutual challenge has to be met. Muslims need to converge toward a consensus that they would settle for only constitutional, participatory and accountable form of government (call it democracy or anything you like). Non-Muslims, especially the West, also need to realize that, just like the West or Islam is not monolithic, so is not democracy. If they would like to see a new world where all people seek and value constitutional, participatory and accountable form of governance, then, once again, the substance is what matters, not label or semantics (Fuller 2002).

Lastly, even though the West regularly sermonizes the rest of the world about the virtue of democracy, the West or the dominant powers of the West fundamentally remains an obstacle against the emergence of democracy in the Muslim world, because the current global domination is more compatible and safer with autocratic or despotic rulers some of which are puppets of the West and some are kept cornered or marginalized by the West. This Western power block is not willing to trust any rise of Islam, even if the Muslims believe in and uphold a constitutional, participatory, and accountable form of government (Kelly 2003). Muslims still have a sacred and a historical duty to rise up to a dual challenge. Internally, they must persevere to establish a system of governance that is Islamic (and thus democratic). They must also rise up to challenge the Western hegemony that only sermonizes about democracy, but actually works against any genuine democratic transformation in the Muslim world (Kelly 2003).

If, in a problem-solving manner and in accordance with the guidance of Islam, Muslims desire to be effective in dealing with the issues that deeply affect them, they need to have the unshakable conviction that despite their current dismal condition, their role is not merely to work out their own problems, but also they do have something valuable to offer to the humanity and the West in balancing the extremities of the modern times. Indeed, the West could not have been what it is today without critical contributions from the Islamic civilization as more than just a bridge-builder. While the West may not readily acknowledge it, Muslims must not forget this historical fact when assessing their present situation and taking stock of their potentials and responsibilities (Kelly 2003).

While some can't get over their preoccupation with the clash of civilization paradigm, especially in the context of Islam and the West, there are conscientious western scholars who look forward to a new phase of relationship between Islam and the West: If ever the opposition of the great societies of the East and west is to be replaced by cooperation, the

mediation of Islam is an indispensable condition. Muslims also need to realize their historic responsibility in this regard (Farooq 2002).

3.10 Islam and Human Rights

In the post-colonial age, and more particularly, in the age of economic and cultural globalization, it is important to dispel doubts about the universality of human rights by seriously engaging metaphysical and epistemic foundations of human rights norms to demonstrate that these norms can be essentially grounded in religious notions about human dignity and divinely ordained human freedom of will. Religious doctrines have the potential of working towards an overlapping consensus on important articles in the Declaration—a consensus that secular human rights theoreticians can ill-afford to ignore. The Declaration's normative discourse must be critically reinvestigated for its universal presumptions about human inherency in light of the theological discourse whose universal language continues to guide ethical and jurisprudential values of the common life (Sachedina 2007).

Whereas many do not share Alasdair MacIntyre's rejection of universal rights as fictitious (MacIntyre 1991), most of them agree with him in insisting that traditional societies had universal notions of justice and had worked towards principles of coexistence among themselves and others long before the secular modernist spoke about the contractarian theory of corporate life that shaped modern politics. The founder of Islam, for instance, not only recognized the temporal existence as part and parcel of one's faith commitment; he also created stable and universal institutional structures to further the vision of a just public order under God's guidance. Islam's experience with the temporal world was sociologically and linguistically inclusive and universalistic. As a world-embracing tradition, Islam's ethical and jurisprudential guidance set out to provide fixed norms for building a multi-faith, multi-ethnic, and multi-cultural society that spoke to the vision of a universal community founded upon justice. Since this moral context was potentially inclusive, the need to compromise its

faith-based vision of the public order to accommodate other communities actually never arose. As a matter of fact, it had no problem in endorsing a common moral stance that was founded upon a universally recognizable account of individual autonomy, the common good, and a divinely endowed self-subsisting moral standard that transcends religious and cultural differences (Sachedina 2007). Having argued for the inclusion of conversation about the foundations that under gird the Declaration, let me also hasten to add that in principle many agree with the secularist theoreticians of human rights who actively advocate avoiding entanglement with metaphysical and religious notions like human dignity, natural law, and divine purposes for humanity so that the true purpose of the international document, namely, protection of human beings from abuse, oppression, and cruelty, is not in any way diminished. It is a truism to reiterate the secularist concern that when human dignity itself is in danger, academic controversy about the foundations of universal morality intensifies moral complacency rather than protecting individual human rights. Nonetheless, ignoring Muslim criticisms about the ethnocentric and hegemonic goals of the Declaration, however unfounded, has the danger of further marginalizing human rights in the Muslim world (Sachedina 2007).

The problem that faces Muslim supporters of the Declaration is that without due consideration of religious or philosophical sources, it will be difficult to garner the support of Muslim communities to work towards improving human rights instruments to effect the necessary implementation of the Declaration. Evidently, emphasis on the secular-religious dichotomy will necessarily lead to a foundationless model, which actually stifles critical dialogue between the secular and traditionalist theorists. In addition, Western- Islamic polarization in terms of liberal-non-liberal societies is also detrimental to the need for international consensus on protecting a number of basic freedoms, including freedom of conscience and religion. The Islamic model for democratic pluralism is not inherently antithetical to a central concept of human dignity and the individual's inalienable right to

determine her spiritual destiny without interference. In Muslim societies enforcement of human rights will be taken even more seriously if, using the foundational model, one can derive the inherent worth of the individual and argue for freedom of religion. Human rights are in origin a Western concept that needs to become Islamic in all its ramifications (Amara 1985).

The secular liberal thesis holds that liberty can survive only outside religion and through secularization of a religious tradition was founded upon the historical experience of Christianity, and, hence, had little resonance in Islam. The liberal solution was clearly to separate the public and the private in order to guarantee that the public square would remain inclusive and tolerant of differences. The value of freedom had to be raised over and against Christian religious exclusivity. In other words, privatization through the secularization of Christianity helped in reducing the hold of religious law and the church over society, thus making pluralism in the public square possible (Amara 1985).

The religious experience of those who argue for foundationless theories of human rights is worth keeping in mind, particularly when such a negative evaluation of religion is extended to the different historical experience of Muslim societies. Foundationless theories are concerned with guaranteeing basic human rights and reconciling basic freedoms with the moral worth of all humans as humans. To be sure, in light of the tragic unfolding of exclusive religiosity and moral absolutism, that concern was and remains real even today. Was Muslim historical experience any different? Evidently it was, and this is what seems to be the source of an alternative human rights paradigm presented by Muslim apologists. What is missing in this alternative paradigm is the discussion of any foundational capacity in Islamic tradition to sit in dialogue with the secular human rights theorists to make a case for inclusive notions of human entitlements, tampered with human responsibilities in maintaining the overall well-being of humanity in all its areas and spheres of existence. What is needed is a substantial theoretical discussion of an inclusive foundational conception of human rights that would

appeal to the suspicious traditional authorities in the Muslim world, apparently threatened by secular ideologies that they believe are determined to destroy the spiritual and moral foundations of a global community to make room for liberal secular ideas of inalienable human rights (Sachedina 2007).

A foundational theory of human rights could be articulated based on some of the pluralistic features of Islam and its culture that are totally ignored by Muslim traditionalist and fundamentalist discourse. True to its internal juridical plurality, the Islamic tradition was concerned with the preservation of freedom against any kind of legal or political authoritarianism, especially in view of its refusal to afford any human institution like the “church” the right to represent divine interests on earth. Moreover, this default plurality was instrumental in preserving relatively peaceful coexistence among peoples of diverse faiths and cultures under Muslim political domination. Functional recognition of separate jurisdictions for spiritual and temporal was also instrumental in affording fundamental agreement on public values and in meeting the demands of multi-faith and multi-cultural societies of the Islamic world to regulate human relationships among peoples of different faiths and culture. Hence, the Western experience of separation of religion and politics by default remains alien to Muslim political experience (Sachedina 2007).

It is this difference in the historical experience of the West and Islam that calls into question whether the foundationless secular model can on its own provide universal standards that can be applied across cultures. It needs to look at the foundational religious model with its own universal claim to offer a more comprehensive understanding of what it means to be a defender of human rights today. Religion cannot and will not confine itself to the private domain where it will eventually lose its influence in nurturing human conscience. It needs a public space in the development of an international sense of a world community with a vision for creating an ideal society that cares and shares.

The Western monopoly on human rights is argued against with the notion that no Western concept of human rights existed before the 17th century (Mawdudi 1975). The first practical proof or demonstration of these rights didn't come until the 18th century, through the proclamations and constitutions of America and France. In Islam there is on the other hand existed human rights since the birth of the religion. Since these rights are sanctioned by God, the rights stated in proclamations and resolutions by the UN can't even be compared to them. Rights given by men can also be withdrawn by men. They are rather philosophical concepts, which have no sanctions behind them. This is where complications for human rights advocates often arise. Since the concept of universal human rights is based on the idea of natural rights given to man on virtue of being human and not through any divine revelation, they may be hard to justify when opposed to a culture where all rights and duties are formulated by God (Mawdudi 1975). Now let us see and analyze some fundamental human Rights that Islam approves--

The Right to Life: This, the most basic of all rights and also one of the opening articles in the UDHR, does not constitute a problem in Islamic law. It is based on verse 5:32 “Whosoever kills a human being without any reason like man slaughter, or corruption on earth, it is as though he had killed all mankind.” There is however an exception to the rule in verse 6:151, where it is said that killing a person through the due process of law is permitted. The law referred to obviously is the *Sharia*, which would make it possible to sentence people to death according to its rules about apostasy. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) does on the other hand in article 6 allow countries who haven't abolished death penalty, to impose it for the most serious crimes. The US can of course be used as an example of a Western country that still hasn't abolished death penalty. The article does not define what constitutes “the most serious crime”, except that it has to be “in accordance with the law at the time of the commission of the crime”. In theory there is consequently no

obstacle for an Islamic state, where a legal system based on Sharía is in force, to have death penalty on what according to that law is considered the most serious crime.

The Right to the Safety of Life: In Islam, it is the duty for all Muslims to save another human being if his life is in danger and if it is within their power to save him.. As it imposes duties on individuals rather than on the state, it however doesn't exist in any of the UN conventions and a comparison with universal human rights is not possible (Souaiaia 2008).

Respect for the Chastity of Women: The right to chastity of women is not either a human right as understood in international law. The rights of women are as mentioned before one of the most complicated fields in Islamic law versus international human rights law. The right of respect of the chastity of women seems to be defined as the right of women not to be raped or in other ways assaulted. The respect of the chastity of women can however, on the contrary of actually being a right of women, constitute a restriction of the woman's personal freedom. The Talibans for example argued that the reason to keep women secluded and enshrouded, is to make sure that her chastity is not at risk (Souaiaia 2008).

The Right to a Basic Standard of Life: Based on the verse "...and in their wealth there is acknowledge right for the needy and destitute." (Q51:19), this right is the duty of Muslims to economically help those less fortunate than themselves. This idea can be found in most religions, Christianity included, but does not have a counterpart in the UDHR or the covenants, as it puts the duty on the individuals rather than the state to attend to the satisfaction of everybody's basic needs. The right to some kind of social security and a minimum economic level can however be found both in the UDHR and the ICESCR, but then with the state as duty-bearer.

Right to Respect: The Qur'an deems all human beings to be worthy of respect , because of all creation they alone chose to accept the "trust" of freedom of the will. Human beings can exercise freedom of the will because they possess the rational faculty, which is

what distinguishes them from all other creatures . Though human beings can become "the lowest of the lowest", the Qur'an declares that they have been made "in the best of moulds" (Q 95:4), having the ability to think, to have knowledge of right and wrong, to do the good and to avoid the evil. Thus, on account of the promise which is contained in being human, namely, the potential to be God's vicegerent on earth, the humanness of all human beings is to be respected and considered to be an end in itself (Souaiaia 2008).

Right to Acquire Knowledge: The Qur'an puts the highest emphasis on the importance of acquiring knowledge. That knowledge has been at the core of the Islamic world-view from the very beginning is attested to by Surah 96: Al'Alaq: 1-5, which Muslims believe to be the first revelation received by the Prophet Muhammad. Asking rhetorically if those without knowledge can be equal to those with knowledge , the Qur'an exhorts believers to pray for advancement in knowledge . The famous prayer of the Prophet Muhammad was "Allah grant me Knowledge of the ultimate nature of things" and one of the best known of all traditions ("ahadith") is "Seek knowledge even though it be in China." According to Qur'anic perspective, knowledge is a prerequisite for the creation of a just world in which authentic peace can prevail. The Qur'an emphasizes the importance of the pursuit of learning even at the time, and in the midst, of war (Hasan 2008) .

Right to Sustenance: As pointed out by Surah 11: Hud: 6, every living creature depends for its sustenance upon God. A cardinal concept in the Qur'an - which underlies the socio-economic-political system of Islam - is that the ownership of everything belongs, not to any person, but to God. Since God is the universal creator, every creature has the right to partake of what belongs to God. This means that every human being has the right to a means of living and that those who hold economic or political power do not have the right to deprive others of the basic necessities of life by misappropriating or misusing resources which have been created by God for the benefit of humanity in general.

Right to Work: According to Qur'anic teaching every man and woman has the right to work, whether the work consists of gainful employment or voluntary service. The fruits of labour belong to the one who has worked for **them** - regardless of whether it is a man or a woman. As Quran states:

“...to men

Is allotted what they earn,

And to women what they earn”(Q 4:32).

Right to Privacy: The Qur'an recognizes the need for privacy as a human right and lays down rules for protecting an individual's life in the home from undue intrusion from within or without.

Right to Protection from Slander, Backbiting, and Ridicule: The Qur'an recognizes the right of human beings to be protected from defamation, sarcasm, offensive nicknames, and backbiting. It also states that no person is to be maligned on grounds of assumed guilt and that those who engage in malicious scandal-mongering will be grievously punished in both this world and the next (Hasan 2008).

Right to Leave One's Homeland Under Oppressive Conditions: According to Qur'anic teaching, a Muslim's ultimate loyalty must be to God and not to any territory. To fulfil his Prophetic mission, the Prophet Muhammad decided to leave his place of birth, Mecca, and immigrated to Medina. This event ("Hijrah") has great historical and spiritual significance for Muslims who are called upon to move away from their place of origin if it becomes an abode of evil and oppression where they cannot fulfil their obligations to God or establish justice (Hasan 2008).

Right to "The Good Life": The Qur'an upholds the right of the human being not only to life but to " The good life ". This good life, made up of many elements, becomes possible when a human being is living in a just environment. According to Qur'anic teaching,

justice is a prerequisite for peace, and peace is a prerequisite for human development. In a just society, all the earlier-mentioned human rights may be exercised without difficulty. In such a society other basic rights such as the right to a secure place of residence, the right to the protection of one's personal possessions, the right to protection of one's covenants, the right to move freely, the right to social and judicial autonomy for minorities, the right to the protection of one's holy places and the right to return to one's spiritual center, also exist (Hasan 2008).

The Cairo Declaration on Human rights in Islam: To avoid conflict with universal declaration of human Rights, and to present the case of Islamic version of human rights to the global community and to UN, the Organisation of Islamic Conference (OIC) formulated this Cairo declaration of human rights in Islam in 1990 (See appendix1).

3.11 Islam and Women Rights

Muslim men never tire of repeating that Islam has given more rights to women than has any other religion. Certainly, if by "Islam" is meant "Qur'anic Islam" the rights that it has given to women are, indeed, impressive. Not only do women partake of all the "General Rights" mentioned in the foregoing pages, they are also the subject of much particular concern in the Qur'an. Underlying much of the Qur'an's legislation on women-related issues is the recognition that women have been disadvantaged persons in history to whom justice needs to be done by the Muslim "ummah". Unfortunately, however, the cumulative (Jewish, Christian, Hellenistic, Bedouin and other) biases which existed in the Arab-Islamic culture of the early centuries of Islam infiltrated the Islamic tradition and undermined the intent of the Qur'an to liberate women from the status of chattels or inferior creatures and make them free and equal to men (Vyver & Witte 1996). A review of Muslim history and culture brings to light many areas in which - Qur'anic teaching notwithstanding - women continued to be subjected to diverse forms of oppression and injustice, often in the name of Islam, while the

Qur'an because of its protective attitude toward all downtrodden and oppressed classes of people, appears to be weighted in many ways in favor of women.

However, there is hope for the future. There are indications from across the world of Islam that a growing number of Muslims are beginning to reflect seriously upon the teachings of the Qur'an as they become disenchanted with capitalism, communism and western democracy. As this reflection deepens, it is likely to lead to the realization that the supreme task entrusted to human beings by God, of being God's deputies on earth, can only be accomplished by establishing justice which the Qur'an regards as a prerequisite for authentic peace. Without the elimination of the inequities, inequalities, and injustices that pervade the personal and collective lives of human beings, it is not possible to talk about peace in Qur'anic terms. Here, it is of importance to note that there is more Qur'anic legislation pertaining to the establishment of justice in the context of family relationships than on any other subject. This points to the assumption implicit in much Qur'anic learning, namely, that if human beings can learn to order their homes justly so that the human rights of all within its jurisdiction - children, women, and men - are safeguarded, then they can also order their society and the world at large, justly. In other words, the Qur'an regards the home as a microcosm of the "ummah" and the world community, and emphasizes the importance of making it "the abode of peace" through just living (Vyver & Witte 1996).

Muslim women have the right and duty to acquire education (Waheed 2009), to have her own independent property, to work (job or business) to earn money, to equal reward for equal deed and/or work, to express her opinion, to argue and/or advocate her cause or opinion to be heard, to vote since 1,421 years, to provisions from her husband for all her needs and more, to negotiate marriage terms of her choice, to obtain divorce from her husband, even on the grounds that she simply don't like him. In Islam divorce is suppose to be last resort. She is not primarily responsible for maintenance of family, she is entitled to get sexual satisfaction from her husband, to get custody of her children in case of divorce (unless she is unable to

raise them for valid reasons), to choose husband of her choice, to refuse a proposed and/or arranged marriage, to re-marry after divorce or after becoming widow.

Exemptions are Given to Women in Certain Circumstances (Waheed 2009):

Women are exempted from fasting when they are pregnant or nursing or menstruating, from praying when menstruating or bleeding after childbirth, from the obligation to attend congregational prayers in the mosque on Fridays, they are not obliged to take part as soldiers in the defense of Islam, although they are not forbidden to do so. But under normal circumstances they are allowed to do all the things that men do. Even when they are menstruating, on special days, like the two Eid festivals, they are still allowed to come to the Eid prayers, and menstruating women can take part in most of the actions of the Hajj pilgrimage. Islamic laws do not require that women should confine themselves to household duties.

Muslim women have headed Islamic provinces [and states as well], like Arwa bint Ahmad, who served as governor of Yemen under the Fatimid Khalifahs in the late fifth and early sixth century (Waheed 2009). Name any other religion, political theory, or philosophy which offers such a comprehensiveness to women by giving her total control of her life and affairs ?

3.12 Islam and Jihad

Some people believe that the Islamic doctrine of *jihad* means “holy war” and that Muslims are commanded to kill unbelievers because of it. However, the true meaning of *jihad* is to strive or to struggle. Another common misconception of Islam is that it encourages violence, but it actually discourages violence and preaches about love and forgiveness. Finally, many people believe that Islamic terrorists are an accurate reflection of all Muslims. The truth is however, that the Qur’an does not support terrorism or homicide. True Islamic

doctrine does not foster terrorism as *jihad* does not demand a “holy war”, Islam is a religion of peace, and Islamic extremists do not accurately reflect the religion (Emerick 2002).

“The word ‘Islamic’ itself has acquired the bristling status of a frightening, irrational monster. Every article published about Hamas or Islamic fundamentalism or Iran...describes a historical world of pure despotism, pure rage, and pure violence,” wrote Edward Said, a professor at Columbia University and an author of many books on Islam and the Middle East (Said 2005). For years, Islamic doctrine has been criticized because of terrorists and extremists who have fought “in the name of Allah”. Especially after the attacks on the United States on September 11th, 2001, there are many North Americans who stereotype the Muslim people as being terrorists.

The belief that *jihad* advocates violence is a major misinterpretation of Islamic doctrine. Mohammed Abdul Malek (2005), an author who dedicated his life to the study of Islam explained, “In reality *jihad* is a duty of Muslims to commit themselves to a struggle on all fronts—moral, spiritual and political—to create a just and decent society” (Malek 2005, p12). It is not a ‘holy war’ against the non-believers as is commonly believed. Malek continued by explaining that “the phrase ‘holy war’ was coined by the West in its struggle against the Muslims during the time of the Crusades (a war instigated by the Church for religious gain)” (Malek 2005, p18). If the intention of *jihad* was to declare war, other Arabic words would have been used which are more appropriate in a war situation. Examples of words such as these are *harb* (war) and *ma'araka* (battle). Therefore, the true meaning of *jihad* is not to initiate a war. Antony T. Sullivan is an associate at the Center for Middle Eastern and North African Studies at the University of Michigan and a member of the board of directors of the Center for the Study of Islam and Democracy. In his article, ‘Islam Does Not Encourage Terrorism’, he explained,

...terrorism and *jihad* are not identical twins but historic enemies...a new vocabulary is essential to demonstrate the radical antipathy that has

separated these concepts until very recent decades. Terrorism is not only un-Islamic but anti-Islamic, and those who commit terrorism should be designated as criminals rather than as holy warriors or resistance fighters (Sullivan 2005, p 30).

If *jihad* meant “holy war” it would be contradicting the true doctrine of the Qur’an, which is the basis of all true Islam. The interpretation of the word *jihad* has been given to individuals who have chosen different paths of obedience to this commandment and unfortunately some Muslims have chosen to commit acts of terrorism which are against the true doctrine of the Qur’an. Muslims who strive for Allah through violence should not be praised for their obedience and devotion, but condemned for their misuse and disrespect of *jihad*. Yahiya J. Emerick, the president of the Islamic Foundation of North America wrote,

Islam is not a society of vigilantes. It’s not up to anyone who feels like it to declare a jihad...only an Islamic government or a worldwide leader of Islam has the authority to declare a jihad. Neither one exists in the Muslim world right now. Jihad is one of the most misused words in the world today. It means to struggle in God’s way. If someone does something in a way other than what God has ordained, then it is a crime that the individual will have to answer for on the Day of Judgement (Emerick 2002, p 25).

The word *jihad* is commonly associated with the wrong meaning and those who believe that it means “holy war” are misunderstanding the doctrine of the Qur’an. Jihad should not be defined as “holy war” but more appropriately as a “holy struggle”.

Moreover, the translation of *jihad* to mean “holy war” is not Islamic in its roots.

The president of a moderate Muslim organization, the Peace Press Association, Seifeldin Ashmawy clarified, “The physical jihad that is erroneously translated as ‘holy war’ was imposed on the early converts of Islam to permit them to defend themselves against the aggression of the pagans” (Ashmawy,2005). The commandment to fight a war in the name

of Allah was given for a specific time and place, and is not to be used as an excuse to permit a “holy war of any kind.” The term was coined by the West and the correct translation of *jihad* as a struggle has been lost. Mohammed Abdul Malek explained,

Jihad means to strive or make an effort, usually in an Islamic context so that anything which requires an effort to be made is *Jihad* and the person doing it is a *mujahid*. The media would have us believe that it is fighting and killing in the name of Allah. It is certainly in the name of Allah, but as usual, the media have corrupted the meaning so that they can apply its new meaning to ‘fundamentalist Muslims’, basically any Muslim who does not subscribe totally to the Western way of life (Malek 2005,p 22).

The media plays a large part in convincing the West that *jihad* means “holy war” and that it is a threat to the United States by sensationalizing violent acts committed by Muslims. Yet, the Arabic word “*jihad*” can be found multiple times in the Qur’an and is replaced with the word “strive” in English versions. It is never translated as “holy war”. For example, the Qur’an reads, “Therefore do not listen to the Unbelievers but strive against them with the utmost strenuousness, with the”(Q9:41). Translated from Arabic to English, the Qur’an clearly uses the word “strive” as the true meaning of *jihad*. Another example can be found in Surah 29, which reads, “And those who strive in Our (Cause), - We will certainly guide them to Our Paths: for verily Allah is with those who do right”(Q29:69). *Jihad* is never translated to English as “holy war” in the Qur’an. Malek concluded by saying, “... simply explaining the true meaning of *Jihad* to those who do not know; is *Jihad* in itself” (Malek,2005). A Muslim can strive for Allah in common daily activities and does not need to fight for Allah in a military sense to please Him. *Jihad* is not a command to die for Allah, but a command to live for Him.

Although many people feel that violence and terrorism are advocated by the Qur’an, the truth is that the writings themselves do not promote violence. Islam is often wrongly

associated with violence instead of peace. Regrettably, “hate and mistrust have taken over in the Islamic world where love and piety have once Reigned, wrote Calicut Hamza, a journalist for *The Milli Gazette*, the leading Muslim newspaper. Yet the Qur’an is not a piece of hate literature which has corrupted the minds of Muslims around the world. The text itself preaches about love and forgiveness and teaches that hatred and murder are unacceptable. The Qur’an states, “If any one slew a person – unless it be for murder or for spreading mischief in the land – it would be as if he slew the whole people”(Q 5:32) Murder, as well as smaller acts of violence, are simply not condoned in the Qur’an. “...take not life, which Allah has made sacred”(Q6:151) is also found in the Qur’an. Islam’s most sacred text clearly states that Allah has made all of life sacred and Muslims are to kill neither Muslims nor non-believers. Lessons can also be learned from the life of the Muslim Prophet Mohammad. Throughout the Qur’an, he demonstrated that a person of the Islamic faith should not be violent. When a person entered a Mosque in Madinah with arrows and the iron-ends exposed, the Prophet told him to take hold of the pointed heads so that he will not harm others. Another time, the Prophet witnessed a person training his son in archery by targeting a hen. The Prophet advised the man not to use any living being as a target for such training. In another instance, the Prophet told a woman not to harm her cat, nor any person for “One, who is not merciful to others, will not be treated mercifully”(Bukhari 5:26) said the Prophet. Cruelty and animosity are not characteristics of the Prophet on whom Muslims are to model themselves. The Qur’an does not preach to kill others, yet some verses have been wrongly interpreted. Yahiya Emerick discussed,

The Qur’an never says to fight and kill people who are not believers, although one of its verses, which is often quoted out of context, does say ‘to fight the unbelievers wherever you find them.’ However, this command was revealed when a state of war existed between the first Muslim community and their stronger opponents, the idol-worshippers of Mecca. The command

was directing the Muslims not to run away from a fight with oppressors but instead to go headlong into battle with the people who had been attacking them without mercy for so long. (Emerick 2002,p 34).

Verses from the Qur'an are often used out of context and should not to be used to vindicate violence or the murder of unbelievers. The command to fight against the oppressors was given through the Prophets for a specific time and place in history. It is not to be understood as a general Islamic ideology or as an excuse to kill unbelievers. An example of a verse from the Qur'an that is often quoted out of context is found in the second Surah, which reads,

And slay them wherever you catch them, and turn them out from where they have turned you out; for tumult and oppression are worse than slaughter; but do not fight them at the Sacred Mosque, unless they (first) fight you there; but if they fight you, slay them. Such is the reward of those who suppress the faith.(Q 2: 190-194).

This verse is even quoted out of context by scholars, who attempt to show that Islam justifies the killing of unbelievers. Yet, the Qur'an itself should not be blamed for those who choose to interpret it incorrectly. Its verses promote peace, love, and forgiveness, and although they contain a few violent events, the Qur'an does not encourage violence, hatred, or bitterness. Even after the terrorist attacks of September 11th, 2001, through such pain and damage to the nation, the president of the United States, George Bush, voiced his opinion about Islam. He said that Islam is not the root of the terrorist acts committed. President Bush stated, "When we think of Islam we think of a faith that brings comfort to a billion people around the world. Billions of people find comfort and solace and peace. And that's made brothers and sisters out of every race – out of every race"(Eidenmuller 2008, p 12). During a time of hurt and mourning; a time when the United States' hegemonic finger could have been pointed towards Islam, the president understood that a small group of people's actions should not account for the integrity of an entire religion.

Many Americans believe that true Islam encourages terrorism because they have seen so many Muslim faces in the media displaying hatred. Yet, so many critics of Islam are unaware of the actual teachings of the Qur'an itself. It is possible that these critics are afraid of that which is different and those who are different from themselves. Reporter Margot Patterson recorded R. Scott Appleby, a professor of history at the University of Notre Dame saying, "One of the reasons America misunderstands Islam is that we've lost touch with the kind of devotion and self-sacrifice that traditional religion can evoke in its followers"(Patterson 2005, p11). Critics may fear a religion that has been given a harsh exterior, but the truth is that its teachings are of love and forgiveness at its core. The Qur'an states, "Hold to forgiveness; enjoin the doing of what is right; and leave alone those who choose to be ignorant"(Q 7:199). Not only does the Qur'an promote peace, it promotes forgiveness which should be applied to the modern Muslim world. The Qur'an is not hate literature meant to promote violence and animosity between believers and unbelievers, but a holy text which encourages peace and forgiveness.

Islamic extremists do not accurately reflect all Muslims as they are not following the doctrine of the Qur'an. After the attacks of September 11th, 2001, President George W. Bush seemed to feel saddened by the animosity that has been displayed to Muslims in the United States. President Bush stated, "The Muslims of America are outraged and saddened by the terrorist attacks perpetrated in their religion's name. All Americans must remember that terrorism and Islam have nothing in common, and Muslims must not be scapegoated for the September 11 attacks" (Eidenmuller 2008, p 13). Although the President is not expert enough on the religion to decipher what is Islamic and what is not Islamic, he does have a bird's eye view of the mistreatment and discrimination of Muslims in the United States. Even after his country has been so wronged by people of a certain race, colour, and religion, the president of the United States believes that the terrorists are not an accurate portrayal of true Islam. What the terrorists stand for violates the basic teachings of the Qur'an. They are

not standing for true Islam, but for their own selfish desires. The religion is used as an excuse to persuade Muslims to cooperate with their plans to acquire land and political power (Eidemuller 2008). Seifeldin Ashmawy illustrated,

The mask of religion, which the extremists wear, must be torn from their face and they should be recognized for what they stand for, greed and power.

It is my opinion that the extremists among Muslims are not motivated by religion but by their own political agenda (Ashmawy 2005, p 45).

Religion has become a mask that the terrorists wear to advance selfish political means. This mask is worn with pride and anger, as a persuasive device to convince dedicated believers of Islam to follow the terrorists' demands. For four years, reporter Jessica Stern interviewed extremist members of Islam around the world. She travelled to refugee camps in Lebanon, to religious schools in Pakistan, and to prisons in Amman. After much research, she concluded that extremists use religion as justification to further political, territorial, and financial means. It is also, for many Muslims, an escape from the political and territorial problems which have been existent in the Muslim world for centuries. This is a common goal among Muslims throughout the Arab world as conflict continues in the Middle East. Many people of the Middle East have been working hard to achieve an ultimate and long-lasting peace plan while others have been demonstrating their longings through violence and coercion. It is a tug-of-war between faithful Muslims and fundamentalists that may never end (Malek 2005). Seifeldin Ashmawy argued, "What has taken place in (early 1996) in Israel reflects the determination and desperation of the extremists to destroy the peace process and achieve political power." He continued, "The political vacuum of the situation created Hamas. Hamas established clinics and schools throughout the occupied territories. As a result, these areas became the breeding ground and the areas to recruit membership for Hamas" (Ashmawy 2005, p 40). When an extremist group appears to be successful in aiding the Muslim society, it gains power in the eyes of Muslims and they are more likely to fall to

terrorism simply out of fear. Many Islamic terrorists use the name of Allah as an excuse for fighting. After interviewing many Islamic extremists, Jessica Stern described the idea of religious terrorism from the eyes of a fundamentalist.

Religious terrorism arises from pain and loss and from impatience with a God who is slow to respond to our plight, who doesn't answer. The way forward is clear: kill or be killed. Kill and be rewarded in heaven....Why is my life not going as well as it should? The answer is America. The answer is affirmative action. The answer is the Jews. The answer is the Dome of the Rock...Without this piece of land or this temple, I am not whole. My people are not whole. We are spiritually dead (Stern 2003, p 35).

Fighting in the name of a religion is an excuse made by terrorists to advance political means and to place blame elsewhere for something that is wrong in their own society. Extremists do not accurately reflect true Islam as they are not following the doctrine of the Qur'an. True Islam is a religion that preaches peace and forgiveness, with billions of devoted, yet misunderstood believers. The attitude that all Muslims are terrorists in nature must be diminished in order for real progress in the peace process to begin. Throughout history, many wars were built on a foundation of religious differences. The main cause of these wars is a grand misunderstanding of others' cultures, beliefs, and lifestyles. The belief that all Muslims are terrorists is only a microcosm in a much larger problem. Anti-Americanism rises and the stereotyping of individual Muslims as terrorists continues. As this dangerous boomerang persists, plans to attack the United States feed a North American attitude that people who are different pose a threat to the West. The world needs to understand that Islam is a religion of peace and does not encourage terrorism. Arguably, the only way to change the general mental state of the West is to begin with one Westerner's perspective at a time. In her attempt to

encourage peace in the Middle East in May of 2005, the First Lady of the United States, Laura Bush stated, "It starts with the individual"(Malek 2005). The hope for a less intense clash of civilizations begins with each individual's perspective. It is essential for North Americans to conquer the lingering and familiar prejudice that the West has become accustomed to in order for there to be a brighter future (Malek 2005).

3.13 Islam and Terrorism

In the present time, if some one switches on any western TV channel or even a secular channel of Muslim world, he can find a common label that is Islamic terrorist or Muslim terrorist. If attaching a name like Mohammed or Abdur Rahman implies of Islamic/ Muslim terrorist, then Timothy and Terry who carried out Oklahoma bombing are the Christian terrorists, Hitler who killed 6 million Jews is a Christian terrorist, Josef Stalin who killed 20 million people was a Christian terrorist, Mao-Tse-Tung who killed around 20 million people was a Buddhist terrorist, Menachem Begin (Leader of Israeli terrorist group Irgun , later he became Prime Minister of Israel and won Nobel Peace Prize) who bombed king David hotel of Jerusalem is a Jews terrorist, Red Brigade of Italy is a Christian terrorist group, Japanese red Army is a Buddhist terrorist group, IRA of Ireland is a Christian terrorist group, ETA of Spain is Christian terrorist group, Lord resistance Army (LRA) of Africa is an Christian terrorist group, LTTE is a Hindu terrorist organization, ATTF of Tripura, India is a Hindu-Christian terrorist group, ULFA of Assam, India is a Hindu-Buddhist terrorist group, Maoist of Nepal is a Hindu terrorist group (Naik 2008).

But interestingly it is found, none of the western or secular non-western media label all the above persons or groups as Christian/Buddhist/Hindu terrorist groups. On the contrary they find all reasoning to call a person or group Islamic or Muslim terrorist/terrorist group by discovering a Muslim name with them. Forget about western media, we found, many of the

secular Muslim media are labeling them as Islamic terrorists. We think, in such cases, media is being cleverly exploited and bluffed by some politicians for the sake of self interest and power politics.

Media is targeting Islam and calling it's followers as fundamentalists, Media is using this word 'fundamentalist' in a negative sense, whereas meaning of this very word is "a person who adhere to the fundamental principles/rules of any religion or any other subject" (Naik 2008). Now a Muslim who follows strict Quranic law can't be a terrorist, but can be an Islamic fundamentalist. So a fundamentalist Muslim can't be a terrorist. But we see western media or politicians are linking terrorism to Islamic fundamentalism. Which is another game to malign Islam and it's followers. Further analysis interestingly reveals that, according to old version of Oxford dictionary, the very word 'fundamentalist' was first used to define a group of American protestant Christian, but in the new version they linked it to Islam, which is a higher standard of knowledge corruption. Hence, if a person or a group of persons are committing act of terrorism in the name of false Islamic ideology, is simply a terrorist group, must not be called/labeled as Muslim/Islamic fundamentalist (Naik 2008).

Before India achieved independence from British rule, some freedom fighters of India who did not subscribe to non-violence were labelled as terrorists by the British government. The same individuals have been lauded by Indians for the same activities and hailed as 'patriots'. Thus two different labels have been given to the same people for the same set of actions. One is calling him a terrorist while the other is calling him a patriot. Those who believed that Britain had a right to rule over India called these people terrorists, while those who were of the view that Britain had no right to rule India called them patriots and freedom fighters. It is therefore important that before a person is judged, he is given a fair hearing. Both sides of the argument should be heard, the situation should be analyzed, and the reason and the intention of the person should be taken into account, and then the person can be judged accordingly. Hence, the Palestinian or any other nation or group who are fighting for

their freedom may be called freedom fighters against illegal occupation or oppression, must not be called terrorist, must not try to cover one's heinous intention by offloading blame to jihad. to-day's world is clever enough to understand this futile exercise of hypocrisy.

Finally it should be mentioned here, linking terrorism to Muslim, fundamentalist and Jihad was never the work of true Christianity, Judaism or Hinduism. It is the politicians of those religions who create all these for their vote bank, domination and power politics. Hence, for peaceful co-existence in this world, followers of all religions should embark on inter-faith dialogue for coming to an agreement of some common terms leaving aside their politicians, only then clash and terrorism may disappear and politicians also would not get chance to play foul with religions .

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The fact that Islam is singled out among other religions or religious groups against which charges of violence and extremism can easily be brought, demonstrates the extent to which we become captive to our own history. In spite of the colonial period, the golden age of Orientalism, and the massive body of information about Islam and the Muslim world in Western institutions of learning, Islam is still perceived as an alien phenomenon outside the religious and intellectual horizon of the Western world. The lack of knowledge and familiarity that had obstructed the study of Islam for centuries during the middle Ages continues to be a stumbling block for the appreciation of the rich tapestry of Islamic culture and history. Furthermore, since the average Westerner is much more familiar with the Judeo-Christian tradition, he or she is in a better position to appreciate the diversity of that tradition and distinguish between the rule and the exception that proves it. In the case of Islam, we scarcely refer to a Judeo-Christian-Islamic tradition whereby the historical unknowing of Islam may be undone and a more realistic picture of Islam may be constructed.

Was Islam Spread by the Sowrd? How can Islam be called the religion of peace when it was spread by the sword? It is a common complaint among some non-Muslims that

Islam would not have millions of adherents all over the world, if it had not been spread by the use of force. The following points will make it clear, that far from being spread by the sword, it was the inherent force of truth, reason and logic that was responsible for the rapid spread of Islam.

However. Each and every human being in this world is not in favour of maintaining peace and harmony. There are many, who would disrupt it for their own vested interests. Sometimes force has to be used to maintain peace. It is precisely for this reason that we have the police who use force against criminals and anti-social elements to maintain peace in the country. Islam promotes peace. At the same time, Islam exhorts its followers to fight where there is oppression. The fight against oppression may, at times, require the use of force. In Islam force can only be used to promote peace and justice (Naik 2008). The best reply to the misconception that Islam was spread by the sword is given by the noted historian De Lacy O'Leary (1923) in the book 'Islam at the cross road' stated:

"History makes it clear however, that the legend of fanatical Muslims sweeping through the world and forcing Islam at the point of the sword upon conquered races is one of the most fantastically absurd myth that historians have ever repeated" (O'Leary 1923,p8).

Muslims ruled Spain for about 800 years. The Muslims in Spain never used the sword to force the people to convert. Later the Christian Crusaders came to Spain and wiped out the Muslims. There was not a single Muslim in Spain who could openly give the adhan, that is the call for prayers. Muslims were the lords of Arabia for 1400 years. For a few years the British ruled, and for a few years the French ruled. Overall, the Muslims ruled Arabia for 1400 years. Yet today, there are 14 million Arabs who are Coptic Christians i.e. Christians since generations. If the Muslims had used the sword there would not have been a single Arab who would have remained a Christian (Naik 2008). The Muslims ruled India for about a thousand years. If they wanted, they had the power of converting each and every non-Muslim of India to Islam. Today more than 80% of the population of India are non-Muslims. All

these non-Muslim Indians are bearing witness today that Islam was not spread by the sword (Naik 2008).

Indonesia is a country that has the maximum number of Muslims in the world. The majority of people in Malaysia are Muslims. May one ask, 'Which Muslim army went to Indonesia and Malaysia?' Similarly, Islam has spread rapidly on the East Coast of Africa. One may again ask, if Islam was spread by the sword, 'Which Muslim army went to the East Coast of Africa?' The famous historian, Thomas Carlyle (1840), in his book 'Heroes and Hero worship', refers to this misconception about the spread of Islam: 'The sword indeed, but where will you get your sword? Every new opinion, at its starting is precisely in a minority of one. In one man's head alone. There it dwells as yet. One man alone of the whole world believes it. there is one man against all men. That he takes a sword and try to propagate with that, will do little for him. You must get your sword! On the whole, a thing will propagate itself as it can'(Naik 2008). It is the sword of intellect that conquers the hearts and minds of people. The Qur'an says in Surah Nahl, chapter 16 verse 125: 'Invite (all) to the way of thy Lord with wisdom and beautiful preaching; and argue with them in ways that are best and most gracious' (Q16:125).

Again, Bernerd Lewis's (2008) latest book is called *Islam: The Religion and the People*. From his research, Lewis draws the following conclusions regarding the history of Islamic culture:

1. "At no time did the (Muslim) jurist approve of terrorism. Nor indeed is there any evidence of the use of terrorism (in Islamic tradition)."
2. "Muslims are commanded not to kill women, children, or the aged; not to torture or otherwise ill-treat prisoners; to give fair warning of the opening of hostilities; and to honor agreements."

3. "The emergence of the now widespread terrorism practice of suicide bombing is a development of the 20th century. It has no antecedents in Islamic history, and no justification in terms of Islamic theology, law, or tradition. It is a pity that those who practice this form of terrorism are not better acquainted with their own religion, and with the culture that grew up under the auspices of that religion."
4. "The fanatical warrior offering his victims the choice of the Koran or the sword is not only untrue, it is impossible."
5. "Generally speaking, Muslim tolerance of unbelievers was far better than anything available in Christendom, until the rise of secularism in the 17th century."(Lewis 2008, p145-150)

3.14 Islam and Polygamy

We came to know from earlier chapter, Islam is heavily criticized for not banning the polygamy. The reason for not prohibiting polygamy categorically is perhaps due to the fact that there are certain conditions which face individuals and societies in different places and at different times, which make the limited practice of polygamy a better solution than either divorce or the hypocritical pretence of morality. Our present day feelings about what is "tasteful" or "distasteful" are something we cannot force on all people everywhere, at all times and under all conditions, This leads to the following question.

Is Polygamy Immoral? To shorten the discussion, let us begin with the assumption that religions are acceptable sources of "morals". Let us also select two religions (Judaism and Christianity) which are the closest to Islam, in order to see where they stand on that issue.

a) In Judaism: It is notable that most of the Old Testament Prophets are polygamous. According to the Old Testament, Abraham "the friend of God" had more than one wife, David had one hundred wives, and Solomon is even said to have had 700 wives and 300 concubines (Dictionary of the Bible 1963).

The Philosophy behind the legalization of polygamy is explained in the *Encyclopedia Biblica* (1902): The man who owns his wife as a chattel can on the same principle own as many as he pleases, that is to say, as many as he can afford to buy and keep...The Talmudists formulate the rule that no Jew may have more than four wives, kings may have at most eighteen (*Encyclopedia Biblica* 1902). It was only at the beginning of the eleventh century (about four centuries after the advent of Islam!) that polygamy was expressly prohibited in Judaism. According to Watermark (1925): "Among European Jews polygamy was still practiced during the Middle Ages, and among Jews living in Mohammedan countries it occurs even to this day (Westermarck 1925).

An express prohibition of it was not pronounced until the convening of the Rabbinical Synod at Worms, in the beginning of the eleventh century. This prohibition was originally made for the Jews living in Germany and Northern France, but it was successfully adopted in all European countries. Nevertheless, the Jewish Marriage Code retained many provisions, which originated at a time when polygamy was still legally in existence"(Badawi 1998).

b) In Christianity: As the Old Testament is a vital part of the Christian Faith, it cannot be disregarded in this discussion. It was concerning the Old Testament laws and Old Testament Prophets that Jesus (as) said plainly that he came not to destroy the Law or the Prophets but rather to fulfil. In addition, there is no passage in the New Testament that clearly prohibits polygamy. This was the understanding of the early Church Fathers and for several centuries in the Christian era (*Dictionary of the Bible*1963).

Westermarck, the noted authority on the history of human marriages states: "Considering that monogamy prevailed as the only legitimate form of marriage in Greece and Rome, it cannot be said that Christianity introduced obligatory monogamy in the Western World. Indeed, although the New Testament assumes monogamy as the normal or ideal form of marriage, it does not expressly prohibit polygamy, except in the case of a bishop or deacon. It has been argued that it was not necessary for the first Christian teachers to

condemn polygamy because monogamy was the universal rule among the peoples in whose midst it was preached: but this is certainly not true of the Jews, who still both permitted and practiced polygamy at the beginning of the Christian era. Some of the Fathers accused the Jewish Rabbis of sensuality, but no Council of the Church in the earliest centuries opposed polygamy, and no obstacle was put in the way of its practice by kings in countries where it had occurred in the times of paganism.

In the middle of the sixth century Diarmait, King of Ireland, had two queens and two concubines. Polygamy was frequently practiced by the Merovingian kings. Charles the Great had two wives and many concubines; and one of his laws seems to imply that polygamy was not unknown among priests. In later times Philip of Hesse and Frederick William II of Prussia contracted bigamous marriages with the sanction of the Lutheran clergy. Luther himself approved of the bigamy of the former, and so did Melanchthon. On various occasions Luther speaks of polygamy with considerable toleration. It had not been forbidden by God: even Abraham, who was a "perfect Christian", had two wives. It is true that God had allowed such marriages to certain men of the Old Testament *only* in particular circumstances, and if a Christian wanted to follow their example he had to show that the circumstances were similar in his case; but polygamy was undoubtedly preferable to divorce (Westermarck 1925).

In 1650, soon after the Peace of Westphalia, when the population had been greatly reduced by the Thirty Years' War, the Frankish Kreistag at Nuremberg passed resolution that thenceforth every man should be allowed to marry two women. Certain sects of Christians have even advocated polygamy with much fever. In 1531 the Anabaptists openly preached at Munster that he who wants to be a true Christian must have several wives. And the Mormons, as the entire world knows, regard polygamy as a divine institution" (Badawi 1998).

What is the Legal Status of Polygamy in Islam? The Verse that allows polygamy was revealed after the battle of Uhud in which many Muslims were killed, leaving widows and orphans for whom due care was incumbent upon the Muslim survivors. The translation of

the verse is as follows: "If you fear that you shall not be able to deal justly with the orphans, marry women of your choice, two, or three, or four; but if you fear that you shall not be able to deal justly (with them), then (marry) only one..." (Q 4:3).

From this verse a number of facts are evident:

1. That polygamy is neither mandatory, nor encouraged, but merely permitted.
2. That the permission to practice polygamy is not associated with mere satisfaction of. Rather, it is associated with compassion towards widows and orphans, a matter that is confirmed by the atmosphere in which the verse was revealed.
3. That even in such a situation, the permission is far more restricted than the normal practice which existed among the Arabs and other peoples at that time when many married as many as ten or more wives.
4. That dealing justly with one's wives is an obligation. This applies to housing, food, clothing, kind treatment...etc., for which the husband is fully responsible. If one is not sure of being able to deal justly with them, the Qur'an says: "then (marry) only one" (Q 4:3). This verse, when combined with another verse in the same chapter, shows some discouragement of such plural marriages. The other verse plainly states: "You are never able to be fair and just between women even if it is your ardent desire..." (Q 4:129). The requirement of justice rules out the fantasy that man can "own as many as he pleases." It also rules out the concept of a "secondary wife", for all wives have exactly the same status and are entitled to identical rights and claims over their husband. It also implies, according to the Islamic Law, that should the husband fail to provide enough support for any of his wives, she can go to court and ask for a divorce.
5. The verse says "marry," not kidnap, buy or seduce. What is "marriage" as understood in Islam? Marriage in Islam is a civil contract which is not valid unless both contracting parties consent to it. Thus, no wife can be forced or "given" to a husband who is already married.

It is thus a free choice of both parties. As to the first wife:

- A. She may be barren or ill and see in polygamy a better solution than divorce.
- B. She may divorce him (unilaterally) if he is married to a second wife provided that the nuptial contract gives her the right of unilateral divorce (ismah)
- C. She can go to court and ask for a divorce if there is evidence of mistreatment or injustice inflicted upon her.

But if polygamy is discouraged and loaded with such constraints, could it have been better if the Qur'an simply forbade it? To answer this question, we may have to raise another one: Can Polygamy be a Better Solution in Some Cases? Scholars in the past and at present, Muslims and Non-Muslims have consistently pointed out such cases. The following are a few examples, which are tied in with the general approach of Islam to individual and social problems (Badawi 1998).

An Individual Case: 1. A man who discovers that his wife is barren, and who at the same time instinctively aspires to have children and heir. In a situation as this, then man would either have to:

- Suffer the deprivation of fatherhood for life.
- Divorce his barren wife and get married to another woman who is not barren.

In many cases, neither solution can be considered as the best alternative. Polygamy would have the advantage of preserving the marital relationship without depriving the man of fathering children of his own.

2. A man whose wife becomes chronically ill would have one of possible alternatives:

- He may suppress his instinctive sexual needs for the rest of his life.
- He may divorce his sick wife at a time when she needs his compassion most, and get married to another woman, thus legally satisfying his instinctive needs.
- Or he could compromise by keeping his sick wife, and secretly take for himself one or more illicit sex partners.

Let us discuss these alternatives from the point of view of the Islamic Teaching. The first solution is against human nature. Islam recognizes sex and sexual needs and provides legitimate means for their satisfaction. The second solution is clearly less compassionate; especially where there is love between two parties. Furthermore, divorce is described by the Prophet Muhammad (saw) as the "permitted thing that is hated most by God". The last solution is plainly against the Islamic teaching which forbids illicit sexual relationships in any form.

To sum up, Islam being against immorality, hypocritical pretence of morality, and against divorce unless no better solution is available, provides for a better alternative which is consistent with human nature and with the preservation of pure and legitimate sex relationships. In a situation like this, it is doubtful that any solution would be better than polygamy, which is, after all, and optional solution.

Social Cases : 1. Anthropologists tell us that among various tribes and societies, polygamy is a social and economic necessity. In some very poor areas, the infant mortality is very high. Children on the other hand, are a source of additional labour for the earning capacity of the family. To have more children under such circumstances would require the practice of polygamy. It is by this very reason that Christian missionaries in some African regions justified their permission to local people to practice polygamy without being excommunicated from the church. One researcher has even found, through his studies that women in such societies not only accept polygamy, but some of them even prefer this (Badawi 1998).

2. Aside from cases where women outnumber men, devastating wars, in the past and at present, have taken their toll mainly among men. The result is not simply more women who cannot find husbands, but even more widows who may aspire to a respectable family life. In such a situation, if polygamy is bad, the limitation on polygamy is even far worse.

Both unmarried women and widows are human beings. Unless their instinctive needs are legitimately satisfied, the temptation is great for corruption and immorality. But aside from the moral question these women are also exploited. They are used as tools for men's pleasures, yet have no guarantees, no rights or security, financial or emotional. Should they become pregnant, it is their burden alone. But even if such women are ready to pay the price for this personally, society also suffers seriously from such situations. The increasing number of illegitimate children born today under conditions such as these provides a potential base for tomorrow's maladjusted and criminals. Furthermore it is inhuman, humiliating for those children to grow up without knowing who their fathers were and without enjoying a clean and normal family life.

3.15 Islam and Modernization

To understand the relationship between Islam and modernity, it is important to begin with an understanding of the religion itself. Generically, Islam is a religion which brings the mission of liberation and salvation. Islam came to the world in order to bring a set of new morality because of its metaphysical and humanitarian characters. It brings not only vertical dimension teachings, but also horizontal aspects for humanity. It is a teaching deriving from God and oriented toward humanity (Munir 2003).

Thus, Islam highly respects the dimension of humanity. The presence of Islam as a moral source can be observed in its achievement in transforming pre-Islamic Arabic nomads into civilized communities with values and morality. With the presence of Islam, these communities, being used to living in open deserts and highly susceptible to inter-tribal wars and conflicts, achieved success becoming sensitized to elevated values and morality. Inter-tribal wars and conflict occurred because of their lack of values and morality, which terminated after Islam spread its teachings. The Koran, Muslims' holy book and reference,

has manifested itself in a language laden with aesthetics, which has the power to influence the nomads' emotions and awareness in shaping society's humanitarian vision.

Linguistically, Islam derives from the root words implying the meaning of peace, salvation, *maslahah* (well-being) and justice. Islam is a metamorphosis of a three-letter root word (*tsulatsi*), i.e. *salima-yaslamu-salaaman*, meaning safe and peaceful. The four-letter root word (*rubai'i*) namely *aslama-yuslimu-islaman* means to save and to bring peace (Munir 2003).

Linguistically speaking, Islam has a very fundamental concern for peace, justice, and well-being. These values should be inwardly internalized by each and every Muslim in the first place. The feeling of being secure and safe in the mind of every Muslim individual is a basic capital for transcending the same feeling to others, making them sensitized to society's needs and interests. This feeling generally grows along with the process of ritualism and ritual practices, which will strengthen one's commitment and vision on the equality of all human beings. Islam teaches that there is no hierarchical structure among Muslims, all are equal before God. The combination of spiritual and ritual practices will produce Muslims who have balanced personalities, inwardly and outwardly, vertically and horizontally (Munir 2003).

The hallmark of the Islamic religion is its pliability to the times. Islamic Law, according to the Quran and Sunnah of the Prophet (pbuh) allows for this pliability in everything except one thing, the religious components of our lifestyle. This fact is evident if one studies the seerah of the Prophet (pbuh) over the course of his life and the lives of the sahabbah during the first 100 years of the Islamic Empire, which is the rough timeframe in which our scholars experienced much of the rulings of Shariah. Many more rulings of shariah are directed at the changing times and often do not even have a basis in Quran or Sunnah because the situations in modern times have changed and have not been experienced by the Prophet (pbuh) or the sahabbah.

For example, in modern times, we face issues of the harvesting of human stem cells from new born babies to correct diseases that may exist later in the child's life. Is this acceptable in Islam? Well, the Prophet (pbuh) and the Sahabbah did not experience science on this scale and such things were unheard of in their time. Thus, our scholars work out a morally acceptable shariah on the topic. They can draw off what we do know of Quran and Sunnah that is totally unrelated to the topic in conjunction with consultation of modern scientists who are expert in the field and apply it to make a ruling. Islam is not a primitive religion, nor is it meant to be. Islam is for all times. Islam is not a religion. It is an entire way of life that includes religious doctrine. It regulates much more than religion. Religion is perhaps 10% of Islam. The remaining 90% is Economy, Science, Governance, Military, Diplomacy and many many other things (Munir 2003).

3.16 Islam and Politics

We must begin with a definition of the term “political Islam,” or “Islamism,” that is, Islam as political ideology rather than as a religious or theological construct. At the most basic level, adherents of political Islam believe that “Islam as a body of faith has something important to say about how politics and society should be ordered in the contemporary Muslim world and implemented in some fashion.” However, this generalization does not get us very far in explaining the political activity undertaken in the name of Islam. A more analytically useful definition political Islam provided by the political scientist Guilian Denoex (2002), who writes of Islamism as “a form of instrumentalization of Islam by individuals, groups and organizations that pursue political objectives. It provides political responses to today’s societal challenges by imagining a future, the foundations for which rest on reappropriated, reinvented concepts borrowed from the Islamic tradition (Denoex 2002). The reappropriation of the past, the “invention of tradition” in terms of a romanticized notion of a largely mythical golden age, lies at the heart of this instrumentalization of Islam. It is the

invention of tradition that provides the tools for de-historicizing Islam and separating it from the various contexts in which it has flourished over the past fourteen hundred years. This decontextualizing of Islam allows Islamists in theory to ignore the social, economic, and political milieus within which Muslim communities exist. It provides Islamists a powerful ideological tool that they can use to “purge” Muslim societies of the “impurities” and “accretions” that are the inevitable accompaniments of the historical process, but which they see as the reason for Muslim decline (Ayoob 2004).

However, context has a way of reasserting itself over abstract theory when attempts are made to put theory into practice. This is exactly what has happened with Islamism. In practice, no two Islamisms are alike because they are determined by the contexts within which they operate. What works in Egypt will not work in Indonesia. What works in Saudi Arabia will not work in Turkey. Anyone familiar with the diversity of the Muslim world—its socioeconomic characteristics, cultures, political systems, and trajectories of intellectual development—is bound to realize that the political manifestations of Islam is the result of the interpenetration of religious precepts and local culture, including political culture (Roy 1996). It is true that there is an Islamic vocabulary that transcends political boundaries. However, this vocabulary is normally employed to serve specific objectives in discrete settings. Thus, although the Islamic idiom may appear to be the same everywhere to the uninitiated observer, it differs from setting to setting. As the anthropologist Dale Eickelman and the political scientist James Piscatori (1986) note, politics becomes “Muslim” by “the invocation of ideas and symbols, which Muslims in different contexts identify as ‘Islamic,’ in support of...organized claims and counterclaims.” Since such claims and counterclaims, and the contesting that accompanies them, are normally specific to a particular sovereign state, the political activity engendered by such claims—often carried out in the name of Islam—is generally confined within the boundaries of that state (Eickelman & Piscatori 1996).

It becomes clear that the Islamist political imagination is largely determined by context when one looks at the political discourse and, more importantly, the activities of the various Islamist movements. Jamaat-i-Islami is as Pakistan-specific as the Islamic Salvation Front is Algeria-specific. The strategies of the Muslim Brotherhood, which was founded in Egypt and has branches in various Arab countries, differ from country to country. The Egyptian, Jordanian, and Syrian variants have adopted radically different political strategies in response to local challenges. Indeed, the parent organization in Egypt has itself mutated over time, its leadership in the early 1980s unequivocally rejecting the more radical and militant ideas associated with Sayyid Qutb, its chief ideologue of the 1960s (Ayoob 2004).

3.16.1 A Modern Phenomenon

Modern phenomenon of political Islam is rooted in the sociopolitical conditions of Muslim countries in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. It is a product of the Muslim peoples' interaction—military, political, economic, cultural, and intellectual—with the West during the past two hundred years, a period when Western power has been in the ascendant and Muslims have become the objects, rather than the subjects, of history (Ayoob 2004).

Modern Islamist political thinkers devised the term “Islamic state” in order to reconcile their romanticized vision of the Islamic polity with the existence of sovereign states on the European model that were products of the twin processes of colonization and decolonization. In practical terms, the Islamists' preoccupation with the Islamic state has meant the attempt to Islamize existing Muslim states. Only a very small minority of Islamists thinks that merging the Muslim world into a single Islamic caliphate is a feasible proposition. Mostly, the search for the pristine Islamic state has led to the emergence of what the French scholar Olivier Roy has called “Islamism” (Roy 1996, p 26).

Many such Islamism movements, from North Africa to Southeast Asia, were fashioned in the crucible of resistance to colonial domination. During the colonial period, the

Islamist movements had to share the stage with secular nationalist forces that were in most cases the leading vehicles through which the anticolonial struggle was waged. However, Islamist resistance movements, like their Marxist counterparts, often departed from the exclusively political preoccupations of the more secular groups by devising strategies for social as well as political transformation. Unlike the Marxists, however, the Islamists were less interested in socioeconomic change than with moral and cultural transformation (Ayoob 2004).

This emphasis on the cultivation of certain cultural traits and moral values that are supposedly in conformity with Islamic precepts continued in the postcolonial era. In several cases, Islam had already underpinned the formation of national identity in reaction to colonization. This was the case with Pakistan. In Algeria, the colonial power had characterized the subject population as “Muslim” in order to deny it the epithet “Algerian,” which would have legitimized Algerians’ quest for self-determination (Ayoob 2004).

In most cases, defining oneself as Muslim was not considered antithetical to the nationalist project since this described the vast majority of people. Paradoxically, this applied even to the secular republic of Turkey, despite the attempt on the part of the Kemalist elite to denigrate Islam. During the Turkish war of independence, Islamic identity was the primary vehicle for popular mobilization, and it became the principal defining element of the territorial contours of the Turkish Republic. Thus, had Turkey not been Muslim, it would not have been Turkey (Ayoob 2004).

The acceptance of Islam as integral to identity formation in most Muslim countries may have been inevitable, but it opened the gates to Islamist intrusion into the postcolonial political process. The attraction of political Islam increased as the governing elites failed to deliver on their promises of economic progress, political participation, and personal dignity to expectant populations emerging from colonial bondage. It is in this era, from the 1950s to the 1970s, that political Islam, as we know it today, came of age. Abul Aja Mawdudi in Pakistan

and Sayyid Qutb in Egypt, both advocates of the Islamic state and opponents of secular nationalism, became its foremost intellectual standard-bearers (Ayoob 2004).

3.16.2 Islam as a Marker of Political Identity

One could argue that religion as marker of political identity is a different matter and that, at first glance, Islam has a distinct record that inextricably links the religious to the political, that it is possible to politicize Islam much more easily than other religions. On closer scrutiny, however, it is clear that even in this respect there is nothing unique about Islam. Zionism, as ideology and political project, can aptly be termed “political Judaism.” Zionists were responsible for settling European Jews in Palestine, establishing the Jewish state in Israel, and defining the political identity of Israeli Jews and many others around the world. Jewish fundamentalists form the hard core of the Jewish settler movement in occupied Palestine, denying Palestinians any rights over their homeland and firmly opposing any territorial compromise that could resolve the Israeli-Palestinian conflict (Lustick 1988).

During the era of European colonization of the globe, the cross invariably accompanied the flag. Thus the political and the religious are inextricably linked in the narrative of colonial domination. The growing power of the Christian right in American politics, particularly the 40-million strong Evangelical movement, with its apocalyptic vision of “Rapture” and the “Second Coming,” is changing the political culture of the United States slowly but surely. Evangelicals’ support for the return of Jews to the Holy Land—although for all the wrong, one could even say genocidal, reasons—has serious implications for American policy toward the Middle East. The references by both Al Gore and George W. Bush to Jesus Christ as the primary source of their political wisdom during the 2000 presidential campaign can be adduced as further evidence that political Christianity, both as

ideological inspiration and as identity marker, is resurgent today even in this avowedly secular, though predominantly Christian country (Ayoob 2004).

Examples abound from non-Judeo-Christian traditions as well. Hindu nationalism in India is but political Hinduism in whose name mosques are demolished, shrines desecrated, and thousands of Muslims massacred—as happened in Gujarat two years ago. Any one even superficially acquainted with the politics of Sri Lanka would recognize the importance of the Buddhist Sangha (monastic order) and, therefore, of political Buddhism in defining the national identity of that country. The Sangha's militancy, combined with the competitive chauvinism of the Sinhalese political parties, contributed in no small measure to the polarization of Buddhist Sinhalese and predominantly Hindu Tamils that led to the outbreak of an ongoing civil war in 1983 (Kirkpatrick 2004).

3.16.3 The Uniqueness of Political Islam

If all religions are equally naked in this Turkish bath (to quote an Urdu proverb), why is Islam singled out in the West as uniquely supportive of the mixing of religion and politics? The answer is relatively simple. Most other religio-political movements either emanate from Western societies or, like the Hindu manifestation of politicized religion, do not challenge Western hegemony, but seek rather to accommodate themselves to it. However, Islamists stubbornly refuse to accept the current distribution of power in the international system as either legitimate or permanent. Islamist movements, including the vast majority that work peacefully within existing political systems, continue in multifarious ways to challenge not only the domestic status quo but the international status quo as well. Since the latter often props up the former, the two are closely intertwined from the Islamist perspective. This is particularly true of Islamist movements active in the greater Middle East, from Morocco to Pakistan. Moreover, the support extended to oppressive and authoritarian regimes by Western powers, especially the United States, makes it easier for the anger against domestic rulers to

be channeled against the United States. The most virulent anti-American feelings at the popular level are expressed in countries such as Saudi Arabia, Egypt, and Pakistan, whose regimes are close allies of the United States (Ayoob 2004).

It is the Muslims' collective memory of subjugation and the current perception of weakness in relation to the West that provides the common denominator among the many divergent manifestations of political Islam. This is the shared ingredient that I referred to at the beginning of this essay that may be responsible for nurturing a misleadingly monolithic image of Islam in the West. It is partly as a result of their search for an explanation for past humiliations and a remedy for the present plight of Muslims that Islamists, from Morocco to Indonesia, advocate a return to the imagined pristine purity of early Islam and cling to a romanticized notion of a golden age. Most Islamists believe that if Muslims could return to the model of the imagined golden age of the early years of Islam they would be able to transform their relationship with the West into one of equality rather than subordination. The common denominator among Islamists, therefore, is the quest for dignity, a variable often ignored by contemporary political analysts in the West (Ayoob 2004).

This Islamist emphasis on the restoration of dignity strikes a sympathetic chord even among the large majority of Muslims who cannot be characterized as Islamists. It resonates with Muslims of all social and economic strata because of the injustices that they continue to suffer at the hands of the West or its surrogates. Since the United States is the leader of the West, the Muslim sense of outrage usually takes the form of anti-Americanism. For most Muslims, this antipathy toward America is not based on opposition to American values but is grounded in opposition to aspects of American foreign policy, especially with respect to the Middle East (Ayoob 2004).

Many of these concerns relating to dignity come together on the issue of Palestine, which has become the Muslim grievance par excellence. Most politically conscious Muslims believe that all Muslims are potential "Palestinians," the ultimate outsiders, who can be

dispossessed and dishonored with impunity, and the justice of whose cause will always be dismissed by the West, and particularly by the United States, as irrational fanaticism. The occupation of Iraq has further fueled Muslim anger against the United States since it is seen as a ploy both to control the oil wealth of the Middle East and to consolidate Israeli hegemony in the region. The Islamists manipulate this general sense of disenchantment and anger to advance their own agendas against American-supported regimes in the Muslim world (Lewis 1993).

Chapter 4

Non-Violent Approaches to Changing the Western Wrong Perception and Conflict Resolution

4.1 Non-Violent Approaches to Changing the Western Wrong Perception

In this chapter effort will be taken to devise various non-violent approaches to changing the western wrong perception. The following approaches are based on literature review as well as own thinking.

4.1.1 Inter-Faith/Inter-Culture/Inter-Civilization Dialogue

Intercultural dialogue is understood as a process that comprises an open and respectful exchange of views between individuals and groups with different ethnic, cultural, religious and linguistic backgrounds and heritage, on the basis of mutual understanding and respect. It requires the freedom and ability to express oneself, as well as the willingness and capacity to listen to the views of others. Intercultural dialogue contributes to political, social, cultural and economic integration and the cohesion of culturally diverse societies. It fosters equality, human dignity and a sense of common purpose. It aims to develop a deeper understanding of diverse world views and practices, to increase co-operation and participation (or the freedom to make choices), to allow personal growth and transformation, and to promote tolerance and respect for the other. Intercultural dialogue may serve several purposes, within the overriding objective to promote full respect for human rights, democracy and the rule of law. It is an essential feature of inclusive societies, which leave no one marginalized or defined as outsiders.

It is a powerful instrument of mediation and reconciliation. Through critical and constructive engagement across cultural fault-lines, it addresses real concerns about social fragmentation and insecurity while fostering integration and social cohesion. Freedom of choice, freedom of expression, equality, tolerance and mutual respect for human dignity are

among the guiding principles in this context. Successful intercultural dialogue requires many of the attitudes fostered by a democratic culture – including open-mindedness, willingness to engage in dialogue and allow others to express their point, a capacity to resolve conflicts by peaceful means and a recognition of the well-founded arguments of others. It contributes to strengthening democratic stability and to the fight against prejudice and stereotypes in public life and political discourse, and to facilitating coalition-building across diverse cultural and religious communities, and can thereby help to prevent or de-escalate conflicts – including situations of post conflict and “frozen conflicts”. There is no question of easy solutions. Intercultural dialogue is not a cure for all evils and an answer to all questions, and one has to recognize that its scope can be limited. It is often pointed out that dialogue with those who refuse dialogue is impossible. Although this does not relieve open and democratic societies of their obligation to constantly offer opportunities for dialogue. On the other hand, dialogue with those who are ready to take part in dialogue but do not – or do not fully – share “our” values may be the starting point of a longer process of interaction, at the end of which an agreement on the significance and practical implementation of the values of human rights, democracy and the rule of law may very well be reached.

The risks of non-dialogue need to be fully appreciated. Not to engage in dialogue makes it easy to develop a stereotypical perception of the other, build up a climate of mutual suspicion, tension and anxiety, use minorities as scapegoats, and generally foster intolerance and discrimination. The breakdown of dialogue within and between societies can provide, in certain cases, a climate conducive to the emergence, and the exploitation by some, of extremism and indeed terrorism. Intercultural dialogue, including on the international plane, is indispensable between neighbours.

Shutting the door on a diverse environment can offer only an illusory security. A retreat into the apparently reassuring comforts of an exclusive community may lead to a stifling conformism. The absence of dialogue deprives everyone of the benefit of new cultural

openings, necessary for personal and social development in a globalised world. Segregated and mutually exclusive communities provide a climate that is often hostile to individual autonomy and the unimpeded exercise of human rights and fundamental freedoms. An absence of dialogue does not take account of the lessons of Europe's cultural and political heritage. European history has been peaceful and productive whenever a real determination prevailed to speak to our neighbour and to co-operate across dividing lines. It has all too often led to human catastrophe whenever there was a lack of openness towards the other. Only dialogue allows people to live in unity in diversity.

Individual human dignity is at the foundation of society. The individual, however, is not as such a homogeneous social actor. Our identity, by definition, is not what makes us the same as others but what makes us unique. Identity is a complex and contextually sensitive combination of elements. Freedom to choose one's own culture is fundamental; it is a central aspect of human rights. Simultaneously or at various stages in their lives, everyone may adopt different cultural affiliations. Whilst every individual, to a certain extent, is a product of his or her heritage and social background, in contemporary modern democracies everyone can enrich his or her own identity by integrating different cultural affiliations.

No one should be confined against their will within a particular group, community, thought system or world view, but should be free to renounce past choices and make new ones – as long as they are consistent with the universal values of human rights, democracy and the rule of law. Mutual openness and sharing are twin aspects of multiple cultural affiliation. Both are rules of coexistence applying to individuals and groups, who are free to practise their cultures, subject only to respect for others. Intercultural dialogue is therefore important in managing multiple cultural affiliations in a multicultural environment. It is a mechanism to constantly achieve a new identity balance, responding to new openings and experiences and adding new layers to identity without relinquishing one's roots. Intercultural

dialogue helps us to avoid the pitfalls of identity policies and to remain open to the challenges of modern societies.

a. The Conditions of Intercultural Dialogue

Equal Dignity and Mutual Respect: Intercultural dialogue entails a reflexive disposition, in which one can see oneself from the perspective of others. Unlike assimilation, it recognizes that public authorities must be impartial, rather than accepting a majority ethos only, if communalist tensions are to be avoided. Unlike multiculturalism, however, it vindicates a common core which leaves no room for moral relativism. Unlike both, it recognizes a key role for the associational sphere of civic society where, premised on reciprocal recognition, intercultural dialogue can resolve the problems of daily life in a way that governments alone cannot. Equality and mutual respect are important building blocks of intercultural dialogue and essential to remove the barriers to its realization. Where progress towards equality is lacking, social tensions may manifest themselves in the cultural arena, even if the root causes lie elsewhere, and cultural identities themselves may be used to stigmatize (Aces 2008).

Combating the Barriers that Prevent Intercultural Dialogue: There are many barriers to intercultural dialogue. Some of these are the result of the difficulty in communicating in several languages. But others concern power and politics: discrimination, poverty and exploitation – experiences which often bear particularly heavily on persons belonging to disadvantaged and marginalized groups – are structural barriers to dialogue. In many societies one also finds groups and political organizations preaching hatred of “the other”, “the foreigner” or certain religious identities. Racism, xenophobia, intolerance and all other forms of discrimination refuse the very idea of dialogue and represent a standing affront to it (Aces 2008).

The Religious Dimension: World's cultural heritage is a range of religious, as well as secular, conceptions of the purpose of life. Christianity, Judaism and Islam, with their inner range of interpretations, have deeply influenced our earth. Yet conflicts where faith has provided a communal marker. Freedom of thought, conscience and religion is one of the foundations of democratic society. This freedom is one of the most vital elements referring to the identity of believers and their conception of life, as it is also for atheists, agnostics, skeptics and the unconcerned. While guaranteeing this freedom, expression of this freedom can be restricted under defined conditions (Aces 2008).

The important role of religious communities with regard to dialogue means that efforts should be undertaken in this field between religious communities and public authorities. Religious practice is part of contemporary human life, and it therefore cannot and should not be outside the sphere of interest of public authorities, although the state must preserve its role as the neutral and impartial organizer of the exercise of various religions, faiths and beliefs (Aces 2008).

b. Intercultural Dialogue in International Relations

The current geopolitical situation is sometimes described as one of mutually exclusive civilizations, vying for relative economic and political advantages at each other's cost. The concept of intercultural dialogue can help overcome the sterile juxtapositions and stereotypes that may flow from such a world view because it emphasizes that in a global environment, marked by migration, growing interdependence and easy access to international media and new communication services like the internet, cultural identities are increasingly complex, they overlap and contain elements from many different sources. Imbuing international relations with the spirit of intercultural dialogue responds productively to this new condition. Intercultural dialogue can thus contribute to conflict prevention and conflict solution, and support reconciliation and the rebuilding of social trust. The international community

acknowledges the importance of initiatives taken by other international actors and values its partnerships with institutions, such as the European Union, the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) and UNESCO, as well as the Arab League Educational, Cultural and Scientific Organization (Alecso) and the Anna Lindh Euro-Mediterranean Foundation for the Dialogue between Cultures. The “Alliance of Civilizations” launched by the United Nations Secretary General and sponsored by Spain and Turkey, and is a milestone Towards international partnership (Council of Europe 2008).

c. Spaces for Intercultural Dialogue

Creating spaces for intercultural dialogue is a collective task. Without appropriate, accessible and attractive spaces, intercultural dialogue will just not happen, let alone prosper. In this regard, number of options may be thought upon. These are--

1. Public authorities and all social actors are invited to develop intercultural dialogue in the spaces of everyday life and in the framework of the respect of fundamental freedoms.
2. Civil-society organizations in particular, including religious communities, are invited to provide the organizational framework for intercultural and inter-religious encounters
3. Intercultural dialogue in international relations Local and regional authorities should consider engaging in cooperation with partner institutions.
4. Civil-society organizations and education providers can contribute to intercultural dialogue internationally, for example through participation in non-governmental structures, cross border partnerships and exchange schemes, particularly for young people.
5. The media are encouraged to develop arrangements for sharing and co-producing – at the regional, national or Global level– programme material which has proven its value in mobilizing public opinion against intolerance and improving community relations (Council of Europe 2008).

4.1.2 Media Management and Regulation to a Positive Direction

Islam is the fastest growing religion in the West. Nevertheless, the West has many stereotypes and misconceptions about Islam that are due to the media, prejudice, and ignorance. Islam is often looked upon as an "extremist", "terrorist", or "fundamental" religion. Many people hate Islam and do not want to acknowledge its true teachings of Islam. There must be positive media both in print and electronic in the Islamic world as well as in the west to project the true picture of Islam in front of western world.

Adding to the fact that the media creates inaccurate ideas about Islam, the Western media is also very influential to its audiences in making negative Islamic stereotypes, such as the assertion that all Muslims are fundamentalists. The media most often portrays Muslim "fundamentalists" prostrating themselves before God in prayer. For example, in the October 4 issue of Time, Muslims soldiers were shown performing prayers with guns. The caption on the bottom of the picture said, "Guns and prayer go together in the fundamentalist battle". The part that the reporters omitted or failed to state was that the Muslim soldiers were praying on a battlefield in Afghanistan. Common sense of the situation meant that the soldiers had to remain armed at all times in case of an ambush at any time. This is a clear example of the media's biased and inaccurate reporting (Akel 2007).

Some inaccurate representations of Islam are often due to the media's incorrect representations of Islamic countries, such as jihad, or women's rights. Waseem Sajjad, former Chairman of the Senate of Pakistan explains the situation of Islam and the media: The Islamic world is poorly represented in the West in terms of press and media coverage. Not only are there just handfuls of news agencies in Muslim countries; there is the concern over the number of inexperienced reporters. Many reporters don't understand the local cultures nor speak the language, leaving them with access to only those English or French speaking Westernized elites. Thus their representation is often a biased account of the

political and social events from the point of view of the ruling minority in Muslim countries (Haque. p14).

Edward Said's book, *Covering Islam*, talks about how the media and experts determine how we see the rest of the world. He says that:

'The term Islam as it is used today seems to mean one simple thing, but in fact is part fiction, part ideological label, part minimal designation of a religion called Islam. Today Islam is peculiarly traumatic news in the West. During the past few years, especially since events in Iran caught European and American attention so strongly, the media have therefore covered Islam: they have portrayed it, characterized it, analyzed it, given instant courses on it, and consequently they have made it known. But this coverage is misleadingly full, and a great deal in this energetic coverage is based on far from objective material. In many instances Islam has licensed not only patent inaccuracy, but also expressions of unrestrained ethnocentrism, cultural, and even racial hatred, deep yet paradoxically free-floating hostility.' (Said 1981).

While the media is so concerned about negative and discriminatory images about Islamic women, it fails to remind their audiences that there are three Islamic countries (Bangladesh, Pakistan, and Turkey) that have had female heads of states. In contrast, most Western nations such as the United States, "who condemn Islamic countries for their oppression of women, have yet to see a female president.

a. Action to be taken for positive Media

Notwithstanding the polarizing effect that much of the media is having on relations between the West and the Muslim World, the media is one of the most fertile grounds for

action that could reach broad populations. Major efforts should be given to the areas suggested below:

1) Establish An Alliance of Civilizations Network of Media Activists and Centers to Stimulate, Monitor, & Reward Media

A Center or, more likely, a Network of existing centers and activists based in the Middle East, Southeast Asia, the US, and Europe, should be established to *produce* media content with more constructive perspectives, to *monitor* inflammatory media reporting, and to *award* examples of professional and constructive media coverage of issues pertinent to relations between the Muslim World and the West (Akel 2007). The center should benefit from past lessons learned when agencies and governments work together on similar initiatives. In particular, different government regulations could complicate the uniformity of the different satellite centers around the world. This center or network would take on three specific tasks:

Rapid Reaction Commentary: The Center or Network could create and disseminate *rapid-reaction commentaries, editorials, and video commentaries* promoting understanding and constructive perspectives on current Islamic-West controversies. The purpose would be to help frame the understanding of issues related to Islamic-Western relations, particularly in "teachable moments" when relations between Western and predominantly Muslim societies are in the news worldwide (i.e. in the months of the Danish cartoon crisis, following the controversy around the death sentence handed down and then rescinded on the Afghan convert to Christianity, and after the Nigerian stoning story two years ago, etc.). Two to three events of this type occur every year, leading media outlets to scramble for content to help contextualize and present the issues. The way in which they are framed by the media both in the West and in predominantly Muslim countries significantly impacts whether populations and even policymakers think in constructive or polarizing ways about their relevance and meaning. Op-ed pieces could be drafted by junior writers to be signed (and cosigned) by

senior figures in the West and in predominantly Muslim countries (perhaps including HLG members), quickly translated into major languages (French, English, Arabic, Urdu, and Bahasa Indonesia for example), and distributed to editors of major newspapers around the world for printing. The prominence of the signatories, the timeliness with which they are provided, and the provision of articles in local languages would help maximize publication and republication of such pieces. Successful models of such systems exist, but not on the global scale or with the level of senior authorship that the Alliance could generate. A similar mechanism using video interviews distributable to TV-News outlets via the internet could also be mobilized (United Nations 2006).

Media Watch: The Center or Network could commence monitoring influential and popular media coverage of Islamic-West issues for grossly inaccurate, pejorative, and other irresponsible incidents with recommendations and best practices on how to counteract them. The monitor should seek inputs from existing monitors such as the recently-created Organization of the Islamic Conference initiative, the European Union's Monitoring Centre for Racism and Xenophobia, and the European Day of Media Monitoring exercise³⁴. The regular "media watch" report should be of sufficiently prestigious research, independence and journalism quality for inclusion in international journalism, public affairs, faith and religion, and other publications and websites with a stake in dialogue.

Media Award: Media monitors could refer examples of constructive and positive media coverage to a separate advisory panel to regularly award journalists and media outlets for distinguished contributions to cross-cultural understanding. The high-profile award program could collaborate with existing awards such as the European Union's Anna Lindh European-Mediterranean Foundation for Dialogue Between Cultures journalist prize, or the European CIVIS prize, or separately recognize gender, specific regions and faith and values reporting of relevance to relations between the West and the Muslim World. A separate award for the empowerment of women could also be considered. These awards will be for

outstanding achievement in addressing women's issues within the Arab media; this award should also stimulate media coverage.

2) Open Access to Educational Media Programming

The Alliance could support the dissemination of non-sensationalistic and educational media program by assisting under-resourced Islamic-world satellite broadcasters to access Western programming of broad appeal and educational content. Broadcasters are eager for such programming to fill gaps in their airtime but lack acquisition rights and translated material from Discovery Channel, National Geographic, various public broadcasters, specialty channels such as Vision Television (Canada), togetherTV, and any programming offering interactivity (United Nations 2006).

3) Strengthen the Capacity of Media Professionals to Cover the Intersection of Religion and Politics and to Cover Stories across Western-Muslim Societies

There is a need to accelerate professional skills development to keep pace with the emergence of new media outlets in the Islamic world and to instill more sensitivity to overcoming stereotypes, resisting sensationalizing and telling important stories creatively in reporters both in the West and in the Muslim World. Moreover, intercultural competence requires new curricula in journalism schools, new career development resources, and new ethical guidelines and accountability mechanisms focused on cross-cultural sensitization (Akel 2007). There is also a need to recognize the perception of double standards, where the suffering of one community is featured in its media but critiqued by others as a manipulation of popular sentiments. Many in the West have criticized the emphasis of suffering of Arabs and Muslims on Arab satellite stations but are unaware that repeated broadcasts of American servicemen in 1993 in Mogadishu had similar effects on their own population. Steps for strengthening media professionals are---

Journalist Training: Journalistic training is required to reduce ill-informed intercultural media reports that repeat stereotypes and emphasize extremes. Modules and full

programs in training culturally-informed and sensitive reporting should be developed with the advice of organizations such as the Media Diversity Institute and leading international organizations such as the Institute for War and Peace Reporting, Panos-Paris, Internews and Press Now, all of which provide journalism capacity-development in a number of countries already. Supporting placement of Arab women journalists in the non-Arab world could also encourage the development and progression of Arab women in the media. *(from the online dialogue)*. To sensitize western journalists to Muslim cultural values and appropriate language a reputable in-career training center such as the Poynter Institute which has previously challenged gender and racial disparities in newsrooms and news, should be invited to partner with counterparts to develop cross-cultural sensitivity training. *In all cases, training must include senioreditors and managers.*

Materials on the Intersection of Religion and Politics: The Media Diversity Institute should be invited to adapt its journalism best-practices manuals for Western journalists reporting on issues related to Islam and Muslim populations to include items such as historical references, basic understanding of secularism, fundamentalism, faith and law, both internationally and within regions. Distribution should include press associations, journalism schools, human rights groups and specific cultural communities.

Journalism School Curriculum: The UN's UPEACE University in Costa Rica, which already offers a degree course in conflict-sensitive reporting, should be invited to lead a consortium of journalism schools in the West to respond to the paucity of formal instruction in understanding and reporting on Muslim-West issues, by developing specific courses for journalism student training and curriculum development workshops or grants for journalism school faculty. The Annenberg School for Communication at the University of Southern California is prepared to begin drafting curricula immediately that would teach journalists-in-training the history of Islamic societies and the complexities of contemporary Islamic movements. Curricula should also include modules on Islam and women.

4) Support the Development, Articulation, and Implementation of Professional Media Standards

Calling for the establishment of a Code of Conduct for journalists risks arbitrary interpretation by licensing authorities within individual states for partisan purposes, and conflicts with the concept of free expression underlying media rights in many countries. However, standards have been developed which cover many of the concerns related to the state of cross-cultural media coverage, including the International Federation of Journalists' code³⁹, and are voluntarily pursued in many countries today. High Level Group members and other prominent individuals are encouraged to make a moral call to the media to take their responsibility of their powerful profession seriously. Non-partisan journalists' associations would be logical partners for considering adoption or modification of such codes to for inclusion in their own codes of practice.

A. Urge and Support the Convening of Professional Press Syndicates to Articulate Standards of Ethical Media Practices

In many countries where media professionals are experiencing a liberalization of laws governing their profession, the question of how to establish and implement professional standards of ethical conduct is an issue. Rather than calling for universal codes of conduct for the media, the Alliance should call for and support the convening of press syndicates to articulate professional standards and mechanisms for fostering a professional culture in which those standards are adhered to.

B. Convene Legislators Concerned with Press Laws, Media Owners, Journalism School Leaders, and Religious Leaders in Order to Facilitate Greater Consensus on the Lines Between Free Speech and Hate Speech in Diverse Societies

Free speech is nowhere absolute. Notwithstanding legitimate concerns among media professionals that government bodies not restrict their range of action for political purposes, any diverse society must regularly revisit the lines it draws in its legislation and within its editorial decision-making processes, over

where to draw the line between free speech and that speech which foments hatred or even violence against others. The Alliance should call for legislators and media professionals to meet periodically to examine, for example, whether the laws that have been established to protect against racist or anti-Semitic media must now be extended to protect against similar hate speech directed at Muslims and Islam in the West.

5) Reduce Cross-Cultural Isolation and Develop a Global Consciousness Among Media Professionals

There is an urgent need to reduce the intercultural ignorance of news media professionals – this can best be accomplished via face-to-face encounters, skills-sharing, and familiarization with fellow-professionals across cultures. Expand Reciprocal Extended Exchanges of Media Professionals in the West and Counterpart in Predominantly Muslim Countries To reduce intercultural ignorance and isolation, which is reflected in media reporting, journalists of specific skills assignments which intersect Islamic-West issues, such as religion and faith, immigration, human rights and politics, should have access to interchange, joint conferences⁴⁰ and possibly permanent councils on reporting on the Islamic-Western relations. The initiative of the Malaysian government to create an Islamic Centre for Journalism Training, with invitations to non-Muslim journalists to participate, should be considered for possible support. An international conference comparing and examining instances of Islamophobia and xenophobia in Western media reporting with their counterparts in the media of predominantly Muslim countries should be held under the auspices of the international federation of journalists or similar interests, as a launching point for smaller exchanges among specialist journalists. Existing professional and scholarship programs such as the program of the international centre for journalism which brings Muslim reporters to Western locations and vice versa for extended work exchanges should be substantially increased.

6) Urge Responsible Political and Cultural Leadership Vis-à-vis the Media

As the Indonesian response to the Danish cartoons controversy demonstrated, cultural

and political leaders of good will can seize the opportunities the media presents before they are commandeered by voices of extremism. Individually and through joint statements and appearances, leaders of moderation need be constrained only by honesty and civility in displacing diatribes and violence as the dominant media focus. The Alliance could play a galvanizing role in supporting such efforts through the rapid reaction commentary service noted above and through popularizing examples of constructive use of the media by leaders. Research and disseminate case studies of the constructive use of media outlets by political and cultural leaders in times of crisis

The Alliance could commission a series of briefing papers on the responsible use of media outlets by political, cultural, and media professionals in times of heightened tension and conflict to quell popular sentiments and to limit violence.

The case studies could be analyzed with a view to establishing and disseminating to policy advisors, diplomatic training institutes, schools of religious instruction and public policy, and to civil society leaders on a set of best practices in the use of media by responsible political, cultural, and community leaders in times of crisis.

7) Enlist the Support and Partnership of Mass Media Leaders

To be successful, efforts to engage the mass media, either in the news or in the entertainment fields, should be approached from a perspective of seeking partnership with them, rather than simply monitoring or seeking to admonish them. The existing media monitoring mechanisms set up by the European Commission and by several universities can provide case studies for best practices. The Alliance should also take advantage of high profile events such as the World Cup.

A. Impress upon Hollywood Script-Writers and Producers the impact they can Have and invite their support in countering extremism efforts are already underway, led by the Harvard School of public health, media mogul Omar Amanat, and the East-West institute to

research the effects of popular media on self-esteem and violence in the Muslim World, drawing on similar research conducted on the African American experience in the 1960s and 1970s. fewer than 200 Hollywood producers and script-writers have been identified as responsible for much of the production of the TV and film industry of Hollywood. Individual meetings are to be held once the sociological and health research has been completed. The Alliance should seriously consider providing it's auspices for a meeting of these Hollywood professionals together with the researchers and public health advocates involved to discuss the impact of film and TV on attitudes and behavior and to invite their input and ideas on how the portrayal of normalized Muslim characters in popular media might have an impact both in predominantly Muslim societies and in Western countries. Hollywood celebrities who serve as UN Goodwill Ambassadors could be asked to help in the convening of the meeting and in generating publicity around its conclusions.

B. Enlist the Support of Owners of Major Media Owners The effects of trainings and exchanges involving media professionals are often undercut by the fact that they operate within editorial lines that are set by senior editors, publishers, and owners. To be effective in enlisting the support of media, the Alliance must reach media conglomerate owners and executives (i.e. BBC, CNN, NBC, Fox, al-Jazeera, al-Arabiya), state media directors and regulators to provide both the space and the resources for media professionals to act. An organization such as the World Editors Forum and regional counterparts should be invited to convene an examination of media misportrayal and manipulation from owners' perspectives. Participants should include regulators, a very few senior journalists and a diverse group of theologian-analysts, with a view to generating support for more positive reporting of Islam-West issues that could in turn be conveyed to media managers and professionals (United Nations 2006).

8) Strengthen Muslim World-West Pop-Culture Collaboration

Work with public and private donors to establish a fund for media aimed at improving people-to-people relations between the Muslim world and the West any media format can be used to divide or unite communities. Pioneering efforts to use soap operas, talk shows, children's programming, and call-in programming to shift attitudes and even behavior have proven successful in a wide variety of cultural settings. The Alliance should convene a coalition of public and private donors interested in media and/or in Islamic-Western relations to establish a catalytic fund for intercultural media development. Funds could support producers and innovators of media with educational content and cultural entertainment focused on common values and demonstrations of dialogue, cooperation, or commonality between the Muslim world and the West. By providing funds for pilot programs, which in turn can be shown to broadcasters and, if successful, lead to full funding for series, such a fund could serve a catalyst for media programming without having to invest the much large funds needed for entire series or broadcasts. Such a fund could prioritize four kinds of media production:

i. *Support producers who have obtained a broadcaster's support and are engaged in a joint venture or co-production across cultural or religious lines.* Priority could be given to productions addressing central misperceptions or pressing cultural issues, such as headscarves, secularism, and the line between free speech and hate speech and those that use creative and popular means to reach the largest possible populations. The work of active voice productions in San Francisco is one example. The company makes films "that open eyes, hearts and minds about critical social issues not covered in depth by the mainstream media," such as immigration, youth justice and helping employees at diverse workplaces push past stereotypes about Muslims worldwide. Partnerships with local producers and outlets sensitive to the indigenous social-political context should be one key criterion.

ii. *Commission producers to create educational media content to be conveyed via innovative and popular entertainment formats* that reach broad sectors of society, such as

reality challenges, game shows and popularity contests, where rewards require multi-cultural cooperation. Such a fund could seek adaptations of the already popular formats of Western fare which floods both the West and the Muslim world, but with constructive and educational themes or in unique ventures capable of attracting audiences across cultures simultaneously, aiming for wide cross-border broadcaster interest and advertisers. Examples of such media production are becoming more plentiful in recent years. These include innovative intercultural communication with intentional educational messages in easily and eagerly-consumed form, such as newspaper special editions, theatre companies, radio soap operas and comic books such as the Asia-Europe comics project of the Asia-Europe Foundation and Singapore Institute of contemporary Arts.

Education and the media are the two most crucial public vehicles for creating and reinforcing social values and attitudes. Particularly with young people, such material can affect a change in how they form their initial social attitudes; that is, to broaden their horizons to a more inclusive, tolerant, and embracing view of the complex, pluralistic society in which they live. Radio soap operas have proved enormously effective education and peace-building tools in countries such as Afghanistan, Sierra Leone and Burundi, and television shows in interculturally stressed countries such as Macedonia where citizens are starved for entertainment. If well-enough produced, such innovative material addressing the global community and especially Islamic-Western gaps can compete with and exceed the popularity of stereotype-laden conventional messaging. Additional attention can be drawn to such programming if broadcast is timed and located strategically around major events that garner attention across cultures, such as the World Cup or Olympic Games.

iii. *Provide a “Risk Fund” to Temper the Market Forces that Allow Only Sensationalistic and Stereotyped Media and Cultural Materials to Be Exchanged Across Cultures.* The pressure to cover costs and turn profits from cultural exchanges and media productions makes it risky for theatres, museums, and other centers of cultural display and exhibit from taking

anything but “sure bets” in cultural exchanges. Cultural products, including media productions that trade in the “proven formulas” of standard stereotypes, therefore dominate the cultural exchange market. Many presenters shy away from presenting large-scale work by foreign companies because they fear significant losses at the box office. A risk or hedge fund that could guarantee presenters against dramatic losses might spur additional players to venture into this territory. Such a fund could be managed by an intermediary organization, or by a cultural institution with a prominent track record in this sphere. Such a fund could, perhaps, provide the means by which an important film produced in a Muslim country could survive in European or American theaters for the extra few weeks needed to gather support via word-of-mouth and become sustainable or even profitable. Similarly, it might allow less sensationalistic and more artistic products produced in the West to tour more extensively through predominantly Muslim countries. Such a fund could help increase exposure to positive and authentic and diverse portrayals of “the Other”.

iv. *Support Media Productions that Counter Prevailing Stereotypes.* This is particularly important for young Muslims who are not accustomed to seeing role models to whom they can relate in the globalized, Western-produced media. For example, efforts are underway to produce video games featuring Muslim protagonists² as well as cartoons featuring Muslim children, as opposed to Western non-Muslim characters dubbed into the local languages of countries with Muslim populations (United Nations 2006).

9) Support New Media Strategies and Efforts to Increase Media Literacy

The internet and the means of digital media production and dissemination provide an unprecedented opportunity for citizens across the globe to communicate with one another. While access to the internet varies widely by socio-economic class, internet access is growing exponentially in many developing countries, including in the Muslim world. As with any powerful communication tool, the internet can and is used in ways that exacerbate divisions and reinforce stereotypes across cultures and in ways that bridge differences and promote

cross-cultural understanding. The Alliance should take full advantage of and support funding and expansion of those “new media” strategies and initiatives that have proven successful in building cross-cultural understanding and in building media literacy among media consumers, particularly youth. The Alliance could do this by taking the following actions:

A. Promote, Feature, and Provide Links via the Alliance Website to Sites that Are Particularly Effective at Fostering Sustained Cross-Cultural Dialogue While un-moderated chat rooms and blogs proliferate on the internet, web-based dialogue that connects people across cultures in deeper ways (i.e. in settings that are moderated, sustained over time, and/or institutionalized through youth centers or university settings) should be featured and expanded. Using the German Government-supported Qantara (“the bridge”) website or the Egypt-based “Islam Online” website as examples, the Alliance could support a larger international portal to intercultural communication. The site format and content should seek socially conscious young adults based in predominantly Muslim countries and in the West. It could include straightforward explanation of cultural distinctions and similarities, reliable news reports, contemporary-issue and interactive forums for moderated discussion, links to leading cultural dialogue sites, chat-lines and supervised pod casting, and links to educational media materials, such as the EU-funded togetherTV online mini-documentaries producers and developers could be approached to support the site.

B. Support initiatives that place the means of media production and dissemination directly in the hands of regular citizens – particularly youth initiatives such as the global nomads group (which provides digital cameras and training to young people in developing countries to produce their own documentaries), and witness (which provides digital cameras and training to citizens to record and report on human rights abuses), provide the means by which voices of regular citizens can be heard, particularly via websites such as www.MySpace.com or Qantera noted above. Moreover, MTV World has expressed interest in airing short video segments of young people from around the world telling their own

stories. Such openings should be pursued by the Alliance to provide direct communication between populations in the West and in the Muslim World and to provide platforms for young people in particular to express their views and opinions (Akel 2007).

C. Establish UN Chairs for Media and Society at major Universities: Such chairs could be tasked with developing courses that foster critical media literacy among media consumers, furthering research into the impact of media on attitudes and behavior, contributing to the media monitoring mechanism noted above, researching and collecting best-practices on uses of new media, particularly the internet, to foster cross-cultural understanding and communication, and providing contact points for the convening of media networks and conferences.

b. The Danish Cartoon Controversy and the Role of Media & Political Leadership

The Danish cartoons crisis confirms the need for responses to the media's influence which respect free speech and cultural values and facilitate dialogue and understanding where the two principles intersect. The over-riding requirement is political and cultural leadership that recognizes the media today is the first platform or pulpit from which to lead. Policy-makers of good will can set the agenda for the media, not encroaching on media freedom but establishing the tone on an issue. As Ismail Serageldin, director-general of the Bibliotheca Alexandrina, suggests, what is needed is not legislation but "enhanced social consciousness that fixes the norms of acceptable behavior. If the overwhelming majority of Western society including its political leaders had condemned the cartoons, without necessarily restricting the right of the newspaper to publish them, it would have gone a long way towards healing past wounds and to fostering the trust needed to diffuse the issue" (Serageldin 2006, np).

It was precisely this kind of widely reported leadership that defused tension over the cartoons incident in Indonesia. President Yudhoyono came out early condemning the cartoons publication but highlighted Danish expressions of regret. He was supported by an array of prominent religious leaders in Indonesia who also condemned the cartoons but with

the message that the issue was “not really about the West versus Islam but about reckless journalism.” There was no widespread violence in Indonesia, the world’s most populous Muslim country, in reaction to the cartoons. Similarly, following the bombing attacks in London in 2005 incidents of hate motivated crime began to rise against members of the Muslim community there. “This is where political leadership came in: the UK government, police, community leaders and Muslim organizations took a strong stance in condemning such attacks as the acts of misguided individuals. And they strongly opposed any acts of retaliation against the wider Muslim community. As a result the level of incidents was soon moving back towards previous level. On the whole the media followed the lead of the politicians and reported in a balanced and responsible way,” according to Bette Winkler, Director of the European Union’s Monitoring Centre on Racism and Xenophobia (United Nations 2006).

4.1.3 A Balanced Educational Curriculum Both in West and Islamic World

An adequately designed educational curriculum could function as a fruitful tool to subvert bias and prejudices as well as distrust, racism and intolerance among different cultures. It is an important vehicle to replace “ignorance of the other with knowledge of the other” through promoting tolerance and understanding. To this end, organizing academic exchanges between the Western and Muslim school and universities, developing particular education and training programs on alliance of and harmony between different culture and civilizations, publishing special books, magazines or leaflets, or benefiting from information technologies, especially Internet in this direction are among the initial steps to be considered. Family and institutional education play an important role in shaping one’s perception, vision and mission. Hence an accurate balanced education curriculum and syllabus is of prime necessity both in west and Islamic world to remove the wrong perception of each other. Elementary and mid level education is the foundation of a human uptake. If a child’s brain is

imprinted with true picture at this foundational stage. It will remain rooted to some extent irrespective of bias media or other propaganda. So, at the very outset, in order to change the wrong perception we need to incorporate a balanced education both in west and Islamic world (United Nations 2006).

4.1.4 Training of Foreign Service Officers, Teachers, Clergymen and Journalists.

Foreign service officers, teachers clargymen and journalists and other professional group like these always play an influencing and motivating role in building up perception and foreign policy. Like, foreign service officers formulate foreign policy, teachers motivate students, clargymen motivate society and Journalists regulate the media. Hence to motivate the public in a right perspective, first of all motivators must be trained in an efficient and balanced way. Otherwise their role might bring the unwanted wrong perception in both west Islamic world (United Nations 2006).

4.1.5 To Refrain from Portraying Terrorism with Any Religion.

Both West and Islamic world ought to refrain from voicing expressions portraying terrorism with any kind of religion. This is particularly valid for the Western world. Terrorism cannot be supported by any kind of religious belief for the simple reason that this is totally against their spirit and core principles. This is valid for Islam as well as other religions. By the same token, it is improper to assess the issue in a comparative manner among different religious affiliations. This fact is even acknowledged by Huntington who states in an interview just after the September 11 attacks that: "I don't think Islam is any more violent than any other religions, and I suspect if you added it all up, more people have been slaughtered by Christians over the centuries than by Muslims"(Steinberger 2001,np). To sum up, the term "Islamic terrorism", used by certain segments of the Western world should be avoided. The acts of IRA have never been called as "Catholic terrorism (United Nations 2006).

4.1.6 From Story of Us and Them to Togetherness.

In the global transformative period that lies ahead, we must be particularly careful to distinguish between two types of narratives: narratives of inevitability and narratives of possibility. Narratives of inevitability tell us that what we do today is of little consequence, or can, at best, moderate the conflict we are fated to experience in our dealings with the "other." Narratives of possibility remind us that, as participants in an unfolding human drama, we have the freedom and responsibility of choice. We have the opportunity to create a new story by moving beyond the scripted tropes that have been recited too often in relations between Islam and the West (Said & Funk 1998).

As we have seen, conventional discourse on "Islam and the West" is deeply laden with presuppositions of irreconcilable "otherness," and tends to reinforce the idea that "we" cannot work with "them" until "they" become like "us." "Islam" and "the West" are exclusive, bounded categories, we are told. Cultural and religious factors are obstacles to peacemaking, not resources. A "clash" is inevitable, and can only be managed (Said & Funk 1998).

Granted, the experience of strangeness upon encountering the "other" is an integral aspect of all genuine cross-cultural encounters. From time immemorial, travelers to distant lands have returned with remarkable tales - tales that evoke feelings of wonder, surprise, and, often, fear or revulsion. These initial reactions are natural and, indeed, thoroughly human. They merit no reproach. To experience another way of being human as strange or "other" is only problematic if initial reactions to the "exotic" do not give way to efforts to move beyond initial impressions and establish a deeper basis of understanding grounded in the open-ended pursuit of knowledge with the "other."

We have come far enough to dispense with the clichés of confrontational discourse, which alleges a fundamental incompatibility between Islamic and Western cultures while neglecting basic questions: Which Islam and which West? Who represents the "West," and

who represents "Islam"? Is the development of the West a finished project, or is the West still developing? Is Islam a static set of static cultural norms, or is Islam a dynamic message whose basic precepts affirm human dignity?

A central premise is that Muslims and Westerners have known each other long enough to cease being strangers to each other, and to recognize representations that willfully distort or exoticize. The current estrangement between Islam and the West is unsustainable. The events of September 11 and its aftermath have reinforced tendencies toward alienation, leaving Muslims and Westerners increasingly distrustful both of each other and of the more humanistic and life-affirming values within their traditions. At the same time, Westerners are finding that they cannot retain a fully "Western" way of life without peaceful relations with Muslims, insofar as the term "Western" is intended to evoke respect for democracy, human dignity, and human rights. Likewise, many Muslims - especially Muslims from the Middle East, whose relations with the West have been simultaneously the most immediate and the most strained - are discovering that they cannot fully realize the potential of their faith tradition as long as they find themselves locked in antagonistic relations with a "Western other." Such relations empower extremist factions that are willing to jeopardize the rich and diverse heritage of Islamic civilization in their pursuit of autonomy, authenticity, and an elusive cultural purity (Said & Funk 1998).

The West and Islam are caught in a twin cycle of arrogance which breeds contempt and fanaticism which breeds paranoia. Since September 11, paranoia has become a dominant discourse, in which both sides deeply distrust each other's intentions and are able to provide coherent, albeit one-sided and selective, justifications for their doubts, fears, and suspicions. To a remarkable extent, the story of rivalry has come to define the terms of the relationship that has acquired an unhealthy dynamism: each side responds to the offenses of the "other" and regards these offenses as integral to the adversary's identity and nature. The result is violence, construed as a defensive measure against a domineering opponent who must be

"taught a lesson." It comes as no surprise, then, when Westerners respond more vigorously to terrorist provocations than to appeals for a dialogue of civilizations, or when many Muslims fail to condemn political violence against civilians even when they recognize that such violence contravenes Islamic norms (Said & Funk 1998).

In a world where distance between cultures, religions, and civilizations has collapsed, we can no longer remain satisfied with narratives that are more preoccupied with preserving past illusions of separation, firm boundaries, and unqualified righteousness than with meeting the contemporary challenge of identifying bases for coexistence among peoples who share common values and problems. The stories we tell about Middle Eastern Muslims and the West have profound implications for the way we frame the tensions we experience and delimit the range of realistic political options. Islam and the West are not inherently incompatible. Mutual accommodation can be achieved, because the West is not the enemy of Islam, and Islam is not the enemy of the West.

The story of "otherness" and rivalry - the dominant story in political and strategic analyses - informs us of tensions that do in fact exist, but it neglects the truths of the second story: sufficient areas of compatibility and deep resonance between Islamic and Western civilizations exist to provide a basis for cooperation and conflict resolution. Where the first story - the story of incompatibility - portrays dialogue between the West and Islam as an exercise in futility, and the second story - the story of compatibility and mutual accommodation - provides a hint of what might be gained from moving beyond facile, stereotypical language and judgments (Said & Funk 1998).

Because the present world affords no scope for authenticity in isolation or security through empire, Muslims and Westerners need to experience themselves "in relationship" rather than "out of relationship," by finding meaning in the common tragedy of their estrangement. The Islamic Middle East is in the West and the West is present in the Islamic Middle East, physically as well as culturally. If they can become reconciled to these facts,

Muslims and Westerners may find that only deep knowledge and appreciation of what the "other" has to offer (and has offered historically) provides a realistic understanding of the self. Through mutual engagement and moral humility, the cultures of Islam and the West can foster a new narrative of complementarities and peaceful coexistence (Said & Funk 1998).

To become more secure, Westerners and Muslims must recognize that they need each other to establish a positive, proactive basis for coexistence. In other words, they need to find a way not only to tolerate each other's presence on the international stage, but also to discover ways in which their cultures may actually benefit from the presence of the "other." Both Islam and the West are here to stay. There can be no peace in the world without peace between them.

Islam and the West are truly between stories - between the stories of the past, and the story that they must now create together. All who identify with Islam and with the West can become coauthors of this new story. We are all heirs of the story of conflict. If we leave aside tired generalizations and seek to know one another, we can become the architects of a truly new order of cooperation (Said & Funk 1998).

4.1.7 Overcoming Monolithic Structure of West and Islam

A mistake conducted by both the Western and Islamic worlds is appraising the other as a monolithic structure. That needs to be dispelled. A fraction of Westerners deny the entire Islamic world the contemporary values of peace, rationalism, democracy, etc. A similar erroneous attitude of some Muslim people towards the Western community is the belief that the latter perfectly constitutes an integral bloc with a uniform vision. On that basis, in the eyes of these people, the entire Western world is equated solely with the motives of imperialism, colonialism, expediency in terms of their treatment of the other. Obviously, both arguments are far from satisfactory. Islamic history as well as current political, economic and social dynamics in the West clearly demonstrates invalidity of these assertions. So long the

idea of this monolithic structure will prevail in the mind of either society. It will be an obstacle in the way to change the wrong perception. Hence, for our greater interest of both sides. We need to erase this idea from our memory, the sooner we can do that, the more easier it will be to change the wrong perception (United Nations 2006).

4.1.8 Obama's " Mutual Interest and Mutual Respect " Policy

The introduction of the Obama administration has put a light on a tunnel for new beginnings in US relations with the Muslim world. Taking advantage of this opportunity, however, will require both political courage and a well-informed, well-developed strategy of active peacemaking that contrasts greatly with the approach of the last eight years (marked as it was by confrontation ideological inflexibility, contradiction, and resistance to diplomatic engagement with adversaries), while also moving beyond the standard repertoire of practices associated with foreign policy realism. In the absence of a new strategy underpinned by principles of conflict resolution, democratic change and restorative justice, the promise of the present moment is likely to go unfulfilled, giving way to an uncomfortable and unsteady new status quo (Funk 2009).

A set of principles and prescriptions for breaking the present impasse in American-Islamic relations may be mentioned here. These principles and prescriptions derived from academic studies of peacemaking in protracted inter group conflict as well as from critical evaluation of past US policies, are intended to build upon President Obama's stated commitment to founding relations upon "mutual interest and mutual respect" They underscore the vital importance of 1) listening carefully to various Muslim accounts of the "backstory" behind present tensions 2) embracing conflict de-escalation as an overarching strategy for marginalizing extremists by "draining the swamp" of enmity that is fed by various enduring rivalries (esp US- Iranian, Israeli-Palestinian /Arab, and US- Arab) in Islamic-Western relations, 3) consistently conveying respect for Islam, while simultaneously

inviting dialogue about Islamic bases for peaceable relations, 4) articulating a “new deal” in US-Muslim relations based on internationally Legitimate norms and standards rather than on traditional forms of geopolitical expediency, 5) drawing upon restorative justice principles to formulate diplomatic messages that signal commitment to genuine change in hitherto troubled historical relationships; and 6) developing a more genuinely “democratic” (as opposed to coercive or ethnocentric) set of guidelines for supporting democratic “change from within” in Muslim-majority societies (Funk 2009).

The Light on a Tunnel: The rise of the Obama administration has created an opportunity for improving US – Islamic relations. After years of deepening antagonism between America and the Muslim world and decades of drift and deterioration there is a chance for something new. Although it would be difficult if not impossible to make a “clean break” from all that has gone before –cultures of policymaking conceptions of national interest, and images of the other do not change overnight, either in Muslim lands or in America – an opening has emerged for new strategic approaches to the many vexing problems that beset the relationship. Years of destructive conflict cannot simply be wished away, but the meaning of past events is subject to change if we can find the political courage to enact a strategy of active and persistent peacemaking

Finding the political courage for such a strategy will not be easy. Particularly at a time of economic crisis and domestic reconstruction, there is a temptation to preserve political capital and adopt a cautious approach rooted in precedents and practices that are widely believed to have “worked” during the Cold War and immediate post-Cold War eras, such approaches although preferable to a confrontational and ideological preoccupation with regime change and selective invocation of human rights norms, cannot deliver “the change we need” in U.S –Islamic relations. To write- or, better yet coauthor-a new chapter in relations with the Muslim world, the U.S will need to move beyond the standard repertoire of practices associated with foreign policy realism and with past Middle East policy. In the

absence of a strategy underpinned by principles of conflict resolution restorative justice and democratic change, the promise of the present moment is likely to go unfulfilled, giving way to an uncomfortable and unsteady new status quo. If, however, American leaders can transcend the temptation to simply repackage traditional formulas for “stability” and can instead make a more serious effort to engage the back story to U.S tensions with the Muslim world, genuine opportunities for transforming political and identity conflict (not only interstate but intersocietal and intercultural) are likely to emerge- to the benefit of all parties, not least the United States (Funk 2009).

Symbolic Gestures: That U.S –Islamic relations are a priority for the Obama administration has been evident since Inauguration Day. In his January 20 address, President Obama sounded a welcome note when he stated, “To the Muslim world, we seek a new way forward, based on mutual interest and mutual respect.” Two days later, he indicated an intent to engage the Israeli-Palestinian conflict by appointing George Mitchell as his special envoy to the Middle East, and on January 26 he granted his first formal interview as president to the Arabic-language satellite channel, Al-Arabiya. These gestures were accompanied by executive orders to close the Guantanamo Bay detention facility and ban the use of torture, and followed up by an Iranian Nowruz message on March 20 and an address on U S Turkish as well as Muslim – American relations in Ankara on April 6.

Taken together, such words and deeds communicate an aspiration to depart from the policies and the overall tone of the Bush administration, and reinforce the symbolism of change that Obama himself represents. While Middle Eastern commentators have detected many areas of continuity with Bush administration policies, particularly on Iran and the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, many Muslims are profoundly hopeful that America’s first black president- a president with Muslim relatives, life experience in Indonesia, and a presumed capacity to identify with people struggling for justice and equality in many parts of the world- will provide substantively different policies than those formulated by George Bush’s policy

team. There is a hope that he will adopt a humbler policy that is more inclined to listen and negotiate than to dictate and polarize. To cultivate new dynamics and enhance long-term U.S security. American leaders would do well to listen closely to-and, indeed, to critically engage- skeptical voices, an effort to identify underlying roots of present conflict and formulate guiding principles for U.S actions in the years ahead (Funk 2009).

4.1.9 To Refrain from Using Religion for Political Gain

In all ages, time and again every religion has been misused for political gain by the incompetent political leaders thereby creating division between religions. But it is found, the three monotheistic faiths share much in common than dissimilarity. While there are several differences between Judaism, Christianity and Islam in some aspects, similarities are much more dominant. They all are monotheistic, believe in prophet hood and divine revelation, and have a concept of moral accountability, sanctity of life, value of family, desire for prosperity, social justice, peace and security and responsibility, etc. Therefore, the real problem between the two parties does not stem from religious differences in essence. Unfortunately, religious issues are being exploited to cover various kinds of other intentions. The fundamental driving force behind the degeneration of attitudes between the two parties is the great imbalance between political, economic, social conditions they are faced with. Therefore, in lieu of explaining various problems based on religious suppositions, the articulation of religion needs to be explored (United Nations 2006).

4.1.10 Co ordination and Joint Effort of all Similar Groups/Alliances

There should be initiative to utilize the achievements of parallel efforts such as the Alliance of civilizations, Barcelona Process and Euro-Mediterranean partnership, “Dialogue among Civilizations”, “World Faiths Development Dialogue” as well as the contributions of international organizations to the subject such as OIC, OSCE, World Economic Forum, etc.

That assistance and sharing process will certainly affect the course of the Initiative in a constructive manner.

The UN High-level Group recommends the development of partnerships in the framework of the Alliance of Civilizations with international organizations that share its goals, and the reinforcement of their interaction and coordination with the UN system. Special attention should be given to those international organizations that are part of the UN family and those organizations that have already been cooperating with the High-level Group of the Alliance of Civilizations, namely: the United Nations Educational Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO), the European Union, the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), the Organization of the Islamic Conference (OIC), the League of Arab States, the Islamic Educational Scientific and Cultural Organization (ISESCO), United Cities and Local Governments (UCLG), and the World Tourism Organization (UNWTO), as well as other international and national organizations, public or private (United Nations 2006).

4.1.11 Muslim Immigrant Initiatives

Muslims immigrants are like ambassadors of Islam to a non-Muslim country. They represent the Islam in outside world. Hence, these immigrants must play two major roles to change the wrong perception of the west.

First to present one self with true Islamic character. So that non-Muslims could have a positive impression about Islam.

Second to renounce, disassociate from all sorts of terrorism openly, so that non-Muslims could understand, Islam has no connection with terrorism. They must circulate the idea among non-Muslims and media that a terrorist can't be a Muslim terrorist, he is simply a terrorist, because Islam does not approve terrorism (United Nations 2006).

4.1.12 Exercising Responsible Leadership

The impact of inflammatory language sometimes used by political and religious leaders is far reaching and there is a destructive effect of such language when disseminated by the media. Such language fuels the spread of hatred and mistrust resulting in Islamophobia, xenophobia, and anti-Semitism. In the current climate of fear and suspicion that grips communities throughout the world, leaders and shapers of public opinion have a special responsibility to promote understanding among cultures and mutual respect of religious belief and traditions. Given the influence and the respect they command, it is their duty to avoid using violent or provocative language about other people's beliefs or sacred symbols (United Nations 2006).

4.1.13 Protection of Freedom of Worship

Freedom of religion and freedom of worship are fundamental rights to be guaranteed by all countries and faith communities. Therefore, particular attention must be paid to the respect for religious monuments and holy sites, as they have a significance that goes to the core of individual and collective religious identity. The violation and desecration of places of worship can grievously damage relations between communities and raise the risk of triggering widespread violence. In line with the resolution adopted by the UN General Assembly in 2001, therefore, we believe that governments should take a strong stand against the desecration of holy sites and places of worship and take responsibility for their protection. Civil society and international organizations must help to promote a culture of tolerance and respect for all religions and religious sites (United Nations 2006).

4.1.14 Political Pluralism in Muslim Countries

One of the factors contributing to the polarization between Muslim and Western societies and to the rise in extremism in these relations is the repression of political

movements in the Muslim world. Therefore, it is in the interest of Muslim and Western societies alike that ruling parties in the Muslim world provide the space for the full participation of non-violent political parties, whether religious or secular in nature. To this end, foreign governments should be consistent in their support for democratic processes and not interfere when the results do not fit their political agenda. This call for expanded political pluralism applies not only to countries in the Middle East or in the larger Muslim world, but to all nations (United Nations 2006).

4.1.15 Commitment for Multilateral Global Politics

Many of the problems facing the international community can only be addressed effectively within a multilateral framework. Because in this unipolar world unilateralism will only bring anarchy and more conflicts. It is therefore incumbent upon states to reinforce multilateral institutions – particularly the United Nations – and to support reform efforts that will strengthen the capacity and performance of these institutions (United Nations 2006).

4.2 Conflict Resolution by Changing Wrong Perception

So far many non-violent approaches are being discussed which are likely to change the wrong western perception. Now we will discuss how a change in perception can influence in resolving many of the prevailing conflicts. These following options are based on literature review as well as own thinking.

4.2.1 Going Back to True Religion for Conflict Resolution

When we speak of the role of faith in cross-cultural conflict resolution, our challenge is to honor the diversity of the world's humanistic and spiritual traditions while seeking common ground among them. What we aspire towards, in other words, is an agenda for research, dialogue and activism that is global in conception and responsive to common challenges of peacemaking and coexistence within and among the world's many traditions. It

is no longer sufficient for transnational peace agendas to be defined primarily by the cultural experiences and perceived security threats of a particular nation or culture. We need new frameworks for organizing knowledge about religion, culture and spirituality – frameworks that recognize the powerful role that faith and belief play in conflict and conflict resolution, and that do not privilege one culture as ‘normal’ and label another as ‘exceptional’. One of the greatest barriers to open dialogue between major cultural traditions is the assumption that a universally valid (and presumably secular) framework of knowledge for peace and the resolution of conflicts already exists. This notion is untenable for two reasons. First, it breeds complacency, lack of vision and reliance on dominant paradigms which presuppose that peace and human development ‘take care of themselves’ so long as self-interested actors pursue such mundane, minimalist goals as economic growth and physical security. Second, it is exclusive, and implies that approaches based on non-Western sources, or even religious precepts, for that matter, are dangerous or somehow invalid. The rising prominence of protracted ethnic and religious conflicts, however, has convinced many scholars that the cultural and religious aspects of conflict and its resolution must be taken seriously. An emerging literature on religion, conflict resolution and peace has contributed significantly to this development (Said & Funk 2001).

One of the most important findings of cross-cultural conflict resolution research is that religion is a perennial and perhaps inevitable factor in both conflict and conflict resolution. Religion, after all, is a powerful constituent of cultural norms and values, and because it addresses the most profound existential issues of human life (e.g., freedom and inevitability, fear and faith, security and insecurity, right and wrong, sacred and profane), religion is deeply implicated in individual and social conceptions of peace. To transform the conflicts besetting the world today, we need to uncover the conceptions of peace within our diverse religious and cultural traditions, while seeking the common ground among them.

a. Defining the Role of Religion in Conflict and Peacemaking

Peace and conflict resolution are both universal and particular; similar as well as divergent approaches derived from the cultural resources of a people. When we examine peacemaking and conflict resolution across cultures, we discover both common themes and significant differences, both of which enhance our general theories of conflict resolution and help to create constructive channels for the perennial religious impulse. Whether or not scholars and practitioners are consciously aware of religious influences in the shaping of their own perceptions, religious belief systems directly impact the development of theories of conflict and conflict resolution. Primarily, this occurs through presuppositions regarding the nature of reality and society, the purpose and ultimate meaning of life, and the means by which to live an 'authentic' ideal life – the life of inner and outer peace. Religious concepts of peace, then, embody and elaborate upon the highest moral and ethical principles of a given society and define the terms and conditions for individual and social harmony. Religion may be defined as a path of ultimate transformation, comprised of interconnected systems of symbols and guidelines. These shape the individual and group subconscious from which social practices and interactions are all given meaning (Galtung 1997). This common frame of reference underpins the very fabric of group and individual identity, providing the shared normative foundation that makes harmonious social interaction possible as well as meaningful. Social and political norms manifest the virtues, priorities and ideals of their religious culture.

b. Religion in Conflict Situations

In promulgating the ideals and values held in highest esteem by groups and individuals, religion profoundly influences goal-seeking behavior in conflict situations, by establishing the criteria or frames of reference for determining the rightness and wrongness of events. Viewed from a religious perspective, conflicts are interpreted not only as ruptures in horizontal relationships between human beings, but also as ruptures in one's vertical

relationship with the divine. The 'shared cultural universe' or 'collective cosmology' that religion provides operates at both a conscious and subconscious level, and both levels come into play in the midst of conflict. For disputants, the disruption that accompanies conflict can shake unstated, implicit expectations and reinforce tendencies to frame relationships in terms of religious categories. In this context, religious presuppositions regarding 'self', 'other', 'conflict' and 'peace' emerge, as individuals or groups frame the conflict, give it meaning and fashion responses appropriate to their values and goals for its resolution.

By enjoining a broad repertoire of models or precedents of desirable behavior in conflicted circumstances while specifically admonishing others, religion implicitly influences the desirability and likelihood of certain courses of action over others. When utilized constructively, religion can affect individual and social responses to triggering events through (a) placing the event in a historical, goal-seeking context, (b) providing meaning for events in light of values, goals and religious identity and (c) offering roles for dealing with conflict through appropriate, affirmative responses based on religious precepts and idealized models or precedents. When faced with difficult challenges or uncertainty in conflicts, participants rely on these established codes of conduct to alleviate cognitive dissonance, anxiety and guilt as well as to fashion a path of correctness (based on idealized courses of action) that promises to restore harmony and order (Said & Funk 2001).

c. Religion and Conflict Resolution

It is essential to recognize that the experience of conflict evokes a deep-seated need for affirmation of identity and restoration of meaning. Conflict resolution does more than address material clashes of interest; it speaks to social reintegration, restoration and redemption, existential security, personal transcendence and transformation. These concepts are drawn from the backdrop of the sacred, which may be defined as any process that explicitly connects us to the largest possible context to which we belong. The affirmation of

individual and group identity achieved through redemptive transformation is essential in giving meaning to a conflict and its resolution. Attempts to divorce the spiritual from conflict resolution practices deny an essential component of healing and social restoration that permits conflicts to be *experienced* as resolved.

The religious cosmology of a group, in privileging some values and ideals over others, specifies how restoration, wholeness and healing can be achieved through distinctive paths of resolution adopted by different cultures (Abu-Nimer 1996). Conflict resolution approaches that do not incorporate appropriate and relevant paths of redemptive transformation are less likely to yield more enduring or effective resolution. The ruptures experienced in conflict situations often require symbolic or other social exchange found within collective cosmologies. In this way, conflict resolution strategies manifest distinctive conceptions of peace, which illuminate the terms and conditions necessary for social harmony to be both understood and experienced. For example, in Christian cosmologies and in some Western approaches to conflict resolution, personal responses such as an aspiration toward transcendence or perceptual transformation are encouraged, emphasizing historical breaks from the past that enable renewal and revisionism. This is in line with Christianity's traditional emphasis on a personal relationship with the divine and the idealized social value attached to the individual pursuit of interests (Tarnas 1991). Significantly, Christianity alone among the monotheist traditions encourages this kind of comprehensive, unilateral conflict resolution approach, whereas in both Islam and Judaism, reciprocal or other social actions signal the achievement of resolution within a larger, historical context. The role of community and community leaders in achieving historically and communally acceptable solutions is particularly evident in Islamic approaches to conflict resolution.

d. Contrasting Western and Islamic Approaches to Peace

Although Western approaches to peace reflect traditions within Christian religious cosmology, most are underpinned by largely secular intellectual constructs. In the field of international relations, the prevailing Western approach is apparent in an emergent synthesis of neorealist power politics and neoliberal institutionalism. Considered separately from justice, peace is equated with an absence of war; justice, in turn, is understood as an absence of gross violations of human rights. As an absence of war or organized violence, peace is maintained by the threat of coercion and by institutionalized cooperation among great powers. Peace is equated with stability and order guaranteed by hegemonic influence. Where institutionalized order cannot be guaranteed, as in politics among core and peripheral nation-states, preponderance of coercive power is viewed as a necessary, albeit arbitrary, arbiter of intractable disputes (Said & Funk 2001).

Like Christians, Jews and followers of other traditions, Muslims share in a common calling to work for peace. This calling is rooted in the *Qur'an*, which enjoins humanity to “strive as in a race in all virtues” (Q 5:48). Within the Muslim community, or *umma*, this calling has manifested, and will no doubt continue to manifest, in varied ways that reflect continuous efforts to interpret and apply foundational Islamic values in specific historical, social and cultural situations. Islam, like all religions, is not only a theological affirmation but also a living historical process with multiple syntheses and expressions that must be taken into account. Though in principle we may speak of Islam as an integral tradition, from a practical, realistic standpoint there are many Islams, each of which reflects a different approach to perennial challenges of integrating precept and practice. Through its varied traditions, Islam has much to contribute to intercultural and interreligious dialogue on the advancement of peace and related humanistic and spiritual values.

This conception is premised on the *Qur'an* and *Sunnah* (the example of the Prophet). The keynote of the Qur'anic revelation could be characterized as integration and wholeness through surrender to God. This essential theme is expressed in a universalistic spirit, suggesting a worldview premised on tolerance and inclusiveness. As mentioned in holy Quran "O mankind! We created you from a single (pair) of a male and a female, and made you into nations and tribes, that ye may know each other (not that ye may despise (each other)). Verily the most honoured of you in the sight of Allah is (he who is) the most righteous of you. And Allah has full knowledge and is well acquainted (with all things)"(Q 49:13). Peace in Islam begins with God; God is peace, for peace (*al-Salam*) is one of the "most beautiful names" of God.

God calls believers unto the abode of peace (*dar al-salam*) as he mentioned "But Allah doth call to the Home of Peace: He doth guide whom He pleaseth to a way that is straight" (Q 10:25), and the yearning for peace derives from the innermost nature of humankind. Interestingly enough, the word *Islam* derives not from the name of a particular prophet or people, but from the same root as *salam* (*s-l-m*) and suggests a condition of peace, security, wholeness and safety from harm that is attained through surrender (*taslim*) to the Divine.

Islam adopts a positive view of human nature, insisting that the original human constitution (*fitrah*) is good and *muslim* in character. There is no conception of original sin, but rather a hopeful conception of human potential that is integrally related to a status of stewardship towards creation. In contrast to the Western idea of free choice and freedom from constraint ('freedom to do'), Islam accentuates existential freedom ('freedom to be'). The dignity of the individual is actualized through service, within a broader context of human solidarity.

There is a clearly articulated preference in Islam for nonviolence over violence, and for forgiveness (*'afu*) over retribution. The *Qur'an* aims to regulate the commonplace,

retributive responses of people to conflict and violence. Forgiveness is consistently held out as the preferred option for humanity in matters of requiting clear injustice or crime. As Quran says “The recompense of an injury is an injury the like thereof; but whoever forgives and thereby brings about a reestablishment of harmony, his reward is with God; and God loves not the wrongdoers” (Q 42:40). Neither naive pardon nor a mechanical retribution is urged; what is sought is a reformation or moral good accomplished by sincere forgiveness.

Finally, the *Qur’an* frequently cautions people against going to excess when attempting to pursue rights or correct injustice. The *Qur’an* discourages unnecessary conflict, and heaps utter condemnation on those who, by selfishly pursuing their own limited goals, bring destruction, oppression and violence (*fitnah*) down upon the rest of their fellows, committing excesses on earth (Said & Funk 2001).

e. A Communally Embedded Approach to Conflict Resolution

From an Islamic point of view, the achievements of the dominant Western approach to peace are impressive, but also one-sided. From a Muslim perspective, the Western approach puts too much faith in institutional formulas and the “invisible hand” of competition, and too little emphasis on communal cooperation in the conscious pursuit of values. Where the Western approach celebrates human self-determination, the Islamic perspective underscores divine purpose and human exertion. While the Western approach points to political pluralism, individual rights and consumerism as the substance of peace, the Islamic perspective affirms cultural pluralism, communal solidarity, social justice and faith.

However suitable modern Western techniques may be in their original cultural milieu – especially when harmonized with religious or humanistic values – their applications in more traditional or non-Western contexts are circumscribed. John Paul Lederach (1995), for example, has observed substantial differences between contemporary Western conflict resolution approaches and traditional Latin American approaches that are derived from

indigenous culture and embedded in communal realities. On the basis of his work in the region, Lederach (1995) concludes that ‘insider partial’ mediators – who are by definition well versed in local cultural meanings and expectations, and often have vested interests in conflict outcomes – have better chances of making important contributions than mediators who play the North American role of the disinterested, impartial outsider (see also Wehr and Lederach (1995). Other scholars have also recognized the role that culture plays in conflict and peacemaking, and have affirmed the potential contributions of diverse religious institutions and principles to conflict resolution within divided societies (Augsburger 1992; Avruch 1998). While the strongest current of the Western approach to conflict resolution prioritizes problems to be abstracted and solved, distinctively Islamic approaches resemble other non-Western approaches insofar as they frame conflicts as matters of communal and not just individual concern, and underscore the importance of repairing and maintaining social relationships.

Muslim approaches to conflict resolution draw on religious values, social networks, rituals of reconciliation and historical practices of communal and inter-communal coexistence. Strong emphasis is placed on linkages between personal and group identity, between individual and collective responsibility for wrongdoings, and between attentiveness to ‘face’-related issues (public status, shame, reputation for generosity) and the achievement of restorative justice within a context of continuing relationship. Conflict resolution efforts are directed toward the maintenance of communal or intercommunal harmony. They favor recognition of mutual rights and obligations, and uphold shared values by calling for public apology, compensation for losses and forgiveness . Conflict resolution mechanisms are legitimized and guaranteed by communal leaders and (traditionally) elders who facilitate a process of reconciliation. History is regarded as a source of stability and guidance that provides lessons for shaping a common future for the society. Efforts aim to protect and

empower families and the community as a whole to participate in a resolution process (Said & Funk 2001).

4.2.2 Cultural Pluralism.

Cultural diversity is not a new phenomenon. The European canvas is marked by the sediments of intra-continental migrations, the redrawing of borders and the impact of colonialism and multinational empires. Over recent centuries, societies based on the principles of political pluralism and tolerance has enabled us to live with diversity without creating unacceptable risks for social cohesion. Samuel P. Huntington (1993) believes in pure modernization and cultural pluralism which only can resolve the clash of civilizations.

In recent decades, cultural diversification has gained momentum. Europe has attracted migrants in search of a better life and asylum-seekers from across the world. Globalisation has compressed space and time on a scale that is unprecedented. The revolutions in telecommunications and the media particularly through the emergence of new communications services like the Internet have rendered national cultural systems increasingly porous. The development of transport and tourism has brought more people than ever into face-to-face contact, engendering more and more opportunities for intercultural dialogue.

In this situation, pluralism, tolerance and broadmindedness are more important than ever. The European Court of Human Rights has recognized that pluralism is built on “the genuine recognition of, and respect for, diversity and the dynamics of cultural traditions, ethnic and cultural identities, religious beliefs, artistic, literary and socio-economic ideas and concepts and that the harmonious interaction of persons and groups with varied identities is essential for achieving social cohesion” (Said & Funk 2001, np). However, pluralism, tolerance and broadmindedness may not be sufficient: a pro-active, a structured and widely shared effort in managing cultural diversity is needed. Intercultural dialogue is a major tool to

achieve this aim, without which it will be difficult to safeguard the freedom and well-being of everyone living in a country.

Islamic traditions provide a set of powerful political precepts and practices with universal implications, Islam can make important contributions to an integrated world order that affirms the unique value of all cultural traditions. In particular, Islam prescribes a strong sense of community and solidarity of people: it postulates a collaborative concept of freedom; and it demystifies the Western myth of triumphant material progress and development. Moreover, Islamic precepts offer strongly affirmative statements on the subject of cultural pluralism (Said & Funk 2001).

In the Western pluralistic tradition, diversity is seen in terms of the coexistence of political systems and ideas but not of cultures. Cultural pluralism has roots in an Islamic tradition of ethnic diversity that historically fostered a tendency toward cultural broadness and flexibility. This heritage has allowed autonomous non Muslim cultures to flourish within Islam to this day, while the West succumbed to the destruction of native cultures and to sporadic, but virulent, anti-Semitism (Mazrui 1997). While Muslim practice has often fallen short of Muslim principles and the advent of the nation-state has created new tensions between national and sub-national identities, the religion of Islam is remarkable for its explicit precepts favoring cultural and religious pluralism. As mentioned in Quran "Let there be no compulsion in religion: Truth stands out clear from Error: whoever rejects evil and believes in Allah hath grasped the most trustworthy hand-hold, that never breaks. And Allah heareth and knoweth all things (Q 2:256). Again it mentioned "To you be your Way, and to me mine (Q109:6).

Today's challenge for the West is to live up to its liberal tradition, which requires continual openness to new revelations of truth. Today's challenge for Muslims is no more than the expansion of the original ideas of Islam. A retreat to a cultural ghetto by any group, be it Muslim, Jewish, Christian, Buddhist or Hindu, is not only a denial of the rich diversity

of the modern cultural experience, but also a rejection of responsibility for future generations. Retreat is one of two faces of fundamentalism, which we define as a pathology of culture that arises when a group takes a subset of the basic tenets of a tradition and – either under the pressure of insecurity (in the case of today’s Muslims) or in the pursuit of hegemony and total security (in the case of the West) – uses them to seal off others or to maintain dominance. Islamic fundamentalism involves a militantly political re-appropriation of religious precepts; Western political fundamentalism is characterized by the canonization and propagation of an exclusive cultural and political narrative. Popular slogans to the contrary, Islam and the West are not inherently incompatible. The first story – the ‘incompatibility’ story of many political and strategic analyses – informs us of tensions that do in fact exist, but it neglects the deep resonances between Islamic and Western civilizations that are cited by the reformers and specialists who narrate the second story. The third story exists only in the form of a working outline; we have attempted here to suggest the contents of future narratives that draw lessons from ongoing dialogue (Said & Funk 2001).

The third story points to the prospect of a cooperative, nonadversarial relationship between Islamic and Western civilizations. Such a relationship would be premised not on ideas of cultural triumphalism, but on mutual respect and openness to cultural eclecticism. Muslims and Westerners can learn from each other and cooperate in the pursuit of humane values. Seeming contradictions will have to be dealt with on a higher plane. If Western individualism is to bring lasting happiness to the individual, new models of ‘free community’ will have to be explored; if Muslim ideals of community are to reach their fulfillment, it will be necessary to revisit traditions that underscore the dignity of the individual. Muslims can benefit from the Western experience with political pluralism, and Westerners can benefit from the spirit of Islamic cultural pluralism. All who identify with Islam and with the West can become co-authors of a new story. We need a new story to tell, and the story we begin to tell today has a bearing on the story we will tell tomorrow. We are all heirs of the story of

conflict. If we leave aside tired generalizations and seek to know one another, we can become the architects of a truly new order of cooperation (Said & Funk 2001).

4.2.3 Dignity of Difference

There is a responsibility that rests with us all, particularly with religious leaders, to envision a different and more gracious future. As noted earlier, faced with intense religious conflict and persecution, John Locke and Thomas Jefferson (Sacks 2003) devised their particular versions of how different religious groups might live together peaceably. These two leaps of the imagination provided, each in their own way, bridges over the abyss of confrontation across which future generations could walk to a better world.

One has to go further than Locke's doctrine of toleration or the American doctrine of separation of church and state because these no longer suffice for a situation of global conflict without global governance. This is a case on secular grounds, but note that the secular terms of today--pluralism, liberalism--will never persuade a deeply passionate, indeed fanatically passionate religious believer to subscribe to them, because they are secular ideas. Here comes the religious idea, based on the story of Abraham, from which all three great monotheisms--Judaism, Christianity, and Islam-- descend. A message of the dignity of difference can be found that is religious and profoundly healing. That is the real miracle of monotheism: not that there is one God and therefore one truth, one faith, one way, but that unity above creates diversity here on earth (Sacks 2003).

Nothing has proved harder in civilization than seeing God or good or dignity in those unlike ourselves. There are surely many ways of arriving at that generosity of spirit, and each faith may need to find its own way. I propose that the truth at the heart of monotheism is that God is greater than religion, that he is only partially comprehended by any one faith. He is my God, but he is also your God. That is not to say that there are many gods: that is polytheism. And it is not to say that God endorses every act done in his name: a God of yours and mine must be a God of justice standing above both of us, teaching us to make space for

one another. to hear one another's claims, and to resolve them equitably. Only such a God would be truly transcendent. Only such a God could teach mankind to make peace other than by conquest or conversion and as something nobler than practical necessity (Sacks 2003).

What would such a faith be like? It would be like being secure in my own home and yet moved by the beauty of a foreign place knowing that while it is not my home, it is still part of the glory of the world that is ours. It would be knowing that we are sentences in the story of our people but that there are other stories, each written by God out of the letters of lives bound together in community. Those who are confident of their faith are not threatened but enlarged by the different faiths of others. In the midst of our multiple insecurities, we need now the confidence to recognize the irreducible, glorious dignity of difference.

4.2.4 Reconciliation Method

a. History of Coexistence, Cooperation and Tolerance

Throughout much of Islamic history, Jews and Christians, people of the Book (ahl al- kitab) were regarded as protected. people (dhimmi) who enjoyed far more tolerance under Muslim governments (Esposito 2002).

As Islam spread as an empire and civilization, it proved open to the many religions and cultures it encountered. Classical Islamic culture incorporated elements of Christian, Jewish and Zoroastrian law, Byzantine and Sassanid (Persian) imperial and administrative practices, Greek science, philosophy, architecture and art in addition to its Arab and Muslim influences. Greek classics of philosophy, science and medicine were translated into Arabic under the Abbasids. These translations formed the body of materials later translated from Arabic into Latin by Roger II of Sicily. This period, reminiscent of when Muslim rulers incorporated Christians within court life, provides a positive example of mutual exchange and tolerance as Muslims were incorporated into political and

intellectual positions as engineers, architects, court poets, and scholars in a Christian kingdom and vice versa. Twelfth century Toledo was also a major center of study for scholars from all over Europe who came to work with native speakers of Arabic. This incorporation of the most advanced elements from surrounding civilizations and the past demonstrates an openness to the benefits to be obtained through a limited form of pluralism - cultural, civilizational, scholastic, and religious. Accompanying this recognition was comparative tolerance (Beedham 1997). Positive examples of Muslim-Christian relations can also be found. In 1076, Sultan al-Nasir of Bejaya made a request to Pope Gregory VII for the ordination of a local priest to care for the Christian population. Christian Emperor Charlemagne and the Abbasid Caliph Harun al-Rashid made arrangements for Christians to travel to the Holy Land, establishing a hostel in Jerusalem for Christian pilgrims as well as hostels run by the Christian Cluniac order along the way (Esposito 2002).

b. Al-Andalus: Convivencia (Living Together) of Civilizations

The most famous example of inter-religious and inter-civilizational tolerance is that of Muslim rule in Spain (al-Andalus) from 756 CE to about 1000 CE, often idealized as a period of interfaith harmony. Part of the attraction for Christians and Jews was the opportunity Muslim rule offered to those seeking refuge from the old ruling class system of Europe. Muslim rule brought with it the elimination of the nobility and clergy and the redistribution of their lands, creating a new class of small landholders who were largely responsible for the agricultural prosperity of Muslim Spain (Esposito 2002).

Although tensions did arise between the Jewish, Christian and Muslim communities, Christians and Jews occupied prominent positions in the court of the Caliph in the 10th century, serving as translators, engineers, physicians, and architects. Bishops were even sent by the Umayyads on important diplomatic missions. The Archbishop of Seville had the Bible translated and annotated into Arabic for the Arabic-speaking

Christian community. Tolerance and social intercourse between religious groups at the upper levels was the highlight of the period: upper class Christians adopted Arab names and aspects of Arab culture, including veiling of women to reflect and enhance their status, not eating pork, and incorporating Arabic music and poetry into their own culture. Interfaith marriages also occurred at the upper class level. This example is important, but it needs to be balanced with the knowledge that the records indicate that, overall, actual contacts between Christians and Muslims were relatively limited. However, Muslims showed less tolerance towards Christians in their territories after the 10th century during the rule of the caliph al-Mansur (Esposito 2002).

The possibility of a new story of peaceful coexistence between cultures is a function of deep changes in the character of global politics. The inexorable dynamics of modern history rule out pretensions by any one group of establishing a “separate peace” through worldwide hegemony. We have moved from a humanity that experienced its collective life as fragments of the whole to a humanity that must experience itself as whole – a humanity that must come to terms with realities of interdependence in the spheres of economics, ecology, culture, and politics. Security is no longer the private good of a particular state and nation that may be purchased at the expense of others, but a public good that can only be achieved through the cultivation of consensus, collaboration, and reciprocity within a framework of dialogue and mutual engagement. In the twenty first century, security cannot be attained through insularity or through political and cultural dominance; porous boundaries and the increasing power of human technology insure that there can be no escape from “others.” An inability to establish a basis for transactions that is considered “just” by all parties will subject those who implement “unjust” policies to great risk .

While interdependence provides the powerful with new sources of leverage over the weak, it also increases the potential costs of exercising that leverage without consent. To

become more secure, Westerners and Muslims must recognize that they need to establish a positive, proactive basis for coexistence. In other words, they need to find a way not only to tolerate each other's presence on the international stage, but also to discover ways in which their cultures may actually benefit from each other.

Individuals on both sides of the cultural divide have much to gain from moving beyond preoccupation with tired images, symbols, and postures, and toward genuine openness to a new experience of the "other." Narrow attachment to preconceived images, inflexible doctrines, and fixed political positions prevents dialogue. Most important for both communities at this time is the need to move beyond reactionary impulses triggered by symbols (turbans, flags, the presence or absence of veils or beards) (Said & Funk 2001).

Instead of retreating into deep subjectivity, we need to develop a process of communication capable of generating new insight. Such a process should involve active listening and a commitment to sustained dialogue. It should not rush to achieve immediate rewards, a quick end of conflict, or complete understanding. Rather, it should seek to help each side understand how the other community expresses its basic concerns, while encouraging both sides work together in the discovery and creation of shared meanings and priorities. This would challenge Westerners and Muslims to better understand their own values and ideals as they learn to share them in new ways (Said & Funk 2001).

Because the present world affords no scope for authenticity in isolation or security through empire, Muslims and Westerners need to experience themselves "in relationship" rather than "out of relationship." They must find meaning in the common tragedy of their estrangement as well as in the possibility of reconciliation. They must also reconsider traditional ways of construing the values that divide them in dichotomous terms – i.e., "individualism versus community," "reason versus passion," "science versus faith," "materialism versus spirituality," "efficiency versus hospitality," "freedom to do versus freedom to be." When cultures view these sets of values as polarities rather than as

complementarities, they are more likely to find themselves locked into adversarial relationships with those who have different priorities. Recognizing that seemingly opposed values can actually reinforce each other opens new possibilities both for intercultural relations and for full development of the human personality .

Islam and the West are truly between stories – between the stories of the past, and the story that they must now create together. All who identify with Islam and with the West can become coauthors of this new story. We are all heirs of the story of conflict. If we leave aside tired generalizations and seek to know one another, we can become the architects of a truly new order of cooperation

4.2.5 Faith-Based Diplomacy

Several factors endow religions and religious organizations with a great and under-utilized potential for constructive conflict management.

First, more than two thirds of the world population belongs to a religion. In 2001, 33% of the religious constituency was Christian; 21% Muslim; 14% Hindu; 5.7% Buddhist/Shintoist; 0.7% Confucianism/Taoist. Together, all those religious organizations have a huge infrastructure with a communication network reaching to all corners of the world. They have a great responsibility and leadership is expected from them (Peace build 2008).

Second, religious organizations have the capacity to mobilize people and to cultivate attitudes of forgiveness, conciliation. They can do a great deal to prevent dehumanization. They have the capacity to motivate and mobilize people for a more peaceful world. Religious and humanitarian values are one of the main roots of voluntarism in all countries: doing something for someone else without expecting to be paid for it. They are problem-solvers.

They do not seek conflict. But when a need is seen, they want to do something about it. They are a force to be reckoned with (Peace build 2008).

Third, religious organizations can rely on a set of soft power sources to influence the peace process. Raven and Rubin (1983) developed a useful taxonomy for understanding the different bases of power. It asserts that six different sources of power exist for influencing another's behavior: reward, coercion, expertise, legitimacy, reference, and information (Peace build 2008). Reward power is used when the influencer offers some positive benefits (of a tangible or intangible nature) in exchange for compliance. If reward power relies on the use of promises, coercive power relies on the language of threat. Expert power relies for its effectiveness on the influencers' ability to create the impression of being in possession of information or expertise that justifies a particular request. Legitimate power requires the influencer to persuade others on the basis of having the right to make a request. Referent power builds on the relationships that exist between the influencer and recipient. The influencer counts on the fact that the recipient, in some ways, values his or her relationship with the source of influence. Finally, informational power works because of the content of the information conveyed.

To mediate, religious organizations can rely on several sources of power. There could be the referent power that stems from the mediation position of a large and influential religious family. Closely related could be legitimate power or the claim to moral rectitude, the right to assert its views about the appropriateness and acceptability of behavior. Religious leaders could refer to their 'spiritual power' and speak in the name of God. Also important could be the informational power derived through non-governmental channels; groups like the Quakers could use expertise power on the basis of their reputation of fine mediators (Peace build 2008).

Fourth, religious organizations could also use hard sources of power. Some religious organizations have reward power, not only in terms of promising economic aid, but, for

example, by granting personal audiences. Use could also be made of coercive power by mobilizing people to protest certain policies. Think of Bishop James McHugh, warning President Clinton of an electoral backlash for the administration's support of abortion rights at the United Nations population conference in Cairo. Integrative power, or power of 'love' (Boulding, 1990), is based on such relationships as respect, affection, love, community and identity.

Fifth, there is a growing need for non-governmental peace services. Non-governmental actors can fulfill tasks for which the traditional diplomacy is not well equipped. They would provide information not readily available to traditional diplomats; they could create an environment in which parties could meet without measuring their bargaining positions, without attracting charges of appeasement, without committing themselves, and without making it look as if they were seeking peaceful solutions at the expense of important interests. They could monitor the conflict dynamics, involve the people at all levels, and assess the legitimacy of peace proposals and agreements (Peace build 2008).

Sixth, most can make use of their transnational organization to provide peace services. **Finally**, there is the fact that religious organizations are in the field and could fulfill several of the above peace services.

When engaging any group – 'religious' or 'secular' – in peacebuilding, attention should be paid to the strengths of the organizations and the role of inter-personal dynamics. Certain groups have established positions within a community from which they are well-placed to facilitate dialogues and interventions. Those who are able to articulate their traditions in ways that are conducive to building peace should be sought out. Mainstream or moderate religious leaders should be assisted in advancing peace discussions without compromising their integrity or in their own communities. Discussions should be pluralistic, participatory, and respectful. Additionally, efforts should be made to engage with and include youth and women. Religious organizations can play a positive role in resolving conflicts

because they (1) demonstrate credibility as a trusted institution (2) possess a respected set of values or principles and moral warrants for opposing injustice on the part of governments (3) hold unique leverage for promoting reconciliation among conflicting parties (4) re-humanize enemies that have been dehumanized (5) mobilize community, national, and international support for peace (6) follow through locally on commitments; and (7) possess a sense of calling that inspires perseverance in the face of obstacles (Peace build 2008).

However, for some participants, there will be situations when the involvement of religious groups in conflict resolution may only exacerbate tensions. While for others, the question is not whether or not to include, but how much to include religious groups, to what extent, when, at what stage, how, and to what purpose. History and trust are among the factors to consider when engaging groups in peacebuilding efforts (Peace build 2008).

In the parlance of diplomats, faith-based diplomacy is “track two,” practiced by non-state actors, NGO officials, religious leaders and private citizens. Most distinctively, it is rooted in religions -- their texts, their practices, their traditions, and the two-vectored spiritual orientation around which all of them revolve, namely the proper orientation of politics to the transcendent and the active role of the divine in human affairs. Practitioners of faith-based diplomacy will, to be sure, draw upon expertise in conflict resolution and analysis, political science and political philosophy, and experience in national security, diplomacy, community development, and the like, but their central compass, around which they integrate this expertise, is their faith (Peace build 2008).

Here, we seek to describe these principles and practices in the hope that with a keener understanding of them, practitioners can better integrate their faith and their expertise and become “militants for peace.” From what sources do they draw such principles and practices? One is own experience from faith-based diplomacy in the Czech Republic, Slovakia, Hungary, Croatia, Serbia, Bosnia, Kosovo, Sudan, Burundi, and Kashmir (India and Pakistan). Currently, under the auspices of the International Center for Religion and

Diplomacy in Washington, D.C., work is going on together on a project in Kashmir that seeks to develop a movement of faith-based reconciliation among the younger generation of Kashmiris, a movement that serves as a means to a political settlement, a framework of sociopolitical healing, and a moral vision that shapes the political order and civil society. They have also learned much from the experiences of other scholars and practitioners working along similar lines, including John Paul Lederach, Rabbi Marc Gopin, Scott Appleby, and the Community of Sant'Egidio. Most recently, Douglas Johnston (2003) has edited a book on faith-based diplomacy. In profound respects, the principles and practices of faith-based diplomacy are embedded in all faith traditions.

a. Principles

Faith-based diplomacy is oriented towards the divine -- that is its most central and distinctive principle. Its motivating vision of politics, its assumptions about human nature and the political order, and the norms that govern its conduct all arise from an understanding of the nature and activity of the divine -- understood in some traditions as a personal God and in other traditions as the source of meaning and existence (Cox & Philpot 2008).

Expressing crucially this divine orientation is a vision of the political order that serves as the lodestar, the compass, the roadmap of the faith-based diplomat. As the Abrahamic faiths understand it, God reveals his vision for how his people are to live together through scriptural texts. From these sources emanate principles that prescribe the nature and purpose of government and temporal authority, the duties and entitlements of citizens, the respective roles of temporal and spiritual authority, the distribution of economic wealth, the treatment of the poor, punishment, war, and other matters. Of course, a multiplicity of interpretations of these texts and principles has proliferated down through the centuries, carrying on a continuing conversation. Many of these principles will overlap with secular conceptions, strongly or weakly depending on how they are interpreted (Cox & Philpot 2008).

What is important for the faith-based diplomat is that the political order is ordered by a divinely grounded vision. In any such vision, the “horizontal” relationships between members and between them and outsiders will reflect their “vertical” relationship with the divine. The Abrahamic faiths hold that a recognition of God’s sovereignty is the basis of community among God’s followers. The very meaning of Islam is submission to God, a concept that is the basis of shari’a, the divine law. For Jews, God’s covenant with the people of Israel and the laws revealed in it are the basis of their common community. Christians view society as ordered around God’s self-revelation in Jesus of Nazareth. So, too, the faith-based diplomat, whether she is helping to construct a truth commission, imparting a moral vision to a divided village, building networks of relationship between political and religious leaders, working for a peace settlement, or seeking to build a movement for reconciliation within a civil society, will base her work on what she understands to be a divine plan for humanity. Though her immersion in the darkest corners of human suffering will frequently remind her of the distance between this vision and the world as it is, it will yet be this vision that motivates her and makes her work intelligible (Cox & Philpot 2008).

An orientation towards the divine, though, involves more than a vision for the political order. Faith-based diplomacy is also premised upon divine agency in human affairs. Reconciliation between enemies, solidarity with the poor, and the overturning of unjust structures, along with the practices through which the faith-based diplomat contributes to them -- prayer, fasting, religiously based conflict resolution, love for enemies, spiritual friendship -- are understood to be the work of the divine.

The orientation towards the divine extends into a second broad theme in faith-based diplomacy -- the centrality of reconciliation. Reconciliation has now become familiar in public discourse, a buzzword today in America and a common phrase elsewhere. It can also arouse deep passions. To be sure, differences abound among and within faith traditions about the meaning of reconciliation and about the relative roles of punishment, forgiveness,

apology, atonement, and the practice of these concepts in public law. But reconciliation is important in each tradition. It pervades Judaism, in which atonement, central to the Torah, infuses halakhah, the Jewish law, where punishment, repentance, and restitution, are all arrayed towards restoration. Christianity extends the logic of atonement to God's mercy toward sinners on the cross. In Islam, the Qur'an's repeated references to Allah's mercy and injunctions to forgiveness imply a restorative logic, one indeed practiced in Arabic rituals of *sulh*, designed to bring reconciliation between offenders and victims. What of Hinduism? The conception of dharma, or human obligations, found in the Laws of Manu, appears to stress retributive punishment, but speaks also of repentance and penance, through which an offender is restored in his soul and returned to his rightful place in the social order. Reconciliation reached its height in Hinduism through the life and thought of Mahatma Gandhi, though he drew upon other faiths as well. He once exemplified his vision by counseling a Hindu murderer of a Muslim to find an orphan Muslim boy and raise him as Muslim. The Buddhist faith is epitomized by the restoration of the offender's soul and of relationships among the estranged (Cox & Philpot 2008).

What, then, does reconciliation mean for faith-based diplomacy? When armies are squared off and guns are firing, reconciliation demands first a political settlement among leaders. But a settlement is not enough. Reconciliation involves a far greater breadth of participants and depth of transformation. Absent this breadth and depth, even a political settlement itself may not succeed. Six years after Israeli Prime Minister Yitzak Rabin and Palestinian leader Yassir Arafat achieved an apparent breakthrough for peace in the Oslo Accords, the two sides descended into a war of suicide bombings and harsh Israeli reprisals. When asked why Oslo had collapsed, the lead U.S. negotiator of the agreement, Dennis Ross, commented that whereas political leaders had come to an agreement, far too much hatred, far too little sympathy for peace persisted between the Israeli and Palestinian people. What was needed was a change of hearts and minds at the grassroots and middle levels of society. Such

reconciliation on the ground can exert upward pressure on political leadership, eliciting new possibilities for a lasting peace.

The deeper, broader reconciliation of faith-based diplomacy is in fact a family of interwoven ideas. Together, they propose reconciliation as a moral vision for wounded societies. The healing of historical wounds is indeed the first of these ideas. Prominent contemporary theories hold that bitter memories of past injustices are only illusory causes of racial, ethnic, and religious war, conflicts whose true causes are cynical elites who manipulate popular identities, globalization, and dysfunctional demographic patterns, and the trauma of economic and political transition. If the power of memories is not illusory, neither is the power of healing. Crucially, healing is not forgetting. It begins with the members of a community examining their suffering at the hands of their enemy. The next, more dramatic step is their acknowledgment of their enemy's suffering. This recognition can, often to surprising degrees, lead to the change of heart, the repentance, and the embrace of the other in which healing begins. As the religious traditions -- and faith-based diplomacy -- understand it, this examination, acknowledgment, and healing occur before, through, and with the assistance of divine power (Cox & Philpot 2008).

The second idea, flowing from the first, is apology and forgiveness, practiced with respect to misdeeds perpetrated in the name of the political order. Apology is the acknowledgment of and expression of sorrow to one's victim for one's misdeeds; forgiveness is the victim's foregoing of all claims to anger, resentment, and payment against the offender. Such practices are usually not the first inclination of doers and sufferers of evil; the change in heart that comes from examination and acknowledgement are usually prerequisites. Apology and forgiveness is essential to the restoration of wounded communities; their absence leaves a good distance between former enemies. It is not surprising that most religious traditions give prominent place to these practices. The Abrahamic faiths understand them as direct responses to God's mercy. There is an important relationship between justice and

forgiveness. Forgiveness does not mean giving up the pursuit of justice. But without forgiveness, justice becomes angry, hostile revenge.

Like visions for the political order and reconciliation, social justice enjoys a long, voluminous, and contested history of thought in virtually all of the faith traditions. But a few threads are broadly common. First, accountability for injustices on the part of offenders is essential. Reconciliation without it is cheap. Second, most religions propose a healthy pluralism and inclusion where people of varying ethnicities, races and religions move beyond tolerating one another's rights, but value and embrace one another for their very differences, affirming the richness of complementarities. Surah 49:13 in the Qur'an expresses just such inclusively: "O mankind! We created/ You from a single (pair)/ Of a male and a female,/ And made you into/ Nations and tribes, that/ Ye may know each other/ Not that ye may despise/ (Each other)." Third, virtually all faith traditions advocate an economics of compassion that gives special emphasis to the dignity of the poor (Cox & Philpot 2008).

b. Practices

How, then, is faith-based diplomacy conducted? Into what courses of action do a divinely grounded vision of the political order and reconciliation translate? At least six practices emerge.

Impartation of Moral Vision: One method is simply the inculcation of principles of faith-based diplomacy in people who are likely to be agents of change, a leaven of reconciliation in their society. They impart to participants a moral vision -- a set of foundational values -- centered upon reconciliation and informed by a divinely grounded understanding of politics. This vision may be communicated through eight principles : pluralism, inclusion, peacemaking through conflict resolution, social justice, forgiveness, healing collective wounds, sovereignty, and atonement. The result of impartation of moral vision is a nascent cadre of foot soldiers committed to reconciliation (Cox & Philpot 2008).

Civil Society: A cadre of foot soldiers -- working outside government, but often comprising leaders of non-governmental organizations, universities, religious bodies, and various professions -- evokes the concept of civil society, a favorite theme of political philosophers dating back to Alexis de Tocqueville and G.W.F. Hegel in the nineteenth century. Associations, clubs, religious bodies, sundry organizations -- this “middle layer” of society, the theory runs, are a vital source of democratic participation and a limit to the power of the state. In the democratic revolutions of 1989 in East Germany, Poland, Hungary, and Czechoslovakia, civil society, allied heavily with religious bodies, evidenced this claim in catalyzing non-violent political metamorphoses.

So, too, civil society is a strategic site for faith-based diplomacy. John Paul Lederach, a contemporary practitioner of reconciliation hailing from the Mennonite tradition, argues for the practical importance of the middle layers of society in bringing “sustainable peace.” Compared to top officials, whose responsibility for the whole creates confining political pressure, the middle rungs enjoy more flexibility to envision and practice creative ideas. Yet, unlike people at the grassroots, they also have the influence and contact with leaders above them to urge reconciliation upon them effectively. Both flexible and efficacious, they are positioned to be conduits of new ideas (Cox & Philpot 2008).

If the members of a civil society were to embrace a moral vision of reconciliation, they could then speak about it in universities, at religious gatherings, in newspapers, on television, and at public forums, and urge it more privately upon leaders of warring factions in a conflict.

Personal Relationships: A movement of reconciliation needs an adhesive to hold it together; faith-based diplomacy in any form needs a special kind of grease to secure the cooperation of the political and military leaders whom they are trying to influence. It is personal relationships that act in these ways. Only naturally are they a central practice of faith-based reconciliation, given its emphasis on the activity of God, personal transformation,

and the role of healing and apology. The faith-based diplomat forms friendships with the people she works with and encourages friendship among them.

Spiritual Conversations : Arising from personal relationships is the practice of spiritual conversations. It is in track two diplomacy that such dialogues usually take place, that is, in meetings between unofficial emissaries and official political and military leaders. But spiritual conversations are hardly a traditional tool of statecraft, even in unofficial settings. They engage leaders in “conversations of the heart” in which they share what they have suffered, the friends, loved ones, career hopes, and property that they have lost, their hatred or resignation or hopefulness about these losses, their dreams for the future, and the place of the divine in all of these matters. We often find political and military leaders to be surprised by such conversations -- not only that they take place, but that they elicit sympathy and lead to friendships (Cox & Philpot 2008).

Prayer and Fasting: Devout believers of virtually all faiths pray and fast. Should not prayer and fasting also infuse faith-based diplomacy? Expressing the believer’s submission to the divine, prayer and fasting usher a spiritual power into the site of a violent conflict, one that effects personal transformation. The work in Kashmir commonly involves a team of people who pray and fast during seminars, diplomatic meetings, and public forums. Certain episodes of transformation, typically instances where an embittered person comes to express profound words of healing, apology, or forgiveness, bear the marks of the sort of divine assistance that can come as a response to prayer and fasting (Cox & Philpot 2008).

The Use of Rituals for Reconciliation: Like prayer and fasting, rituals and ceremonies that are normally directed towards worship, celebration, mourning, petition, and healing can be potently redirected towards the resolution of conflicts and the transformation of people wounded by political violence. The reading of sacred texts, common prayer, liturgy, and rites of healing can all become tools of faith-based diplomacy.

Rabbi Marc Gopin has proposed that rituals of grieving can also be used to heal conflict between communities. The Jewish practice of *aveilus*, the mourning of a loved one through acknowledgment, burial, remembering, and then healing and recovery, could, he argues, be used by Arabs and Jews in the Middle East to address and heal memories of lost loved ones, homes, and land dating back one hundred years. Similarly, Arab Islamic communities have developed rituals of *sulh* for settling conflicts between community members that could be practiced on a larger scale. Conceived of as alternatives to cycles of vengeance, they involve entire families and even village leaders in the hearing of grievances, mutual mourning, restitution, forgiveness, and restoration of normal friendship. As with the other practices of faith-based diplomacy, rituals for reconciliation emanate from faith and point out the path to wells of healing (Cox & Philpot 2008).

The above six practices are modes through which the faith-based diplomat operates. They are surely not exhaustive and doubtless omit practices through which people of faith dramatically exercise political healing and restoration. The religion based love for enemies of the civil rights movement, Gandhi's theory and practice of non-violence, the influence of a theology of restorative justice in shaping the Truth and Reconciliation Commission in South Africa -- all are the work of people of faith motivated to influence the political order (Cox & Philpot 2008).

c. Situations and Contexts

The practical, the worldly, the skeptical, surely every diplomat of the traditional sort will want to know: What difference does faith-based diplomacy make? With all the equanimity of a divine grounding, the faith-based diplomat might respond with Mother Teresa's quip that faithfulness, not success, is what matters. True, the most important virtue of faith-based diplomacy is doubtless faith itself, the belief that one's actions will, through divine assistance, bear munificent fruit. Still, even the least worldly-minded faith-based

diplomat must interest himself in whether his work effects good or ill, succeeds or backfires (Cox & Philpot 2008).

An interest in effects begets an interest in the situations in which the work most likely occurs. There are at least five of these. First, there are conflicts whose parties define themselves by their religion and perhaps even fight over religion: Sudan, the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, and, in important ways, the conflicts of the 1990s in Yugoslavia. Kashmir is ever more such a conflict as militant groups come more and more to seek not merely self-determination but the spread of Dar al Islam. In such conflicts, an approach that resonates with the religious worldview of the factions may well achieve successes that purely secular approaches will not.

The second situation favorable to faith-based diplomacy is one in which, regardless of the identities of the parties, certain religious leaders enjoy a charisma that they may exercise for settlement and reconciliation. Gandhi's ability to halt rioting through fasting during the partition of India is exemplary, explainable only through his own concept of "soul force."

The third situation is civilizational dialogue. Conflict, at least of the broad ideological sort, occurs even among the broadest religious collectivities -- Islamic and Western civilizations, for example, between which popular tensions have escalated as of late. In response, both President Mohamed Khatami of Iran and Pope John Paul have proposed a "dialogue between civilizations" that involves spiritual conversations among religious leaders (Clash 2009). People of faith are indeed equipped well to foster such dialogue as they understand the complexities of the theologies that define worldviews, and are able to avoid shallow forms of common ground that seek a lowest common denominator that few devout religious believers can endorse.

Fourth are situations in which faith-based diplomats are well positioned to become trusted envoys. This position may arise from their links within a society -- witness Sant'Egidio's network of friendships in Mozambique. Or, it may come from a leader's

prestige. The role that Reverend Jesse Jackson played in negotiating for hostages in Yugoslavia and Lebanon is such a case. In both cases, parties were more willing to accord respect to faith-based diplomats because of their religious calling (Cox & Philpot 2008).

A fifth, differently poised situation is one where people of faith play an effective oppositional role, mobilizing resistance to injustice. Jinnah's leadership of separate state for Muslims which gave birth to Pakistan. Gandhi's leadership of India's independence movement, King's leadership of the civil rights movement, and John Paul II's inspiration of the movement to resist the Communist government Poland are all examples. In each case, the religious leader drew upon some of the tools that have been discussed -- prestige, soul-force, a link of networks with a society -- to inspire followers to protest, organize, and oppose in the most dangerous of circumstances.

All told, then, in any of these situations, what difference might any of the above principles and practices make? Dramatic results abound on the personal level -- in the bitter partisan who comes to embrace forgiveness and healing, in the cadres of committed friends and activists who willingly put themselves in danger by coming to urge reconciliation, in transformations and healings and renewals. But faith-based diplomacy can alter nations' histories, too. In the last twenty years, religious movements have helped to topple authoritarianism in Poland, the Philippines, East Germany, Brazil, South Africa, and elsewhere. In the wake of transitions, they have been instrumental in bringing reconciliation in South Africa and Chile. They have also brokered peace settlements in Mozambique, Nicaragua, and between Chile and Argentina. The results should not be overstated. Few of the changes in Eastern Europe or South Africa would have occurred apart from the end of the Cold War; in every case, economic, political and social circumstances and leadership on many fronts helped to produce the outcome. These many layers of causality warrant humility. But the same episodes also ought to inspire boldness. Large in significance, concentrated in time, each bearing the unmistakable imprint of faith, they together suggest

that faith-based diplomacy is, in the words of Victor Hugo, “an idea whose time has come” (Cox & Philpot 2008).

4.2.6 Making Peace with Islam

Though there were historical confrontations between the monotheistic religions, but it is found that their scriptures are almost close to each other. There are many episodes of co-existence between these religions. And to-days world is a globalized world, not a tribal or isolated world of middle ages where various religions could survive even after occasional conflicts. But in this age of globalization, in this nuclear age, an explosion, a conflict will affect both sides and all. There is no scope of survival for the either side. Hence, it is for the sake of survival of all, for the greater interest of mankind, there must be peace with Islam and all other religions. There is no alternative to this.

4.2.7 Establishing Democracy Compatible with Islam

Democracy is a system that must come from within not from outside. If it comes from outside, it becomes autocracy. Besides, true Islam has got it's own version of democracy basing on liberty, equality and social justice where all factors of modern democracy are available including political and economic rights (Farooq 2002). Hence, efforts should be made to bring out that Islamic democracy from within rather than out side. Only than many conflicts over human right and democracy may be resolved.

There is a fundamental need to open Arab societies, but it must done in such a manner that is compatible with Arab and Islamic notions of social justice and interaction. There must be reconciliation with western notions of political and economic development with Islamic notions of justice to produce an inclusive model of democracy that accepts the idea of freedom without alienating the either culture (Farooq 2002).

4.2.8 Balanced Foreign Policy

After September 11, slogans like “a clash of civilizations”, a war between the civilized world and terrorists or against fundamentalists who hate Western democracy, capitalism, and freedom; or a war against evil and merchants of death. were common, emphasizing a white and black world that obscures the deeper realities and long-term issues that exist. Similarly, belief that overwhelming force brought a quick victory in Afghanistan and is an effective answer has distracted from the need to address the nature and causes of real and future threats. Other Bin Ladens exist as do the political and economic conditions that they can exploit to recruit new soldiers for their unholy wars (Esposito 2002).

Osama Bin Laden, like the secular Saddam Hussein and the Ayatollah Khomeini before him, cleverly identified specific grievances against Muslim regimes and America that are shared across a broad spectrum of Muslims, most of whom are not extremists. He then used religious texts and doctrines to justify his jihad of violence and terrorism. Anti-Americanism is driven not only by the blind hatred of terrorists but also by a broader-based anger and frustration with American foreign policy among many in Arab and Muslim societies: government officials, diplomats, the military, businessmen, professionals, intellectuals, and journalists. Many admire the fundamental principles and values (political participation, human rights, accountability, basic freedoms of speech, thought, the press) of the West. But they also believe that a double standard exists; these American principles and values are applied selectively or not at all when it comes to the Muslim world (Esposito 2002).

Part of the problem Americans have had in understanding anti- Americanism is the failure to recognize that Arabs and broader Muslim world sees more than Americans see. In recent years, America had become less international-minded and more preoccupied with domestic issues. Many members of Congress saw no reason to travel abroad; a prominent congressional leader freely quipped that he had been to Europe once and saw no reason to

return. Major American networks and newspapers have cut back on the number of foreign bureaus and correspondents. Domestic news coverage expanded at the expense of American public awareness of international affairs. In contrast with the past, today many in the Muslim world are no longer dependent on CNN and the BBC for news of the world. International Arab and Muslim publications and media provide daily coverage of foreign affairs. Families in the Muslim world sit glued to their television sets, watching daily coverage on Al-Jazeera which gives them live news in vivid color from Palestine/Israel, Iraq, Chechnya, and Kashmir. Many see America's espousal of self-determination, democratization, and human rights as disingenuous in light of its foreign policies. With the exception perhaps of Kosovo, America's interventions in Kuwait and Iraq in the Gulf war and in Somalia are seen as driven solely by national interest rather than American principles (Esposito 2002).

While the average American sees one side of the latest explosive headline event such as suicide bombings in Israel, they are not bombarded daily with the sight of Israeli violence and terror in the West Bank and Gaza, the disproportionate firepower, the number of Palestinian deaths and casualties, the use of American weapons including F16s and Apache helicopters provided to Israel and used against Palestinians, including civilians, in the occupied territories. America's relationship with Israel has proved to be a lightning rod. While some in the West downplay or deny the significance of the Palestinian issue, surveys continue to verify its importance to Muslims globally. A survey in spring 2001 of five Arab states (Egypt, Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, Kuwait and Lebanon), demonstrated that the majority in all five countries said that the Palestinian issue was the single most important issue to them personally. In a Zogby International poll of American Muslims in Nov/Dec 2001, 84% believed that the U.S. should support a Palestinian state, 70% believed that it should reduce financial support to Israel (Esposito 2002).

America's long record of relatively uncritical support of Israel--expressed in its levels of military and economic aid to Israel, its voting record in the United Nations, official

statements by American administrations and government officials, and votes by Congress (often opposed by administrations in the past) to move the American embassy from Tel Aviv to Jerusalem in direct contravention of long-standing UN resolutions--are seen by many in the Muslim world as proof of American hypocrisy. Other critical foreign policy issues include the impact of sanctions on more than a half million innocent Iraqi children (with little direct effect on Saddam Hussein) and sanctions against Pakistan but failure to hold India and Israel to similar standards for their nuclear programs. The moral will so evident in Kosovo is seen as totally absent in US policy in the Chechnya and Kashmiri conflicts (Esposito 2002).

American, as well as European, responses must remain proportionate, from military strikes and foreign policy to domestic security measures and anti-terrorism legislation. A reexamination and, where necessary, reformulation of U.S. foreign policy will be necessary to effectively limit and contain global terrorism. Short-term policies that are necessitated by national interest and security must be balanced by long term policies and incentives that pressure our allies in the Muslim world to promote a gradual and progressive process of broader political participation, power sharing, and human rights. Failure to do so will simply perpetuate the culture and values of authoritarianism, secular as well as religious, and feed anti-Americanism. If foreign policy issues are not addressed effectively, they will continue to provide a breeding ground for hatred and radicalism, the rise of extremist movements, and recruits for the Bin Ladens of the world (Esposito 2002).

4.2.9 Reframing War on Terrorism

War on terrorism is not a conventional war with defined boundary and identity. It is an unconventional warfare where there is no boundary, limit. Identity and rules of the game. In such an unpredictable scenario, defeating enemy only with military means is an unrealistic idea. Of course there will be military discourse as a preventive measure but that has to be

backed by a balanced, well thought foreign policy and action. Terrorists are bound to lose their support base once the cause of terrorism, anger or grievance is being accurately addressed by timely foreign policy and action. Once the terrorists lose their support base, terrorism is bound to die down (Ledarach 2010). Hence, perception, foreign policy and action of one conflicting country to other needs to be changed. Only then, there will be win –win situation in the war on terrorism. And most of the present conflicts may be resolved.

4.2.10 A Strong and Unified Islamic World

According to Huntington(1996), a strong and unified Islamic world will best serve the west and will resolve many of the west-Islamic conflicts as a unified Europe is serving best to rest of the world. He justifies that, before unified Europe, there were lot of conflicts within and out side Europe. But now Europe has a strong forum to talk it out their difference, also out side world can easily resolve conflicts with negotiation with single European entity, earlier Europe meant many voices, so negotiation and resolving was very difficult (Clash 2009).

Chapter 5

Research Design and Methodology

5.1 Hypotheses

After reviewing the literature I have formulated the following hypotheses for subsequent analysis and testing:

Hypothesis 1: There is a prevailing wrong perception of Western world about Islam.

Hypothesis 2: To change the wrong perception of the Western world a non-violent approach of interaction, dialogue, diplomacy and reconciliation should be followed between West and Islam.

Hypothesis 3: By changing the wrong perception of the West many of the prevailing global conflicts can be resolved

5.2 Data Collection Method

There is limited scope of collecting primary local data as very few data are available locally for testing these hypotheses. On the other hand, collecting primary data internationally is very expensive and time consuming. With these situations and constraints in place the methodology for testing the hypothesis is mostly based on limited primary data and extensive secondary data from internationally recognized survey sources. However, for collecting data from primary sources, 180 people from six areas of Dhaka city were interviewed using a set of 10 questions. Secondary data were collected by browsing internet from the recognized survey source like Gallup, Media tenor international

5.2.1 Primary Data

As mentioned before the primary data were collected by public survey from 180 people of greater Dhaka city. For this purpose, Dhaka city was subdivided into six areas with a

combination of upper class and middle class, conservative class and liberal class, educated class and less educated class. Data were collected from those six areas by randomly selected 30 people from each area.

5.2.2 Secondary Data

The secondary data for the analysis were collected by data-mining process from the secondary source by literature review, internet browsing. The collected data have been analyzed by descriptive statistical method. These data were then processed into various tables and graphs by SPSS, MS Excel and MS Word. In this method various response data from Western and Muslim world were being analyzed, which finally discloses some deductions or results for testing the hypotheses

5.3 Muslim-West Perception Survey

The Gallup Panel: The Gallup World Religion Survey was administered through the Gallup Panel. The Gallup Panel was created in 2004 as a proprietary, probability-based longitudinal panel of U.S. households selected by random-digit-dial (RDD) sampling methods. Panel households are recruited via an outbound phone interview and agree to participate in an average of three surveys per month via phone, Web, or mail. There are no incentives or financial rewards for participating in the panel, though several token thank-you gifts are sent throughout the year. As with any longitudinal design, the Gallup Panel is affected by attrition. The monthly attrition rate averages between 2% and 3%. As of November 2009, membership in the Gallup Panel consisted of approximately 61,715 panelists aged 13 and older, representing 49,052 U.S. households. Once enrolled, Gallup Panel members are assigned to receive surveys via phone, Web, or mail. Respondents included in the current study were contacted by phone only (Mogahed 2009).

The Gallup World Religion Survey: The Gallup World Religion Survey was administered via phone to a representative random sample of 1,002 adults in the U.S. (aged 18 and older). The Gallup World Religion Survey was fielded from Oct. 31 to Nov. 13, 2009.

Response Rates: Overall, the total number of completed surveys used in the analysis for this report is 1,002. In total, 1,874 phone interviews were attempted with current panel members. In response, a total of 1,002 panel members completed the interview. While the overall survey completion rate equals 53.5%, the overall response rate for the survey should take into account the selection and composition of the Gallup Panel participants. As noted in Rookey, Hanvey, and Dillman (2008), the Gallup Panel initial RDD recruitment has a response rate of 27%. Approximately 55% of those who agree to participate are ultimately enrolled in the Gallup Panel. Therefore, the cumulative response rate for the first wave is 7.9% (27% x 55% x 53.5%).

Margin of Error: The design effect-adjusted margin of error for the overall study is ± 3.4 percentage points (Mogahed 2009).

5.4 Public Perception Survey

These surveys of the general public were conducted in February, 2005 in the US, UK and France and in August, 2005 in Netherlands and Germany. This was an Internet based survey of 2420 individuals, with 1010 completed interviews in the US, 351 in the UK, 350 in France, 356 in Netherlands and 352 in Germany. The data were collected from February 15-28, 2005 in the US, UK and France and from August 29- September 8, 2005 in the Netherlands and Germany. The study was conducted using random sampling from an opt-in multi-million person database and was balanced for general population representation. Margin of error is $\pm 3\%$ with 95 confidence level (Yalonis 2005).

5.5 Muslim-West Dialogue Survey

The Gallup Muslim-West Dialogue Index measures perceptions of the state of dialogue in 21 countries. It combines responses to nine questions about the state of Muslim-West relations and ranks countries in terms of their citizens' optimism about the state of dialogue. The higher the score the more optimistic are the citizens, with a possible score of

100. (Mogahed ,Younis 2008). The State of Dialogue Index is constructed from aggregate responses to these questions are:

- Do you think the Muslim world and the Western world are getting along well with each other today?
- Do you believe the Western world respects the Muslim world?
- Do you believe the Muslim world respects the Western world?
- Is the quality of the interaction between the Muslim and the Western world important to you?
- Do you think the interaction between the Muslim world and the Western world is getting better or getting worse?
- Do you think the Muslim world is committed to improving relations between the Western and Muslim worlds?
- Do you think the Western World is committed to improving relations between the Muslim and Western worlds?
- Is greater interaction between the Western and Muslim worlds a threat or benefit?
- Do you think violent conflict between the Muslim and Western worlds can be avoided or not?

For Index calculation purposes, each of the items is scored as “0” for a negative (or unfavorable) response and “1” for a positive (or favorable) response. Those scores are then summed, producing a total of 0, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, or 9 for each respondent. The sum is then divided by 9 to produce a final individual-level Index score ranging from 0 to 1 that is then aggregated to produce a country-level Index score. An average weighted by the size of the population over 15 years of age is used to produce an Index score for each category (Muslim, West and overall). The country-level Index score for all countries in each category is multiplied by that country’s total population over 15 years of age, creating a weighted Index score. The weighted Index scores and the population totals are then summed across the

relevant countries. Finally, the sum of the weighted Index scores is divided by the total population for the category, producing one weighted Index score for the entire category. (Mogahed ,Younis 2008)

5.6 Media Coverage Survey on Muslim-West Issues

The media coverage survey is conducted by Media Tenor International. Media Tenor International is a global content analysis organization based in Zurich, Switzerland that monitors print, broadcast and online news in more than 15 languages and 35 countries. It's research focuses on the portrayal of countries, individuals and institutions in leading media outlets. Media Tenor's content analysis for this report included a fifteen week content analysis of three TV news shows, three print publications and one business publication from 24 different countries. The analysis was conducted by 43 Media Tenor researchers who coded content in their native languages. Analysis was conducted on a statement level. Each coded statement contains a person or institution, the topic at hand, a positive or negative rating, and the source of the statement or rating. As the data is analyzed, if any part of a statement changes (for instance, if a new topic is introduced), a new statement is coded (Enans,Kolmer , Schatz 2008).

5.6.1 Countries Covered

The survey covered twelve Muslim majority countries : Egypt, Indonesia, Iran, Jordan, Lebanon, Malaysia, Morocco, The Palestinian Territories, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, Turkey and United Arab Emirates. It also covered twelve non-Muslim majority countries : Brazil, Denmark, France, Germany, Israel, Italy, Namibia, Russia, South Africa, Spain, the United Kingdom and the United States.

5.6.2 Stories Analyzed on Statement Level

The stories analyzed on statement level by following subjects--

- Topic • Main actor(s) featured • Type of main actor (political, religious, etc.)
- Geographical origin of the main actor • Tone towards that actor (positive, negative, or neutral) • Source of that evaluation (individual, government, organization, etc.)

5.6.3 Muslim-West Issue Areas Covered

- International politics, with a focus on Middle East conflicts.
- Religion, ethics and ideology, as a factor in social interactions and politics.
- Education and intercultural understanding, particularly efforts to educate the public about different cultures and religions.
- Citizenship and integration, with an emphasis on issues confronting religious minorities.
- Economic and social development, including reporting on Muslim-West economic and social ties.

5.7 Public Survey within Greater Dhaka City

The Muslim-Non Muslims public survey of greater Dhaka city measures the perceptions of both sides within Dhaka city. It combines responses to ten questions about the state of Muslim- West relations. The higher the score the more optimistic, with a possible score of 100.

The Muslim-Non Muslims public survey index is constructed from aggregate responses to 10 questions.

1. Do you think that there is prevailing wrong perception of western world about Islam with respect to democracy, equality, liberty and modernity?
2. Do you think that there is prevailing wrong perception of western world about Islam with respect to human rights and justice?
3. Do you think that there is prevailing wrong perception of western world about Islam with respect to terrorism, jihad and religious politics?

4. Do you think that inter- faith/inter- culture/inter- civilization dialogue between Islam and West can change the wrong perception about Islam and West and can resolve many of the related conflicts?
5. Do you believe that media regulation and management in a positive direction by the West can change the wrong perception about Islam and can resolve many of the related conflicts?
6. Do you think that western perception can be changed by togetherness and mutual respect?
7. Do you believe a balanced education and a balanced training both in Islamic and western world can change the wrong perception about Islam and West and can resolve many of the related conflicts?
8. Do you think that conflicts between West and Islam can be resolved by cultural pluralism and balanced foreign policy?
9. Do you think that conflicts between West and Islam can be resolved by true religion and faith based diplomacy?
10. Do you think that conflicts between West and Islam can be resolved by reconciliatory approach?

For Index calculation purposes, each of the items was scored as “0” for a negative (or unfavorable) response and “1” for a positive (or favorable) response. Those scores were then summed, producing a total of 0, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, or 10 for each respondent. The sum was then divided by 10 to produce a final individual-level Index score ranging from 0 to 1 that is then aggregated to produce an area-level index score. Survey we conducted in six (6) areas of greater Dhaka city. An average 30 people we selected randomly over 18 years of age with combination of male, female, rich, poor, educated, less educated, Muslim and Non-Muslims to produce an index score for each area . Accordingly, from 06 areas of Dhaka city, a total of 180 (6 x 30) people were interviewed using the above questions.

Chapter 6

Data Analysis and Hypotheses Testing

6.1 Hypothesis 1: There is a prevailing wrong perception of Western world about Islam

6.1.1 Analysis of Wrong Perception of the West about Islam With Respect to Democracy, Equality, Liberty, and Modernity

Western historian Bernard Lewis (1990) perceives that the struggle of Islam is against two enemies, secularism and modernism. Lewis considers the “problem of the Islamic world:” i.e., extremism and fundamentalism, to be deeply rooted in its history and cultural preferences. Thus he locates the roots of what he labels as the “Muslim rage” in the cultural and civilizational realities of the Islamic world. Some western perspectives hold that Islamists and traditionalists reject *modernity*, western secularism is considered by Islamists as new devils, modern blasphemies because they dare to set man up as equal to God. The original sin of modern man is therefore to have rejected the sovereignty of God and put in its place the sovereignty of the Individual (IBA 2003).

Many Western people also are afraid that a democratic outfit of the Muslim world might undermine the current western domination (Farooq 2002). To them, Muslims are barbaric and backward people to whom modern ideas are unsuitable. They also believe that the Muslims are better suited for autocratic, repressive rules either under current despots or the western puppets. This group of non-Muslims suffers from acute Islamophobia based on their stereotypical understanding of Islam and prejudiced viewpoint of the western interest.

The survey data suggest that the negative perceptions of Muslim- West relations are most prevalent in the United States, Israel and the Muslim Middle East, reflecting the acute conflicts currently raging in Iraq and the Palestinian territories. Despite the fact that most people in these countries feel those on the “other side” have little concern for improving

relations, majorities on both sides in fact are very interested in better relations and see greater interaction as a benefit rather than a threat.

Gallup asked Americans about Islam elicits the most negative views. A slight majority of Americans (53%) say their opinion of the faith is either “not too favorable” (22%) or “not favorable at all”(31%). When asked about their level of knowledge about Islam, many Americans tell Gallup they have either “very little knowledge” (40%) or “none at all” (23%). The study also reveals that Americans view Islam more negatively than they view Muslims. When it comes to the followers of Islam, Americans are more than twice as likely to express negative feelings about Muslims as they are about Buddhists, Christians, and Jews. Forty-three percent of Americans admit to feeling at least “a little” prejudice toward Muslims, with 9% telling Gallup they feel “a great deal” of prejudice. Fifty-seven percent of Americans report they do not feel any prejudice. The study also explores what Americans think most Muslims around the world believe. Majorities of Americans disagree with the statements that most Muslims are accepting of other religions (66%) and that Christians’ and Muslims’ religious beliefs are basically the same (68%). While a majority of Americans (70%) agree that most Muslims want peace, more than one in four (27%) disagree. Additionally, 81% of the American public disagrees with the statement that most Muslims believe women and men should have equal rights, and 47% disagree with the statement that most Muslims around the world are accepting of others from different races (Mogahed 2009).

In America today, prejudice on religious, racial, or ethnic grounds usually carries a social stigma. Gallup findings show (see Fig 6.1) 43% of Americans admit to feeling at least “a little” prejudice toward Muslims and 57% say they do not feel any prejudice toward Muslims. But when asked about other religious groups, Americans are less likely to report feeling some level of prejudice. Americans are more than twice as likely to express negative feelings toward Muslims as they are toward Buddhists, Christians, and Jews. More than 1 in

10 Americans say they feel some level of prejudice (either “a great deal,” “some,” or “a little”) toward Buddhists (14%), Christians (18%), and Jews (15%).

Public Opinion about Their Feelings Toward Different Religious Group




Figure 6.1

Few Americans (4% or less) say they feel “a great deal” of prejudice toward these three religious groups; as a point of comparison, 9% of Americans say they feel that much prejudice toward Muslims (Mogahed 2009).

Gallup’s findings show (see Fig 6.2) that Islam is the religion (among those asked about) that elicits the most negative views (Mogahed 2009).

Public Opinion about Various Religions




Figure 6.2

The wrong perception of the Western world can be best understood from the verses of the holy Quran. The Qur'an has elaborately and repeatedly emphasized freedom of conscience. Faith and conviction are matters of conscience and no compulsion is allowed in this regard (Farooq 2002). We find several verses in the Qur'an clarifying this point. For example: "Let there be no compulsion in religion. Truth stands out clear from error" (Q 2:256). Again it says "Proclaim: This is the truth from your Lord, then whoever wills let him believe, and whoever wills let him disbelieve" (Q18:29). Again in another place it mentioned "And when we made with you covenant: shed not blood of your people nor turn a party of people out of your dwellings"(Q 2:34-35).

Freedom is one of God's great gifts to human. The Quran clearly spells out that freedom should be the foundation for any society that claims to be Islamic. The above verses make it clear that the word of God in the Quran advocates the absolute freedom of religion. Any society or nation which claims to be Islamic must have fundamental freedom of religion. The right to preach any religion, the right to assembly and worship would be the basic tenants. Tolerance of other religions and civility would be the hallmarks of such a society. It will be the duty of the state to preserve and protect the right of any citizen to practice their religion in freedom.

Islam recognizes absolute equality between men irrespective of any distinction of colour, race or nationality. As it is a pre-condition for democracy hence Islam makes it an important and significant principle, a reality. The Almighty God has laid down in the Holy Quran: "Say: Are those who know and those who do not know alike" (Quran 39:9)? With this guidance from Almighty Allah Prophet Mohammed (S M) also echoed the same voice. We can find it from the following Hadith:

“ Oh Mankind! Your Lord is One. Your (grand) father is one. All of you belong to Adam (peace and blessings of Allah be upon him). Adam is created of soil (earth dirt). Truly, the most honorable person in the Sight of Your Lord, the Almighty Allah, is the most pious

among you. There is no superiority for an Arab over a non-Arab. There is no superiority for a non-Arab over an Arab. There is no superiority for a red (race) person over a white person. Likewise, there is no superiority of a white over a red (race) person except for the level of piety" (mindfulness of God, the Almighty Allah in life and practices) (Ahmad Hadith No.411).

According to Islam, governments in this world are actually representatives (khulafa') of the Creator of the universe, and this responsibility is not entrusted to any individual or family or a particular class or group of people but to the entire Muslim nation. The Holy Quran says: "God has promised to appoint those of you who believe and do good deeds as (His) representatives on earth" (Q24:55). This clearly indicates that khilafah is a collective gift of God in which the right of every individual Muslim is neither more nor less than the right of any other person.

The correct method recommended by the Holy Quran for running the affairs of the state is as follows: "And their business is (conducted) through consultation among themselves" (Q42:38). According to this principle it is the right of every Muslim that either he should have a direct say in the affairs of the state or a representative chosen by him and other Muslims should participate in the consultation of the state. The Islamic term of this consultation assembly is shura. Islam, under no circumstance, permits or tolerates that an individual or a group or party of individuals may deprive the common Muslims of their rights, and usurp powers of the state. The prophet was told to: "consult with them upon the conduct of affairs." (Q 3:159). We are also told how the process of governance is to be conducted in a society of similar publics: "And whose rule is based upon consultation (Shura) among themselves" (Q 42:38).

Analysis of the survey data collected from greater Dhaka city also reveals that there is prevailing wrong perception of western world about Islam regarding democracy, equality, liberty and modernity.

Table 6.1: Public Perception about the Western World Toward Islam Regarding Democracy, Liberty, Equality and Modernity.

Do you think there is prevailing wrong perception of western world about Islam with respect to democracy, equality, liberty and modernity?	Gulshan Area N=30	Dhanm-ndi Area N=30	Uttara Area N=30	Rampura Area N=30	Dhaka University Area N=30	Lalbagh Area N=30	Total N=180
Yes	18(60%)	20(66.67%)	21(70%)	20(66.67%)	23(76.67%)	24(80%)	126(70%)
No	10(33.33%)	08(26.67%)	09(30%)	09(30%)	07(23.33%)	06(20%)	49(27.22%)
No Response	02(6.66%)	02(6.66%)	0	01(3.33%)	0	0	05(2.78%)
Total	30(100%)	30(100%)	30(100%)	30(100%)	30(100%)	30(100%)	180(100%)

Table 6.1 indicates that a high percentage (70% or 126 of 180) of the respondents of the Dhaka city believe that the non-Muslims of the West have wrong perception about Islam, while a very low percentage (27.22% or 49 of 180) of the respondents think that there is no wrong perception of the Western world about Islam with respect to democracy, equality, liberty and modernity. Data also reveal that the highest percentage (80% or 24 of 30) of the respondents who believe that there is a prevailing wrong perception of the Western world toward Islam are from Lalbagh area. Majority of the respondents (76.67% or 23 of 30) of Dhaka University area perceive that there is a prevailing wrong perception of the Western world toward Islam with respect to democracy, equality, liberty and modernity. However, the lowest percentages (60% or 18 of 30) of the respondents who believe that there is a prevailing wrong perception of the Western world toward Islam with respect to democracy, equality, liberty and modernity are from Gulshan area. Despite the differences in the perception of the respondents from different areas of Dhaka city about the perception of the people of the West toward Islam, the majority of the respondents from all the areas of Dhaka city believe that there is a prevailing wrong perception of the Western world toward

Islam with respect to democracy, equality, liberty and modernity which is supportive of hypothesis 1 that there is a prevailing wrong perception of Western world about Islam.

6.1.2 Analysis of Wrong Perception of the West about Islam with Respect to Human Rights and Justice.

The right wing non-Muslims believe that Islam approves killing of innocent human beings in the name of jihad or holy war. They also believe that Islam imposes restriction on freedom of expression, movement, liberty and democratic right. According to them, these are clear violation of basic human rights. Some believe that, the very notion of apostasy has vanished from the West. There are certainly no penal sanctions for converting from Christianity to any other religion. In Islamic countries, on the other hand, the issue is far from dead, the death penalty is the Islamic punishment for apostasy (Bostom 2003).

The topic which is most misinterpreted in the western world is probably women’s rights in Islam. Western world feels that Muslim women are oppressed and deprived of their due rights and respect in the society. Moreover, they have the impression that male in the Islamic society is oppressing and dominating woman in various ways (Saimah 1998).

Table 6.2: Opinion about Muslim Belief Regarding Woman Rights

<i>Do you agree or disagree with each of the following statements about Muslims? Most Muslims around the world believe that women and men should have equal rights.</i>		<i>Sample Size Percentage</i>	
Disagree.....	1702	100%	
Agree.....	138	16%	
Disagree.....	912	81%	
Don't know.....	31	3%	
Refused.....	1	1%	

From Table 6.2 we find that the American public is largely unconvinced that most of the Muslims believe in gender equality, because 81% of respondents disagree that most Muslims around the world think both sexes should have equal rights, while 16% of the respondents agree in this regard (Mogahed 2009).

But Islam has answers to this misperception about human rights. According to Islamic view, the concept of human rights was not the result of any revolution in human thought but the result of the divine revelations which were conveyed through the prophets from the very beginning of the existence of mankind (Hussain 1990). History witnessed the great judgement of Hazrat Ali in the case of murdering a zimmi where pronounced: "Whoever is our zimmi, his blood is as sacred as our own and his property is as inviolable as our property"(qtd in Hussain 1990, p59). The holy Quran and the traditional sayings and acts of the prophet strictly impose the following injunctions during the time of peace and the time of war. (1) No one should be burned alive or tortured with fire. (2) Wounded soldiers who are neither unfit to fight, nor actually fighting, should not be attacked. (3) Prisoners of war should not be killed. (4) It is prohibited to kill anyone who is tied up or in captivity. (5) Residential areas should not be pillaged, plundered or destroyed, nor should the Muslims touch the property of anyone except those who are fighting against them. (6) Muslims must not take anything from the general public of the conquered country without paying for it. (7) The corpses of the enemy must not be disgraced or mutilated. (8) Corpses of the enemy should be returned and (9) Treaties must not be broken (Souaiaia 2008).

In Islam, taking one's life is equal to taking the life of the whole of the world. Allah says in the holy Quran "Whoever kills a human being without (any reason like) man slaughter, or corruption on earth, it is as though he had killed all mankind ... And whoever saves a life it is as though he had saved the lives of all mankind" (Q 5:32). This Holy verse refers to the killing of Moslem or non-Moslem. It is incumbent on every human being that under no circumstances should he be guilty of taking a human life. If anyone has murdered a human being, it is as if he has slain the entire human race. These instructions have been

repeated in the Holy Quran in another place saying: "Do not kill a soul which Allah has made sacred except through the due process of law (Q 6:151).

Regarding the rights of needy and poor people the Quran says "And in their wealth there is acknowledged right for the needy and destitute" (Q 51:19). The meaning of this verse is that anyone who asks for help and anyone who is suffering from deprivation has a right in the property and wealth of the Muslims; irrespective of the fact whether he belongs to this nation or to that nation, to this country or to that country, to this race or to that race. If one is in position to help and if a needy person asks him for help or if he comes to know that someone is in need, then it is his duty to help the needy person. Because in Islam Allah has established the poor's right over the rich.

Another important thing that we find in the Charter of Human Rights granted by Islam is that a woman has to be respected and protected under all circumstances, whether she belongs to our own nation or to the nation of an enemy, whether we find her in the wild forest or in a conquered city; whether she is our co-religionist or belongs to some other religion or has no religion at all. A Muslim cannot outrage her under any circumstances. With the advent of Islam came the verse from the Quran condemning those who practiced female infanticide, "And when the news of (the birth of) a female (child) is brought to any of them, his face becomes dark, and he is filled with inward grief! He hides himself from the people because of the evil of that whereof he has been informed. Shall he keep her with dishonor or bury her in earth" (Q 16: 58-59).

The rights of Muslim women were given to us by Allah (SWT), who is All-Compassionate, All-Merciful, All-Just, All-Unbiased, All-Knowing and Most Wise. These rights, which were granted to women more than 1400 years ago, and were taught by the perfect example of the Prophet Muhammad (SAW), were given by the one Who created us and Who alone knows what rights are best for our female natures. Allah (SWT) says in the Quran: "O you who believe! You are forbidden to inherit women against their will, and you

should not treat them with harshness, that you may take away part of the Mahr (bridal-money given by the husband to his wife at time of marriage) you have given them, unless they commit open illegal sexual intercourse. And live with them honorably. If you dislike them, it may be that you dislike a thing and Allah brings through it a great deal of good" (Q 4:19).

An important and valuable right is justice which Islam has given to man as a human being. The Holy Quran says: "Oh you who believe! Stand out firmly for justice, as witnesses to God, even against yourselves, or your parents, or your kin, and whether it be against rich or poor, for God can best protect both. Follow not the cravings of your hearts, lest you swerve, and if you distort justice or decline to do justice, verily God is well acquainted with all that you do"(Q 4:135). In another verse it says "Whenever you judge between people, you should judge with (a sense of) justice" (Q 4:58).

Table 6.3: Public Perception about the West Toward Islam with Respect to Human Rights and Justice

Do you think there is Wrong perception of the West about Islam with respect to human rights and justice?	Gulshan Area N=30	Dhanmo -ndi Area N=30	Uttara Area N=30	Rampura Area N=30	Dhaka Universit -y Area N=30	Lalbagh Area N=30	Total N=180
Yes	18(60%)	19(63.33%)	22(73.33%)	21(70%)	24(80%)	18(60%)	122(68.46%)
No	09(30%)	09(30%)	07(23.33%)	08(26.67%)	06(20%)	12(40%)	51(28.33%)
No Response	03(10%)	02(6.67%)	01(3.33%)	01(3.33%)	0	0	07(3.89%)
Total	30(100%)	30(100%)	30(100%)	30(100%)	30(100%)	30(100%)	180(100%)

Table 6.3 demonstrates that a high percentage (68.46 % or 122 of 180) of the respondents of the Dhaka city believe that the non-Muslims of the West have wrong perception about Islam, while a very low percentage (28.33% or 51 of 180) of the respondents think that there is no wrong perception of the Western world about Islam with

respect to human rights and justice. Data also reveal that the highest percentage (80% or 24 of 30) of the respondents who believe that there is a prevailing wrong perception of the Western world toward Islam with respect to human rights and justice are from Dhaka university area. Majority of the respondents (73.33% or 22 of 30) of Uttara area perceive that there is a prevailing wrong perception of the Western world toward Islam with respect to human rights and justice. However, the lowest percentages (60% or 18 of 30) of the respondents who believe that there is a prevailing wrong perception of the Western world toward Islam with respect to human rights and justice are from Gulshan and Lalbagh area. Despite the differences in the perception of the respondents from different areas of Dhaka city about the perception of the people of the West toward Islam, the majority of the respondents from all the areas of Dhaka city believe that there is a prevailing wrong perception of the Western world toward Islam with respect to human rights and justice which is supportive of hypothesis1 that there is a prevailing wrong perception of Western world about Islam.

6.1.3 Analysis of Wrong Perception of the West about Islam with Respect to Terrorism, Jihad and Religious Politics.

It is important to mention that the main attitudes of the West towards Islam have crystallized in the aftermath of September 11,2001(Kalin 2008). The first is the resurfacing of the medieval descriptions of Islam as the religion of the sword, the Prophet as a violent person, Muslim societies as monolithic, violent, and power-driven collectivities, etc. The second attitude is to identify Islam as a code of belief and action that is obstinately irrational, anti-modern, aberrant, rigid, religious, and traditional. Francis Fukuyama claimed that “Islam, by contrast, is the only cultural system that seems regularly to produce people like Osama bin Laden or the Taliban who reject modernity. This raises the question of how representative

such people are of the larger Muslim community, and whether this rejection is somehow inherent in Islam” (Fukuyama 2001).

Many non-Muslims believe that terrorism is firmly rooted in the very 'lofty' doctrine of an Islamic world visioned by Muhammad. This use of terror tactic is nothing new in Islam; it was the lifeblood through which Muhammad forced his concept of a unipolar world, devoted only to one Semitic God, Allah. In this lengthy treatise, he has exercised all the events of terror, murder, deceit, lies, intrigue and warfare that had been used to nurture, advance and propagate the very essence of Islam: accept Islam, pay protection of money (*Jizya*) or die (Kasem 2005).

Many people in the West believe that Islamic fundamentalists are an accurate portrayal of true Islam. Novelist and Nobel prize-winner V.S. Naipaul, long a critic of Islam, analyzed the religion once again in an interview published in the October 28, 2001, issue of *The New York Times Magazine*, implying that a non-fundamentalist Islam was a contradiction in terms. More recently, *New York Times* columnist Thomas L. Freidman, argued, “This is not about terrorism. Terrorism is just a tool. We’re fighting to defeat an ideology: religious totalitarianism”(Freidman 2001,27). There are many critics of Islam in the twenty-first century who feel that Islam can be rightly judged based on the fundamentalists of the religion. Many people feel that the Muslim who is found on television representing violence is an accurate representation of all Muslims as well.

There is a perception among many people of the West that whatever change the West bring into their policy and action towards Islamic world, it (Islamic world) will remain anti-western because this anti western sentiment is deep rooted in Islam (Ye’or 1985). Where West believes in separation of state and church, but Islam is a religion which covers complete way of life. That includes social & political, here comes the conflict with West, who blames Islamic world for religious politics (Tessler 2009).

Finding of a survey conducted by the National Conferences in 1994 revealed that forty-two percent of the 3000 Americans interviewed believe that “Muslims belong to a religion that condones or supports terrorism.” Findings also reveal that forty-seven percent of the respondents stated that Muslims are “anti-Western and anti-American” (Shaheen1984, p 12). Until recently, this was the dominant view even among high school students in the US who have either never been exposed to Islam or have only been exposed to a distortion of it (Suleiman 1983, p 21).




Figure 6.3

Results of the public opinion revealed that Muslims rated the lowest (See Fig 6.3) in overall favorability among various religious groups (Yalonis 2005). Figure 6.3 reveals that 27% of overall respondents had a very or somewhat unfavorable opinion of “Muslims who live inside my country”. Again, 25% , 25%,28% and 27% of US, UK, French and German respondents, respectively,gave unfavorable opinion. Most negative opinion came from Netherlands with 33% being very or somewhat unfavorable. The figure further discloses that 32% of overall respondents had a somewhat or very unfavorable opinion of Islam, where Netherlands gave most unfavourable opinion with 40%. In addition, 49% of respondents believe that Islam is more likely than other religions to encourage violence (Yalonis 2005).

Now let us analyze the Quranic responses and see whether Islam patronises terrorism or not. The holy Quran says, "Whosoever kills a human being without (any reason like) man slaughter, or corruption on earth, it is as though he had killed all mankind ... And whoever saves a life it is as though he had saved the lives of all mankind"(Q 5:32). God says in the holy Quran "GOD does not enjoin you from befriending those who do not fight you because of religion, and do not evict you from your homes. You may befriend them and be equitable towards them (Q 60:8-9). Almighty also advised as ""Do not let your hatred of a people incite you to aggression" (Q 5:2).

God does not forbid that you do good and make justice for those who do not fight you in the religion or drive you out from your homes. Indeed, God loves those who do justice. As Almighty says, "And if they incline to peace, so you must incline to it. And trust in God, for He hears and knows all" (Q 8: 61).

The Qur'an repeatedly urges forgiveness and restraint, and warns believers not to "transgress" or become "oppressors." Some examples:"let your punishment be proportional to the wrong that has been done to you. But if you show patience, that is indeed the best course. Be patient, for your patience is from God. And do not grieve over them, or distress yourself because of their plots. For God is with those who restrain themselves, and those who do good" (Q 16: 125-128).

Table 6.4: Public Perception about the West Toward Islam Regarding Terrorism , Jihad and Politics.

Do you think there is prevailing wrong perception of western world about Islam regarding Terrorism , Jihad and Politics ?	Gulshan Area N=30	Dhanm o-ndi Area N=30	Uttara Area N=30	Rampur a Area N=30	Dhaka Universit -y Area N=30	Lalbagh Area N=30	Total N=180
Yes	19(63.33%)	21(70%)	22(73.33%)	21(70%)	24(80%)	17(56.67%)	124(69.58%)
No	08(26.67%)	07(23.33%)	07(23.33%)	09(30%)	06(20%)	13(43.33%)	50(27.78%)
No Response	03(10%)	02(6.67%)	01(3.33%)	0	0	0	06(3.33%)
Total	30(100%)	30(100%)	30(100%)	30(100%)	30(100%)	30(100%)	180(100%)

Table 6.4 reveals that a high percentage (69.58 % or 124 of 180) of the respondents of the Dhaka city believe that the non-Muslims of the West have wrong perception about Islam, while a very low percentage (27.78% or 50 of 180) of the respondents think that there is no wrong perception of the Western world about Islam with respect to terrorism, jihad and religious politics. Data also reveal that the highest percentage (80% or 24 of 30) of the respondents who believe that there is a prevailing wrong perception of the Western world toward Islam with respect to terrorism, jihad and religious politics are from Dhaka university area. Majority of the respondents(73.33% or 22 of 30) of Uttara area perceive that there is a prevailing wrong perception of the Western world toward Islam. However, the lowest percentages (56.67% or 17 of 30) of the respondents who believe that there is a prevailing wrong perception of the Western world toward Islam with respect to terrorism, jihad and religious politics are from Gulshan area. Despite the differences in the perception of the respondents from different areas of Dhaka city about the perception of the people of the West toward Islam, the majority of the respondents from all the areas of Dhaka city believe that there is a prevailing wrong perception of the Western world toward Islam with respect to terrorism, jihad and religious politics which is supportive of hypothesis I that there is a prevailing wrong perception of Western world about Islam.

6.2 Hypothesis 2: To change the wrong perception of the Western world a non-violent approach of interaction, dialogue, diplomacy and reconciliation should be followed between West and Islam.

6.2.1 Non-Violence Approach to Changing the Western Perception Through Inter-Faith/Inter-Culture/ Inter-Civilization Dialogue.

As mentioned before intercultural dialogue is a process that comprises an open and respectful exchange of views between individuals and groups with different ethnic, cultural,

religious and linguistic backgrounds and heritage on the basis of mutual understanding and respect. It requires the freedom and ability to express oneself, as well as the willingness and capacity to listen to the views of others. Intercultural dialogue contributes to political, social, cultural and economic integration and the cohesion of culturally diverse societies. It fosters equality, human dignity and a sense of common purpose. It aims to develop a deeper understanding of diverse world views and practices, to increase co-operation and participation (or the freedom to make choices), to allow personal growth and transformation, and to promote tolerance and respect for the other (Council of Europe 2008).

Mutual openness and sharing are twin aspects of multiple cultural affiliations. Both are rules of coexistence applying to individuals and groups, who are free to practice their cultures, subject only to respect for others. Intercultural dialogue is therefore important in managing multiple cultural affiliations in a multicultural environment. It is a mechanism to constantly achieve a new identity balance, responding to new openings and experiences and adding new layers to identity without relinquishing one's roots. Intercultural dialogue helps us to avoid the pitfalls of identity policies and to remain open to the challenges of modern societies (Council of Europe 2008).

Majorities of the people around the world believe that violent conflict between the West and the Muslim world can be avoided, but they also share a great deal of pessimism about the state of the relationship. Americans, Israelis and Palestinians are among the most likely to say that Muslim-West relations are worsening (See Fig 6.4), reflecting the acute conflicts currently raging in Iraq and the Palestinian territories. This underscores the importance of their resolution to the state of the dialogue. With tensions between Iran and the United States intensifying, one might expect the Iranian public to be among the most pessimistic about the future of Muslim-West relations.

Opinion about Interaction between Muslim and Western World




Figure 6.4

Among both Muslim majority and non-Muslim majority nations, the proportion who says they think the “other side” is committed to better relations rarely rises above a minority. Three-in-four US residents say the Muslim world is not committed to improving relations with the West, an identical percentage of Palestinians attribute the same apathy to the West. At least half of respondents in Italy (58%), Denmark (52%), and Spain (50%) agree that the Muslim world is not committed to improving relations (See Fig 6.5).

Commitment of West and Muslims in Relation With Muslim and West.




Figure 6.5




Figure 6.6

Among the majority-Muslim nations surveyed, we see roughly the same pattern; majorities in every Middle Eastern country studied believe the West is not committed to better relations with the Muslim World (See Fig 6.6), while respondents in majority-Muslim Asian countries are about evenly split (Mogahed ,Younis 2008).

Despite low levels of confidence in the commitment of those on the “other side”, majorities in most nations surveyed in both the Muslim and Western worlds say that the quality of interactions between the two is important to them. In some Western countries, including Denmark, the United States, Belgium, Italy, Israel, Canada and Spain, the percentage who say the issue is important to them is even higher than the percentage who give the Western world credit for commitment to improved relations. In other words, some respondents believe their personal level of concern is higher than that of their own leadership, not to mention the leadership of the “other side”. In the Middle East, Iranians are most likely

to say the interaction between the West and the Muslim world is important, at 70%, followed by Turks at 64%.

European populations surveyed are much more likely to believe that greater interaction between the Muslim and Western worlds is a threat rather than a benefit (See Fig 6.7). This appears to reflect widespread anti-immigration sentiment within the European Union. Clear majorities in all European countries surveyed see greater interaction between the West and Muslim worlds as a threat. This is true of 79% of the population in Denmark, 67% in Italy, 67% in the Netherlands, 68% in Spain, 65% in Sweden and 59% in Belgium. This corresponds to a growing fear among Europeans of a perceived “Islamic threat” to their cultural identities, driven in part by rising immigration from predominantly Muslim regions. A recent poll found that only 21% of Europeans supported Turkey’s bid for EU membership. A 2006 poll found that the main reason Germans opposed Turkey’s membership was “fear of a growing influence of Islam in Europe” (Mogahed & Younis 2008).

Although some might expect the United States, Israel and the Middle East to be more likely than Europe to feel threatened by the “other,” the opposite is the case. In the United States (70%), Canada (72%) and Israel (56%) majorities say that greater interaction is a benefit. Similarly, residents of Saudi Arabia, Egypt, the Palestinian Territories, Malaysia, Turkey and Iran were more likely to feel that greater interaction between Muslim and Western worlds is a benefit rather than a threat. These findings are supported by a 2005-2006 Gallup world poll that found Americans favored greater cultural interaction as a way to improve relations with the Muslim world.

The same study revealed that the two statements Muslim-world residents most frequently associate with the Muslim World are: “Attachment to their spiritual and moral values is crucial to progress.” “Eager to have better relations with the West.” These results

suggest that many Muslims do not regard religious devotion and cross-cultural cooperation as mutually exclusive.

Interaction Between West and Muslim is a Threat or Benefit




Figure 6.7

Data suggest that roughly 2 in 5 Bangladeshis believe the West is committed to promote better relations with the Muslim world and 35% believe the West respects Muslims(SeeTable 6.5). Unlike Bangladesh, some might expect Saudi Arabia and the Netherlands to be among the most pessimistic about Muslim-West dialogue. They were both directly affected either by military or cultural conflicts between Muslim and Western communities.

Table 6.5: The Muslim-West Dialogue Index

The Gallup Muslim-West Dialogue Index	
OVERALL	37
BANGLADESH	50
SAUDI ARABIA	46
NETHERLANDS	44
CANADA	44
SINGAPORE	43
IRAN	43
ISRAEL	42
BELGIUM	42
INDONESIA	40
USA	41
THE PALESTINIAN TERRITORIES	39
EGYPT	39
MALAYSIA	39
SWEDEN	36
ITALY	37
DENMARK	37
TURKEY	36
SPAIN	33
PAKISTAN	30*
BRAZIL	26*
RUSSIA	25*

* Indicates a high percentage of "Don't know responses"
100 points = Most optimistic

However, they rank second and third respectively in the Index. More Saudis believe greater interaction between Muslim and Western societies is a benefit than those who believe it is a threat, and they are among the most likely majority Muslim countries to give the West credit for commitment to better relations. Saudis are also most likely to express confidence in Muslim good will toward the West, with roughly 7 in 10 saying the Muslim world respects and is committed to better relations with the Western world. Roughly 1 in 3 residents of the Netherlands believe the relationship between Muslim and Western communities is getting better, second only to Bangladesh. The Dutch are the most likely to believe the Western world is committed to improved relations with Muslim societies (72%) and among the most likely to say they are personally concerned with this issue, though less than half (46%) believes the West respects the Muslim world. Like Saudi Arabia, the Netherlands is the most

likely Western country to trust in the other community's good will; 2 in 5 say the Muslim world is committed to better relations and 1 in 3 say it respects the West. Like the other European countries surveyed, the majority of the Dutch see greater interaction between Western and Muslim worlds as a threat, but their relative optimism in other dimensions pushed them into third place. Pakistan, Brazil and Russia rank last on the Index due more to a lack of a positive response than the prevalence of negative responses (Mogahed & Younis 2008).

It is important to mention that the Quran advocates for dialogues and interactions between the religions and cultures. Allah commands in the holy Quran as "Invite (all) to the way of thy Lord with wisdom and beautiful preaching; and argue with them in ways that are best and most gracious"(Q16:125). In another verse he mentioned "Say: O People of Book, Let us come to a word common to us and you that we will worship none but God"(Q 3:64). He further clarifies by another verse as "Do not argue with the people of the Book unless it is in the politest manner"(Q 29:46). From these verses it is justified once again that Islam advocates for dialogue and interaction between west and Islam to change the wrong western perception.

Role of Iner-faith/Inter-civilizational Dialogue in Changing the Wrong Perception




Figure 6.8

Figure 6.8 presents the findings of survey data conducted in Dhaka city. From these data it becomes evident that people of Gulshan-Baridhara-Banani being widely visioned and educated are most optimistic about resolving conflicts by inter-faith dialogue with 80% approval. That is out of 30 people who were surveyed, 24 respondents opined that western wrong perception could be changed by dialogue and interaction. On the other hand, respondents from Dhaka University and BUET campus area also were very much optimistic with 70% approval as they are widely educated and conscious. However, the respondents of Lalbagh-Chockbazer area expressed the pessimistic views with only 40% approval due to their rigid religious mindset.

From the above data analysis it is evident that the wrong Western perception can be changed through iner-faith/iner-civilization/inter-culture dialogue which testifies hypothesis2.

6.2.2 Non-Violence Approach to Changing the Western Perception Through Media Management and Regulation.

As mentioned in the literature review section, Islam is the fastest growing religion in the West. Nevertheless, the West has many stereotypes and misconceptions about Islam that are due to the media, prejudice, and ignorance. Islam is often looked upon as an "extremist", "terrorist", or "fundamental" religion. Many people hate Islam and do not want to acknowledge the true teachings of Islam. There must be positive media both in print and electronic in the Islamic world as well as in the west to project the true picture of Islam in front of western world. Once they find the truth of Islam by positive media their perception about Islam is likely to change (Akel 2007).

Media is having polarizing effect on relations between the West and the Muslim World. Media is one of the most fertile grounds for action that could reach broad populations. Actions to be taken for positive media included (1) establish an alliance of civilizations network of media activists and centers to stimulate, monitor, & reward media, (2) open access to educational media programming, (3) strengthening the capacity of media professionals to

cover the intersection of religion and politics and to cover stories across western-muslim societies,(4) supporting the development, articulation, and implementation of professional media standards, (5) reducing cross-cultural isolation and develop a global consciousness among media professionals, (6) urging responsible political and cultural leadership vis-à-vis the media, (7) enlisting the support and partnership of mass media leader, (8) strengthening muslim world-west pop-culture collaboration and (9) supporting new media strategies and efforts to increase media literacy (Akel 2007).

Projection of Religious Actors in Media




Figure 6.9

Figure 6.9 depicts that among religious actors presented in the media, Islam and Muslims were by far the most prominent accounting for 56% of individuals and groups explicitly identified with a religion. Christianity came next, identifying approximately 28% of religious protagonists. Judaism accounted for approximately 4% of protagonists surveyed. No

other religion achieved more than 1% visibility. Whereas journalists most commonly portrayed Christian, Jewish and other religious actors engaged in religious activities (in 75% of statements, on average), Muslim protagonists were only associated with religious activities in 13% of statements. More often, actors identified with Islam were engaged in militant or political activities (in 68% of statements). Muslims were also associated with fundamentalist and extremist activities more than six times as often as other religious protagonists were.

Table 6.6 demonstrates that Islamic protagonists were more often depicted involved in political or military activities by 55% of statements. Journalists depicted Islamic protagonists engaged in religious activities in only 23% of statements.

In media outlets within the Muslim world, journalists were more likely to present Muslims engaged in political activities (29.7% of statements). In media outside the Muslim world, journalists presented Muslims involved in militant activities (36.1% of statements). Media from both areas presented Muslims engaged in religious activities with about the same frequency.

The fundamentalist perspective was most visible in media reporting on Muslims, with 12% of statements, compared with an average of 1% of statements involving other religious protagonists. Partially as a result of these perspectives, the overall tone towards Islamic protagonists was more negative (overall rating 24.5% negative statements) than that which was communicated toward Jewish (9.5%) and Christian (6.7%) protagonists. Media from non-Muslim majority countries presented Western protagonists in negative circumstances in only 19% of coverage and presented protagonists representing Islam and Muslim majority countries in negative circumstances in 31% of coverage.

Table 6.6: Most Visible Religious and Secular Protagonist

Religion	Percent of reporting	Religion	Percent of reporting
Islam	56.0%	Judaism	4.2%
<i>Subdivision</i>	<i>Percent within reporting</i>	<i>Subdivision</i>	<i>Percent within reporting</i>
	<i>on Islam</i>		<i>on Judaism</i>
Islam in general	90.7%	Judaism in general	56.0%
Shiite	6.0%	Orthodox Judaism	31.9%
Sunni	4.0%	Zionism	10.3%
Ismaelite	37.0%	Conservative Judaism	1.7%
Sufi	3.0%	Liberal Judaism	0.20%
Christianity	37.0%	Other religions	1.3%
<i>Subdivision</i>	<i>Percent within reporting</i>	<i>Subdivision</i>	<i>Percent within reporting</i>
	<i>on Christianity</i>		<i>on other religions</i>
Christianity in general	46.0%	Buddhism	44.6%
Roman Catholicism	45.0%	Hinduism	10.6%
Anglican	2.6%	Orthodoxy, other	9.7%
Protestantism	2.4%	Sikhism	2.9%
Evangelical	0.9%	Satanism	2.0%
Russian Orthodox	0.7%	Shinto	1.9%
Mormonism	0.6%	Traditional African Religions	1.7%
Methodist	0.3%	Secular Ideologies	0.9%
Lutheran	0.3%	<i>Subdivision</i>	<i>Percent within reporting</i>
Scientology	0.1%		<i>on secular ideologies</i>
Presbyterian	0.1%	Communism	38.0%
Baptist	0.1%	Secularism in general	27.9%
		Socialism	14.7%
		Atheism	14.3%
		Secular Judaism	2.7%
		Individualism	1.5%
		Liberatism	0.4%
		Nationalism	0.3%

Regionally, the overall tone towards and 34% negative statements, respectively. Media from Brazil, Russia and Europe covered the “other” with the most balance (overall rating of 26% negative statements). In Muslim majority countries, TV outlets were more balanced than print outlets were in their portrayal of the “other” side (overall rating 41.3% negative statement in print versus 34.2% negative statements in TV). In non- Muslim majority countries, the opposite was true : print outlets were more neutral, presenting an overall negative rating of 33.1% towards the “other” in TV coverage versus 22.9% negative statements in print.

Figure 6.10 shows that there were very negative and very positive outliers within Muslim majority countries: Jordan and Morocco’s average rating was 76% negative statements. Malaysia’s was 68% positive statements. Egypt and Saudi Arabia covered this area most neutrally. Religious fundamentalism was the topic most often addressed in the coverage of religion, ethics and ideology. Reporting on this topic was very negative, with an overall rating of 24.3% negative statements. Figure 6.10 also depicts that the only topic covered more negatively was extremism(Over all rating 29.4% negative statements)




Figure 6.10

Social stability had a significantly less negative rating of 4.9% negative statements. The relationship between tradition and modernity was addressed in the next most visible topic – democracy and sovereignty – which also had a less negative rating of 6.9% negative statements (Enans, Kolmer & Schatz, 2008).

Studying the holy Quran we find that Islam also supports the regulation of media in a positive direction. Allah says in the Quran, “O Messenger, declare what is revealed to you from your Lord. If you will not declare, it would be as though you have not conveyed my Message. Allah protects you from men. He does not guide the unbelieving people (Q 5:67). Hence it is clear from the above verse that Islam advocates for optimum utilization of media through all forms (Print, electronic, internet etc) for conflict resolution and peacebuilding.

Media Regulation for Changing the Wrong Perception in Resolving Conflicts




Figure 6.11

Findings of the survey conducted in Dhaka city also reveal that majority of the respondents (in average 63.17%) are supportive of the changing role of media towards a positive direction (See Fig 6.11). This figure shows that a high percentage (70%) respondents from the Dhaka University and BUET area emphasize the role of media in a positive direction in changing perception and resolving conflicts. That is, around 23 out of 30 people opined that media should be regulated in a positive direction to change the wrong western perception. On the other hand, people of Gulshan-Baridhara approves only 60% as large portion of non-muslim in that area also in favour of changing Islamic perception about west.

Findings of the above data reveal that to change the wrong perception a non-violent approach of media regulation in a positive direction should be adopted for resolving conflicts between West and Islam, which is supportive of hypothesis 2.

6.2.3 Non-Violence Approach to Changing the Western Perception Through Togetherness and Mutual Respect

Islam and the West are not inherently incompatible. Mutual accommodation can be achieved, because the West is not the enemy of Islam, and Islam is not the enemy of the West. Through mutual engagement and moral humility, the cultures of Islam and the West can foster a new narrative of complementarities and peaceful coexistence (Said & Funk 1998).

To become more secure, Westerners and Muslims must recognize that they need each other to establish a positive, proactive basis for coexistence. In other words, they need to find a way not only to tolerate each other's presence on the international stage, but also to discover ways in which their cultures may actually benefit from the presence of the "other." Both Islam and the West are here to stay. There can be no peace in the world without peace between them. Islam and the West are truly between stories - between the stories of the past, and the story that they must now create together. All who identify with Islam and with the West can become coauthors of this new story. We are all heirs of the story of conflict. If we leave aside tired generalizations and seek to know one another, we can become the architects of a truly new order of cooperation. And there by we can change our perception towards each other (Said & Funk 1998).

.Obama's " Mutual Interest and Mutual Respect " Policy is another important issue for changing the present perception. Analyzing it we find that the introduction of the Obama administration has put a light on a tunnel for new beginnings in US relations with the Muslim world. However, taking advantage of this opportunity, will require both political courage and a well-informed, well-developed strategy of active peacemaking that contrasts greatly with the approach of the last eight years (marked as it was by confrontation ideological inflexibility, contradiction, and resistance to diplomatic engagement with adversaries), while also moving beyond the standard repertoire of practices associated with

foreign policy realism. In the absence of a new strategy underpinned by principles of conflict resolution, democratic change and restorative justice, the promise of the present moment is likely to go unfulfilled, giving way to an uncomfortable and unsteady new status quo.

The author *Nathan C Funk (2009)* beautifully articulated a set of principles and prescriptions for breaking the present impasse in American-Islamic relations may be mentioned here. These principles and prescriptions derived from academic studies of peacemaking in protracted inter-group conflict as well as from critical evaluation of past US policies, are intended to build upon President Obama's stated commitment to founding relations upon "mutual interest and mutual respect" They underscore the vital importance of

- 1) listening carefully to various Muslim accounts of the "backstory" behind present tensions
- 2) embracing conflict de-escalation as an overarching strategy for marginalizing extremists by "draining the swamp" of enmity that is fed by various enduring rivalries (esp US- Iranian, Israeli-Palestinian/Arab, and US- Arab) in Islamic-Western relations,
- 3) consistently conveying respect for Islam, while simultaneously inviting dialogue about Islamic bases for peaceable relations,
- 4) articulating a "new deal" in US-Muslim relations based on internationally Legitimate norms and standards rather than on traditional forms of geopolitical expediency,
- 5) drawing upon restorative justice principles to formulate diplomatic messages that signal commitment to genuine change in hitherto troubled historical relationships; and
- 6) developing a more genuinely "democratic" (as opposed to coercive or ethnocentric) set of guidelines for supporting democratic "change from within" in Muslim-majority societies (Funk 2009).

To write a new chapter in relations with the Muslim world, the U.S will need to move beyond the standard repertoire of practices associated with foreign policy realism and with past Middle East policy. In the absence of a strategy underpinned by principles of conflict resolution restorative justice and democratic change, the promise of the present moment is likely to go unfulfilled, giving way to an uncomfortable and unsteady new status quo, If

however, American leaders can transcend the temptation to simply repackage traditional formulas for “stability” and can instead make a more serious effort to engage the back story to U.S tensions with the Muslim world, genuine opportunities for transforming political and identity conflict (not only interstate but intersocietal and intercultural) are likely to emerge to the benefit of all parties, not least the United States (Funk 2009).

Although most Muslims say the Muslim world respects the West, many of them feel that the West does not respect the Muslim world. In 2005, the Gallup Organization asked residents of several Muslim majority countries to explain in their own words what the West could do to improve relations with the Muslim world. The most frequent response, from countries as different as Turkey and Saudi Arabia, can be summed up with this statement: “Show greater respect for Islam and stop regarding Muslims as inferior.” The Gallup Index on Muslim-West Dialogue showed that many Muslim populations believe that the Western world lacks respect for the Muslim world (See Fig 6.12). The vast majority of Palestinians (84%) and Egyptians (80%) say this is the case, while the percentage from Turkey (68%), Saudi Arabia (67%) and Iran (62%) are only somewhat lower. These findings illustrate a consistent sense of being disrespected across nations that have very different economic, political and geo-strategic relationships with the West. Do residents of Western nations believe the Western world respects Muslim societies? In some cases, the answer is no; fewer than half of those in Denmark (30 %), the United States (42%), Sweden (32%) and Canada (41%) believe the West respects the Muslim world. In Israel and the Netherlands, the percentages are somewhat higher (45% and 46%, respectively), though still below half. In contrast, most residents in all but one majority-Muslim nation believe that the Muslim world respects the Western world.

Moreover, data indicate the two-thirds of respondents in Indonesia (65 %), the country with the world’s largest Muslim population, believe that the Muslim world respects the West, similar numbers are seen in Saudi Arabia (72%), the Palestinian territories (69%)

and Egypt (62%). On this question, as on others within the Index, non-Arab nations of the Middle East diverge from their Arab neighbors. In Iran, the percentage who say the Muslim world respects the West is somewhat lower at 52%, while Turkey is the only country in which this figure represents less than a majority, at 45%. However, while most respondents in almost all Muslim majority countries say the Muslim world respects the Western world, majorities of those in Western countries – and Israel – disagree. Eighty-two percent of Americans and 73% of Israelis believe that the Muslim world does not respect the West. Similarly high figures are seen in Spain (63%), site of the Madrid terrorist bombing of 2004, Denmark (69%), where the international firestorm over the Danish cartoons depicting the Prophet Muhammad originated in 2005, and the Netherlands (55%), where the 2004 killing of a Dutch filmmaker by a young Muslim has sparked controversy. However, the Index reveals that even in the nations studied with no obvious conflicts or significant dysfunction with local Muslim minority communities – such as Italy (70%), Canada (67%) and Sweden (54%) – high percentages of respondents feel the West is disrespected. If residents of Muslim majority countries mostly say their society respects the West, why do Westerners feel disrespected?

A possible explanation is that Westerners may conflate negative opinion of the United States common in the Muslim world with a rejection of the West and its values as a whole. This perception is intensified by cultural firestorms such as the Danish cartoon controversy, which leave some Westerners feeling that Muslims do not respect “Western values” of free speech, and therefore do not respect the West. For example, nearly 1 in 2 Danes say they consider Islam to be incompatible with democracy, and a slight majority said in 2006 that they believed the Danish newspaper *Jyllands-Posten* was right to print the controversial cartoon of the Prophet Muhammad with a bomb in his turban as a demonstration of free speech.

Opinion Regarding Respect of Western World Towards Muslims World




Figure 6.12

While most Americans (61%) said they believed it was irresponsible to print the cartoons, the same percentage blamed Muslim’s intolerance to other points of view rather than Western disrespect for Islam for the controversy. In other words, many Westerners regarded the reaction of some Muslims to the printing of the cartoon as disrespectful to Western values, just as many Muslims saw the wide distribution of the caricature as an assault on their tradition. Data suggest, however, that Muslim’s unfavorable views of the United States are more often driven by resentment of it’s perceived policies than by rejection of its values. Data also suggest that the diverse reactions to the Danish cartoons observed

across the Muslim world were much more complex than simply a rejection of free speech. Often incited by local factors and aggravated by long standing seemingly unrelated political grievances with Western powers, the actions of a violent and vocal minority in response to the caricature do not represent populations who oppose liberty. In reality, the vast majority of Muslims support the value of free speech in principle. For example, 94% of Egyptians and 92% of Iranians say they would guarantee the right of free speech. If they were asked to draft a constitution for a new country, many Muslim-world respondents also cite freedom of expression as among the qualities of the West that they most admire.

But, the Danish cartoon was clearly offensive to many Muslims who felt it violated the boundaries of free speech. Some Europeans agreed – 30% of the German public, 45% French and a majority (57%) of the British public said in 2007 that printing the cartoon was not protected by freedom of speech. Although Europeans were split about the acceptability of printing the Danish cartoon, there was broad consensus rejecting other expressions. Strong majorities said that newspapers should not be allowed to print racial slurs, child pornography or jokes about the Holocaust. For example, more than 8 out of 10 of the German public said that racial slurs and jokes about the Holocaust were not protected by free speech (Mogahed & Younis, 2008). These trends suggest that while Western and Muslim communities both claim free speech as a value, each society creates what it considers are appropriate limits to this freedom, sometimes differing even among societies that share a common faith. Discriminating between a more manageable difference in cultural definitions and an insurmountable clash of basic values is essential to moving the dialogue forward.

Islam also patronizes togetherness and mutual respect for changing the wrong perception for conflict resolution. Quran says, “ He has made plain to you of the religion what He enjoined upon Nuh and that which We have revealed to you and that which We enjoined upon Ibrahim and Musa and Isa that keep to obedience and be not divided therein; hard to the unbelievers is that which you call them to; Allah chooses for Himself whom He

pleases, and guides to Himself him who turns (to Him), frequently”(Q 42:13). In another verse Almighty says, "Say: we believe in God and what has been revealed to us and what was revealed to Abraham, Ismail, Isaac, Jacob, and the tribes, and in what was given to Moses, Jesus, and the prophets from their Lord. We make no distinction between one and another among them and to Him [God] do we submit"(Q 3:84). God intructs in another place as,"And argue not with the People of the Book unless it be in a way that is better, save with such of them as do wrong; and say we believe in that which has been revealed to us and to you; and our God and your God is one and unto Him we submit"(Q 29:46). From these Quranic verses it becomes clear Islam advocates for establishing peace on earth in a non-violent way of togetherness and mutual respect.

Table 6.7: Changing of Western Perception by Togetherness and Mutual Respect.

Do you think that Western perception can be changed by togetherness and mutual respect?	Gulshan Area N=30	Dhanmo -ndi Area N=30	Uttara Area N=30	Rampura Area N=30	Dhaka Universit -y Area N=30	Lalbagh Area N=30	Total N=180
Yes	24(80%)	23(76.67%)	21(70%)	18(60%)	23(76.67%)	16(53.33%)	125(70.14%)
No	04(13.33%)	05(16.67%)	09(30%)	09(30%)	07(23.33%)	14(46.67%)	48(26.67%)
No Response	02(6.67%)	02(6.67%)	0	03(10%)	0	0	07(3.89%)
Total	30(100%)	30(100%)	30(100%)	30(100%)	30(100%)	30(100%)	180(100%)

Table 6.7 indicates that a high percentage (70.14% or 125 of 180) of the respondents of the Dhaka city beleive that Western wrong perception about Islam can be changed by togetherness and mutual respect , while a very low percentage (26.67% or 48 of 180) of the respondents think that Western wrong perception about Islam can not be changed by togetherness and mutual respect. Data also reveal that the highest percentage (80% or 24 of 30) of the respondents who believe that Western wrong perception about Islam can be

changed by togetherness and mutual respect are from Gulshan area. The Majority of the respondents (76.67% or 23 of 30) of Dhaka University and Dhanmondi area perceive that Western wrong perception about Islam can be changed by togetherness and mutual respect.. However, the lowest percentages(53.33% or 16 of 30) of the respondents who believe that Western wrong perception about Islam can be changed by togetherness and mutual respect are from Lalbagh area. Despite the differences in the perception of the respondents from different areas of Dhaka city about changing of the Western perception, the majority of the respondents from all the areas of Dhaka city believe that Western wrong perception about Islam can be changed by togetherness and mutual respect which is supportive of hypothesis2 that to change the wrong perception of the Western world a non-violent approach of interaction, dialogue, diplomacy and reconciliation should be followed between West and Islam.

6.3 Hypothesis 3: By changing the wrong perception of the West many of the prevailing global conflicts can be resolved.

6.3.1 Conflict Resolution by Changing the Wrong Western Perception through Reconciliatory Approach.

As mentioned earlier, reconciliation is an important approach to conflict resolution. When perception changes, then various groups are likely to reconcile with each other. The humanity as a whole must come to terms with realities of interdependence in the spheres of economics, ecology, culture, and politics. Security is no longer the private good of a particular state and nation that may be purchased at the expense of others, but a public good that can only be achieved through the cultivation of consensus, collaboration, and reciprocity within a framework of dialogue and mutual engagement (Said & Funk 2001).

Study reveals that while interdependence provides the powerful sources of leverage over the weak, it also increases the potential costs of exercising that leverage without consent.

To become more secure, Westerners and Muslims must recognize that they need to establish a positive, proactive basis for coexistence. In other words, they need to find a way not only to tolerate each other's presence on the international stage, but also to discover ways in which their cultures may actually benefit from each other. Individuals on both sides of the cultural divide have much to gain from moving beyond preoccupation with tired images, symbols, and postures, and toward genuine openness to a new experience of the "other." Narrow attachment to preconceived images, inflexible doctrines, and fixed political positions prevents dialogue. Most important for both communities at this time is the need to move beyond reactionary impulses triggered by symbols (turbans, flags, the presence or absence of veils or beards).

Analysis further reveals, instead of retreating into deep subjectivity, we need to develop a process of communication capable of generating new insight. Such a process should involve active listening and a commitment to sustained dialogue. It should not rush to achieve immediate rewards, a quick end of conflict, or complete understanding. Rather, it should seek to help each side understand how the other community expresses its basic concerns, while encouraging both sides to work together in the discovery and creation of shared meanings and priorities. This would ensure Westerners and Muslims to better understand their own values and ideals as they learn to share them in new ways. (Said & Funk 2001). Hence, from the analysis of above literature data it is found that by reconciliation process many of the prevailing global conflicts can be resolved.

Despite gloomy appraisals of the current state of the relationship between Muslim and Western societies, the Muslim-West Survey data suggest that most respondents, Muslim and non-Muslim alike, do not accept the idea of an inevitable clash between the two civilizations. Majorities in all countries believe that violent conflict can be avoided. The exception is Pakistan, where the majority said they did not know. This sentiment was strongest in Italy, Belgium and Spain, where roughly three-quarters believed conflict was avoidable and

weakest in the United States, Israel, Egypt and the Palestine territories, where just over half held this view. Once again the similarity between Israeli and Palestinian assessments of the state of the relationship between the Muslim and Western worlds is remarkable. As a whole, world population is optimistic that violent conflict can be avoided.

History bears witness that if perception of opposing sides can be changed by reconciliation then conflicts between them can be resolved in a non-violent way. If we analyze some international accords it will be more clear to us. These accords ultimately resolved some of the contentious conflicts the world faced.

Camp David Accords: The Camp David Accords were signed by Egyptian President Anwar El Sadat and Israeli Prime Minister Menachem Begin on September 17, 1978, following twelve days of secret negotiations at Camp David. The two framework agreements were signed at the White House, and were witnessed by United States President Jimmy Carter. The second of these frameworks, *A Framework for the Conclusion of a Peace Treaty between Egypt and Israel*, led directly to the 1979 Israel-Egypt Peace Treaty, and resulted in Sadat and Begin sharing the 1978 Nobel Peace Prize. (Wikipedia-Camp David). One can easily find from the above accord that several wars between Egypt and Israel could not resolve their conflict. But, when they changed their perception about each other and sat together for sorting out their differences they could easily come to a resolution of conflict (Camp David 2010)

Israel-Jordan Treaty of Peace: The Israel-Jordan Treaty of Peace was signed in 1994, which normalized relations between Israel and Jordan and resolved territorial disputes between them. The conflict between them had cost roughly 18.3 billion dollars. Its signing is also closely linked with the efforts to create peace between Israel and the Palestine Liberation Organization representing the Palestinian authority. It was signed at the southern border crossing of Arabah on October 26, 1994, and made Jordan only the second Arab country, after Egypt, to normalize relations with Israel (Wikipedia-Israel-Jordan Treaty of Peace).

From this accord also one can conclude that battles between Jordan and Israel could not resolve their conflict. However, when they changed their perception about each other and chose the non-violent way for sorting out their differences they were able to resolve their conflict (Israel-Jordan 2010).

Oslo Accords: The Oslo Accords, officially called the Declaration of Principles on Interim Self-Government Arrangements or Declaration of Principles (DOP) was a milestone in the ongoing Palestinian-Israeli conflict, one of the major continuing issues within the wider Arab-Israeli conflict. It was the first direct, face-to-face agreement between the government of Israel and the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO). It was intended to be the one framework for future negotiations and relations between the Israeli government and Palestinians, within which all outstanding "final status issues" between the two sides would be addressed and resolved (Oslo 2010).

In order to understand the importance of reconciliation for resolving conflict in a non-violent way it is essential to briefly analyze Islam in light of the Quran. For instance, Allah says, "Oh mankind! We created you from a single (pair) of a male and a female, and made you into nations and tribes, that you may know each other (not that you may despise each other). Verily the most honored of you in the sight of Allah is (he who is) the most righteous of you. In addition, Allah has full knowledge and is well acquainted (with all things)"(Q 49:13). Again the Quran says, "Say, 'People of the Book, let us arrive at a statement that is common to us all: we worship God alone, we ascribe no partner to Him, and none of us takes others beside God as lords.' If they turn away, say, 'Witness our devotion to Him'"(Q 3: 64). After receiving guidance from God, Prophet Muhammad (S M) voiced the same message, "Oh Mankind! Your Lord is One. Your (grand) father is one. All of you belong to Adam (peace and blessings of Allah be upon him). Adam is created of soil (earth dirt). Truly, the most honorable person in the Sight of Your Lord, the Almighty Allah, is the most pious among you. There is no superiority for an Arab over a non-Arab. There is no superiority for a non-

Arab over an Arab. There is no superiority for a red (race) person over a white person. Likewise, there is no superiority of a white over a red (race) person except for the level of piety (mindfulness of God, the Almighty Allah in life and practices)’’

(Ahmad, Hadith No.411).

Table 6.8: Resolving Conflicts Between West and Islam by Reconciliatory Approach.

Do you think conflicts between west and Islam can be resolved by reconciliatory approach?	Gulshan Area N=30	Dhanmo -ndi Area N=30	Uttara Area N=30	Rampura Area N=30	Dhaka Universit -y Area N=30	Lalbagh Area N=30	Total N=180
Yes	23(76.67%)	24(80%)	23(76.67%)	21(70%)	26(86.67%)	18(60%)	135(75%)
No	05(16.67%)	04(13.33%)	07(23.33%)	09(30%)	04(13.33%)	09(30%)	38(21.11%)
No Response	02(6.67%)	02(6.67%)	0	0	0	03(10%)	07(3.89%)
Total	30(100%)	30(100%)	30(100%)	30(100%)	30(100%)	30(100%)	180(100%)

Table 6.8 reveals that a high percentage (75% or 135 of 180) of the respondents of the Dhaka city believe that conflict between Muslim and non-Muslims can be resolved by reconciliation method, while a very low percentage (21.11 % or 38 of 180) of the respondents think that conflict between Muslim and non-Muslims can not be resolved by reconciliation method. Data also reveal that the highest percentage (86.67 % or 26 of 30) of the respondents who believe that conflict between Muslim and non-Muslims can be resolved by reconciliation method are from Dhaka University area. Majority of the respondents (80% or 24 of 30) of Dhanmondi area perceive that conflict between Muslim and non-Muslims can be resolved by reconciliation method. However, the lowest percentages (60% or 18 of 30) of the respondents who believe that conflict between Muslim and non-Muslims can be resolved by reconciliation method are from Lalbagh area. Despite the differences in the perception of the respondents from different areas of Dhaka city about the ways of conflict resolution, the majority of the respondents from all the areas of Dhaka city believe that conflict between

Muslim and non-Muslims can be resolved by reconciliation method which is supportive of hypothesis 3 that by changing the wrong perception of the West many of the prevailing global conflicts can be resolved..

6.3.2 Conflict Resolution by Changing the Wrong Western Perception Through True Religion and Faith- Based Diplomacy.

From the literature analysis it is found, if people's perception is changed then they are likely to rely on religion for conflict resolution. And when we speak of the role of faith in cross-cultural conflict resolution, our challenge is to honor the diversity of the world's humanistic and spiritual traditions while seeking common ground among them. What we aspire towards, in other words, is an agenda for research, dialogue and activism that is global in conception and responsive to common challenges of peacemaking and coexistence within and among the world's many traditions. It is no longer sufficient for transnational peace agendas to be defined primarily by the cultural experiences and perceived security threats of a particular nation or culture. We need new frameworks for organizing knowledge about religion, culture and spirituality – frameworks that recognize the powerful role that faith and belief play in conflict and conflict resolution, and that do not privilege one culture as 'normal' and label another as 'exceptional'. The rising prominence of protracted ethnic and religious conflicts, however, has convinced many scholars that the cultural and religious aspects of conflict and its resolution must be taken seriously. An emerging literature on religion, conflict resolution and peace has contributed significantly to this development (Said & Funk 2001).

One of the most important findings of cross-cultural conflict resolution research is that religion is a perennial and perhaps inevitable factor in both conflict and conflict resolution. Religion, after all, is a powerful constituent of cultural norms and values, and because it addresses the most profound existential issues of human life (e.g., freedom and

inevitability, fear and faith, security and insecurity, right and wrong, sacred and profane), religion is deeply implicated in individual and social conceptions of peace. To transform the conflicts besetting the world today, we need to uncover the conceptions of peace within our diverse religious and cultural traditions, while seeking the common ground among them (Hossain 2009).

The analysis of literature also reveals that from an Islamic point of view, the achievements of the dominant Western approach to peace are impressive, but also one-sided. From a Muslim perspective, the Western approach puts too much faith in institutional formulas and the “invisible hand” of competition, and too little emphasis on communal cooperation in the conscious pursuit of values. Where the Western approach celebrates human self-determination, the Islamic perspective underscores divine purpose and human exertion. While the Western approach points to political pluralism, individual rights and consumerism as the substance of peace, the Islamic perspective affirms cultural pluralism, communal solidarity, social justice and faith (Said & Funk 2001).

The literature discloses that Muslim approaches to conflict resolution draw on religious values, social networks, rituals of reconciliation and historical practices of communal and inter-communal coexistence. Strong emphasis is placed on linkages between personal and group identity, between individual and collective responsibility for wrongdoings, and between attentiveness to ‘face’-related issues (public status, shame, reputation for generosity) and the achievement of restorative justice within a context of continuing relationship. Conflict resolution efforts are directed toward the maintenance of communal or intercommunal harmony. They favor recognition of mutual rights and obligations, and uphold shared values by calling for public apology, compensation for losses and forgiveness. Conflict resolution mechanisms are legitimized and guaranteed by communal leaders and (traditionally) elders who facilitate a process of reconciliation. History is regarded as a source of stability and guidance that provides lessons for shaping a common

future for the society. Efforts aim to protect and empower families and the community as a whole to participate in a resolution process (Hossain 2009).

Analysis suggests that Islamic traditions provide a set of powerful political precepts and practices with universal implications, Islam can make important contributions to an integrated world order that affirms the unique value of all cultural traditions. In particular, Islam prescribes a strong sense of community and solidarity of people: it postulates a collaborative concept of freedom; and it demystifies the Western myth of triumphant material progress and development. Moreover, Islamic precepts offer strongly affirmative statements on the subject of cultural pluralism. In the Western pluralistic tradition, diversity is seen in terms of the coexistence of political systems and ideas but not of cultures. Cultural pluralism has roots in an Islamic tradition of ethnic diversity that historically fostered a tendency toward cultural broadness and flexibility. This heritage has allowed autonomous non-Muslim cultures to flourish within Islam to this day, while the West succumbed to the destruction of native cultures and to sporadic, but virulent, anti-Semitism (Mazrui 1997). While Muslim practice has often fallen short of Muslim principles and the advent of the nation-state has created new tensions between national and sub-national identities, the religion of Islam is remarkable for its explicit precepts favoring cultural and religious pluralism, as Quran says, "To you be your Way, and to me mine" (Q109:6).

It has been also revealed that faith-based diplomacy is an important tool for conflict resolution. With the change of perception, faith-based diplomacy can be utilized for resolving conflicts. In this respect, different religious organizations can play an important role in resolving inter-religious or inter-cultural conflicts. Because religious organizations have the capacity to mobilize people and to cultivate attitudes of forgiveness, conciliation. They can do a great deal to prevent dehumanization. They have the capacity to motivate and mobilize people for a more peaceful world (Cox & Philpot 2008).

More than two-thirds of the world population belong to a religion. In 2001, 33% of the religious constituency was Christian; 21% Muslim; 14% Hindu; 5.7% Buddhist/Shintoist; 0.7% Confucianism/Taoist. Together, all those religious organizations have a huge infrastructure with a communication network reaching to all corners of the world. They have a great responsibility and leadership is expected from them (Peace build 2008).

One may find many records and data of faith-based conflict resolution from the history. For easy understanding two such records are mentioned here. In Nigeria, the reverend James Wuye and Imam Mohammed Ashafa of the Interfaith Mediation Center. Remarkably, roughly simultaneous epiphanies transformed the pastor and imam from religious warriors to religious peacemakers. They had been engaged in the violent struggle between Christians and Muslims in Kaduna, Nigeria before they committed their lives to turning religious conflict into peace and reconciliation. Joint activities between the United States Institute of Peace and the Interfaith Mediation Center have included training for young Nigerian religious leaders in peacemaking techniques; sponsoring a religious summit for top Muslim and Christian leaders in Nigeria to combat violence during Nigeria's 2007 elections; and efforts to establish a strong interfaith council in Nigeria that includes Christian and Muslim leaders. Their work brought peace mediations to two different parts of Plateau State, where thousands have died in fighting between Christians and Muslims. In Yelwa-Nshar, where over 1,000 villagers were slaughtered in May 2004, the pastor, imam, successfully mediated a peace agreement that ended violence and resulted in a compact to promote reconciliation and the resolution of contentious issues between Christians and Muslims (Smock 2008).

Quran revealed the unique way of conflict resolution before 1400 years, For all the Children of Abraham, the pursuit of peace and justice is paramount. As the Quran says, "*God loves the just*" (Q 5:42). Again it mentioned, "*If they incline unto peace, then incline unto it*" (Q 8:61). Let us find a way to unite our peoples in the pursuit of justice and the peace to which true justice gives rise. Almighty says to Prophet in the Quran, "Only through the

Divine Mercy have you (Muhammad) been able to deal with your followers so gently. If you had been stern and heard-hearted they would all have deserted you a long time ago. Forgive them and ask Allah to forgive (their sins) and consult with them in certain matters. But when you reach a decision trust Allah. Allah loves those who trust Him” (Q 3:159). Regarding conflict resolution by true religion God says in Quran, “Good and evil cannot be equal. [Prophet], repel evil with what is better and your enemy will become as close as an old and valued friend” (Q 41:34). The Quranic verses in fact reveal that Islam advocates for conflict resolution by true religion and faith based diplomacy.

Table 6.9: Public Perception Toward Conflict Resolution by True Religion and Faith-based Diplomacy.

Do you think conflicts between west and Islam can be resolved by true religion and faith based diplomacy?	Gulshan Area N=30	Dhanmo -ndi Area N=30	Uttara Area N=30	Rampura Area N=30	Dhaka Universit -y Area N=30	Lalbagh Area N=30	Total N=180
Yes	19(63.33%)	20(66.67%)	21(70%)	22(73.33%)	18(60%)	26(86.67%)	126(70%)
No	07(23.33%)	07(23.33%)	09(30%)	08(26.67%)	09(30%)	04(13.33%)	44(24.44%)
No Response	04(13.33%)	03(10%)	0	0	03(10%)	0	10(5.56%)
Total	30(100%)	30(100%)	30(100%)	30(100%)	30(100%)	30(100%)	180(100%)

Table 6.9 demonstrates that a high percentage (70% or 126 of 180) of the respondents of the Dhaka city believe that conflict can be resolved by true religion and faith-based diplomacy, while a very low percentage (24.44 % or 44 of 180) of the respondents think that, conflict can not be resolved by true religion and faith-based diplomacy. Data also reveal that the highest percentage (86.67 % or 26 of 30) of the respondents who believe that conflict can be resolved by true religion and faith-based diplomacy are from Lalbagh area. Majority of the respondents (73.33 % or 23 of 30) of Rampura area perceive that conflict can be resolved by

true religion and faith-based diplomacy. However, the lowest percentages (60% or 18 of 30) of the respondents who believe that conflict can be resolved by true religion and faith-based diplomacy are from Dhaka University area. Despite the differences in the perception of the respondents from different areas of Dhaka city about the ways of conflict resolution, the majority of the respondents from all the areas of Dhaka city believe that conflict can be resolved by true religion and faith-based diplomacy which is supportive of hypothesis 3 that by changing the wrong perception of the West many of the prevailing global conflicts can be resolved..

6.3.3 Conflict Resolution by Changing the Wrong Western Perception Through Cultural Pluralism and Balanced Foreign Policy

It is believed that with the change of perception, the western and Islamic societies might accept cultural pluralism, which in turn might solve many of the prevailing conflicts. Study reveals that in recent centuries, societies based on the principles of political pluralism and tolerance has enabled us to live with diversity without creating unacceptable risks for social cohesion. Samuel P. Huntington (1993) believes in pure modernization and cultural pluralism which can help resolve the clash of civilizations. In this age of globalization, pluralism, tolerance and broadmindedness are more important than ever. The European Court of Human Rights has recognized that pluralism is built on “the genuine recognition of, and respect for, diversity and the dynamics of cultural traditions, ethnic and cultural identities, religious beliefs, artistic, literary and socio-economic ideas and concepts”, and that “the harmonious interaction of persons and groups with varied identities is essential for achieving social cohesion”. However, pluralism, tolerance and broadmindedness may not be sufficient: a proactive, a structured and widely shared effort in managing cultural diversity is needed. Intercultural dialogue is a major tool to achieve this aim, without which it will be difficult to safeguard the freedom and well-being of everyone living in a country (Said & Funk 2001).

It is essential to mention that nothing has proved harder in civilization than seeing God or good or dignity in those unlike ourselves. There are surely many ways of arriving at that generosity of spirit, and each faith may need to find its own way. But truth at the heart of monotheism is that God is greater than religion, that he is only partially comprehended by any one faith. He is my God, but he is also your God. That is not to say that there are many gods: that is polytheism. And it is not to say that God endorses every act done in his name: a God of yours and mine must be a God of justice standing above both of us, teaching us to make space for one another, to hear one another's claims, and to resolve them equitably. Only such a God would be truly transcendent. Only such a God could teach mankind to make peace other than by conquest or conversion and as something nobler than practical necessity (Sacks 2003).

Analysis reveals that with the change of perception of West or a country the relevant foreign policy is bound to change. Once a balanced foreign policy is in place, then many of the conflicts will automatically be resolved.

Anti-Americanism is driven not only by the blind hatred of terrorists but also by a broader-based anger and frustration with American foreign policy among many in Arab and Muslim societies: government officials, diplomats, the military, businessmen, professionals, intellectuals, and journalists. Many admire the fundamental principles and values (political participation, human rights, accountability, basic freedoms of speech, thought, the press) of the West. But they also believe that a double standard exists; these American principles and values are applied selectively or not at all when it comes to the Muslim world (Esposito 2002).

America's long record of relatively uncritical support of Israel--expressed in its levels of military and economic aid to Israel, its voting record in the United Nations, official statements by American administrations and government officials, and votes by Congress (often opposed by administrations in the past) to move the American embassy from Tel Aviv

to Jerusalem in direct contravention of long-standing UN resolutions--are seen by many in the Muslim world as proof of American hypocrisy. Other critical foreign policy issues include the impact of sanctions on more than a half million innocent Iraqi children (with little direct effect on Saddam Hussein) and sanctions against Pakistan but failure to hold India and Israel to similar standards for their nuclear programs. The moral will so evident in Kosovo is seen as totally absent in US policy in the Chechnya and Kashmiri conflicts (Esposito 2002).

American, as well as European responses must remain proportionate, from military strikes and foreign policy to domestic security measures and anti-terrorism legislation. A re-examination and, where necessary, reformulation of U.S. foreign policy will be necessary to effectively limit and contain global terrorism. Short-term policies that are necessitated by national interest and security must be balanced by long term policies and incentives that pressure our allies in the Muslim world to promote a gradual and progressive process of broader political participation, power sharing, and human rights. Failure to do so will simply perpetuate the culture and values of authoritarianism, secular as well as religious, and feed anti-Americanism. If foreign policy issues are addressed effectively, they will help to reduce the breeding ground for hatred and radicalism, the rise of extremist movements, and recruits for the Bin Ladens of the world.

History witnessed many conflict resolutions out of cultural pluralism. To help this analysis, one such record is mentioned here. Canada had been suffering from cultural conflict with its French speaking Quebec province for a long time. With a view to solving this problem, in June 23 1987, Quebec province of Canada ratified an agreement with rest of Canada which is commonly known as Meech lake agreement. The distinct society clause incorporated into the Meech lake accord called for constitutional recognition of Quebec's distinctive character, in terms of both its culture and language. The clause stated that the constitution will be interpreted in a manner consistent with the recognition that Quebec "constitutes within Canada a distinct society." It went so far as to affirm the role of the

Quebec government and legislature in preserving and promoting Quebec's distinct identity. This specific clause further recognized Canada's bilingual, bicultural heritage, stating: "the existence of French-speaking Canadians, centred in Quebec but also present elsewhere, and English-speaking Canadians, concentrated outside Quebec but also present in Quebec, constitutes a fundamental characteristic of Canadian society." To this end, this tenet of the agreement affirmed the role of Parliament, and the provincial legislatures, in preserving this fundamental characteristic.

Holy book Quran is said to be revealed as complete code of personal, social, economic and political life. Hence, Quran also prescribes for cultural pluralism for peace and co-existence on earth. It says, "Let there be no compulsion in religion: Truth stands out clear from error" (Q 2:256). God commands prophet in the Quran to say to people of the book, "And I follow the religion of my fathers, Ibrahim and Ishaq and Yaqoub; it beseems us not that we should associate aught with Allah; this is by Allah's grace upon us and on mankind, but most people do not give thanks" (Q12:38). The Almighty Allah states in the glorious Qur'an Sura Hujurat: "Oh mankind! We created you from a single (pair) of a male and a female, and made you into nations and tribes, that you may know each other (not that you may despise each other). Verily the most honored of you in the Sight of Allah is (he who is) the most righteous of you. In addition, Allah has full knowledge and is well acquainted (with all things)" (Q 49:13).

Table 6.10 indicates that a high percentage (73.89 % or 133 of 180) of the respondents of the Dhaka city believe that conflicts can be resolved by cultural pluralism and balanced foreign policy, while a very low percentage (22.22% or 40 of 180) of the respondents think that conflicts can not be resolved by cultural pluralism and balanced foreign policy.

Table 6.10: Conflict Resolution by Cultural Pluralism and Balanced Foreign Policy

Do you think conflicts between west and Islam can be resolved by cultural pluralism and balanced foreign policy?	Gulshan Area N=30	Dhanmo-ndi Area N=30	Uttara Area N=30	Rampura Area N=30	Dhaka University Area N=30	Lalbagh Area N=30	Total N=180
Yes	26(86.67%)	22(73.33%)	24(80%)	20(66.67%)	23(76.67%)	18(60%)	133(73.89%)
No	04(13.33%)	08(26.67%)	05(16.67%)	08(26.67%)	07(23.33%)	08(26.67%)	40(22.22%)
No Response	0	0	01(3.33%)	02(6.67%)	0	04(13.33%)	07(3.89%)
Total	30(100%)	30(100%)	30(100%)	30(100%)	30(100%)	30(100%)	180(100%)

Data also reveal that the highest percentage (86.67 % or 26 of 30) of the respondents who believe that conflicts can be resolved by cultural pluralism and balanced foreign policy are from Gulshan area. Majority of the respondents(80 % or 24 of 30) of Uttara area perceive that conflicts can be resolved by cultural pluralism and balanced foreign policy. However, the lowest percentages(60% or 18 of 30) of the respondents who believe that conflicts can be resolved by cultural pluralism and balanced foreign policy are from Lalbagh area. Despite the differences in the perception of the respondents from different areas of Dhaka city about the ways of conflict resolution, the majority of the respondents from all the areas of Dhaka city believe that conflicts can be resolved by cultural pluralism and balanced foreign policy which is supportive of hypothesis3 that by changing the wrong perception of the West many of the prevailing global conflicts can be resolved.

Chapter 7

Conclusion

7.1 Summery of Findings

From the analysis of data it is found that there is wrong perception of the West about Islam. The study reveals that this wrong perception is developed in the West by a long term media and literary biasness against Muslims and Islam. From the findings of public survey of Dhaka city it was found that majority of respondents opined that there is wrong western perception about Islam which is supportive of hypothesis 1. From the various verses of holy Quran as cited in the analysis section, it is also evident that the Western misperception about Islam is Wrong and not true. It is found from these Quranic verses that Islam supports peace and non-violence, it (Islam) advocates for democracy, equality, human rights, liberty and justice.

The survey data suggest that the negative perceptions of Muslim-West relations are most prevalent in the United States, Israel and the Muslim Middle East, reflecting the acute conflicts currently raging in Iraq and the Palestinian territories. Despite the fact that most people in these countries feel those on the “other side” have little concern for improving relations, majorities on both sides in fact are very interested in better relations and see greater interaction as a benefit rather than a threat.

Taking the literature, secondary and primary survey into consideration various non-violent approaches to change the western perception are being analyzed. Among them, inter-faith dialogue, media, education and togetherness and mutual respect are worthy to note, In addition, training of foreign service officers, teachers, clergymen and journalists, refraining from portraying terrorism with any religion, Overcoming monolithic structure of the West and Islam, Obama’s “ mutual interest and mutual respect “ policy, to refrain from using religion for political gain, Muslim immigrant initiatives, exercising responsible leadership,

political pluralism, commitment for multilateral global politics, etc are also important tools for resolving conflicts between the West and the Muslims in a non-violent way. From the public opinion of greater Dhaka city, it appears that the majority of respondents were in favour of inter-faith, inter-culture dialogue for removing the wrong perception of West. The Quran also is very supportive for interaction and dialogue in resolving the differences. From the analysis it is seen, many verses of Quran advocates for dialogue among people of the book or faith. The analysis concluded that to change this wrong perception a non-violent approach of interaction, dialogue, diplomacy and reconciliation should be followed between West and Islam in respect of religions, cultures and civilizations, which ultimately testifies hypothesis 2.

Lastly, how changing perception can resolve conflict is also being analyzed. Among them going back to true religion for conflict resolution, cultural pluralism, dignity of difference, reconciliation method, faith based diplomacy, making peace with Islam, developing form of democracy compatible with Islam, balanced foreign policy, re-framing 'War on Terrorism' and a unified Islamic world are mentionable options for conflict resolutions. The holy book of Islam, the Quran also advocates for reconciliation, faith-based diplomacy in resolving conflicts. It is evident from the various verses of Quran cited in the analysis section that Islam promotes non-violence and peaceful conflict resolution.. People of Dhaka city also opined in favour of reconciliation, cultural pluralism and faith-based diplomacy which are also important tools that provide insights into changing the Western wrong perception toward Islam in resolving conflicts. which in turn testifies the hypothesis 3.

The international public survey data suggest that most respondents, Muslim and non-Muslim alike do not accept the idea of an inevitable clash between the civilizations. Majorities in all countries believe that violent conflict can be avoided. In case of public survey in greater Dhaka city, most of the people around Dhaka city believe that conflict between Muslim and non-Muslims can be resolved in a non- violent way.

So far effort has been taken to go back in the history to dig out the root cause of wrong perception. At the same time a true picture of Islam is presented to remove those age old wrong perception out of Islam. Then a non-violant way forward is being visioned, which is likely to add new dimension in guiding the western society towards the correct perception about Islam and Islamic world, which ultimately is likely to help in resolving many of the existing conflicts the world is facing today.

7.2 Recommendations

After the literature review, after the secondary, primary data analysis and hypothesis testing few specific findings are summarized in the summery of findings section. From these findings some specific recommendations are prepared with the aim of removing the wrong perception, with the intention of persuing a non-violent approach to changing the wrong perception. Lastly to resolve conflicts by changing the very perception. These set of recommendations are presented to global movers and shakers for their ultimate understanding for the greater interest of global peace. These recommendations are----

1. Inter faith/inter culture/inter civilization dialogue should be encouraged to reduce the gap and to change the wrong perception about each other. The first step should be dialogue among faiths, cultures and civilizations. There is no alternative to dialogue.
2. Media plays an important role in creating wrong perception or to change it. Hence, this important tool should be utilized to the fullest to change this misperception and to project true picture about Islam.
3. Education is the foundation of all perception. So it should be reformed in order to ensure, it does not produce hatred and enmity, rather it teaches co-existence,mutual respect,non-violence and positive peace.

4. Training of various professional groups play important role in either creating or changing the wrong perception. Hence, the training curriculum should be reformed to get the new non-violent dimension.
5. In a globalize world, universalism will only bring danger, conflict and confrontation. So there must be cultural pluralism and mutual respect for various cultures. UNESCO should play more active role to convince the world players about the danger of universalism and domination of one culture over other.
6. Unilaterism does not have a place in to-days inter-depended world. It can only bring anarchy and confrontation. Hence in dealing with a conflict, multilaterism is the ultimate solution. UN should play more active role to inculcate this idea into the mind set of world players.
7. Death is the ultimate truth, no one on earth could deny it ever. With this absolute truth, religion comes automatically as another truth and a truth can't be suppressed, it is bound to surface. So a conflict may not be resolved permanently by passing this truth, that is, the religion. Here is the requirement of faith based diplomacy. World players, negotiators and mediators should take note of it while dealing with a conflict in order to get the lasting solution of a conflict.
8. Wrong foreign policy creates wrong perception and conflicts. Hence this foreign policy should be a balanced one basing on both one's own interest and other's perception.
9. Islam does not approve terrorism. Islam does not approve killing of innocent people. By terrorism in the name of Islam, in fact they are harming Islam. Because, across the globe anti-Islamic perception is developing by their acts. Hence, to change the western perception and to resolve prevailing conflicts they should follow the non-violent path for the greater interest of Islam.

10. This unconventional war on terrorism should be a blend non-Military and Military factors. Where non-Military factors like balanced foreign policy should dominate.

11. This Muslim immigrants can play very important role by projecting themselves and projecting Islam in a positive way to the non-Muslims who sometimes are misguided by biased media or orientalism. Hence there should be active Muslim immigrant initiative in this regard.

12. There should be a strong and unified Islamic world as it will best serve the west and will resolve many of the west-Islamic conflicts as an unified Europe is serving best to rest of the world. Before unified Europe, there was lot of conflicts within and with out side Europe. But now Europe has a strong forum to talk it out their difference, also out side world can easily resolve conflicts with negotiation with single European entity, earlier Europe meant many voices, so negotiation and resolving was very difficult

7.3 Implication

The implication of studying the non-violent approach is far reaching. Because successful implementation of this approach is likely to remove the wrong western perception regarding Islam. Once this wrong perception is erased, there is likely to be a balanced foreign policy. As a result, resolution of many prevailing West-Islamic conflicts. Hence, this non-violent approach can play a very important role in ensuring world peace. With the reduction of conflict, definitely there will be reduction of killing of innocent people, son, husband and father. There by it will ensure family peace and happiness besides world peace. To see a happy smile in the face of a mother, wife and children are as good as to see heaven in earth.

Once, the conflicts and wars are reduced, spending on military by the rich countries will be reduced. This saved money then can be diverted to eradicate world poverty, hunger, food crisis. It can be utilized for solving climate crisis. Also portion of this money could be

utilized for survival treatment of poor people. Lastly poor children of the world who remain illiterate due to poverty can be educated by this money. Hence we can see what enormous benefit and implication this non-violent approach can bring to this world.

Another far reaching implication is, once the tainted picture is removed from the face of Islam, the Muslim immigrants, tomorrows new born innocent Muslim baby can sail a smooth sail in their journey to future among Muslims and non-Muslims without any uncertainty or embarrassment.

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APPENDIX-1

The Cairo Declaration on Human Rights in Islam (Wikipedia 2010):

To avoid conflict with universal declaration of human Rights, and to present the case of Islamic version of human rights to the global community and to UN, the Organisation of Islamic Conference (OIC) formulated this Cairo Declaration of human rights in Islam in 1990. For better understanding, this declaration is appended below--

The Cairo Declaration on Human Rights in Islam

Adopted and Issued at the Nineteenth Islamic Conference
of Foreign Ministers in Cairo
on 5 August 1990.

The member states of the Organization of the Islamic Conference, reaffirming the civilizing and historical role of the Islamic Ummah which God made the best nation that has given mankind a universal and well-balanced civilization in which harmony is established between this life and the hereafter and knowledge is combined with faith; and the role that this Ummah should play to guide a humanity confused by competing trends and ideologies and to provide solutions to the chronic problems of this materialistic civilization.

Wishing to contribute to the efforts of mankind to assert human rights, to protect man from exploitation and persecution, and to affirm his freedom and right to a dignified life in accordance with the Islamic Shari'ah

Convinced that mankind which has reached an advanced stage in materialistic science is still, and shall remain, in dire need of faith to support its civilization and of a self-motivating force to guard its rights;

Believing that fundamental rights and universal freedoms in Islam are an integral part of the Islamic religion and that no one as a matter of principle has the right to suspend them in whole or in part or violate or ignore them in as much as they are binding divine commandments, which are contained in the Revealed Books of God and were sent through the last of His Prophets to complete the preceding divine messages thereby making their observance an act of worship and their neglect or violation an abominable sin, and accordingly every person is individually responsible — and the Ummah collectively responsible — for their safeguard.

Proceeding from the above-mentioned principles,

Declare the following:

Article 1

- (a) All human beings form one family whose members are united by submission to God and descent from Adam. All men are equal in terms of basic human dignity and basic obligations and responsibilities, without any discrimination on the grounds of race, colour, language, sex, religious belief, political affiliation, social status or other considerations. True faith is the guarantee for enhancing such dignity along the path to human perfection.
- (b) All human beings are God's subjects, and the most loved by him are those who are most useful to the rest of His subjects, and no one has superiority over another except on the basis of piety and good deeds.

Article 2

- (a) Life is a God-given gift and the right to life is guaranteed to every human being. It is the duty of individuals, societies and states to protect this right from any violation, and it is prohibited to take away life except for a Shari'ah-prescribed reason.
- (b) It is forbidden to resort to such means as may result in the genocidal annihilation of mankind.

- (c) The preservation of human life throughout the term of time willed by God is a duty prescribed by Shari'ah.
- (d) Safety from bodily harm is a guaranteed right. It is the duty of the state to safeguard it, and it is prohibited to breach it without a Shari'ah-prescribed reason.

Article 3

- (a) In the event of the use of force and in case of armed conflict, it is not permissible to kill non-belligerents such as old men, women and children. The wounded and the sick shall have the right to medical treatment; and prisoners of war shall have the right to be fed, sheltered and clothed. It is prohibited to mutilate dead bodies. It is a duty to exchange prisoners of war and to arrange visits or reunions of the families separated by the circumstances of war.
- (b) It is prohibited to fell trees, to damage crops or livestock, and to destroy the enemy's civilian buildings and installations by shelling, blasting or any other means.

Article 4

Every human being is entitled to inviolability and the protection of his good name and honour during his life and after his death. The state and society shall protect his remains and burial place.

Article 5

- (a) The family is the foundation of society, and marriage is the basis of its formation. Men and women have the right to marriage, and no restrictions stemming from race, colour or nationality shall prevent them from enjoying this right.
- (b) Society and the State shall remove all obstacles to marriage and shall facilitate marital procedure. They shall ensure family protection and welfare.

Article 6

(a) Woman is equal to man in human dignity, and has rights to enjoy as well as duties to perform; she has her own civil entity and financial independence, and the right to retain her name and lineage.

(b) The husband is responsible for the support and welfare of the family.

Article 7

(a) As of the moment of birth, every child has rights due from the parents, society and the state to be accorded proper nursing, education and material, hygienic and moral care. Both the fetus and the mother must be protected and accorded special care.

(b) Parents and those in such like capacity have the right to choose the type of education they desire for their children, provided they take into consideration the interest and future of the children in accordance with ethical values and the principles of the Shari'ah.

(c) Both parents are entitled to certain rights from their children, and relatives are entitled to rights from their kin, in accordance with the tenets of the Shari'ah.

Article 8

Every human being has the right to enjoy his legal capacity in terms of both obligation and commitment. Should this capacity be lost or impaired, he shall be represented by his guardian.

Article 9

(a) The quest for knowledge is an obligation, and the provision of education is a duty for society and the State. The State shall ensure the availability of ways and means to acquire education and shall guarantee educational diversity in the interest of society so as to enable man to be acquainted with the religion of Islam and the facts of the Universe for the benefit of mankind

(b) Every human being has the right to receive both religious and worldly education from the various institutions of education and guidance, including the family, the school, the university, the media. etc., and in such an integrated and balanced manner as to develop his personality, strengthen his faith in God and promote his respect for and defense of both rights and obligations.

Article10

Islam is the religion of unspoiled nature. It is prohibited to exercise any form of compulsion on man or to exploit his poverty or ignorance in order to convert him to another religion or to atheism.

Article11

(a) Human beings are born free, and no one has the right to enslave, humiliate, oppress or exploit them, and there can be no subjugation but to God the Most-High.

(b) Colonialism of all types being one of the most evil forms of enslavement is totally prohibited. Peoples suffering from colonialism have the full right to freedom and self-determination. It is the duty of all States and peoples to support the struggle of colonized peoples for the liquidation of all forms of colonialism and occupation, and all States and peoples have the right to preserve their independent identity and exercise control over their wealth and natural resources.

Article12

Every man shall have the right, within the framework of Shari'ah, to free movement and to select his place of residence whether inside or outside his country and, if persecuted, is entitled to seek asylum in another country. The country of refuge shall ensure his protection until he reaches safety, unless asylum is motivated by an act which Shari'ah regards as a crime.

Article 13

Work is a right guaranteed by the State and Society for each person able to work. Everyone shall be free to choose the work that suits him best and which serves his interests and those of society. The employee shall have the right to safety and security as well as to all other social guarantees. He may neither be assigned work beyond his capacity nor be subjected to compulsion or exploited or harmed in any way. He shall be entitled — without any discrimination between males and females — to fair wages for his work without delay, as well as to the holidays, allowances and promotions which he deserves. For his part, he shall be required to be dedicated and meticulous in his work. Should workers and employers disagree on any matter, the State shall intervene to settle the dispute and have the grievances redressed, the rights confirmed and justice enforced without bias.

Article 14

Everyone shall have the right to legitimate gains without monopolization, deceit or harm to oneself or to others. Usury (riba) is absolutely prohibited.

Article 15

(a) Everyone shall have the right to own property acquired in a legitimate way, and shall be entitled to the rights of ownership, without prejudice to oneself, others or to society in general. Expropriation is not permissible except for the requirements of public interest and upon payment of immediate and fair compensation.

(b) Confiscation and seizure of property is prohibited except for a necessity dictated by law.

Article 16

Everyone shall have the right to enjoy the fruits of his scientific, literary, artistic or technical

production and the right to protect the moral and material interests stemming there from, provided that such production is not contrary to the principles of Shari'ah.

Article17

(a) Everyone shall have the right to live in a clean environment, away from vice and moral corruption, an environment that would foster his self-development; and it is incumbent upon the State and society in general to afford that right.

(b) Everyone shall have the right to medical and social care, and to all public amenities provided by society and the State within the limits of their available resources.

(c) The State shall ensure the right of the individual to a decent living which will enable him to meet all his requirements and those of his dependents, including food, clothing, housing, education, medical care and all other basic needs.

Article18

(a) Everyone shall have the right to live in security for himself, his religion, his dependents, his honour and his property.

(b) Everyone shall have the right to privacy in the conduct of his private affairs, in his home, among his family, with regard to his property and his relationships. It is not permitted to spy on him, to place him under surveillance or to besmirch his good name. The State shall protect him from arbitrary interference.

(c) A private residence is inviolable in all cases. It will not be entered without permission from its inhabitants or in any unlawful manner, nor shall it be demolished or confiscated and its dwellers evicted.

Article19

(a) All individuals are equal before the law, without distinction between the ruler and the

ruled.

- (b) The right to resort to justice is guaranteed to everyone.
- (c) Liability is in essence personal.
- (d) There shall be no crime or punishment except as provided for in the Shari'ah.
- (e) A defendant is innocent until his guilt is proven in a fair trial in which he shall be given all the guarantees of defence.

Article 20

It is not permitted without legitimate reason to arrest an individual, or restrict his freedom, to exile or to punish him. It is not permitted to subject him to physical or psychological torture or to any form of humiliation, cruelty or indignity. Nor is it permitted to subject an individual to medical or scientific experimentation without his consent or at the risk of his health or of his life. Nor is it permitted to promulgate emergency laws that would provide executive authority for such actions.

Article 21

Taking hostages under any form or for any purpose is expressly forbidden.

Article 22

- (a) Everyone shall have the right to express his opinion freely in such manner as would not be contrary to the principles of the Shari'ah.
- (b) Everyone shall have the right to advocate what is right, and propagate what is good, and warn against what is wrong and evil according to the norms of Islamic Shari'ah.
- (c) Information is a vital necessity to society. It may not be exploited or misused in such a way as may violate sanctities and the dignity of Prophets, undermine moral and ethical values or disintegrate, corrupt or harm society or weaken its faith.

(d) It is not permitted to arouse nationalistic or doctrinal hatred or to do anything that may be an incitement to any form of racial discrimination.

Article 23

(a) Authority is a trust; and abuse or malicious exploitation thereof is absolutely prohibited, so that fundamental human rights may be guaranteed.

(b) Everyone shall have the right to participate, directly or indirectly in the administration of his country's public affairs. He shall also have the right to assume public office in accordance with the provisions of Shari'ah.

Article 24

All the rights and freedoms stipulated in this Declaration are subject to the Islamic Shari'ah.

Article 25

The Islamic Shari'ah is the only source of reference for the explanation or clarification to any of the articles of this Declaration.

Appendix 2

Universal Islamic Declaration of Human Rights

21 Dhul Qaidah 1401 19 September 1981

*This is a declaration for mankind, a guidance and instruction to those who fear God
(Al Qur'an, Al-Imran 3:138)*

Foreword

Islam gave to mankind an ideal code of human rights fourteen centuries ago. These rights aim at conferring honour and dignity on mankind and eliminating exploitation, oppression and injustice.

Human rights in Islam are firmly rooted in the belief that God, and God alone, is the Law Giver and the Source of all human rights. Due to their Divine origin, no ruler, government, assembly or authority can curtail or violate in any way the human rights conferred by God, nor can they be surrendered.

Human rights in Islam are an integral part of the overall Islamic order and it is obligatory on all Muslim governments and organs of society to implement them in letter and in spirit within the framework of that order.

It is unfortunate that human rights are being trampled upon with impunity in many countries of the world, including some Muslim countries. Such violations are a matter of serious concern and are arousing the conscience of more and more people throughout the world.

I sincerely hope that this *Declaration of Human Rights* will give a powerful impetus to the Muslim peoples to stand firm and defend resolutely and courageously the rights conferred on them by God.

This *Declaration of Human Rights* is the second fundamental document proclaimed by the Islamic Council to mark the beginning of the 15th Century of the Islamic era, the first being the

Universal Islamic Declaration announced at the International Conference on The Prophet Muhammad (peace and blessings be upon him) and his Message, held in London from 12 to 15 April 1980.

The *Universal Islamic Declaration of Human Rights* is based on the Qur'an and the Sunnah and has been compiled by eminent Muslim scholars, jurists and representatives of Islamic movements and thought. May God reward them all for their efforts and guide us along the right path.

Paris 21 Dhul Qaidah 1401 Salem Azzam

19th September 1981 *Secretary General*

O men! Behold, We have created you all out of a male and a female, and have made you into nations and tribes, so that you might come to know one another. Verily, the noblest of you in the sight of God is the one who is most deeply conscious of Him. Behold, God is all-knowing, all aware.

(Al Qur'an, Al-Hujurat 49:13)

Preamble

WHEREAS the age-old human aspiration for a just world order wherein people could live, develop and prosper in an environment free from fear, oppression, exploitation and deprivation, remains largely unfulfilled;

WHEREAS the Divine Mercy unto mankind reflected in its having been endowed with super-abundant economic sustenance is being wasted, or unfairly or unjustly withheld from the inhabitants of the earth;

WHEREAS Allah (God) has given mankind through His revelations in the Holy Qur'an and the Sunnah of His Blessed Prophet Muhammad an abiding legal and moral framework within which to establish and regulate human institutions and relationships;

WHEREAS the human rights decreed by the Divine Law aim at conferring dignity and honour on mankind and are designed to eliminate oppression and injustice;

WHEREAS by virtue of their Divine source and sanction these rights can neither be curtailed, abrogated or disregarded by authorities, assemblies or other institutions, nor can they be surrendered or alienated;

Therefore we, as Muslims, who believe

- a) in God, the Beneficent and Merciful, the Creator, the Sustainer, the Sovereign, the sole Guide of mankind and the Source of all Law;
- b) in the Vicegerency (Khilafah) of man who has been created to fulfill the Will of God on earth;
- c) in the wisdom of Divine guidance brought by the Prophets, whose mission found its culmination in the final Divine message that was conveyed by the Prophet Muhammad (Peace be upon him) to all mankind;
- d) that rationality by itself without the light of revelation from God can neither be a sure guide in the affairs of mankind nor provide spiritual nourishment to the human soul, and, knowing that the teachings of Islam represent the quintessence of Divine guidance in its final and perfect form, feel duty-bound to remind man of the high status and dignity bestowed on him by God;
- e) in inviting all mankind to the message of Islam;

f) that by the terms of our primeval covenant with God our duties and obligations have priority over our rights, and that each one of us is under a bounden duty to spread the teachings of Islam by word, deed, and indeed in all gentle ways, and to make them effective not only in our individual lives but also in the society around us;

g) in our obligation to establish an Islamic order:

i) wherein all human beings shall be equal and none shall enjoy a privilege or suffer a disadvantage or discrimination by reason of race, colour, sex, origin or language;

ii) wherein all human beings are born free;

iii) wherein slavery and forced labour are abhorred;

iv) wherein conditions shall be established such that the institution of family shall be preserved, protected and honoured as the basis of all social life;

v) wherein the rulers and the ruled alike are subject to, and equal before, the Law;

vi) wherein obedience shall be rendered only to those commands that are in consonance with the Law;

vii) wherein all worldly power shall be considered as a sacred trust, to be exercised within the limits prescribed by the Law and in a manner approved by it, and with due regard for the priorities fixed by it;

viii) wherein all economic resources shall be treated as Divine blessings bestowed upon mankind, to be enjoyed by all in accordance with the rules and the values set out in the Qur'an and the Sunnah;

ix) wherein all public affairs shall be determined and conducted, and the authority to administer them shall be exercised after mutual consultation (*Shura*) between the believers qualified to contribute to a decision which would accord well with the Law and the public good;

x) wherein everyone shall undertake obligations proportionate to his capacity and shall be held responsible pro rata for his deeds;

xi) wherein everyone shall, in case of an infringement of his rights, be assured of appropriate remedial measures in accordance with the Law;

xii) wherein no one shall be deprived of the rights assured to him by the Law except by its authority and to the extent permitted by it;

xiii) wherein every individual shall have the right to bring legal action against anyone who commits a crime against society as a whole or against any of its members;

xiv) wherein every effort shall be made to

(a) secure unto mankind deliverance from every type of exploitation, injustice and oppression,

(b) ensure to everyone security, dignity and liberty in terms set out and by methods approved and within the limits set by the Law;

Do hereby, as servants of Allah and as members of the Universal Brotherhood of Islam, at the beginning of the Fifteenth Century of the Islamic Era, affirm our commitment to uphold the following inviolable and inalienable human rights that we consider are enjoined by Islam.

Right to Life

a) Human life is sacred and inviolable and every effort shall be made to protect it. In particular no one shall be exposed to injury or death, except under the authority of the Law.

b) Just as in life, so also after death, the sanctity of a person's body shall be inviolable. It is the obligation of believers to see that a deceased person's body is handled with due solemnity.

II Right to Freedom

a) Man is born free. No inroads shall be made on his right to liberty except under the authority and in due process of the Law.

b) Every individual and every people has the inalienable right to freedom in all its forms physical, cultural, economic and political — and shall be entitled to struggle by all available means against any infringement or abrogation of this right; and every oppressed individual or people has a legitimate claim to the support of other individuals and/or peoples in such a struggle.

III Right to Equality and Prohibition Against Impermissible Discrimination

a) All persons are equal before the Law and are entitled to equal opportunities and protection of the Law.

b) All persons shall be entitled to equal wage for equal work.

c) No person shall be denied the opportunity to work or be discriminated against in any manner or exposed to greater physical risk by reason of religious belief, colour, race, origin, sex or language.

IV Right to Justice

- a) Every person has the right to be treated in accordance with the Law, and only in accordance with the Law.
- b) Every person has not only the right but also the obligation to protest against injustice; to recourse to remedies provided by the Law in respect of any unwarranted personal injury or loss; to self-defence against any charges that are preferred against him and to obtain fair adjudication before an independent judicial tribunal in any dispute with public authorities or any other person.
- c) It is the right and duty of every person to defend the rights of any other person and the community in general (*Hisbah*).
- d) No person shall be discriminated against while seeking to defend private and public rights.
- e) It is the right and duty of every Muslim to refuse to obey any command which is contrary to the Law, no matter by whom it may be issued.

V Right to Fair Trial

- a) No person shall be adjudged guilty of an offence and made liable to punishment except after proof of his guilt before an independent judicial tribunal.
- b) No person shall be adjudged guilty except after a fair trial and after reasonable opportunity for defence has been provided to him.
- c) Punishment shall be awarded in accordance with the Law, in proportion to the seriousness of the offence and with due consideration of the circumstances under which it was committed.
- d) No act shall be considered a crime unless it is stipulated as such in the clear wording of the Law.

e) Every individual is responsible for his actions. Responsibility for a crime cannot be vicariously extended to other members of his family or group, who are not otherwise directly or indirectly involved in the commission of the crime in question.

VI Right to Protection Against Abuse of Power

Every person has the right to protection against harassment by official agencies. He is not liable to account for himself except for making a defence to the charges made against him or where he is found in a situation wherein a question regarding suspicion of his involvement in a crime could be *reasonably* raised

VII Right to Protection Against Torture

No person shall be subjected to torture in mind or body, or degraded, or threatened with injury either to himself or to anyone related to or held dear by him, or forcibly made to confess to the commission of a crime, or forced to consent to an act which is injurious to his interests.

VIII Right to Protection of Honour and Reputation

Every person has the right to protect his honour and reputation against calumnies, groundless charges or deliberate attempts at defamation and blackmail.

IX Right to Asylum

a) Every persecuted or oppressed person has the right to seek refuge and asylum. This right is guaranteed to every human being irrespective of race, religion, colour and sex.

b) Al Masjid Al Haram (the sacred house of Allah) in Mecca is a sanctuary for all Muslims.

X Rights of Minorities

a) The Qur'anic principle "There is no compulsion in religion" shall govern the religious rights of non-Muslim minorities.

b) In a Muslim country religious minorities shall have the choice to be governed in respect of their civil and personal matters by Islamic Law, or by their own laws.

XI Right and Obligation to Participate in the Conduct and Management of Public Affairs

- a) Subject to the Law, every individual in the community (*Ummah*) is entitled to assume public office.
- b) Process of free consultation (*Shura*) is the basis of the administrative relationship between the government and the people. People also have the right to choose and remove their rulers in accordance with this principle.

XII Right to Freedom of Belief, Thought and Speech

- a) Every person has the right to express his thoughts and beliefs so long as he remains within the limits prescribed by the Law. No one, however, is entitled to disseminate falsehood or to circulate reports which may outrage public decency, or to indulge in slander, innuendo or to cast defamatory aspersions on other persons.
- b) Pursuit of knowledge and search after truth is not only a right but a duty of every Muslim.
- c) It is the right and duty of every Muslim to protest and strive (within the limits set out by the Law) against oppression even if it involves challenging the highest authority in the state.
- d) There shall be no bar on the dissemination of information provided it does not endanger the security of the society or the state and is confined within the limits imposed by the Law.
- e) No one shall hold in contempt or ridicule the religious beliefs of others or incite public hostility against them; respect for the religious feelings of others is obligatory on all Muslims.

XIII Right to Freedom of Religion

Every person has the right to freedom of conscience and worship in accordance with his religious beliefs.

XIV Right to Free Association

a) Every person is entitled to participate individually and collectively in the religious, social, cultural and political life of his community and to establish institutions and agencies meant to enjoy what is right (*ma'roof*) and to prevent what is wrong (*munkar*).

b) Every person is entitled to strive for the establishment of institutions whereunder an enjoyment of these rights would be made possible. Collectively, the community is obliged to establish conditions so as to allow its members full development of their personalities.

XV The Economic Order and the Rights Evolving Therefrom

a) In their economic pursuits, all persons are entitled to the full benefits of nature and all its resources. These are blessings bestowed by God for the benefit of mankind as a whole.

b) All human beings are entitled to earn their living according to the Law.

c) Every person is entitled to own property individually or in association with others. State ownership of certain economic resources in the public interest is legitimate.

d) The poor have the right to a prescribed share in the wealth of the rich, as fixed by Zakah, levied and collected in accordance with the Law.

e) All means of production shall be utilised in the interest of the community (*Ummah*) as a whole, and may not be neglected or misused.

f) In order to promote the development of a balanced economy and to protect society from exploitation. Islamic Law forbids monopolies, unreasonable restrictive trade practices, usury, the use of coercion in the making of contracts and the publication of misleading advertisements.

g) All economic activities are permitted provided they are not detrimental to the interests of the community(*Ummah*) and do not violate Islamic laws and values.

XVI Right to Protection of Property

No property may be expropriated except in the public interest and on payment of fair and adequate compensation.

XVII Status and Dignity of Workers

Islam honours work and the worker and enjoins Muslims not only to treat the worker justly but also generously. He is not only to be paid his earned wages promptly, but is also entitled to adequate rest and leisure.

XVIII Right to Social Security

Every person has the right to food, shelter, clothing, education and medical care consistent with the resources of the community. This obligation of the community extends in particular to all individuals who cannot take care of themselves due to some temporary or permanent disability.

XIX Right to Found a Family and Related Matters

a) Every person is entitled to marry, to found a family and to bring up children in conformity with his religion, traditions and culture. Every spouse is entitled to such rights and privileges and carries such obligations as are stipulated by the Law.

- b) Each of the partners in a marriage is entitled to respect and consideration from the other.
- c) Every husband is obligated to maintain his wife and children according to his means.
- d) Every child has the right to be maintained and properly brought up by its parents, it being forbidden that children are made to work at an early age or that any burden is put on them which would arrest or harm their natural development.
- e) If parents are for some reason unable to discharge their obligations towards a child it becomes the responsibility of the community to fulfill these obligations at public expense.
- f) Every person is entitled to material support, as well as care and protection, from his family during his childhood, old age or incapacity. Parents are entitled to material support as well as care and protection from their children.
- g) Motherhood is entitled to special respect, care and assistance on the part of the family and the public organs of the community (*Ummah*).
- h) Within the family, men and women are to share in their obligations and responsibilities according to their sex, their natural endowments, talents and inclinations, bearing in mind their common responsibilities toward their progeny and their relatives.
- i) No person may be married against his or her will, or lose or suffer diminution of legal personality on account of marriage.

XX Rights of Married Women

Every married woman is entitled to:

- a) live in the house in which her husband lives;

- b) receive the means necessary for maintaining a standard of living which is not inferior to that of her spouse, and, in the event of divorce, receive during the statutory period of waiting (*iddah*) means of maintenance commensurate with her husband's resources, for herself as well as for the children she nurses or keeps, irrespective of her own financial status, earnings, or property that she may hold in her own rights;
- c) seek and obtain dissolution of marriage (*Khul'a*) in accordance with the terms of the Law. This right is in addition to her right to seek divorce through the courts.
- d) inherit from her husband, her parents, her children and other relatives according to the Law;
- e) strict confidentiality from her spouse, or ex-spouse if divorced, with regard to any information that he may have obtained about her, the disclosure of which could prove detrimental to her interests. A similar responsibility rests upon her in respect of her spouse or ex-spouse.

XXI Right to Education

- a) Every person is entitled to receive education in accordance with his natural capabilities.
- b) Every person is entitled to a free choice of profession and career and to the opportunity for the full development of his natural endowments.

XXII Right of Privacy

Every person is entitled to the protection of his privacy.

XXIII Right to Freedom of Movement and Residence

- a) In view of the fact that the World of Islam is veritably *Ummah Islamia*, every Muslim shall have the right to freely move in and out of any Muslim country.

b) No one shall be forced to leave the country of his residence, or be arbitrarily deported therefrom without recourse to due process of Law.

Explanatory Notes

1 In the above formulation of Human Rights, unless the context provides otherwise:

a) the term 'person' refers to both the male and female sexes.

b) the term 'Law' denotes the *Shari'ah*, i.e. the totality of ordinances derived from the Qur'an and the Sunnah and any other laws that are deduced from these two sources by methods considered valid in Islamic jurisprudence.

2 Each one of the Human Rights enunciated in this declaration carries a corresponding duty.

3 In the exercise and enjoyment of the rights referred to above every person shall be subject only to such limitations as are enjoined by the Law for the purpose of securing the due recognition of, and respect for, the rights and the freedom of others and of meeting the just requirements of morality, public order and the general welfare of the Community (*Ummah*).

The Arabic text of this *Declaration* is the original.

Glossary of Arabic Terms

SUNNAH - The example or way of life of the Prophet (peace be upon him), embracing what he said, did or agreed to.

KHALIFAH - The vicegerency of man on earth or succession to the Prophet, transliterated into English as the Caliphate.

HISBAH- Public vigilance, an institution of the Islamic State enjoined to observe and facilitate the fulfillment of right norms of public behaviour. The "Hisbah" consists in public vigilance as well as an opportunity to private individuals to seek redress through it.

MA'ROOF - Good act.

MUNKAR - Reprehensible deed.

ZAKAH - The 'purifying' tax on wealth, one of the five pillars of Islam obligatory on Muslims.

'IDDAH - The waiting period of a widowed or divorced woman during which she is not to re-marry.

KHUL'A - Divorce a woman obtains at her own request.

UMMAH ISLAMIA - *World Muslim community.*

SHARI'AH - Islamic law.

APPENDIX--3

The Universal Declaration of Human Rights

PREAMBLE

Whereas recognition of the inherent dignity and of the equal and inalienable rights of all members of the human family is the foundation of freedom, justice and peace in the world,

Whereas disregard and contempt for human rights have resulted in barbarous acts which have outraged the conscience of mankind, and the advent of a world in which human beings shall enjoy freedom of speech and belief and freedom from fear and want has been proclaimed as the highest aspiration of the common people,

Whereas it is essential, if man is not to be compelled to have recourse, as a last resort, to rebellion against tyranny and oppression, that human rights should be protected by the rule of law,
Whereas it is essential to promote the development of friendly relations between nations,

Whereas the peoples of the United Nations have in the Charter reaffirmed their faith in fundamental human rights, in the dignity and worth of the human person and in the equal rights of men and women and have determined to promote social progress and better standards of life in larger freedom,

Whereas Member States have pledged themselves to achieve, in co-operation with the United Nations, the promotion of universal respect for and observance of human rights and fundamental freedoms,

Whereas a common understanding of these rights and freedoms is of the greatest importance for the full realization of this pledge,

Now, Therefore **THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY** proclaims **THIS UNIVERSAL DECLARATION OF HUMAN RIGHTS** as a common standard of achievement for all peoples and all nations, to the end that every individual and every organ of society, keeping this Declaration constantly in mind, shall strive by teaching and education to promote respect for these rights and freedoms and by progressive measures, national and international, to secure their universal and effective recognition and observance, both among the peoples of Member States themselves and among the peoples of territories under their jurisdiction.

Article 1.

- All human beings are born free and equal in dignity and rights. They are endowed with reason and conscience and should act towards one another in a spirit of brotherhood.

Article 2.

- Everyone is entitled to all the rights and freedoms set forth in this Declaration, without distinction of any kind, such as race, colour, sex, language, religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin, property, birth or other status. Furthermore, no distinction shall be made on the basis of the political, jurisdictional or international status of the country or territory to which a person belongs, whether it be independent, trust, non-self-governing or under any other limitation of sovereignty.

Article 3.

- Everyone has the right to life, liberty and security of person.

Article 4.

- No one shall be held in slavery or servitude; slavery and the slave trade shall be prohibited in all their forms.

Article 5.

- No one shall be subjected to torture or to cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment.

Article 6.

- Everyone has the right to recognition everywhere as a person before the law.

Article 7.

- All are equal before the law and are entitled without any discrimination to equal protection of the law. All are entitled to equal protection against any discrimination in violation of this Declaration and against any incitement to such discrimination.

Article 8.

- Everyone has the right to an effective remedy by the competent national tribunals for acts violating the fundamental rights granted him by the constitution or by law.

Article 9.

- No one shall be subjected to arbitrary arrest, detention or exile.

Article 10.

- Everyone is entitled in full equality to a fair and public hearing by an independent and impartial tribunal, in the determination of his rights and obligations and of any criminal charge against him.

Article 11.

- (1) Everyone charged with a penal offence has the right to be presumed innocent until proved guilty according to law in a public trial at which he has had all the guarantees necessary for his defence.
- (2) No one shall be held guilty of any penal offence on account of any act or omission which did not constitute a penal offence, under national or international law, at the time when it was committed. Nor shall a heavier penalty be imposed than the one that was applicable at the time the penal offence was committed.

Article 12.

- No one shall be subjected to arbitrary interference with his privacy, family, home or correspondence, nor to attacks upon his honour and reputation. Everyone has the right to the protection of the law against such interference or attacks.

Article 13.

- (1) Everyone has the right to freedom of movement and residence within the borders of each state.
- (2) Everyone has the right to leave any country, including his own, and to return to his country.

Article 14.

- (1) Everyone has the right to seek and to enjoy in other countries asylum from persecution.
- (2) This right may not be invoked in the case of prosecutions genuinely arising from non-political crimes or from acts contrary to the purposes and principles of the United Nations.

Article 15.

- (1) Everyone has the right to a nationality.
- (2) No one shall be arbitrarily deprived of his nationality nor denied the right to change his nationality.

Article 16.

- (1) Men and women of full age, without any limitation due to race, nationality or religion, have the right to marry and to found a family. They are entitled to equal rights as to marriage, during marriage and at its dissolution.
- (2) Marriage shall be entered into only with the free and full consent of the intending spouses.
- (3) The family is the natural and fundamental group unit of society and is entitled to protection by society and the State.

Article 17.

- (1) Everyone has the right to own property alone as well as in association with others.
- (2) No one shall be arbitrarily deprived of his property.

Article 18.

- Everyone has the right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion; this right includes freedom to change his religion or belief, and freedom, either alone or in community with others and in public or private, to manifest his religion or belief in teaching, practice, worship and observance.

Article 19.

- Everyone has the right to freedom of opinion and expression; this right includes freedom to hold opinions without interference and to seek, receive and impart information and ideas through any media and regardless of frontiers.

Article 20.

- (1) Everyone has the right to freedom of peaceful assembly and association.
- (2) No one may be compelled to belong to an association.

Article 21.

- (1) Everyone has the right to take part in the government of his country, directly or through freely chosen representatives.
- (2) Everyone has the right of equal access to public service in his country.
- (3) The will of the people shall be the basis of the authority of government; this will shall be expressed in periodic and genuine elections which shall be by universal and equal suffrage and shall be held by secret vote or by equivalent free voting procedures.

Article 22.

- Everyone, as a member of society, has the right to social security and is entitled to realization, through national effort and international co-operation and in accordance with the organization and resources of each State, of the economic, social and cultural rights indispensable for his dignity and the free development of his personality.

Article 23.

- (1) Everyone has the right to work, to free choice of employment, to just and favourable conditions of work and to protection against unemployment.

- (2) Everyone, without any discrimination, has the right to equal pay for equal work.
- (3) Everyone who works has the right to just and favourable remuneration ensuring for himself and his family an existence worthy of human dignity, and supplemented, if necessary, by other means of social protection.
- (4) Everyone has the right to form and to join trade unions for the protection of his interests.

Article 24.

- Everyone has the right to rest and leisure, including reasonable limitation of working hours and periodic holidays with pay.

Article 25.

- (1) Everyone has the right to a standard of living adequate for the health and well-being of himself and of his family, including food, clothing, housing and medical care and necessary social services, and the right to security in the event of unemployment, sickness, disability, widowhood, old age or other lack of livelihood in circumstances beyond his control.
- (2) Motherhood and childhood are entitled to special care and assistance. All children, whether born in or out of wedlock, shall enjoy the same social protection.

Article 26.

- (1) Everyone has the right to education. Education shall be free, at least in the elementary and fundamental stages. Elementary education shall be compulsory. Technical and professional education shall be made generally available and higher education shall be equally accessible to all on the basis of merit.

- (2) Education shall be directed to the full development of the human personality and to the strengthening of respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms. It shall promote understanding, tolerance and friendship among all nations, racial or religious groups, and shall further the activities of the United Nations for the maintenance of peace.
- (3) Parents have a prior right to choose the kind of education that shall be given to their children.

Article 27.

- (1) Everyone has the right freely to participate in the cultural life of the community, to enjoy the arts and to share in scientific advancement and its benefits.
- (2) Everyone has the right to the protection of the moral and material interests resulting from any scientific, literary or artistic production of which he is the author.

Article 28.

- Everyone is entitled to a social and international order in which the rights and freedoms set forth in this Declaration can be fully realized.

Article 29.

- (1) Everyone has duties to the community in which alone the free and full development of his personality is possible.
- (2) In the exercise of his rights and freedoms, everyone shall be subject only to such limitations as are determined by law solely for the purpose of securing due recognition and respect for the rights and freedoms of others and of meeting the just requirements of morality, public order and the general welfare in a democratic society.
- (3) These rights and freedoms may in no case be exercised contrary to the purposes and principles of the United Nations.

Article 30.

- Nothing in this Declaration may be interpreted as implying for any State, group or person any right to engage in any activity or to perform any act aimed at the destruction of any of the rights and freedoms set forth herein.

Appendix-4 Non-violence in Islam: Some case Studies

Nonviolence in Islam is neither a theoretical exercise to "feelgood," nor is it a modern hermeneutical extrapolation into a distant historical past. On the contrary, nonviolent interpretations of Islam base their approach on the Quran, the *Hadith*, and the *Sunna*. After the fall of Mecca to the forces led by the Prophet, can be cited as the best example of his love. At that time the marching army of God could easily have compelled the demoralized Meccans to accept whatever terms he wanted. But the Prophet agreed to the terms suggested by the Meccans. Within two years the Meccans violated the truce and the Prophet was compelled to march and finally Mecca was conquered. Stanley Lane-Poole writes: The day of Mohammad's greatest triumph over his enemies was also the day of grandest victory over himself. He freely forgave Quaraysh all the years of sorrow and cruel scorn with which they had afflicted him and gave an amnesty to the whole population of Mecca. Four criminals whom justice condemned made up Mohammad's proscription list, when as a conqueror he entered the city of his bitterest enemies. The army followed his example, and entered quietly and peaceably; no house was robbed, no woman insulted (Lane-Poole 2009).

There are various examples of significant and successful nonviolent movements that took place in both pre-modern and modern history." Among these examples, the nonviolent movement of Pashtuns, led by Ghaffar Khan during the British colonial period in India, is worth mentioning. This example is in striking contrast to the current situation in Afghanistan, since Pashtuns are one of the major ethnic groups in this country. Considering the rise of Taliban and their violent interpretation of Islam in Afghanistan, and among Pashtuns in particular, the example of Ghaffar Khan becomes even more interesting for a case study.

Living in the North-West Frontier Province of British India, Pashtuns had the reputation of being extremely aggressive and violent. Their cultural norms emphasized vengeance and military arts. Johansen states that:"In selecting a case of nonviolent action

from this cultural context, one is examining a difficult case in which the people and culture seemed unusually violent, in order to demonstrate that a militant group, displaying what today would be called "fundamentalist" tendencies bearing the fervor of religious nationalism (although led by a rare traditional leader), developed nonviolent strategies, pursued by a wide following, and achieved notable success." " However, it is from this context that Ghaffar Khan was able to articulate a nonviolent resistance movement to repel the British. "This movement dissolved after the establishment of Pakistan (Ghaffar Khan was opposed to separation of Pakistan as a distinct state and believed that Hindus and Muslims should stay together and coexist peacefully), and many of its member became citizens of Pakistan, although some remained in India (Johansen 1997).

Ghaffar Khan, as a son of a religious chieftain, felt the personal religious calling to Serve God by uplifting his people through social reform and education. Ghaffar Khan was convinced that pervasive violence was responsible for the Pashtun society's inability to uplift itself. Therefore he decided to create a nonviolent organization to bring social, economic, and political reforms. Based on this commitment, he established a nonviolent army, called *Khudai Khidmatgars* (servants of God), founded on Islamic principles. Consistent with the code of honor in the Pashtun society and Muslims beliefs, those who joined this army declared that they were willing to swear before God to give their lives for their people (Khan 1984).

Ghaffar Khan's army (which also included women) was drilled and disciplined with officers, cadres, uniforms, a flag, a drum and bagpipe corps. However, this army was completely nonviolent, and Khan told his followers that he was going to give them the most powerful weapon, the weapon of the Prophet, and this weapon was "patience" and "righteousness." In his own words, Khan stated (Khan 1984): I am going to give you such a weapon that the police and the army will not be able to stand against it. It is the weapon of the Prophet, but you are not aware of it. That weapon is patience and righteousness. No power on earth can stand against it. When you go back to your villages, tell your brethren that

there is an army of God, and its weapon is patience. Ask your brethren to join the army of God. Endure all hardships. If you exercise patience, victory will be yours. The basic teachings of this army were forgiveness, sacrifice, and nonviolence.

Ghaffar Khan's interpretation extended the notion of *sabr* (patience) to mean renunciation of all forms of violence, thus became a key element in his religious teaching and practice. Joining the army required an oath to refrain from violence and from taking revenge, as well as to refrain from any antisocial customs and practices, and to devote at least two hours a day to social work. This oath was of great importance because Pashtun culture assumed that one's word could not be broken without losing one's integrity. The word must be honored with life (Khan 1984).

As this case proves, faith not only created space within the minds of Muslims for employing nonviolence, but also reduced the moral space within which they considered violence to be legitimate. Ghaffar Khan's example might strike readers as unique and unprecedented in the light of current representations of Islam. However, it is not the only example. Islamic history is rich in such examples, and men were not the only figures who were successful in resolving conflicts nonviolently.

On November 29, 1975, five adult Malay Muslims and a thirteen-year-old boy traveling in Narathiwat, southern Thailand, were stopped and put into a dump truck by a group of people dressed in dark green suits. When the truck reached the Kor Tor bridge separating Narathiwat from Pattani, the six civilians were stabbed in the back, their skulls crushed, and their bodies thrown into the river. Fortunately, the boy survived, and the massacre was brought to public attention by a group of Muslim activists who began a protest. The people started their peaceful demonstration on December 12, 1975, in the compound of the central government house in Pattani, then formed the Civil Rights Protection Center to keep the protest going. On behalf of the Muslims, the center issued four demands to the government, the arrest of the criminals by rule of law, compensation for the victim's families,

withdrawal of government troops within seven days, and a meeting by December 16 between Prime Minister M. R. Kukrit Pramoj and the people.

The government did not seem to take these demands seriously, but the Muslims persevered. On December 13, 1975, University students from institutions in the south came to join the protest. The military and the police surrounded the city of Pattani. During a panel discussion that evening, a bomb exploded among the people. One of the coordinators of the protest rushed to the microphone shouting "Do not flee!" He was fatally shot on the stage. The police came and put an end to the protest. There were twelve deaths and more than thirty people injured, seven of whom were women and children. This incident caused the people grave concern and sadness (Anand 1987).

On the same day, around fifty thousand gathered again at the central mosque in Pattani, patiently braving the torrential rain. In retaliation, schools in Pattani and Narathiwat were burned, and the people accused the soldiers of committing arson. One more officer of the Civil Rights Center was stabbed to death. The government did not yield—but neither did the people. On December 21, 1975 Muslims from Bangkok rallied at their central mosque to pray for those killed. On the following day, nine educational institutions joined the protest by suspending classes (Anand 1987).

The government responded by saying that the protest was but a minor incident involving only a few hundred people, a claim that prompted a huge demonstration on December 28, 1975. The mass of people formed themselves into a parade more than three kilometers long, marching in orderly fashion with Thai flags and portraits of the Thai king and queen leading their procession. Even a heavy rain could not weaken their will as they walked toward the Toh Ayah graveyard. The organizers pointed out that this demonstration was an attempt to fight for justice, display the people's strength, and demonstrate that the protest was not the "minor" incident the government claimed it to be. The protesters prayed for the souls of the deceased and then dispersed at 6:00 p.m. (Anand 1987).

On January 2, 1976, Thai Muslim government officials from the five southern provinces met to consider how to encourage the prime minister to come to Pattani. They announced on January 4, 1976 that they would strike on the following day if their demands were not met. On January 10 their representatives met with the prime minister, who promised to go to Pattani. The protest ended after forty-five days with, among other things, the removal of Pattani's governor and his replacement by a Muslim (Anand 1987).

There seem to be five conditions that enabled the Muslim protesters to stage a sustained nonviolent protest in Pattani. First, they possessed the will to disobey, without which no nonviolent action can be realized. The Muslims are willing to disobey because for them God alone is supreme. This total submission to Allah in turn means a rejection of any other form of absolute authority, including the state's authority (Anand 1987).

Second, the Pattani Muslims were courageous despite severe repression by the state apparatus. Because they submitted to Allah alone, they did not have to fear any mortal. Muslims believe as a precept of *iman* (faith) that all the good and bad incidents in their lives are bestowed upon them by God. As a result, resignation while working for a just cause, without fear of punishment, becomes possible. In the final analysis, they believe God will take care of them (Anand 1987).

Third, Muslim discipline enabled the gathering, the protest march, and even the threat to resign en masse to be carried out efficiently. All of the activities were well orchestrated. The quality of discipline bears little relationship to the leadership of the group because it takes time to cultivate such a collective trait. Muslims, however, are already disciplined in their everyday life; that they pray five times a day contributes to this quality (Anand 1987).

Fourth, the concept of *ummah* (community) is very strong among Muslims, who find this unity of brotherhood expressed in the Qur'an:

Fifth, the feeling among the Pattani Muslims was anything but passive. Islam repeatedly encourages action, and although *jihad* can be performed by the heart, the tongue,

or the hand, the important requirement is that it be performed in one way or another. It is also important to note that two out of three ways of performing *jihad* are action-oriented. Action, therefore, is of paramount importance for Muslims, just as it is at the core of the modern theory of nonviolence (Anand 1987).

These five characteristics of the Muslims evident in the Pattani case can be termed the “Five Pillars of Muslim Nonviolent Action.” Interestingly they correspond well with the sacred Five Pillars of Islam: *shahadat* (a vow that proclaims there is no god but God and Muhammad is His messenger); *salat* (prayers at specific times five times a day from sunrise to sunset, each preceded by proper ablution); *zakah* (compulsory religious tax that every Muslim has to pay); *sawm* (fasting in the month of Ramadan every year by abstaining from food and drink from sunrise to sunset while purifying both the tongue and the heart in the process); and *hajj* (pilgrimage to the holy city of Mecca at least once in a lifetime if one can afford it).

Each of these five pillars produces a special quality for those who continually practice them. The *shahadat* vow by a Muslim is an act asserting that the person will not allow other things to supersede the Will of God. This obedience to God entails the possibility of disobedience to any power that contradicts God’s command. The *salat*, at a lower level of understanding, is an exercise in disciplinary action. When offered in a congregation, which is usually encouraged, it becomes an assertion of equality because the poor can stand shoulder to shoulder with the rich in such a prayer. The *zakah* reminds Muslims of their obligation to society at large because the tax sensitizes them to the problems of others and induces them to do something about it. The *sawm*, both a lesson of self-sacrifice and empathy, enables Muslims to develop patience, the quality that Abdul Ghaffar Khan, the leader of the nonviolent struggle by the Pathans against the British, regards as crucial for nonviolence in Islam. Finally, the *hajj* is a reaffirmation of brotherhood and the belief that all Muslims form one nation, regardless of race, color, nationality, or class. It is a return to the beginning, an

immersion in the eternal source of life that has guided their ancestors for millennia (Anand 1987). In other words, a practicing Muslim should possess the potential for disobedience, discipline, social concern and action, patience and willingness to suffer for a cause, and the idea of unity—all of which are crucial for successful nonviolent action. It remains to be seen how Muslim intellectuals will attempt to tap the fertile resources of nonviolent thought within their own tradition and resolve the paradox of living as a true Muslim in the contemporary world.