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The Civil Service in Pakistan

(The Centrally Recruited Civil Services)

A Thesis submitted for the Degree of Doctor
of Philosophy in the University of London

by

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
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
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ABSTRACT

Since independence in 1947, Pakistan has embarked upon comprehensive measures of economic and social development on the basis of five year plans. This has changed the task of the administration and its instrument, the Civil Service. The Civil Servants are called upon to assume responsibilities which are rapidly increasing in magnitude, variety and complexity. The question has arisen whether the Civil Service which Pakistan inherited from British India is adequate for this purpose, because the Civil Service in British India grew in response to the requirements of a Government engaged largely on the functions of collection of revenue, administration of justice and the maintenance of law and order. It is generally recognised that if the Civil Service is to occupy its position effectively and collectively in the new setting, it must undergo a series of reforms designed to make it stronger in organisation, more varied in talent, deeper in knowledge, higher in quality and integrity, and wider in outlook.

In Pakistan there are three main categories of Civil Servants. Firstly, there are the all-Pakistan services, the members of which serve under both the Central Government and Provincial Government by rotation. Secondly, there are the Central Services, the members of which work exclusively under the Central Government. Thirdly, come the Provincial Services, the members of which work exclusively under the Provincial Government. The Provincial Civil Services have been left out for want of space and time.



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In this thesis an attempt has been made to study the organisation of the Civil Servants - all-Pakistan and Central Civil Services - working under the Central Government in order to find out whether adequate re-orientation has been brought about to suit the requirements of an administration geared to the economic and social development of the country. The results of the investigation indicate that considerable leeway still remains to be made up. Suggestions have been offered towards rectifying the existing shortcomings and inadequacies in the fields of organisation, recruitment, training, conditions of service and conduct. In view of the close historical link between Britain and Pakistan it has been found useful to draw frequently upon British experience while discussing the Civil Service in Pakistan.

PREFACE

The present work is the outcome of my two years' study at the London School of Economics and Political Science (1958 to 1960).

It is my pleasant duty here to acknowledge my debt to all those who have directly or indirectly helped me in the preparation of this work. I wish to place on record my deep sense of gratitude to my supervisor, Professor W. A. Robson, not only for his inspiring guidance and stimulating suggestions, but also for the personal and friendly interest he took in my affairs during my stay in London, which proved a source of inspiration and encouragement to me and enabled me to complete my work. I also wish to thank Mr. H.R.G. Greaves who supervised my work for one term during the absence of Professor W.A. Robson. I am also grateful to a number of high-ranking officers at Karachi and a few British members of the old U.S. in Britain for the constant and ungrudging assistance I received from them.

I wish to thank the University of Dacca for the award of study leave and advance to enable me to undertake research work at the London School of Economics and Political Science. I am also quite grateful to the Rockefeller Foundation for the award of a Fellowship which enabled me to stay in London for the period, and also for the family allowance granted to my wife at Dacca.

I am also indebted to my wife who always encouraged me in my work, and also to her for her solitude for two years while I have been away in far-off London.

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CHAPTER ONE

The Growth of the Civil Service
in British India and Pakistan

Human institutions everywhere have their roots deep in the past. They cannot escape the categories of time. They are the product of historical growth, slowly evolved under the stress of changing times and conditions. The Civil Service of Pakistan is no exception to it. In its structure and methods, it forms a direct continuation of the traditions of the Civil Service in British India. "The Civil Service of Pakistan is the successor in Pakistan of the Indian Civil Service, which was the most distinguished Civil Service in the world", states an official pamphlet.¹ To study its present organisation, it is useful to trace the history of its growth in British India.

In British India, the Civil Service was the product of an evolutionary process. The mercantile service of the East India Company was transformed into a well organised Governanted Civil Service when the Company became the ruling power with administrative responsibilities. The transference of power from the Company to the Crown did not affect the position of the Civil Service very much. With the passage of time, the demand of the educated Indians to enter the higher services became persistent. The

1 Careers in the Pakistan Central Superior Services, issued by the Cabinet Secretariat, Establishment Divisions, Government of Pakistan, Karachi, 1954, p. 3

organisation and structure of the service began to grow complex. The service received in the course of its development the close attention of a few Commissions. The Act of 1919 inaugurating responsible government in British Indian provinces had an important effect on the Civil Service. Finally, the Civil Service was divided between Pakistan and India after partition and independence in 1947.

The growth of the Civil Service in British India was divided into four periods:-

- (a) a Mercantile Service from 1601 to 1772;
- (b) from 1772 up to the introduction of competitive examination in 1855;
- (c) from 1856 to the diminution of bureaucratic rule in 1920; and
- (d) from 1921 to 1947.

These divisions form no water-tight compartments. They are arranged more or less arbitrarily for the convenience of study.

I.

(1601 - 1772)

From the beginning of its career up to the seventies of the eighteenth century, the East India Company had been primarily a mercantile corporation, and as such the principal pre-occupation of its servants was with trading activities. Only to a limited extent they carried on other functions such as legislative, judicial, administrative and municipal within the limits of their factories or trading settlements.

The servants of the Company were divided into five grades - apprentices¹, writers, factors, junior merchants and senior merchants. Writers were nominated by the Directors from 1714. The age of admission varied from time to time. There was no provision for the systematic training of the servants either at home or in India. The only qualifications that were insisted upon were a smattering of book-keeping, accountancy and good handwriting. Promotion from grade to grade went by seniority. On appointment the writers were to sign Covenants which embodied their conditions of service, rights and obligations. Hence is the term the "Covenanted Civil Service".

The conditions of their service, ^{was} ~~was~~ ^{well} ~~was~~ adverse and unfavourable. Their salary was ridiculously low.² There was also the lack of security of tenure. Suspensions and dismissals were frequent. Leave rules were quite unsatisfactory. Such adverse conditions of service in an uncongenial environment, away from the salutary influence of home, coupled with their young age, could not but prejudicially affect the morale of the servants. They supplemented their poor pay by engaging in private trade. Unscrupulousness and exploitation for wealth were resorted to by them. Presents and gifts were freely accepted. Abuses among them were rampant.

1 The 'apprentices' were withdrawn from 1694, and since then youths were appointed straightway as writers.

2 "Warren Hastings in Bengal, 1772 - 74" by Jones, Monckton, M.E. (1918), p. 35

There were rank corruption, greed, factious spirit, laxity in morals, gambling, negligence of duty, insubordination and indiscipline. Apart from the scanty remuneration, the political situation in India played a part in corrupting its servants. A moral nightmare came down on India with the disintegration of the mighty Moughul empire, and there was moral degradation among people and ruling classes.

II

(1772 ~ 1855)

With the assumption of direct responsibility for the administration of revenue in 1772¹, the Company had to build up an administrative machinery and to find the personnel to staff and run it. The administrative machinery was completed by stages through a series of experimental measures. The process was started by Warren Hastings and completed by Cornwallis. Through a series of experiments, the districts gradually became the units of revenue administration, with collectorship as the permanent and main feature, and it remains so even today. In course of time Commissioners came to be appointed to supervise the work of district officers, and above them was set up a Board of Revenue. The administrative machinery for the administration of revenue and the maintenance of law and order began to develop. Many subordinate offices were also created to cope with the increasing activities.

1 The 'Diwani' was conferred on the Company in 1765, but it did not stand forth as Diwar, until 1772

Both Hastings and Cornwallis re-organised the judicial system. In each district was set up two Courts - one Civil and the other Criminal. At the Presidency also were set up two Superior Courts - the Chief Civil Court and the Chief Criminal Court.

The Secretariat at the headquarters was very small, the majority of the employees were employed in the field organisation throughout the Company's territory. By the time Cornwallis assumed office, the headquarters establishment consisted of three departments (i) general or public, (ii) revenue, and (iii) commercial, under two Joint Secretaries. In 1787 the Secretariat was re-organised under one Secretary General with three sub-secretaries to keep the records of three separate departments. With the passage of time an elaborate administrative machinery and an administrative hierarchy for the administration of revenue, civil and criminal justice and the maintenance of law and order grew up. Bombay and Madras built up administrative machineries to suit their purposes.

In order to staff and run this administrative machinery, the Covenanted Civil Service of the Company was divided by Warren Hastings into two branches. One branch was to carry on the commercial functions, and the other to run the general administration. Under Cornwallis, who further elaborated the structure, the Civil Service came to be organised under four main branches - (i) Public or General (ii) Revenue,

(iii) Judicial, and (iv) Commercial.¹ There was no rigid line between them. The Act of 1793, reserved all Civil posts under the rank of Councillors for members of the Covenanted Civil Service. Thus, a monopoly was created for them; but the exigencies of the public service rendered it impossible to maintain the monopoly. With the passage of time, the functions of the Company began to expand. Hence, subordinate posts or offices for different purposes had to be created. Many special Departments also came into being, and these were to be staffed. It had been found necessary to confer many such appointments on other persons who were mostly military and uncovenanted officers.² There was no legal sanction for many of these appointments. The position was reviewed in 1861 and an Act of the same year validated these appointments. It also reserved all the principal offices - administrative, revenue and judicial - for the Covenanted Civil Servants. Authorities in India were permitted, under special conditions, to appoint to such offices persons other than Covenanted Civilians.³

Thus the Covenanted Civil Servants came to occupy all the higher Civil posts under the administration of the Company. Each Presidency had a separate branch of the Covenanted Civil Service, but the recruitment,

1 The Civil Service in India (Under the East India Company) by Dr. A.K. Ghosal (1944), p. 226

2 The Report of the Public Service Commission (1886-87) (C-5327, para 25, p. 11-12); . . .

3 Ibid, para 36. p. 17 - 18.

training and conditions of the service were the same. The service in each Presidency adopted its name as its designation. Collectively and officially the service was known as the "Covenanted Civil Service of India".¹ Ordinarily there was no transfer from one Presidency to another and this caused great difficulties. In the eighties of the nineteenth century, the Government of India decided in favour of inter-presidency transfer.² Gradually, the Covenanted Civil Service became an All-India Civil Service.

As previously pointed out, the morale of the Company's servants was very low. Warren Hastings, Cornwallis and Wellesley made efforts to raise the morale, integrity and efficiency of the Covenanted Servants. Warren Hastings made a vigorous and loyal effort to amend and purify the service.³ He increased their legitimate emoluments. He achieved considerable success in lifting the service out of the morass into which it had fallen. The Act of 1773 contained several provisions which prohibited the Civil Servants from indulging in usury, gifts, extortion of money from Indians and other malpractices. These provisions were confirmed by the Act of 1784. But the enforcement of these acts was a rather difficult job. The tradition of corruption was too strong. Hastings started the process on which

¹ O'Malley, *The Indian Civil Service (1601-1930)*, London, 1931, ~~op. cit.~~, p. 83

² Aitchison Commission, *op. cit.* para 75, p. 54 - 55.

³ P.E. Roberts "The Early Reforms of Warren Hastings in Bengal", in 'Cambridge History of India', Chapter XI, Vol. V. Edited by H.H. Dodwell, (1929); p. 212

Cornwallis built a better standard of conduct. Cornwallis took a number of measures in this direction. First, the pay and allowances of the Civil Servants were substantially raised to enable them to live a decent and comfortable life during and after office. The service was thus rendered highly attractive for young men of good calibre. Secondly, he fought against the abuses of patronage which was the mode of entry to the Company's Civil Service. Redundant establishments were reduced and sinecures were abolished by Cornwallis. He went to the length of refusing candidates recommended by highly placed persons in Britain.¹ The Act of 1793 prohibited all appointments from outside the Covenanted Civil Service by reserving all Civil posts below the degree of Councillors to the members of the Covenanted Service. It thus reduced the area of patronage to some extent. The Act of 1833 incorporated the principle of limited competition to modify the unrestricted patronage of directors. But the Directors managed to postpone the operation of the Act of 1833. Thirdly, Cornwallis had conferred all superior and higher posts on Europeans, as he entertained a very low opinion about the character and ability of Indians. Indians were thus excluded from all positions of trust and responsibility. He also strictly enforced the rules of discipline and conduct as embodied in the Covenants and in other documents.

¹ Correspondence of Charles, First Marquis of Cornwallis, by C. Ross. Vol. I. (1859), p. 273.

As a result of their efforts, standards of morale and integrity went up. A great tradition of integrity, zeal and devotion to duty began to grow up.¹ Cornwallis' policy of excluding Indians from all positions of trust and responsibility was not above criticism. The standard of public morality of Indians in the Company's service was none too high. The same was true of the European Covenanted Servants before his reform. Indians, if offered the same opportunity, could have shown similar integrity and ability.

This brings to our mind the similar efforts made in Britain to raise the standards of the Civil Servants. From the closing decades of the eighteenth century started a process of the purification of the Civil Service. A strong tradition of integrity and devotion to duty began to grow up. Successful efforts were made to put an end to peculations. Sinécures were abolished.² The ideas of Burke and Bentham, the growth of the middle classes, and the efforts made to raise the educational standards contributed to the same process.³

Wellesley realised the necessity and importance of some system of systematic education and training for the recruits to the Covenanted Civil Service. He drew up an elaborate scheme and sent comprehensive proposals

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- 1 The Administration of the East India Company: A History of Indian Progress (2nd edition) by Kaye, J.W. (1853) p. 88
 - 2 The Growth of the British Civil Service (1780-1939) by Cohen, E.W. (1941) p. 22.
 - 3 The Civil Service in the Changing State, by Greaves, H.R.G. (1947) p. 11 - 14.

to the Directors to this effect. He took initiative in the matter and founded the College of Fort William in Calcutta in 1800 without waiting for their sanction.

The central idea of his scheme of education and training was that the education of the Company's servants was to be of a mixed character, combining studies both Western and Oriental to suit the needs of an administration based on Western principles. The aim was to provide liberal as well as specialised education and training. The syllabus was designed accordingly. It comprised humanities, science and Indian subjects. The Civilians were to be educated for three years in the College and to appear at two public examinations each year.

The Directors set their face against the College and refused to sanction the scheme. The Board of Control was convinced of the necessity of it, and after an acute controversy between the two bodies, the Directors under pressure, agreed to continue the College for some time. The establishment of the College was drastically curtailed. It was whittled down to a mere school to teach native languages to young recruits to the Covenanted Service assigned to Bengal. The College was abolished in 1854. Similar arrangements were made in Madras to train the Civilians in native languages.

It was easy to mutilate the College, but the fundamental idea which underlay the scheme of Wellesley could not be killed. His efforts bore fruit in 1806, when the Directors accepted his idea of education, and

themselves founded the Haileybury College in England. The object was "to provide a supply of persons duly qualified to discharge the various and important duties required from the Civil Servants of the Company".¹ The institution was given a statutory status by the Act of 1813 which required that the young men nominated by the Directors were to spend two years in it and to pass an examination before being confirmed to their appointments to writerships in India.

The courses of study were comprehensive. They included two groups of subjects - 'Europeans' and 'Orientals'. The 'Europeans' included classical languages and mathematics. There was law, both general and Indian. Great emphasis was put on political economy and general history. The 'Orientals' were mainly languages.² The college was designed, it would appear, more or less on the same principles and ideas which underlay Wellesley's original scheme for the College of Fort William. "There was a great deal at Haileybury that was borrowed from Fort William".³ The College served as a partial corrective of the abuses of the patronage system of recruitment to the Company's services.

Many of the witnesses, including alumni of the College before the Parliamentary Enquiries of 1833 and 1853, extolled the institution as having eminently served its purpose. It supplied the special training

1 The British Impact on India by Griffiths, Sir P. (C.I.E.) (1952) p.192

2 The Men who Ruled India (The Founders) by P. Woodruff (1953), p.280-281
v.7.1

3 Ibid, p. 280

needed, cheap and well. It generated an esprit de corps among its students. "The best argument in favour of Haileybury was that it fostered a close family spirit, a unity of interest; because of Haileybury, the Indian Empire was administered by men who knew each other and strove together in the friendly spirit of the Cook-House Football match. They trusted each other and worked for the Company, the Queen, the Team - what you will - but not exclusively for themselves, and that was why they overran India", observed Woodruff.¹ The tradition of loyalty and integrity among the Civil Servants was strengthened by the Haileybury College.² The critics pointed out that it fostered too much exclusiveness, narrowness of outlook and arrogance among the Civil Servants by cutting them off from the main stream of student life in Britain. The standard of education within the College was low. Education imparted was not liberal but professional and had to be adjusted to suit the age of young boys. It could not provide facilities for instruction in all subjects, a knowledge of which would have been necessary for their introduction to, and specific duties in, India.

With the introduction of open competition in 1853, as the mode of entry to the Company's Civil Service, there was no place for an institution of this type. The College was abolished in December, 1857.

We may now turn our attention to a review of the system of recruitment to the Covenanted Civil Service. The system of nomination continued

¹ Ibid, p. 285

² The I.C.S. (Indian Civil Service) by Blunt, Sir E. (1935) p. 35-6.

to be the mode of entry till the fifties of the nineteenth century. It was challenged by many critics from the thirties of the nineteenth century. Mr. Halt McKenzie, a distinguished servant of the Company, vehemently criticised the nomination system as it failed to send out competent men to India for various high offices.¹ The main argument advanced in support of its replacement by open competition was that it would ensure "men of higher attainment in every branch of the service".² This increased efficiency, it was argued, would ensure the stability of the British rule in India. Macaulay, who took a leading part in challenging the system of nomination, pointed out that "even the character of the Governor-General is less important than the general character and spirit of the servants by whom the administration of India is carried".³

When the question of replacing the patronage system by open competitive principle was mooted in 1853, the Company raised all sorts of objections against it and sought to maintain the status quo. First, a written examination put a premium on mere academic ability and minimised such factors as personality and initiative on the part of the candidates. India needed no scholars as administrators but men of vigorous character

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- 1 Answers to Questions (52-56) March 2, 1832, Minutes of Evidence, pp Vol IV of 1831 - 32.
 - 2 Answer to Question 1372 (March 22, 1832) Minutes of Evidence, pp Vol IX. of 1831-32.
 - 3 Hansard's Parliamentary Debates, 24 June 1853, Vol. CXXVII, p. 745

and personality, and they could be recruited only by nomination. Second, it was pointed out that competitive mode of entry by making the Civil Servants independent of their nomination would have a harmful effect on their discipline.¹ Finally, it was argued that open competition might lead to the increasing entry of Indians into the Covenanted Civil Service which was the keystone of the administrative arch in British India. This might weaken the British hold on the country.

The case for competitive examination was admirably put by Macaulay who in his classic and oft-quoted speech in the House of Commons in 1833 stated, "It is said, I know, that examinations in Latin, in Greek, and in mathematics are no tests of what men will prove to be in life. I am perfectly aware that they are not infallible tests; but that they are tests I confidently maintain. Look at any walk of life - at this House - at the other House - at the Bar - at the Bench - at the Church - and see whether it be not true, that those who attain high distinction in the world are generally men who were distinguished in their academic career."²

The competitive system, it was argued, would widen the area of selection by opening up equal opportunity to all, at least theoretically. "The method of open competitive examination", observes Professor Robson, "is sound, democratic and equitable in that it treats all comers alike,

1 See the correspondence between the Court of Directors and the Board of Control regarding the Bill for the Future Government of India in pp Vol. LXIX, 1852 - 53, p. 89

2 Speeches & Documents on Indian policy (1750 - 1921) by Keith, A.B. (1922) Vol. I. p. 252

regardless of the distinction of wealth and social rank, in that it judges men and women impersonally by their ability to carry out a specific performance, and in that it selects individuals, without reference to their family connections and inherited fortunes, by the common rule of a prescribed test under known conditions".¹ It ensures, he further points out, the attainment of at least a "minimum standard of general education or of technical knowledge", on the part of the competitors, which constitutes the first essential of "an expert and efficient administration".²

Professor Robson has pointed out some defects of the written examination system. "The greatest defect of the written examination is, however, the fact that it can at most test but a single aspect of an individual's general capacity as a potential Civil Servant. Of his character and powers of endurance, of his address and resourcefulness, of his general demeanour and discretion, of his moral courage and loyalty, of his honesty and purpose and tactfulness, of his powers of co-operation and of creative invention, above all of his quality of mind and outlook - of these vitally important elements the written papers take no account".³ Perhaps the case for the open competitive principle could not be better put than in the above statements. No exaggerated claim is made for the system, but what can be fairly claimed in favour of the competitive selection based on merit, as opposed to the nomination system based on favour, has been clearly stated. We

1 From Patronage to Proficiency in the Public Service (An Inquiry into Professional qualifications and the methods of recruitment in the Civil Service & Municipal Service) by Robson, W.A. (1922) (Fabian Society) p.17

2 Ibid.

3 Ibid, p. 19

endorses Professor Robson's view when he says that with all its defects, it is by far the most satisfactory method of recruitment.¹

Ultimately, the protagonists of the Open Competitive principle won the day. The Act of 1853 threw the Covenanted Civil Service open to competitive examination. This victory of the competitive system was due to a favourable climate of opinion prevailing in Britain during those days. Two factors contributed to this. Firstly, the introduction of open competition at Oxford and Cambridge in regard to the award of Fellowships, produced such encouraging results as to create a powerful impression in favour of the principle. "That the rewards of competition be given to the most worthy is a principle now so deeply penetrating the moral life of Cambridge that its violation seems almost beyond the region of thought", stated the Royal Commission on the Cambridge University.² The dons were ready to lend their support to the campaign against privilege elsewhere. Secondly, the growth of the middle classes in Britain in the wake of the industrial revolution was generating a new atmosphere in which privilege and patronage in different fields were being increasingly challenged. The middle classes who became a dominant force in British political life wanted a strong, stable and efficient administrative machinery in India, so that trade and commerce with her could be fully exploited. An efficient administration, they thought, could be achieved by recruiting its personnel on the basis of merit. The impetus to competitive principle came from these classes as well.

¹ W. A. Robson, op. cit. p. 21 - 22

² Royal Commission on Cambridge University, B.P.P. Vol. XLIV, 1852-53 p. 210 - 211

It will not be out of place here to mention that a campaign for the introduction of the open competitive examination for recruitment to the British Civil Service was started in the middle of the nineteenth century. This movement was partly inspired by the application of the competitive mode of entry to the Covenanted Civil Service in British India in 1855.¹ The process culminated in the Report of the Northcote-Trevelyan presented to the British Parliament in 1854, recommending the adoption of the competitive examination in place of nomination.² This principle of selection by open competition as advocated in the Report was, as aptly remarked by Sir Laurence Hulsby, "in accord with the social and educational movements of the time, and reflected the stirrings of the growing middle class against privilege."³ But Parliament was not as yet ready to apply this principle to the British Civil Service, although a year earlier they had done so in regard to the Indian Civil Service. The reason was obvious. It would adversely affect their own power of patronage on which depended partly not only the smooth functioning of the party in power, but also the election of some members to Parliament itself. In the case of British India, the power of patronage of a small number of merchants was being taken away. But ultimately the British Government had to adopt the principle, and in 1870 Gladstone issued an order in Council

1 Higher Civil Servants in Britain (from 1870 to the Present Day), by Kelsall, H.K. (1955), p. 59 .

2 This document is called the "Report on the Organisation of the Permanent Civil Service", p.p. Vol. XX. 1854-5.

3 L. Hulsby "The Recruitment to the Civil Service", in W.A. Robson (edited) The Civil Service in Britain (1956), p. 36
and France

prescribing open competition as the basis of recruitment in all departments except a few.

With a view to giving effect to the provisions of the Act of 1853, a Committee was appointed with Macaulay as President for making detailed regulations regarding the system of selection and appointment of candidates. The Committee made two main recommendations.¹ Firstly, the competitive examination was to be a test of general education and ability of candidates. It was not to be a test of any specialised knowledge. This was advocated on the following grounds. Work in India required the exercise of the "higher powers of mind" which could be developed only by the "best, the most liberal, and the most finished education".² This type of education was needed also in Britain for every calling involving the exercise of the 'higher powers of mind'. Moreover, a competitive examination based on general education would ensure that "no candidate who may fail shall, to whatever calling he may betake himself, have any reason to regret the time and labour which he spent in preparing himself to be examined."³

The syllabus and age-limits were designed accordingly. The syllabus comprised mostly European literature, science and languages, classical and modern. Only two oriental subjects - Sanskrit and Arabic were included.

1 Report on the Indian Civil Service 1854, published in the Parliamentary Papers, Vol. LV. 1876.

2 Ibid, p. 24.

3 Ibid, p. 25.

The Committee recommended 18 years as the minimum and 23 years as the maximum age for admission^{into} the open competitive examination, and this was expected to enable the graduates of the various British Universities to compete for the Covenanted Civil Service.

The second main recommendation of the Committee was with regard to the training of the successful candidates. The period of probation was to be not less than one year and not more than two years.¹ The Committee recommended that the theoretical training should be in Britain, while the practical one could be given on the job itself in India. The theoretical training in Britain was to consist of instruction in Indian History, the science of jurisprudence, commercial and financial science, and the oriental languages.² There was to be an examination after this specialised training and those who passed it would be confirmed in their appointments and sent out to India.

The report of the Committee is a very valuable document: it marks an important epoch in the history of the Civil Service in British India. Modifications, no doubt, were made from time to time to meet the changing conditions, but the basic idea that the competitive examination should be a test of general academic nature - a test of mental powers and resources - has survived even today for the Civil Service of Pakistan. The emphasis

1 Ibid, p. 29

2. Ibid, p. 27-28

of the report on the "excellent general education" and the practical training of the new recruits was of great significance. They could, however, claim no originality in this respect because the idea of training started with Wellesley as we have seen earlier. But the Committee gave it a forceful and fresh interpretation in the light of the conditions of the mid-nineteenth century.

The effect of this fundamental change on the Civil Service in British India was remarkable. It determined the essential character of the Indian Civil Service. "Be this as it may, the open competition has conditioned the I.C.S. for nearly a hundred years and it has at least guaranteed high intellectual standards", writes Sir Percival Griffiths.¹ The Covenanted Civil Service became a full-fledged Civil Service in the modern sense of the term.

The employment of military officers in superior posts reserved for the Covenanted Civilians was a special feature of the Service structure, as it developed in the Non-Regulation Provinces.² The rapid expansion

1 The British Impact on India (1952) by Griffiths, Sir P.(C.I.E.), p.192

2 The Non-Regulation Provinces were those areas of British India where the laws passed by the Governor-General in Council, called Regulations were not applicable owing to the low level of culture and unsettled conditions. These less advanced areas were governed under more simple rules and procedure made by the Executive to suit local conditions. Gradually, the system was given up as the people became more advanced in the scale of civilisation. The distinction between the Regulation and non-Regulation areas ceased to exist towards the end of the nineteenth century.

of the British Power in India and the shortage of Covenanted Civil Servants led to the growth of this phenomenon. The army officers were also appointed to certain special posts in some special departments for other reasons as well. For certain posts men of specialised qualifications were not available in sufficient numbers in the open market, as the technical and professional education was in the initial stage of development. Again, in some special departments, such as medical and public works departments, places had to be found for army officers to maintain a peace-time reserve for war.

The employment of military officers in civil posts caused resentment among civilians, both Covenanted and un-Covenanted. These appointments adversely affected their promotion prospects.¹ Covenanted Civilians complained that army officers lacked good brains and sense. The handsome salary paid to the army officers excited the jealousy of the uncovenanted Civil Servants because they were paid less for the same work. From the seventies of the nineteenth century the appointment of army officers in Civil posts began to decline.² The main reason was that the Non-regulation areas became more settled and adopted methods similar to those obtaining in Regulation areas. The employment of military officers in special departments began to be curtailed with the increasing availability of men with technical qualifications in the open market.

1 The I.C.S. (The Indian Civil Service), by Blunt, Sir E. (1937) p.

2 O'Malley, op. cit. p. 59 and 92 - 93

We may now pass on to the other important feature of the service organisation, that is, the growth of what came to be known as the uncovenanted branch of the Civil Service. The term 'uncovenanted' was probably used originally to distinguish the uncovenanted Civil Servants from the Covenanted ones.¹ The expansion of the Company's territories, the increasing activities of the Government and the limited number of the Covenanted Civil Servants, compelled the authorities to appoint persons from outside the covenanted service in increasing numbers.

It was, however, inaccurate to characterise it as the uncovenanted Civil Service for the following reasons. First, quite a few of them entered into Covenants with the Secretary of State at the time of their appointment.² Second, it did not constitute any organised Civil Service as did the Covenanted Civil Service. The Uncovenanted Civil Servants constituted various categories with different grades, conditions of service and different methods of recruitment. Hence the term 'uncovenanted' is scarcely applicable to a body which included many different classes.³ Third, the members of the superior grades of the uncovenanted Civil Service were on the same social level as the Covenanted Civil Servants.⁴ One group of the uncovenanted Civil Servants held lower executive and

1 Report of the Public Service Commission (Aitchison Commission) 1886-87 C-5327, p. 54

2 Ibid.

3 Statement on the Uncovenanted Civil Service in India (prepared by the Committee of the Uncovenanted Civil Service Association, London, on behalf of the Service), 1887. p. 1

4 Ibid.

judicial posts and worked under the Covenanted Civilians. Another category of them was appointed in the various special departments, such as Salt, Opium, Education, Public Works and Forest, and so on.¹ Some of them again held miscellaneous types of higher posts.² On occasions they were appointed to responsible offices which were so long the monopoly of the Covenanted Civilians. Many such appointments not warranted by Law (Act of 1793) had to be made because of sheer necessity and of economy, and these were regularised by the Act of 1861.

Most of the uncovenanted servants were appointed by nomination. In some cases, nomination was tempered by a limited competition, and in a few cases there was open competition.³ As most of them were Indians, it was felt that competition was not desirable owing to the educational backwardness and unevenness in the country. This was resented by educationally advanced Indians. Even in Britain, nomination was resorted to for the recruitment of uncovenanted servants to technical and special posts in India, and the reason for this was the dearth of men with technical qualifications.

The conditions of service prescribed for the different categories of the uncovenanted servants were not always satisfactory. Their pay was not often adequate, and other conditions of service were not quite

1 Aitchison Commission, op. cit. (1886-87) Para 46. p. 22 - 23

2 Ibid, para 56, p: 35

3 Aitchison Commission, Para 49. p. 24 - 25

reasonable. This gave rise to discontent among them. They memorialised the Government for the remission of the conditions of their service. European uncovenanted servants started a vigorous agitation and their efforts bore fruit gradually. On the whole it would not be unreasonable to state that much less attention was paid by authorities to the problems of the uncovenanted Civil Servants.

III

(1856 - 1920)

Representation of Indians in the higher branches of the Civil Service.

The Indianisation of the higher services had long been a controversial question, and the controversy became acute as the Indians had no place in the Covenanted Civil Service for a long time to come. The policy of keeping the higher administrative posts in British hands was strongly criticised by some far-sighted British Administrators in British India. Munro believed that the effective method of educating Indians for ultimate self-government was to employ them in "important situations" and to render them eligible for almost "any office under Government".¹ Malcolm, Elphinstone and Henry Lawrence held the same view.² With the spread of Western education in British India in the thirties of the last century, Indians who took advantage of it, began to demand more employment

¹ Quoted in "The Making of British India", by Muir, Ramsay, (1915), p. 284

² Britain and India (1600 - 1941) by Copland, R., p. 37

in superior posts. The Act of 1853 prescribed that no Indian would be disabled from holding any office in the administration on account of religion, place of birth, descent, or colour.¹ But the clause remained a 'dead letter'² as it afforded no opportunity to the Indians to enter the Covenanted Civil Service.

When the Act of 1853 introduced the competitive examination as the mode of entry to the Covenanted Civil Service, it was thought by Macanlay and others that Indians would be able to come by open door. In actual practice, the difficulties of travel, question of finance, religious objections among the Hindus against the sea voyages, lack of educational facilities in British India, comparative ignorance in British India of the conditions of life in Britain, and the unwillingness of parents to send their sons to a foreign country at a very young age, created obstacles preventing Indians from competing for the Covenanted Civil Service on equal terms with British candidates. Only one Indian entered the Covenanted Civil Service in 1864 and by 1886 there were twelve Indians in it. Necessarily the educated sections of the Indians were disappointed by the working of the competitive examination.³ Their hopes had been raised by the declaration of Queen Victoria in 1858 to the effect that Indians would be admitted freely and impartially to offices on the basis

1 Vide Clause 87 of the Act of 1853

2 The Government of India, by MacDonalld, J.R. p. 102

3 O'Malley, op. cit. p. 210.

of education, ability and integrity, irrespective of caste or creed.¹ It was necessary, observed Coupland to make serious effort to admit Indians to higher services, but that effort was not made.²

From the late fifties of the nineteenth century the demand for the Indianisation of higher services assumed two forms - the simultaneous examinations, and the raising of the age-limits. It became the subject of agitation in both countries. In British India the demand came from the educated Hindus and Parsis. The Muslims, as a community, held aloft from it because of their educational backwardness.³ In England the agitation found a leader in Dadabhai Naoroji. In 1860 a Committee appointed by the Secretary of State recommended in favour of simultaneous examinations; but the Government refused to take any action on it. The maximum age of candidates for the Covenanted Civil Service had been reduced from twenty one years to nineteen years in 1878, and it pressed hardly on the Indian Candidates.⁴ This reduction in the age-limit added to the grievance of educated Indians, and they began to agitate both for simultaneous examination and for the raising of the age-limits.

The authorities, instead of conceding to these two demands sought to tackle the problem in a different manner. In 1870 an Act was passed

1 Quoted in "The Making of British India", by Muir, Ramsey (1951) p.

2 India - A Re-Statement by Coupland, R. (1945) p. 47

3 'The Development of the Services (1858 - 1918) by Lovett, in "The Cambridge History of India", Vol.VI. Ed. by H.H. Dodwell (1952) p. 366

4 'A Nation in Making' 'Being the Reminiscences of Fifty Years of Public Life' by Banerjee, Sir S.N. (1925), p. 44

authorising the appointment of Indians to the higher offices by nomination. After nine years of travail rules were made under the Act in 1879 which allowed one-fifth of the vacancies in the Covenanted Civil Service to be filled by nomination in British India. To give effect to this scheme, the number of appointments in the Covenanted Civil Service made on the result of the competitive examinations was reduced by one-sixth in 1886. Thus, the statutory Civil Service was brought into existence. The nominees were appointed to specific posts but did not belong to any organised service. The selection of Statutory Civilians by means of nomination was not regarded favourably by the educated Indians. Their salary was not equal to that of the Covenanted Civilians. The Statutory Civil Service was regarded as of an inferior status and position. In all, sixty nine Statutory Civilians were appointed. "The Statutory Civil Service had proved a failure as a means of admitting Indians to higher services", wrote Sir Lovett.¹

In 1879 instructions were issued by the Government of India and Secretary of State to appoint Indians in increasing numbers to the higher offices in the Un-Covenanted Civil Service, carrying a salary of Rs.200 and upwards a month. Non-Indians could be appointed to these posts with the previous sanction of the Governor General in Council or that of the

1 The Cambridge History of India, Vol. VI. op. cit (1932) p. 365

2 Aitchison Commission, op. cit (1886-87) Para 46. p. 23

Secretary of State in Council. But this did not apply to appointments in certain special departments (public works, survey, police, etc.) owing to the scarcity of qualified Indians to hold such posts.

The educated Indians were not satisfied with the policy of the Government in regard to their employment in the superior posts. Their ambitions and aspirations were stimulated by the growth of western education, and the influx of European ideas into British India. The Indian National Congress became a platform for these demands, and passed a resolution in favour of simultaneous examinations in 1885, which was re-affirmed in subsequent years. The Government of India decided to institute a public inquiry into this and other problems of the public services, and this led to the appointment of the Aitchison Commission in 1886.

The Aitchison Commission, 1886 - 87

The Government of India appointed a Public Service Commission in 1886 under the chairmanship of Sir C.U. Aitchison with instructions, broadly speaking, "to devise a scheme which may reasonably be hoped to possess the necessary elements of finality, and to do full justice to the claims of the Natives of India to higher and more extensive employment in the public service".¹

The Commission had gone exhaustively into the Indian demand for

1 Report of the Public Service Commission (Aitchison Commission) 1886 - 87, Para 1, p. 1.

simultaneous examination for the Covenanted Civil Service to be held both in England and British India, and rejected it on the following grounds.¹ Firstly, it was understood that the competitive examination was "to bear a distinctively English character, and to constitute a test of English qualifications", and as such, should be held in England, the centre of the educational system on which it was based. As education in British India was in a backward state, her educational institutions could not produce men of a high and liberal education, contemplated as a necessary qualification for admission to the Indian Civil Service. British India needed men of first-class Western education for higher administration. Indian youths willing to compete for the Covenanted Civil Service should spend a period in the stimulating and invigorating atmosphere of Britain. Secondly, it was held that the spread of Western education was so uneven among the various communities in British India that the introduction of the open competition for the Covenanted Civil Service there, would produce "inequality of a more marked kind" as it would give undue advantage to some classes and would exclude other important classes altogether. Thirdly, it was held that its effect on the development of education would be injurious. Many private establishments for this purpose would be created. The regular educational institutions would hardly be able to resist the temptation of shaping their course of study to suit the Indian Civil Service Examinations. The standard of education would

1 Ibid, para 60. p. 39 - 42

suffer. Fourthly, it was pointed out that it would be extremely difficult, if not impossible, to maintain the secrecy of examination papers. Finally, it would not be possible to secure either uniformity of test or high standard in conducting the viva voce examination owing to the lack of qualified examiners in British India.

The Commission, however, made two recommendations to remove some of the handicaps of the Indian Candidates. The age-limit then was a handicap to Indian Candidates. The Commission recommended that the maximum age limit must be raised, and that the minimum and maximum limit of age should be 19 and 25 years respectively.¹ The second suggestion of the Commission was in regard to the syllabus for examination. Indians complained that the marks assigned to Sanskrit and Arabic - the two classical languages of British India - did not adequately represent their educational value as compared with the western classical languages. They demanded that the marks assigned to Sanskrit and Arabic should be made equal to those assigned to Latin and Greek. The Commission recommended that marks assigned to these two languages should be increased. The Commission did not accept the Indian demand to include the chief vernacular languages of British India in the subjects of examination.

The statutory Civil Service failed to fulfil the purpose of its existence. It could not attract men of rank and social position and fair

¹ Ibid, para 62. p. 43 - 45

education because the members of the higher classes showed no eagerness to enter it. It had neither the status nor the prestige of the Covenanted Civil Service. It failed to satisfy the aspirations of educated Indians for higher posts. The Commission recommended its abolition.¹

The Commission recommended new measures to secure to Indians 'higher and more extensive employment in the public services'. It was suggested that the number of posts reserved under the Act of 1861, for the Covenanted Civil Service, should be reduced, and that the posts so set free be transferred to a local service, to be called the Provincial Civil Service, and to be recruited separately for India in each province.² The cadre of the Covenanted Civil Service should be reduced to a Corps d'elite by limiting its numbers to what was necessary to fill the chief administrative appointments and also such a number of smaller appointments as would ensure a complete course of training for the junior Civilians. It would continue to be recruited in Britain.³ The Covenanted Civil Service, the Commission suggested, should be re-named the "Imperial Civil Service of India". The terms 'covenanted' and 'uncovenanted' were inaccurate, misleading and unscientific.⁴

The posts released by the reduction of the schedule reserved for the Covenanted Civilians were to be amalgamated with the higher posts in the

1 Ibid, paras 67 - 72, p. 49 - 53

2 Ibid, para

3 Ibid, para 73. p. 53

4 Ibid, para 75, p. 54 - 55

executive and judicial branches of the existing un-covenanted Service. In each province these posts should be knit into a regular service to be called the Provincial Civil Service. The lower administrative posts below the proposed provincial service, but above the ministerial grades, were to be organised into a new service to be called the 'Subordinate Civil Service'. Vacancies in the provincial service should be filled partly by promotion and partly by recruitment. The rules for the recruitment to the subordinate service in each province should be carefully revised to meet the requirements of the changed situation.¹ The salaries of the members of the provincial service should be fixed on independent grounds, and should have no relation to those attached to the members of the Imperial Civil Service.² The terms of service and pension rules were to be properly laid down.³ Adequate provision for the training of recruits to the provincial service should be made.⁴ The members of the provincial civil service, the Commission suggested, should be on a 'footing of social equality' with those of the Covenanted Civil Service.⁵

The Commission made a number of recommendations with regard to the special departments. They suggested that higher posts should be organised into appropriate Imperial Service, the middle ones into Provincial Service, and the lower ones into Subordinate Service, wherever possible.

1 Ibid, para 82. p. 62-3

2 Ibid, para 86. p.66

3 Ibid, p. 67

4 Ibid, para 82. p. 64

5 Ibid, para 75, p. 55

The Imperial branch was to be materially reduced and recruited exclusively from Britain. Indians were to predominate in the other two branches. The rules as to qualification, recruitment, probation and general conditions of service in regard to the Provincial Branch of this service should be similar to those proposed for the Provincial Services.

The recommendations were implemented by the Government with a few modifications. The name of the Covenanted Civil Service was not changed into "The Imperial Civil Service", but into the "Civil Service of India". It was popularly known as the Indian Civil Service, or the I.C.S. The cadre of the Covenanted Civil Service was not reduced to transfer some scheduled posts to the Provincial Civil Service. A certain number of posts in the schedule were thrown open to the members of the Provincial Civil Service, and came to be known as "listed posts" to which officers of that service in each province could be appointed direct without any of them being transferred to the cadre of the Civil Service of India. Well-organised services in addition to the existing well-knit Covenanted Civil Service, such as the Provincial Civil Service and the Subordinate Civil Service came into existence. There was a considerable improvement in the efficiency of administration. "The reforms which they introduced undoubtedly resulted in a great improvement in the standard of every service", observed the Islington Commission.¹

¹ Report of the Royal Commission on the Public Services in India. (1912 - 1915). 1917, Cd. 8382, para 7 p. 11

In the first decade of the twentieth century many important changes were slowly beginning to manifest themselves in the public services of British India. The Royal Commission upon Decentralisation¹ made comprehensive suggestions for the relaxation of the control of the Central Government over Provincial Governments with regard to the organisation of the provincial and subordinate services. The police service received the close attention of the Commission in 1905. Well-organised police services - Imperial Police service consisting of Europeans recruited entirely in England, and Provincial and Subordinate ones recruited exclusively in British India - came into existence on the implementation of their recommendations.² Lord Curzon made vigorous efforts and took a number of measures to organise a few departments. He also effected a number of reforms in revising and simplifying the methods and procedure of administration. His efforts began to bear fruit gradually.

The effects of these changes on the services arising out of the recommendations of the Aitchison-Commission, the Fraser Commission, Royal Commission Upon Decentralisation, and the efforts of Lord Curzon were significant. By the beginning of the twentieth century British India had been equipped with a highly organised, trained and professional Civil Service in all important departments of the Government "fully geared to

1 Report of the Royal Commission upon Decentralisation in India, 1909, Cd. 4360, paras 154 - 159, p. 62-66.

2 Report of the Indian Police Commission (Fraser Commission) 1905, paras 54, 57, 58, 61, 64, 66, p.38-9, 41-3, 44-5, 47-9, and 50.

the growing complexities of administration". The administration reached new levels of efficiency and integrity.¹ Sir John Strachey also spoke of the high standards of efficiency and integrity prevailing in British India among European Civil Servants and Indians too.²

Indians were not satisfied with the recommendations made by the Aitchison Commission and the action taken on them in regard to their representation in the higher administration. The system of 'listed posts' as a means of employing Indians in higher offices was far from satisfactory. Firstly, the men appointed to the 'listed posts' did not pass into higher service, and therefore always remained inferior. Secondly the persons appointed were too old to fill their places with energy and drive. Thirdly, the men had fallen into grooves of the Provincial Service and had lost self-confidence and initiative. The system of the Provincial Service could not adequately meet the Indian aspirations for higher employments.² The demand for simultaneous examination had been kept alive. In 1895 the House of Commons passed a Resolution in favour of it. To this Resolution the Government did not consider it either necessary or desirable to give effect. But the agitation for the representation of Indians in the higher administration went on.

1 Griffiths, Sir Percival, op. cit. p. 202

2 India - Its Administration & Progress, by Strachey, Sir J. (1911) p. 91

The Islington Commission (1912 - 1915), 1917.

The Indian demand for simultaneous examination for the I.C.S. remained unfulfilled. In 1911 a notable debate took place in the Imperial Legislative Council, which brought to a head the agitation which had been long growing among politically conscious Indians for a larger share in the higher services. The progress in this respect was very slow. There was a remarkable change in the attitude of the Muslims towards the question of simultaneous examination from what it was in 1886-87. Almost all of the outstanding and eminent Muslim leaders - Mr. M.A. Jinnah (later on Quai-de-Azam), His Highness the Aga Khan, Mr. A.K. Fashul Hug and others - joined their weighty voices with those of the leaders of the Congress in demanding simultaneous examination for the Indian Civil Service. The structure of the Services had grown considerably complex and needed some examination. There was a great rise in price levels affecting the purchasing power of money and consequently relief had to be given to the European members of the various services. An inquiry into the salary structure and other conditions of the Services became necessary. Once more the Government resorted to the usual expedient, and appointed a public service commission under the chairmanship of Lord Islington in 1912.

The Commission in their approach to the various issues before them were guided by three main considerations:-¹ (a) the need of maintaining

¹ Report of the Royal Commission on the Public Services in India (Islington Commission), (1912-1915), 1917, Cd. 8382, para 23, p. 18

high standards of civil administration in British India, (b) the need to safeguard the paramount interests of British rule, and (c) the desirability of satisfying the reasonable aspirations of Indians and of promoting harmonious relations between Indians and Europeans for the sake of good government.

The Commission made a number of suggestions in regard to the organisation.¹ The services should be organised, where necessary, into higher and lower branches on the basis of work, and not on the basis of race or salary, or any other artificial distinction. The Civil Servants promoted from a lower to a higher service should be treated identically with those directly recruited and should be made full-fledged members of the service, except in the case of the I.C.S. In regard to the practice of employing army officers on civil duties, they proposed for its discontinuance, except in a few departments (medical, public works, railway, etc.,) where their employment was necessary to maintain a war reserve of officers or for efficiency. The Commission approved of the existing practice of the employment of I.C.S. officers in higher administrative posts even in special departments (post office, salt, finance, customs, etc.) in the interest of inter-departmental co-ordination and general efficiency. It was inaccurate, the Commission pointed out, to designate the services under the Imperial Civil Service working under

1 Ibid. paras 24 - 30, p. 18 - 21.

the Central Government as Provincial Services. These should be termed as Central Services. The services, on the other hand, which were organized provincially and which were working under provincial governments should bear the name of their province. In other words, there were to be four categories of Civil Services - Imperial, Central, Provincial and Subordinate.

The Commission enquired into the problem of recruitment to the various services from the point of view of place, fixation of proportions for Indians, and the methods. As regards the place of appointment, higher services were divided by the Commission into four groups.¹ Firstly, there were the services which were to be recruited exclusively in British India. Secondly, there were the Indian Civil Service and Indian Police Service. These Services were to be recruited predominantly in Britain, though some recruitment was to be made in British India for the first time. In the third group should come the services like education, medical, public works, engineering, etc. and these should be recruited partly in Britain and partly in British India "on grounds of policy and efficiency". An admixture of both the Eastern and Western elements in these services was necessary to promote better understanding between the two communities. In the fourth group should be placed certain scientific and technical services to be recruited both in Britain and British India. Eventually, the normal requirements of these services would be met in British India. In the meantime some recruitment was to be made in Britain owing to the lack of technically qualified men in

¹ Ibid, para 31-2. p. 22-3

British India. Efforts should be made to develop technical education in British India.

These recommendations about the place of recruitment would facilitate, it was hoped, the admission of Indians in increasing numbers to the higher branches of the various services.

The Commission made detailed recommendations in regard to the fixation of specific proportions for Indians in those services which were to be recruited partly in Britain and partly in British India.¹ In making appointments to the various services, the Government should keep in mind, the Commission suggested, the desirability of providing for the representation of the various communities in the services. The power of nomination should be properly utilised for this.²

The Commission were of opinion that the time was not ripe for the general adoption of open competition.³ The Commission recommended that the nomination system was to continue for recruitment to the services. The main reason for this was the backward state of Western education in British India. Not only this, English education was diffused unevenly among the different communities and among different provinces. In a situation like this, recruitment through competitive examinations would exclude from public services important sections of the Indian population. The Commission argued that with the improvement of education, the competitive system could be adopted with advantage.⁴ The change-over

1 Ibid, para 36. p. 27

2 Ibid, para 46, p. 31 - 33

3 Ibid, para 42. p. 30

4 Ibid, para 42. p. 30

from nomination to competition must not be too sudden and must be warranted by the existing conditions. The nomination system was to be carried on with the following safe-guards against its likely abuses.¹ Firstly, the impartiality of the selecting agency was to be above challenge. Secondly, adequate and full publicity was to be given to the vacancies to be filled, to attract a large number of candidates. Thirdly, the credentials of candidates were to be submitted to expert scrutiny. Fourthly, no outside pressure was to be brought to bear on the authorities responsible for making the choice. Fifthly, all recruits must possess a minimum educational qualification. Finally, nomination was to be carried on with the help of a Selection Committee composed of officials and non-officials. It was also suggested that the nomination system should be tempered by limited competition. Direct recruitment was to be supplemented by promotion from lower services. But the Commission did not want too much emphasis to be put on promotion as a method of recruitment, as it was likely to jeopardise the initiative, vigour and freshness of outlook.²

Definite principle was enumerated by the Commission in regard to the determination of salary structure of the various Civil Servants. The criterion recommended by the Commission was that "Government should

1 Ibid, para 57. p. 27 - 8 .

2 Ibid, para 44. p. 30 -31

pay so much, and so much only to their employees, as is necessary to obtain recruits of the right stamp, and to maintain them in such a degree of comfort and dignity as will shield them from temptation and keep them efficient for the term of their service".¹ Detailed suggestions were made for the application of this principle to the various categories of the Civil Servants. In some services, different rates were to be paid to Indians and Europeans for the same type of work. The services recruited wholly in British India were to carry salaries in accordance with Indian conditions. In certain services no distinction in salary was to be made on racial grounds. Indians recruited in Europe should be paid as Europeans.² The graded system of pay was to be replaced by incremental scales based on the compartment system.³ In short, the revision of pay scale was to take place on the basis not only of the general rise in prices but also on racial grounds, with some exceptions.

The Commission also made elaborate suggestions for the revision of other terms and conditions of service. Rules relating to allowances of different kinds were to be simplified and rationalised.⁴ The separate leave rules for the Europeans and Indians were to be simplified.⁵

1 Ibid, para. 49. p. 34.

2 Ibid, para 55 - 57, p. 36-39

3 Ibid, para 51, p. 35.

4 Ibid, paras 66 - 71, p. 45 - 48.

5 Ibid, paras 74 - 82 p. 49-54

The pension rules were to be liberalised. The members of the Indian Civil Service who, unlike other categories of Civil Servants, had to contribute to their pension fund, were not to do so in future. The possibility of instituting family pensions for certain groups of higher civil servants was to be explored. The system of family pensions already existed for the I.C.S. officers.¹ These recommendations were likely to improve and simplify considerably the various terms and conditions of service.

The Commission made an exhaustive inquiry into the public services in British India and recorded an immense volume of evidence, official and non-official in each province. The report was completed in 1915, but owing to the outbreak of World War I it was not published till 1917.

Some of the suggestions made by the Commission were very valuable. The proposals regarding the re-organisation of the structure of the Civil Service were quite useful. But the recommendation of the Commission about the continuation of the nomination system as the mode of recruitment was probably not commendable. The Indian witnesses of all classes communities and shades of opinion were opposed to the nomination system.² The emphasis put by the Commission on the communal and provincial representation in superior services was not perhaps quite sound, and was not liked by the majority of Indian witnesses.³ The racial discrim-

1 Ibid, paras 87-96, pp 55-60

2 See the Minutes of Evidence taken by the Commission.

3 Ibid.

-ation introduced into the salary structure was not perhaps conducive to the morale of the Civil Servants. Indians resented the violation of the principle of equal pay for equal work. They also objected to the increase of salaries as these put a great burden on the exchequer which was too inadequate for development purposes. The proposals of the Commission regarding the representation of Indians in large numbers in higher service fell short of Indian aspirations. The effect of the report, stated the authors of the Montagu-Chelmsford Report "was to irritate rather than to satisfy Indian opinion".¹

The Government could not take immediate action on the recommendations of the Commission because of the 1914-18 war. By about 1919-20, many of its recommendations were begun to be put into practice, with such modifications as seemed desirable in the light of the changing conditions. Most of the Civil Servants were of the view that full account was not taken of the rise in price levels. The recommendations of the Commission regarding the entry of Indians into higher services became outmoded before they were implemented, owing to a very momentous statement made in the House of Commons on August 20, 1917, about the goal of British Policy in British India. "The policy of His Majesty's Government, with which the Government of India are in complete accord, is that of the increasing association of Indians in every branch of the

¹ Report on Indian Constitutional reforms (Montagu-Chelmsford Report), Cd. 9109, 1918, para 12. p. 10

administration, and the gradual development of self-governing institutions with a view to the progressive realisation of responsible government in India as an integral part of the British Empire."¹ The effect of this historic announcement was to transfer authority gradually to Indian hands. The 'system of absolute government' would yield to responsible government which till then was unknown in the chequered history of British India. The need for the Indianisation of higher administration became urgent and essential. The introduction of responsible government in British India provinces would lead to the progressive curtailment of bureaucratic rule. The announcement marked the end of one epoch, and the beginning of a new chapter in the history of the Civil Service in British India.

IV

(1921 - 1947)

The Montagu-Chelmsford Report, 1918.

We may now examine the views of the Montagu-Chelmsford Report on the Civil Service. The report focussed attention on the following things regarding the Civil Service.

The report advocated a liberal policy in regard to the admission of Indians into higher administration. The development of responsible government which was to be introduced in British India for the first

1 Ibid, para 6. p. 5

time, would depend on the extent to which Indians were associated with higher administration. Practical experience in higher administration would not only make Indians sober, realistic and mature in their outlook and judgment but would provide British India with public men versed in the whole "art of Government". The report, however, struck a note of caution by insisting that too rapid Indianisation might impair the tradition and standards of the Civil Servants. A leaven of British elements in the I.C.S. and in other higher services would be needed for administrative efficiency and proper development of self-governing institutions. There must be a system of appointment in British India for all the public services for which there was recruitment in Britain open to Europeans and Indians alike. Finally, they suggested specific proportions for Indians in the I.C.S. and other superior services.¹

The authors of the report examined the proper position of the Civil Servants vis-a-vis the ministers. The members of the I.C.S. were asked to recognise the change in their position in the new constitutional set-up. They would be called upon to act as the principal and impartial advisers to the ministers in the formulation of policies² and to carry out the policies so formulated with efficiency,

1 Report on Indian Constitutional Reforms (Montagu-Chelmsford Report), Cd. 9109, 1918, paras 313-317, p. 250-253.

2 Ibid, para 325, p.257, and para 327, p. 260

loyalty and impartiality. The British members of the Civil Service were asked to actively guide the growth and development of self-governing institutions in British India.¹ The politicians were called upon to realise that the effective and smooth functioning of parliamentary government would depend on the system of proper relations based on co-operation, good-will, mutual tolerance and confidence between the Ministers and Civil Servants.

The report also suggested that adequate provisions should be made to safeguard the legitimate rights and interests of the Civil Servants. This was done on two grounds. First, the Civil Servants would need this protection if they were to carry on their functions with objectivity and efficiency when the ministers would be their masters in a limited way. Second, many Europeans would not like to continue in the various Civil Services, and these services, on the other hand, would not be able to attract European recruits of the right stamp, unless a formal guarantee of their rights and interests was assured. If the British elements in the services faded away too soon, and too much, administrative efficiency and the infant self-governing institutions would suffer.²

1 Ibid, para 325, p. 258, and para 327, p. 260

2 Ibid, para 325, p. 258

The reforms suggested by this report in regard to the Civil Service had important effects on the personnel policy of the Government. We may here offer a few comments on their suggestions. The authors of this report showed considerable enthusiasm in expecting that the European members of the I.C.S. and other superior services would act as guides to the growth and development of self-governing institutions in British India. Future events did not justify it fully in all cases. Some of the higher Civil Servants opposed the grant of constitutional reforms to British India on the ground that she was not ripe for it. The new situation was repugnant to quite a substantial number of European Civil Servants who chose to retire on a pension proportionate to their length of service after the inauguration of the Act of 1919.¹ This attitude on the part of the Civil Servants who refused to serve their new political masters, but elected to retire, was nothing peculiar as it might be true of any bureaucracy that might be called upon to surrender its power.

On the other hand, the majority of the witnesses, who were ministers, before the Reforms Enquiry Committee of 1924, set up to enquire into the working of the reforms, stated that they and their Indian Civil Service Secretaries worked together smoothly and harmon-

¹ Report of the Indian Statutory Commission, Vol. I. Cmd. 3568, 1930. para 294, p. 267

iously.¹ Some Ministers, however, were of the view that they did not receive full co-operation from all their senior officers.² Summarising the evidence before them, the Committee said: "We consider that there can be no doubt but that the members of the services generally loyally co-operated with the Ministers in working the reforms. There may have been a few instances in which this was not the case, but we believe they were exceptional. We consider that the evidence before us also goes to show that the members of the permanent services did not hesitate to carry out any policy once it had been decided upon by the Ministers".³ Even the members of the Committee who wrote a minority report came more or less to the same conclusion when they said, "Our conclusion upon a review of the evidence is that generally speaking the attitude of the members of the services was one of loyal co-operation, though in a few exceptional cases it might not have been so".⁴ In view of this it would appear to be reasonable, we think, to state that the members of the superior services did co-operate with the ministers in working the reforms, in actual practice. Even the safeguards recommended by the report to protect the rights and interests of Civil Servants proved to be no obstacles to the good relationships between the Civil Servants and Ministers.

1 Report of the Reforms Enquiry Committee, 1924 (Muddiman Committee), Cmd. 2360, 1924, para 31, p. 30 - 31.

2 Ibid, paras. 28, 29, and 30, p. 28-30

3 Ibid, para 32, p. 31

4 Ibid, p. 163

The authors of the report, it was suggested by some critics, did not display much far-sightedness in their recommendation regarding the rate of Indianisation of higher services. The time had come, they thought, to suggest the cessation of further recruitment to the I.C.S. and other superior services by the Secretary of State. Some Civil Servants themselves held the same view. Sir Lancelot Graham said that there was no point in sending out from Britain a privileged class of Civil Servants if British India was to achieve responsible government.¹ Referring to the I.C.S., Professor Percival Spear said, "a service which under a Colonial system must govern as well as administer should be remodelled as soon as the Colony sets course steadily towards self-government".² The Indian Civil Service, he thought, should have been subordinate to the Government of India.

The Government of India Act, 1919, made ample provisions for the protection of the rights and interests of the members of the I.C.S. and other Civil Servants. Section 96(B) of the Act dealt with the rights and interests of all categories of Civil Servants while sections 97 to 100 dealt with those of the members of the I.C.S. The Instrument of Instructions issued to the Governors required them to take personal interest in safeguarding the legitimate rights and interests of the

1 The Asiatic Review, Vol. 47: (1951) p. 210

2 Percival Spear, "The Transition from Dependence to Sovereign Status", 'The Constitutional Aspect', The Asiatic Review, Vol. XLVII (1951) p.120

Civil Servants and to secure the due representation of the various Communities in the provincial Civil Service. At the centre, however, there was no transfer of political power to any significant extent. Consequently, the Central Civil Services, and the members of the All-India Services, working under the Central Government, remained in the same position as before and there were no ministerial masters for them.

The Civil Services in British India began to lose their old charms. Several factors were responsible for this. The rise in prices deflated the real value of their salary. The financial stringency of the post-war years made it difficult for the Government of India to adjust their emoluments to the new level of prices. Hence the economic position of the services was a source of anxiety to them. The Act of 1919 led to a progressive diminution of the power of bureaucracy and consequently the lure of power and prestige suffered a great deal. The persistent criticism, not often well-informed, inflicted on the Civil Servants by the members of the Legislature in the early years of reform had a discouraging effect on them. The political barometer was unsteady. The non-co-operation movement of 1920-21 rendered the work of the head of the district and police officials extraordinarily difficult. As a consequence, the number of British Candidates for the London Competition for the Indian Civil Service and other superior services, began to fall.¹ On the other hand, the rate of Indianisation

1. The Simon Commission, op. cit. (1936) para 294, p. 267

of the higher services adopted in 1919 was regarded by Indians as inadequate and illiberal.¹ There was, thus, a compelling need for a fresh, full and impartial inquiry into these and other questions, and that led to the appointment of the Lee Commission in 1923.

The Lee Commission, 1924.

A Royal Commission on the superior services in British India was appointed in 1923 under the Chairmanship of Lord Lee of Fareham. The Commission made a number of recommendations which may be briefly discussed here. The Commission reviewed the position of the two groups of services— The All-India Services and the Central Services - since the provincial services were no longer under the control of the Secretary of State. The Commission divided the All-India Services into two groups, and recommended that the All-India Services which had been operating in the Transferred departments² should no longer be recruited, and controlled by the Secretary of State. The services dealt with in this manner were the higher education, agriculture, veterinary, and the roads and building branches of the engineering services. These services were provincialised and their recruitment was

1 Indian Statutory Commission (Memorandum submitted by the Government of Bengal to the Indian Statutory Commission, Vol. 7.III, 1930, para 281, p. 192.

2 Under the Government of India Act, 1919, the provincial administration was divided into two halves - transferred half and the reserved half. Over the transferred departments the Ministers responsible to the Legislature exercised control subject to certain limitations. In the transferred departments, control remained in the hands of the Executive Councilors responsible to Governors.

handed over^{to} the provincial governments. This was done in order to bring things into conformity with the partial transfer of political power under the Montagu-Chelmsford reforms. Status quo was to be maintained in regard to the position of the existing members of the All-India services operating in the transferred field. As regards the second group of All-India services operating in the reserved departments, the Commission recommended that these should be recruited and controlled by the Secretary of State. The services concerned were the I.C.S., I.P.S., Indian Service of Engineers (Irrigation Branch) and the Indian Forest Service outside Bombay and Burma.¹ These four services were to be retained on all All-India basis. This was justified on the ground that these services were operating in departments for which the Secretary of State still remained responsible in a general way to the British Parliament.

With regard to the Central Services the Commission suggested that all the higher appointments to the political, ecclesiastical and imperial customs departments should be vested in the Secretary of State. On the other hand, the Government of British India would be responsible for the control and recruitment to all the appointments in the rest of the Central Services. But recruitment to the higher posts in the Railway, post and telegraph departments would be shared between the Secretary of State and the Government of India.²

1 Ibid, para 13, p. 7.

2 Ibid, para 19, p. 9 - 10

The delegation of power by the Secretary of State in regard to the recruitment and control of various services was also conducive to the progressive Indianisation of higher services.

The second main recommendation of this Commission was in regard to the Indianisation of the higher services which were still to be recruited and controlled by the Secretary of State. For the Indian Civil Service, the Commission suggested that twenty per cent. of the superior posts should be filled by promotion from the provincial Civil Service, and that direct recruits should be Europeans and Indians in equal numbers.¹ For the Indian Police Service direct recruitment was to be in the proportion of five Europeans to three Indians, while twenty per cent. of the vacancies would be filled by promotion from the provincial police service.² In the Indian Forestry Service, the recruitment proposed was seventy-five percent for Indians and twenty-five percent for Europeans. In the Irrigation Branch of the Indian Service of Engineers, the Commission recommended direct recruitment of Europeans and Indians in equal numbers, with twenty percent. of the vacancies to be filled by promotion from the provincial services.⁴ As regards the Central Services, the Commission suggested that twenty-five percent. of the vacancies in the political department would be

1 Ibid, para 35, p. 18-19

2 Ibid, para 37. p. 19-20

3 Ibid, para 39, p. 21

4 Ibid, para 40. p. 21-22

filled by Indians and the rest by Europeans; and a much higher proportion for Indians in other departments.¹

The third recommendation of the Commission related to the conditions of services. The Civil Servants were demanding the increase of their salaries and improvement of the other conditions of services, owing to the rise in the cost of living. In political circles in British India there was a strong opposition to any increase in pay scales as it would put a strain on the Indian exchequer. The Commission decided neither to reduce the basic pay of the services nor to increase it all round. They thought to strike a middle course. They suggested some improvement in the pay scale of a few services - I.P.S., Indian Forest Service and the Indian Service of Engineers.² At the same time the Commission proposed to give substantial financial relief to the European members of the Services on account of the higher cost of their various commitments. They recommended an increase in overseas pay, facilities to remit money to their dependants in Britain at a favourable rate of exchange, and the provision of a specified number of return passages to England for them and their families.³ Finally, the Commission advocated some liberalisation of pension rules for all higher Civil Servants, and also the facility of medical aid for them.

The recommendations of the Commission were not regarded as quite

1 Ibid, para 42. p. 22 - 23

2 Ibid, Paras 52 & 59 (p.28-29 and 32-33).

3 Ibid, Paras 53 - 54 (p.29-31; Paras 62-65 (p.35 - 37)

4. Ibid, Paras 66 - 73, p. 38 - 42

satisfactory by many European Civil Servants. Some of them thought that the Commission was too liberal in regard to the Indianisation of higher administration. Nor were they happy with regard to the financial relief suggested by the Commission as it was inadequate from their point of view. On the other hand, in the political circles in British India, it was felt that the Commission had been too partial and liberal to the Civil Servants. There was considerable opposition in the Indian Central legislature to the proposed increase to the emoluments of the European Civil Servants in the shape of overseas pay and other allowances. Indians were not satisfied with the rate of Indianisation proposed in the I.C.S. and other superior services. But in fairness to the Commission it must be said that the rate of Indianisation proposed for the various services was much higher than what it was in the past. The full effect of the changes advocated by them was yet to show itself and it would take time before the new recruits would rise to the position of importance.¹

The Government decided to implement the recommendations of the Commission with minor modifications. The increase of emoluments failed to attract any adequate number of British young men to the I.C.S. and other higher services. The Indian services were beginning to lose their appeal to the British youths. It was partly due to the less attractive

1 Memoranda submitted by the Government of India and India Office to the Indian Statutory Commission, Vol. V. Part II (1930), para 21. p. 818

emoluments than in the past and the gradual change in the position of the Civil Servants in view of the constitutional reforms. It was also due to the availability of well-paid jobs for highly qualified persons in Britain itself. Again, the entry of Indians to the I.C.S. began to increase rapidly with the passage of time. The introduction of the competitive examination for the I.C.S. in British India in 1922 also contributed to this development. London, however, remained the main route of entry to the I.C.S., but the Indian youths were no longer afraid of going to England to compete for the I.C.S. During the early thirties of the present century, Indians were successful in large numbers to create a headache for the Secretary of State for British India. It was found that enough British candidates were not forthcoming to fill up the quota reserved for them.¹ In 1936 the Secretary of State took recourse to nomination to make up the deficiencies. The Universities in British India strongly protested against nomination. Nomination, however, went on for the British Candidates for the I.C.S. until the recruitment to the I.C.S. was suspended during the world War II. In British India the system of open competition for the I.C.S. was tempered by nomination when recruitment for it was begun. It was done to provide for the representation of various Communities to the service. From 1925

¹ Report of the Government of India Secretariat Committee, 1937. (Appendix VI), p. 67

the Government of India pursued a definite policy of Communal representation in the various services. The object was to redress "Communal inequalities". In 1934 the Government of India passed a comprehensive resolution laying down definite proportions for the various communities in the All-India Services, Central Services, and the Subordinate Services under the Control of the Government of India.¹ In 1943 more definite provisions were made for the representation of scheduled castes and tribes in the services.² Gradually more castes among the Hindus began to clamour for this. These might give satisfaction to the various communities, castes and tribes, but they were unfortunate from the point of view of administrative efficiency and integrity.

A Public Service Commission was set up in British India in 1926. The Act of 1919 embodied a provision for such a body.³ The Lee Commission made a strong plea for establishing such a body without delay as a safeguard against unhealthy political or personal influences over the selection of the Civil Servants.⁴ The public service commission, when set up, was entrusted with the function of recruitment like the Civil Service Commission in Britain but was also made responsible for

1 Government of India, Home Department Resolution, dated 4 July 1934 (published in the records of the Joint Committee on Indian Constitutional Reforms, Section, 1933-34, Vol. II (1934) H.L.6 (II) H.C.5 (II) Record C.I. p. 315-318.

2 Government of India Resolution, No.23/5/42 - 11 August 1943

3 Section 96 (c) of the Government of India Act, 1919.

4 Lee Commission (Cmd. 2128, 1929) para 24. p. 13

advising the Government on two important matters - disciplinary control and protection of the services.¹ Detailed regulations were issued regarding the exact composition and functions of the Commission. Madras among the provinces in British India took the initiative in setting up such a body.

The service in British India received the close attention of three important bodies in the early thirties of the twentieth century - the Indian Statutory Commission,² a sub-Committee of the Round Table Conference,³ and the Joint Select Committee of both Houses of the British Parliament.⁴

In the first place, they dealt with the future of the All-India Services, five of which were operating. The Simon Commission recommended that two of these services - the I.C.S. and I.P.S. - should be recruited on an All-India basis by the Secretary of State. They also prescribed the employment of a sufficient number of Indian Medical Service Officers in the provinces for the usual reasons - the maintenance of a reserve for war purposes and the desirability of providing European doctors for the treatment of European civil servants and their families.

1 Ibid, para 27, p. 14

2 Report of the Indian Statutory Commission (Cmd. 3568, 1930) Vol. I and (Cmd 3569, 1930), Vol. II (Simon Commission).

3 Report of the Sub-Committee (Services) No. VIII of the First Round Table Conference (1930-31), Proceedings of the Sub-Committee, Part II

4 Report of the Joint Select Committee on Indian Constitutional Reforms, Vol. I. part I. (Session 1933-34), 1934, H.L.C. (Part I) and R.C. 5. (in Part I).

The Joint Committee also were of the view that three All-India Services - the I.C.S., I.P.S. and I.M.S. - should be recruited on an All-India basis by the Secretary of State and that the control of their conditions of service must remain in his hands. The position was to be reviewed after some years in the light of experience. The Sub-Committee of the Round Table Conference were of the view that the I.C.S. and I.P.S. should be recruited on an All-India basis; but some members were opposed to it. The majority of the Sub-Committee held the view that the recruiting and controlling authority with regard to these services must be vested in the Government of India, while a minority held the view that authority must be vested in the Secretary of State. The Sub-Committee were of the view that there should be no Civil Branch of the Indian Medical Service, and that the question of appointing British doctors for the purposes stated above, should be left to the Governments in British India. As regards the Indian Service of Engineers (Irrigation Branch) and the Indian Forest Service, the Simon Commission, while emphasising the advantage of maintaining their All-India character, left their future to the consideration of the authorities in British India. The Sub-Committee of the R.I.C. and the Joint Committee recommended that they should be provincialised.

The second aspect of the services dealt with by these bodies was in regard to the rate of Indianisation in these services. The Simon

Commission agreed with the ratio fixed by the Lee Commission for both Europeans and Indians in the I.C.S. and I.P.S. A strong British element in these two services was necessary not only in the interest of administrative efficiency but for the sake of ensuring impartiality and objectivity in administration in a country where there were acute conflicts between the Hindus and Muslims. The Joint Committee held the view that British India would need a strong British element in the two security services in particular, and in the Railway, Forest and Engineering Services to some extent. The majority of the Services Sub-Committee (S.T.C.) admitted the necessity of maintaining British element in the I.C.S. and I.P.S., but they could not agree as to the exact ratio to be reserved for them.

The third thing examined by these bodies related to the representation of the various Communities to the Services. The various minority communities became very vocal regarding their representation in the different services. Both the Services sub-committee (S.T.C.) and the Joint Committee emphasised the need to secure a fair and adequate representation to the different communities in the services consistently with the considerations of efficiency and the possession of necessary qualifications. The Governor-General and Governors should have a special responsibility to see that the legitimate interests of the minorities in the services were being safeguarded and implemented effectively.

The fourth important question dealt with by these bodies was in regard to the adequate provision for the constitutional safeguards and protection of the legitimate rights and interests of the Civil Servants. The Simon Commission strongly recommended the necessity for embodying in the Constitution adequate provisions for safe-guarding the rights and privileges of all the civil servants in general and the ones recruited by the Secretary of State in particular. The services sub-committee (S.S.C.) were also emphatic in recommending the same thing. The Joint Committee had gone into this question in a very comprehensive manner. They approved of all the rights and safe-guards proposed for all the Civil Servants who were to be recruited, and controlled, by the Secretary of State. Without such provisions offering reasonable security, European recruits of the best type would not be attracted to service in British India. The actual safeguards proposed in the White Paper for all Civil Servants in regard to the security of tenure and fairness in disciplinary control were accepted and advocated by the Committee. The Committee also endorsed the proposal that a special responsibility was to be imposed on the Governor-General and Governors to secure to "the members of the public services any rights provided for them in the Constitution Act", and to safeguard their "legitimate interests". The Committee also thought two more steps were necessary in this respect. It was desirable to make it clear that All-India, Central and Provincial Civil Servants were essentially the servants of the Crown. It was

expected that such a clarification of their status would contribute to the development of healthy and sound conventions, as in Britain, to govern the relations between the Civil Servants on the one hand and the ministers and legislatures on the other. Again, it would be essential that the central and provincial legislatures respectively should give general legal sanction to the rights and status of the Central and Provincial Services.

Finally the significance of the role of the public service commission in maintaining adequate standards of recruitment and thereby ensuring efficiency in administration was duly emphasised by all these three bodies. Already, the Government of India and the Government of Madras set up these Commissions. Other provinces were yet to do so. The Simon Commission pointed out these Commissions would be of great advantage to the ministers. "They should be freed from the technical work of recruitment, which is no part of Ministers' duties, and even more important, they should not be exposed to the charge, however ill-founded, of using their position to promote family or communal interests at the expense of the efficiency, or the just administration, of the services".¹ In order to maintain the impartiality and independence of the members of the Commission, they must be completely removed from political influence. To secure this, firstly, no further employment under the Government should be open to them except the higher officers in the Commission itself, or an appointment on the Central Commission. Secondly, they

¹ The Simon Commission, op. cit. para 334, p. 296

must be appointed by an authority independent of all party interests and they should not be removed from office except by the same authority.

The Government of India Act, 1935, embodied elaborate provisions to safeguard the rights and interests of the two categories of civil servants - the one recruited by the Secretary of State and the other by the authorities in British India.¹ The Instrument of Instructions issued to the Governor-General and Governors defined their responsibility with respect to the rights and interests of the services. The ratio of Indianisation fixed by the Lee Commission was to continue in the I.C.S. and I.P.S. to be recruited by the Secretary of State. The Civil branch of the Indian Medical Service was to remain, while all other All-India services were provincialised. The proportions reserved for the various communities in the services became more definite. The Act of 1935 contained elaborate provisions relating to the organisation and functions of the public service commissions.

The Act of 1935 extended the scope of responsible government in the provinces, although subject to safeguards. But opportunity was not taken to re-organise, critics pointed out, the structure of the services to bring them into conformity with the transfer of political power. The provincial ministers responsible to the provincial legislature would have no complete control over the two security services -

1 The Government of India Act, 1935, Chapter II, Part I.

I.C.S. and I.P.S. - working under them as they would be recruited and controlled by the Secretary of State. The majority of the sub-committee (M.T.C.) suggested that the recruiting and controlling authority in regard to these two services should be the Government of India, and not the Secretary of State, but it was ignored. The British Indian delegation in their joint memorandum urged that All-India services should be organised on a provincial basis and recruited and controlled exclusively by the provincial governments.¹ It was felt that responsible government in British India would not function successfully so long as "the steel frame of the services" secure in rights and privileges, and used to an atmosphere of prestige and unquestioned obedience, remained beyond the control of the ministers. The special safeguards provided for them by the Government of India Act, 1935, strengthened such fears.

The working of the provincial autonomy which was put into operation in 1937 dispelled such apprehensions. The members of the two security services - the I.C.S. and I.P.S. - had shown a spirit of accommodation and a power of adaptation to the new situation created by the Act of 1935. The members of these two services had enjoyed 'happier relations with their ministerial chiefs' in some provinces.² But in some provinces, however, the relations between the ministers and the higher Civil Servants

¹ Report of the Joint Committee, op. cit., para 296, p. 182

² Indian Politics (1936-1942) by Coupland, R. (1943) p. 81.

had not been quite cordial and satisfactory at the initial stage because many of the ministers who took part in political movements and agitations against the Government were arrested and imprisoned by the members of these two Services. Consequently, many of the Ministers could not overcome their distrust of these officials very easily. The lack of experience on the part of many ministers was also partly responsible for this. Gradually, the ministers began to recognise the value of the work of the higher Civil Servants and also began to take them into confidence. Relations improved as time went on.¹ Sir Harry Haig stated, "Congress and the services, starting about as far apart as it was possible to be, learned to work together. The Congress learned the stubborn facts of administration. The Services learned the implications of democratic control."² The position of the members of the Central and All-India services remained as before, as there was no responsible government at the centre.

Before we pass on to discuss the problems of the Civil Service in Pakistan, we might reflect briefly on the work and professional standards of the Civil Servants in British India. Since the twenties of the present century the work of the Civil Servants had been growing increasingly complex and arduous. Several causes were responsible for this. Political

1 Ibid, p. 119 - 120

2 The Asiatic Review, Vol. 36. 1940 (July) p. 126.

movements and agitations, sometimes quite violent and revolutionary, began to produce unrest and turmoil on a wide scale. The Hindu-Muslim conflicts were becoming increasingly acute and sharp. By the end of 1946, British India was drifting towards a 'chaos'.¹ All these rendered the task of maintaining law and order extremely difficult. Again, the masses of British India were in the grip of appalling poverty and illiteracy. Their demand for economic development and for the extension of education became keen and insistent. Comprehensive programmes of socio-economic development were launched by the provincial ministers since 1937. These added to the task of the higher officials who had to undertake more work. The introduction of a parliamentary system of government in the provinces under the Acts of 1919 and 1935 also increased their work. They had to explain and justify their actions to some extent to the Ministers and Executive Councillors who had to meet the questions, debates and discussions, as well as criticism of the administration in the legislature. The preparation of the materials for these fell on the Senior Officers. Lastly, the outbreak of World War II added to their work to a great extent. The Government had to take the various measures to deal with the problems created by War. Economic controls had to be imposed to tackle the shortage of goods and services. The resources of the country had to be planned

1 Modern India, by Sir P. Griffiths (1957), p. 85

and mobilised for war purposes. To add to all these, there was a severe famine in Bengal. Last, but not least, the wheels of government had to be kept from getting clogged in spite of difficulties. All these enormously increased the work of the higher officers, even though there was considerable expansion in the size of the Civil Service during the war.

The Civil Servants in British India - particularly the members of the I.C.S. and other Superior Services - set up excellent traditions and a very high reputation for integrity, honesty, morale, initiative, objectivity and efficiency. The I.C.S. as the corps d'elite set the tone which was followed by other categories of the Civil Servants. However, the standards at the lower levels were not uniformly high. Since the twenties, as their work was becoming complex and difficult, professional standards among the Civil Servants tended to fall. This tendency was probably more marked at the lower level. Several causes were responsible for this fall-off of integrity and competence. The character of political movements and agitations which were becoming aggressive and violent, compelled the Government of the day to use the Civil Servants to suppress these. The Civil Servants were exposed to political controversies and bitterness. They were subjected to public vituperations and attacks. By the end of 1946 the position became more critical for them. Senior officials were quite anxious about their future, and were conscious that

they were caretakers under notice. They were thoroughly disheartened".¹ No wonder that all these had a very depressing and demoralising effect on their morale and impartiality. Again, the rising tempo of Hindu-Muslim conflicts and bitterness produced pulls and pressures which had an unfavourable effect on their morale and integrity. Civil Servants who belonged to one community were suspected of partiality and discrimination by the members of another community. Some of the Civil Servants recruited on communal grounds succumbed to political influences and lost objectivity in their work to some extent. "Even some members of the services, at least in the upper levels, had given up their traditional loyalty and impartiality and had begun openly to take sides in the political controversy", wrote Menon.² A statement more or less to the same effect was made in the Constituent Assembly of Pakistan by the late S.A.R. Nishtar, when he said "Muslim League expected of Muslim public servants to help in the establishment of Pakistan just as Congress utilised the services of the Hindu public servants".³ Finally, the World War II had its effect on the professional standards of the Civil Servants; particularly at the lower levels. The war-time inflation coupled with low pay at the lower rungs caused considerable hardships to them, and some of them yielded to the temptation of bribery.

1 Sir P. Griffiths, *op. cit.* p. 85 .

2 The transfer of Power in India by Menon, V.P. (1957), p. 348

3 Constituent Assembly of Pakistan Debates (Official Report), Monday, the 26th October, 1953, Vol. XV. No. 14, p. 475

In 1947, British India was divided into two independent dominions, - Pakistan and India - with complete transfer of political power to both. The power of the Secretary of State to recruit and control the members of the I.C.S. and I.P.S. and other superior services came to an end. The British members of the Superior Services were given the option to serve either of the new dominions or to retire on proportionate pension and rehabilitation gratuity.¹ Some Indian members of the Secretary of State's Services were given similar choice, subject to certain limitations.² The new Government of Pakistan showed itself eager to employ the British members of the old I.C.S. and other superior services, as there was an acute shortage of trained senior officials in Pakistan. The partition of British India also led to the division of the services between the two dominions. All these developments had not been without their unfavourable effect on the strength and morale of Civil Services.

V

(Since 1947)

Civil Service in the New Constitution
of Pakistan.

After independence and partition, Pakistan decided to adopt a parliamentary system of government within the framework of a federal

1 For details, see Cmd. 7116 and Cmd. 7192 of 1947

2 Ibid.

constitution.¹ The new Constitution which came into force in 1956, incorporated several provisions in regard to the Civil Service. Firstly, the Constitution defined the status of the Civil Servants by laying down that the members of the Central and All-Pakistan Services should hold office during the pleasure of the President, and that the members of the provincial services would hold office during the pleasure of the Governor.² The clarification thus made of their status was expected to promote political neutrality of Civil Servants as no minister could look upon them as his employees. It also made clear that no civil servants would have a right to office. His services could be dispensed with by the President and Governor as the case might be.

Secondly, it was provided that the tenure and conditions of service should not be varied to their disadvantage. The rules which would be framed to govern the conditions of their service must permit at least one appeal to each of the Civil Servants against any order which would punish or censure him, or alter or interpret the rule affecting his service to his disadvantage or terminate his employment before he would reach the age of retirement.³ This provision was intended to protect the Civil Servants from undue interference with their rights, emoluments and other conditions of service, and was expected to contribute to their

¹ The same system of government prevailed in Pakistan from 1947 to 1955 under the Government of India Act, 1935, as adapted & amended in the light of the Indian Independence Act, 1947. The new Constitution was abrogated in October, 1958, and since then the country has been under martial law and military administration.

² Article 180 (a) and (b)

³ Article 182

morale and integrity. Thirdly, the Constitution provided for the continuance of All-Pakistan Services. At present there are two such services - the Civil Service of Pakistan and the Police Service of Pakistan. They are common both to the Central and Provincial Governments. The existence of All-Pakistan services is an unusual feature of the Federation of Pakistan. With the exception of the Indian Federation, there is probably no other federation where there are such services besides the Federal and State services. Many critics pointed out that these services would be incompatible with provincial autonomy and responsible government as the provincial ministers would have no control over them. The answer is that they are needed in the interest of national unity and administrative efficiency. The position will be examined in the next chapter.¹

Fourthly, the Constitution guaranteed two important safeguards to Civil Servants to protect them against any arbitrary action. No Civil Servant - Central, All-Pakistan or Provincial - could be dismissed or removed from office or reduced in rank by any authority subordinate to that by which he was appointed. Nor could a Civil Servant be dismissed or removed or reduced in rank without being given a reasonable opportunity for self-defence.²

1 See Chapter II

2 Article 161

These safeguards, it was argued, would give the Civil Servants due and effective protection against victimisation by Ministers. Some members of the Constituent Assembly were very keen to preserve the political neutrality of the Civil Servants in the interest of fair and efficient administration. Many critics might point out this provision relating to safeguards was a legacy of the past and not in conformity with the doctrine of ministerial responsibility as the ministers would be without full disciplinary control over the Civil Servants. It will be examined in a later chapter.²

Fifthly, provisions were made in the Constitution to secure certain guarantees to the Civil Servants who were recruited by the Secretary of State before independence. The Government of Pakistan was eager to retain the services of the highly experienced members of the old Indian Civil Service. Consequently, provisions were incorporated into the Constitution guaranteeing the same terms and conditions of service and the same rights to these higher officials as they enjoyed before independence.³

Sixthly, the Constitution contained a provision to give equal representation to the provinces in all the Central and All-Pakistan Services. East Pakistan, in particular, has been very poorly represented in the services. There has been persistent demand to remedy the situation.

1 See the Debates of the Constituent Assembly of Pakistan (Thursday, the 20th May, 1954, Vol. XVI, No. 12

2 See Chapter VI

3 Articles 232 and 233

In the course of Debate in the Constituent Assembly, the East Pakistan members took a very strong view of the matter and demanded parity of representation in the services. It was provided in the "Directive Principles of State Policy" that steps should be taken to achieve parity with regard to the representation of East Pakistan and West Pakistan in the services.¹ Although it is a non-justifiable provision, it has been acted upon. We shall examine the position in the next chapter.²

Seventhly, provision was made in the Constitution for the abolition of Communal representation in the Services. Every citizen would be free to enter the service of Pakistan, if he was otherwise qualified, irrespective of race, religion, caste, sex, residence or place of birth.³ This guaranteed equality of opportunity to all citizens in respect of appointment in the service of Pakistan. But the Constitution also permitted the reservation of specified posts and services for persons of either sex, and for the first fifteen years, posts might be reserved for persons belonging to any class or area to secure their adequate representation in the services. A critic may point out that special reservations are not conducive to integrity and efficiency. We shall examine the view while discussing the system of recruitment.⁴ In the eighth place, the

1 Article 31 (2)

2 See Chapter II

3 Article 17 (1)

4 See Chapter III

Constitution made elaborate provisions in regard to the organisation and functions of the public service commission.¹ The main functions of the public service commission are to maintain adequate standards of recruitment, to conduct examinations for appointments to various services, and to advise the government in regard to the principles to be followed in making appointments to various posts, promotion, transfer and disciplinary matters. Their functions can be extended by law. The President or Governor, as the case may be may remove certain class of Civil Servants from the purview of the Commission.

The public Service Commissions² are purely advisory bodies. Their recommendations are not binding on the Government. The Government can ignore or reject them. Some members of the Constituent Assembly wanted that the recommendations of the Commissions should be made mandatory. It was pointed out that the Commissions would not be appointing authority. The ultimate responsibility for appointment would rest with the Government. It was decided that the matter should be left to the development of Conventions that normally the recommendations of the Commissions should be accepted.³ In order further to strengthen the position of the Commissions it was provided that they would submit annual reports about their activities. These reports would show the cases where their advice

1 Part X, Chapter II of the Constitution of Pakistan, 1956.
Article 184 - 190.

2 There are two types of Commissions in Pakistan - Federal Public Service Commission, and Provincial Public Service Commission.

3 Constituent Assembly of Pakistan, Debate, Saturday, the 19th June, 1954. Vol. XVI, No. 15

was not accepted and also the matters, if any, on which the Commission ought to have been consulted, but was not consulted, with the reasons therefore. These reports would be laid before the Legislature. It was expected that public opinion would act as a deterrent to the Government when they contemplated the rejection of recommendations of the Commissions.

To promote the independence, impartiality and integrity of the Commissioners, it was decided that they should be removed completely from political influence. To secure this objective, a number of provisions were incorporated into the Constitution. First, the Chairman and members of the Federal and Provincial Commissions would be appointed respectively by the President and Governor, each acting on his discretion. They would thus be appointed by an authority above party politics. Secondly, the Chairman of the Federal Public Service Commission would not be eligible for further employment under the Government of Pakistan. No further employment under the Government would be open to commissioners except the higher office in the Commission itself, or an appointment on the Federal Commission. This would, it was argued, shield them against outside influence and temptation. Thirdly, the Commissioners might not be removed from office except on the ground of misbehaviour, infirmity of mind or body. A member of the Federal Commission should not be removed from office except by the procedure applicable to the removal of a High Court Judge. A Provincial Commissioner would be removable

by the Governor on a report from the Supreme Court made on a reference to it by the Governor. Finally, the terms of their offices were definitely laid down, and it would be for a period of five years. These provisions, it was argued, would ensure the independence, objectivity and integrity of the Commissions.

These elaborate provisions in the Constitution regarding the Civil Services, critics might point out, would tend to introduce a certain degree of rigidity in the administration of public personnel. A few general provisions with regard to the Civil Service and Public Service Commission would have been enough and the rest could have been left to the Government to be dealt with by law.¹

1 See Chapter VI

CHAPTER TWO

Organisation and Composition

Size and Distribution

Pakistan encountered immediately after its establishment in 1947 an acute shortage of senior, trained and experienced officers. It was stated in the Constituent Assembly that only eighty-two members of the former I.C.S. and Indian Political Service came to Pakistan in 1947.¹ The position was reversed in some of the lower grades and there was a surplus of employees in the railways and posts and telegraphs departments.² Since then there has been considerable increase in the size of the Civil Service. In 1950 the total number of employees under the Central Government was 236,444³ and it rose to 286,720 in 1959⁴. If the figures for the railways and posts and telegraphs departments are deducted, the total number of employees in all other ministries and

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- 1 Constituent Assembly of Pakistan Debates, Official Report, Vol. I, No. 57, Thursday, 26th January, 1956, p. 2104
 - 2 Constituent Assembly of Pakistan (Legislature) Debates, Vol. I, p. 147. March 2, 1948
 - 3 The figures for 1950 have been collected from the Demands for Grants for the Expenditure of the Government of Pakistan for 1950-1. Figures for 1947-48 are not available. The figures relating to the railway employees are taken from the Report by the Railway Division of Pakistan Railways for 1949-50 (p.91) and those relating to Posts & Telegraphs employees are supplied by the Office of the Director General, Posts & Telegraphs, Government of Pakistan.
 - 4 The figures for 1959 are supplied by the President's Secretariat, Establishment Division.

departments was 34,841 in 1950, and 60,000 in 1959. The size of the employees has nearly doubled itself between 1950 and 1959, in all ministries and departments other than railways and posts and telegraph departments.

The Second World War was responsible for a vast expansion of the Civil Service in British India between 1939 and 1945. After partition and independence, Pakistan inherited her portion of the increased staff, though mainly at the lower levels. The obligations and responsibilities of the Government have increased in the fields of economic and social development since independence. The introduction of the Five-year National Development Plan has led to an increase in the size of the Civil Service. The number of ministries and departments provides also a convenient index to the growth of the public service. In 1949 there were twelve ministries¹ and they rose to twenty in 1957.² In future, the size of the Civil Service is likely to increase.

In Britain there has been a tremendous expansion in the size of the Civil Service. In 1939 the numerical strength of the whole-time Civil Servants was 371,050 and it was 647,619 in 1942.³ Recently there has been some reduction in numbers owing to the economy policies pursued

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- 1 Report of the Pakistan Pay Commission, 1949, p. 82
 - 2 Report of the Economy Committee, Government of Pakistan, (Parts I - III), 1957 - 58.
 - 3 Sixteenth Report from the Select Committee on National Expenditure, Parliamentary Papers, 1941 - 42, p. 22
 - 4 Central Administration in Britain by MacKensie, W.J.M. and Grove, J.W. 1957, p. 23 (to be the No. 1 and 2 pages).

by the Conservative Government, yet it is much bigger as compared with the pre-war figures. In 1955 it stood at 655,436.¹ The rapid increase in Governmental activities during the Second World War led to this huge growth of the Civil Service. The socio-economic planning and development undertaken by the Labour Government was responsible for the existence of a large number of Civil Servants.² Britain is devoted to the ideal of the welfare state and hence the size of her bureaucracy is not likely to come down, but to expand.

L.C./C.C. An analysis of the distribution of Civil Servants shows that 62.33 per cent. were employed on the railways, 16.81 per cent. in posts and telegraphs offices, 7.16 in the Ministry of Finance, and 13.70 per cent in the remaining central ministries and departments in 1957. Pakistan possesses a big railway system exclusively administered by the Central Government, and to staff it, a large number of employees is necessary. The Central Government is also responsible for the administration of posts and telegraph offices and these require a large staff to man them. The Ministry of Finance controls as many as nine departments apart from the main Secretariat. A large staff is not necessary in the social service and economic ministries and departments because the Central Government is mostly responsible for the over-all policies, co-ordination and

1 Foot Note 4 on previous page (78) refers.

2 See the Growth of Public Employment in Great Britain by M. Abramotis and V.F. Eliasberg

3) In July 1962, the Pakistan Railway was bifurcated into two — P.E.R & P.W.R, & transferred to the respective Provincial Governments.

assistance to the provincial governments in the sphere of socio-economic development activities. The federal character of the Country's Constitutional system is also responsible for Centre's comparatively small staff in socio-economic departments.¹

The dispersion of the Central employees outside the national capital at Karachi is not something unusual. Of the 178,512 railway employees, 170,908 were outside Karachi and only 7,604 were in Karachi in 1957. In the posts and telegraphs department only 9,049 employees out of 48,208 were in Karachi and the rest were spread over the whole country. Of the 55,480 employees in all the remaining ministries and departments, 29,814 were outside Karachi and 25,666 were in Karachi in 1957.² The running of the railways, and posts and telegraphs and other field services offered by the Central Government are responsible for this. It is also due, to a great extent, to the vast spatial separation between the two wings of the country - east and west. A small number of Civil Servants are in the Central Secretariat in Karachi, and they are concerned with the formulation of policies and with the general control and supervision of governmental machinery and activities. A small number of officers are also appointed in the attached departments mostly located in Karachi. The officers of these departments tender technical advice to the Secretariat

1 For distribution of powers between the Central & the Provincial Governments. See Article 106 & Fifth Schedule of the Constitution of 1956.

2) Recently the Capital has been shifted to Rawalpindi.

3) Information supplied by the President's Secretariat (Establishment Division), Government of Pakistan.

as well as supervise the actual execution of policies. The bulk of the employees work in the establishments called Subordinate Offices. The geographical dispersion raises the question of adjusting the emoluments of the employees to local variations, and it will be discussed in another chapter of this monograph.¹

Provincial representation

The extremely uneven representation of the provinces in the Central Superior Services is an unusual feature of the composition of the federal bureaucracy in Pakistan. The Province of East Pakistan, in particular, has been very poorly represented in the services. The issue aroused considerable controversy and was keenly debated in the Constituent Assembly in 1956. The position of the East Pakistanis in the Superior Services in the Central Secretariat in 1956 is given in the following table:²

Posts	Number	West Pakistan	East Pakistan
Secretaries	19	19	-
Joint Secretaries	41	38	3
Deputy Secretaries	133	123	10
Under-Secretaries	548	510	38
TOTAL	741	690	51

¹ See Chapter V

² Constituent Assembly of Pakistan Debates, Official Report, Vol. I. No. 52, p. 1843-44. Tuesday, 17 January, 1956.

ment of Persian as the Court language by English in 1837 served not only as a blow to the education of the Muslims, but also deprived them of important positions in the Government.¹ They were also suspicious for a long time of the purely secular and English education. Added to these was the poverty of masses of Muslims in general and of Bengali Muslims in particular. They had taken less readily than the non-Muslims to English education, and hence to the higher levels of the Government Services. Secondly, at the time of partition, option was given to the Muslim officers as well as the British members of the Superior Services to serve in Pakistan. Many of the Muslim members of the higher services who came to Pakistan in 1947 did not originally belong to the province of West Pakistan. They came from different provinces of British India, but they are easily assimilated in West Pakistan. Some of them, again, were, and still are, the British members of the former I.C.S. and other higher services. Of twenty-seven secretaries and joint secretaries in 1950, seven were listed as "non-Pakistani".² Finally, the location of the Federal Capital in Karachi ^{was at Rawalpindi} in West Pakistan constitutes another obstacle in the way of the East Pakistanis to join the Central Services at the lower levels as well. The distance is too great and the journey is too costly.

The Government of Pakistan have been taking measures since 1947 to remedy the situation. A provision "to achieve parity in the repres-

- 1 The Indian Problem (1833 - 1935) by Coupland, B. 1942, p. 32. It also *advancing affected members rather Commission, but they took to English more readily & quickly.*
- 2 Constituent Assembly (Legislature) of Pakistan Debates, Vol. II, January 12, 1949, p. 465 and Vol. I. March 23, 1950, p. 309.

entation of East Pakistan and West Pakistan in all other (non-defence) spheres of Federal administration¹ was incorporated into the Constitution of 1956.¹ In order to secure fair and adequate distribution of officers between the provinces and regions of the country, a system of quota is established for each province. According to the quota system, the first twenty per cent. of the vacancies in the all-Pakistan and other Central Superior Services are filled on the basis of merit alone; the remaining eighty per cent. are divided equally between East Pakistan and West Pakistan.² The purpose of this scheme of provincial quota is to ensure that the areas of the country which are less favoured in higher education shall have a fair and adequate share of superior appointments. The quota system seriously modifies the principle of recruitment on the basis of merit and its effect is quite unlikely to be beneficial on the efficiency of administration. It is adopted as a remedy to meet a desperate situation. Politically, it may be expedient and even wise as it gives to the people of various provinces and areas adequate share in superior appointments. It will be discussed in detail in the chapter on recruitment.

Classification of Services.

The present system of the classification of the Central Services in

1 Article 31 (2).

2 Constituent Assembly of Pakistan Debates (Official Report), Vol. I. No. 61, p. 2282, Wednesday, 1 February, 1956.

Pakistan is both vertical and horizontal.¹ The services are classified vertically according to the type of work they perform and under this concept there are three main categories:² (a) generalist-administrative services, such as the Civil Service of Pakistan; (b) functional services like audit and accounts, income tax, customs and central excise; and (c) the specialist services such as health, engineering, survey, etc. The horizontal classification of services is based on the degree of the importance of work and the nature and scale of responsibilities involved. The services are horizontally divided into four classes - Class I, Class II, Class III and Class IV. The members of the class I and class II services are gazetted officers in the sense that their names appear in official gazette, and in practice, they are invested with higher powers and responsibilities in regard to management. The Class III civil servants carry on routine work under the control and supervision of Class I and Class II officers. The class IV employees carry on manual work and petty jobs. By far the bulk of the employees belong to Classes III and IV.

1 Government of Pakistan. The Civil Services (Classification, Control and Appeal) Rules, 1951, (First Edition).

2 The C.S.P. officers - the generalist administrators - move from one type of work to another, from one department to another, and also from the centre to the provinces and vice versa. They are concerned not only with work relating to the administration of the land revenue system and the regulatory functions of the Government, but also with the industrial, economic and commercial activities of the state. They also deal with the solid functions of the state. Some of them also serve in the judiciary. The C.S.P. is a general all-purpose service. In a broad sense, the C.S.P. is also functional in nature. The members of the audit and accounts, customs, income tax, and central excise services carry on the functions which their names indicate, and remain in their respective departments throughout all their career.

L.C./L.C. What is the basis of the classification of services? According to
 the Constitution of 1956 all the Civil Servants working under the Central
 Government are to be appointed by the President.¹ In reality, all
 L.C/ appointments are not made by him. The members of the Class I services
 receive their appointments from the Establishment Division under the
 signature of the President. Class II officers are appointed by the
 L.C/ Secretary of a department or by some other specified higher authority.
 Class III officers are appointed by a deputy secretary, or an equivalent
 officer, and sometimes even by a lower authority. Class IV Civil
 L.C/L.C. Servants are appointed by a still lower authority. No Civil Servant,
 according to the Constitution, can be dismissed or removed from service,
 or reduced in rank, by an authority subordinate to that by which he is
 appointed.² Thus one of the basic distinctions between the four classes
 of employees in Pakistan lies in the difference in regard to the appoint-
 ing and dismissing authority.³ The conditions of service for each of
 the four classes of employees are different. Their pay structure is
 L.C/ different. The rules relating to leave, pension and medical aid for Class
 L.C/ I and Class II officers are different from those for the Class III and
 L.C. Class IV employees. The classification of services in Pakistan is not
 L.C.

1 Article 182 (1) (a), Constitution of 1956.

2 Article 181 (1)

3 Report of the Pakistan Pay Commission, vol. I. p. 16, 1949

based solely on the salary rates or the character of the work done,¹ but it reflects both these elements too. Thus, the distinction between the various classes of services is based upon the appointing and dismissing authority, upon the levels of responsibility and power, and also upon the conditions of service.

Objection has been taken to the classification of services on the ground that the "system is undemocratic, promotes class feeling and breeds superiority and inferiority complexes."² It gives rise to too much consciousness of class, title, rank and service membership and too little consciousness of a common service. But it cannot be denied that some kind of hierarchical organisation is unavoidable, and as such it is an 'indispensable feature of large-scale enterprise!'.³ The Pay Commission have pointed out: "There is some confusion of thought underlying this objection as in every rational system of service organisation, classification, whether express or implied, is unavoidable so long as public servants are assigned different functions and responsibilities".⁴

The main question that the Pay Commission have been called upon to decide is whether the present Class II should be allowed to continue as it is or be amalgamated with the junior scale of Class I.⁵ The members of the Class II service have strongly advocated the amalgamation on the

1 Ibid, p. 12.

2 Ibid.

3 Millet, J.D. "Working Concepts of Organisation" in *Elements* of Public Administration, edited by Marx, F.D. 1946, p. 149

4 Report of the Pakistan Pay Commission, op. cit. 1949, p. 12.

5 Ibid, p. 16

following grounds.¹ First~~y~~, they have pointed out that in most departments there is not much difference between the two classes regarding the nature of work and degree of responsibility. Second~~ly~~, there is not much difference between the members of Class II and the young recruits to Class I in regard to the basic educational and technical qualifications. Third~~ly~~, the "freshness of outlook" and the "breadth of vision" which the young recruits to Class I are expected to bring to the service, are regarded as "synonymous with inexperience by the members of Class II who rely on their experience as imparting the maturity of judgment." Fourth~~ly~~, against the argument that amalgamation will impose additional burden on the exchequer, they have pointed out that most of the Class II officers draw more than the initial salary of the junior officers of Class I. Hence, the financial effect of the proposed amalgamation will be negligible.

The correct course, according to the Commission, in seeking a solution to this question is "to examine the principle which underlies the constitution of Class II and to make its retention or abolition depend upon the soundness or otherwise of that principle".² The members of Class I services are recruited directly. Promotion to this class is rare and exceptional. They are put in charge of junior scale posts for

1 Ibid, p. 17

2 Report of the Pakistan Pay Commission, Vol. I. 1949, p. 16

purpose of training. They possess high academic or technical qualifications, and are appointed on the basis of competitive examination or selection test, conducted by the Federal Public Service Commission.¹

L.C./ Recruitment to Class II, with the exception of a few departments where direct recruitment is permissible, is mainly by promotion from subordinate service.² Consequently, officers come to Class II fairly late in their career and with a very few exceptions retire from that class.³ In so far as the competitive examination or selection test held by the Public Service Commission is a "test of man's general or technical ability", the members of Class II lack that ability because ex hypothesi they have either failed or not appeared at all before the Commission.⁴ Thus, the members of the junior scale of Class I, who are young men of high academic or technical qualification and are destined to rise to positions of higher responsibility, and the members of Class II who are promoted from subordinate service, and are old gentlemen with comparatively low academic or technical qualifications near the end of their official career, fall in two distinct categories.⁵ The Commission, therefore, are of the view that the amalgamation of these two categories in such a manner as will put them in an equal position with regard to the right to promotion

1 Ibid.

2 Ibid, p. 17

3 Ibid

4 Ibid.

5 Ibid

to superior posts will be "wrong in principle".¹ It will affect efficiency and be unfair to direct recruits to class I.² Moreover, the proposed amalgamation will impose additional burden on the Exchequer as the present Class II scale is lower as compared with the junior scale of Class I.³ The Commission have not accepted the proposal for amalgamation. The Commission are of the view that the claims of qualified Class II officers for promotion must be more clearly and liberally recognised.⁴

We think that the existing classification of services needs re-examination not for its abolition, but for a thorough overhaul. It may be necessary to elaborate the classification of services further. It is open to question whether it is any longer desirable and accurate to divide the administrative hierarchy into four levels of responsibility to correspond with four ^{classes} ~~classes~~ of Civil servants. The increasing activities of the Government for the socio-economic development of the country lead to an expansion of the size of the bureaucratic hierarchy and introduce more and more functional diversifications within it. Should not, then, the hierarchy be divided into larger number of levels of responsibility? If the answer is in the affirmative, there should be more than four classes of Civil servants. Another important thing

1 Ibid

2 Ibid

3 Ibid, p. 17

4 Ibid, p. 18

to be aimed at during the re-examination of the service structure is to remove or greatly modify the rigidity of stratification within it. At present the services are divided into four classes with barriers between classes being too rigid, and consequently class to class promotion is very inadequate. It creates jealousy and frustration and tells adversely on the morale of the employees. Again, the differences between the classes as regards the terms and conditions of service is far from satisfactory, and these, in turn, breed complexes in the services. In short, mobility between classes, removal of glaring differences in the incidents of service, and such less emphasis on rank, class and title, are necessary to remove or modify the inflexibility of stratification within the organisational structure of the civil services.

All-Pakistan Service.

The Civil Service of Pakistan is the pivotal service around which the entire administrative edifice, central and provincial, is organised.

The fundamental structure of the C.S.P. is laid down in the resolutions¹ adopted and rules² made by the Central Government. The rules promulgated in 1954 establish a fairly large number of specified posts as belonging to the cadre of the C.S.P. In 1954 there have been 519 such posts

1 Resolution No. F.25/4/50 - Ests. (S.E.1), Cabinet Secretariat (Establishment Branch), Karachi, 8 November, 1950.

2 Notification, No. 25/12/51 - S.E.1, Government of Pakistan, Cabinet Secretariat (Establishment Division) Karachi, 1 June, 1954.

in the total authorized strength. Of these, 49 posts in the Provinces have been reserved for persons to be promoted from the Provincial Civil Services, and 470 posts are left to be filled by the members of the C.S.P. Junior posts intended primarily for the training of the young recruits account for 134.¹ In actual practice, the number of the C.S.P. officers is smaller than the cadre establishment will indicate because it will be filled on a long-term basis through annual recruitment on the basis of open Competitive Examination. At present there are 323 members on the cadre of the C.S.P.²

The members of the C.S.P., who serve both the Central and Provincial Governments, occupy by far the bulk of the most important and key positions in the Central and Provincial Secretariats. Sixty per cent. of the posts of under-secretaries, and two-thirds of the posts of deputy-secretaries are reserved for the C.S.P. officers at the Centre outside ^{the} newly-constituted Economic Pool.³ The rest of the cadre posts are to be filled by officers not being members of the C.S.P. At present two-thirds of the total cadre posts of secretary and joint-secretary at the Centre outside the Economic Pool must be filled by the C.S.P. officers, the remaining one-third are available to other officers.⁴ In the provinces 209 superior and key positions - Chief

1 Ibid.

2 Gradation List of the Civil Service of Pakistan (corrected up to 1 January, 1959).

3 Notification No. 25/12/51 - S.E.1, 1954, op. cit. The Economic Pool has been created in September, 1959. Resolution, Ministry of the Interior (Establishment Division).


4 Ibid.

Secretary, Secretary, Joint-Secretary, Deputy-Secretary, Collector, Deputy-Collector, Commissioner, and other higher executive posts - are also reserved for the members of the C.S.P.¹ Apart from this, over fifty judicial posts including the judgeships of the High Courts and the District and Sessions Judgeships are also included in the cadre of the C.S.P.

The policy of reserving key and senior posts, both at the centre and in the provinces, for the members of the C.S.P. has its origin in the I.C.S. of British India. This policy safeguards for the C.S.P. officers some of the important privileges enjoyed by its predecessor. Like the I.C.S., the C.S.P. is an all-Pakistani service and its members are bound to serve anywhere in the country. The assignments given to the C.S.P. Officers are of a higher and more responsible nature. All these give it a greater prestige than any other service. The reservation of key positions, both at the centre and in the provinces, for the members of the C.S.P. makes the service attractive and is likely to draw to its rank the best available talents in the country. Any scheme of reservation, critics argue, perpetuates the service distinctions which hamper the growth of homogeneity and unity in the services. It introduces a superiority complex in the members of the C.S.P. and

1 Ibid (1954)

2 Ibid



that is detrimental to the development of the complementary role of the other Central Superior Services. It prevents, to a considerably great extent, the possibility of ^{maximum} ~~maximum~~ utilisation of talents throughout the Civil Service. It may damp their initiative and energy. Finally, the reservation of posts for the C.S.P. officers elevates them into a privileged class within the administrative hierarchy. This, in turn, breeds discontent and jealousy, and affects unfavourably the morale of other services.

22/ The C.S.P. constitutes the Corps d'elite within the Civil Service, like the Administrative Class in Britain. We can compare the functions of the general administrators in both the countries. In Pakistan, the C.S.P. officers move from one type of work to another, and from one department to another during the course of their careers. On first appointments, they serve as assistant collectors, or assistant-commissioners. Those who exhibit a bent for Secretariat work are given Secretariat experience as under-secretaries for a short spell. After a period in junior posts, they become Collectors or deputy Commissioners. After some years, as district officers, those considered suitable are elected for secretariat posts either at the centre or in the provinces, and they may be deputy secretaries, joint-secretaries, or secretaries, according to ability and length of service. The members of the C.S.P. in the Secretariat are responsible for the formulation of policies. The C.S.P. officer in Pakistan is, thus, a general purpose civil servant who holds executive, administrative and judicial posts.

L.C./C.C. *1) Now they are redesignated as ~~deputy~~ assistant Commissioners.*

L.C./L.C.
 L.C./
 L.C./
 L.C./

The Administrative class officers in Britain are concerned with the "formulation of policy, the co-ordination and improvement of Government machinery and the general administration and control of the departments of the public service".¹ He starts his career as an Assistant Principal and becomes a Principal after a few years. After some years as Principal he becomes an assistant secretary in charge of a division. Then he is promoted to under-Secretaryship, deputy secretaryship, and Secretaryship on merit. His duties are less varied than those of his counterpart in Pakistan. He is not expected to hold executive posts.

The C.S.P. fulfills a dual role. First, it forms the executive ^{team} ~~arm~~ of the administration deployed in the field. Secondly, it assists the Ministers both at the centre and in the provinces in the formulation of policies. We may examine the desirability of combining the administrative and executive functions in the hands of the same group of officers. Such a combination may be justified on the following grounds. Firstly, the C.S.P. officers who are responsible for the formulation of policy are better equipped for their work if they possess executive experience. Their approach to administrative problems is likely to be realistic as it is based on their acquaintance with the difficulties and problems arising out of the actual implementation of policies. Secondly, if

1 Introductory Factual Memorandum on the Civil Service submitted by the Treasury to the Royal Commission (Priestly) on the Civil Service, 1953, p.-46

opportunity is accorded to an executive officer to make suggestions to administrative officers, it will add to the soundness of administrative policies. But the critics point out that as they move from executive work to administrative work, they seldom become really experts in any one.¹ But this criticism overlooks the important consideration that the C.S.P. officers are expected to be general administrators who can bring to bear a common-sense point of view on problems of administration, the technical aspects of which have been fully dealt with by those who send them up from the attached departments or provincial governments.² That is the view of the Administrative Enquiry Committee. We endorse the view of the Committee.

Recent trends in writing on this aspect in Britain show that there is a strong advocacy for the removal of dichotomy between the administrative and executive functions. Mr. Frank Dunnill thinks that the higher grades of the executive class should be merged into lower ones of the administrative class, and that it will enable the members of the administrative class to be more realistic in their administrative work. It will also rectify the wrong assumption on the part of the executive class officers that their functions stop short of policy-making.³ Dr. Gladden also offers a similar suggestion.⁴

1 Pakistan (A Political Study) by K. Cullard, 1957, p. 292

2 Government of Pakistan, Report of the Administrative Enquiry Committee, 1953, p. 15

3 The Civil Service: Some Human Aspects by Dunnill, F., 1956, p.205-6

4 Civil Service or Bureaucracy by Gladden, E.H., 1956, p. 170

Police Service of Pakistan

The Police Service of Pakistan resembles the C.S.P. in that it supplies officers both to the Centre and the Provinces. It differs from the C.S.P. in that a much smaller proportion of its posts are at the centre, and a much larger proportion in the districts. It also possesses a number of cadre posts to which its officers have the prior claim. A member of the P.S.P. begins his career as the assistant superintendent of police, and then he becomes a superintendent of police after some years. The posts of deputy inspector-general, inspector-general, and director of intelligence bureau are prizes open to officers of outstanding merit.

The Civil Service of Pakistan consists of a central cadre as distinct from the provincial cadre of the I.C.S. in British India.¹ The result of a single central cadre is that instead of the Centre borrowing officers from the provinces, the latter now borrow officers from the Centre. The members of the C.S.P. serve for a term in the Central Secretariat and after that they are sent back to the provinces. This system of the rotation of officers between the centre and the provinces is known as the tenure system. According to the existing rules, a member of the C.S.P. serves the following terms at the Central Secretariat:²

1 Resolution, No. F.25/4/50 - Est. (S.E.1) Cabinet Secretariat (Establishment Branch), Karachi, 8 November, 1950.

2 Careers in the Pakistan Central Superior Services, 1954, p. 6

Secretary 5 years
 Joint-Secretary 4 years
 Deputy-Secretary 4 years
 Under-Secretary 3 years

After each period spent there, officers are deputed once more to the provinces. As a result, it secures a two-way flow of experience and ideas. This formula "has the double advantage of bringing up men to the centre", the Administrative Enquiry Committee have pointed out, "who are in touch with provincial problems and with the people in the districts and of sending out to the Provinces men who have seen some of the complexity and international ramifications of a modern Central Government".¹

The application of the tenure system involves considerable difficulty. The effect of a centralised cadre, the Economy Committee have pointed out, is that the provinces have the right to refuse any officer offered to them by the centre. They can also hand over to the Central Government any officer without giving any reason. This is not desirable. We think that the Provincial Governments should specify the reasons as to why they are handing over some officers to the Centre. This has led to the concentration of senior officers at the centre, who cannot be reverted to the provinces even after the completion of their tenures. The Committee have urged the Government to resort to the pre-partition arrangement.² But the

1 Report of the Administrative Enquiry Committee, op.cit. 1953, p.15

2 Government of Pakistan. Report of the Economy Committee (Part III) 1958, p. 75

reversion to the pre-partition arrangement may create similar difficulties in the provinces which the existing system creates at the centre. Therefore, the suggestion of the Committee does not appear to be an adequate solution of this problem. What is necessary is that the application of the tenure system should be governed by sound convention based upon the recognition of the needs and difficulties of both sides.¹

Desirability of retaining all-Pakistan Services.

The all-Pakistan Services are a peculiar feature of the federation of Pakistan. No other federation has a similar service, except India. It is worthwhile to examine whether it is necessary and useful to retain the all-Pakistan Services.

The Supporters of the all-Pakistan Services argue that these services will act as a unifying force in the country. It is specially important in Pakistan which is divided between the two wings - east and west - separated one from the other by well over one thousand miles of foreign territory. A sense of unity is yet to strike a deep root in the country where the fissiparous forces such as the controversy over language, parochialism and provincialism have been dominant. The members of the all-Pakistan Services recruited from all over the country are expected to act as bulwark against centrifugal forces. They are likely to bring to bear an all-Pakistan outlook on their work. Their

¹ Report of the Government of India Secretarial Committee (Wheeler Committee), 1937, p. 17

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 approach is also likely to be national. The effect of a centrally-run training institute like the Civil Service Academy which provides training to the young recruits to the C.S.P. should not be overlooked. "I often wonder which was more true: that the idea of an all-Pakistan Service as the C.S.P. helps to unite Pakistan, or that the idea of Pakistan helps to unite the Service. On the whole, I think the people who leave the Academy are better Pakistanis than those who join, without at the same time losing their character as Punjabis or Bengalis or whatever it is", observes Sir G. Burgess, Director of the Civil Service Academy at Lahore.¹

The all-Pakistan Services have a much wider field of choice. They are recruited from all over the country. As successors to the former I.C.S. and Indian Police Service, the C.S.P. and P.S.P. in Pakistan, and because of the status and tradition attaching to them are likely to secure for their recruits the best available talents in the country.² This is likely to add to the high standard of administrative efficiency. The existence of the tenure system which results in a two-way flow of ideas and experience is conducive to efficiency. As the C.S.P. officers serve both the centre and the provinces, it is possible for them to bring about better understanding and co-operation between the centre and provinces.

1 "The Civil Service in Pakistan", in *The Listener*, Vol. LVIII, No. 1486, September 19, 1957, p. 420

2 See Chapter III. In fact, they do not appear to obtain an adequate share of the best available talents in the country.

L.C./U. Finally, the supporters of the all-Pakistan Services argue that the members of their services are expected to maintain high standard of political neutrality. There has been considerable attempts on the part of the politicians to influence the Civil Servants directly and indirectly through the ministers. The C.S.P. people are expected to resist political pulls and pressures and to set up better examples to the lower ^{category of} Civil Servants.

The opponents of the all-Pakistan Services argue that the C.S.P. officers cannot have whole-hearted loyalty for the provincial government. They point out that the existence of the all-Pakistan Services is not compatible with the working of provincial autonomy and of ministerial responsibility in the provinces, as the appointment, terms and conditions of their services and the ultimate control over them are all in the hands of the central government. The provincial government does not have the ultimate control over these officers so far as their dismissal or removal is concerned. The C.S.P. officers can flout the provincial ministers. A few cases of such conflict took place in the provinces. "I must admit that there were instances where the Civil Servants of the country tried to stand against the wish of the local Government", stated a Central Cabinet Minister in 1956.¹ The Chief

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¹ Constituent Assembly of Pakistan Debates, Vol. I. No. 68, p. 2781, Thursday, 9 February, 1956.

secretary to the Government of East Pakistan revealed during the Proda¹ proceedings against the then provincial finance and commerce minister, that under instructions from the central government he had stopped the export of "steel drums" to India which was ordered by the Finance and Commerce Minister.² A former provincial minister stated in the Constituent Assembly, "Officers who were under the direct control of the Central Government but were working in that province (East Pakistan) refused to carry out or obey the orders of the Ministers of the Provincial Cabinet or the Provincial Legislature, because they believed that the Provincial Government had no power to take any action against them if they violated the orders of the Ministers or the Ministry".³ This argument cannot be dismissed lightly as a mere expression of narrow provincialism. We agree that the all-Pakistan Services can be an encroachment on the autonomy of the provinces. But, at the same time, it must be pointed out that Pakistan cannot afford to have a weak central government. What Pakistan needs most in view of her peculiar geography is a body of officers with an all-Pakistan and national outlook and approach.

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- 1 The Public & Representative Offices Disqualification Act, 1949, usually called PRODA. It provided a form of impeachment and was sub-titled "AN Act to provide for the debarring from public life for a suitable period of persons judicially found guilty of misconduct in any public office or representative capacity or in any matter relating thereto". (Cassette of Pakistan, July 9, 1949).
 - 2 The Dawn, Karachi, (Daily Paper), September 20, 1950.
 - 3 Constituent Assembly of Pakistan Debate, Vol. I. No. 68, p. 2777, Thursday, 9 February, 1956.

The opponents also argue that some members of these services, born and brought up in one province, but posted to another province, are apt to lack an insight into local conditions and problems, and to that extent, their work is likely to be unrealistic. There is not, we think much substance in this argument. The Government of Pakistan have taken special measures to the effect that C.S.P. officers will serve both the 'wings' of the country, and thus learn thoroughly the system of administration, language, local laws, usage, etc. of each province.¹ This provision, in our view, is enough to enable the members of the C.S.P. to learn the local conditions of a province which is not a province of their birth. Moreover, the presence of outsiders in a province is of great advantage as their vision and outlook are not ^{likely to be} coloured by provincial horizons.

The all-Pakistan Services are performing a useful role in the country. In a country plagued with political instability and extreme demand for provincial autonomy, the Civil Service of Pakistan plays both a stabilising and unifying role. These services are more important in view of the peculiar geography of Pakistan. The creation of a few more services on an all-Pakistan basis which will emphasise the unity of Pakistan and encourage the growth of national feeling and outlook is highly desirable.

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- 1 Resolution, No. F.25/4/50 - Mts. (S.E.1), Cabinet Secretariat, (Establishment Branch), Karachi, 8 November, 1950.
 - 2 Resolution No. F.25/4/50, - Mts. (S.E.1), Cabinet Secretariat, (Establishment Branch), Karachi, 8 November, 1950.

Central Superior Services

Apart from the two all-Pakistan Services, C.S.P. and P.S.C., there are a number of Central Superior Services such as audit and accounts service, railway accounts service, military accounts service, customs service, income tax service, central excise service, and a few more.¹ These services differ from the two all-Pakistan services in two respects.² First, they are true Central Services in that they work exclusively for the central government. Second, in the three accounts services, and in the income tax service, women are eligible for appointment, and that constitutes another difference. These services are divided into four grades³ - junior grade, senior grade, junior administrative grade, and senior administrative grade. Each grade carries a different pay scale.

These Central Superior Services are non-technical, and are organised as independent entities each operating within the limitations of its own cadre. A number of higher posts in these cadres are also reserved for members of the C.S.P. This fosters jealousy and class-consciousness. Recruitment to these services is made through a combined competitive examination.⁴ The relative position of the candidates in the proficiency list largely determines their allotment to one of these services. This

1 Careers in the Pakistan Central Superior Services, op. cit. 1954, p. 22.

2 Ibid.

3 Ibid, p. 11

4. See chapter III.

restricts their future promotion and prospects to their own service cadres. They are also entitled to be promoted to a few posts of under-secretary, deputy secretary, joint secretary, and secretary, in the Central Secretariat.¹ This provision, to some extent, widens the avenue of their promotions to higher posts outside their own cadre. But here also they are to compete with the members of other services, such as the Secretariat Service, General Administrative Reserve, Provincial Services and Armed Forces.²

Economic Pool.

A new service, the "Economic Pool", on the model of the Finance and Commerce Pool³ in British India, has been recently created.⁴ In 1950, the Government of Pakistan announced the decision to re-constitute the Finance and Commerce Pool. But the terms and conditions of this cadre were not finally settled and it had not really started functioning. In September, 1959, the Government have re-considered the matter carefully and have decided to constitute a "Pool" of officers known as "the Economic Pool" for the Ministries of Finance, Commerce and Industries.⁵

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- 1 Resolution, No. P.25/4/50 - Mts.(S.E.1) 1950 & Notification No. P.25/23/51 - S.E.1, 1954, op. cit.
 - 2 Government of Pakistan, report of the Administrative Enquiry Committee 1953, p. 15
 - 3 In British India, the Finance & Commerce Pool was constituted in 1937, since it was felt that the specialised needs of the economic departments such as the Finance, Commerce & Industries, could not be adequately met by officers obtained on a tenure basis. Though the cadre was filled by recruitment mainly from the I.C.S., it had an element of officers from other eligible services such as the Indian Audit, Custom Income tax & Military Accounts. The officers of this cadre manned the reserved posts in the Central economic services such as Audit, Incometax, & Excise Services, as well as the posts in the finance & Commerce department on a whole-time basis. (4 & 5 overleaf).

The reasons which have led the government to the creation of this new service are stated in the following words: "The specialised and increasingly complex character of the work of these Ministries and offices subordinate to them makes it necessary that an expert cadre should be built up to ensure a regular supply to these Ministries, of officers, who, apart from having general administrative qualifications, should have special knowledge and experience of the working of the economic policies of the Government".¹ These are important and weighty considerations. The Pool will adequately provide for a number of specialists where the need for continuity of experience is considered necessary.² Similar reasons led to the creation of the Finance & Commerce Pool in British India in 1937.

L.C./ The "Economic Pool" will consist of three categories of Class I officers divided into class 'A' posts, class 'B' posts and class 'C' posts.³ In class 'A' category, there are twenty posts and thirty five posts are in each of the classes 'B' and 'C'.⁴ Posts in class 'A' consist of secretaries, joint secretaries and posts of equivalent rank. Classes 'B' and 'C' include deputy secretaries and posts of equivalent rank and under secretaries and posts of equivalent rank respectively.

From previous page:

4 Ministry of the Interior (Establishment Division), Resolution, Karachi September 16, 1959. Constitution of the Economic Pool.

5 Ibid.

1 Ibid.

² Report of the Administrative Enquiry Committee, 1953, p. 15

³ Ministry of the Interior (Establishment Division), Resolution. Constitution of the Economic Pool, Karachi, September 16, 1959.

⁴ Ibid. For details see the Resolution, Ministry of the Interior, 16/9/59

The Pool will consist of 126 officers in all, including ten per cent. for leave reserve, twenty percent. for deputation reserve, and ten percent. for training reserve.¹ But until the pool is established and staffed by a sufficient number of officers, recruited specifically for it, it may be necessary for the government to depart from some of its conditions in individual cases.² In future, posts may be added to or removed from this list if the government deem it necessary.

Recruitment to the Pool will be made from the following Class I services:

(1) the Civil Service of Pakistan, (II) the Pakistan Audit & Accounts Service, (III) Military Accounts Service, (IV) Railway Accounts Service.

(V) Customs Service Class I, (VI) Incometax Service Class I, (VII) Central Excise Service Class I, ^{and} (VIII) Commercial Secretaries and

Attaches and Trade Commissioners if and when constituted into a separate service.³ The ratio for recruitment to the Pool from these services will be as follows: (1) 60 percent. for the C.S.P. and

40 percent. for all other services.⁴ Recruitment to the Pool will ordinarily be made in the sixth or seventh year of service, but not later than 35 years of age.⁵ For initial recruitment, the Pool Establishment may, however, invite applications without any restriction of age.⁶

Again, officers who were recruited to the Finance & Commerce Pool in British India and who are at present serving under the Government of Pakistan, will have the right to be members of the Pool.⁷

1 Ibid 2 Ibid 3 Ibid 4 Ibid
5 Ibid 6 Ibid 7 Ibid

There will be a Pool Establishment Committee consisting of the members of the Central Selection Board and all the secretaries in the Ministries of Finance, Commerce and Industries, if they are not already members of the Central Selection Board. Appointments to the Pool shall be made on the recommendations of this Committee. The recommendations of the Committee with regard to recruitment shall be submitted to the President through the Minister-in-Charge of the Establishment Division. The Establishment Secretary will act as Secretary of the Pool Establishment Committee which will be responsible for the administration, management and control of the Pool.² The Establishment Division shall be responsible for the following: (I) obtaining information from the Provincial Governments and Heads of Central Services and departments concerned regarding suitable candidates; (II) maintaining the confidential reports of prospective and actual Pool officers; and (III) making suggestions for postings and for the general management of the Pool.³ The Pool Establishment Committee will consider the suitability of the officers who were finally or provisionally approved for appointment to the Finance and Commerce Pool as reconstituted under the Resolution of 1950.⁴

1 Ibid.

2 Ministry of the Interior (Establishment Division) Resolution. Constitution of the Economic Pool, Karachi, September 16, 1959.

3 Ibid

4 Ibid.

Sixty percent. of the posts in the Pool are reserved for the members of the C.S.P. and forty percent. for the other Central Superior Services. A critic may point out that by far the bulk of the important and key positions, as already noted, both at the Centre and in the provinces are reserved for the C.S.P. officers who are also given a larger share in the Economic Pool. This will constitute, to a great extent, a limitation on the promotional prospects of the members of the other Central Superior Services. The officers of these services might have been given a larger share of posts in the Pool. Nevertheless, the Pool will provide an organised outlet to the members of the Central Superior Services for acquiring a wider and more varied administrative experience. The Constitution of this cadre will create yet another privileged class within the administrative hierarchy, and will do little to assuage service distinctions.

A single Civil Service.

The administrative system, critics point out, is not adequately prepared in organisation to meet the major change in government policies from law and order functions to development activities. "The inevitable result is that, with the attainment of independence and the shift of emphasis in governmental policies from regulating the life of the community to positive actions for promoting its welfare, the system has become outdated and seriously inadequate".¹ After independence, the

¹ Government of Pakistan. Planning Board. The First Five Year Plan (1955 - 1960), Draft, Vol. I. May, 1956, p. 99

Government of Pakistan have embarked on comprehensive programmes of social and economic development. All this has given a new purpose and a new role to the administration, and its members are called upon to assume new responsibilities which are rapidly increasing in scope and magnitude as development expands and acquires new tempo. Without a major re-adjustment of administrative machinery and re-organisation of the superior services to foster the growth of the feeling that all officers are equally responsible for the administration of the country, it may be difficult to realise the major purposes of the State.

From the point of view of organisation of services, one of the major reforms recommended by the Planning Board is to integrate the non-technical Central Superior Services into a single Civil Service. Apart from the two all-Pakistan Services, there is a number of Central Superior Services such as Audits and Accounts, Customs, Railway Accounts, Military Accounts, Customs, Central Excise, and Income Tax, and these are of a general and non-technical nature. They are separated from the two all-Pakistan services and each other by "artificial walls built around existing cadres, each having its own scales of pay and prospects of promotion".¹ According to the Planning Board, their separation from each other is artificial for four reasons.² First, recruitment to

1 Ibid, p. 123

2 Ibid

then is made through a combined competitive examination requiring a similar educational background. This had been the system from 1949 to 1956. Since 1957, a new policy of administering three separate competitive examinations has been started by the Federal Public Service Commission, for recruitment to the all-Pakistan and other Central Superior Services.¹ Although the members of these services are now recruited through separate competitive examinations which enable the candidates to indicate their choice for any one, the academic qualifications prescribed for all, and the nature and number of subjects for examination are similar in all cases. The standard of recruitment is, therefore, the same in all cases. Secondly, the work involved in the various services is equally non-technical in the sense that it does not require academic qualifications of a technical kind, such as those necessary in the case of, say, doctors and engineers.² From the viewpoint of general education, apart from personal aptitudes, all successful candidates are prima facie equally suitable for all services. There are now three separate institutions which are responsible for the post-entry training of the recruits to the various services - one for the C.S.P., one for the P.S.P. and the other for the remaining Central Superior Services. The three separate institutions not only create psychological barriers, but also reflect the "exaggerated independence of the parts

1. Federal Public Service Commission, No. F.2/1/57-E. 1957, and No. F.11/1/57-E, 1958 and No. F.12/1/57-E. 1958. Recently, the government reverted to the former system of ~~single~~ combined competitive examination.

2. Government of Pakistan. Planning Board. The First Five Year Plan (1955-60), P.O.J. 1956, p. 123.

of the public service".¹ We shall discuss this issue in detail in the chapter on training. Thirdly, "several accidental factors", ~~have~~^{stated} stated the Planning Board, "affect their assignment to one service or another, like their relative position in order of merit, their personal options, the ranking of the services inter se, the number of posts to be filled in the various services in particular years, and provincial and communal quotas. The combination of these factors can easily result in wrong selection from the point of view of temperamental suitability".² Mr P.H. Appleby has made a similar criticism in regard to the administrative system in India.³

Fourthly, "the ranking of the services inter se is open to question. Whatever the facts of administrative history behind it, this ranking does not seem to have such justification for its continuance. There is nothing inherent in the subjects handled by the respective services, which makes any service superior to those ranked below it. Mere volume or diversity is not a correct criterion".⁴

This rigid compartmentalisation of services into so many distinct and independent entities each operating within the limitation of its own cadre creates class-consciousness and fosters the feeling of caste among the civil servants. The Planning Board ~~have~~^{has} said, "The existence of

1) Ralph Braibanti, "The Civil Service of Pakistan: A Theoretical Analysis" in the South Atlantic quarterly, Vol. LVIII, No. 2, Spring, 1959, p. 283.

2) ~~The~~ First Five Year Plan, op.cit., p.123.

3) Report of a Survey (Public Administration in India) by Paul H. Appleby, 1953, p. 11.

4) Government of Pakistan. Planning Board. The First Five Years Plan. op. cit. Vol. I. 1956, p. 123

5) *Ibid.*

of so many services of a general character as discrete entities divides the total work of the Government into water-tight compartments, militates against the pooling of administrative resources, encourages class-consciousness and mutual jealousies, creates conflicts in many common areas of administration, and prevents the maximum utilisation of talents in accordance with aptitudes and emotional pulls, to mention only a few of the evils emanating from it¹. In Britain, it was a hundred years ago that a beginning was made to constitute a single Civil Service to replace the conglomeration of separate and independent services. The Northcote-Trevelyan Report said in justification, "Each man's experience, interests, hopes and fears, are limited to the special branch of the Service in which he is himself engaged. The effect naturally is, to ^{cramp} the energies of the whole body, to encourage the growth of narrow views and departmental prejudices, to limit the acquisition of experience, and to repress ^{and} almost extinguish the spirit of emulation and competition²."

These reasons, according to the Planning Board, will justify the integration of the non-technical Central Superior Services into a single unified Civil Service. The existing services should be converted into branches of this single Common Civil Service, all having identical scales of pay, prospects of promotion, pension and leave. The rights of the existing incumbents should, however, be protected.²

1 Papers relating to the Re-organisation of the Civil Service, B.P.P. Vol. XX. 1854-55, p. 454

2 . Planning Board, op. cit., 1956, p. 123

The Planning Board have also proposed that "posts of a Common Service nature, posts requiring all-round experience and proficiency, posts involving administrative leadership or high-level co-ordination, such as those at present generally occupied by senior members of the Civil Service of Pakistan, should be reserved for a Common Pool constituted on the model of the Finance and Commerce Pool".¹ The Board ^{had} ~~have~~ also suggested that it, ^{would} ~~will~~ be useful to have "two sections of this pool, one for the higher executive posts and the other for the higher secretariat posts. The pay scales of posts belonging to the pool should be higher than those of posts in the various branches. The pool will thus constitute a new elite corps of senior officers and administrative leaders different from the present one in that it will be composed of elements drawn from various sources, contributing manifold types of talents and experience. After officers are drawn into the pool; they will begin to be trained as specialists in administration and will add depth to the width of experience they bring with them from earlier backgrounds."²

The proposal to integrate all the non-technical central superior services into a single unified Civil Service is, we think, a move in the right direction. Mr. P.H. Appleby has recommended the creation of a Common Civil Service in India during his examination of the Indian Administrative system.³ Mr. Asok Chanda also has proposed the constit-

1) Planning Board, Vol. I. 1956, op. cit. p. 123-4.

2) ^{ibid, p. 124} Report of a Survey by P.H. Appleby, 1953, p. 58

3) ~~ibid, p. 124~~

ution of a "Common Civil Service" in India.¹

A single unified Civil Service will, the Planning Board ~~have~~ claimed, have two important advantages. Firstly, it will increase the supply of "general administrators with a broad sweep of the field of public administration, and integrated outlook, and a common esprit de corps".² With the increasing tempo of developmental activities, the need for a large supply of administrators of this type will expand. Secondly, it will offer within the framework of the "liberal administrative culture" "increased opportunities of specialisation in different sectors of public administration in harmony with innate talents and individual aptitudes".³ Apart from these, an integrated Civil Service, ~~thirdly~~, will afford equality of opportunity to all service personnel, and what is more, will ensure the utilisation of the best available talents in the higher and more responsible assignments unhampered by existing service restrictions. Fourthly, if the rigid distinctions between the various services are abolished by integrating them into a single Civil Service, it may be possible to arrange the allotment of candidates on a more rational basis, with reference to the subjects they have offered in the open competitive examination and to the impressions they have created in the viva voce examination. A further test of their aptitudes can be carried out

1 Indian Administration by Chanda, Aqak, 1958, p. 113

2 Planning Board (1956), Vol. I. op. cit. p. 125

3 Ibid.

during their basic training in the training institute. Fifthly, being integrated into a single Civil Service, transfers from one department to another should not present complications. Finally, a single Civil Service will bring about uniformity in pay-scales and other incidents of service, and afford equal opportunity to all for advancement based on merit rather than on present service distinctions. No pattern or system of administration, as Mr. Asok Chanda has pointed out, can remain static.¹ "It must always be in a state of evolution and of self-adjustment, if it is to fulfill adequately", he further states, "the changing demands and needs of a nation".² In Britain we find that a single unified Civil Service, which came into existence on the basis of the Northcote-Trevelyan Report in 1954, has been subjected since then to periodical comprehensive reviews and adjustments. As a result, the British Civil Service has proved itself to be a remarkably adaptable body, highly-capable of standing heavy strains and of adjusting itself to an increasing and changing variety of complex tasks and situations with equally remarkable facility. In France also, a bold and rational measure of integrating the Services into a Single Civil Service on the British model was taken in 1945. The members of the single service are trained and equipped differently to undertake wide and varied functions and responsibilities.³

1 Indian Administration, by Chanda, Asok, 1958, p. 100

2 Ibid.

3 Andre Bertrand, "The Recruitment and Training of Higher Civil Servants in the United Kingdom and France", in The Civil Service in Britain and France, edited Prof. Robson, W.A. 1956, p. 171

We think that a competent Commission should be set up to re-examine the structural organisation of the services with a view to exploring the possibility of creating a single unified Civil Service out of so many existing ones.

The Specialists in the Civil Service.

The extension of state activities in social and economic fields requires the services of a large corps of officers with professional, scientific and technical qualifications, training and experience. With the increasing tempo of socio-economic development, the demand for scientists and technicians will expand. This development has added complications to the structure of the Civil Service and posed new problems - above all, that of the proper relationship between the general administrator and the specialist.

The Planning Board have pointed out that the technician has not yet been accorded the recognition due to him in the public administration of the Country. The Board have urged for a proper adjustment of their respective positions in the administrative hierarchy. Equality of treatment, the Board hold, should be brought about between the technical and non-technical services. The technicians should be associated more closely with the general administrator in the formation of policy.¹

¹ The First Five Year Plan, Government of Pakistan, Planning Board, 1955-60 (Draft), Vol. I. May, 1956, p. 126

The status of the specialists in the Civil Service has for long been a source of lively controversy between the specialists and administrators in Britain. In 1929 the case of the specialists was put to the Tomlin Commission by the Institution of Professional Civil Servants. They wanted to ensure that no decision involving technical questions should be taken unless the specialist concerned had the opportunity of presenting his advice directly to the official, or the Minister, taking the decision. To facilitate this, the departments, they urged, should be organised on the "board system" as different from the "pyramidal system". In the absence of a system of this kind, they demanded that the principal professional, scientific and technical officers should have the right of access to the ministers on all important questions involving technical considerations.¹ The heads of technical divisions would by this means be given equality of status with the administrative heads of the departments. With this the Commission did not agree. They said, "We regard it as essential that, in the normal type of administrative department, there should be one officer responsible to the Minister for the advice tendered to him, and for the conduct of the Department. That officer must be the Permanent Secretary. We do not, therefore, recommend any extension of what is known as the board system. Such a step would not be to the advantage of the Ministers and would tend to delay public business".²

1 Appendix XI to Minutes of Evidence, Royal Commission on the Civil Service (Tomlin Commission) 1929-31, para 48.

2 Ibid, para 177, p.51

Few will be inclined to contest the wisdom of the view expressed by the Tomlin Commission.¹

The Barlow Committee have recently recommended that the prospects of the scientists in the Civil Service can be improved by "a more frequent transfer of suitable scientists to the Administrative Class".² Such transfers, if made more frequently, will introduce "a different outlook" particularly in departments whose work is concerned with scientific and technical processes, to the great benefit of the government. It will also open up wider avenues of promotion to the scientists. The recommendations of this Committee as well as some earlier ones have contributed greatly to the improvement of the conditions of service of the specialists. But things have not been regarded as completely satisfactory by the specialists. More recently the Institution of Professional Civil Servants have repeated their claim before the Priestley Commission that the principal professional officers "must be in a direct line of responsibility to the Minister and there should not lay any interpolation of another officer purporting to hold responsibility and to give advice when in fact he can become only a transmitter of the advice of others. Transmission of professional advice is full of danger when it is done by a non-professional person. It is also, and this is the primary point, a

1 The Civil Service in a Changing State, by Greaves, H.R.C. 1947, p. 89

2 Report of the Barlow Committee on Scientific Staff in the White Paper on the Scientific Civil Service, Cmd. 6679, 1945, p. 12.

means of lowering the value and status of the professional person, and thereby decreasing the whole profession and structure".¹ The Royal Commission have not expressed any definite opinion on this demand, as it was outside their terms of reference. The Commission have strongly recommended more frequent transfers from the specialist class to the administrative class "not only in the interest of providing careers, but also as a means of ensuring that those who are responsible for policy in departments such as the Ministry of Supply or Post Office are able, by educational background and previous Civil Service experience, fully to appreciate the technical issues involved in the formation of policy".² There has been some opposition to the hierarchical changes in the structure of the Civil Service as proposed by the Institution of Professional Civil Servants. Sir Frederick Brundnett has strongly criticised the idea of instituting a "hydra-headed control" in any department.³ He thinks that it should continue to be left to the general administrator to take the final decision because only then can account be taken of the political, social, financial and practical aspects of the matter, besides the technical aspect. Mr. Greaves also is opposed to hierarchical changes in the interests of the specialists as he fears that it may lead to the diffusion of responsibility.⁴

1 Memorandum of Evidence submitted by the Institution of Professional Civil Servants on the Professional, Scientific and Technical classes. Minutes of Evidence, 12/13 taken before the Royal Commission (Priestley Commission), 1954, p. 17

2 Report of the Royal Commission on the Civil Service (Priestley Commission), 1953-55, Cmd. 9613, 1955, para 531, p. 128

3 Minutes of Evidence before the Priestley Commission.

4 Greaves, H.R.G. "Structure of Civil Service" in 'The Civil Service in/ contd.

In Pakistan, ex-officio secretariat status is accorded to specialists within the administrative hierarchy. It enables them to transmit their advice straight to the Secretary or a Minister, without the interpolation of a deputy secretary and under-secretary. In the Ministry of Education at Karachi, the educational adviser is an ex-officio joint secretary. The Director General, Railways in the Ministry of Communications is now an ex-officio Secretary in the Railway Division, reporting direct to the Minister of Communications.¹ The Directors General, Posts and Telegraphs in the Ministry of Communications and of Health in the Ministry of Health enjoy ex-officio secretariat status at the joint-secretary level.² The same status is also held by a few officers at the lower level. By this means, the specialist Civil Servants who are heads of technical departments are given equality of status with the Secretaries. But the system has also its disadvantages as well. Recently, the Economy Committee have pointed out that in the Ministry of Communications, "the Director General, Railways, and the Director General, Posts and Telegraphs enjoy ex-officio Secretariat Status and deal directly with the Minister in charge of Communications. The functions of Secretary, Communications, are, therefore, confined to the little that is left over. In his evidence before us, he made no secret of the fact that he was being wasted in that Ministry".³ The Committee have further pointed out that unless the

(cont'd). Britain & France" edited by Robson, K.A. p. 102.

1 Information supplied by the Establishment Division, Ministry of the Interior, Government of Pakistan.

2 Report of the Administrative Enquiry Committee, Government of Pakistan, 1953, p. 22. para 56.

3 Report of the Economy Committee, Government of Pakistan, (Part III) 1958. p. 7

work committed to the Railways and Posts and Telegraphs is transferred to the Secretary, there is no point in continuing the post of Secretary in the Ministry of Communications.¹ The system thus reduces the work of the Secretary and renders his post almost redundant. It also blurs the distinction, as the Administration Enquiry Committee have pointed out, between a Ministry and an Executive department.² It also leads to the diffusion of responsibility. It is of the essence of sound administration that responsibility must be unified; the seat of responsibility must be clear and well-known; and the channels of responsibility must be clear and well-defined. There can be only one person who can stand at the head of a Ministry, responsible for advising the Minister, to carry out his instructions, and to answer for all that happens in the Ministry.

In regard to the grant of ex-officio Secretariat Status, the Government of Pakistan took a decision in 1950 to the effect that "Heads of Departments should not as a general rule be granted ex-officio Secretariat Status, and, if in any particular case the Ministry concerned considers that such status should be granted, the proposal should be referred to the Cabinet Secretariat (Establishment Branch) for decision by the Honorable the Prime Minister on the merits of the case". The Committee have endorsed this view.⁴

1 Ibid.

2 Report of the Administrative Enquiry Committee, op. cit. p. 22

3 Quoted in the Report of the Administrative Enquiry Committee, 1957, p. 21-22, para 56.

4 Ibid.

give that leadership as he is aware of the important political and social forces at work in the country.¹

Re-organisation of some technical services on an all-Pakistan basis.

L.C./ The re-organisation of certain technical services such as agriculture, health, engineering, education, forests, e.c., on an all-Pakistan basis is of paramount importance because of the expanding need of competent technical manpower. Such a reorganisation is likely to ensure a high standard of efficiency and performance. It will widen the field of recruitment. It will attract to the service candidates of the highest quality from all over the country. It is likely to serve the best interest of the country.

L.C./ Secondly, the all-Pakistan composition of these services will add to the unity of Pakistan divided into two wings — East and West. It will foster the development of national outlook and point of view. It will further ensure that the administration of each province will have a leavening of officers from outside, whose vision and outlook are not coloured by provincial or parochial horizons. It is likely to ensure the much needed objectivity in administration.

Thirdly, the control and management of these officers will not be vested solely in the provincial governments to whom they shall be allotted, but will be shared jointly by the provincial and central govern-

1 Ibid.

ments. This will provide for a measure of remote control which, by its very nature, will be objective. This will enable these officers to discharge their responsibilities without being unduly subjected to the pulls and pressures of local political influences.

Another argument which can be advanced in support of this view is the attainment of a minimum uniform standard in the administration and development of the country as a whole.

L.C.7
The main difficulty arises from the opposition of the provincial governments to an extension of the [✓] "all-Pakistan" principle to services other than the Civil Service of Pakistan and the Police Service of Pakistan, which had been imposed by the constitution. This opposition of provincial governments cannot be dismissed lightly as mere narrow provincialism. The provinces today are autonomous and not mere administrative units of the country. They have well-defined areas and responsibilities. L.C.1
The constitution of [✓] all-Pakistan Services is regarded as contrary to the conception of provincial autonomy. The provincial governments will not have exclusive control over these Services, and to that extent it will impinge on provincial autonomy.

L.C.1
Secondly, the [✓] all-Pakistan Services will have to be paid on a higher level than the provincially recruited services. This is necessary to attract the best available talent from all over the country, and

L.C/ also to enable the officers to serve away from their home province without financial embarrassment. The financial burden of the All-Pakistan Services, the provincial authorities point out, is higher, and constitutes one of the main obstacles to the creation of such services. But this objection is not really substantial. The magnitude of some of the development projects, both in scope and capital investment, is so vast that the employment of a small number of highly paid officers in their direction and control will form but an insignificant portion of the total expenditure involved. Moreover, the increased competence and effective supervision which these services will be able to offer are likely to yield ultimately substantial economies, more than compensating the initial extra expenditure. But even if the financial difficulties prove to be real obstacles, these can be resolved by a proper adjustment in the allocation of financial resources between the provinces and the centre.

L.C/- Thirdly, the organisation of these services on an All-Pakistan basis will lead to a measure of central control of these services. The Provincial governments are averse to it. In the case of the Civil Service of Pakistan and the Police Service of Pakistan, the provinces have agreed to joint control and a general agreement has been reached defining its scope and extent in the form of statutory rules. It should not, in our view, be impossible to extend this principle of joint control to other Services as well.

L.c/ Finally, there is the apprehension that provincial candidates will fail to compete successfully in an all-Pakistan competition, and that the services operating within a province will come to be filled by persons from outside. The provincial authorities are anxious to provide maximum opportunity to their own people, on consideration of narrow provincialism and political expediency. This fear can be removed by the extension of the principle which governs the recruitment to the all-Pakistan and other Superior Central Services, to these Services as well.¹

L.c/ The question of the re-organisation of certain technical services on an all-Pakistan basis is a matter which, in our opinion, must obviously be considered at the highest political level.

Central Control and Management

In Pakistan the Central Cabinet used to exercise its over-all control over the civil servants working under the central government from 1947-58. The powers given to the President in regard to Civil Service matters were not exercised save on the advice of the Cabinet. In actual practice, the Cabinet Secretariat acted as the principal Central Personnel Agency. Under the new regime the Cabinet Secretariat is renamed as President's Secretariat.²

1 The recruitment policy will be discussed in the chapter on recruitment.

2 The Constitution of 1956 was abrogated in 1958. The system of parliamentary government also was abolished. Since then the Country has been under Martial law and administration.

The Establishment Division in the President's Secretariat is divided into two main branches, one dealing with the Superior Establishment, and the other dealing with the Ministerial Establishment. The main and important functions of the Establishment Division in regard to both the superior and ministerial establishments are the formulation of the recruitment policy of the Central Government and the recruitment of Central Officers and staff, training of the different categories of officers, the promotion of officers, disciplinary action and the maintenance of an organisation to review the procedure and methods in government offices. It is for the President's Secretariat to initiate and to focus any general legislation relating to the Civil Service. It retains control over the main conditions of service, pay, pension, leave, medical attendance, and so on. It frames the rules regarding the employee associations and their recognition. It also supervises the implementation of the personnel policies and programmes of Government.¹ The Railway Division in the Ministry of Communications is responsible for the personnel policies and programmes relating to the railway employees.² Civil Service matters of financial bearing are the joint concern of the President's Secretariat and the Ministry of Finance.³

1 Administrative Directory of the Government of Pakistan, Cabinet Secretariat, Karachi, 1950, p. 117-122.

2 Ibid, p. 222

3 Ibid, p. 148

The President's Secretariat fixes the cadre strength of the all-Pakistan Services. It also deals with the reservation of posts for the members of the C.S.P. and of other Services. In consultation with the provincial governments it frames rules and regulations regarding the all-Pakistan services. It consults the Federal Public Service Commission on recruitment, promotion, transfer, discipline and pension. The control over the all-Pakistan services is shared between the President's Secretariat and the provincial government. The President's Secretariat decides the question of the representation of provinces in the all-Pakistan and other Central Superior Services. It also runs the Civil Service Academy at Lahore for the training of recruits to the C.S.P. It also transfers the members of the C.S.P. from the Centre to the province and from one province to another. One of its important functions is the selection of officers for promotion to all the higher posts in the secretariat. It has also the direct responsibility for the control and management of ministerial establishments and class four employees of the Central Government. It issues detailed rules and regulations regarding the recruitment, promotion, transfer, pay and allowance and organisation. It runs the Secretariat Training School for them. It exercises general disciplinary control over them. It consults the departments concerned in all appropriate cases. It seeks the advice of the Federal Public Service Commission in regard to their recruitment, promotion and conditions of services.

There is thus a great deal of centralisation of control located in the President's Secretariat as the central personnel agency. Too much centralisation of control is not desirable as it gives rise to the short-comings of the "red-tape". Sir Thomas Padmore, a top ranking British Civil Servant, with considerable experience in personnel management points out the following defects of over-centralisation of personnel control. In establishment matters, over-centralization of control leads to "the proliferation of rules and regulations and the attempt to force varying circumstances into conformity with a general pattern; the complexity of paper work to which the rules give rise; the sapping of local initiative and the frustration of the sensible decisions appropriate to the facts of the individual problem which are known only on the spot; in short, all those evils of "red-tape" which tend to make administration sluggish, inept and sometimes unjust".¹ What is necessary is, to strike a proper balance between centralised control on the one hand and the delegation of the power of decision on the other.

We may now examine the question whether the President's Secretariat is a suitable organ to serve as the central personnel agency. In Britain, the Treasury acts as the central agency in regard to personnel control and management. Since the end of 1956 one of the two permanent joint

1 Sir Thomas Padmore "Civil Service Establishments & The Treasury" in the Civil Service in Britain & France, edited by Professor Robson, W.A. 1956, p. 128

secretaries of the Treasury is responsible for establishments work. He reports direct to the Prime Minister on many matters, and enjoys the title of the Head of the Home Civil Service. He advises the Prime Minister whose consent is necessary for all the senior appointments to various departments. Treasury's position as the locus of central control over personnel matters is supported on the following grounds. First, "the high cost of the Civil Service makes it "a matter of high financial importance".¹ Secondly, its control over all forms of expenditure gives it "the best knowledge of the work being done throughout the service. The Treasury better than any one else can relate the numbers and grades of people employed to the actual work to be done, and in so doing establish standards common to all departments".² Critics argue that the Treasury is not a suitable agency for personnel management because its operations are guided by too much "narrow parsimony" and very little by human aspects of the Civil Service matters. This criticism is beginning to loose its ground. In France, to take another example, a Civil Service Office was created in 1945 to act as the central personnel agency. It performs the following functions in regard to the management of the Civil Service. It prepares the "texts of all laws and decrees affecting the civil servants as a group". It classifies their position within the administrative hierarchy. It

1 Sir John Wood, "Treasury Control" in the Civil Service in Britain and France, edited by Robson, K.A. 1946, p. 120.

2 Ibid.

supervises and approves the preparation of regulations governing the recruitment and promotion of Civil Servants. . Finally, it offers guidance on all questions relating to the improvement of the methods of work and organisation of the various services.¹ The French Civil Service office works under the direct supervision of the Prime Minister but in actual practice, he delegates his power to another Minister.² In the U.S.A. the Civil Service Commission acts as the personnel agency. Its function is to assist the President in the formulation of general personnel policies. The Civil Service Commission administers the Civil Service laws, safeguards the merit system, sets standards for the departments and agencies, and offers professional guidance and assistance in personnel management.³

In Pakistan, under the present regime, the President's Secretariat serves as the central personnel agency. This will enable the President to establish direct and intimate contact with personnel matters. Thus, the central personnel agency is attached to the effective head of the Government. As the role of the Civil Service is becoming more and more vital and important, it is essential that the well-being and efficiency of the Civil Servants should be constantly under the eyes of the head of the State. If the seat of the central control is

1 Public Administration Review, Vol, XI, No.3, Summer, 1951, p. 181.

2 Ibid.

3 Hoover Commission (Task Force Report on Personnel & Civil Services, p. 140 - 141.)

L.C./C.4

located in any particular ministry, as is done in the Ministry of Home

affairs.
 ^ Officers in India, it may create resentment among the various central ministries and the effective head of the State may not have any direct contact with Civil Service matters. The location of this agency in the President's Secretariat avoids this. The Civil Servants can look upon the President for inspiration and ~~fair~~ *fair* treatment. It will improve their ~~work~~ *work*. But very recently, the Establishment Division has been

L.C./L.C. transferred from the President's Secretariat to the Ministry of the Interior.¹ We think that it is not a desirable step as it will not enable the President to have any direct contact with Civil Service matters. In Britain, France, and the U.S.A. the effective head of the state is associated with Civil Service matters. We think that it may be desirable to shift it back to the President's Secretariat. *Recently, it has been transferred to the President's Secretariat.*

¹ Information supplied by the Establishment Division, Ministry of the Interior.

CHAPTER THREE

Recruitment

The main problem of recruitment in simple terms is how to unite equality of opportunity with efficiency.

The Constitution of 1956 ensures as one of the fundamental rights equality of opportunity to any citizen in regard to public employment.¹ But there are certain exceptions to it. In reality, this equality is limited by the under-developed character of the educational system. At present, the Civil Service draws its recruits from a very narrow section of the Community — only 18.9 per cent. of the people can read and write.² Again, the State is empowered to reserve posts for persons belonging to any class or area in order to secure their adequate representation in the Services of Pakistan. Although Communal representation in the Services has been abolished, six per cent. of the vacancies in the centrally recruited Civil Services are reserved for the members of the scheduled Castes.³ Any scheme of reservation of posts is not favourable to administrative efficiency, although it may give satisfaction to a backward class. More efforts need to be made to remove the educational backwardness of the scheduled Castes.

1 Article 17 of the Constitution of 1956.

2 Census of Pakistan, 1951, Vol. I. p. 78

3 Pakistan Public Service Commission. Report on the Central Superior Services Examination, 1953, Appendix IV. p. 27

L.C./L.C. Gradually, this will enable the Scheduled Caste candidates to compete for the various services on a level of equality with others.

L.C./ Equality of opportunity is further limited by the fact that a woman candidate under the existing recruitment rules is only eligible for the audit and accounts service, railway accounts service, military accounts service, income tax service, and ^{postal} ~~post~~ service, but she is not eligible for the all-Pakistan and other Central Superior Services for which a candidate must be a male.¹ Even in regard to the Services for which a woman candidate is eligible, she will be appointed, if selected, on the express condition that she must resign the service on marriage or remarriage. It has been pointed out by the government that married women cannot always prove efficient members of these services. We think that this view of the government has a substantial basis. A C.S.P. officer, for instance, is not merely to occupy a post in the Secretariat but is also to work as a district magistrate or deputy Commissioner.² In this capacity he is the chief executive officer of the district, responsible for law and order, collection of revenue, social and economic development and other matters concerning the welfare of the people. The work is very hard and strenuous and a woman may not have the energy to stand the rigour of it. Moreover,

1 Pakistan Public Service Commission No. P2/1/56-E. 1956.

2 The two provinces of Pakistan - East and West - are divided into thirteen divisions which are again divided into sixty-eight districts. The districts are further subdivided into a vast number of Tehsils or talukas in West Pakistan & sub-divisions in East Pakistan. The C.S.P. officers are in charge of divisions & districts. In each district there are often 3 or 4 C.P.S. officers as assistant magistrates, additional magistrates & magistrates. ~~In addition, they are also in charge of a large number of tehsils or talukas and sub-divisions.~~

the C.S.P. officers, as already noted, move from executive work to administrative work, from one department to another, and also from the centre to the province and vice versa on a tenure basis.¹ The number of women, however, in the Civil Services in Pakistan is very small because of educational and social backwardness.

The selection process is the corner-stone of the Civil Service structure. Unless the recruitment policy is soundly conceived, it is unlikely to build up a first-rate staff. The young persons are recruited to the various Central Services - superior and ministerial - on the basis of their results in the competitive examinations conducted for this purpose by the Federal Public Service Commission. But the recruitment policy adopted by the Government of Pakistan is based on a quota system.² According to this policy, twenty per cent. of the centrally recruited civil servants - ^Ssuperior and ministerial - are appointed purely in order of their merits as determined by their positions in the competitive examinations, irrespective of their provinces or areas of birth, or origin. In order to secure fair representation for the provinces of Pakistan, the eighty per cent. of the remaining recruits are distributed in the case of the Civil Service of Pakistan among candidates from the provinces in the ratio of the respective provincial caste strengths. In the case of the

1 See Chapter II

2 F.P.S.C. Report on the Central Superior Services Examination, 1953, p. 27

22/69
 Police Service of Pakistan,¹ the number of recruits in respect of each province is determined by the provincial governments concerned. In regard to other Central services - Superior and Ministerial - eighty per cent. of the recruits are divided equally between the two wings - East and West. But in each of these cases, the candidate's position on his respective area or provincial list is determined by his standing in the competitive examination. In other words, appointments to the eighty per cent. of the vacancies which are to be filled by candidates belonging to a particular province or area are made by the Government in the order of merit of the candidates of that province or area, as determined by their positions in the competitive examinations.

The system of recruitment on the basis of quota is adopted to secure adequate and fair representation of the provinces and areas in all the centrally recruited Civil Services. The province of East Pakistan and some areas in West Pakistan have been inadequately represented in these services. This under-representation creates a feeling of exclusion from an effective share in the Central Services in the minds of the people of these areas, and is considered detrimental to the unity and integrity of Pakistan divided between two wings, east and west - separated by a foreign country. The quota system is evolved to meet this situation.

¹ Recruitment to the Police Service of Pakistan ^{is} will be made by the Central Government through the Federal Public Service Commission on an all Pakistan basis but the cadres of this service will be on Provincial basis and an officer once allotted to a Province/area will be required to serve in that province/area.

If we examine the working of this policy of recruitment, we find that 338 officers were recruited on the basis of their results in the Central Superior Services examinations from 1950 to 1953. Of these, 68 officers or twenty per cent., were recruited on the basis of merit alone, and the rest on the basis of quota. An analysis of these 68 officers from the point of view of their province of origin shows that as many as 30 officers came from different areas of the former British India, ^{now in India} and 38 from the provinces of Pakistan during these four years. Of these 38 officers, only six came originally from East Pakistan, twenty five from the West Punjab, two from Sind, two from the North-West Frontier Province, one from Khairpur and two from Karachi. These figures indicate, to a large extent, the rationale of the quota system.

Although the quota system maintains equality in regard to the eighty per cent. of the vacancies as between the provinces and areas, it constitutes a major departure from the system of recruitment on the basis of merit as one of the recognised techniques of building up an efficient Civil Service. The eighty per cent. of the vacancies as already noted, divided equally between the two wings, are filled from among the successful candidates of the two wings in the competitive examinations. The system of recruitment on the basis of quota militates against efficiency

1 These figures are taken from the Pamphlets of the C.S.S. Examinations for 1950, 1951, and 1952, and from the Report on the C.S.S. Examinations, 1953, published by the Pakistan Public Service Commission. During the last few years the number of candidates from East Pakistan, ~~has been increasing~~ ~~on a merit basis~~ ~~has been successful in the twenty per cent. recruited on merit, has been increasing.~~

in administration. It also affects adversely the incentive of the intending-candidates. But against this are to be set the under-representation of the various areas in the Services and the peculiar geography of the country. Gradually, the number of candidates from East Pakistan in the twenty per cent. of the vacancies filled on merit is increasing. We think that the situation needs to be closely watched, and the eighty per cent. of the vacancies filled on the basis of quota should be progressively reduced. "It is certain that if the recruitment of officials is to be improved in the years ahead, this 80 per cent. must somehow be progressively reduced", thus observed Mr. A. Bertrand.¹

Recruiting Agency

The Federal Public Service Commission² carry on the task of recruitment to the Central Civil Services - higher and lower. The Constitution^{al} position of the F.P.S. Commission is examined in an earlier chapter.³ The Commission now consists of one Chairman and four members.⁴ Analysing the composition of the Commission as it stood on May 30, 1959, we find that the Chairman and one member belong to the old Indian Political Service and I.C.S. respectively, two members are from the Provincial Public Service Commission and one from the public. There is no woman member on the Commission. No attempt so far has been made to appoint any one

1 A. Bertrand. "The Civil Service Academy of Lahore and the Training of the Members of the Civil Service of Pakistan" in International Social Science Bulletin, Vol. VII, No. 2, 1955, p. 268

2 From 1948 to 1955, it had been known as the P.P.S. Commission. In 1956 its name was changed to F.P.S. Commission. Recently it has been renamed as the Central Public Service Commission.

3 See Chapter I.

4 Information supplied by the office of the F.P.S. Commission.

connected with industry and business on the Commission. The need for professional, technical and scientific personnel is expanding day by day. It will be more useful if a member possessing industrial, commercial, or technical knowledge and background is included in the Commission. It is likely to make the selection of personnel more discriminating and realistic.

The following figures give an idea of the variety and volume of work of the Federal Public Service Commission.¹

Recruitment by examination					Recruitment by Interview			Temporary appointment	
No. of exam-inations	No. of appli-cants	No. of cand- dates who actually attended	No. of candi- dates inter- viewed	No. of posts	No. of appli- cants	No. of candi- dates inter- viewed.	No. of cases	No. of posts	
1949	7	1,427	2,057	555	461	6,445	2,796	80	118
1950	6	3,188	2,552	253	752	6,205	3,614	232	440
1951	8	2,994	2,389	169					
1952	11	4,538	3,946	262	369	2,594	1,408	117	-
1953	7	2,031	1,738	129	299	1,474	924	104	208
1954	9	1,581	953	359	402	2,465	1,465	87	133
1955	10	1,079	561	178	544	3,794	2,137	74	109
1956	11	1,179	871	79 ²	455	2,978	2,226	81	132

¹ The members of the different ministerial services appointed on the basis of examination are not required to appear before an Interview Board

- 1 These figures are taken from the appendices of the annual reports of the Federal Public Service Commission, from 1949 to 1956.
- 2 The number of candidates who appeared at the viva voce for the Central Superior Services in 1956 is not available.

These figures show that the number of competitive examinations has increased from seven in 1949 to eleven in 1956. The number of candidates who applied to sit for the various examinations varied from year to year, the highest being in 1952. It was low in 1956. The number of candidates who applied for selection by competitive interview also varied from year to year, the largest being in 1949. It was because immediately after partition the government required a large number of officers to man the newly-created Pakistan Foreign Service.¹ Similar has been the case in regard to temporary appointments.

Besides these, the Commission also hold a larger number of typewriting and proficiency tests. In addition, the Commission are also responsible for dealing with various service matters such as promotion, disciplinary cases, pension, recruitment rules, and so on. The following figures give an idea of the work of the Commission in these respects:²

Year	No. of tests.	No. of applicants	No. of candidates who applied	Service Matters: Promotion, disciplinary cases, pension, domicile, recruitment rules and miscellaneous
1949	42	2,300	1,567	185
1950/51	83	6,390	4,958	463
1952	40	3,141	2,223	163
1953	68	3,023	2,293	177
1954	48	3,609	2,743	172
1955	40	3,037	2,278	175
1956	52	3,337	2,446	180

¹ P.P.S.C. Second Annual Report, 1949, p. 23½

² These figures are taken from the appendices of the annual reports of the Commission from 1949 to 1956.

Moreover, the Commission also select sometimes by interview and sometimes by written tests candidates for the award of various types of scholarships.

In 1949 the total number of employees in the office of the Commission was 111, and it has increased to 161 in 1959.¹ In their Annual reports the Commission have been continuously complaining of the inadequacy of the staff to cope with their work.² "The shortage of staff is very adversely affecting the efficiency of work in the Commission's office."³ Again, about fifty per cent. of the staff is temporary. The temporary employees, after gaining experience, are always anxious to seek employment elsewhere with better security. As a result, the Commission's office continues to lose its trained hands which adversely affects the quality and speed of work in the office. It is also partly responsible for delay in the work of the Commission. In their eighth annual report the Commission pointed out that four examinations for recruitment to the various ministerial services could not be undertaken owing to the inadequacy of staff.⁴ Although additional staff on a temporary basis is occasionally granted to cope with the heavy rush of business, the demand of the Commission for more staff still remains undecided.⁵ The Commission strongly urge the Government to grant them

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- 1 Information supplied by the office of the Federal Public Service Commission.
 - 2 See the 5th, 6th, 7th and 8th Annual Reports of the Commission.
 - 3 Seventh Report of the Commission, 1955, p. 2
 - 4 Eighth Report of the Commission, 1956, p. 2 - 4
 - 5 The Commission cannot recruit their own staff unless sanctioned by the Government (i.e. Establishment Division dealing with Services).

additional staff in adequate numbers. We think that the demand of the Commission for more staff needs careful consideration. Again, the Commission are of the view that, for the purpose of maintaining a high standard of efficiency in their office, the status and scales of pay of their employees should be at least the same as those for the employees - in the Central Secretariat. We think that this is a reasonable demand and should be accepted by Government.

Recruitment to the all-Pakistan and Central Superior Services through Competitive Examination.

Recruitment to the all-Pakistan and Central Superior Services had been made through a combined competitive examination from 1949 to 1956. Since 1957 a policy of administering three competitive examinations - one for the C.S.P. and Pakistan Foreign Service, another for the P.S.P., and the other for the remaining Central Superior Services - has been started.¹ The entire scheme of examination, whether combined or separate, for all these services is the same with some minor differences. The services for which combined or separate examinations are held are the following: (i) The Civil Service of Pakistan, (ii) the Pakistan Foreign Service, (iii) the Police Service of Pakistan, (iv) Audit and Accounts Service, (v) Railway Accounts Service, (vi) Military Accounts

1 Federal Public Service Commission No. F.2/1/57-E, 1957. This Policy, it is claimed, has been adopted to enable a candidate to indicate more clearly his choice and liking for a particular service. But it is too early to make any assessment of it.

Recently, the Government have again reverted to the system of combined competition examination & recruitment to the Central Superior Services.

candidates who are permanent residents of Azad Kashmir or candidates living in these areas or in any other Pakistan, who belong to the state of Jammu and Kashmir.¹ This is done to provide adequate facilities to young men belonging to the backward classes and areas. In many cases they start their education rather late in life, and hence do not obtain the university degree at the same age as others do. Age-limits are also relaxed for the government employees in subordinate positions to enable them to compete for some of these services other than the all-Pakistan services. They must be over 25 and under 28 years of age. It is also laid down that they must hold substantively permanent appointments or have been in continuous service for a period of not less than two years. They are to be recommended by their respective heads of departments.² The underlying idea is that special age-limits will enable many civil servants in lower positions to find their way into higher services through open competition. Special age-limits are of doubtful value. Very few candidates can have the time and energy to prepare for a stiff competitive examination after doing their regular official work. In Britain also, before the Second World War, special age limits were prescribed for lower civil servants to enable them to compete in the examination for recruitment to the higher classes. But

1 Federal Public Service Commission, No. F.12/1/57-E, 1958.

2 Ibid.

it was felt that "the open competition was academically exacting, and the candidates entering from the service were handicapped by lack of time for preparation".¹ In the post-war period special age-limits have been abolished. A system of limited competition has been instituted and it provides opportunity to young officers to compete for certain percentage of vacancies in the higher levels of service. A system of limited competition on the British pattern is worth a trial in Pakistan.

To compete for any of these services a candidate must hold a degree in any faculty of the recognised universities.² In Britain there is no formal requirement in regard to a University degree in Method I, but it is the university honours graduates who compete for the administrative class. For recruitment by Method II, it is necessary that a candidate must have at least a second class honours degree.

The structure of the competitive examination in Pakistan is modelled on the British pattern. It consists of two parts - written and oral. The written part consists of two sections - compulsory and optional. The compulsory subjects are English Essay, carrying 100 marks and General English and General Knowledge carrying 200 marks each. The object of the essay paper is to test a candidate's ability to think constructively, to reason, and to present his ideas logically and

1 Eighty-fourth Report of E.A. Civil Service Commissioners, p1 30.

2 A candidate must hold a degree in Arts, Science, Engineering, Commerce or Agriculture.

effectively in clear English. The papers on English are designed to test the candidate's knowledge of the English language and his capacity for its skilful use. The papers on General Knowledge, ^{dealt with} are matters of general interest and importance in the present-day world. They are designed to throw considerable light on candidate's knowledge and awareness of his environments which include social, political, economic, cultural forces and institutions and also scientific phenomena and trends. The optional subjects are of a diverse nature and can be arranged in six main groups:- (a) languages and literature, (b) history, (c) mathematics, (d) science, (e) social sciences, and (f) law. Each of these subjects carries 200 marks, but marks for certain subjects have been reduced recently. The candidate must select the optional subjects to carry 600 marks in all. In the case of the Police Service of Pakistan the candidates are allowed to take two optional subjects carrying 400 marks.¹ The examination in optional subjects is intended to test the general equipment and intellectual calibre and worth of candidates. The minimum standard of optional subjects will be that of an honours degree of a University in Pakistan or India.²

To qualify for the viva voce test a candidate must secure an aggregate of at least 40 per cent. marks in the written examination. He must secure at least 25 per cent. marks in each compulsory subject. The viva voce test carries 300 marks. A candidate who fails to obtain 100 marks

1 Federal Public Service Commission, No. F.12/1/57-E, 1958

2 Ibid. No. F 2/1/58- E, 1958

out of 300 in this test is considered to have failed. In Britain the marks obtained by a candidate both in the written and viva voce tests are taken together to determine his position. In Pakistan a departure has been made from this principle, and failure in the viva voce test disqualifies a candidate, however brilliant his performance might have been in the written papers. The object of the viva voce test is the same in both countries. It seeks to test a candidate's self-possession, firmness of purpose, alertness, intelligence and intellectual outlook, personality, his personal qualities of mind and mental equipment.

The ratio between the written part and interview may also be of some interest. In the case of the C.S.P. P.F.S. and other Central Superior Services, the former carries 1100 marks and the latter carries 300 marks. The ratio is thus $3\frac{2}{3} : 1$. This is very nearly similar to the one in the case of the British Administrative Class recruited by Method I: The written part in this case carries 1000 marks while the interview is given 300 marks - the ratio is $3\frac{1}{3} : 1$. In the case of the P.S.P. in Pakistan the proportion is 900 : 300 or 3 : 1.

We may now turn to a review of the performance of the candidates at the combined competitive examinations for the Central Superior Services from 1950 to 1953. The average marks obtained by the candidates in most of the subjects are given below and these are arranged in groups.¹

1 Pakistan Public Service Commission. Report on the Central Superior Services Examination, 1953, p. 1 - 3. These averages are worked out by the application of the rule penalising superficial knowledge which requires the Commission to reduce marks below 25 p.c. to zero. Detailed figures for the years from 1954 to the present day are not available.

(1) Compulsory subjects

	<u>Average mark in percentage</u>			
	<u>1950</u>	<u>1951</u>	<u>1952</u>	<u>1953</u>
General Knowledge	51.4	36.2	27.8	27.5
English Essay	38.7	34.2	36.6	33.2
English	28.5	21.1	29.5	35.2

The number of candidates in this group was large and it was expected that the average marks would be fairly constant. This expectation was realised in the averages of the group but the marks in English displayed considerable variation. "It is possible to hope that the standard in the two English papers has now touched bottom and is unlikely to fall further; but the same cannot be said for the General Knowledge, which this year (1953) produced more 'howlers' than any other subject", observed the Commission.¹ The average is very low.

(2) Languages and Literatures

	<u>Average marks - percentage.</u>			
	<u>1950</u>	<u>1951</u>	<u>1952</u>	<u>1953</u>
English Literature	55.0	40.9	31.7	43.9
Urdu	44.5	41.5	30.8	47.4
Bengali	42.5	46.2	40.2	41.5
Arabic	38.0	29.8	27.6	31.8
Persian	48.3	43.0	39.3	44.1
French	70.0	63.7	63.8	53.3

The average marks in Bengali were very steady, the level being much higher than in most subjects. The other languages except French more than recovered the ground in 1953 which they lost in 1952, and this suggests that decline in this group has been arrested.²

1 Ibid. p. 2

2 Ibid

(3) History

	<u>Average marks - Percentage</u>			
	<u>1950</u>	<u>1951</u>	<u>1952</u>	<u>1953</u>
History of Pakistan & India	43.6	39.4	39.6	28.7
British History	32.8	35.7	34.8	15.5
European History	56.1	52.8	39.9	35.1
Islamic History & Culture	32.3	39.1	28.3	31.5
International Relations	35.8	35.5	42.1	42.7

The decline in this group had been continuous: the small gain in Islamic History and Culture and International Relations being more than off-set by a serious fall in the two most popular historical subjects. The quality of the work offered in British History was "appalling", and that in the History of Pakistan and India had been almost equally deplorable.

(4) Mathematics

	<u>Average mark - percentage.</u>			
	<u>1950</u>	<u>1951</u>	<u>1952</u>	<u>1953</u>
Pure Mathematics	18.4	29.4	15.9	15.7
Applied Mathematics	17.6	16.8	25.6	23.6
Statistics	41.9	31.6	26.1	10.3
Advanced Accounting and Auditing	35.4	37.8	39.9	37.2
Prime Movers	25.0	44.4	57.5	0

The best work in this group was done in advanced accounting and auditing, the marks in this subject being remarkably steady. The fall in statistics was disturbing and all the candidates in prime movers were awarded zero in 1953. The average mark in any subject of this group in 1953 was

lower than in 1952.¹

(5) Science

	<u>Average mark - percentage</u>			
	<u>1950</u>	<u>1951</u>	<u>1952</u>	<u>1953</u>
Physics	38.8	21.6	10.8	31.8
Chemistry	21.6	6.0	18.2	33.1
Geography	32.1	37.0	33.8	31.1
Geology	15.1	29.0	49.2	37.1
Botany	47.2	35.5	32.9	47.6
Zoology	35.1	45.8	26.5	30.1
Physiology	-	40.1	25.0	19.8
Agriculture	31.6	52.3	37.6	29.8

On the whole the marks in 1953 were better than those for 1952. "But the fluctuations in this group are so wide and the number of candidates so small that it would be rash to draw any comfort from these figures".²

(6) Social Sciences

	<u>Average mark - percentage</u>			
	<u>1950</u>	<u>1951</u>	<u>1952</u>	<u>1953</u>
Political Science	27.6	35.8	46.2	35.5
General Economics	32.5	29.5	44.9	37.1
Psychology	46.4	44.5	39.6	28.0
Philosophy	30.1	37.3	51.0	27.0

Psychology was out of step with the other subjects in the group. The general picture was of a rapid rise from 1950 to 1952, followed by an abrupt fall in 1953.

1 Ibid

2 Ibid

(7) <u>Law</u>	<u>Average mark - percentage</u>			
	<u>1950</u>	<u>1951</u>	<u>1952</u>	<u>1953</u>
Law	44.1	39.7	33.8	20.7
Mercantile Law	13.8	45.6	44.6	48.9
International Law	37.3	33.4	47.2	49.2

These figures were "unhealthy", especially because the number of candidates offering Law was falling even more steadily than the quality of the work. The average marks in Mercantile Law and International Law had been increasing fairly steadily.

These tables show that the general standard of the work of the candidates in so far as it can be ascertained from their performances in the written examinations, had been unsatisfactory from 1950 to 1953. But it was steady in those years. In 1953 there was a definite fall, which, though small, was disturbing.¹

We may now analyse the intellectual standard of the successful candidates of the same period on the basis of their performances in the written examinations. It is based on the "rough and ready" guide that an average mark of 60 per cent. or more is equivalent to a first class, and an average of 50 to 59 per cent. is equivalent to second class honours in the degree examinations of the Universities in Pakistan. The following figures² indicate the position in this respect.

¹ Ibid, p. 4.

² Ibid, p. 10

(8)

Year	No. of candidates who qualified for appointment	No. & percentage securing 60% or more in written examination.	No. & percentage gained 50-59% in written examination	No. & percentage gaining less than 50% in written examination
1950	125	2 (1.6%)	35 (28%)	88 (70.4%)
1951	67	2 (3.0%)	19 (28.4%)	46 (68.7%)
1952	84	2 (2.4%)	26 (31.0%)	56 (66.7%)
1953	63	2 (3.2%)	30 (47.6%)	31 (49.2%)

During these years only eight candidates out of a total of 339 achieved first class standard. From 1950 to 1952, two-thirds or more of the candidates who qualified for appointment by their performances in the written examination and the viva voce test were men of third class honours standard. In 1953 the general standard of candidates taking the written examination was lower but nearly half of the candidates who qualified for appointment were of second class honours standard. On the other hand, the number of candidates who reached the standard of first class honours did not change during these years. "It would probably be safe to say that whatever the number of candidates or the vacancies offered the superior services, with their present pay scales and conditions of service, are not likely to attract more than a negligible number of men of first class ability", observed the Public Service Commission.¹

1 P.P.S.C. Report On the Central Superior Services Examination, 1953, p. 10

We may now discuss the reasons for this. "The decline in the intellectual standard of our ^uUniversity men is serious but not quite so bad as the results of the C.S.S. Examinations would suggest", said the Pakistan Public Service Commission.¹ Before the second world war almost all the best products of the universities tried to enter the old I.C.S. or other higher services in British India. But during the last fifteen years the services have lost most of their glamour. This is due to a number of factors. First, "a government officer no longer initiates policy or hopes for a provincial governorship".² Secondly, increased taxation and inflation caused by deficit financing to implement the five year plans have deflated the purchasing value of their salaries to a "mere fraction of what it was before the second world war". Thirdly, more recently, the salaries have been severely cut in the manner recommended by the Pay Commission.³ As a consequence, the superior services are no longer attractive to young men who seek positions of power and influence. Fourthly, many of the best young men are "seeking employment in commerce and industry, a field which widens with the enforcement of the government order requiring foreign firms to employ Pakistanis in at least 50 per cent. of their covenanted posts".⁴ Moreover, with the inauguration of the five year plans, the economic and industrial activities of the government have

1. P.P. S.C. Report of the C.S.S. Examination, 1953, p. 14.

2. Ibid.

3. See Chapter V.

4. P.P.S.C. Report on the C.S.S. Examination, op.cit. 1953, p. 14

been expanding. The Pakistan Industrial Development Corporation and other indigenous firms and industrial concerns are attracting a fair portion of the best available talents in the country. "Apart from the decline in the quality of candidates owing to the fall in the intellectual standards of universities, the flower of the country's youth is beginning to turn away from Government Service".¹ The Commission have taken a serious view of the situation and ask the government "to consider whether the complex policies of a modern democratic state can be executed by huddled individuals whose youth has gained no distinction and known no adventure or healthy excitement. If first-class ability, personality and initiative are still needed, the superior services must be made attractive to men who possess these qualities."² The problem, we think, demands a competent Commission to inquire into it.

The above Tables reveal certain features of the examinations which present a very gloomy picture. The reports of the examiners³ on the performances of the candidates in different subjects make dismal reading, and confirm this sombre picture. A close perusal of these reports shows that the common shortcomings of candidates revealed by the examination during these years were four in number. First, there was lack of original thinking and critical ability. Very few candidates seemed

1 Ibid.

2 Ibid.

3 For detailed reports of the examiners on different subjects see the C.S.S. Examinations for 1950, 1951, & 1952 and the Report on the C.S.S. Examinations for 1953.

capable of original thought or criticism. The majority relied on their memories. There was plenty of discussion but little analysis. The examiners, for instance, in 1952, pointed out that "suddled and illogical thinking and irrelevancy" marred the answers of the majority of candidates. Their ideas were vague, analytical powers rare, and precise statements were conspicuous by absence.¹ Secondly, knowledge displayed by the overwhelming majority of candidates in different papers was superficial. Many candidates were insufficiently familiar with the fundamentals of subjects on which they possessed knowledge of honours standard. The Commission's rule which requires marks under 25 per cent. to be reduced to zero had to be applied in every subject of the examination in 1953 except one or two.² Not a single mark in prime movers survived the application of the rule against superficial knowledge. In pure mathematics, applied mathematics, statistics and British history, more than half of the candidates in 1953 had their marks reduced to zero. Even in Arabic, Urdu and Bengali there were candidates who incurred this penalty.³ Thirdly, the great majority of answers were characterised by paralysing mediocrity, or even absence of maturity. "The approach of most candidates at least in the Arts subjects was emotional rather than scholarly. Only a small minority had

1 Pakistan Public Service Commission. Pamphlet of the Central Superior Services Examination, 1952, p. 1

2 P.P.S. Commission, Report on the Central Superior Services Examination, 1953. (From the marks assigned to candidates, such deductions will be made as the Commission may consider necessary in order to insure that no credit is allowed for superficial knowledge. Candidates who obtain less than 25% of the marks in any subject will not be given any credit in that subject, p. 26)

3 Ibid, p. 7 -8

any maturity of thought or confidence in composition".¹ In the majority of cases the candidates "did not seem to have any point of view of their own. They echoed current slogans and quoted other people's opinions and gave stereotyped answers. This was, evidently, on account of the fact that the candidates had not made a systematic study of the subjects offered for the examination".² The fourth defect revealed by most candidates was the poverty of expression, poor spelling and grammar. The power of expression of most of the candidates was poor and proved a handicap in both Science and Arts subjects. Owing to the lack of adequate and proper command over the language, the expression was generally "confused and blurred".³ Many candidates committed unforgivable spelling mistakes.⁴

In the light of their experience of the Central Superior Service Examinations from 1950 to 1953, the Commission have "with some concern but with a fair amount of certainty", come to the conclusion that "in intellect, knowledge and personality, the standard of the candidates who compete in this examination is not satisfactory".⁵ The tables mentioned above, even after making due allowances for the vagaries of examiners, confirm this view of the Commission.

1 Ibid, p. 8.

2 P.F.S.C. Pamphlet of the Combined Competitive Examination for recruitment to the C.S.S. examination, 1951, p. 2.

3 Ibid, p. 2.

4 P.F.S.C. Report on the C.S.S. Examination, 1953, p. 7

5 P.F.S.C. Pamphlet of the C.S.S. Examination, 1952, p. 16

An analysis of the candidates by the subjects offered by them in the Central Superior Service examinations from 1950 to 1953, shows that many of the candidates offered subjects which they had not studied for their degree examinations. For example, in 1950, out of 229 candidates who qualified in the written test, as many as 126 offered subjects which they had not studied for their graduation.¹ The subjects were mainly history, Persian, political science, Islamic studies and Urdu. "There appears to be a feeling - perhaps justified - among the candidates that in certain subjects crammed information is as good for examination purposes as organized knowledge. The standard in these "popular" subjects is considered so low by the candidates that they feel hopeful of achieving satisfactory results in them without any systematic course of training or uncomon strain on the mind. In viva voce such candidates reveal lack of that mental discipline which is generally associated with a properly supervised study of a subject", said the Commission.² The Commission, accordingly, reduced the marks assigned to some of these subjects in 1951. This did not have the desired effect; indeed, the number of candidates offering these subjects increased in 1951.³ The following table is an analysis of the 339 successful candidates by the subjects they offered in the examinations during the period from 1950 to 1953.⁴

1 F.P.S.C. Pamphlet of the C.S.S. Examination, 1950, p. 8.

2 Ibid, p. 9 3. F.P.S. Commission; Pamphlet on the C.S.S. Examination, op. cit. 1951, p. 9.

4 These figures are taken from the Pamphlets and Reports on the C.S.S. Examinations for 1950, 1951, 1952 and 1953.

British History	120	General Economics	86	International Law	69	Pure Mathematics	13
History of Pakistan & India	115	Political Science	83	Urdu	66	Applied Mathematics	10
Modern European History	89	Law	64	Persian	51	Physics	7
		Mercantile Law	61			Chemistry	6

This table shows that the subjects most popular with the candidates were history, political science, general economics, Law, Urdu and Persian. On the other hand, the number of candidates who offered the stiffer disciplines of mathematics and science was very small.

The Federal Public Service ^{Commission} have given a great deal of thought to this important question regarding the nature of subjects to be included in the examinations. In Britain there has been some discussion on the subject. Greater infusion of the social sciences into the examination has been urged in recent decades by informed critics. Mr. Greaves points out the importance of recognising the social sciences in preparing students for the public services while students of other subjects should not altogether be excluded.¹ Sir Paul Sinker thinks that the subjects of study are "relatively unimportant" but the fact still remains that the humanist has "an advantage because administration is after all more concerned with people than things".² Sir Henry Tizard urges the need to draw administrators from those having education in science.³

¹ Greaves, H.E.G.: The Civil Service in the Changing State, 1947. p.71-

² Sir Paul Sinker: "How should we train our Administrators?" Public Administration. (J.R.I. P.A.) Vol. XXVII, Spring, 1949

³ Sir Henry Tizard: A Scientist in & out of Civil Service, 1955, p.21

In examining the scheme of the examination, we have to be clear about the objectives for us not to make a mistake about the method. We have to be clear what we want the nature of the product to be, for us to fashion what the method of examination should be. The cardinal principle of the whole scheme of examination, both in Britain and Pakistan, is to secure persons not with any specialised and technical preparation for the job, but with excellent general education, intelligence and capacity. The examination is designed accordingly. For these purposes it is distinctly preferable that the competitive examinations should focus on those resources of mind and personality that are of great value on every level of responsibility but of the greatest value at the top levels. From this point of view there are certain disadvantages in giving weight to any one branch of knowledge or studies. Firstly, it will restrict the choice to those trained in any particular branch of study and make the service go without many who might be attracted by other fields of study. Secondly, the effect of such a stipulation on the general educational system of the country will be even more serious because the stimulus for competition will affect the balance of studies. It will lead to a tendency to pursue subjects for examination, and students will crowd those faculties in the universities. Utility rather than aptitude will determine the choice of subjects and educationally that is an unbound tendency. Thirdly, the candidates who fail in this examination will be handicapped by embarking on special study. The candidates should not be required to adapt their education to the requirement of the Civil Service examination; on the

contrary, the examination should be adapted to the chief forms and stages of education prevailing in the country. It is, therefore, advantageous to draw recruits from all corners of academic disciplines. "I adhere to the traditional view that it is right to recruit the brightest graduates from the universities for the Civil Service, irrespective of the subjects they have studied" observed Professor Robson. We endorse the view of Professor Robson. This is not, however, to question the main force of the argument that a knowledge of the social sciences is wholly desirable for the future administrators. But this should be secured not by restricting the selection to those trained in these subjects, but by providing facilities for training in such subjects to those without it, after selection for the Civil Service.

Interview System.

A candidate who obtains at least 40 per cent. mark in the aggregate in the written test is called to appear before the Interview Board. He qualifies in the interview by obtaining 100 marks out of a total of 300, and his position is determined by the aggregate of marks secured in the written and oral tests. In Britain the position is different. All the candidates for the Administrative Class are admitted to the oral test without any condition about qualifying marks in the written

1. Robson, W.A. "Recent Trends in Public Administration" in the Civil Service in Britain and France, edited by Robson, W. A., 1956, p. 58

test. The advocates of the existing procedure in Pakistan argue that it is necessary because it spares the Interview Board any unnecessary waste of time, money and trouble, over candidates who have little or no chance of success. It also serves, they point out, such candidates from unnecessary expense and for appearing at the test.

We may now review the performance of the candidates at the viva voce test. From 1950 to 1952, 546 candidates who qualified in the written test were summoned to interview, and of these 546, only 275 qualified in the viva voce test. 32 or 11.6 per cent. of the 275 successful candidates attained the first class standard. 88, or 32 per cent. were of the second class standard. 155 or 56.6 per cent. of the candidates were in the category of third class standard. Of the 271 candidates who failed to qualify in the viva voce test as many as 170 or 62.7 per cent. had secured in their written tests marks very close to the lowest level necessary for qualifying. (40%). In the University examination candidates of this category would be placed in low third class. Only a little above these were 88 or 29.5 per cent. of the failures in the viva voce, and they would also be placed in the third class on the basis of their intellectual attainment. Of the candidates who obtained 50 per cent. of the marks or over in the aggregate in their written tests, only 21, or 7.7 per cent. were disqualified

at the viva voce, and this works out as 3.8 per cent. of the total number of candidates interviewed by the Commission. None of these candidates obtained 60 per cent. or more, and hence none of them could be placed in the first class according to the standards obtaining in the universities of Pakistan.¹

We agree with the view of the Commission that "selection for Superior Services from among candidates of such low intellectual calibre and poor attainment demanded great caution and could only be justified if such candidates possessed some of those valuable qualities which did not find expression through a written test".²

In order to assess the suitability of candidates through modern methods, an "assessment form" was prepared and used for the viva voce test in 1951.³ The form was prepared with a view to appraising the Interview Board of the factual history of the candidate and other factors which were likely to bring out the main feature of his personality. It was a statement giving the age, parentage, school, college and university records including extra-curricular activities, particulars of previous employment or training and personal qualities and potentialities of the candidate. In Britain also the records of the activities of the young persons at school, university, and else-

1 These figures were taken from the Pamphlet of the C.S.S. examinations for 1950, 1951, and 1952.

2 F.F.S.C. Pamphlet of the C.S.S. Examinations for 1950, p. 10

3 F.F.S.C. Ibid, for 1951, p. 12

where, and also the remarks of their teachers about their personal and intellectual qualities are relied on to obtain a proper picture of the candidates' qualities of mind, character, intelligence and personality. This is a commendable process, and we suggest its continuance.

The psychological tests have been introduced since 1951 in order to bring the Central Superior Services examinations in line with modern technique of selection.¹ The psychological tests arranged by the Commission are still at an experimental stage. The test of intelligence is not yet utilised because no such test, standardised on Pakistani population, is available for use. At present psychological tests consist of a simple written personality test and interview with the Commission's psychologist.² The Commission secured the services of Mr. K.A.C. Murray, principal psychologist, British Civil Service Commission, towards the end of 1956 to advise them on the modern technique in the psychological testing of the candidates for the Central Superior Services. In addition to advising the Commission regarding the setting up of a Research Unit in the Commission's office, Mr. Murray was asked to advise them on job analysis, test construction methods, efficiency of objective forms of tests, job classification, devising of application of follow-up forms, and re-organisation of psychological section in the Commission's office.³ The efforts made by the Commission in this

1 Ibid, p. 14

2 P.P.S.C. Report on the C.S.S. Examination, 1953, p. 11

3 Eighth Report of the Federal Public Service Commission, 1956, p. 8

connection are really commendable.

The Federal Public Service Commission inform us that they have been considering the feasibility of introducing the pre-Board interview technique.¹ This, we think, is a move in the right direction. In Britain pre-Board interview has been introduced in the post-war era. The Civil Service Commission have found it a useful refinement of the traditional interviewing technique. This is conducted by one interviewer who supplies a report to the Final Interview Board. In support of this technique the Commission said, "The candidate is seen in two very different settings, the informal and friendly setting of the preliminary interview and the more formal (though no less friendly) setting of the Board interview. This greatly assists the Board in making the selection, while it affords the candidate a double opportunity of showing his merits. He is able to take a more active part in the interview than is possible before the large Board and his real interests and capabilities are more likely to emerge. The report of the pre-Board interviewer gives the Interview Board more assistance than they could derive from the bare statement of the candidate's record. The pre-Board interviewer is able to pursue topics of discussion more freely than any single member of an Interview Board is likely to have time to do. Moreover, by giving 'pointers' to candidate's

1 Ibid, 1951, p. 16

qualities and limitations, he can assist the interview Board to concentrate their attention, without waste of time, on matters which bear directly on the candidate's suitability.¹

The technique of pre-Board interview is also used to test the professional or technical knowledge and competence of candidates for certain specified posts. The commission have pointed out that in spite of the extra labour and expense involved, this technique has been of great value.² We suggest the introduction of this technique in Pakistan.

The Interview Board working under the presidency of the Chairman of the Federal Public Service Commission is fairly large. It consists of the members of the Commissions, a representative each from the Public Service Commissions of the provinces where the interviews are held, the ministries of the foreign affairs and Commonwealth relations, finance, communication, interior, Cabinet secretariat, universities and also the senior officers of the provincial government. The Chairman or a member of the Commission presides over the Interview Board in London and Washington,³ and both these Boards include a few senior officials of the Pakistan embassies there and a member of the Civil Service Commission of the country where the interview takes place.

1 84th Report of H.M.'s Civil Service Commissioners, p. 32 -33

2 Ibid.

3 Since 1952 examinations are also held in London & Washington to enable young Pakistanis pursuing studies in these countries to take part in the examinations.

The personnel of the Interview Board is sufficiently large, comprising twelve to thirteen members. We think that a representative of the Pakistan Industrial Development Corporation or public enterprise should be there on the Board. This is likely to provide another angle on the suitability of candidates for higher services. It will be of interest to know that in Britain the composition of the Final Selection Board has been broadened in the post-war era to include not only the retired Civil Servants and representatives of ministry and department, but also representatives from trade and industry and trade unions. There is always a woman on the Board.¹

To sum up, the combined results of the written test, pre-Board interviewers report, psychological tests, and longer interview, should, we think, provide a much more satisfactory basis for assessing the suitability of candidates for the Central Superior Services.

Reasons for the decline in the intellectual standards.

We might now discuss the reasons for the decline in the intellectual standards of the candidates competing for the Central Superior Services in Pakistan. The Federal Public Service Commission have made an extensive and candid analysis of the factors which are responsible for the decline in the intellectual standards of the products of the universities in Pakistan.² They have suggested a few reasons which are highly suggestive

1 84th Report of H.M.S. Civil Service Commission, p. 35

2 P.P.S.C. Report on the C.S.S. Examinations, 1953, p.12-15.

and helpful and deserve serious consideration by all concerned. Firstly, a few years ago the universities were in a "ferment". The educational institutions became the centres of political agitation, and young minds were excited and inflamed. The youth yearned to throw itself into the noise and bustle of strife. There is no longer any need for the student community to engage in political agitation, but the "spirit of restlessness and rebellion" is not yet dead. The contemporary student still lives in the world of the student of 1945/47, who foresook study, sport and cultural activities for political agitation. In those years of strain and stress there might have been some excuse for the student who was "undisciplined, defiant and over-ambitious". But the student of 1953 is not very different. He too sees easy success achieved by pretence and agitation, and decides to seek it by those methods. Then intensive work is rare and the love of knowledge rarer still.¹ Gradually, the conditions are returning to normal, but it will take time to bear its fruit.

Secondly, the impact of the partition had been very serious on the educational institutions. Most of the teachers at all levels of academic institutions had been Hindus, who left Pakistan along with partition. This affected adversely the educational system of the country at differ-

1 Ibid, p. 12

ent levels. The Muslims who took to English and modern education less readily and late¹ could not offer sufficient number of able teachers to take their places. Commenting on the position in the University of Dacca, the Dacca University Enquiry Committee observed, "After partition education in this University was seriously and adversely affected by the loss of many able teachers. Many of the Hindu teachers left the University, in 1947. Most of those who remained also left this Country after the disturbances of 1950".² Similar was the position in the University of Punjab in West Pakistan. There has been an acute shortage ✓ of qualified and competent teachers in the Universities of Pakistan. (Due to the absence of qualified teachers, many posts of professorships in different subjects in the Universities still remain vacant.) Besides these two ✓ Universities, four more new ✓ Universities have been set up - three in West Pakistan and one in East Pakistan - at different times after partition. Most of them are yet to be properly staffed and equipped. Most of the universities have been suffering from the lack of proper and adequate equipment and accommodation. It would take the necessary time to remove all these obstacles. Again, the teachers, particularly at the primary and secondary levels of education, are always low-paid individuals, and their first concern is not their

1 See Chapter II

2 Report of the Dacca University Enquiry Committee, Vol. I. 1956, p. 37

3 ~~Ibid.~~

pupils but how to make both ends meet. The average teacher at the school stage has "little dignity and is seldom respected".¹ "Our youth is, therefore, being trained in institutions which are run by spiritless, worried and badly-integrated individuals. A frustrated, dissatisfied teacher is likely to neglect his duties; if he does not he moulds his pupils in his own image", said the Commission.² The Commission, however, rightly admit that one must not be too critical and generalise unjustly. There are excellent teachers in the schools, colleges and universities, but they are yet few in number and the good they do is undone by the majority.³ We think that it will be difficult to induce the ablest men to devote themselves to teaching at all levels - primary, secondary and higher - unless the living conditions offered to teachers correspond more nearly to those obtainable in the various branches of public and private employment. We agree with the view of the Commission that educational workers should be accorded adequate status, and only then suitable men will join the ranks of teachers.

✓ Gradually things are improving, the pay scales of the University teachers have recently been increased. But a great deal remains to be done at other levels of education.

1 P.P.S.C. Report on the C.S.S. Examination, 1953, p. 12

2 Ibid.

3 Ibid.

Thirdly, the Commission have pointed out that the educational institutions lack vitality. For decades the educational system has been under attack and criticism but though it has few defenders, it has somehow resisted the change. Many schemes have been worked out on paper, the product of much thought and planning, and they only show that the problem of educational reform is soluble. "The necessary solvents - courage, initiative and money - have been lacking. We, therefore, remain in the 19th century and we still educate our youth in accordance with ideas current in the days when Karachi was an obscure fishing village".¹ No doubt this is a serious indictment, but unfortunately it has a substantial basis in reality.

Fourthly, the difficulties have recently been complicated by the question of language. Before the partition the medium of instruction in schools and universities was usually English. The transfer from School to College was, therefore, comparatively easy and smooth. But recently Urdu and Bengali - the two State languages - have been introduced as the medium of instruction in schools throughout Pakistan. In reality it has increased the number of languages that a boy must learn from the beginning of his school life, thereby leaving him insufficient time for more important and useful subjects. Equally significant and probably more consequential is the neglect of English. "The recent rapid decline

1 P.P.S.C. Report on the G.S.S. Examinations, 1953, p. 13

in the standard of our English is a great loss for which so far there is no compensation", said the Commission.¹ Whereas at the University a good knowledge of English is essential. "There are hardly any original works in the physical and social sciences in Urdu or any of the provincial languages. There is much good poetry and fiction in Urdu and Bengali, but poetry and fiction are not of such help to the students of science, mathematics and economics. Most translations are inept, the best are mere approximations".² Therefore when a boy comes to the University with a poor knowledge of English, he is greatly handicapped as knowledge is imparted to him in a language he dimly understands. The Constitution of 1956 provided that English would remain the official language for twenty years after the entry into force of the Constitution. In 1976 the question will be re-opened. In the meantime the importance of the English language needs no emphasising. It is the business language in Pakistan. It is, and will remain, for a long time to come, the essential working language for all students, since all the basic and important books at the higher stages of education exist in English only. Therefore, in any consideration of the scheme of examinations, the language question is an important one. We agree with the Commission that "there is obvious need for a new, dispassionate and well-considered policy in regard to the language ^{problem} situation. To this task our Government and Universities must bend themselves if the downward trend in our education is to be arrested".³

1 . Ibid

2 Ibid.

3 Ibid.

Finally, the Commission have raised the hope that "there is light in the prevailing gloom. Not all candidates are "lazy-minded, incurious and absorbed in vanities. Some did well both in the written and in the oral examinations, and a few were excellent".¹ Most of the best candidates, the Commission have pointed out, were those who had been to boarding school and had benefited from association and competition with boys of other communities and races.² But we cannot possibly judge a system by the exceptions, but by the quality of the generality. It is true, as the Commission have pointed out that all the best university students do not compete for the Superior Services now-a-days, but it is difficult to resist the conclusion, they point out, that the standard of the universities in Pakistan has deteriorated considerably since 1947.³ This becomes evident from the fact that "the quality of most of the candidates appearing at London and Washington centres suggest that the fault is perhaps more with the Universities than with the youth of the country".⁴ "Unfortunately there is at present no first-class University in Pakistan", said the Commission.⁵

These observations constitute a severe stricture on the educational system in Pakistan. That the Commission are not alone in their criticism of higher education in Pakistan can be seen by examining other

1 Ibid

2 Ibid

3 Ibid, p. 4.

4 Ibid

5 Ibid

official reports such as the Report of the Punjab University Commission, 1951-52, Report of the Educational Reforms Commission, East Pakistan, 1957 and the Report of the Dacca University Enquiry Committee, 1956. "The quality and the content of education imparted in our educational institutions, particularly in the higher ones, are almost incomparably inferior to the same of the advanced countries. This difference is obviously due to want of properly qualified teachers and adequate provision of modern equipment and other essential facilities in our institutions".¹ The Commission and all these bodies made pointed reference to the thoroughly under-developed and inadequate character of the educational system, both in quality and quantity, resulting in the shortage of persons to meet the growing and complex needs of a modern society. The Federal Public Service Commission rightly point out that "only a major operation can bring our educational system up-to-date".² The University Commissions and Committees have made elaborate recommendations for a thorough overhaul of the educational system. The Planning Board also made a number of suggestions in this direction.³ Although things are on the move, though rather tardily, the tempo needs to be accelerated to accomplish the gigantic task of educational reconstruction. Besides, there is the need for closer consultations between the Universities and Public Service Commission so that recruitment can be based on the different levels of the overhauled educational system.

1 Report of the Educational Reforms Commission, East Pakistan, 1957,

2 Ibid, p. 15

p. 38

3 Government of Pakistan, Planning Board. The First Five Year Plan,
Vol. II, 1956, Chapter 26, p. 397 - 457

We have discussed this at considerable length in view of the seriousness of the problem.

Method II in Britain.

The selection of recruits to the Administrative Class and the Senior branch of the Foreign Service by Method II, introduced in Britain in the post-war period, represents an entirely new and significant approach to the recruitment problems. It may be useful to describe the method in brief and examine its suitability for Pakistan. The new method is in three stages. First, it consists of a short written examination comprising two papers in English, two general papers, and an intelligence test. On the result of this examination (and for those with borderline marks) and an assessment of their achievements at school and universities, candidates are invited to the Civil Service Selection Board (C.S.S.B.). Secondly, the successful candidates invited to the C.S.S.B. undergo a series of tests and interviews lasting two and a half days, and these include written tests, group discussions, committee work, psychological tests, and personal interviews with the individual members of the directing staff. On the candidates' performance at the C.S.S.B. and their school and university achievement the Commissioners make selection for final interview. Thirdly, the Final Selection Board, under the Chairmanship of the First Civil Service Commissioner determines the candidate's place in the competition. It awards marks to candidates out of a maximum of 300 for their intellectual and personal qualities. It also takes into

account the candidates' achievement in relation to their opportunities at school and University (and if he has done National Service) in the Forces, and also confidential reports from the authorities and from two referees named by the candidate as knowing him well in private life. It also pays attention to the candidate's performance in the preliminary written tests as well as to the detailed assessment made by the C.S.S.B. of the candidate's intellectual and personal qualities and its recommendation on his suitability for appointment.¹ The candidates must have, or obtain in the year of competing, a second class honours degree of a recognised University.

The new method has evoked considerable interest. It has been criticised on the following grounds. First, there is the danger, as Mr. Kelsall points out, that "those admitted by this way may be lower in their standards of academic attainment than their compatriots under Method I".² Open competitive examination under Method I seeks to skim the "intellectual cream" of those competing, whereas the only direct indication of academic standard under Method II is a second class honours degree of a University.³ Secondly, the Method II tends to favour the slapdash and the superficial type of candidates as against those who are quiet but

1 A brief description of Method II is given in the Statement of Government Policy & Report by the Civil Service Commissioners (Recruitment to the Administrative Class of the Home Civil Service & the Senior Branch of the Foreign Service, (Cmd. 232, 1957). A fuller description is contained in the Memorandum by the Civil Service Commissioners on the Use of the Civil Service Selection Board in the Reconstruction Competitions (M.M.S.O.) 1951.

2 R.K. Kelsall, Higher Civil Servants in Britain, 1955, p. 91

3 Ibid.

more thorough.¹ Thirdly, the cost of selection under Method II is higher than the one under Method I. The advocates of the new method argue that it represents a genuine effort to match the people chosen with the type of work they will be called upon to perform. The method, they hold, leads to a more thorough probing of a candidate's personality and intellectual ability than is possible under the traditional method, through the extended interview, the use of a variety of tests and exercises in which the candidate appears both as an individual and as a ~~member~~ of a group. It represents an endeavour to build up a composite picture of the candidate, distinguishing between fundamental and acquired capacities, and giving weight to those most required for the Service. Under Method II "the tests are designed to reveal temperament and personality as well as quality of mind. They demonstrate a candidate's power of leadership, ability to co-operate, alertness in grasping a situation, quickness in assimilating relevant facts, lucidity & persuasiveness in presenting a point of view, ability to understand the administrative and political implications of a problem, resourcefulness in solving it, capacity for team work and good fellowship. They disclose intellectual power in action, and they make it possible to distinguish the man or woman of constructive outlook from the negative, indifferent, or sceptical type. They permit a such nearer approximation to a judgment of the whole man than the old-fashioned style of written competitive examination", observes

1 Ibid.

Professor Robson.¹ However, he qualifies "the warm tribute" to Method II, by rightly insisting on the need for continuous improvement of tests under it through psychological analysis of different types of Government work.² The supporters of the Method II also point out that high cost of Method II should not matter much if it provides the administration with a more effective type of higher personnel.

When the new system was introduced in 1948 it was agreed that this should be experimental and should be reviewed after ten years. In 1957 the results of that review, together with the Government's decision, were published.³ The quality of the performance of those recruits is summed up in the following table.⁴ It may be useful to examine them here briefly.

Administrative Class.

Method	Very good	Distinctly better than the normal	Up to standard.	Not quite up to the standard	Among the least suitable	Resigned after service: too short for assessment
Method I	2.8	22.0	59.6	12.4	1.8	1.4
Method II	4.6	41.7	48.1	3.7	-	1.9

"Nearly half the recruits from Method II have been put in the 'high

1 Professor Robson; "Recent Trends in Public Administration in The Civil Service in Britain & France"; edited by Robson, W.A.1956, p.55-56

2 Ibid.

3 "Recruitment to the Administrative Class of the Home Civil Service & the Senior Branch of the Foreign Service, Cmd.232, 1957.

4 Ibid, p. 15

potential' category, and very few have proved unsatisfactory. Method I has yielded a greater number of satisfactory officers than Method II, but also a greater number, including those rejected after probation, who have not proved satisfactory, though these are not many".¹ But comparison between recruits selected by each method must be made, the report points out, with due caution. Method II takes place earlier in the year and people who succeed by Method II do not pursue their Method I candidatures. The average performance of Method I recruits would probably be raised if some of the better candidates by that method did not withdraw on being successful by Method II.²

With regard to the educational and social background of the candidates, Method I tends to draw a high proportion of the younger candidates; of those who have attended the day schools and non-residential universities; and of those who belong to the lower social strata.³ Method II attracts a "high proportion of the older candidates; of those who attended boarding schools and residential universities"; of those who belong to a somewhat higher social strata and of those who have done their military service.⁴

The Civil Service Commissioners recommended the continuance of both methods since the abolition of either would result in the loss of good

¹ Ibid, p. 15 & paras. 14, 16, 18 & 19.

² Ibid, p. 12.

³ Ibid, p. 10.

⁴ Ibid,

~~⁵ Ibid, p. 16~~

candidates.¹ Method I and Method II have proved to be, to a valuable extent, complementary, each possessing merits which are less apparent in the other.² The recommendation was accepted by the government. In 1948 Method II was a novelty, and it was felt prudent to limit the proportion of vacancies to be filled by it to 25 per cent. of the total number offered in the competition. But since 1952 the proportion to be filled in this way has been increased to about 50 per cent., and this practice is now confirmed by the Government statement.³ Commenting on this, Sir Percival Waterfield said, "Writing as one who has sat regularly (though not invariably) on both the Final Boards (the Final Interview Board, or F.I.B. under Method I, and the Final Selection Board or F.S.B. under Method II), I whole heartedly endorse this conclusion".⁴ We may agree with him that the new method has proved "well worth while", and that "it has come to stay".⁵

The question with which we are concerned here is whether Method II should be adopted in Pakistan for recruitment to the C.S.P. and Pakistan Foreign Service. Since there is a separate competitive examination for recruitment to the C.S.P. and P.F.S., we think that Method II is worth a trial, only for a partial recruitment to these two services on an experimental basis. The minimum qualifications for the candidates should

1 Ibid, p. 16

2. Ibid.

3 Sir Percival Waterfield: "Civil Service Recruitment," in the Public Administration (J.R.I.P.A.) Vol. XXVI, Spring, 1958, p. 3.

4 Ibid.

5 Ibid, p. 8

be first class honours degree of a recognised university, or high second class M.A. and M.Sc. degrees. In that case the number of candidates will not be too large. It may enable the Federal Public Service Commission to find a substantial number of good candidates for these services.

A critic may object to the adoption of Method I from the point of view of social egalitarianism. But we think that the question of the social background of the higher Civil Service is not very important in Pakistan where the Civil Service would not be able to draw recruits from all sections of society for a long time because the over-whelming majority of population is still without any adequate facilities for high school education, not to speak of higher education. Again, the rigid social stratification is fading away in Pakistan with the abolition of landlordism, the levying of high taxation on high incomes and the gradual raising of the lower ones. When the country's social fabric is almost in a state of flux, it may not be desirable to raise controversy with regard to the social background of the higher officers. Again, the urgent need in Pakistan is the improvement of the quality of administration to tackle the difficult problems facing the country. The introduction of the Method II should be welcomed in the interest of efficiency as proved in Britain.

Recruitment by Competitive Interview.

6/20: Recruitment to the various Class I and Class II posts, both general and technical, for which a competitive examination is not considered

appropriate, is made on the basis of a competitive interview held by the Federal Public Service Commission.¹ The process of selection by interview is neither easy nor brief. The Commission adopt the following procedure in making the selection of recruits by interview. First; the requisitions for various posts which are received from the different ministries and departments are summarised in the office of the Commission. Then various points of doubt or dispute about qualifications and other matters are clarified with the ministry or department concerned by correspondence. Secondly, after this is done, the posts are advertised in all the leading newspapers in both the wings of the country. As the success of recruitment depends largely on publicity, various methods of publicity have been devised by the Commission. Nine show cases displaying the Commission's advertisements for various posts have been set up in different centres in both parts of the country. Copies of advertisements are also sent to the provincial Public Service Commissions, employment exchanges, colleges, universities, Heads of districts and departments of provincial governments. In addition, advertisements are announced twice from each radio station in Pakistan and published in official gazettes.² Thirdly, one month's time is allowed to candidates to apply from the far-flung parts of the country to the Commission, on a prescribed form of application. Fourthly, ^{after} after

1 4th Report of the Pakistan Public Service Commission, 1952, p. 6

2 Eighth Report of the Federal Public Service Commission, 1956, p. 15/16.

the applications are received, the Commission scrutinise them, weed out the ineligible and invite only those candidates to interviews who are, in their opinion, prima facie, suitable. Fifthly, the interviews are held at Karachi, Lahore, Dacca and also at Quetta and Abbotabad for the convenience of the candidates.¹ A representative of the Ministry or department concerned always assists the Commission at the interviews. The Commission, while interviewing candidates for highly technical posts, invite independent experts to assist them at the interviews.² Finally, when the interviews at all centres are over, the Commission set themselves upon the task of finalising results, and as soon as it is over, the recommendations are communicated to the government.

The Commission are often blamed for delay in the finalisation of the selection of candidates by interview.³ The method described above shows that the nature of this work and the geographical situation of the country all add to render it impracticable to complete the work of selection of candidates by interview more expeditiously than is being done by the Commission. It appears that a great deal of criticism of this type is based on a misapprehension of the actual mode of working of the Commission in this respect. Nevertheless, we think that personal contacts between the Commission and the departments need to be established with regard to the drafting of qualifications for the new personnel required. Mechanisation of the routine work within the Commission's office should be introduced on a substantial scale.

1 Ibid, p. 13

2. Ibid.

3 Sixth Report of the Pakistan P.S. Commission, 1954, p.20-21.

There are often complaints that advertisements for different posts are not drafted in a precise, effective and attractive way.

Mr. F.H. Appleby makes a similar criticism with regard to advertisements in India when he says, "advertisements seem to have been written

by lawyers, not by skilled advertising or public relations men".¹

We have seen that the Federal Public Service Commission are unable to find highly qualified personnel for some technical and professional posts in the administration. Apart from the general shortage of technically qualified men in Pakistan, it may be quite possible that the advertisements do not attract their attention. It would be desirable that the Commission and Departments should pay adequate attention to the proper wording of advertisements. Precise and attractive wording of the advertisements may go a long way in attracting ^{The} that attention of those employed in other occupations.

As there is a general shortage of technically qualified persons in Pakistan, the Commission also try to recruit suitable personnel from abroad for highly technical posts. Accordingly, search for suitable candidates for these posts are made in Britain, the United States, Canada, Australia and in many other western European countries through the Pakistan missions in those countries. In such cases the candidates are interviewed by special boards set up by the Pakistan Legations, and

1 P. H. Appleby, Public Administration in India, p. 27

their views are communicated to the Commission. The final selection, however, is made by the Commission.¹

The Federal Public Service Commission draw attention to the great shortage of technically qualified personnel in Pakistan. In order to overcome this problem the system of man-power budgetting should be introduced and pursued with vigour. The number of officers to be recruited to the various posts should be calculated not with reference to immediate needs but on a careful assessment of their future personnel requirements of the programmes included in the Five Year Plans. An assessment of the man-power requirement should be incorporated as an integral part of the plans. More and more institutions for technical education should be set up and the existing ones should be liberally *aided* to speed up the development of technical education in the country. Besides, many technical posts which still remain unknit into regular services need to be reorganised. The Central Government, for example, need an increasing number of scientists. If these posts are organised into a regular service, more scientists may be attracted to the service as it will offer them better prospects of promotion. Adequate job analysis may play an important part in regard to various specialist posts. It is high time that adequate arrangements should be made for *job analysis*.

1 Sixth Report of the P.P.S. Commission, 1954, p. 12

Recruitment of higher specialist Civil Servants through open Competitive Examinations

A few categories of specialist posts in the Civil Service are recruited through a combined competitive examination, but most of them are recruited, as noted earlier, on the basis of competitive interview. The Federal Public Service Commission conduct a combined competitive examination for the following Central Engineering Services -

(I) Civil Engineering Department, (II) Signal Engineering Department, (III) Motive power and mechanical engineering departments (IV) the stores department of railways, (V) Telegraph Engineering Service, Class I, and (VI) Central Engineering Service (F.W.D.).¹

The examination consists of written papers - compulsory and optional as well as a viva voce test. The written papers carry 1000 marks. In the 1955 examinations there were five compulsory papers common to all the Services carrying 600 marks.² But in the previous examinations there were no qualifying marks for compulsory subjects, with the result that candidates securing very low marks in certain engineering subjects were able to secure appointments on the ground of their having attained the necessary qualifying marks in the aggregate. The Commission considered the matter and the qualifying marks had been fixed at 25 per cent. in each compulsory subject in 1955.³ To qualify for the interview

1 P.F.S.C. Report on the Engineering Services Examinations 1950 & 1952, p. 11.

2 Seventh Report of the F.P.S. Commission, 1955, p. 9 - 10.

3 Ibid, p. 8

carrying 300 marks a candidate must obtain at least 40 per cent. of the marks in the aggregate. The demand for qualified engineers is increasing but an adequate number of candidates is not forthcoming. The figures given below indicate this.¹

Year	No. of exams	No. of applicants.	No. of candidates who actually	No. of candidates interviewed	No. successful	No. of vacancies
1950	1	65	24	24	11	30
1952	1	173	104	68	63	65
1953	1	198	72	43	36	35
1955	1	183	62	6	4	47

These figures show that there is a dearth of candidates for the technical services. The position improved in 1952 and 1953 because the number of candidates increased, and the Commission were able to recommend as many candidates as there were vacancies. But the improvement was due, to a large extent, to the fact that the qualifying mark was lowered from 40 per cent in 1950 to 30 per cent. in 1952.² The position deteriorated greatly in 1955. The Commission were faced with "a most extraordinary situation" because out of 62 candidates who took the examination only

1 These figures are from the annual reports of the Comm. from 1950 to 1955.

2 P.F.S. Comm. Report On the Engineering Services Examination, 1950 and 1952, p. 116

four finally qualified against a total number of 47 vacancies.¹ A conference was held in 1955 at the suggestion of the Commission, consisting of the chairman and members of the Commission and the representatives of user departments to consider this position.² It was decided at the conference that the five compulsory papers common to all services should remain as they were, with the exception that the number of written papers in each subject be reduced to one, carrying 100 marks. Thus, the total marks for the compulsory papers were reduced from 600 to 500. Moreover, the compulsory subjects prescribed for each individual service were reduced to one in place of two carrying 100 marks. Here also the marks were reduced from 300 to 100. The optional subjects should continue to carry 100 marks each. The age-limit was also fixed between 20 and 27 to enlarge the field of recruitment.³ This decision appears to have the effect of lowering the standard of examination. Unless an adequate standard is maintained it will impair the efficiency of the administration.

The performance of the candidates in the examination was very poor. Most of the examiners were of the view that the results were not satisfactory. The common deficiencies of the candidates as revealed by the examination were lack of proper grasp and poor expression, insufficient reading, superficial knowledge, irrelevance and poor sketching and

1 Seventh Report of the P.P.S. Commission, 1955, p. 8

2 Ibid.

3 Ibid, p. 10-11

drawing.¹ The reasons for this deplorable deterioration in the intellectual standards of the candidates already discussed in this chapter are also equally applicable in this case. The remedies suggested to overcome this problem in the case of the superior services apply equally here also. It is doubtful whether well-qualified engineers would in future compete for these services in adequate numbers, as the demand for good engineers is increasing in commercial and industrial fields. We agree with the Commission that the position cannot be improved unless the training provided in the Engineering Colleges is improved and the engineering services made more attractive. It is essential to increase the number and a fortiori the quality of engineers and to attract a fair proportion of the best men into government service.²

Recruitment to the Ministerial Services through open Competition

The Federal Public Service Commission are also responsible for conducting examinations for recruitment to the ministerial establishments of the Central Government. The exact services for which the examinations are held are the following: (I) Assistant and Upper Division Clerks, (II) Lower Division Clerks, (III) Stenographers, and (IV) Stenotypist. In the case of the first two categories of these Services the examination

1 P.P.S.C. Report on the Central Engineering Service Examinations, 1950 and 1952, op. cit. p. 69 - 72, and p. 113 - 116.

2 Ibid, p. 116

are divided into 'A' for the recruitment of Assistants and Upper Division Clerks, and 'B' for the appointment of Lower Division Clerks.¹

The age-limit in regard to candidates for examination 'A' is fixed between 20 and 30, and that for examination 'B' between 17 and 30. There are no age-limits for candidates competing for the posts of stenographers or stenotypists. No age-limit is prescribed for a Government servant competing for any of those services.² A candidate for examination 'A' must have passed the degree examination of a university. A candidate for examination 'B' must have passed the Matriculation or equivalent examination. A candidate for the post of stenographer and stenotypist must have passed the matriculation or equivalent examination.³

The subjects for examination 'A' are as follows: (I) English - essay, précis, drafting and handwriting carrying 400 marks, General knowledge, arithmetic and clerical aptitude test each with 100 marks. The paper on general knowledge seeks to test their awareness of environments and also their power of observation. In the paper on 'clerical aptitude tests' the questions are designed to test quickness in performing simple operations like checking, filing, coding and decoding in the light of given instructions. The subjects in regard to examination 'B'

1 Federal Public Service Commission, No. F.S./1/56 - M.S., 1958.

2 Ibid.

3 Ibid, No. F.9/1/55 - M.S., 1959

are as follows: English, drafting simple letters, proof correction, elementary tabulations, short essay and handwriting with 300 marks, general knowledge, clerical aptitude test and arithmetic each carrying 100 marks. The examination for the posts of stenographers comprises two tests in English shorthand at a speed of 100 and 120 words per minute respectively, and a written test to assess clerical aptitude and ability with 100 marks. For the stenotypists there are two tests in English shorthand at a speed of 80 and 100 words per minute respectively, and a written paper to test clerical aptitude and ability carrying 100 marks.

Critics point out that the educational qualifications fixed for the posts of assistants and higher division clerks are not satisfactory. A university degree is laid down as essential for this category of post. The upper age-limit also is high. The insistence on a university degree for these services encourages many persons to go in for the university degree resulting in over-crowding in universities and a fall in educational standards. As a consequence, even graduates at the various levels of the service lack calibre and personality in many cases. It also involves a good deal of waste of time, energy and money, for the young men because they seek university education when they have ultimately to look for the posts of assistant and higher division clerks, for which a university degree is not essential. The educational qualifications laid down for these lower division clerks is, we think, satisfactory.

In India a Committee was appointed in 1956 to go into this question.¹ The Committee recommended that university degree should definitely not be insisted upon for the clerical services. The age-limit should be fixed at 17 - 19 to discourage graduates from entering these services.² For the middle category of posts a university degree should not be insisted upon, but graduates should be given an opportunity to compete. The age-limit should be 19 - 21.³ Entry to the Superior Services should continue to remain open to graduates. The age-limit should be 21 to 23.⁴ The Committee were of opinion that the recruitment to the various categories of Civil Service should be linked up with the educational system. It is desirable on two grounds. First, it will go a long way in reducing the congestion in the universities and thus help to raise the standard of education, ⁱⁿ the interest of the country as a whole. Second, it will broaden the basis of recruitment to the lower classes of Civil Service. A son of a poor man who cannot afford a university education can enter the lower service when he is not to compete against graduates.

In Britain, the theoretical basis of recruitment to the Civil Service is well known. It is based on a system ^{designed} _{designed} to correspond, broadly speaking, with the human material provided by the different levels of the educational system. The administrative class is recruited

1 Report of the Public Services (Qualification for Recruitment) Committee. Ministry of Education, Government of India, 1956.

2 Ibid, p. 12

3 Ibid, p. 13

4 Ibid.

from the cream of the university honours graduates. The executive class derives its entrants from the sixth forms of the secondary grammar schools. Recently, graduates are permitted to compete for posts in this class. The members of the clerical classes are drawn from the secondary and modern technical schools. The age of entry is adjusted to the leaving ages of schools, colleges and universities. The administrators come in their early twenties, the executives between seventeen and a half and nineteen, and the clericals between sixteen and nineteen.

The actual pattern of recruitment does not, however, correspond fully to this theoretical basis. "It is clear from the figures given to the Commission (Pristley) by the Treasury (expressed only in percentages) that the pattern of recruitment no longer corresponds to this theory", writes Professor MacKenzie.¹ Of those who reached the grade of the principal in the administrative class in 1954, 52.6 per cent. had originally entered the class by open competition (including reconstruction competition), 14.1 per cent. had come from lower classes in the service by examination, 25.6 per cent. from the executive class by promotion, and 7.7 per cent. from other classes by transfer.² It seems unlikely that the "Trevelyan-Northcote entrants" will in future hold much more ^{than half} than the places in the class.³

1 MacKenzie, W.J.M.: "The Royal Commission on the Civil Service", in The Political Quarterly, Vol. XXVII, No. 2. April-June, 1956, p. 135

2 Ibid.

3 Ibid, p. 136

In 1954 in the executive class, 61.1 per cent. of the vacancies were filled by promotion, 12.4 per cent. by limited competition, 7.9 per cent. by various other competitions, and only 18.6 per cent. by the traditional 18-year-old examination.¹ "Science and technology have increasing claims, and it is becoming usual for boys of decent average ability to go to a University rather than to seek a job at 18"² The clerical class was "virtually placed 'end on' to the executive class by a decision taken in 1945, which merged the top grades of the clerical class in the executive class, leaving an overlap only for a limited number of higher clerical officers engaged purely on supervision of clerical work".³ The executive class is, therefore, recruited largely from the clerical class. In 1954 only 30.8 per cent. of clerical entrants were 16-year-old school leavers.⁴

Hence, it is not wholly proper to assume that the modern Civil Service in Britain has been wholly or mainly assembled by open competition geared to the different stages of the educational processes.⁵ Nevertheless, there must be "some thought" Professor MacKenzie observes, "about the relation between the structure of the Civil Service and the structure of education in the latter part of the twentieth century".⁶

1 Ibid.

2. Ibid

3. Ibid

4. Ibid.

5 For detailed information see "The Civil Service: Some Human Aspects" by F. Dunnill, 1956, p. 9-22.

6 Professor MacKenzie, op. cit. 1956, p. 137

L.C. We think that a Committee should be set up to enquire into the qualifications for recruitment to the various classes and categories of Civil Servants.

Temporary Appointments.

L.C./L.C. The various Ministries and Departments of the Central Government are competent, under regulation 4(b) of the Pakistan Public Service (Consultation by the Governor General) Regulations, to make appointments to posts in the Central Services Class I and Class II, without consultation with the Commission, provided that such appointments are not likely to continue for more than a year.¹ If the temporary appointments are extended beyond that period, approval of the Commission is necessary, and if they are to be made permanent, fresh recruitment is to be entrusted to the Commission. The power to make temporary appointments is given to different authorities mainly to militate against delay which will be entailed if they are to be made by the Commission.

L.C/ There have been complaints that the various Ministries and departments do not always use their power of appointment judiciously. Occasionally, the choice made for temporary posts smacks of favouritism. The ministries and departments later on declare some of the posts as permanent. The Federal Public Service Commission then advertise the posts in order to fill them by open competitive selection but the temporary occupants generally

¹ Eighth Report of the Federal Public Service Commn. 1956, p. 17

have an advantage in the selection because of previous experience.

Allegations are often made that the departments try to get in their own favourites in this manner.

There has been a great deal of controversy over this type of appointment in Pakistan. "This is an unsatisfactory feature of recruitment and has been criticised very much in the press".¹ However, with a view to checking any violation of the statutory requirement for consultation with the Commission, regulations have been issued that appointments made without reference to the Commission are to be reported to them in regular monthly returns. Even if no appointments are made in any month, a 'nil' return for that month is required to be submitted.² These returns are examined in the office of the Commission to check irregularity in appointments. The Commission have been making serious complaints in their annual reports that this regulation is being "extensively misused". In many cases appointments are made for one year in the first instance but persons so appointed are allowed to continue beyond that period without any reference to the Commission. The reports of the Commission contain a large number of cases of such irregularities. To give one example of extreme irregularity, the Commission pointed out in their seventh annual report that an officer "continued to hold appointments for about seven and a half years without the knowledge of approval of the Commission."³

1 Second Report of the P.P.S. Commn. 1949, p. 9

2 Fifth Report of the P.P.S. Commn. 1953, p. 9

3 Seventh Report of the P.P.S. Commn. 1955. p. 21

as this, are not good signs of a good, healthy and progressive administration".¹ Some ministries and departments, the Commission held, do not send any monthly returns of such appointments, and some again send consolidated returns for several months instead of separate returns for each month. This is, indeed, a deplorable state of affairs. We agree with the Commission that this is by no means a healthy practice.

In order to put a stop to what the Commission call such 'delinquencies' they have been making several proposals during the last few years. The Government have not accepted many of these measures. One of the steps suggested by the Commission seems to be useful. The Commission proposed to constitute a "Survey Party" consisting of two or three co-ordinating officials and one chief co-ordinating officer with a view to enhancing co-operation and co-ordination of work between the Commission and the ministries and departments under the Government. The main function of the survey party will be to visit the various ministries and divisions in order to make an on-the-spot study and explain the exact implications of regulations and other statutory requirements. It will facilitate the work of the ministries and will remove a lot of unnecessary correspondence and occasional misunderstanding between the ministries and the Commission. "This is to ensure

1 Ibid.

minimum delay and make matters easy, which would otherwise take months and even years of long and protracted correspondence to solve. The Commission feel that if the Government extend the desired co-operation and afford all facilities in the discharge of their functions, they can prove to be a really effective, efficient and independent body¹. We fully endorse the view of the Commission and think that the number of such appointments should be reduced to what is absolutely necessary to avoid delay. The Ministries and Divisions of Government should get such appointments regularised by the Commission without any delay.

It is gratifying to note that the Federal Public Service Commission are making efforts to keep the recruitment methods up-to-date. In their L.C./L.C. Sixth Annual report they inform us that they are considering the question of setting up a Research Unit in their office with a view to studying the relevant and useful data available from the reports and other literature published by the Public Service Commissions of the Commonwealth Countries and the Civil Service Commission of the U.S.A. It is proposed to organise the Research Unit under two wings. One of the wings would be confined to psychological research and development of the technique of personnel selection on modern lines. There is already a L.C. psychologist on the staff of the Commission. The other wings would be

1 Sixth Report of the P.P.S. Commn. 1954, p. 17

devoted to general research with a view to effecting economy, enhancing efficiency and achieving all-round development in administration.¹

Towards the end of 1956 the Commission secured, as already mentioned, the services of Mr. U.A.C. Murray to advise them, inter alia, on the setting up of a Research Unit in their offices.² This is a commendable move in the right direction.

In Britain increasing attention is given to the continuous re-orientation of the methods of selection. A Research Unit has been set up in the office of the Commission in post-war years. The main functions of the Research Unit are four.³ First, it is to supply intelligence tests for those competitions for which the Commission consider them to be appropriate. Second, it helps the checking up of selection procedures by comparing them with confidential reports on the performance of the officers selected. This 'follow-up' inquiry is one of the main responsibilities of the Research Unit. Third, it carries out job analysis for those types of posts for which it is considered to be useful. It is not solely related to the selection procedure, and it also helps the employer departments in the task of training and posting recruits after assignment. Fourth, the job analysis made by the Research Unit provides a basis for the preparation of batteries of aptitude tests.

1 Sixth Report of the F.P.S. Commission, 1954, p. 4 - 5

2 Eighth Report of the F.P.S. Commission, 1956, p. 8.

3 84th Report of H.M.'s Civil Service Commission, p. 36

It may not be unreasonable to hope that the efforts made by the Federal Public Service Commission in Pakistan will result in instituting a Research Unit in their office to carry on more or less similar functions.

CHAPTER FOUR

Training

Need for training.

The training of the Civil Servants has assumed special significance in the light of the increased responsibilities imposed on the administration by the extension of the governmental activities in social and economic fields. Modern society itself is becoming more and more closely-knit and inter-dependent, and what is done in one field has its repercussions in many others. Administration itself has become a highly specialised and complex task calling for a high degree of specialised knowledge in several fields. It is symptomatic of the growing complexity of the task that very few administrative decisions today can be taken without consulting or calling for the co-operation of many interests. The growing complexity of modern conditions and the increasing difficulty of modern problems render the systematic training in administration, its methods and techniques, highly necessary.

When the majority of recruits enter into the services at a young age, they are merely raw recruits as they come almost immediately after taking a degree at one of the Universities. They are admitted to the competitive examinations between 21 and 25. The recruits are not expected to have any knowledge of the skills or techniques in administration. At this age they are unlikely to have any great

experience of men and affairs. This clearly establishes the need for a proper system of planned training. Again, the general quality of the pre-entry university education of recruits in Pakistan, as noted in a previous chapter¹, is rather low. The candidates are not of the "requisite intellectual stature" and they show "deficiency in outlook and mental reactivity"². It is, therefore, necessary to arrange an intensive and planned course of training to make up for the deficiencies of the present university education. Emphasising the need of training, the Assheton Committee³ pointed out the "disadvantages, more especially on the long-term view, inherent in the policy of leaving the recruit to learn his job by trial and error are formidable. They include not only delay in his becoming a fully effective member of the department, but also a risk of dissipating the enthusiasm with which he enters on his first job"⁴.

The Civil Service of Pakistan, in particular, like the Administrative Class in Britain is the cream of the public service. They shoulder a heavy burden and on them rests a heavy responsibility. "The dominant feature of public service policies is the administrative leadership of the Civil Service of Pakistan, a body of general administrators which provides not only the executive officers in the districts and the heads

1 Chapter III

2 P.P.S. Pamphlet of the Combined Competitive Examinations for recruits to the U.S.S., 1951, p.19

3 Report of the Committee on the Training of the Civil Servants, Cmd. 6525, 1944, p. 27

of some of the departments, but also the policy advisers to the Central and provincial Governments".¹ On their performance depends much of the success of administrative measures and from their ranks are chosen persons for positions of highest responsibility in government. It is clearly in the interest of the nation that the fullest possible attention should be paid to the training of its administrators.

Training is of great value to the vast body of civil servants outside the category of all-Pakistan and Central Superior Services. A great part of the daily work in government offices is done by the middle and lower grades of the service. A fully trained and efficient service in the middle and lower ranks alive to its duties and responsibilities is as necessary for the successful execution of the tasks of the administration as an intelligent and active element in the higher ranks. If they are to be encouraged to give of their best to the community, and the best in them is to be developed, they are to be trained for their tasks as well. They should not be left to learn their job by doing it. The idea that the new recruit will pick up necessary elementary knowledge of Government rules and procedure somehow of his own accord is out of date and definitely wasteful.²

The need for the systematic training of the civil servants has been

1. Government of Pakistan: First Five-year Plan, op. cit.

2. Government of Pakistan. Interim Report of the Committee appointed to review the organisation, structure and level of expenditure of various Ministries, Departments and Offices of the Government of Pakistan, 1950, p. 5.

accepted in many countries. It has gained status as an appropriate and necessary function of the administration. In France, a Central Training Institute called the Ecole Nationale d'Administration was set up in 1945 for the training of the higher civil servants. In Britain during the post-war years a Training and Education Division was set up in the Treasury for the central training of the administrative, professional and technical classes, and for the central guidance and co-ordination of the training schemes. In India also a number of training institutes — the training school for the members of the Indian Administrative Service, a Central Police College for the training of the I.P.S. Officers, and a Staff College for railway employees and a Central Secretariat School — have been set up. In Pakistan a number of central institutions — the Civil Service Academy for the training of the C.S.P. officers, the Finance Services Academy for the training of the members of the various Finance Services, a Police Training College, and a Central Secretariat Training Institute — have been established.

Objectives and meaning of training.

The immediate objective of training is to equip the new recruits for the assumption of the regular duties of their positions, to help them to develop the best in them, and to fit them gradually for the assumption of increasing responsibilities of ~~higher~~ ^{more} and varying character. They must be able to do the work for which they are first assigned quickly, accurately and intelligently. For this they must know the

techniques of the actual job. Their standard of performance is likely to be better if they have a clear and lively appreciation of their positions in the scheme of things around. Everyone should understand clearly the nature and purpose of his work and the relation of his work to the purposes of the Government. Such a knowledge can give meaning and significance to their work. It will be of immense advantage to them to have some knowledge of the background of their work. It will be equally useful for them to have a knowledge of political, social, cultural and psychological background of the Community they are called upon to serve. The mental ability, natural equipment and ambitions of each and every one should be given the fullest scope so that there will be the least possible waste of energy and ability. Every Civil servant should be provided with adequate opportunities to improve his equipment and be fit for higher and more responsible tasks in administration. They should be encouraged to continue their general cultural education as a background to higher departmental training. The post-entry training should not be restricted solely to instructions in administrative techniques but must include an effort at character building and at a broadening of interest and outlook. The training scheme should be utilised to develop an esprit de corps in the service as a whole.

The five-fold aims of training, as laid down by the Asheton

Committee are:-¹

- 1) Training should endeavour to provide a civil servant whose precision and clarity in the transaction of business can be taken for granted.
- 2) The Civil servant must be attuned to the tasks he will be called upon to perform in a changing world. The Civil Service must continuously and boldly adjust its outlook and its methods to the new needs of new times.
- 3) The Civil servant should not be allowed to fall into the danger of becoming mechanised by machine. The recruit from the start should be made aware of the relation of his work to the service rendered by his department to the Community. The capacity to see what he is doing in a wider setting will make the work not only more valuable to his department, but more stimulating to himself. In addition, therefore, to purely vocational training directed to the proper performance of his day-to-day work, he should receive instruction on a broader basis as well as encouragement to persevere with his own educational development.
- 4) Even as regards vocational training, it is not sufficient to train solely for the job which lies immediately at hand. Training must be directed not only to enabling an individual to perform his current work more efficiently, but also to fitting him for other duties, and, where appropriate, developing his capacity for higher work and greater responsibilities.

¹ Report of the Committee on the Training of Civil Servants,
Cmd. 6525, 1944, p. 10-11.

- 5) The training plans, to be successful, must pay substantial regard to staff morale to off-set the dull monotony of routine work.

It is of utmost importance that every probationer should realise that he is entering upon a life of service, and that he should be a servant of the people and not their master. The Civil servants should be given proper training in the methods of dealing with the members of the public. "Nothing could be more disastrous than that the Civil Service and the public should think of themselves as in two separate camps. The inculcation of the right attitude towards the public and towards business should therefore be one of the principal aims of Civil Service training. The Civil servant must never forget that he is the servant, not the master, of the community, and that official competence need not, and should not, involve the loss of the human touch".¹

The objectives of the training as stated above, serve to show that the training of the Civil servants has assumed a wider connotation and meaning now-a-days. It includes not only vocational training designed to make the Civil servant fit to perform his current duty but also instruction on a broader basis to develop his capacity for higher work and greater responsibilities. It is not easy to distinguish the latter kind of instruction from general education. The training of the Civil servants is to be a continuous process and may be in two

¹ Ibid, p. 11

stages - initial training and in-service training. The initial training needs to be followed by intensive in-service training, both formal and informal. The formal type means that the officer gets away from his routine work for a period and spends the time in under-going some specialised training or particular type of education. The informal type of in-service training implies that facilities are afforded to an officer while on his job to improve his knowledge and to develop his capacities.

The exact nature of training will vary according to the different levels of the Civil Service. The higher grades of the civil servants will require wider and more thorough training than the middle ones and the latter more than the lower ones. It will also vary according to the nature of the job. Where the work is of a general type, a broad type of training will be necessary. Again, if the work is of a technical or professional character, substantial professional training is called for and yet broad training in this case also should not be overlooked. Training will depend, again, on the nature, volume and variety of the socio-economic plans for the development of the country. Training needs to be comprehensive if the educational system of the country is backward.

Initial Training in Pakistan

The recruits to the C.S.P. undergo training for a period of a little over two years, divided into three stages. The first stage is the academic training at the Civil Service Academy at Lahore; the second

stage is five months' practical work in East Pakistan; and the third is a year's partly academic and partly study-tour investigation of administration in Britain.¹

The Civil Service Academy was set up in 1948. Its functions under the general control of the Establishment Division which was formerly a part of the Cabinet Secretariat and now of the Ministry of the Interior.² The Academy is headed by a Director, who is a senior British member of the old I.C.S. The staff consists of a Deputy Director, two lecturers in Law, and part-time lecturers in languages and Islamic studies.³ The system of teaching Bengali and Urdu - the two State languages of Pakistan - and Islamic studies by part-time lecturers does not appear to be a satisfactory method. Persons appointed on a part-time basis may not always give whole-hearted attention to their work. We think that these subjects should be taught by permanent and whole-time lecturers.

In the first stage, the young recruits receive instruction in the Civil Service Academy for a period of nine months. This period is divided into three terms. In the first term they are given an intensive course of instruction in Criminal Law, Criminal Procedure Code, Civil Procedure Code, Evidence Act, Punjab Revenue Laws, Bengal Revenue Laws,

1. Notification No. F.25/47/49 SEI, Government of Pakistan. Cabinet Secretariat (Establishment Division), Karachi, 1954.

2. The Establishment is now a part of the President's Secretariat.

3. Information supplied by the Director of the Civil Service Academy.

and Bengali and Urdu. Instruction is also given in the governmental and administrative structure of Pakistan, in history and Islamic studies.¹ All the recruits are to learn typewriting. This occupies 2½ hours a week. As the time available for instruction of a general kind is extremely limited, the Academy has initiated an ingenious system whereby the students are expected, by the end of their nine months' course, to have read, very thoroughly, eight books of different kinds. The list is drawn up by the Director of the Academy and may be changed from year to year.² The list in 1955 included the memoirs of Sir Winston Churchill, a work on the Government and Politics of America, a book on Stalin; a Survey of the British Rule in India, etc.³ A great deal depends on how wise is the selection of books. The biographies of great administrators may be a useful addition.

During the second term the recruits spend an hour and a half daily in practical exercises directly connected with their instruction in revenue law (practical revenue field work). "This enables them to learn, in a concrete way, the basic revenue procedures in the various provinces of Pakistan", said Mr. Bertrand.⁴ The normal work of this period is interrupted by different activities which keep the students

1 Ibid.

2 A. Bertrand: "The Civil Service Academy of Lahore and the Training of the Members of the Civil Service of Pakistan" in International Social Science Bulletin, Vol. VII, No. 2, 1955, p. 265

3 Ibid, p. 266

4 Ibid.

away from Lahore for a period. They spend a brief period in the Pakistan army. They also go to a district in the Punjab, and this gives them their first opportunity of seeing on the spot how district administration is carried out. Finally, special visits are arranged for them to see various development projects in agriculture and industry.

The last term is very short. It is devoted to the last part of the formal lecture course and ^{the} preparation for the examination held at the end of their training in the Academy. The examination carries 500 marks out of which 240 marks are allotted to various legal subjects, 30 to survey and measurement, 40 to Islamic studies, 60 to languages, 50 to horse riding which continues throughout the nine months, 40 to the Constitution of Pakistan, and 40 to compulsory reading.¹

The second stage consists of five months' practical training in East Pakistan. It fulfills several purposes. Politically, it enables the recruits to the C.S.P. from West Pakistan to know East Pakistan as the training at the Academy at Lahore enables the members of the C.S.P. from East Pakistan to know West Pakistan better. It thus enables the young C.S.P. officers to know and understand ^{the} both wings of the country. This is of great value to the unity of Pakistan separated between east and west by Indian territory. "This in itself is fundamental, Eastern Bengal being separated from Western Pakistan by 1,250 miles of Indian

1 Information supplied by the Director of the Civil Service Academy.

territory. The unity of the new state will be preserved to the extent that its officials have familiarised themselves with the human and sociological characteristics of the inhabitants of the various provinces".¹ During this period the young civil servants come to grip with actual problems of administration. This period also enables them to make use of the knowledge they have gained at the Academy. They are distributed among different districts of East Pakistan, each being placed under the control and supervision of a district magistrate and collector,² under whose authority they are initiated into the handling of actual public affairs. Each probationer is to try sixteen petty criminal cases and this initiates him into one of his future tasks which he will be called upon to perform in his capacity as magistrate. It also enables the young probationers to see on the spot how the different activities and functions of the collector in different capacities are actually handled. It also gives them an opportunity to understand the local problems and needs and the way they can be met on the spot. They are also acquainted with the methods and procedures of administration at the district level. Each probationer has to keep a diary in which he notes the results of his experiments with comments. This diary is sent by the collector to the Director of the Academy, who subsequently returns it to the author with appropriate comments. The Director

1 A. Bertrand: International Social Service Bulletin, Vol. VII No. 2, op. cit. 1955, p. 266

2) The district officer is re-designated as deputy Commissioner in East Pakistan as well.

also pays an annual visit to East Pakistan to see how his students are faring during their probation.

No performance report is made on the work of the students during the probationary period. At the end of this period, they sit for a special confirmatory examination at Dacca, at which papers are set specifically on administrative work done during this period. The examination is conducted by the Federal Public Service Commission. The seniority of each batch of probationers inter se is determined by the aggregate of marks obtained in the open competitive examination, the final examination at Lahore and the confirmatory examination at Dacca.

At the third stage the C.S.P. probationers are sent to Britain and half of them go to the University of Oxford, and the other half to the University of Cambridge. They pursue a regular academic course in these two famous seats of learning for one full academic session. They attend courses on public administration, political science, economics and social institutions. They are also to write an essay consisting of eight to ten thousand words on any subject connected with administration. They also acquaint themselves with the working methods and techniques of the British administration which is highly modern and built on long and well-established traditions. They spend a month in London, learning how British government offices are run, and the technique of inter-departmental co-ordination. They are to attend a

course of training conducted by the Education and Training Division of the Treasury. It lasts for about two weeks. Two months are reserved for a study of the local government on the spot, in collaboration with a selected County Council. They also pay a series of visits to various places of interest in Britain. This enables the young Pakistani officials to have a bird's eye view of certain economic and social problems in Britain. At the end of this period their supervisors send a report on each one of them to the Government of Pakistan.

This period which they spend in the intellectually invigorating and stimulating atmosphere of two of the oldest and most famous Universities in Britain is of great value. It widens their interests, broadens their outlook, and develops their self-confidence. It gives them an opportunity to come into contact with different peoples, cultures, ways of life, and the political and governmental system. It is likely to give the young members of the C.S.F. what William James called the 'pungent sense of effective reality'. Study and training abroad "would shake complacency, institute comparison, compel reflection and broaden the mind as nothing else can", said Professor Finer.¹

Yh Officers who satisfactorily complete their training are confirmed. Those who fail to do so may be allowed a second chance or may be removed from the Service. They may also be removed if it is thought that they will not make satisfactory officers or for conduct unbecoming

1 Finer, H; The British Civil Service, 1927, p.45

a member of the Service. So far it has not been necessary to take this extreme measure.¹ During the entire period of two years, the probationers remain under the disciplinary control of the Director of the Academy, who makes a confidential evaluation of each one. The Director is required to submit two reports on each probationer - one when a probationer has completed four months in the Academy and the other when he leaves the Academy. The Collector of the district in which a probationer receives training in East Pakistan is ^{also} to submit one month before the termination of the probationer's training there, a confidential report to the Commissioner who forwards it to the Government through the Chief Secretary to the Government of East Pakistan and the Director.²

On the completion of their training they are sent to the provinces for regular posting. During the first five years of their service, officers are posted to particular provinces, but during the next five years they are required to serve at least for three years in the other wing of Pakistan. After this posting will be governed by the needs of the service. For the first one or two years they receive further training in magisterial, revenue and development work under the guidance of the Collectors and ^{deputy} Commissioners. They also receive some training in administrative work in the Secretariat for a brief spell. During this period, they are required to pass a number of departmental examinations designed to test their grasp of practical work and of provincial

1 Careers in the Pakistan Central Superior Service, 1954, p. 5.

2 Cabinet Secretariat, Establishment Division, Notification No. F25/47/49-SEL, 1954

laws. These examinations are conducted by the provincial governments. when they pass these examinations, they are given the powers of sub-divisional officers, and what is more, an increment in pay. In addition, increments in the scale of pay may be advanced or retarded by success or failure. Gradually, they move on to other administrative and executive posts until at the end of six or seven years they become eligible for senior posts - collectors, deputy commissioners, and deputy secretaries.¹

The system of training for the young recruits to the C.S.P. differs from that of their predecessors, the I.C.S. officers, in that it is run by a Central Academy. It retains some features of the previous system in that the C.S.P. officers, like the old I.C.S. officers in the past, pursue a full year's academic course in ^{The} British Universities. It is not easy to distinguish between the nine months' theoretical instruction in the Civil Service Academy at Lahore and a year's academic course in Oxford and Cambridge, which the C.S.P. officers receive in two stages, and general education. The whole period of training is under the supervision and control of the Civil Service Academy which tries to be both a source of higher administrative culture and education as well as a training body. This system differs from the position in Britain where the young recruits to the

1 Careers in the Pakistan Central Superior Services, 1954, p. 5

Administrative Class do not receive any theoretical training and instruction either in a Central Institution or in a University, but attend a fortnight's course run by the Education and Training division of the Treasury. The five months' practical training which the young recruits to the C.S.P. receive in the districts in East Pakistan under the supervision and guidance of Collectors is largely similar to that of the I.C.S. officers in the past except that the C.S.P. officers are to devote more attention to development work. It differs from that of the entrants to the Administrative Class in Britain, who are trained mainly in administrative work and not in executive work, and it is done in the Central departments and offices. The members of the C.S.P. come into closer contact with local people and their problems than do the members of the Administrative Class in Britain. The training of the C.S.P. officers resembles that of the civil administrators in France in one way. The French administrator during his first year of training spends the time in the department (which is similar to a district in Pakistan) and in North Africa where he learns executive work under the supervision of a prefect or a senior administrator.

At this stage, it might be both interesting and instructive to refer briefly to the main features of the comprehensive system of theoretical and practical training conducted by the Ecole Nationale d'Administration for the higher civil servants in France.

organised

The French system is ⁱⁿ three stages and covers a period of three years. First, shortly after joining the E.N.A. the young Civil servants are sent for the whole of their first year to serve under prefects in the départements or senior administrators in North Africa. The students are away from their habitual milieu of thought and life. It enables them to have personal knowledge of France, to mix with all classes and types of men and to acquire first-hand experience of rural, industrial and workers' circles. It brings them into contact with all parts of ^{the} French society.¹ The senior administrator is asked to regard the student attached to him as his personal assistant; to bring him into close touch with his day to day work, to show him all but secret correspondence, to take him to official ^{meetings} and formal social occasions. He is also asked to introduce him into the detail of administrative work. It enables the students to see how administrative problems are actually handled in concrete cases, to understand the local needs and problems and the way they can be met on the spot, and to discover the methods and procedures of administration.² One of the three directors of the E.N.A. is personally responsible for supervising the students during this year and he travels throughout the year keeping in touch both with the students and with the official in charge of them. This is likely to minimise the chances of a serious

1 Chapman, B. The Profession of Government, 1959, p. 115-6

2 Andre Bertrand: "The Recruitment of the Higher Civil Servants in the United Kingdom & France", in The Civil Service in Britain & France, edited by Professor Robson, 1956, p. 180

error. At the end of this period, the supervising official sends a comprehensive report on the student placed in his charge, on his intellectual and human possibilities, his application, intelligence and personality. The report is given a formal mark. The student is also required to write a short thesis on a particular subject or problem which has interested him during this period, with critical observations and constructive suggestions for improvement. This is also given a mark. Each student is also required to send to the E.N.A. periodical reports of his activities during this year.¹

The second year in the E.N.A. is devoted to a cycle of studies of a systematic and more intellectual character. The aim is to complete the general cultural knowledge of the students but with emphasis on aspects which will impinge on their official work, and to give them an administrative formation. During this period instruction falls into two categories - courses of general instruction, common to all divisions², and courses specially designed for the needs of individual divisions. The courses common to all divisions are of various kinds. There are general courses on national questions of vital concern, and these are treated, as far as possible, in the context of relevant foreign experience in the same fields.³ There are also general lectures, dealing with

1 Ibid, p. 180-181

2 The French Higher Civil Service is divided into four major divisions - General Administration, Financial & Economic, Social Administration and Foreign Affairs.

3 For detailed information see Chapman, *op. cit.* 1959, p. 177-8

the problems that confront a modern welfare state, given by University Professors and high-ranking Civil Servants. These are followed by general discussion between the lecturer and the students. The teaching of foreign languages is also included in the general course. The courses specially designed for the needs of individual divisions are much more intensively specialised. They deal with the functions of the departments included in the respective divisions. The various problems which arise in the departments, from time to time, are posed for discussion and the students are required to prepare papers on these problems. There is, thus, a programme of seminars on different problems. This stimulates thinking and encourages research. It also assists the development of analytical faculties and the ability to state a problem in a clear and logical way and make constructive suggestions for its treatment.

At the end of this period, all probationers go through a classificatory examination, consisting of three papers, two oral tests and one test in a foreign language.¹ The students are then assigned to different careers.

The third and last year then begins. During this period, the students are attached for about three months to private, industrial, commercial or agricultural enterprises. This is intended to bring the probationers into touch with the business community to enable them to appreciate the problems and methods of work of the commercial, industrial

¹ Andre Bertrand, op. cit. p. 182

or agricultural world, and also to create a basis of mutual understanding. They are expected to study production programmes and methods, social relations and financial and commercial management. Those attached to an industrial unit are also required to spend a period as workmen. It serves the purpose of giving the probationers an idea of the psychology of the workers and of their hopes and expectations. Once more the probationer's experience is broadened in new domains, which may be of great value to him in future.¹ At the end of this period, the probationers come back to the E.N.A., and receive instruction specifically related to their future tasks. The training is devoted mainly to guided practical work relating to their respective departments. The probationers are given actual departmental files and are asked to prepare resumes of the views recorded and to suggest solutions with cogent reasons for their adoption. During the same period, the probationers spend a part of their time in their corps or departments to familiarise themselves with the machinery of the government as a whole and with the internal structure of their own organ of administration in particular.² At the end of this period they begin their careers as Civil servants.

This is a very elaborate and comprehensive system of training for the Civil servants. Some of its important features can be incorporated into the training arrangements for the higher Civil servants in

1 Andre Bertrand, op. cit. p. 182

2 Ibid.

Pakistan with considerable advantage both to the trainees and the administration.

Finance Services Academy

The members of the various Finance Services - audit and accounts, income tax, railway accounts, excise, customs and others, - had been trained on their respective jobs. But it has been found unsatisfactory, and in 1957 an institution called the Finance Services Academy was established for the training of the members of these services. It is organised more or less on the model of the Civil Service Academy. The head of the Academy is a high-ranking British member of the old I.C.S. He is assisted by a staff of three, including an assistant-director and a resident economist. It is managed by an Executive Council representing the various services trained.¹

Post-graduate training is given on a systematic basis in economics, public administration, public finance, financial organisation and the working of such world bodies as the International Monetary Fund and World Bank. A course on book-keeping, some lectures on Civil and Criminal Law and on current affairs are also included. This training occupies the first nine months of the total training period of two years.² The next year consists of departmental training in the particular Finance and Revenue Services to which the probationers belong. This is also carried on systematically under the general direction of the

1 Information supplied by the Director of the Finance Services Academy.

2 Ibid.

Academy. Finally, the probationers are assigned to business firms, commercial banks, the State bank, and the Pakistan Industrial Development Corporation for three months.¹ This brings the probationer into contact with the problems and methods of work in the commercial, industrial and banking world. It enables them to see and gain first-hand experience of the private sector, and to become acquainted with the part which commerce and industry play in the economic life of the country.

Method of Training

The training in the two Academies is imparted through lectures, seminars, small-group supervision classes, essays, and intensive private reading. For the seminars which form a particularly important feature of training, each probationer has to prepare a paper once a fortnight on a subject out of a selected list drawn up with reference to the programmes on each subject, and this forms the basis to initiate discussion by the whole class.² Both ^{the} Academies use the lecture and seminar methods, and do not rely on formal lectures alone. Senior officers of the government who are practical experts in their own sphere are also invited to deliver lectures on their particular subjects. They also utilise the services of U.N. and International Co-operation Administration experts to give courses of lectures on social sciences and personnel management.³ The E.N.A. in France also uses the Seminar or Conference methods in the second year, and these have proved effective not only in

1 Ibid.

2 Ibid

3 Information supplied by the Director of the Civil Service Academy

the intellectual training of the probationers but also in making them understand administrative problems realistically. Professor Andre Bertrand describes the seminar or conference method as the 'keystone' of the system of training at the National School of Administration.¹

The young recruits to the Police Service of Pakistan are on training for a period of not less than two years. They receive a year's training at the Police Training College at Sardar in East Pakistan.² The Principal who is the head of the College is a senior police officer, and is assisted by three other members of the staff. At the College the probationers are given instruction in Criminal Law, Medical Jurisprudence languages, equitation, and the scientific investigation of crimes. They are also to undergo physical training like drill and riding. Extra mural activities fostering the qualities of leadership are also arranged. At the end of their training they are required to pass an examination in these subjects conducted by the Federal Public Service Commission. During the second year of their training they spend a period with a military unit for training. They are also required to spend a part of this period in selected district headquarters for practical training in various aspects of police work. On the satisfactory conclusion of their training they are confirmed and appointed as assistant superintendents of police. During this period they are to pass a number of departmental examinations. The purpose of these examinations is to test their grasp of practical

1 A. Bertrand. op. cit. 1956, p. 181

2. Careers in the Pakistan Central Superior Services, 1954, op. cit. p. 8-9.

and work of law. Gradually, they are given higher and more responsible assignments.

Foreign Service of Pakistan.

The recruits to the Foreign Service of Pakistan are required to under-go a period of training for two years but it may be extended beyond that period in special cases.¹ The selected candidates are sent abroad for studies at approved institutions for a year and a half. Usually they are sent to the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy, U.S.A. At this School, they study international law, diplomatic history and practice, and learn French. They are also to learn one other foreign language. At the end of this period, they come back to Pakistan, and are given practical training in government procedure in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs & Commonwealth Relations.² During this period they are also sent on a study tour of East and West Pakistan according as they belong to East or West Pakistan. This enables them to acquire intimate knowledge of the area of the country which is not their place of birth. During their stay in Karachi they are required to satisfy the Board of Examiners of the Ministry of Defence in French. It is also necessary for them to pass an examination in international law and diplomatic history and practice. They are also eligible for a book allowance of rupees three hundred for the purchase of essential books. The normal period of training is two years, but it may be extended in special cases.³

1 Careers in the Pakistan Central Superior Services, op.cit.1954, p. 7

2 It is now re-named as the Ministry of External Affairs.

3 Careers in the Pakistan Central Superior Services, op.cit.

Central Secretariat Training Institute

The entrants to the Central Secretariat Service¹ are trained in the Central Secretariat Training Institute. It came into existence in 1956. It is under the general control and management of the Establishment Division which is now a part of the Ministry of the Interior.² The Institute is headed by a director who is assisted by three deputy directors.³ The Institute offers instruction and refresher courses to superintendents and assistants in ^{the} Secretariat procedure and practices, office administration, drafting, recording and indexing, government servant's conduct rules, and other conditions of service, budget and accounts. In certain subjects the trainees are given practical exercises. Lectures are given by the staff and also by senior government officers and professors on different problems such as supervisory training, principles of human relations, man-management, statistics, and organisation and method in the Secretariat. Experts from different private firms are also invited to deliver lectures on various aspects of office work and procedure. Arrangements are also made to enable the trainees to visit places of interest in Pakistan. It is likely to widen their outlook. It also enables them to acquire first-hand knowledge of some of the development schemes in operation in Pakistan. The Institute also makes use of the documentary cinematograph.

1. It covers the cadre of the Superintendents and Assistants in the Secretariat.

2. The Establishment Division is now located in the President's Secretariat.

3. Information supplied by the Director of the Secretariat Training Institute.

graph shows through the courtesy of the British Information Service to demonstrate to the trainees how greater efficiency and higher output can be achieved in clerical operations by employing the techniques of method study.¹ The training in the Institute lasts for three months. The courses are not compulsory. The various ministries and departments of the government are expected to get their superintendents and assistants trained.

Review of the features of training

We may now review critically some of the important features of the existing arrangements for the training of the Civil Servants, particularly at the higher levels, in Pakistan. In the first place, there is the system of institutional training which in the case of the C.S.P. officers also includes a year's academic study in the Universities of Oxford and Cambridge. The question now is whether institutional training is at all necessary to supplement practical training. The advocates of the institutional training argue that it is essential for the members of the Central Superior Services for a number of reasons. First, the pre-entry university education of most of the recruits to these services, is, as already noted in a previous chapter², deficient in many respects. Institutional training, they think, is therefore necessary in order to widen the interests and broaden the outlook of

1 Brochures issued by the Institute, 1959. .

2 See chapter III.

the prospective higher Civil Servants and to deepen their knowledge of the social significance of the activities of the government in general and of their jobs in particular. Such knowledge, of the social, economic and political background of their work, if properly organised and adequately imparted, may remove largely the deficiencies of ^{the} present-day university education. It would also add to administrative competence and enable the officers to perform their duties properly and effectively. But a critic might point out that the curriculum which is confined mainly to law and languages in the Civil Service Academy, although a knowledge of these subjects is necessary for the C.S.P. officers, is not adequate enough for this purpose. A change in the course of study (which is discussed below) seems to be necessary. The courses of the study in the Finance Services Academy, however, are a ^{little} bit more helpful.

Secondly, the advocates of institutional training point out that the two Academies aim at developing in their students the essential qualities of objectivity, precision, accuracy and breadth of view. Commenting on the Civil Service Academy at Lahore, Professor Andre Bertrand has said that due to the 'hostels and the communal life led by the students and staff', the Director of the Academy and his deputy, "are able at any moment, in informal conversation, to develop in these young Civil Servants a sense of public service, to dwell on the essential qualities of objectivity and integrity they will have to display, and to place them on their guard against the dangers and temptations with which they may be assailed later in their career. In our view, this aspect of the training given at

Lahore is, perhaps, the most important of all".¹ Another foreign observer, Professor R. Braibanti, observed, "The Civil Service Academy, created in 1948, seeks to continue the finest traditions of the Indian Civil Service: the development of character, a sense of dedication and service to the state, and impartial, efficient administration".² These qualities are, as already ^{part} stated, ~~some~~ of the important objectives of training. It is only proper that the training institutions should make adequate efforts to develop these qualities in their students. A critic might say that these are the qualities best fostered by higher education. The supporters of the institutional training would point out that most of the university products are also deficient in these respects. Hence, the training must be related to the nature of the incoming products. Moreover, the members of the C.S.P., in particular, apart from receiving nine months' instruction at the Academy, and five months' practical training in East Pakistan, also attend a full year's academic course in the Universities of Oxford and Cambridge. Moreover, the two Academies, they hold, are residential. The probationers and the staff live together. This brings the probationers into direct daily contact with the Directors and other members of the staff and this might enable them to mould and influence the conduct and behaviour of the young officers, to

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- 1 A. Bertrand: "The Civil Service Academy of Lahore & The Training of Members of the Civil Service of Pakistan", in the International Social Science Bulletin, Vol. VII, No. 2, 1955, p. 266
 - 2 R. Braibanti: "The Civil Service of Pakistan: A Theoretical Analysis in The South Atlantic Quarterly", Vol. LVIII, No.2, 1959, p. 280

a great extent, by the examples of their own life, conduct, character and personality. This communal mode of living is also likely to develop a corporate spirit among them. Nevertheless, it seems that it would be perhaps much better and even wiser to make more adequate arrangements and more intensified efforts, as are done in the E.N.A. during the second year of the intellectual training of the French higher civil servants, to develop these highly desirable qualities in the civil servants of Pakistan. The period of training in the Academies may be extended by one year more for a fuller and more comprehensive intellectual training. Again, institutional training of this type may be followed by adequate 'follow-up enquiries' to assess whether it has succeeded in enabling the civil servants to acquire these qualities. In the third place, it is argued that institutional training will also provide the young civil servants with a systematic introduction to his actual job before he actually embarks upon it. It will be helpful in two ways. First, it will enable him to learn his job quickly. Senior officers now-a-days are too busy to have time and energy to train the young officers thoroughly. Therefore, properly organised institutional training will initiate him into the mysteries and technicalities of modern administration which is growing increasingly complex. Second, systematic introduction to his job and the machinery of government and administration aids him to understand the significance of over-all co-ordination in governmental activities. It may also be helpful in bringing about a ^{degre of} greater willing and intelligent co-operation among the civil servants themselves.

The opponents of the institutional training argue that it may result in the doctrination of the probationers and also in inbreeding. The political party in power may use the training institutes for propagating its own ideology and programmes. It is, therefore, likely to threaten the political neutrality of Civil Servants. So far, there is no evidence to entertain this fear in Pakistan. The institutional training is too short and too much of it is devoted to law, language and economics to provide time for any undesirable indoctrination. Well-informed critics point out that it is doubtful whether thought is sufficiently sophisticated for any fear of it to exist in Pakistan. Instead of fostering inbreeding, the right type of institutional training can be directed to broaden their outlook. The opponents further point out that it involves unnecessary waste of time and money. The probationers have already spent a number of years in academic institutions, schools, colleges and universities, and do not require any more schooling. Hence, to spend a year or two in institutions before practical training will be unnecessary and wasteful. In Britain such a point of view is held by several distinguished administrators. They think that with their good general educational background, the Civil Servants can be relied on to learn on their own the theory and technique of public administration. Sir Edward Bridges (now Lord Bridges) for instance, is of the view that the traditional method of learning by doing the job, under the supervision of the right type of senior officers, is an invaluable way of

training the Civil Servants. Emulation of senior Civil Servants, not going through a process of on-the-job tuition, is the proper way to get training for a career in the Civil Service.¹ But this view is being challenged in Britain, in spite of the very high order of university education. Professor Robson, for example, emphasises the necessity of institutional training. "The time has come when a Central Training School for the administrative, professional and scientific, and perhaps the technical and executive classes, should be established."²

In Pakistan the institutional training must continue for the higher services in which it already exists, and in our view, should be extended to cover other categories of higher and middle level Civil Servants.

Another important question which needs to be discussed in this connection is whether training should be imparted by the departmental academies or by the universities. The opponents of departmental institutions argue that these institutions are likely to produce inbreeding. There is no living contact between the probationers and the outside world. They live in a world of their own, cut off from the mainstreams of thought and life in the country. If they are to receive their instruction in a University, they will breathe in a stimulating and intellectually invigorating atmosphere. "I think it is a great error of judgment

1 Sir E. Bridges: "Administration: What is it? How can it be learnt?" In The Making of an Administrator, edited A. Dunsire, 1956, p. 23

2 Robson, W.A: "Recent Trends in Public Administration", in The Civil Service in Britain & France, edited by Robson, 1956, p. 58

to segregate officials from the rest of the population", said the late Professor Laski.¹ Secondly, the standards of such institutions cannot be continually "reviewed by being tested in the light of external criterion".² The authorities of departmental institutions might often suffer from self-complacency and may not be readily persuaded to introduce changes in the course of study and methods of teaching. Thirdly, the teachers whose activities are confined to the teaching of civil servants in departmental institutions "would tend to become narrow in their interests and limited in their vision".³ Professor Laski made a vigorous plea that the probationers should be trained initially not in a Staff College but in a University because "What gives its salt to University life is the width of the horizons it has to scan, the variety in the outlook of its teachers, the need, in its students, to test the values at which they have provisionally arrived ^{against} ~~against~~ other values born of contact with a different experience, or a different discipline".⁴ Mr. Greaves also thinks that the preliminary instruction of the probationers "ought to be in a University institution, or closely connected with one, partly because of the need which the Committee (Ashton Committee) recognised for highly developed library facilities, and partly for the atmosphere and community of scholarship there best to be found".⁵ Fourthly, a departmental academy, they point out, is unlikely

1 Laski, H.J.: "The Education of the Civil Servants" in 'Public Administration', (I.I.P.A.) Vol. XX, 1943, p. 19

2 Ibid.

3. Ibid

4. Ibid

5 Greaves, H.R.G.: "The Civil Service in the Changing State, 1947, p. 74

to have adequate library facilities and other useful equipments which a university can afford.

The advocates of the departmental academies point out that the training of the Civil Service probationers in a University cannot be useful. First, in universities the emphasis is more on the abstract than on the concrete and they deal with political science, public administration, economics, sociology, social psychology and other social sciences from the wider angles of theory and principle. The probationers, therefore, are unlikely to learn much to be of practical value in their subsequent careers when they are to grapple with the stark realities of social, economic, political and administrative problems. Universities may be able to arrange courses in public administration or in other specified subjects, but "their remoteness from the actual processes of Civil Service Administration would narrowly limit their usefulness".¹ A realistic study of public administration and an effective insight into the techniques and methods of administration require that instructors should be senior officers well-versed in the practicalities of administration and not mere scholars. The persons who are fully competent to train others in the techniques of their tasks are obviously those engaged in them, or who have become conversant with them through their own personal experience. The services of senior officers can be used in departmental academies more adequately, as universities do not normally

1 Report of the Committee on the Training of Civil Servants,
Cmd. 6525, 1944, p. 27

appoint them. Moreover, in Pakistan, Universities are not so well-developed and well-equipped as in Britain and other advanced countries, and the departmental academies exist precisely because the University product is not quite satisfactory.

There appears to be some elements of truth in both the viewpoints. The training arrangement for the young members of the C.S.P. strikes a balance between training at the departmental academy and study at the Universities of Oxford and Cambridge. This enables the probationers to derive the benefit of both types of training. We think that this arrangement can with great advantage be extended to the other Central Superior Services. But the main difficulty is the shortage of foreign exchanges.

At present there appears to be hardly any co-operation and co-ordination between the academies and institutions in Pakistan. There are certain physical difficulties in the way of effective co-ordination as some institutions are in West Pakistan and some in East Pakistan. But even between the two most important institutions at Lahore - the Civil Service Academy and the Finance Services Academy - there seems to be no co-operation and co-ordination. "Although located only a few miles apart, the academies conduct no joint classes in subjects taught at both institutions, and there is little social contact between the two groups of probationers or the faculties".¹ This is by no means a satisfactory state of affairs.

¹ Braibanti, R. op.cit. 1959, p. 283

There seems to be a need at least to re-organise the two academies at Lahore in a manner in which can also be adapted some distinguishing features of the organisation of the Ecole Nationale d'Administration in France. At this stage, it may be of some interest to discuss the distinctive features of the organisation of the E.N.A. The E.N.A. is managed by a Director and an Executive Council, and not by any department. The Director and members of the Executive Council are all nominated by the decree of the Council of Ministers. The Executive Council consists of fifteen members: one-third of them are drawn from the Civil Servants, one-third from the University professors, and one-third from among persons of some distinction in the country.¹ There is, thus, a variety of opinion in the Executive Council which lays down the general principles on the basis of which the E.N.A. is to be run. The Council watches its progress and development. The Director enjoys a high status and distinction as he is directly nominated by the Council of Ministers. He can be dismissed by the Government but only on a proposal from the Executive Council which has to assign reasons for this purpose.² His position is stronger than that of the Director of either of the Academies in Pakistan, who is always a high-ranking Civil servant holding the post for a number of years. He can be removed at any time by the department concerned.

The Director of the E.N.A. can take initiative in re-organising the School in any way he likes, subject to the general approval of the

1 J. Reyziogla: "The Reforms of the French High Civil Service", Part I in 'Public Administration' (J.R.I.P.A.) Vol. XXXIII, 1955, p. 85

2 Ibid.

Executive Council. Teaching in the E.N.A. is not undertaken by any member of the staff. The Director determines how the whole courses shall be given, and proposes the names of persons to give them. The E.N.A. draws on outside experience. Its annual list of lecturers includes senior officers, university professors, directors of nationalised industries and people with special competence.¹ There is thus, then, an "extreme diversity of opinions, origins and positions" among the members of the school's staff. This militates against "a danger of bias and indoctrination".²

The departmental academies and institutions, particularly the two academies at Lahore can be amalgamated into a single academy. It will serve a number of purposes. First, it will go a long way in breaking down the psychological barriers between the members of the C.S.P. and the other Central Superior Services. "The Academies reflect the exaggerated independence of the parts of the public services".³ The C.S.P. officers think that they are superior to Audit and Accounts officers, who in turn think that they are superior to the other members of the ^{other} Central Superior Services. This clannishness is injurious to the over-all co-ordination so necessary in administration. If the probationers from the various services spend a year or two in a common institution, it is likely to develop esprit d'corps among them and may make it easier for them to look upon each other as partners in a common enterprise. But we think that the psychological barriers between the various services can be removed more effectively, if all the non-technical central superior

1 Chapman, B: The Profession of Government, 1959, p. 119

2 A. Bertrand, op. cit. p. 183

3 Braibanti, R. Op. cit. Vol. LVIII, No.2. 1959, p. 283

services are integrated, as suggested in a previous chapter,¹ into a single unified Civil Service on the British pattern. The members of a single Civil Service can be trained in the manner in which the civil servants are trained in the E.N.A. in France. They will receive common instruction in subjects common to them all and then courses can be specially designed as in the E.N.A. for the needs of individual divisions and branches.² Secondly, the proposed amalgamation will increase the teaching resources of the academy. The teaching staff of the academy need not be confined to the civil servants. It should include, in our opinion, university professors and competent men from both the public and private enterprises. The university professors may deal with subjects of general nature and the senior officers and others may deal with courses of instruction having direct bearing on the work of the Civil Servants. This is likely to be an antidote to possible inbreeding and indoctrination as there will be diversity of opinions and views in the academy. Thirdly, the library facilities in the two academies is very inadequate. "Neither Academy has a significant research library".³ This is highly unsatisfactory. The consolidation of the two academies into one will mean a bigger library and more adequate equipment. We suggest that more efforts should be made to build up adequate libraries. Fourth, the management of the academies should not be left to the departments as at present, but should be dealt with by

1 Chapman, M. op.cit. p. 117-118

2 Braibanti, R. Op.cit. p. 285

3 Braibanti, R. op.cit. p. 285

an Executive Council representing the important sectors of opinion on the French model. The Executive Council should consist of senior officers, University professors, and distinguished members of the public, to be nominated by the Government. Fifth, the structure of the system of training in Pakistan has some similarities with the French system, but it is heavily compressed in Pakistan at present. We think that the period of training can be extended from two years to three years, and the academies will then be able to pay more attention to the teaching of general administrative subjects.

As regards what may be called the 'knowledge' aspects of training, the courses of study for the various categories of Civil Servants, particularly the members of the Central Superior Services need to be re-examined. At the Civil Service Academy, the C.S.F. probationers are given instruction in revenue laws, criminal law, civil law, Bengali and Urdu, Islamic studies, and the Constitution of Pakistan.¹ Adequate knowledge of revenue law is essential for the members of the C.S.F., who are entrusted immediately on appointment with the collection and administration of revenue. Study of criminal law and procedure is also necessary as they are also invested with magisterial powers over their fellow citizens. Knowledge of Bengali and Urdu - the two state languages of Pakistan - is necessary for all officers and particularly for the C.S.F. officers who are bound to serve anywhere in the country. Urdu

1 The Constitution of Pakistan was abrogated in 1958

is the dominant language in ~~West~~ Pakistan and hence the C.S.P. officers who come from East Pakistan, where Bengali is the only language spoken by the people, must learn Urdu. Similarly, the C.S.P. officers who come from West Pakistan must learn Bengali. Islamic studies may be an excellent subject for general education but it does not appear to be quite relevant to the tasks of the future administrators. The emphasis at the Civil Service Academy at present is on law and language. Too much time is devoted to these subjects and there is little time or room for other subjects. In this respect, the syllabus for the C.S.P. officers is more or less similar to that for the I.C.S. officers in the past, when the main functions of the government were confined to the collection of revenue and the maintenance of law and order. But after partition and independence, there is a major and significant shift of emphasis in government policies and activities from regulating the life of the people to positive actions for promoting their welfare. The kind of training suitable to a regulatory state, a critic might argue, may not serve the purposes of a positive state. Collection of revenue and the maintenance of law and order are important functions, no doubt, but much more important, significant and essential today, are the increasingly complex functions of the government in the social and economic fields. The implementation of successive five year plans will continue to increase the responsibilities of administration in these fields. It is, therefore, ^{essential} essential that the training of the future

administrators must be related to the purposes and functions of the government. Width of perspective and a clear understanding of the dynamics of social change are more important than a mere description of legal powers and responsibilities. As already stated, the study of law alone is quite unlikely to broaden the outlook of the civil servants and to deepen their understanding of the socio-economic forces in a modern society. From this point of view, the present syllabus followed at the Civil Service Academy is extremely limited and thoroughly inadequate. The courses of study need to be changed and designed accordingly.

The inclusion of public administration, general and applied economics, political science, and sociology seems to be necessary. ~~No~~ No detailed study of these subjects is perhaps necessary, but a brief review of the fundamentals with reference to the conditions and needs in Pakistan is likely to enable the general administrators to have a broader outlook, and perception, and a better and livelier appreciation and deeper understanding of the working of the variety of socio-economic forces in the country. This has been stressed by some eminent scholars in Britain. Professor Robson says, "I believe, however, that the Social Sciences can be of unique value in assisting a civil servant to understand the social, economic and political background of his working environment".¹ Mr. Greaves also puts similar emphasis on the importance of social sciences in any scheme of training for the civil serv-

1 The Civil Service in Britain & France, edited by Robson, W.A. 1956, p. 58

ants.¹ The course at the Civil Service Academy, the Planning Board hold should give a comprehensive background of the entire range of activities of the service in an integrated manner. "The course should include the principles and methods of public administration, with special emphasis on planning and development and social welfare activities and liberal instruction in the social sciences necessary for the new type of administrator, such as economics, sociology, social psychology, and political science."²

We think that the following subjects should be included in the syllabus of the two academies. Modern government is so intimately concerned with the economic life of the people that thorough knowledge of the principles of economics has become a necessary tool in the equipment of every responsible administrator. Economics should, therefore, be added to the syllabus for the recruits to the C.S.P. also. Care needs to be taken in the teaching of this subject to stress the practical application of economic principles with special reference to the conditions in Pakistan and the implementation of the five year plans. The importance of public administration - its principles, methods and techniques - cannot be over-emphasised. It is bound to find a place in the scheme of training for all the recruits to the various services. Initial basic knowledge of the principles and techniques of public administration will increase the chances of success and minimise the

1 Greaves, H.R.C. Civil Service in the Changing State, 1947, p-54-55

2 Government of Pakistan. Planning Board. The First Five Year Plan. 1955 - 60. Vol. I. 1956, p. 124

risk of errors. At the same time the probationers must also acquire a thorough knowledge of the machinery of government at the centre, in the provinces and at district level, and organisation, functions, purposes and procedures of the various departments and operating agencies. Comprehensive stress should be laid on district administration. It should also include lectures on the administrative history of Pakistan tracing the evolution of the present day institutions and administrative practices. The great expansion of international organisations since the end of the second world war has affected the work of several departments of government. Pakistan is a member of ^{the} U.N., its ^{allied} ~~outside~~ agencies and various other international bodies. Delegations consisting of officers and public men are always sent to participate in the work of these bodies. The officers are quite likely to play an intelligent role if they have a thorough knowledge of the purposes, organisation and functions of ^{the} U.N., its allied agencies and other international bodies. It seems necessary that a brief study of the international organisation should be included in the course of studies for the generalist administrators. Statistics is another important subject which needs to be included in the syllabus for all the higher Civil Servants. In Britain, the Ascheton Committee, emphasising the importance of statistics, said, "The course should include some training in methods of preparing and presenting statistics, and the logical principles underlying their interpretation. Government policy must often be largely based upon statistical evidence and there is scope here

for some training in a subject which is of vital importance to the efficiency of the "service".¹ This view of the Committee appears to have a universal validity. Training in statistics is necessary for the administrators in Pakistan.

The courses of study in the Finance Services Academy show some improvements. These include, as already noted, economics, public finance, public administration, International Monetary Fund and World Bank, and Book-keeping. This is a welcome step. The inclusion of these subjects is not enough. The inclusion of sociology and political science appears to be called for in order to make the administrators fully conscious of the operation of socio-economic forces in the country. Again, the absence of the principles of audit and accounts, and financial rules and regulations seems to constitute a serious gap. Courses given on these subjects will help the recruits to pick up their jobs quickly and efficiently. Not much is done to teach the members of the Finance Services the real purpose of the financial system in a modern state. Complaints are often heard about the rigid and unimaginative adherence on the part of accounts officers to financial rules. Training, in our opinion, should be directed to remedy this shortcoming.

The training arrangements and the courses of study for the members of the Police Service of Pakistan - an all-Pakistan Service - are defective and inadequate in many important respects. The P.S.P. probationers

1 Cmd. 6525 of 1944, p.28

receive instructions, as already stated, in criminal law, principles and methods of scientific crime investigation, medical jurisprudence, etc. All these subjects relate to their future work. But the standard of legal education that is imparted in the Police Training College is utterly inadequate, whereas a sound knowledge of criminal laws and procedures is essential for the P.S.P. officers. "As regards the Instructors in Law, the Principal pointed out that there were two Deputy Superintendents of Police as Law Instructors for the P.S.P. officers; but we were told that neither of them was a graduate in Law", observed the East Bengal Police Committee in 1953.¹ This is thoroughly and wholly unsatisfactory. To improve the standard of legal education, the Committee suggested that courses on the principles of criminal law and law of evidence must be delivered by practitioners having wide experience of criminal work, and that the probationers should be allowed to attend a special course in law in the University of Rajshahi, which has been started recently. We think that the suggestion of the Committee in regard to the teaching of law should be implemented without delay. Recently some steps are taken in this direction. Secondly, instruction in accounts is also very defective and unhealthy. "With regard to lectures on accounts, we were surprised to learn that the instruction on this subject was given by the Head Clerk of the College, who was paid an honorarium of Rs.10 per month. As large sums of money pass through

1 Report of the East Bengal Police Committee, 1953, p. 42

the hands of a Superintendent of Police, good training in accounts is quite essential, and we are unable to appreciate why such an extraordinary course as to make the Head Clerk lecture on accounts is being adopted", observed the Committee.¹ This is, indeed, a shocking surprise. The Committee recommended that an experienced officer, good in accounts, should be appointed to deliver lectures in this important subject.² The removal of this gross defect cannot brook any delay. Thirdly, the library of the College has been too inadequate and defective. Commenting on the library, the Committee said, "During our visit to this Institution, we were surprised to find that there was no library worth the name, and this deficiency was particularly noticeable in the branch of legal education. The very fact that no law journal was being subscribed for, indicates how no importance was attached to the legal part of the training of the police".³ It is impossible to think of a training college without an adequate library. We think that the suggestion of the Committee should be implemented without delay. Fourthly, the present site of the College is located in Sardah which is far away from Dacca, the provincial metropolis. It has a few disadvantages. It is not possible to secure the services of lawyers with wide original practice to give instruction on the principles of law. Owing to the inaccessibility of the place, very few ministers, high-ranking officers and foreign experts have visited the College or are able to do so. Again, the trainees are cut off from the rest of society and they can come into

1 Ibid, p. 42

2 Ibid.

3 Ibid, p. 41

contact with the people whom they are intended to serve. To quote the words of the Committee: "The result is that trainees are thrown entirely on the society of their own class and they do not come into contact with the public to serve whom they are all intended".¹ The Committee, therefore, suggested that the College should be located in a place very near to the provincial capital. The advantage of the College being near Dacca is that the trainees, the Committee held, can be brought into the city on occasions when they can, by practical experience, learn how to handle crowds and also see for themselves how the officers who have already been trained and are in service discharge their duties towards the public.² It would also remove other disadvantages mentioned above. We think that the suggestion of the Committee is an important one and that it deserves serious consideration.

Apart from these serious defects as stated above, it seems that nothing much is done to stimulate the members of the P.S.P. to see and view their work in the wider setting of a modern society. There are complaints about the behaviour of police officers towards the members of the public. Perhaps it may be partly attributed to the absence of correct and inspired lead on the part of the higher police officers. We are of the opinion that the imparting of the knowledge of the social significance of police work to these officers could prove helpful in giving them a proper perspective. Officers of the right type of outlook

1 Ibid.

2 Ibid

would not fail to exert their influence to make the police organisation behave in a proper way towards the commoner. Courses on public administration, political science, sociology and social psychology might be of great value in this respect.

The logical outcome of the inclusion of more and new subjects in the syllabus for the recruits to the various Central Superior Services will involve increase in the period of training and additional cost. We think that the time and expenditure will be more than compensated by an increase in the efficiency, ability and responsiveness of the higher Civil Servants at all levels.

Practical Training

There is much room for improvement, in its effectiveness, in the practical training of the C.S.P. officers in Pakistan. Young officers need to be guided, supervised and controlled more effectively than is the case today. The Chief Secretary of the provincial government should take personal interest in the matter. They are placed in charge of Collectors or Deputy Commissioners who are themselves young or too busy to pay any adequate attention to the training of the young officers under them. The importance of training in the first stage of an officer's career can hardly be over-stressed. A great deal depends on the senior officer, the Collector under whom the young C.S.P. officers begin their work. The training is not only in procedure and methods, its scope covers the whole of official life and conduct. It must help the officer to realise fully his duties and responsibilities, as well as his position of trust and honour as a public servant. Utmost care

should be taken to select the right type of collector to guide and supervise the training of the young C.S.P. officers. The collectors should be persons young in spirit, so as to be as near as possible to their pupils in outlook and they ought to be chosen primarily for their keenness and sympathy. They must be persons who could mould fresh, impressionable material to the proper shape and inspire them with love for the traditions and ideals of the service. They should be able to look upon the pupils as junior members of the same family who would in the fulness of time not only be required to assume the heavy burdens of administration, but to whom they would have themselves to pass on the reins.

The practical training of the other higher Civil servants should also be more effective. There should be a proper integration of theoretical and practical training - theory to facilitate the grasp of the practical work and practical work to enrich and widen the understanding of the former. Senior Civil servants with whom the probationers are to be understudies should be selected with great care and they should be good guides and sympathetic friends. The Establishment Divisions within departments should be well-staffed so that besides attending to other duties, they can adequately and effectively supervise the practical training schemes.

The training arrangements for the members of the Ministerial services needs careful consideration. At present the Secretariat Training Institute runs refresher courses for the superintendents and

assistants under the Central Government. The course is not compulsory and as a result there is a fall in the number of trainees.¹ We think that the course should be made compulsory. There is as yet no centralised training arrangements for the clerical staff, although adequate training arrangements for them seem to be urgent and essential. "A general opinion shared by a great majority of senior officers of the Government of Pakistan is that efficiency amongst clerical staff has deteriorated considerably and something must be done to remedy this state of affairs".² One of the various factors responsible for this is the absence of post-entry training for the clerical staff.³ In their second interim report the Committee strongly emphasised the need of systematic training for the clerks.⁴ We fully endorse the view of the Committee and think that adequate arrangements should be made in this respect without delay. The post-entry training of the staff should follow practical lines and should be in relation to the actual task to be performed by them. It should also give the recruits a background of the organisation of the Central Government, and particularly of the ministry or department to which they are allotted. Again, a brief introduction to a course on good public relations will be of great use to

1 Information supplied by the Director of the Secretariat Training Institute.

2 Government of Pakistan, Report of the Committee, 1950, op.cit.p.3

3 Ibid. 4. Ibid, Second Interim Report, 1951, p. 3

them. The common people come more into direct contact with the lower Civil Servants. Hence, some instruction in good public relations is essential. It is not often unusual to find lower civil servants behaving shabbily and arrogantly towards common men. This is partly attributable to the lack of effectiveness and breadth of training. Adequate attention should also be given to this aspect.

In-Service Training

The training of the Civil servants is a continuous process. 76a Initial training should be followed by a carefully devised in-service training. The importance of further education cannot be over-emphasised. It goes beyond the training for the immediate job. It looks towards the broadening of the field of interests and the intellectual horizons of the Civil Servants. It is justified on the ground that the broader-gauged the officers become, the more valuable they will be to the service. There must be continuous incentive in the Civil Service for its members to improve their equipment and to keep themselves abreast of the developments in the world. With many of them, because of the pressure of normal work, it is difficult to keep in touch with their interests and a sense of intellectual arterio-sclerosis develops. They should be encouraged to keep their interest alive and to acquire new qualifications which will be of value directly or indirectly to their work. "The Civil Service is a profession, and I should like it to become and realise itself as a learned profession", said Sir (now Lord)

W. Beveridge.¹ There are different types of in-service training and these should be used for the further education of all categories of Civil Servants in Pakistan.

In-service training implies that the departments should try to keep their employees well-informed about various activities inside and outside the departments having relevance to the broadening of their minds. It should be a standing practice to furnish the staff with such information as possible about the work of the office, its purpose and its progress. The Asheton Committee in Britain emphasised the utility of this background training and suggested various methods by which it can be achieved - weekly discussions, talks by managers, periodical statement of policy by management, house journals, well-stocked library, exhibition of appropriate films, visits to other branches and sub-departments, oral discussion and circulation of bulletins.² In Pakistan such background training is still in an under-developed stage. Very few departments make comprehensive use of the various devices to provide for it. We think that the Government of Pakistan should emulate the British example in this respect.

The diversification of the work entrusted to a Civil Servant is yet another form of in-service training. It may take various forms such as the mobility of the Civil servants from one type of work to another, from one department to another, from one branch to another

1 The Development of the Civil Service, p. 242

within the same department, and from headquarters to the out-stations.¹ This system of the rotation of officers is a distinctive feature of the C.S.P. in Pakistan as it was in the case of its predecessor, the I.C.S. in British India. This is also true of the I.A.S. officers in India. The members of the C.S.P. move from one department to another, from one type of job to another, from the centre to the provinces, from the provinces to the districts and from administrative work to executive work, as already noted, on a tenure basis.² When a member of the C.S.P. comes to the Secretariat - Central or provincial - from field work in the districts, he brings freshness of outlook, born of administrative experience, to the Service. Experience in the field brings administration to life. Moreover, the C.S.P. in Pakistan like the I.A.S. in India is a multi-purpose service, as already stated earlier in this chapter, the members of which are to hold varied duties and functions. It is based on the assumption that a man of proved general competence is regarded as eligible to fill the general requirements of most posts under the government. Such a course, therefore, is of great advantage to them. It widens experience, breaks rigidity and monotony, and imparts freshness, flexibility and vitality to the service. For many types of work nothing trains better than a variety of experiences. A corps of officers of high calibre, containing within itself rich, diversified and varied

1 Report of the Committee on the Training of Civil Servants, Cmd. 6525, 1944, p.15 . . .

2 See Chapter II .

experience, will be available for the varied and changing needs of government. Commenting on this with regard to the I.A.S. in India, P. Appleby thinks that India would do well to apply this valuable experience of the I.A.S. to other services as much as possible.¹ In India some selected officers of the Central Secretariat are attached to districts for one year, and this enables them to acquire some experience of district administration and appreciation of problems which arise in the field in the execution of plans and programmes.² We think that this practice should be extended to other Central Superior Services in Pakistan. It would be quite helpful if this planned movement of officers from one job to another and from the centre to provinces is preceded by brief and appropriate re-orientation courses.

In Britain, the members of the Administrative Class in the early years of their careers are moved from division to division and from branch to branch at regular intervals. An officer of this class is to work for six months in a local office if his ministry has a regional or local network.³ There should be more planned inter-change of officers between central and local governments. The importance of the transfer of officers between the centre and the circumference cannot be denied. It widens their experience. The officers will have more opportunities

1 Appleby, P: *Indian Journal of Public Administration*, 1956.

2 Chanda, A: *Indian Administration*, 1958, p. 110

3 Hubback, O: "The Treasury's Role in Civil Service Training", in *Public Administration*, (J.R.I.P.A.) Vol. XXXV, 1957, p. 102

for appreciating more readily the impact of action at the centre upon local government and upon the general public.

Various reports, committees and distinguished scholars have pointed out the necessity of mobility from one department to another. The authors of the Northcote-Trevelyan Report themselves realised the importance of transferring from one department to another "so that each man may have an opportunity of making himself master of the whole of the business before being called upon in due course to take a leading position".¹ Expressing the same view, but in a rather cautious tone, the Assheton Committee said, "Where they can take place they are undoubtedly beneficial in increasing an officer's adaptability. In normal times such movement is unusual; we believe however, that the service as a whole would derive advantage if departmental barriers could be less rigid so as to permit more fluidity of staff".² Stressing the importance of inter-departmental transfer of officers, Professor Robson has said that "a deliberate effort should be made to see that at least the higher and middle Civil Servants obtain experience in a number of different departments, instead of the matter being left largely to chance, as at present".³ In such inter-departmental transfer of officers, the "connecting link" between their posts should be visible otherwise their

1 Papers on the Re-organisation of the Permanent Civil Service, p.p. 1854, p. XX

2 Cad. 6525 of 1944, p. 14

3 Robson, W.A.: 'Recent Trends in Public Administration' in The Civil Service in Britain & France edited by Robson, W.A. 1936, p. 59

public usefulness may be reduced rather than increased. The 'linked experience' he rightly says, would add to the usefulness of Civil servants.¹ This is a valuable suggestion which deserves serious consideration both in Britain and Pakistan. To facilitate this he suggests that "One course would be to group departments into such categories as those dealing with economic matters, social services, defence, overseas countries, etc., and to arrange for Civil Servants to circulate among the departments comprising the group to which they belong".² He is also in favour of interchange between groups when some degree of relevance can be attained in the particular appointments.³ Summing up the whole position he says that "more regard should be paid than at present to the idea of increasing the Civil Servant's usefulness by extending his relevant experience - the emphasis is on relevant".⁴ We fully endorse the view of Professor Robson.

The use of refresher courses, conferences, group discussions and highly specialised courses is another type of in-service training. This can be employed for the training and development of supervisors and comparatively young generalist and specialist Civil Servants for higher administrative responsibilities. In Pakistan no systematic efforts have so far been made by the various Ministries and departments of the Central Government to provide specialised courses and to arrange residential conferences for the young generalist and specialist Civil

1 Ibid

2 Ibid

3 Ibid

4 Ibid

Servants. The Central Secretariat Training Institute offers a few refresher courses for the members of the Central Secretariat Service.

Refresher courses for the C.S.P. and other higher services are yet to be organised on any systematic basis.

If we look at Britain, we find that significant developments have taken place and important innovations have been made in this field during the post-war years. Britain has been a pioneer in this direction as in many others. Increasing efforts are made to institute specialised courses, refresher courses and conferences. The Treasury has been arranging residential conferences at both the assistant Secretary and Principal level for the discussion of management and organisation problems.¹ These conferences last for eight days and are attended by scientists, engineers, architects and administrators of assistant secretary and equivalent rank. This kind of group discussion among civil servants of varied and different backgrounds results in a good deal of cross-fertilisation of ideas. They have an opportunity of exchanging ideas with colleagues of equal rank in different departments. The specialist officers get a proper idea and perspective about management and the general administrators have an informal opportunity to have some idea of matters of a technical nature. The success of this

1 For detailed discussion of this form of training for higher administrators in Britain, see (a) 'Training of the Technician in Administration Practices' by S.A. Bailey in Public Administration (Vol. XXXIII, 1955), (b) 'The Treasury's Role in Civil Service Training' by Hubback, D. in Public Administration (Vol. XXXIV, 1957), (c) 'Public Service Training in the Past Decade' by Tickner in Public Administration (Vol. XXXIV, 1956), (d) 'Training & Education in Post Office' by Greenland, J.V. in Public Administration (Vol. XXV, 1957).

experiment has encouraged the Treasury to go further in the field. A new series of one-week conferences for principals and equivalent executive, scientific and technical officers have been started by the Treasury.¹ Apart from these, the Treasury also runs a number of 'special central courses'.²

The various departments of the Government are arranging an increasing number of courses of one kind and another for their employees of various levels and categories.³ The Ministry of Supply, for instance, hold conferences for various classes of technicians and these aim at initiating their senior officers into the esoterics of the organisation of the Ministry. The General Post Office, in addition to their residential management training centre, have residential courses for three weeks for the training of technologists in management and administrative problems.⁴

The grant of sabbatical leave to pursue an approved course or to undertake a task of research either at home or abroad, is another significant device to enable the Civil Servants to refresh their minds and to prepare themselves for higher positions in administration requiring wider knowledge, varied experience and highly developed capacities. In British India furlough and study leave were available for some categories of higher Civil servants. The Planning Board have recommended its revival in Pakistan. "The formal practice of granting officers study

1 Hubback, D. op.cit. p. 106

2 Ibid

3 S.A. Bailey, op.cit. p. 381

4 Ibid

leave to go abroad for further study, which seems to have fallen into desuetude, should be revived. The modern state does not need only men and women mechanically efficient in their jobs; it also needs people with advanced learning in various subjects, including the humanities and Social Sciences".¹ The Board also recommend that there should be more frequent deputation of senior officers to the Administrative Staff College at Henley.² They should also be sent on study tours to advanced countries like Britain, U.S., France, and Germany, to make a comparative study of public administration which will enable them better to appreciate the problem in Pakistan.³ The Assheton Committee in Britain have strongly recommended that selected officers should be given the opportunity to travel abroad to study aspects of government or public administration, which is likely to be of great value. It will be stimulating and provide a safeguard against insularity.⁴ So far as study tours are concerned, things are improving in Pakistan. Under the Colombo plan, U.N. Technical Schemes, agreement with International Co-operation Administration, a number of Civil Servants go abroad for advanced teaching in different aspects of administration. Recently, under a contract with the I.C.A., the University of South California has started a special course for training a batch of fifteen to twenty senior officers from Pakistan in U.S. methods and techniques of public administration. The purpose is to

1 Government of Pakistan. Planning Board. The First Five Year Plan, 1955 - 60, Vol. I. 1956, p. 127

2 Ibid.

3) Ibid.

3/4 Cmd. 6525 of 1944, p. 32

4. Indian Journal of Public Administration, Vol. IV. No. 1, 1958, p. 106

prepares the trainees for assuming higher administrative responsibilities on return to Pakistan.¹ In Pakistan, Universities are not well-developed and well-equipped for the higher Civil Servants to spend a spell of time in research or specialised study. Most Universities do not have any well-organised department of public administration. Reference libraries in almost all the Universities are not satisfactory. The Planning Board recommended that the Universities should be encouraged to start courses in public administration.²

There is as yet no institute of public administration like the Royal Institute of Public Administration in Britain. The Planning Board have recommended the setting up of such an institution.³ The general objective of the Institute will be to improve the functioning and operation of public administration, to conduct, propose and support research and surveys on administrative problems, and to organise exchanges of views and proposals with regard to the solution of these problems. "In order to stimulate interest in public administration as a subject of study and research in political, administrative, professional and academic circles, it will be necessary to establish a subsidised but autonomous Institute of Public Administration. Its scope should include business administration. It should publish a journal, hold seminars and conferences, encourage research by the Universities, maintain liaison with similar institutes abroad and with Universities

1 *Indian Journal of Public Administration*, vol. IV, no. 1, 1958, p. 106.
Planning Board, *op. cit.*, p. 127.

2 *Ibid.* Planning Board, *op. cit.*, p. 127.

3 *Ibid.*

interested in the subject, obtain literature from them, and have a circulating library and a reading room".¹ We endorse the view of the Planning Board.

In Britain increasing attention is paid to sabbatical leave and travel abroad for civil servants. In one year about 50 civil servants of the rank of assistant Secretary and principal and equivalent ranks among the scientists have spells of sabbatical leave ranging from three to twelve months. Out of these, 10 attend the Administrative Staff College at Henley, 12 go to the Imperial Defence College, 4 to the Joint Staffs College, and 2 to the NATO Defence College in Paris.² Universities are also generous in awarding research fellowships to civil servants. The Maffield College appoints a civil servant to Gwilyn Gibbon Fellowship, Manchester University to Simon Fellowship, and L.S.C. to Webb Fellowship. The Commonwealth Fund offers three fellowships to administrators and two for scientists in each year to visit the U.S.A. There are King George VI fellowships for young scientists to study in the U.S.A.³

An immense gap in the arrangement for the training for higher administration in Pakistan is the absence of an Administrative Staff College to provide regular courses in public administration or in particular aspects of it to officers at intermediate levels of higher services. This gap, the Planning Board hold, should be filled up immediately.⁴

1 Ibid. p. 126 - 127

2 Hubback, D. op. cit. Vol. SSSIV, 1957, p. 104

3 Ibid, p. 104 - 5

4 Planning Board, op. cit. p. 126

Such an institution can usefully serve industry and business, which in Pakistan suffer greatly from lack of administrative skill. India set up an Administrative Staff College at Hyderabad on the principle and model of the Administrative Staff College at Henley in Britain. In Australia a similar institution was set up in 1957.

It may be of interest in this connection to discuss some of the distinguishing features of the Administrative Staff College at Henley. The College was opened at Henley in 1949. The main purposes of the College are not primarily to extend or impart knowledge, but to cultivate administrative skills and talents and to develop an awareness in the trainees which will help them to tackle their own jobs with a broader vision and a deeper understanding. "The training programme is therefore so designed as to encourage the participants to think about and develop skills which a senior administrator needs; the ability to see clearly an objective; the skill to plan, to delegate and control work and to mobilise the knowledge and abilities of others to achieve that objective; the skill to handle a management team involving co-operation with colleagues - often more experienced than himself; having to make decisions as intelligently as possible in the time and with the resources available; and finally to understand the complex inter-relationships of a modern community, which involves appreciating the distinctive points of view and abilities of those who are working

in other fields and learning from their experiences."¹ The College provides a new approach to the training in administrative leadership. Its members are drawn from industry, commerce and government on the belief that the problems of administration in those different spheres have common features which call for the constructive skill and technique of leadership, policy-making and planning which are not simply gifts of nature. Training helps and is necessary.

The College is managed by an independent board of governors, who in turn employ the Principal. The Governors are drawn from different walks of life. The College is free from political, economic and social bias.² The College is financed by private funds from business institutions and individuals and fees paid by the employers on behalf of their members.³

The main parts of the course are comparative administrative structures, internal organisation and administration, external relations, constructive administration, and conclusions.⁴

The College holds three sessions in each year, and each session lasts for twelve weeks. Each session is attended by a group of sixty persons nominated by their respective employers and approved by the College. Out of 60, 6 are from the Civil Service, 6 from banking and

1 Adams, J.W.H. 'Henley & Hyderabad' in the Indian Journal of Public Administration, Vol. IV. No. 1, 1958, p. 67-68.

2 Dimock, N.E. "The Administrative Staff Colleges Executive Development in Government & Industry" in American Political Science Review, Vol. L. No. 1, 1956, p. 169

3 Ibid.

4 For details see Dimock, op. cit. p. 173

insurance companies, 6 from overseas, 36 from the broad field of industry and commerce, and the rest from the Local Government and the Armed Forces. The ages of the members vary from 34 to 43 and the underlying idea is that the members are to be persons of some maturity yet at a stage of development when they are adaptable. These 60 persons of diverse educational backgrounds and varied experiences are divided into six groups of ten each. Each group or syndicate works under one of its members as a chairman and with another as secretary. Each group is assisted in its work by a Directing Staff of the College. Each syndicate holds discussions on select topics of administration and is to submit a report embodying the views of its members. Issues arising from the reports of the various syndicates are discussed in the College as a whole. The College also arranges from the benefit of the members background lectures, appropriate reading material, discussions with distinguished visitors and visits to factories, government departments and other places of interest.

Thus, an effort is made by the College through group or syndicate methods of self-instruction "to widen their horizons, to help them to clarify their thinking, and to give them also some experience of handling issues which are above their present responsibilities".¹ The College seeks to accelerate the 'maturing process' of its members for higher administrative responsibilities.² Professor Dimock says, "the most

1 D.K. Clarke, C.B.F: 'Educating the Administrators' in the Making of an Administrator, edited by A. Dunsire, 1956, p.29

2 Ibid.

interesting experiment in the world today for the student of comparative administration and business and government is the Administrative Staff College at Henley-on-Thames, England".¹ The College is pioneering with imagination and boldness a significant method towards the mastery of the art of governing men. It is perhaps too early to make any systematic evaluation of this famous institution. Nevertheless, it has won an international reputation for its work.

Further education of the members of the Ministerial services.

Every effort should be made to facilitate the further education of the members of the ministerial ^{services} ~~services~~. The various ministries and departments should encourage their staff to acquire external qualifications having vocational value to improve their skill and efficiency. These may be, for instance, in accountancy for those engaged in accounting work, and in statistics for those whose job it is to handle them. Again, further education may be of a cultural and academic kind. Anything that tends to broaden the mind, to make a better, more complete, more harmonious individual, tends to make a better civil servant. In Pakistan not much attention is given to it. The Central Government should approach the various academic institutions in Karachi, Dacca and Lahore and in other places to explore the possibility of making arrangements for the education of their staff. They should offer financial aid and time concession to their employees for this purpose. The Committee appointed by the Government of Pakistan to review the organisation,

1 Dimock, M.E. op.cit. Vol. L. No. 1, 1956, p. 166

structure and level of expenditure of the various departments of government in their first interim report suggested that government should support the growth of schools and institutions which would impart training to matriculators in typing, stenography, commercial correspondence and book-keeping as there is a dearth of such institutions in Pakistan.¹ The Government, in their view, should not hesitate to set up model schools of this type in the country.² We agree with the Committee in this respect.

Significant developments in this respect have taken place in Britain during the post-war years after the publication of the report of the Asheton Committee, and these should provide enough food for thought and action in Pakistan. The Committee recommended that the departments should aid the staff to study by giving reasonable time off and by paying fees in appropriate cases.³ Departments are making extensive use of technical colleges and universities for vocational training and technical education for their staff by giving time off and paying fees in appropriate cases. The Treasury, the National Whitley Council, and the Civil ^{Service} Council for further education, are taking active interest in providing opportunities for further education and stimulating the staff to take advantage of them. The members of the staff are associated with the policies and programmes formulated by the Treasury and

1 Government of Pakistan. Interim Report of the Committee, op.cit. 1950, p. 3

2 Ibid.

3 Cmd. 6525 of 1944, p. 13

Departments. The Report of the Assheton Committee which has aroused considerable interest in this respect constitutes a landmark in the history of the British Civil Service. There is room for improvement in this field. Mr. Hubback thinks that a new committee should be set up to appraise what has been done in the past, to devise ways and means to improve training methods, and to ascertain whether better or more training is necessary.¹

The Government of Pakistan should set up ^α machinery for the co-ordination and central direction of all the training schemes. This can be achieved by adopting as an experimental measure the practice and procedure followed by the British Treasury. The Treasury has a division called the Training and Education Division. It offers central guidance and co-ordination of all the training schemes worked out on a departmental basis according to the needs of the different departments. The Establishment Division in the Ministry of the Interior in Pakistan, which deals with the Civil Service matters should have a wing or branch to deal with the training of civil servants.²

We think that the time is ripe for a comprehensive enquiry into the training arrangements for the various categories of civil servants in Pakistan.

1 Hubback, D. op.cit. Vol. XXV, 1957, p. 109 .

2 . Government of Pakistan. Second Interim Report of the Committee. op. cit. 1951, p. 6-7. *Recently the Establishment division had been shifted to the President's Secretariat.*

CHAPTER FIVE

General Conditions of Employment

The general quality and quantity, tone and efficiency, integrity and morale of the Civil Servants are determined, to a considerably great extent, by the important conditions of service such as pay, retirement benefits and promotion. We propose to examine in this chapter these three general conditions of employment. The size of the monthly salary is one of the most important conditions of service. It determines not only the supply of suitable recruits to the service but the long-term efficiency of the service. Adequacy of remuneration bears on the efficiency of the employees, because it affects their freedom from care and anxiety and promotes their willingness to work. Promotion policies and practices are hardly less important than pay in determining the quality of the Civil Servants. Promotion is part of the greater problem of placement within the service, the problem of so allocating the available personnel that the most efficient result is obtained through the maximum use of existing abilities¹. Such a result is of great advantage as it gives the employee an incentive to push higher. Pension is regarded as one of the main attractions of the service. All sections of the Civil Servants attach great importance to retirement benefits.

1 Gladden, E.H: Civil Service^{on} and Bureaucracy, 1956, p. 96

(3) The conditions of retirement of government servants and the extent to which the existing regulations in regard to their pensions and contributory provident funds require simplification.

We are concerned here only with the centrally recruited Civil Services. The terms of reference are extremely restricted and confined to four important things only - pay, promotion, retirement benefits, and leave.

The Commission consisted of four members including the Chairman, who was the Chief Justice of a High Court. Two members came from the Central Legislature, and another member who was both a member and secretary was a Civil servant. There were none from industry and labour. The personnel of the Commission as a whole could not claim to have intimate knowledge of administration. The Commission had to work in difficult and uncertain conditions. Pakistan came into existence in August 1947, and in 1948 neither the magnitude nor the exact nature of problems could be ascertained with any degree of clarity or certainty.¹ The economic position of the country was unstable. Before partition, the industrial and commercial fabric was almost exclusively in the hands of the non-Muslims. The partition of British India was followed by mass migration of the non-Muslims from Pakistan to India, and of Muslims from

1 Ibid, p. 11

India to Pakistan. Consequently, with the departure of the non-Muslims the whole of this fabric crumbled down, and Pakistan inherited "a completely shattered economy".¹ Again the permanent defence needs, the development schemes, the respective constitutional position of the Central and Provincial finances had yet to assume their ultimate form, the social policy of Pakistan was yet to be formulated, and the political structure of the Country was yet to be re-shaped.² The re-organisation of the administrative machinery and the public services had yet to be finally settled.³ The Commission pointed out that in a situation like this it was not possible for them to locate and identify the permanent factors that must be borne in mind in determining the salaries of public servants, and that the usefulness of their recommendations would largely depend on the correctness of their forecast of the future.⁴ No wonder that these uncertain conditions left their marks on the recommendations of the Commission. Most of the recommendations of the Commission were implemented by the government with some modifications.⁵

Pay Structure:

It is as well to follow the pattern of the Report of the Pakistan

1 Ibid, p. 9

2. Ibid, p. 11

3 Ibid, p. 23

4 Ibid, p. 11

5 Information supplied by the Establishment Division, Ministry of the Interior, Government of Pakistan.

Pay Commission by first stating briefly the then position in regard to pay structure. The pay-scales of the different categories of Civil Servants, which prevailed in Pakistan immediately after partition were exactly those which were in existence in British India before partition. The main features of the pay-scale of the Civil Servants were determined in British India on the recommendations of the Islington Commission.¹ There were different scales of pay for the different categories of the Civil Servants. The members of the old I.C.S., I.M.S., and certain other services, whether British or Indian, were on the same scales of pay. In regard to other services there was one scale of pay for the British recruits and another for the locally recruited Indians. The reason they gave for this discrimination was that any remuneration in excess of what was needed to obtain suitable Indian recruits was an unjustified burden on the Exchequer. Again, the pay-scales of the Superior Services other than the I.C.S. and I.P.S. in British India were scaled down in 1931 owing to the economic depression. The old entrants, that is, those who entered the services before 1931 were exempted from the operation of the reduced scale. Thus came into existence two scales of pay for the same category of officers.² As a consequence, there was no uniformity in the pay-scales. There was one scale for the

1 See chapter 1

2 Report of the Pakistan Pay Commission, Vol. I. 1949, p. 6

I.C.S. and I.P.S. officers. There were two scales for the other Superior Services since 1931. There was no proper correlation between the pay-scales of the different categories of services. Race and status were determining factors in certain cases. The disparity between the remuneration of the higher and the lower services was enormous.¹ The result was a variety of pay-scales and complexity of rules and regulations. All these created jealousy, bitterness and heart-burnings among the Civil Servants.

The Commission first examined the pay-scales of the higher and superior services and recommended their reduction on the following grounds. First, all the members of the higher services were originally intended to be British who could only be induced to accept employment in British India by a salary much above what they would obtain at home. The remuneration for service in India was such above the British standard for comparable posts at that time, and a fortiori considerably above what it should have been if recruitment had been in India and from among Indians. Before every Commission or Committee that was appointed to enquire into this problem, it seemed to be the common ground that Indians could be recruited to the higher services on substantially lower salaries

1 Ibid. p. 5

'than the British.'¹ Secondly, it was chiefly due to political reasons that the standard of remuneration for Europeans and Indians recruited in Britain continued to be the same in some cases.² Thirdly, the introduction of the provincial services and the reducing of posts reserved for members of the former Secretary of State's services was an express recognition of the principle that Indians could be recruited on lower salaries for work which when done by Europeans carried higher remuneration.³ The Commission were of the view that if there had been no intervention of other factors which would justify the retention of existing salaries attaching to higher posts, the case for the reduction of the salaries of such posts was unanswerable.⁴ Section 10 of the Indian Independence Act, 1947, guaranteed to the former Secretary of State's services the same terms and conditions in regard to pay and other matters after partition as they used to enjoy before partition. These were accepted by the Government of Pakistan. Later on, these were incorporated into the Constitution of 1956.

The only grounds, according to the Commission, that had been urged in support of the existing salaries for superior services were the rise in prices and the increasing incidence of income tax.⁵ The increase or

1 Ibid, p 26

2 Ibid

3 Ibid.

4 Ibid

5 Ibid.

decrease of income tax, the Commission held, was dependent on factors which had nothing to do with the fixation of salaries.¹ The rise in prices, according to the Commission, was certainly a relevant factor as the real salaries depended on the purchasing power of money.² The Commission fixed the salaries on the assumption of a fall in prices and provided for dearness allowances in the transition period. Hence, they thought that the prevailing high level of prices was no reason for not revising and rationalising the pay-scales.³ The members of the Superior Services were of the opinion that the reduction of pay would lower their standard of living and put a great emphasis on it.⁴ The Commission did not accept this view fully, and said, "The standard of living on which considerable emphasis has been laid by the higher services is as foreign to us as the salary structure of which it is the result".⁵ These standards were introduced by the Europeans and with their departure these also should go. The Commission said that they could not subscribe to the proposition that "the state should prescribe and recognise standards of living for its servants quite out of tune with the generally prevailing standards" of the country.⁶ Pakistan must adopt her own standards which would rest on the realities and limitations of her own national resources.⁷ Finally, the Commission did not think it to be a right policy for the State to offer such salar-

1, 2, 3, 4, and 5. Ibid. . . .

6 Ibid, p. 26 - 27

7 Ibid, p. 27

ies to its servants as to attract the best available material. The correct place for "men of genius", they thought, is in private enterprise and not in Civil Service. "We cannot, therefore, prescribe a pay-scale with the object of attracting to public service all the best intellect in the Country".¹ The attitude of the Commission towards the low-paid employees was that the State must do everything in its power to raise their standard of living. In the past there had been indifference to the position of the low-paid staff.

The various service associations and unions urged that in fixing the salary structure and salary scales the Commission must adopt the course suggested by the Central Pay Commission in British India before partition. It may be of some interest to refer briefly to the method followed by the Indian Pay Commission. The method also adopted by that Commission in fixing the scales of pay of the various categories of Civil Servants was to ascertain the cost of living index which would obtain when prices would stabilise and to fix the pay scales for each class of service on that basis, making up the difference in certain cases during the transition period by a system of dearness allowance.² They adopted the criterion enunciated by the Islington Commission in determining the pay-scale and qualified it by the proviso that in no case should a man's pay be less than a "living wage".³ Assuming, on

1 Ibid.

2 Report of the Pakistan Pay Commission, Vol. I, 1949, p. 27

3 Report of the Central Pay Commission (Indian), 1946-47, p. 28

the opinion of some experts, that when the prices would stabilise they would give a cost of living index between 160 and 175, taking the pre-war average to be 100, and also assuming that an average family would consist of three consumption units, they fixed the initial basic pay of the lowest-paid employees at Rs. 30 and that of a clerk recruited from the middle class at Rs. 55 a month and supplemented them by dearness allowance of Rs. 25 and Rs. 35 respectively.¹ The proportion of dearness allowance to the basic pay would decrease as the salary would rise or as the cost of living index would fall.² Except for a few select posts at the top, they thought the maximum salary of a Civil Servant should not exceed Rs. 2,000 a month. Between the maximum and the minimum, they suggested a variety of scales for different classes and categories of Civil Servants.

The Pakistan Pay Commission thought that the system of basing salaries on the assumption of a fixed price level and adjusting the difference consequent on the rise or fall of prices by a system of dearness allowance and cuts was open to serious objections.³ First, when a person accepts employment in public office, he contracts for the receipt of a money salary and is, therefore, expected to adjust his cost of living according to the rise or fall in the purchasing power of money.⁴

1 Ibid, p. 28-34

2 Ibid. p.45-48

3 Report of the Pakistan Pay Commission, Vol. I. 1949, p.27-28

4 Ibid, p. 28

Secondly, a system of dearness allowance reflecting in its occasional variations the precise changes in the purchasing power of money creates in the minds of the employee the belief that his contract with his employer is for real salary as distinguished from money salary and that the slightest variation in the purchasing power of money gives him a right to demand more whenever and to whatever extent such purchasing power falls. Thus, the system raises hopes and expectations and leads to actual demands which the Government may not be able to satisfy.¹

Thirdly, if the purchasing power of money rises and the cost of living index falls, the employee is not willing to accept the converse logical result of the system, namely, a proportionate cut in his salary.² We

still think that the system of fixing the remuneration of public servants which, when measured in terms of money rises or falls according to the variations in the purchasing power of money, is impracticable and has to be subjected to so many qualifications that it is hardly worthwhile adopting it as a principle.³

The Commission paid some attention to the doctrine of living wage but did not accept in its entirety² because of its vague and imprecise character. Its application to the salaries of the civil servants raises some fundamental issues. First, it raises the question as to how many persons a worker is supposed to support.⁴

Secondly, what commodities and services are necessary to enable them to live.⁵ Thirdly, the claimants are apt to lose sight of the fact that

1, 2, and 3. Ibid.

4. Ibid. p. 50

5. Ibid

wages can only be paid out of national income and that the lesser the income the lower must be the wages.¹ Fourth, when the doctrine of living wages cannot be applied to the wage earners in general, can the government employees demand its application to themselves?² Fifth, the determination of a living wage is extremely difficult as it needs the determination of the price level with reference to which the living wage is to be determined. Now, the cost of living index is an extremely elusive figure and is never as exact as the figures that are employed to indicate a rise or fall in the cost of living.³

The Commission rejected the cost of living index as the determining factor in the fixation of salary structure, but they thought that the rates of remuneration to be rational must have some broad connection with the purchasing power of money. Hence, some kind of forecast of prices must be hazarded, otherwise there would be no basis for the superstructure.⁴ In fixing a living wage for the lower and middle class employees, the most important factor to be borne in mind, according to the Commission, was not the general price level but the price index of necessities and ordinary comforts of life.⁵ The most weighted item in the consumption schedule of these ^{classes} ~~classes~~ is food. The next item is cloth.⁶ The food position was easy at that time, and with the

1 Ibid, p. 31.

2 Ibid.

3 Ibid, p. 32.

4 Ibid, p. 33

5 Ibid

6 Ibid

completion of the various schemes, the prices of food stuffs would fall. Gradually, the prices of cloth too would decline. The Commission anticipated that in normal times of which they were thinking, the general price level of consumer goods would be somewhere between one-third and one-half of their prevailing level.¹ On that assumption they fixed the pay-scales for the lowest categories of employees.

The Commission did not enunciate any new criterion for the determination of the pay structure and pay-scales of the various classes and categories of civil servants. They accepted the ^{criticism} ~~test~~ formulated by the Islington Commission. The criterion formulated by the Islington Commission was: "Government should pay so much and so much only as is necessary to obtain the recruits of the right stamp and to maintain them in such comfort and dignity as will shield them from temptation and keep them efficient for the term of their service."² This principle, the Pakistan Pay Commission thought, should be qualified by the provision that in no case should the Government pay to any class of its employees a salary which would be insufficient to maintain them.³ Moreover, in its application due attention should be given to the duties and responsibilities of posts, the cost of living, the method of recruitment, qualifications and training, reasonable standards of comfort and broad comparison with prospects of remuneration outside government service.⁴

1 Ibid.

2 Royal Commission On the Public Services in India, Cmd. 8383. (1917)

3 Report of the Pakistan Pay Commission, Vol. I. 1949, p. 28 Vol. I. p. 34.

4 Ibid. p. 28 - 29

We may offer here a few comments on the views of the Commission. They did not lay down any new formula. They broke no fresh ground. In accepting the Islington formula they assumed that dignity and status was to be one of the factors in determining pay structure. Much stress should not be laid on the necessity of enabling the holder of an office to maintain its status and dignity. At the same time, it is perhaps true to say that dignity and status usually go with higher offices carrying higher responsibilities and salaries. Although this cannot be made a fetish of in this democratic age, it cannot be wholly ignored.

Again, the precision of this formula is more apparent than real. There seems to be no direct means of measuring what is "right stamp", what is an "efficient staff" and what is necessary to keep it "efficient". These things can be established only relatively and by comparison. Again, the Commission's suggestion that the salaries of civil servants must have some relation with prospects of remuneration outside Government service is a useful one. But the Commission did not lay down any principle on the basis of which such comparison might be made. From that point of view, it is vague. The question is discussed below. The pay-scale may not be for "men of genius" but it should be such as would attract a fair portion of best available talents in the country. The Commission, however, suggested that this test should be liberally interpreted. Again, they did not seem to pay adequate attention to the

importance of over-hauling internal disparities, both vertical and horizontal, in the interest of providing incentives and creating proper human relations within the administration.

The pay structure of the Civil Servants in Britain had been inquired into recently by a Royal Commission on the Civil Service.¹ The Commission enunciated the end to be served by the criteria of pay in the Civil Service "as the maintenance of a Civil Service recognised as efficient and staffed by members whose remuneration and conditions of service are thought fair both by themselves and by the community they serve".² To achieve this end the Commission recommended that "the primary principle of Civil Service pay is fair comparison with the current remuneration of outside staffs employed on broadly comparable work, taking account of differences in other conditions of Service".³ The Commission gave elaborate defence of this principle on the following broad grounds. First, the formula is fair to the community in two ways. (a) It looks after the ordinary citizens' interest as a tax payer who has to foot the bill. He is called on to pay as much for the Civil Service as is paid to employees in other organised occupations, and the citizen cannot reasonably complain that he is being exploited.⁴ (b) It safeguards the political neutrality of the Civil Servants by

1 Royal Commission On the Civil Service (1953-55), Cmd. 9613, 1955 (Priestley Commission).

2 Ibid, p. 24

3. Ibid, p. 25

4. Ibid.

keeping the terms of employment outside the area of political controversy.¹ Secondly, it is fair to those responsible for administering the Civil Service because it should enable them to secure the staff they need for the efficient discharge of their duties.² Thirdly, it is also fair to the individual Civil Servants because his just deserts are not sacrificed to political expediency or to uninformed press or public opinion.³

The Commission's doctrine of fair comparison is not completely acceptable to the staff associations. The Civil Service Alliance and the Institution of Professional Civil Servants argued that it is "inequitable for some classes and grades because being the largest employer of certain types of workers the Government influences the market to such an extent that outside rates are not an independent guide".⁴ The Civil Service Alliance pointed out that for clerical grades outside comparisons are vitiated by the fact that outside clerical workers are not sufficiently organised for the purpose of collective bargaining.⁵ The Institution of the Professional Civil Servants argued that the specialist Civil Servants should be accorded a status and standing in relation to other Civil Servants which would more accurately reflect their importance in the country. They also claimed that their salary scales should be fixed on the basis of social need rather than outside relativity.⁶ The Commission were of

1 Ibid. 2. Ibid, p. 26 . 3. Ibid. 4. Ibid, p. 28 5. Ibid

6 Cpd. 9613 of 1955, p. 27-28

the view that for the Civil Service to give a lead to the country in matters of pay would endanger the non-political character of the Civil Service. It would also be repugnant to public opinion for the Civil Service to give a lead in altering the economic and social status of the specialists.¹ The Post Office Engineering Union demanded that the government should guarantee a living wage to the lowest-paid employees. The Commission could not accept the living wage doctrine as they thought that it is too imprecise to offer any real guide.² The Commission came to the conclusion that none of the associations was able to suggest alternative principles which would be fair both to the country and the Civil Service.

Internal relativities, both vertical and horizontal, should be used as a secondary principle to fair comparison, in settling rates of pay in detail, and may have to be the first consideration when outside comparisons cannot be made, but they should never be allowed to override the primary principle or to become rigid.³ The Commission attached great importance to vertical relativities, since an adequate step in pay from one grade to the other is the only way to give a financial incentive to seek promotion.⁴ They disapproved of the horizontal relativities as it would be unfair and insufficient to freeze the relative rates of pay of two classes irrespective of the demand for them outside the Service. Even vertical relativities are

1 . Ibid. p. 28 2. Ibid. 3 Ibid, para 769(3) 4. Ibid, p.29-30.

to be used with care; horizontal relativities are to be used only when fair comparison breaks down, as it sometimes must do because the Civil Service employs categories for whom there is virtually no outside employment at all.¹ The Commission recommended that a fact finding unit should be set up quite separate from the sections of the Treasury which deal with pay negotiations. The unit, with which the staff associations should be associated, would have a two-fold task: first, to determine what jobs outside the service are comparable with jobs inside it, and secondly, to report what those outside jobs are paid and other relevant facts.² The unit will use all available techniques of statistical sampling and job analysis. The task of fact finding should be made a continuous process and the resulting material should be made available to both sides in any pay negotiations. This recommendation was accepted by the government. An organisation called the Civil Service Pay Research Unit was set up, with the agreement of both sides, under the supervision of a special committee of the National Whitley Council.³

The Priestley formula of fair comparison is, in essence, a re-statement of the Tomlin formula with considerably more precision and elaboration. It has broadened the concept of fair remuneration which is to be fair both to the community and the Civil Servants. It puts due emphasis on the maintenance of proper internal relativities in the

1 Ibid, p. 30 - 32. . . .

2 Cmd. 9613 of 1955, p. 36-37

3 MacKenzie & Groves: Central Administration in Britain, 1957, p. 55

salary structure of the Civil Servants. The criterion of fair comparison with outside remuneration introduces the element of elasticity in the pay scale. It also keeps the question of Civil Service pay away from direct political pressure by this direct link-up with current outside wages rather than with prices.

The applicability of the Priestley formula in its entirety to the re-organisation of the pay structure and pay-scales of the Civil Servants in Pakistan is out of the question. Pakistan is economically under-developed. She has not the financial resources to enable her to pay remunerations which may be fair to the Civil Servants. The situation in Britain is different. In Britain, the financial limitations are much less severe as the economy is highly developed and dynamic. Means are thus available for revision of the conditions of service to a reasonable extent. Again, the staff associations and Whitley Councils - National and departmental, - are so strong as to exert pressure upon government for a revision of pay and other conditions of service which might appear to be warranted by circumstances. On the other hand, industrial, commercial and business organisations and concerns in Britain are highly organised and stable with many years of traditions behind them. Although the doctrine of "fair comparison" may not be applicable in its entirety in the case of Pakistan, it seems, nevertheless, worthwhile, as the Pakistan Pay Commission suggested, to make a beginning in instituting such a comparison wherever possible. Some critics, however, would argue that

when organised collective bargaining is not a marked feature of outside employments, it may not be possible to make a comparison between them and the Civil Service salaries. As a matter of fact, they would further point out, the outside occupational groups follow in a varying degree, in many cases, the lead given by Civil Service pay structure. They are not as yet in a position to give a lead as do the industrial and commercial concerns in Britain.

In Pakistan also, with the developments in industry, commerce and business, these concerns are gradually coming to a position from where it is possible for them to compete with the government, as the Federal Public Service Commission¹ have pointed out, in attracting bright young men to their services. With the passage of time, these concerns might be organised on a better footing than in the past. Hence, such a comparison, if made, might enable the government to examine the whole position in detail and to make suitable adjustments in the emoluments of their employees, if found necessary. This might, in turn, enable the government to attract, in more adequate numbers, to their services recruits of the right stamp and high calibre. The problem, in our opinion, demands full and thorough investigation by a competent commission.

In the light of the test adopted by them the Commission built up the pay structure of the various classes and categories of Civil

¹ See Chapter III

servants. There are four grades and scales among the Class IV employees. The minimum basic pay of a peon is fixed at Rs. 25 per month.¹ There are thirteen scales and grades for the members of Class III. Apart from the general formula, the difference in the pay-scales of the officers of this class depends on the method of recruitment, degree of education, skill, length of training and proficiency test in departmental work.² The least paid employee in this class is a routine clerk whose basic pay per month is fixed at Rs. 50.³ In Class II there is only one scale.⁴ There are two scales - junior and senior - for the members of the Class I services, and these are arranged on the principle that while recruitment to this class will be to the junior scale, the ultimate position of the members of this class would be in the Senior Scale.⁵ The Commissioners were of the opinion that the standard scale for Class I services should be the same for each service but that the salary in the initial stages for technical and scientific departments, where a longer course of training is necessary, should be higher.⁶ "We are also of the view that where for appointment to technical posts some real research work or foreign education or training is necessary, facilities for which do not exist in Pakistan, the candidate may, keeping in view the time and money spent on such research, education or training, be recruited at a higher stage

1 Report of the Pakistan Pay Commission, Vol. I. 1949, p. 34

2 Ibid, p.35

3 Ibid, p. 56

4 Ibid, p. 37

5 Ibid

6 Ibid

in the junior scale."¹ There are two junior scales - one for the members of the C.P.S., the Foreign Service of Pakistan and the scientific and technical departments, and another for the members of the P.S.P. and other Class I services.² Again, where a department does not admit of a regular junior and senior scale but qualifications needed for recruitment are comparable with those required for Class I, the scale should be in between the junior and senior scale of Class I.³ One senior scale for the members of the Class I services ends at Rs. 1,150 a month, but in the case of the C.S.P. and P.F.S. the senior scale runs to Rs. 1,300 a month.⁴ The Commission proposed special pay should be added to the posts of district magistrates and district and sessions judges, which are reserved for the members of the C.S.P.⁵ There are certain selected posts outside the usual time scales of the all-Pakistan Service and Class I Services, as, for instance, posts of heads or deputy heads of departments, and secretaries and joint-secretaries to the Government. The Commission recommended three grades for administrative posts in this category.⁶ For the Secretariat posts the Commission proposed five grades and scales - the pay of the lowest grade being Rs. 700 a month and that of the highest grade, the Secretary, Rs. 2,250 a month.⁷ The Chairman of the Commission thought that the pay of the Secretary should be Rs. 2,500 a month and that of

1, 2, 3, 4, and 5. - Ibid.

6 Ibid, p. 38

7. Ibid.

the head of the biggest department Rs. 2,000.¹

The Commission did not, as already noted, accept the principle that the remuneration of the employees should be changed from time to time with variations in the purchasing power of money. But where the cost of living rises to a height out of all proportion to the cost of living which prevailed when an officer entered the service or when the pay-scales were fixed, some system of cost of living bonds, the Commission suggested, becomes necessary to preserve the integrity and efficiency of the Civil Service.² To meet a situation like this the Commission recommended a system of dearness allowance which must be based on the following principles.³ The allowance should be determined on the prevailing level of prices and should not be disturbed except in a violent upheaval of or a steady and continuous rise in prices. It should be so determined as to provide a "living wage" for those employees whose real salaries owing to the rise in prices have fallen below that level. In the case of those whose salaries despite a rise in prices still remain above the living wage, the allowances should be limited to relieve the hardship caused by the increase in the cost of the necessities of life. The rate should be liberal at bottom and should decrease as salary goes up. Those who have a sufficient margin to adjust their budget by reducing their expenditure should not be entitled to any allowance. The allowance is

1 Ibid, p.45

2 Ibid, p.52

3 Ibid, p.53

to be given according to a schedule drawn up by the Commission.¹

In addition, officers are entitled to special pay which varies from province to province. For example, many sub-divisional officers receive special pay and so do most Under-Secretaries and Secretaries under the provincial governments. A large number of officers at the centre also receive special pay. This is given owing to the differences in the cost of living from area to area. Again, expatriation allowance at the rate of 20 per cent. of the pay, subject to a maximum of Rs. 200, is also admissible to officers when posted to the wing of Pakistan, other than that of their birth or domicile. In other words, if an officer who belongs to West Pakistan is posted in East Pakistan, he is entitled to it. Similarly, if an officer who belongs to East Pakistan is posted in West Pakistan, he is also entitled to it. The peculiar geography of the country dividing the two wings - east and west - by long distance of foreign country and the differences in the cost of living are responsible for this.

We may now turn our attention to some important features of the pay structure of Pakistan. First, there is a great disparity between the minimum and maximum. The minimum pay of a person is fixed at Rs. 25 a month. It is an improvement on the prevailing pay of Rs. 14 a month. It is not based on any extensive family budget inquiry. It does not appear to us to record any substantial improvement on the past. The maximum pay - that of a secretary to ^{the} government - is fixed at Rs. 2,250

¹ Ibid, p. 54

per month which is lower than the previous salary of Rs. 4,000 a month. But Rs. 4,000 a month is drawn by a secretary who is a member of the old I.C.S. The disparity between the minimum and maximum salary is: 25:2,250, that is = 1:90. If we take into account the pay of an I.C.S. secretary, the disparity is: 25:4,000, that is = 1:160. The Commission stated that they made no effort to discover some principle by which the maximum and its proportion to the minimum might be determined.¹ According to the Commission "the proportion between the minimum and maximum salary is the effect and not the cause of a rational pay structure".² Nevertheless, the present disparity between the lowest and highest levels of pay seems to be out of tune with current trends in democratic countries like Britain and the United States. The gaps should be narrowed to give a more balanced pay structure.

In the second place, the time-scale system with efficiency bars is another general ~~feature~~ of the pay structure in Pakistan. The length of time-scale must necessarily depend, to a large extent, on the age of retirement. The Commission recommended the age of retirement at 55.³ On that basis a person entering the service at the age of 25 would have thirty years' length of service. The time should be so divided as to provide for an increment in the salary of

1 Report of the Pakistan Pay Commission, Vol. I. 1949, p. 44

2 Ibid.

3 Report of the Pakistan Pay Commission, Vol. I. 1949, p. 45

an officer as his efficiency increases and his family responsibilities grow as he grows in age.¹ But the increment need not be uniform or continuous as increments being in the nature of appreciation of good work, the right to earn them must at certain stages be subjected to scrutiny, and the employee must have some years to draw the maximum if before that he is unable to rise to a selection post or to a higher scale. It is on this principle that the Commission based the increments and efficiency bars.² In regard to efficiency bar, the Commission also acted on the principle that an officer should be given a fair trial and permitted to earn some increments before he is pronounced to be unfit to earn further increments. During his service he may be required to do work of a variegated character, there should be more than one opportunity for *judging* his capacity. Hence more than one efficiency bar is provided where the length of service permits.³ In certain cases where recruitment to the service can only be expected at an advanced age, the starting pay must be higher, the length of the scale shorter, the increments more rapid, and there need be no efficiency bar or only one.⁴

The general complaint against efficiency bar is that it gives the head of the department extensive powers to make or mar the career of a subordinate officer. Consequently, it has the effect of demoralis-

1 Report of the Pakistan Pay Commission, Vol. I: 1949, p. 45

2 Ibid.

3 Ibid

4. Ibid

~~5. Ibid~~

ing those who with a view to avoiding the penalty, even when it is not in fact deserved, are forced to cajole the penalising officer and to pander to his individual idiosyncracies.¹ Expressing the hope that this power should be used with justice and discretion the Commission said, "In the Pakistan of tomorrow we expect positions with these wide powers to be occupied by men of undoubted honesty and to whom favouritism and injustice should be an anathema, and the aggrieved officer will also have a right of appeal against the action taken".² We fully endorse this view.

In the third place, the pay-scales of the officers of the Central Superior Services do not follow any uniform pattern. First, there are two scales in the categories of ^{the} posts of secretaries to ^{the} government. The members of the old I.C.S. who hold these posts draw Rs. 4,000 a month and the members of the new C.S.P., their successors in Pakistan, will draw Rs. 2,250 a month. Of course, the pay-scale of the old I.C.S. officers were guaranteed by the ^{constitution} constitution of 1956. Thus, for the same category of officers there are two scales of pay. Secondly, the two-scales for the other Central Superior Services - the pre-1931 scale and the post-1931 scales - as already noted, introduced in British India owing to economic depression, are also valid in Pakistan. The pay-scales recommended by the Pay Commission in this category are better than those in the reduced scale of 1931.³ The Commission's recommendation that the

1 Ibid

2 Ibid

3 Pakistan Pay Commission, op. cit. Vol. I. 1949, p. 47

existing rights of officers must be protected and recognised permits the pre-1931 scale to continue in Pakistan. Hence, there are two-scales for the same class of officers. Thirdly, the standard pay-scales prescribed by the Commission for the members of the Central Class I services are fairly uniform. The junior scale for the P.S.P. and other Class I officers is slightly lower than that for the C.S.P., P.F.S. and the technical officers.¹ The senior scale for the members of the C.S.P. and P.F.S. is higher than that for the members of the other Central Class I services including the P.S.P.² We think that the integration of all the non-technical Central Superior Services, as suggested earlier³, will go a long way in removing the existing anomalies and ^{and} introduce uniformity in the pay structure. Fourthly, at the lower level - ministerial services - there is a difference between the pay-scales of the secretariat and non-secretariat officers. The Commission justified it on the ground that work in the secretariat differs from work in other offices both in its nature and degree of responsibility. The work in other offices is restricted in scope, being confined to the administration of a single or a few enactments while that in the secretariat is more general and requires a different mode of approach and a higher faculty of analysis and discernment.⁴ There appears to be a substantial element of truth in this position.

1 Ibid, p. 37

2 Ibid, p. 38

3 Chapter II

4 Pakistan Pay Commission, p. 93

The adequacy of the pay-scales prescribed by the Commission for the members of the Central Superior Services including the two all-Pakistan Services is criticised as being low. The Federal Public Service Commission have pointed out that the present salary is inadequate, and with this salary it is not possible to attract recruits of the right stamp to the various services.¹ Nevertheless, the public criticism still persists that the pay-scales are too high. But these critics do not seem to take into account certain relevant facts. No dearness allowance is given to those whose monthly salary is above Rs. 1,500. The rise in prices hits them hard. The purchasing power of the rupee has gradually depreciated and the incidence of taxation has increased, and these reduce the real income. The effect of this uninformed criticism adversely affects the morale of the Service. We think that an inquiry Commission with comprehensive terms of reference should be set up to inquire into the pay structure of the Civil Service as a whole.

Retirement Benefits

In Pakistan the retirement benefits to which the employees under the Central Government are entitled are of two kinds - pension and provident fund. The superannuation system is non-contributory in that the benefits are over and above the emoluments during service. The provident system is contributory. The non-pensionable employees in the railways and other employees serving under the government on a contract

¹ P.F.S. Commission: Report on the Central Superior Services Examination, 1953, p. 14

Basis are eligible for the provident funds. The Civil Service superannuation system in Britain is governed by Superannuation Acts, 1934 to 1950.¹ In Pakistan it is regulated by non-Statutory rules and regulations. But it is similar to the British system in that there is no legal right to the superannuation allowance, and the allowance, though subject to conditions set out in the rules and regulations, is sanctioned at the discretion of a specified competent authority. It is earned on the basis of satisfactory and approved service, and future good conduct is an implied condition of every grant.

Pension is of two kinds, ordinary and extraordinary. Extraordinary pension is granted to an employee who is injured and to the family of an officer who is killed or dies of injuries received in the execution of his duty unless the injury or fatal accident is caused by his own negligence. The benefit is granted to all civilian employees of government, whether permanent or temporary or casual and whether remunerated by fixed pay or by piece work rates.² The scale of benefit varies according to the pay, status and rank of the employee. The rules in this respect are adequate and there are no complaints about it.³

The ordinary pensions are of five kinds.⁴ (1) The superannuation pension is granted to an officer who is required by rules to retire, at

1. Introductory Factual Memorandum on the Civil Service submitted by the Treasury to the Royal Comm. on Civil Service (1953-55), 1954, p. 26

2. Report of the Pakistan Pay Commission, Vol. I. 1949, p.76.

3. Ibid

4. Government of Pakistan, Ministry of Finance. The Civil Service Regulations relating to salary, leave, pension & travelling allowances, First Edition, 1951. p.100-109

a particular age: This age is generally 55 years in the case of the members of the superior services and 60 years in the case of employees of lower categories. (ii) The retiring pension is granted to an officer who is permitted under rules to retire after completing thirty years of qualifying service. (iii) The compensatory pension is granted to an officer who is selected for discharge owing to the abolition of his permanent post provided that it is not possible for government to offer him other suitable alternative employment. (iv) Invalid pension is granted to an officer who is permanently incapacitated for public service and for the particular branch to which he belongs. (v) Compassionate allowance is granted to an officer who is removed from government service for mis-conduct, insolvency or inefficiency.

The ministerial Civil Servants, that is, employees of lower categories, are governed by a separate set of rules which differ from the rules applicable to superior services in the following main particulars: (a) the age of compulsory retirement is 60 years; (b) retiring pension is admissible only on completion of 30 years service; and (c) compassionate, invalid or superannuation pension is admissible only on completion of a minimum qualifying service of 20 years.¹

The provident fund system has certain features of its own. Government employees recruited on contract for a period normally of five years or more are allowed to subscribe to the contributory provident fund. Non-pensionable employees in the railways¹ are eligible for

¹ Ibid, p. 133-135

L.C./L.C.

Provident Fund as well as gratuity now called Special Provident Fund. Subscription to the Fund is compulsory for persons in permanent service. The lower staff and the temporary employees under certain conditions have the option to subscribe to the fund. The Special Provident Fund is open to employees who subscribe to it and is payable to those retiring after completion of 30 years' service or at the age of 55 years or retiring prematurely on account of permanent physical or mental incapacity or abolition of post. If an employee dies in service, the heirs receive the benefit.¹

An examination of the pension system shows that it is quite inadequate in that there is the total absence of any provision for the family of a person dying prematurely in service or on the verge of retirement or shortly thereafter.² That is one of the main grievances of the pensionable government employees. The inadequacy of the pension system is shown up as against the comparative security of the competence that is left by non-pensionable employees who are eligible for contributory provident fund and special provident fund, as in the Railway Service.³

1 Report of the Pakistan Pay Commission, Vol. I. 1949, p. 77

2 Ibid.

3 The Provident Fund system is applicable to the majority of the employees in the Railways, both in Pakistan and India. The Central Pay Commission in British India (1946-47) stated the position in the following words: "When the Railway Provident Fund system was first introduced about half a century ago, it appears to have been the intention to give Railway officers a benefit in the shape of a bonus (employer's contribution) and gratuity which together would be roughly equivalent to corresponding pensionary benefits in the Civil departments of Government. But as a result of the substantial increase in the rates of pay during the years 1919/24 and the higher rates of interest then prevailing, the relative advantages of the Railway Provident Fund benefit increased considerably."
(continued..)

The pension is also open to the objection that many employees do not live long enough to enjoy their pension and thus the hard-earned accumulation is lost and the family of the deceased are left without any provision.

The family pension system existed for the old I.C.S. and a few other services of the former Secretary of State for British India. The need for the proper provision for the family of an officer does not require any emphasizing. The Pay Commission recommended a scheme of retirement benefit which provides for the family. According to their scheme any employee should be given the option to retain his pension rights or elect in its place the retirement benefits mentioned below by surrendering one-fourth of his pension.

- (a) Gratuity equal to half a month's pay per year of his service subject to a maximum of 12 months' pay but limited to an absolute maximum of Rs. 20,000 payable to him on retirement or to his family in case of his death before retirement, plus (b) in the event of his death before retirement payment to his family for five years of 50 per cent. of the pension calculated on the basis of one-sixtieth for each year of service

3 Continued from p. 309

particularly in the case of the higher paid officers. With a fall in the rate of interest (involving a corresponding increase in the commuted value of pensions) and with the introduction of the new scales of pay since 1951, there has been a swing round in favour of pension as being financially more advantageous. Report of the Central Pay Commission (1946 - 47), p. 90

but limited to an absolute maximum of Rs. 150 per month, and in the case of death after but within five years of retirement payment to the family of the pension as in (a) above for the unexpired portion of five years¹. It has not been possible for the Pay Commission to consult any expert on the proposal mentioned above, and hence, their recommendation, they said, would be subject to investigation by an actuary.² The benefit may be extended to the railway employees if they forego their existing rights. This provision is essential. It has been accepted by the government with necessary actuarial investigation.³

In Britain there is now^a a contributory scheme of pension for widows, children and other dependents of a Civil Servant sanctioned under an Act of 1949. The widows' and children's pension scheme is contributory. The Civil Servant is to contribute nearly one-eightieth of his salary and it guarantees a pension of one-third of his pension to his widow for life. If he leaves any children under the age of 16 (or still receiving whole-time education) the widow may also be paid a children's pension varying, according to the number of children, from one-twelfth to the one-third of the Civil Servant's pension. If there are eligible children, but no widow, the children's pension is at a

1 Report of the Pakistan Pay Commission, Vol. I, 1949, p.80-81

2 Ibid.

3 Office Memorandum, No. (4) F.12(2) - R1/53, Government of Pakistan. Ministry of Finance, March 24, 1954.

higher rate.¹ All men who entered the Civil Service after July 14, 1949 must participate in these scheme on marriage.² Those who entered before are given the option to do so.³ The dependant's pension scheme is contributory, but the rate of contribution varies according to the circumstances of each case. Unlike the widow's and children's scheme it is voluntary. Dependents' pensions are payable according to the nature of the dependency, either for life or up to age of 16 or to the end of dependant's whole-time education if later. Generally, this scheme is open to all men and women Civil Servants with persons wholly or mainly dependent on them, who are not eligible to participate in the widow's and children's scheme.⁴ Again, subject to proof of good health, a Civil Servant may on retirement surrender up to one-third of his pension to provide an actuarially equivalent pension for his wife or some other dependant. This provision may take the form either of a pension for his widow or other dependant after his death or of a pension to his wife during his life-time which is doubled on his death. This scheme is voluntary and may operate in addition to the Widows' and children's or dependants' scheme.⁵

All these schemes of pension guarantee increasing economic security to the family and dependants of a Civil Servant.

1. Introductory Factual Memorandum submitted on the Civil Service by the Treasury to the Royal Commission on Civil Service (1952-55), 1954, p. 27

2. Ibid

3. Ibid

4. Ibid

5. Ibid.

The question of the age of compulsory retirement is very important in any discussion of the scheme of retirement benefits. Under the existing rules the members of the old I.C.S. retire after completing 35 years' service, while others retire at the age of 55 except ministerial servants, who, unless required to retire at 55 go up to 60, if found fit.¹ Class IV employees are allowed to remain in service up to 60 and in some cases even beyond that.² The Commission did not recommend any change in the existing practice. Very few government employees, stated the Commission, maintain their efficiency after 55 years - not un seldom the decay sets in much earlier. According to them the raising of the age-limit will be contrary to public interest.~~the~~ Once the age-limit is raised even inefficient employees will be allowed to stay on, as the very old age of these employees will appeal to the officers who, on compassionate grounds, would hesitate to throw them out.³ The raising of the age-limit will cause disappointment to the educated but unemployed persons seeking jobs. It may also block, to some extent, the promotional prospects of the officers already in the service. Pakistan, on the other hand, needs men of experience in this era of planned development, and there is a shortage of senior, trained and experienced officers. For these two reasons, the critics point out,

1 . Report of the Pakistan Pay Commission, Vol. I. 1949, p. 79

2 Ibid, p. 80

3 Ibid.

the age of retirement may be raised. The Economy Committee strongly recommended that the age of compulsory retirement should be raised to 60 in the case of technical personnel and to 58 in the case of non-technical employees. The government should retire, the Committee thought, any officer who is considered physically or mentally unfit even before he attains the age of fifty-five. Again, an officer who does not want to continue in service beyond the age of 55 should not be compelled to do so.¹ In Britain the age of retirement is 60 normally, but extension is possible up to 65 or even beyond. This enables the British Government to utilise the experience of Civil Servants more adequately than in Pakistan.

Another important question which needs discussion is the position of an employee in regard to retirement benefits while serving as an apprentice. Under the existing rules service as a probationer on a substantive post qualifies for pension but not service as an apprentice, except in a few cases.² There is not much difference between the two so far as their usefulness to the Government is concerned. Both are required to undergo a period of training after which they have to pass departmental examinations. Only then are they assigned regular duties and become equally useful to Government. The fact that an apprentice is taken against a probable vacancy and a probationer against an exist-

1 Report of the Economy Committee, 1957, p. 9 - 10

2 The Civil Service Regulations relating to salary, leave, pension, and travelling allowance, 1951, p. 91

the Commission rightly thought, without qualifying for pension is 'definitely unsatisfactory'. It creates a sense of insecurity in the minds of employees. They feel that they have no stake in their service, and are constantly looking for other avenues or using their official position as an occasion for corrupt practices. If they are accorded pensionary rights, they would be more inclined to stick to their official position and less liable to corruption.¹ We, therefore, recommend that all Government servants borne on temporary establishments who have rendered more than five years' temporary service may be allowed to count their entire temporary service for the purpose of pension or gratuity, if they have been on probation. Wherever, however, they have not been on probation, a period of two years should be excluded in computing the period of their entire service², said the Commission.² This has been accepted by the Government of Pakistan. It is also laid down that temporary and officiating service followed by confirmation which does not qualify for pension under the existing rules should also be allowed to count for pension or gratuity subject to the exclusion of broken periods of temporary or officiating service, if any.³

Another important question which requires examination is whether the system of pension is or is not an obstruction to the weeding out of the unfit from the Service. In Pakistan an officer belonging to one of the Central Superior Services - C.S.P., P.S.P., Audit & Accounts,

1 Ibid

2 Ibid

~~3 Ibid~~

3. Office Memorandum. No. F. 11(4)-R-1/52:

4. Government of Pakistan, Ministry of Finance, 1952.

Customs, Post & Telegraph departments, the Geological Survey of Pakistan, the engineering establishment of public works and state railway departments - who is proved to be unfit, may be removed from the Service. He may be granted a pension not usually exceeded¹, and not necessarily so great as, that which would have been admissible to the officer if he had been invalid on medical certificate.¹ In awarding pensions in such cases the government will be guided by the circumstances of each case and the amount will be higher or lower according to the circumstances. In the interest of efficiency and to remove the unfit, this rule, we think, should be made an all-Service rule. This will enable the government to retire unfit persons at all levels without loss of pension rights. This rule, however, needs to be applied discreetly but firmly. The Civil Service today is looked upon as a life career. Any flagrant violation of this idea may give rise to jobbery, destroy the non-political status of the Civil Service and may weaken a Civil Servant's devotion to work. On the other hand, a proper, just and judicious use of this power is likely to promote efficiency and effectiveness in administration.

In Britain this problem has attracted a great deal of attention. In 1937 Professor Robson said, "If pension rights accrued with each year of service and had a definite surrender value, those who wished to

1 Government of Pakistan; Ministry of Finance. The Civil Service Regulations relating to salary, leave, pension and travelling allowance, 1951, p. 84

leave the service and the inefficient members who ought not to be allowed to remain in it, would be able to pass out freely with advantage to themselves and the nation".¹ The Treasury in Britain has recently taken power to terminate the employment of an officer of fifty or more if this is regarded as "desirable in the interests of efficiency" and pay him the same pension as he would have received on grounds of ill-health.² But it is not always easy to make use of it for removing the unfit. Mr. G.A. Strauss said, "Theoretically, it is now possible to retire an officer, with a pension, at any time after the age of 50. On one occasion I tried to do this. I rounded against myself all the camaraderie of the Civil Service and every obstacle was put in my way. Eventually a compromise solution was evolved. I can honestly say that this was the only time I was thwarted by my officials".³ A greater facility for shedding the inefficient or unsuitable officials is of great value to the service and needs to be used with great care and justice.

Promotion.

The objective of an efficient Civil Service cannot be attained unless it is followed by a proper and adequate system of promotion. Promotion aims at selecting the right type of persons for positions of

1. Robson, W.A. "The Public Service" in The British Public Servant, edited by Robson, 1937, p. 25
2. Campbell, G.A. : The Civil Service in Britain, 1955, p. 287
3. New Statesman, November 13, 1954.

higher and greater responsibilities. Even as it is necessary in the interest of the Service and the Community that men of first-rate ability and talent should be admitted to the service, so is it necessary that higher posts at every level in the service should be held by able and efficient men. The authors of the Trevelyan-Northcote Report realised that the problem of the Civil Service was not merely "what was the best method of providing it with a supply of good men, but of making the most of them after they had been admitted".¹ Not only should efficient and able men be retained, but persons of outstanding capacity should be discovered early and given opportunities of finding their way to positions of higher and greater responsibility while still young, fresh, energetic and vigorous. Efficiency varies with the breadth of opportunity and adequate opportunities should be provided for the able and efficient in the Service to put their mettle to the test, to give free play to their gifts, and to utilise them freely for the service of the country. This is all the more important because the state is committed to comprehensive programmes for the socio-economic development of the country. The needs of the state, therefore, are becoming increasingly complex. The state needs not merely a static administration of each man performing his share of duties satisfactorily and without complaints, but a dynamic administration calling for inventiveness, resourcefulness, ability, imagination, initiative and vigour to

¹ Papers on the Re-Organisation of the Permanent Civil Service, pp. 1854 - 55, Vol. XX.

evolve and execute those programmes. In this a proper and well-directed system of promotion is a vital factor. With the stimulus of personnel improvement based on the hope of just recognition and reasonable reward, it is a great spur for the individuals to put forth their best. Such recognition or reward is important not merely for the increased emoluments that promotion may bring but for the enlarged opportunities it may provide.¹ Harold Nicholson said that promotion is a question "not so much for increased promotion or salary, as of increased opportunities".² Again, promotion is a factor that is important not only for efficiency but also for morale in the service. The system should be of a kind that will command the respect and confidence of the service as a whole. To that end, the system of promotion must be thoroughly impartial and as free from prejudice, nepotism, favouritism and caprice as human ingenuity can make it. It must be such that the service as a whole will accept it as fair. Again, it must be dynamic to discover the more enterprising and able. At the same time, it has to be equitable. An effective system of promotion thus has to achieve "three important goals, namely, (i) to select the best man for the higher position, (ii) to satisfy those to whom it is applied that it is fair and just, and (iii) to have a creative influence on the whole staff structure".³ The success with which this intricate problem is handled is a

1 Report of the Central Pay Commission (British India) (1946-47), p. 64

2 "The British Civil Servant" edited by Professor W.A. Robson, 1937, p. 61-62.

3: Gladden, E.N: Civil Service or Bureaucracy, 1956, p. 99

very important factor which vitally affects the efficiency and morale of the service as a whole.

Criteria for Promotion.

What should be the criterion of promotion? Should it depend on seniority alone? Or should it depend on merit alone? Should both these factors be combined in some given proportion to determine the promotion from one grade to another and from one class to another? In Pakistan promotion cannot be claimed on grounds of seniority alone but other things being equal it becomes the determining principle. "Where appointment by promotion is the rule or is permissible, the present position is that promotion cannot be claimed on the ground of seniority alone but where other things are equal seniority becomes the determining factor".¹ Promotion on seniority is claimed on the following grounds. First, seniority indicates the length of Service, and the length of service as reflecting the accumulation of valuable experience, determines, to some extent, the usefulness of an officer to the state. It is, thus, one of the factors that determines merit itself. Secondly, the operation of promotion on this basis is objective and intelligible. It is a safe method likely to cause least resentment. Thirdly, it avoids the need of making any invidious distinction between one person and another and the embarrassment of placing a junior officer over the head of an older one. Fourth, the promotion of senior competent officers rather than

¹ Report of the Pakistan Pay Commission, Vol. I. 1949, p. 57

the officer possessing superior ability and efficiency is generally favoured by the bulk of the employees. It is accepted as a bulwark against nepotism, favouritism and patronage. But seniority as the basis for promotion has rightly come in for very severe criticism. First, it is based on rather wide assumptions.¹ It assumes that all members of a particular grade are equally fit for promotion. It also assumes that the percentage of higher posts in relation to lower is high. It further assumes that vacancies are arising in a reasonable flow. In practice, the occurrence of such ideal conditions is extremely improbable. All members of the grade are not equally fit for promotion. Promotions are rather slow and few and far between.² Secondly, it provides no incentive for work of merit nor does it ensure that positions requiring initiative and imagination of a higher order are, in fact, held by persons hav^{ing} these qualities. Ambition is stifled. It may create a sense of frustration which is likely to compel the best officer to turn elsewhere for opportunities. Criticizing promotion by seniority Trevelyan said, "This is necessarily discouraging to civil servants and tends to strengthen in them the injurious ^{conviction} ~~conviction~~ that their success does not depend upon their exertion and that if they work it will not advance them, if they waste their time in idleness it will not push them back".³ Third,

1. Gladden, E.H.: The Civil Service: its problems and future, 1945, p.70

2. Ibid.

3. Papers On the Re-Organisation of the Permanent Civil Service, pp 1854 - 55, Vol. XI.

a rigid adherence to the seniority formula deprives the taxpayer of the best quality of service to which he is entitled, and in the final analysis proves to be expensive. It may put a great strain on the efficient handling of public business. The Trevelyan-Northcote Report condemned seniority as the basis of promotion and in its place advocated promotion by merit. Each subsequent inquiry supported this view and a dictum of the Playfair Commission, 1875, is well worth quoting. The Commission said, "A man should be promoted, not because those above him are unfit, but because he is the best man for the place. If this course be pursued, no man is branded as unfit, and it would not at all follow that the senior man, passed over for one promotion, might not be the fittest man for the next".¹

The Pakistan Pay Commission suggested that merit or ability must be the primary consideration in governing promotions to higher posts in the administration. In all such cases the relative merits of the candidates will require careful consideration. While experience and seniority will be an important factor, it cannot be the sole or the most important criterion.² The Planning Board also recommended that promotions to posts carrying higher responsibilities must be based on merit.

Seniority should only be a secondary factor. "Promotions to higher

1 Quoted in the Report of the Royal Commission on the Civil Service, 1929 - 1931, Cmd. 3909, p. 79. ~~(Mentioned in the Report of the Royal Commission on the Civil Service, 1929 - 1931, Cmd. 3909, p. 79.)~~

2 Report of the Pakistan Pay Commission, Vol. I, 1949, p. 57. ~~and also in the Report of the Planning Board, 1949, p. 57. and also in the Report of the Pakistan Pay Commission, Vol. I, 1949, p. 57.~~

3 Report of the Pakistan Pay Commission, Vol. I, 1949, p. 57

grades in the ordinary course in accordance with seniority and normal performances are undoubtedly indispensable as a general incentive, and in order to meet gradually increasing financial needs of the officers as they advance in years. But promotions after a certain stage, and to posts carrying special responsibilities, emoluments and further openings should invariably be on the basis of merit, judged by a performance rating system, and not merely by the superficial impressions recorded in confidential records. Seniority should also receive consideration, but only as a secondary factor¹.

Seniority, despite the vigorous advocacy to adopt merit as the criterion for promotion, is still the determining factor in selecting officers for promotion to higher posts, but where other things are equal, a thorough re-orientation of promotion policy is essential. The rule of seniority may be followed for many situations, especially those of a routine character in respect of which long familiarity with office work itself is adequate training. But even in this category of posts, occasional examples of exceptional and accelerated promotions of exceptionally deserving persons would be an inducement to greater endeavour, provided of course, care is taken to guard against all suspicion of nepotism and favouritism. We agree with the Pay Commission and the Planning Board that in regard to promotions to positions

¹ Planning Board. The First Five Year Plan, 1956, Vol. I. p. 125

of higher responsibilities, merit should be the main criterion. Fitness for the post should be the sole criterion for promotion. To make promotion by any other consideration would be destructive of the efficiency and vitality of the Civil Service. The formula laid down by the Tomlin Commission, though written in a different context, seems to be valuable to Pakistan. The Tomlin formula is as follows.¹

First, in filling higher posts in the service, merit should be the only consideration. Second, in filling posts in the middle levels of the Service, merit should be the determining factor. Third, in the lower ranges seniority and length of service will necessarily carry weight.

In Britain the Royal Commissions and various committees have emphasised the importance of merit as the basis of promotion in the Civil Service. Since the Tomlin Commission the criteria laid down by them has been substantially followed. The present policy with respect to promotion is officially stated by ^{the} Government: "Promotions in the Civil Service, generally speaking, are made according to merit and not purely by seniority. The aim is to secure the greatest possible efficiency rather than to reward individuals for long and faithful service; to pick the very best man or woman for the job, even though he or she may not be the most senior candidate. But, of course, when other things are equal, seniority is naturally taken into account and

¹ Report of the Royal Commission on the Civil Service (1929-34)
Cmd. 3909, 1931, p. 80

particularly so in promotions to posts where the work is of a routine character".

Procedure.

In Pakistan, promotions to the highest administrative posts - Secretary, Joint-Secretary, Deputy Secretary, or equivalent rank - had been made by the Prime Minister on the recommendations of the Ministers concerned from 1947 to 1958. Since October, 1958, when the present regime came into existence, these promotions have been made by the President on the recommendations of the Ministers concerned. The procedure followed is that the Establishment Officer (Joint-Secretary, Establishment Division) is required to submit a factual note about possible candidates for these posts covering such matters as service, eligibility, tenure, etc., together with their character rolls. The Minister concerned then formulates his recommendations on the basis of this factual note and appointments to these posts are then made by the President on the recommendations of the Minister.² Other things being equal, weight is given to seniority.

In Britain promotions to the highest administrative posts are filled by the Minister concerned with the consent of the Prime Minister, who acts on the advice of the head of the home Civil Service. Much responsibility rests on the last-named officer who is one of the Joint-

1 A Handbook for the New Civil Servant, 1946, p. 23

2 Office Memorandum, No. 33/5/54-SE1. Government of Pakistan, 1954 and 1959

Secretaries to the Treasury. He consults the political head of the department, through the existing Permanent Secretary in making appointment to the post of a new Permanent Secretary. If other things are equal, weight is given to seniority.¹ Promotions to the posts at the level of assistant secretary and above in all classes, including the specialist classes, are filled by the Minister of the department concerned on the advice of his Permanent Secretary. Some weight is always given to relative seniority but the decisions about this lie in each case within the discretion of the promoting officers.² In Pakistan promotions from Class II to Class I services are made normally by the heads of departments on the recommendations of the departmental promotion committees or of ad hoc selection boards. The departmental promotion committees and selection boards are presided over by a member of the Federal Public Service Commission. The departmental promotion committee consists of the Secretary of the department or an officer nominated by him and two other officers familiar with the work of candidates for promotion.³ These Committees or boards rely mainly on the personal records of the candidates as recorded in the confidential reports. Interviews are not in much use. A similar procedure with some differences is followed in regard to promotions from the provincial services to the

1 MacKenzie, W.J.W. & Grove, J.W.: Central Administration in Britain, 1957, p. 122.

2 Ibid. p. 122-23

3 No. F.35/1/47- Lata. ESR1, Government of Pakistan, Cabinet Secretariat (Establishment Division), 1948.

two all-Pakistan Services - C.S.P. and F.S.P. The Promotion Committee consists of the members of the Federal Public Service Commission and the senior officers of the provincial government, usually the Chief secretary, and is presided over by the chairman or a member of the Federal Public Service Commission. The procedure followed in making promotions from Class III to Class II services differs from department to department. Some departments use promotion Committees and in others promotions are made on the recommendation of a higher officer who goes through the personal records of the candidates. The candidates who are superseded have a right of appeal. A similar procedure is followed so far as promotions from Class IV to Class III Services are concerned.

In Britain, the great mass of promotion cases below the level of the assistant secretary are dealt with by departmental promotion boards. The composition of the board depends on the seniority of the appointment being dealt with. Generally, the principal establishment officer or his representative is in the chair, and is assisted by two other senior members of the staff, one of whom is concerned with the grade of the staff in question and the other is independent. The staff side is not represented on the board. The policy of the staff associations is to refuse to discuss the merits of individual claims to promotion; but the staff representatives have the right to appear before the board to ensure that agreed general rules have been strictly followed. Exact procedure varies from department to department.

Since 1951 there has been a tendency among the departments to associate a Civil Service Commissioner with the board which recommends promotions to the administrative class or certain equivalent professional classes.¹ The underlying idea is that the Civil Service Commissioner is to satisfy himself that the officer selected for promotion is suitably qualified. The choice is made on the basis of reports and records. There is also a procedure for appeal by which a candidate who feels himself aggrieved may put his case either before a special board or before the next meeting of the ordinary promotion board.²

Reporting System

The materials with reference to which the relative merits of candidates for promotion are assessed are derived mainly from the records of work as contained in the confidential reports. These reports contain annual or periodic assessments of character and performance of the work done by the candidates. These reports are likely to give the selecting authority enough information about the character, ability, efficiency, outlook and temperament of the individual employees to enable their present or potential value to be as fairly assessed as possible. Taken over a long period of service such reports are likely to present as good a picture of the capacity and even of the personality

1 87th Report of H.M.'s Civil Service Commissioners.

2 MacKenzie, J.N.M. and Grove, J.W., Central Administration in Britain, 1957, p. 123

of a person as can be obtained. The great problem of a reporting system is, however, the establishment of a common set of values. Such reports do, as indeed they must, reflect the varying personalities of the reporting officers. A number of them taken together, however, tend to cancel out these variations, and give a picture which may not be far from correct. But it is complained that confidential reports are not always written accurately or comprehensively. These reports are less specific and less objective. The confidential reports merely record the superficial impressions¹ of the reporting officer. The Federal Public Service Commission in their third annual report complained that the character rolls of officers referred to the Commission in cases of promotion "were often not up to date and were sketchy". Such reports, they held, were of little help to them for arriving at a decision about the suitability of officers for promotion.²

The main purpose of the reports is to provide evidence of fitness for promotion. Hence, the proper writing of the confidential reports is very important, if the principle of merit is to play a larger and more effective part in matters of promotions. If the report is to be really useful, it must be both full, adequate and reliable. The form of the report should be carefully designed and must follow a pattern deliberately set to elicit the essential information regarding the worth, ability

1 Planning Board: The First Five Year Plan, Vol. I, 1956, p. 125

2 F.P.S. Commission, Third Report, (1950 - 1951), p. 18

and character of the candidate. "Whatever system is adopted, the reports should (a) be similar in form, (b) be based as far as possible on a common standard of judgment to enable valid comparisons to be made, (c) be accepted as fair and reliable by the staff; and (d) give the fullest possible account of present performance and suitability for promotion", said Mensies.¹ It may be worth-while in this connection to discuss the annual reporting system in Britain. The form of report provides for the officer concerned to be assessed under a number of specific heads - knowledge of branch, knowledge of department, personality, force of character, judgment, power of taking responsibility, initiative, accuracy, address and tact, powers of supervising staff, zeal and official conduct. These qualities are to be assessed on the basis of performance in the officer's existing grade.² There is also a space for general remarks. There is also provision for the officer's degree of fitness for promotion to be assessed under one of the four headings - exceptionally well-qualified, highly qualified, qualified or not yet qualified - and for supporting and explanatory remarks. If an officer is given a bad report, he must be told about it.

In order to secure uniformity, detailed instructions on the writing of the report are incorporated in the report form itself in Britain.

1 F.E.P. Mensies & Dr. E. Anstey: Staff Reporting (I.P.A.) 1951, p. 14

2 Dunnill, F.: The Civil Service: Some Human Aspects, 1956, p. 64

Some departments have also issued separate instructions on the subject, including descriptions of the various qualities and headings used on the form and a general definition of the points on the scale. Besides such written notes for the guidance of reporting officers, many departments include instructions on reporting in their training courses for supervising officers. The Central Course run by the Training and Education Division of the Treasury for managers (senior officers) and supervisors includes lectures and discussions on reporting. Such courses may not turn out perfect reporting officers, but they can undoubtedly help to make supervisors clearer about their role as reporting officers and about the qualities to be rated, and to make them approximate more closely to a uniform standard of reporting. Several methods have been adopted by all departments to check the reporting standards of officers with a view to making them as uniform as possible. Some of the methods used are:-

- (a) Compelling counter-sizing officers to comment on each report form on the standard of the reporting officer concerned.
- (b) Conferences of reporting officers within each Branch or Division before the reports are completed. The objects of these conferences are to ensure that no relevant information about an individual is overlooked and to help reporting officers to work to a common standard.

- (c) - Calling on all senior officers to serve on Promotion Boards in turn, thus enabling them to check the standards of different Divisions.
- (d) Appointment of an 'Inspector of Staff Reports'.
- (e) Comparison of Establishment Division of different reports made on the same individual at different times.
- (f) Scrutiny of reports for inconsistencies, etc., by a Promotions Board Review Panel or similar Committee.
- (g) Periodical (non-statistical) survey by Establishment Division of the general level of reports from different Divisions, resulting in tactful advice to Head of Divisions or reporting officers who appear to be markedly out of step with the rest".¹

Considerable efforts are being made to make the reporting system as uniform and realistic as is possible. The reports can be improved in several respects. Dr. Anstey has made several suggestions for the modification of the form.² These suggestions seem to merit serious consideration. We may give a brief summary of these suggestions. The qualities that are important in several classes of the service obviously vary and it is desirable that separate forms are used for the five main Treasury classes. The form used for assistant Principal

1 I.K.P. Mensies, & Dr. E. Anstey: Staff Reporting (I.P.A.) 1951, p. 54

2. Ibid, p. 70 - 71

three advantages. First, there is the "regularity of report". This means that there must be recurrent attention to the relative merits of subordinates. The deliberateness at stated intervals conduces to conscious attempts at distinction and though there is in all countries a tendency for the certifying officer to tar all with the same brush, so that the total marks tend to prove that all are equally meritorious - distinctions are made.¹ Secondly, the second gain is the "heightening of responsibility brought about by the possibility of a representation against a flagrantly unjust promotion".² Third, the staff feels that the system reduces the possibility of favouritism, jobbery and nepotism, and that they are having a "square deal".³ We agree with Professor Finer that "these are important gains and well worth the time and energy expended upon the operation of the system".⁴ We feel that the form of confidential report in Pakistan may adopt some of the important features of the British reporting system.

There are complaints against the working of the departmental promotion committees. The Federal Public Service Commission in their second annual report made serious allegations against the departmental promotion committees. The procedure followed by these committees is not fully conducive to fairness in that the departmental officers come with a certain degree of 'prejudice' for or against certain candidates. "Those whom they have made up their minds to favour are presented

1. Finer, H. "The Theory & Practice of Modern Government", 1950, p.852
2, 3, and 4, Ibid.

before the D.P.C.'s as the only eligible and suitable candidates and often it is indicated that the post requires such an urgent filling up that there is no time to consider anybody else for it.¹ "In such circumstances", the Commission further said, "it is difficult for the representative of the Commission to press an impartial view and to give an independent ^{verdict} ~~verdict~~".² This is a very serious allegation and is not by any means helpful in effecting promotion on the basis of merit. The eradication of such allegations cannot brook any delay. We suggest the following measures to remove the grounds for such allegations. First, the members of these Committees should be carefully selected. If the Committee consists of independent officers none of whom is subordinate to the other, it is less likely that its decisions will be unduly influenced by the opinion or the likes and dislikes of the head of the department or his representatives, who has to be there. Secondly, a representative of the Federal Public Service Commission must be associated with the Committees in their deliberations, and if necessary, the membership of the Commission should be increased for this purpose. Under the Constitution of 1956 the government are bound to consult the Commission on the principles to be followed in making promotions from one class to the other, and from one Service to the other, and on the suitability of candidates for promotion.³ The Commission will act as the guardian of the merit system and fairness in promotion. Thirdly, it is essential to

1 . P.P.S. Commission, 2nd Report, 1949, p. 14.

2 Ibid.

3 Article 188, Section 2(e) of the Constitution of 1956.

ensure that no names of persons who have a fair claim to be considered are withheld from the Committees. A complete list of all the candidates should be made in advance. Fourthly, the materials placed before the Committee must be full, adequate and reliable. The representatives of the departments should come to the Committees with open minds, and place all the facts before the Committees. Fifthly, the candidates concerned should be interviewed. This is likely to enable the Committee to obtain a better picture of the relative fitness of candidates for promotion. These measures are likely to minimize the chances of miscarriage of justice on the one hand and of mistrust on the other. When all is said and done, a great deal depends on the officers who are entrusted with these powers, an erratic or arbitrary use of which might be highly detrimental not only to the officers affected but also to the morale and efficiency of the service as a whole.

Immediately after partition there had been accelerated promotions at all levels and more so at the higher level of the Civil Service. It was due to the shortage of staff. Government had given accelerated promotions to officers who would have ordinarily to wait for many years had there been no partition.¹ Owing to the departure of non-Muslim officers after partition, a large number of officers had been promoted to posts which in the usual course they could never expect to occupy. Government took measures against this. First, these officers were not

1 Constituent Assembly (Legislative) of Pakistan Debate, Vol. I.
No. 8. Wednesday, March 22, 1952, p. 293

given full salaries of the posts to which they had been promoted but only a percentage rise in their salaries. Secondly, government laid down a number of years of service which an officer must have before he could be given full salaries of certain post.¹ Again there are complaints that promotions in some cases are not prompt. This delay is attributed to two reasons. First, the establishment divisions of the various ministries are under-staffed with the result that they are unable to cope with the increasing number of such cases. Adequate steps should be taken to remove this. Secondly, references that are required to be made to the Federal Public Service Commission involve delay. It seems necessary that the staff of the Commission should be increased to cope with it. Again complaints of favouritism and nepotism are numerous at the lower levels of the service. In cases of promotions to Class II and Class III, the risk of favouritism is greater because these cases are not subject to the scrutiny of the Federal Public Service Commission. Unless adequate safeguards are adopted, there will be more risks if merit is to be the criterion of promotion. In our view greater use should be made of the promotion Committees and the public Service Commission should be associated with these bodies. The right of appeal to the Federal Public Service Commission needs to be granted on a wide scale. The use of interview as a supplement to this process will be most useful.

1 Ibid, p. 296

During the post-war era in Britain it has become a settled policy that regular prospects of class to class promotions - administrative and executive class - are open to established civil servants by means of centralized limited competitive examinations conducted by the Civil Service Commission. A certain percentage of vacancies in the administrative and executive class are filled in this way. Between the ages of 21 and 28 clerical officers and executive officers can take limited competitive examinations for entry to the executive and administrative class respectively. The limited competition for the administrative class is on the same lines as in Method II: qualifying examination, C.S.S.B. tests and interview. As an experiment, the candidates are allowed to take Method I if they choose.¹ With the setting up of limited competitions, departmental promotions to these two classes of persons with the above-mentioned age limit is abolished. This system has certain advantages. It has the supreme merit of making the selection thoroughly impartial and objective. It gives the civil servants equality of opportunity for promotions. It also provides opportunities for accelerated promotions to the young civil servant whose length of service is so short that confidential reports cannot reveal their true worth. It seems that written examinations suitably supplemented by interviews and personality tests can be useful in effecting promotions on merit. We think that this method is worth a trial in Pakistan in regard to promotion in some services.

¹ MacKenzie, J.M. & Grove, J.W: Central Administration in Britain, 1957, p.68

The system of interview is not in much use in promotions in Pakistan. Interview has certain distinct advantages. It enables the selectors to assess directly the personality of the candidate. The assessments in the form of confidential reports or annual reports, if carefully designed and drawn up, can help in that direction, but they can at best provide a second-hand picture. The direct impression created at the interview gives reality to the picture and helps in forming a more or less correct assessment. But the interview system has its disadvantage in that appearances may frequently pass for reality. Human personality is a very complex phenomenon hardly capable of being analysed thoroughly in course of an interview, which however elaborate, must necessarily be brief. A dominant trait, though really superficial, may easily be mistaken for an essential quality. It needs very experienced and well-trained interviewers to isolate the reality from appearance; but provided such interviewers are available, interview can be a useful supplement to other methods of selection in cases of promotions.

Perhaps it may not be possible to obtain complete objectivity in making promotions. When all measures and precautions to ensure objectivity are taken, it is yet likely to elude the assessors because assessment of merit remains essentially a matter of subjective judgment, not capable of being fully determined by objective criteria.

CHAPTER SIX

Professional standards of Conduct .

Highest standards of public and private conduct on the part of the Civil servants is of capital importance because the Civil Servants occupy strategic positions in the administration of a country. They represent the government in the daily life of their fellow citizens.

"By qualitative standards, the significance of their outlook and behavior, both on duty and off, is still greater because of their strategic position and because of the extent to which they represent the government in the everyday life of their fellow countrymen".

The quality of administration is, in a large measure, determined by the integrity, honesty, devotion and ability of the public personnel.

"No administrative system can be better than the men and women who conduct, indeed it might be said, who personify it".² In Britain the new entrants to the Civil Service are officially reminded that as Civil Servants they are not entitled to do things according to their personal taste but must do what Parliament wants them to do. They must remember that as Civil Servants they are the servants of the public as a whole and not of any sectional interest. "Practical rules for the guidance of social conduct depend also as much upon the instinct and perception of the individual as upon cast-iron formulae;

¹ Stahl, O.C.: Public Personnel Administration, 4th Ed. 1956, p. 427

² Standards & Techniques of Public Administration, U.N. 1951, p.2

and the surest guide will, we hope, always be found in the nice and zealous honour of civil servants themselves. The public expect from them a standard of integrity and conduct not only inflexible but fastidious".¹ In the U.S.A. the policy of the federal government in this respect is laid down in the following words: "Officers and employees of the Federal Government are servants of the people. Because of this, their conduct must, in many instances, be subject to more restrictions and to higher standards than may be the case in certain private employments. Officers and employees of the Federal Government are expected to conduct themselves in a manner which will reflect favourably upon their employers. Although the Government is not particularly interested in the private life of its employees, it does expect them to be honest, reliable, trustworthy, and of good character and reputation".² Emphasising the importance of the highest standards of public and private behaviour, an official pamphlet in Pakistan states that the Civil Service "requires complete and absolute probity and a meticulous observance of the highest standards of public and private behaviour; A government servant cannot flout accepted standards".³ The civil servant, it further states, should be, in a measure, "a dedicated being".⁴

In this chapter we propose to examine the general rules and regulations relating to the conduct of the civil servants, the main features

1 A Handbook for the New Civil Servant, H.M. Treasury, 1947

2 Federal Personnel Manual, p. 62 - 71

3 Careers in the Pakistan Central Superior Services, 1954, p. 3

4 Ibid

of the disciplinary procedure, and the special provisions with regard to the security measures.

Probity

Doubts may arise about a Civil Servant's probity from any careless involvement in money deals and other economic transactions based on knowledge or contacts acquired in official activities. To ensure honesty among the Civil Servants the Government of Pakistan have made general and detailed rules and regulations to regulate their conduct. We are concerned with the general regulations. Certain restrictions are imposed on the economic and allied activities of a Civil Servant. He is not to lend money to any person possessing land within the local limits of his authority, nor is he to borrow money or otherwise place himself under a pecuniary obligation to any person subject to his authority. Every government employee must make to the Government a declaration of all immovable property which may from time to time be held or acquired by him or his wife, or by any members of his family living with him or in any way dependent upon him. An official is not to make any investment which gives him private interest in matters with which his public duties are connected as it is likely to embarrass or influence him in the discharge of his official duties. A Civil Servant is not to engage in any financial speculations nor in any private trade or private employment. He is not to run into debts

habitually nor to be reckless in financial matters as to be insolvent. Finally, he is not to accept any gifts from others, except presents of a nominal value from relatives or personal friends.

The main purpose of these rules is to ensure and maintain honesty among the Civil Servants. The Civil Servants are called on to deal with government policy in regard to taxation, industrial control, government contracts, permits, licences and other economic transactions on an increasingly large scale. In all these matters they are not to line their own pockets at the public expense and are not to act so as to favour one interest at the cost of another. Complete honesty in all these transactions is of utmost importance. The safest course for a Civil Servant is to stay meticulously outside the shadow of doubt. Where there is a conflict between their public duties and private interests, the conflict is to be resolved by the subordination of their private interests to the public duties. The general principle which should guide the conduct of the Civil Servants was remarkably stated by the Board of Inquiry in Britain in 1928. "With his private activities the State is in general not concerned, so long as his conduct therein is not such as to bring discredit upon the Service of which he is a member. But to say that he is not to subordinate his duty to his private interests nor to make the use of official position to further these interests, is to say no more than that he must behave with common honesty. The Service exacts from itself a higher standard, because it

recognises that the state is entitled to demand that its servants shall not only be honest in fact, but beyond the reach of suspicion of dishonesty".¹ The Board of Inquiry further stated, "A Civil Servant is not to subordinate his duty to his private interests; but neither is he to put himself in a position where his duty and his interest conflict. He is not to make use of his official position to further those interests; neither is he so to order his private affairs as to allow the suspicion to arise that a trust has been abused or a confidence betrayed".²

In actual practice, there have been widespread allegations of corruption, lack of honesty and integrity among Civil Servants in Pakistan. "There is a widespread feeling in the country that the standard of integrity has deteriorated in recent years; this feeling is shared by the public services themselves".³ Corruption has been rampant not only among the lower categories of Civil servants but also at the higher levels. Mr. Muhammad Ali, one of the ex-Prime Ministers of Pakistan stated in the Central Legislature, "we have found, Sir, from experience, that even highly placed officials - we must be frank to admit this - even highly placed officials are corrupt".⁴ The

1 Report of a Board of Inquiry to investigate certain statements affecting Civil Servants during the case of Ironmonger & Co. v Dyne (The Gregory Case), Cmd. 3037, 1928

2 Ibid

3 Government of Pakistan: Planning Board. The First Five Year Plan, Vol. I. 1956, p. 127

4 Constituent Assembly (Legislature) of Pakistan Debates, Vol. II. No.2, Thursday, September 26, 1955, p. 206

Central and Provincial Legislatures moved and passed a number of resolutions to focus the attention of the government on the seriousness and urgency of this problem. There has been considerable discussion in the press also. That there is considerable substance in these allegations becomes evident when one examines the work of the Special Police Establishment set up in 1948 to deal with cases of corruption and dishonest practices among government employees. In 1948 the Special Police Establishment examined 721 informations about alleged corrupt practices and transactions. After investigation, they succeeded in securing conviction in six cases and of departmental punishments in 14 cases. In 1949 the figures were 955, 57 and 38 respectively. In 1950 the number of informations increased to 1,123 while convictions and departmental punishments rose to 91 and 87 respectively. The figures for 1951 on these accounts were high, being 1,515 investigations resulting in 113 convictions and 85 departmental punishments. In 1952 the figures stood at 1,031, 91 and 76 respectively. The forms which corruption and corrupt practices have taken have been bribery, frauds, misappropriation of government funds, tampering with official records, use of official position for the acquisition of property and nepotism.¹ Even the present military regime dismissed, compulsorily retired and down-graded 84 senior officials, including some secretaries of the various ministries on grounds of corruption, or reputation of being corrupt or ineff-

¹ Constituent Assembly (Legislature) of Pakistan Debates, Vol. II, No. 8, Thursday, October 8, 1953, p. 732

iciency¹ The number of Civil Servants affected in this manner at the lower levels was larger.

These figures reveal the distressing instances and the extent of oddities and aberrations of conduct on the part of the Civil Servants, which have sullied the high reputation which the officers, particularly at the higher levels enjoyed in the past. These figures also show that the cases of corruption have been on the increase since 1948. But it will be unfair and unjust to condemn Civil Servants generally as corrupt and dishonest. Many of the members of the Civil Services of all grades, classes and ranks have given ample proof of their honesty, high sense of duty and devotion in tackling the gigantic and complex administrative problems which faced Pakistan immediately after it first came into existence. But there have been many 'blacksheep' among the Civil Servants as these figures show. These corrupt officials are enough to tarnish the reputation of the Civil Services as a whole. We may now turn our attention to an analysis of the causes of corrupt practices and unsatisfactory standards of conduct among the Civil Servants. The problem of corruption has been discussed in the Central and Provincial legislatures. Several Committees also have dealt with this. The Press has been critical of this evil. An examination of the various points of view shows that there are several causes for the existence of corruption among Civil Servants.

1. The Gazette of Pakistan, July 3, 1959

Firstly, the unsatisfactory standards of public morality have facilitated the growth of corruption. The lowering of the ethical standards among the civil servants is the result of the general deterioration in moral standards which widely and deeply affected all the departments of public life, since the second World War. It was aggravated by the widespread disturbances which preceded and followed the partition of British India in 1947. "In the upheaval and the large-scale migration of population as a result of widespread disturbances that followed the partition, the moral fabric of our society became loose and moral values touched practically the rock bottom. It was but inevitable that the virus of corruption that entered the public life generally should also infest the public services. After all our public servants are not a class by themselves. They are not like plants grown in greenhouses. They are part and parcel of the society to which all of us belong and the atmosphere that prevails all over the country must influence and affect them", stated a Central Cabinet Minister.¹ The causes for the deterioration of moral standards are many and complex. Public morality was not high in the country because the overwhelming majority of people had been in the grip of appalling poverty. Illiteracy on a mass scale has been another feature of society. The level of cultural development has been rather very low. Since partition the

¹ Constituent Assembly (Legislature) of Pakistan Debates, Vol. II No. 8, Thursday, October 1, 1953, p. 731

material lot of the common man has not improved to any appreciable extent. The standard of education at all levels has gone down because of the departure of the non-Muslim teachers along with partition. Public morality has gone down because of inadequate attention given to character-building in academic institutions.¹ The quality of political leadership, on the other hand, has not been high. The political leaders, by and large, with a few exceptions, sought to use their positions to promote their own personal and selfish interests at the price of national development. Most of them never hesitated to use the name of Islam, which like every other great religion, enjoins a code of public and private morality on their followers, for their selfish purposes. Again, most of the religious leaders, with a few exceptions, sought to use religion not to impress its virtues on the people but to serve their personal and political purposes. Again, the acute differences between those who have received western and modern education and those who have received Islamic education on the proper role of Islam in the social, political and economic life of the country have aggravated the situation. No group of leaders - political and religious - had been able to place the good of the public before their selfish interests.² Most of these leaders could not set before the people examples of higher standards of conduct from their own life

1 See Chapter III

2 For detailed information see the Report of the Court of Inquiry constituted under the Punjab Act II of 1954 to inquire into the Punjab disturbances of 1953.

and activities. Example, it is said, is better than precept. As a consequence, religion also has lost considerably its hold over the life of man and woman without the emergence of appropriate moral values to fill the vacuum. On the political plane, chronic instability has been another feature of the political life of the country. At the Centre, no less than seven Ministries had held office from 1947 to 1958. The Ministries in the provinces had been dismissed on many occasions in the past. The legislatures - Central and Provincial - had been dissolved on numerous occasions. The fundamental reason for political instability and for the failure to establish genuine responsible government had been the failure of politicians and political parties to provide a stable basis for the formation of effective ministries.¹ The Press also has been weak. Public opinion has not been well-informed, strong and effective. In short, poverty, ignorance, low level of culture, low level of the quality of political leadership, the loosening of the hold of religion, political instability and the lack of effective press and public opinion - all these factors are responsible in varying degree for the loosening of the moral fabric of society. It is hard, as Mr. Douglas rightly holds, to develop honest officials in a corrupt society. But it is equally true, he further states, that high standards on the part of officials and public leaders raise the level of the whole community.²

Secondly, corruption was rampant during the war years in British India when great opportunities were offered for corruption owing to the

1 Callard, K. : Pakistan (A Political Study), 1957, p. 154

2 Douglas, P.W. : Ethics in Government, 1953, p. 21

execution of large contracts. The government during that period had to appoint a vast number of officers on a temporary basis. Most of these officers had no permanent stake in the job and they indulged in corrupt practices. "It is a common knowledge that during the war the army of temporary officers set a new standard of morality from the continued effects of which we are still suffering", observed the Pakistan Pay Commission.¹ Again, administrative control and supervision had not been effective and strict owing to the pre-occupation of the government with war efforts. Moreover, the cost of living during the war period went high and hit hard the Civil Servants, particularly at the lower levels. Communalism was also rampant among officers before partition. All these rather left a bad legacy for the Civil Servants today. We have already discussed it elsewhere in this monograph.²

Thirdly, economic distress is one of the main causes of corruption, mostly among the low-paid employees who constitute by far the overwhelming bulk of the Civil Servants. Hardships are due to the rise in the prices of essential commodities and services, caused by deficit financing in implementing the five year plan. The pay-scales at the lower levels are low. They remain static. The cost of living bonus is not increased adequately. The Government are not in a position to increase the pay-scales owing to financial stringency. Hard-pressed by distressing economic conditions many of these employees indulge in mal-

1. Report of the Pakistan Pay Commission, Vol. I. 1949, p. 79

2. See Chapter I.

practices in money matters.

Fourthly, the lack of sufficient administrative efficiency is another fertile source of corruption. "There has been a distinct decline in the efficiency of the public service. This was inevitable since Pakistan inherited so small a portion of the more experienced officers of undivided India", writes Professor Callard.¹ This is attributable to a few reasons. Firstly, the withdrawal of the top layer in the service which mostly consisted of the British members of the old I.C.S. and other superior services along with partition created a vacuum which it has been no easy task to fill. Consequently their experience was not available to the new Government. Secondly, the number of Muslim officers at the higher level has been very insignificant.² Thirdly, to fill the places thus vacated government has perforce to promote to higher posts, men who on account of the lack of experience, would not have been thought suitable for promotion in ordinary conditions. The result was that the level of efficiency went down to a great extent. Again, the new governments - Central and Provincial - had to be hastily improvised after partition and many unsuitable appointments were made. The confused political situation and many changes in ministerial direction did nothing to make the task of efficient administration any more easy. The consequences have been

1 Callard, K: Pakistan (a Political Study), 1957, p. 296

2 See Chapter II

rather serious. The shortage of senior, trained and experienced officers and the consequential lack of efficiency not only result in inadequate and ineffective supervision and control but in inordinate delay in the disposal of cases. On the other hand, many of the civil servants have found themselves in positions of considerable power. They can influence the commercial fortunes of private firms, or individuals, by granting licences and awarding contracts and permits. Owing to the shortage of officers most of them have been working without effective supervision and control. There have been constant complaints of excessive delay in the execution of accepted policy and in the consideration of new proposals. It was stated in the legislature that files were intentionally delayed because the officers felt that the longer the file was detained, the businessmen would come forward and give them money for the expeditious disposal of files.¹ Mr. Muhammad Ali, an ex-Prime Minister of Pakistan made complaints of delay in the disposal of cases.² "In regard to delay, it cannot be too frequently emphasised that delay is the handmaiden of corruption, wherever the public are concerned".³ Thus, failure to enforce effectively and speedily compliance with rules and regulations, owing to ineffective control and supervision, delay in the disposal of cases owing to insufficient staff, poor quality of personnel and the lack of policy or direction in many cases, have bred corruption.

1 Constituent Assembly (Legislature) of Pakistan Debates, Vol. II. No. 2, Thursday, September 24, 1953, p. 198

2 Ibid.

3 Government of Pakistan: Report of the Administrative Inquiry Committee, 1953, p. 47

In the fifth place, disciplinary control over the civil servants has not been as effective and speedy as is desirable in the interest of maintaining honesty. There are several reasons for this. First, higher officers who are competent to deal with disciplinary cases of serious types are often so preoccupied with other duties that they do not have sufficient time to devote to these matters. Second, some of them, as noted above, were not ^{themselves} above reproach. Third, some of the officers vested with disciplinary powers are not adequately familiar with the detailed and complex disciplinary procedure. The disciplinary procedure is protracted, involved and complex. It often proves ineffectual. It will be discussed in a later section of this chapter. Fourth, sometimes the officers take inordinately long time to make up their minds about the nature of punishment to be inflicted on a corrupt officer. "We are seriously concerned with the time which it takes to decide departmental enquiries and criminal proceedings against government servants".¹ Finally, the Federal Public Commission are not always in a position to give their opinion regarding disciplinary matters, specially with respect to higher officers referred to them because the process is elaborate and they are to conform to detailed rules and regulations. The Commission also do not have sufficient staff to cope with their work.

In the sixth place, some of the officers who belong to a particular religious sect or community have been found to utilise their official

1 Ibid, p. 50

position to show favour to the members of the public who belong to that sect our community. Mr. Muztas Daultana, the then Chief Minister of the West Punjab stated in a speech in 1952¹ that the Qadiani officers had been guilty of partiality towards men of their own Community as several allotments of land were made by them merely on the ground that the allottees were themselves Qadianis.² This was, he said, an abuse of their official position. This shows that sectarianism is another source which deflects the officers from the path of their duty as officers. In such a case the confidence of the public in the impartiality of the officers is bound to be ^{adversely} affected.

In the seventh place, the utter lack of a proper sense of responsibility among many politicians has an adverse effect on the morale and integrity of officers. Many politicians and even ministers in the past interfered with the work of the officers and deflected them from their path of duty. The West Bengal Police Enquiry Committee gave one such instance of gross and undue interference with the work of the members of the C.S.F. and P.S.P. by a Minister. There had been allegations in the press about it. The Committee examined the records and found that in respect of a case of 'ritting and theft'¹ one of the ministers of the

1 Quoted in the Report of the Court of Inquiry constituted under Punjab Act II of 1954 to inquire into the Punjab Disturbances of 1953, p. 98

2 The Qadianis are a sect among the Muslims and differ from the general body of Muslims on religious grounds.

Government of East Bengal called the district magistrate, the superintendent of police and the deputy superintendent of police to the Secretariat to agree to the accused in the case being let out on bail. The bail was granted due to the interest in the case shown by the Minister. This is a blatant instance of undue influence by a Minister. "Nothing is so damaging to the Government than the impression in the public mind that influence can deflect the course of justice".¹ In this case, the Minister not only interfered with the work of the district officers, but sent for them to the Secretariat over the heads of their respective departments. He violated the well-established departmental procedure and helped the breaking up of discipline. "Laxity in the observance of departmental procedure, which has held the field for years, undermines discipline. A Minister of Government sending for an officer of a district, ignoring the head of the department, in our opinion, directly helps the breaking up of discipline" observed the Committee.² Many members of the legislature approached the officers for favour either for themselves, or their relatives and other friends. Many of the officers could not withstand such influence and attempted to ingratiate themselves with the legislators by doing them favours and anticipating their wishes in order to use them, that is, their influence, with the Ministry, for their own advancements. Where the officers resisted or

1 Report of the East Bengal Police Committee, 1954, p. 7.

2 Ibid, p. 8

attempted to resist such influences, they were often transferred to what may be called 'penal stations'.

Standards of conduct as exemplified in the outlook and methods of politicians are quite likely to exercise a profound influence on the integrity of Civil Servants. The Civil Servants are the administrative instrument of the nation, functioning through ^{the} ~~the~~ political leaders, for carrying out governmental policies, and are likely to reflect in their outlook and conduct the standards set before them. In the past the role of many of the ministers in this respect had been thoroughly unsatisfactory. During the period from 1949 to 1954, judicial inquiries into the conduct of seven provincial ministers - four of them were chief ministers at different times - were held under the Public and Representative Officers Disqualification Act of 1949.¹ These inquiries were prolonged and involved elaborate searches of government records as well as testimony by Civil Servants. Four of the seven provincial ex-ministers could not emerge unscathed from such searching inquiries, and accordingly disqualification debarring them from holding public offices, including ministerial offices, was imposed on them. Far from inculcating high standards of behaviour among officers, the example of the

¹ In 1949, the Public and Representative Officers Disqualification Act, popularly called PRODA was passed. The sub-title of the Act, which reads: "An Act to provide for the debarring from public life for a suitable period of persons judicially found guilty of misconduct in any public office or representative capacity or in any matter relating thereto", explains the purpose of the Act. (Gazette of Pakistan, ~~July~~ 1949).

conduct of these ministers under whom they worked could not but have a thoroughly depressing and demoralising effect on their integrity.

"There is nothing which so lowers the level of individual and civic morality as to have men in positions of honour and power use those positions to enrich themselves and their friends", said Mr. Douglas.¹ Again, the Civil Servants have not had the benefit of leadership from senior officers of ripe experience in the difficult conditions through which the country has been passing. The number of such officers has been extremely small. The position was further aggravated by the "willing and unwilling employment of public servants in personal and party struggle for power",² by many of the politicians.

Disciplinary Measures and Procedure.

Apart from the regular forms of punishment and disciplinary procedure prescribed by the government to deal with officers guilty of misconduct, insubordination and inefficiency, they have taken a number of special measures to eradicate corrupt practices among their employees. We may draw an over-all picture of these measures - administrative and legislative - which form part of the government scheme to fight the virus of corruption. These anti-corruption measures have

1 Douglas, P.H. Ethics in Government, 1953, p. 20

2 Government of Pakistan, Planning Board, The First Five Year Plan, Vol. I. 1956, p. 129

been evolved after a careful study of the problem. Firstly, government set up a Special Police Establishment in 1948 for this purpose. A member of the then Central cabinet explained the function of this body: "The functions of the Special Police Establishment are to investigate and bring up for trial cases of bribery and corruption involving transactions with the Central and Provincial Governments".¹ Subsequently, this body was re-organised and strengthened. Its powers were enlarged. The status of the officers of this organisation was upgraded. Its head was given the rank and status of the Inspector-General of Police. This would enable the government to have a high-powered officer who might be able to investigate into the charges and allegations of corruption against higher officers.² An officer of this organisation not below the rank of a deputy superintendent of police might be authorised in writing by the government to demand the production of bank account, or income-tax return or any other thing in the custody of postal and telegraph authorities necessary for the investigation of an offence relating to bribery and corruption.³ This is, no doubt, a very strong measure. A member of the then Central Cabinet said in justification, "In view of the nature of the disease a strong drug is indicated to eradicate it".⁴

1. Constituent Assembly (Legislature) of Pakistan Debates, Vol. I. No. 9, Monday, March 8, 1948, p. 320

2. Ibid, Vol. II, No. 2, Thursday, September 28, 1953, p. 204 - 5.

3. Ibid, Vol. II, No. 8, Thursday, October 1, 1953, p. 740

4. Ibid.

Secondly, a further step in the drive against corruption was taken with the ^{promulgation} Civil Services (Prevention of Corruption) Rules promulgated by the Central Government in 1953. These rules provide that any officer who is or is reasonably believed to be corrupt, may be dismissed or compulsorily retired from Government service. An officer may reasonably be presumed to be guilty of corruption on the following grounds:

- (i) If he has "a general and persistent reputation of being corrupt";
- (ii) If he or any other person through him or in his behalf is in possession of property for which he cannot satisfactorily account or has pecuniary resources or property disproportionate to his known sources of income; and (iii) if he has assumed a style of living above his visible means. This definition of a corrupt officer is very wide. It covers various types of cases of illegal gains. The measure is very drastic. It is also vague. When an officer is reasonably presumed to be guilty on any of these grounds, an inquiry into the conduct of the officer concerned takes place. The procedure of inquiry is that the officer who is proceeded against under the rules is informed in writing of the action proposed to be taken against him. He is given reasonable opportunity for showing cause against the proposed action, and before passing final order the authority concerned takes into consideration any representation or explanation made by the accused official in this behalf. If the explanation is not satisfactory and it is established that the charges against the accused official are well founded,

D. This is a very drastic measure. It is one which may ruin the career of an officer & his family. This may be fatal to the integrity of the service. The gradual elimination of such an atrocious measure will improve the morale of the civil servant.

Government pass orders for his compulsory retirement. The inquiry in such cases is held by a board of three secretaries to the Government.¹

It seems that it would better ensure impartiality if the board of inquiry includes only the retired Secretaries to Government. Some critics argue that the board of inquiry should have a Judge of the Supreme Court. That is likely to inspire confidence in the officer affected that due attention is being paid to justice and fair play.

Thirdly, amendments were made in the Government Servant Conduct rules to ensure that an officer where required by the government to disclose his assets, immovable and movable, would be bound to do so. Prior to this amendment an officer was not required to declare his immovable assets. Under the amended rules a Civil Servant would be required to furnish a full statement of his assets with an explanation of their sources. This has also been provided for under the Prevention of Corruption Rules and the Prevention of Corruption Act.² The purpose of this is that if an officer has in his possession assets, immovable and movable, for which he cannot offer any satisfactory explanation, he may be, after full inquiry, be compulsorily retired from service.

Fourthly, the Government have issued orders that officers who indulge in nepotism, favouritism, victimisation or wilful abuse of their official authority are liable to disciplinary action which may

1. Ibid.

2. Ibid, p. 757.

include dismissal.¹ Fifthly, secretaries to Government and heads of departments have been instructed to keep under constant review possibilities of corruption which current policies and procedures might provide. This particularly relates to procedures of issuing licences and permits. A delay in the disposal of cases or applications is one of the most important sources of corruption. Instructions have been issued that delays in the transaction of business in government offices should constantly be reviewed through surprise check and through instructions to the heads of offices.² Sixthly, instructions have also been issued that in appointing officers to posts which provide greater scope for temptation, care should be taken in selecting only such officers as have an unimpeachable reputation for honesty and have a good record of service.³

These administrative measures apart, the government have also taken a few legislative measures to penalise corrupt officers. Special provisions for dealing with cases of corruption were made by the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1947.⁴ Its scope was widened and it would apply to all officers and citizens as well. There was a provision in the anti-corruption act to the effect that prior sanction of the government should be obtained before prosecuting an officer on a charge of accepting a bribe. The Act was amended and the necessity

1 Constituent Assembly, (Legislature) of Pakistan Debates, Vol. II No. 2, Thursday, October 1, 1955, p. 737.

2 Ibid, p. 738.

3 Ibid.

4 Act II of 1947

of previous sanction was dispensed with. Accordingly, executive instructions in regard to the registration of cases and sanction of prosecution have been revised to facilitate expeditious action.¹ The Pakistan Penal Code was amended to the effect that the offering and acceptance of illegal gratuities and bribes are made a substantive offence. The maximum punishment under section 165 of the Penal code has been increased from two to three years. The Government also provided machinery to deal with offences under these Acts. The Act empowers the government to appoint special judges not below the rank of assistant sessions judges to try offences under the Act. The jurisdiction of the special judges are to be fixed by the Government. An appeal against the order of the special judge should be to the High Court.²

Apart from the special and additional measures, the Government of Pakistan have prescribed general and regular forms of punishment and disciplinary procedures for their employees. The most important types of punishment are³; (a) censure, (b) with-holding of increments and promotions, (c) reduction to lower post, (d) recovery from pay of the whole or part of any pecuniary loss caused to the Government by negligence or to breach of orders, (e) suspension, (f) removal.

1 C.A. (Legislature) of Pakistan Debates, Vol. II, No. 8, Thursday, October 1, 1953, p. 736

2 Ibid, p. 739 - 740

3 Government of Pakistan. The Civil Services (Classification, Control & Appeal) Rules, First Edition, 1951, p. 21

from the Civil Service, which does not disqualify from future employment, and (g) dismissal from the service, which disqualifies from future employment. The punishing authority is to decide about the nature of punishment to be inflicted on the Civil Servant concerned. In deciding the form of punishment the authority is to take into account two factors - first, the nature of the offence or irregularity in the context of the circumstances, and, second, the type of work on which the offending officer is engaged.

The main features of the disciplinary procedure in Pakistan may be summarised in the following manner. First, there are two kinds of inquiries - public and departmental - which may be held to inquire into a charge or charges of misconduct against a Civil Servant. Under the Public Servants Inquiries Act, 1850, the government may appoint Commissioners to inquire into the alleged misconduct of an official. It is in the form of a judicial trial by an independent body. Departmental inquiry is held more frequently, and is not open to the public. The second main feature of the disciplinary procedure is derived from the provisions of the Constitution of 1956. Under Article 181 of the Constitution, no Civil Servant can be dismissed or removed or reduced in rank until he has been given reasonable opportunity of showing cause against the proposed action to be taken against him. It further provides that no Civil Servant can be dismissed or removed from service or reduced in rank by an authority subordinate to that by which he was appointed. But it shall not apply to an officer who is dismissed or

often prove to be ineffective. "The procedure for departmental inquiries into charges of corruption, inefficiency and indiscipline, is heavily weighted in favour of public servants, and, besides being long-drawn-out often proves ineffectual".¹ Often there is a general reluctance to initiate inquiries, to pursue them to a finish or report matters to higher authority. In India also, as Mr. Asek Chanda points out, the disciplinary proceedings are both protracted and involved. Officers are inclined, therefore, to overlook minor lapses rather than initiate "distasteful, time-consuming departmental proceedings". It is necessary, he observes, to simplify the procedure suitably, but without sacrificing the essentials of justice.² In regard to public inquiries, without any prejudice to the Public Servants Inquiries Act of 1850, no order of dismissal, removal or reduction in rank shall be passed on an officer unless he has been informed in writing of the grounds on which it is proposed to take action, and has been afforded an opportunity of defending himself. The grounds on which it is proposed to take action have to be reduced to the form of a definite charge or charges which must be communicated to the officer charged together with a statement of allegations on which each charge is based. He is required to put in a written statement of his defence within a reasonable time and to state whether he desires to be heard in person. If he so desires, an inquiry is held in which oral evidence is heard and he is entitled to cross-examine the

1 Planning Board. The First Five Year Plan, Vol. I. 1956, p. 128

2 Chanda, Asek: Indian Administration, 1958, p. 137

witnesses who depose against him and also to produce such witnesses as he may wish to call in his defence.¹ This undoubtedly involves much delay. Article 181 of the Constitution of 1956 guarantees all these and renders the disciplinary procedure elaborate and protracted. It provides, as already noted, that no civil servant can be dismissed, removed or reduced in rank without being given reasonable opportunity in self-defence. The civil servant has the right of appeal to higher authorities. He can send memorials and petition to the President. Finally, he may go to the Court of Law in some cases if he so chooses. Moreover, there is no decentralisation of disciplinary power regarding the dismissal, removal or reduction in rank of corrupt and inefficient officers as the Constitution provides that only an authority not subordinate to the appointing one can exercise this power. The net result of all these procedural limitations is that punishment loses its effectiveness as a deterrent, to a considerable extent, if it is not swift and prompt. The corrupt and inefficient civil servants cannot be weeded out speedily by the authorities concerned.

There had been some discussion on Article 181 in the Constituent Assembly of Pakistan in 1953 and again in 1956. It was argued that this article was not in conformity with the principle of ministerial responsibility.² The constitutional guarantee of the security of

¹ Government of Pakistan. The Civil Services (Classification, Control and Appeal) Rules, First Edition, 1957, p. 24

² From 1947 to 1958, there had been a parliamentary system of Government in Pakistan. This was abolished in October 1958 and since then the Country has been under Martial Law & Military administration.

tenure of civil servants militated against the working of parliamentary government because ministers could not easily and speedily punish officers working under them for corruption, inefficiency and insubordination. These critics argued that the provisions contained in Article 181 should be deleted. It would then simplify the disciplinary procedure. The ministers would find it easy to terminate the services of corrupt and inefficient officers. The disciplinary matters, they further pointed out, should be dealt with by the Law of the Legislature. The right of appeal should be adequately provided for under the statutory instruments to be issued under the law. The advocates of Article 181 argued that civil servants must be protected against political pressures and victimisation in order to ensure the impartiality and the non-partisan character of the administration. Too much importance should not be attached to the doctrine of ministerial responsibility as parliamentary government was yet to strike its roots in the country. Ministers did not grumble much about the inadequacy of control over the officials. Most ministers and legislators gave their support to article 181.¹ Delay in disciplinary matters, they held, has been due to inadequacy and inexperience of personnel officers to a large extent. They recommended the strengthening of the personnel agencies and the adequate and proper training of the staff. The disciplinary procedure should be simplified in consonance with the provisions of Article 181.

1. See the Constituent Assembly of Pakistan Debates, Vol. XV. No. 12 Friday, October 23, 1959, p. 372-4, and Ibid, No. 14, Monday, 26 October, p. 475 - 6.

We think that it is necessary to simplify the disciplinary procedure to enable the government to weed out the dishonest, corrupt and inefficient Civil Servants promptly. Administrative efficiency and integrity have suffered as it is not easy to dismiss the corrupt and inefficient officers. Too much security of tenure is apt to breed complacency and cause indolence among Civil Servants. The Establishment Division have issued, the Administrative Enquiry Committee pointed out, clear and detailed instructions stating what requires to be done to satisfy the law, and the rules and in dealing with disciplinary cases. The Committee have observed that if such cases are handled quickly at all stages, and an officer is normally placed on special duty to conduct the inquiry, much of the delay involved can be easily overcome.¹ "There can be no short cut if service rights are to be maintained, as they must be; but it is essential to give high priority to all cases".² If this procedure as suggested by the Committee is enforced strictly, and if the competent authorities make adequate efforts to quicken the process, it will go a long way in reducing delay and in simplifying the disciplinary procedure. It may be pointed out that neither too much delay nor too much speed is desirable. What is necessary, we think is to strike a balance between the requirements of justice and security on the one hand and the need for speedy and effective action on the other. Disciplinary control

1 Government of Pakistan, Report of the Administrative Enquiry Committee, 1953, p. 50

2 Ibid.

becomes effective if it is firm, prompt and consistent. Certainty of punishment is no less important than the severity of punishment.

Every Civil servant has a right of appeal in regard to the punishment proposed against him. The appellate authority is to take into account a number of considerations: firstly, whether the facts on which the order is based have been well established, secondly, whether the facts established afford sufficient ground for taking action, and thirdly, whether the penalty is excessive, adequate, or inadequate. The right of appeal is very important and will act as a brake on hasty and ill-conceived decisions. At present the Federal Public Service Commission are consulted on disciplinary matters relating to higher officers. We suggest that appeals should be heard by a Board of Appeal to be located within the Federal Public Service Commission. It should consist of highly experienced persons to be chosen by the Commission themselves. The appeals preferred by the higher officers may be heard by the Commission themselves. All this would involve giving more power to the Commission. In course of time the Commission and the Board of Appeal under their control would be able to evolve useful administrative jurisprudence on disciplinary matters.

Security

The government servant conduct rules contain a number of provisions to ensure loyalty and to regulate the conduct of the officers in the interest of the security of the state. A government employee cannot,

save with the sanction of the government, communicate to government servants belonging to other departments or to non-official persons or to the press any official documents or information in his possession. An officer cannot, in any document published under his name or in any public utterance delivered by him, make any statement of fact or opinion which is capable of embarrassing the relations between the government and the people of Pakistan or any section thereof, and the relations between the government of Pakistan and any foreign country; a civil servant cannot give evidence before a public Committee without the permission of the government. In giving such evidence he must not criticise the policy or decisions of government. This rule will not apply to the evidence given before the statutory committees with power to compel attendance and the giving of answers. Neither the civil servants nor their wives and children nor any persons dependent on them can take part in any activities or movements which are considered subversive by the Government.

The problem of security has been given a new form by the general alarm over Communist penetration in many modern states during the post-war years. As a result, the problem of preventing subversive activities among civil servants has been growing in importance. Commenting on this Professor Finer says, "When states are threatened in their form of government, they try to make sure that at least they shall have no worry from their officials. These hold special positions of power and trust

and betrayal might mean downfall".¹

The government of Pakistan have adopted special measures to safeguard their employees against subversive influences and also to punish those officials who indulge in activities subversive of the security of the State. The disciplinary control in this respect has been strengthened. In 1950 government promulgated special rules known as the Civil Services (National Security) Rules which have simplified the disciplinary procedure to deal with civil servants guilty or suspected of activities subversive to the security of Pakistan. These rules had been modified in 1957 in order to bring them into conformity with the provisions contained in Articles 184 and 188 of the Constitution of 1956. Under these Rules as modified in 1957, "a Government servant who, in the opinion of the competent authority is engaged in or is reasonably suspected of being engaged in subversive activities or who is or is reasonably suspected of being associated with others in subversive activities and whose retention in service is thereby considered prejudicial to national security, may be dismissed or compulsorily retired from service, subject, however, to the proviso that no ^{servant} Government shall be so dismissed or retired unless, where the competent authority is the head of a department, the prior approval of the President has been obtained".² In applying these Rules to the case of

1 Finer, H: The Theory & Practice of Modern Government, 1950, p.886

2 Notification No.7/5/57, - Reg. Government of Pakistan. Cabinet Secretariat (Establishment Division). The Civil Services. (National Security) Rules, 1957. Karachi, December 7, 1957. (Rule 3).

an officer guilty or suspected of activities subversive to the security of Pakistan, the competent authority is to follow the following procedures. Where, in the opinion of the competent authority, there are reasonable grounds for believing that a Government servant is liable to dismissal or compulsory retirement, it shall:-

- (a) by order in writing, require the Government servant to proceed on such leave as may be admissible to him and from such date as may be specified in the order;
- (b) by order in writing, inform him of the action proposed to be taken in regard to him under these Rules;
- (c) give him a reasonable opportunity of showing cause against that action, and
- (d) before passing final orders under these Rules take into consideration any representation made by him in this behalf.¹ But the President is empowered to dispense with the necessity of giving the officer concerned reasonable opportunity for self-defence if the President is satisfied, for reasons to be recorded by him, that in the interest of the security of Pakistan or any part thereof, it is not expedient to give that officer such an opportunity.²

According to section (c) of Article 188, the Federal Public Service Commission shall be consulted on all disciplinary matters including compulsory retirement for disciplinary reasons and otherwise. But

¹ The Civil Services (National Security) Rules, 1957, (Rule 4)

² Article 181 (c) of the Constitution of 1956.

Clause (2) of the same article permits the Government to withdraw any particular class of case from the purview of the Commission if the Government deems it necessary. Now, the disciplinary cases arising from the subversive activities indulged in by the Civil servants have been withdrawn from the purview of the Commission. It shall not be necessary, therefore, for the President to consult the Federal Public Service Commission to respect of any order to be passed under these rules.¹

The main reason for this course of action is that if detailed procedures requiring consultation with the Federal Public Service Commission are to be followed, this would only result in delay and would defeat the very object for which the Security Rules have been framed². The Government have set up a Committee of three serving Secretaries to the Central Government to deal with such cases.

These measures are criticised on three grounds. First, they violate the fundamental rights guaranteed to every citizen by the Constitution. Second, they are bound to have an adverse effect on the morale of the Civil servants as it threatens their security of tenure. Third, it is pointed out that a Committee of three retired secretaries instead of serving Secretaries would better ensure an impartial approach to the issue. However, when an order of compulsory retirement or dismissal is passed on an officer, he may apply to the President for a review of that order.³ Again, when an officer is compulsorily retired under

1 The Civil Services (National Security) Rules, 1957. (Rule 7)

2 Third Annual Report of the F.P.S. Commission, 1950-51, p.16

3 Article 182 (3) of the Constitution of 1956

these rules, he is entitled to such compensation pension, gratuity or provident fund benefits as would have been admissible to him under the rules if he had been discharged on account of the abolition of his post without provision of alternative suitable employment.¹ Government would determine the extent to which any such benefits might be withheld from the officer.² Government, however, have found it necessary to have special powers to deal with subversive activities among their employees but have used it very discreetly. Government have further pointed out that cases under these rules are few and far between and that the existence of these rules has strengthened their hands in dealing with subversive elements in the Civil Service. These rules and the action taken under them have had a salutary effect in checking disloyal activities. We think that these rules should be applied with utmost care and caution and that the officer affected may be permitted to appear before the committee in person to explain his position.

In Britain also we find that special measures have been adopted to deal with subversive activities among Civil Servants. In 1948 the then Prime Minister Attlee stated in the House of Commons that certain posts should, on security grounds, be ranked 'sensitive', and that Civil Servants who were members of, or otherwise associated with Communist and Fascist parties in such a way as to raise legitimate doubt about their reliability would be removed from such posts. This means that if an

1 The Civil Services (National Security) Rules, 1957. (Rule 8).

2 Ibid.

official concerned is an established Civil Servant, he will be removed to a post of a non-secretive nature, in the same department or in another. If he refuses transfer, he may resign without official discredit. Only in the last resort will he be dismissed.¹ The question of security arrangements within the Civil Service received fresh attention after the Maclean and Burgess case.² In 1955 the government appointed a Conference of seven Privy Councillors to examine the security procedures applied in the public services and to consider whether any other precautions were called for and should be taken.³ The conference studied the problem and made three suggestions. First, they dealt with the relation between security risks and defects of character and conduct. The general defects of character such as "drunkenness, addiction to drugs, homosexuality or any loose living", seriously affects a man's reliability. Adequate attention must be paid to such character defects of the Civil Servants. The departmental authorities must take full note of these and must not fail to report anything which affects security. The Conference recommended that such serious character defects might, in themselves, be "the determining factor in a decision to dismiss a particular individual or to transfer him to other work".⁴ Secondly, they suggested that a Civil Servant,

1 MacKenzie, W.J.M. & Grove, J.W.: Central Administration in Britain, 1957, p.152

2 Report concerning the disappearance of two former foreign office officials, Cmd. 9577, 1955.

3 Statement on the Findings of the Conference of Privy Councillors on Security, Cmd. 9715, 1956.

4 Ibid.

who is living with a wife or husband who is a communist, or communist sympathiser may have to be removed from work of a secret nature.¹

Thirdly, the conference was of opinion that in difficult and border-line cases 'it is right to continue the practice of tilting the balance in favour of offering greater protection to the security of the state rather than in the direction of safeguarding the rights of the individual'.² Government accepted the view of the Privy Councillors.

In 1948 an independent advisory Committee consisting of two retired Civil Servants and a Trade Union official was set up to deal with such cases. Any individual case may be taken to this body on appeal from the departmental authorities. The Committee sees all the evidence, but security authorities may refuse to disclose some, or all of it, to the person accused. The accused person may appear before the Committee in person, but cannot be assisted by a trade union official or other representative. Proceedings are informal and there is no judicial hearing.³ The Committee seems to have been prepared to take its own line in opposition to the security authorities.⁴

These measures came in for severe criticism from many quarters. Several staff associations protested against these suggestions of the Privy Councillors on the ground that they would constitute an encroachment on the liberty of Civil Servants; Professor MacKenzie and M. Grove,

1 Ibid

2 Ibid

3 MacKenzie, W.J.W. & Grove, J.W. Central Administration in Britain, 1957, p. 153-4

4 Ibid, p.153

commenting on this procedure mentioned above, remarks: "This procedure amounts to imposing a penalty for an action which is not even now regarded as being in itself an offence against discipline, and the penalty may be imposed on the basis of evidence which cannot be produced publicly for examination. The best that can be said is that the authorities have done much to introduce safeguards, and that the number of cases involved is very small".¹ Mr. Douglas Houghton has made a strong plea to maintain a proper balance between the liberty of the individual Civil Servant and the security of the State.²

The responsibility of the government in these matters is very great. We think that proper care should be taken to guard against the danger of character assassination by irresponsible and anonymous accusers. They should be dealt with as sharply as a security suspect himself is treated. Meticulous care, in our view, should be taken so that security operations may result neither in tale-bearing, nor in malicious gossip, nor witch-hunting within the Civil Service, otherwise, these will damage the morale of the Civil Servants and curtail their existing rights unnecessarily, and that will be disastrous to administrative integrity and efficiency. Commenting on this, the American Assembly concluded: "Clearly the national interest requires effective employee security procedures. But basic human values are at stake when an

1 Ibid, p. 155

2 Douglas Houghton, "Security Measures for Civil Servants", The Listener, Vol. LVII, No. 1453, 1957

employee is charged with disloyalty. Security charges in today's climate of public opinion cast a stigma on the employee which may quite literally ruin him and his family. We are uncomfortably aware that existing security procedures - and, even more, a widespread public misconception of what the security program is in fact - are doing serious damage to recruitment and to the effectiveness and morale of the Government Service".¹ We think that the security measures should be administered in an orderly, judicious and discerning way.

Political Activity

In Pakistan there are a few general rules which impose restrictions on the social and political activities of the Civil Servants.² They exist to secure and maintain the social neutrality and the non-partisan character of the administration. A Civil Servant is not to receive, except according to certain prescribed conditions, any complimentary address, or any entertainment from a member of the public or from a group or from a political party, and he is not to attend any public meeting held in his honour. He is not to receive, without the previous sanction of the government, any trowel, key, or other article offered to him in a ceremonial function. A Civil Servant cannot be a member of a political party or group. He cannot canvass or interfere, or use his influence in connection with, or take part in, any election to a legislative body in Pakistan. He is not to issue an address to electors nor is he to announce

¹ The American Assembly: The Federal Government Services: Its Character, Prestige and Power, 1954, p. 184

² Government of Pakistan: The Government Servant Conduct Rules, 1955.

publicly or allow himself to be announced publicly as a candidate or prospective candidate for election to a legislative body. Government servants are prohibited from the propagation of sectarian creed or taking part in sectarian controversies or indulging in sectarian partiality and favouritism. Any breach of these instructions or the use of their official position by the government servants to influence the religious beliefs of their associates, may render them liable to dismissal. A civil servant has the right to vote in elections. A civil servant may, without making any reference to political party or individuals who may be in opposition to the Government, defend and explain in public the policy of the government, for the purpose of removing misapprehensions, correcting mis-statements and refuting disloyal and seditious propaganda.¹

In Britain also, before 1949, general restrictions were imposed upon the exercise of political rights by non-industrial civil servants. First, they could not seek election to Parliament under the Servants of the Crown (Parliamentary Candidature) Order, 1927, until they resigned or retired from their employment.² Secondly, the civil servants who were peers could attend the House of Lords when their official duties permitted, but might not take part in debate until they retired or resigned.³ Thirdly, in regard to other forms of political activities,

1 Government Servant Conduct Rules (amended up to 1953).

2 Report of the Committee on the Political Activities of Civil Servants, Cmd. 7718, 1949, p. 7.

3 Ibid.

the non-industrial civil servants could vote and belong to political parties. But the civil servants were expected to maintain at all times a reserve in political matters and not to put themselves forward prominently on one side or the other.¹ The Board of Inquiry in 1928 formulated the general principle which guided the departments in this respect. "There are spheres of activity legitimately open to the ordinary citizen in which the civil servant can play no part, or only a limited part. He is not to indulge in political or party controversy, lest by doing so he should appear no longer the disinterested adviser of Ministers or able, impartially, to execute their policy. He is bound to maintain a proper reticence in discussing public affairs, and more particularly those with which his own Department is concerned".² Fourthly, the participation in local government affairs was dependent on departmental discretion.³ Finally, the industrial civil servants enjoyed greater freedom than others in the exercise of political rights. But most of them were not permitted to accept nomination as Parliamentary Candidates. In other words, they must resign from service before becoming candidates.⁴ "Even this limitation did not apply to industrial civil servants employed by the Service Departments, and there were some other exemptions".⁵

1 ~~Government Servant~~ Ibid. p. 8

2 Cmd. 3037, of 1928

3 Cmd. 7718 of 1949, p. 9

4 MacKenzie, W.J.M. & Grove, J.W. Central Administration in Britain, 1957, p. 156

5 Ibid.

The fundamental question now is whether these restrictions on the political rights of the Civil Servants should be retained, relaxed or withdrawn. The problem has been very ably debated in Britain before the Masterman Committee appointed in 1948 "to examine the existing limitations on the political activities (both national and local) which may be undertaken by the Civil Government staffs and to make recommendations as to any changes which may be desirable in the public interest".¹ We may briefly refer to the main arguments used in the debate by the Official side and the staff-side for and against the abolition of restrictions on the political rights of the Civil Servants.

The members of the National Staff Side in Britain, who have advocated for the elimination of the differentiation between the Civil Servants and the rest of the community so far as political rights are concerned, have based their arguments on the following grounds. Firstly, it is undemocratic to restrict the political rights of an increasingly large group of people. A larger segment of population is drawn into State employment with the expansion of a welfare state. Secondly, the Civil Service contains a large number of persons who are well-educated, intelligent and well-versed in administrative machinery. Hence, they are well qualified for service in Parliament. Restrictions on their political rights prevent them from enriching the political life by their contribution. Political parties and the legislative bodies are deprived

¹ Report of the Committee on the Political Activities of Civil Servants, Cmd. 7718, 1949

of their contribution. These restrictions are, therefore, "harmful to public interest". On this basis it may be all the more undesirable to deprive the civil servants of political rights in a country like Pakistan where the number of educated people is very low owing to the under-developed character of the educational system. Thirdly, the representatives of the staff-side have argued that all specific prohibitions and restrictions in regard to general political activities should be removed as these are "wrong in principle, out of tune with current thoughts, unwise in present-day conditions and unnecessary in practice".¹ Finally, they argue that the restrictions on the political rights of the civil servants create an unnecessary and undesirable discrimination as the employees of the public corporations and public companies can enjoy the exercise of political rights while their opposite numbers in the Civil Service are subjected to restrictions in regard to political rights..

The dominant consideration on which the advocates of the status quo, that is the official side, have built their arguments is the preservation of the non-partisan character of the administration and the basic neutrality of the civil servants in political affairs. Firstly, the official side argues that the Civil Service must have not only the reality but the appearance of political neutrality. The over-riding consideration must be to maintain the existing reputation of the service for political neutrality and the public confidence in its freedom from all possibility of bias".² If the civil servants, other than those who

1 Ibid, p. 11

2 Cmd. 7718 of 1949, p. 13

belong to minor grades, are allowed freely to engage in politics, to stand for Parliament, to return to service after sitting as M.P.'s and thus to declare their alliance to one party or the other, the public's belief in their impartiality will be destroyed with disastrous results to the Service and the country.¹ Supporting the recommendation of the Blanesburgh Committee of 1925 to the same effect, the Masterman Committee said, "This need is, we think, axiomatic and will not be disputed".² They also believe that the efficient and smooth working of democratic government depends very largely in maintaining the public confidence in the impartiality of the Civil Servants, and on the people, believing that, notwithstanding political change, the Civil Service will be completely loyal to the Government of the day. The extension of the functions of the state greatly increases the need for maintaining the impartiality of the service. Secondly, the official side points out that no minister can have full confidence in his civil servants if they are seriously or overtly involved in party politics. It will destroy a minister's confidence in the ability of Civil Servants to give equally loyal service to whichever party is in power. Thirdly, complete political freedom will jeopardise the relationship of the individual Civil servant to his fellow colleagues. The suspicion that promotion and other rewards depend upon the proper political allegiance will constitute a danger to the merit system and the morale of the Civil Service.

1 Ibid.

2 Ibid. p. 14

It will raise a multitude of suspicions, legitimate or otherwise. It may lead down a slippery slope to a renewal of patronage appointment. It may also lead to favouritism, jobbery and victimisation within the department and will seriously injure administrative efficiency. It may give rise to a spoils system. Professor Finer sums up: "If the belief in the political impartiality or neutrality of tendered advice and execution of commands should be shaken, we should be faced with the social tragedy that the political chiefs - who are unskilled and casual workers - would hesitate to accept the skilled aid of the permanent experts. They would be tempted to remove those they distrusted and put their own 'experts' in their place. They would deny the value and possibility of the existence of objective science, natural, social, economic or administrative, and deprive the state, that is, everyone, by depriving themselves of all the benefits of knowledge from which the sepias of partisanship has been removed".¹ Fourthly, the fact that in Britain the civil servants have behaved discreetly in political affairs and have not damaged the public confidence is due, the official side argues, to the existence of rules and regulations that channel political action in a fairly harmless way. Finally, if the civil servants become the 'sport' of political parties, it will involve a great social loss - "the waste of organisation technique, expertness, professional zeal, and the adaptation which comes of years of regular and uninterrupted devotion to duties".²

1. Finer, H: The Theory & Practice of Modern Government, 1950, p. 884

2. Ibid, p. 883

In Britain most of the staff associations did not like the continuance of these restrictions on the political rights of their members and began to press for their removal. The Government, as already noted, appointed a Committee in 1948 to examine whether the existing rules required any modification. The Committee made a valuable survey of the situation and their specific recommendations were based on a compromise between what was regarded as two conflicting principles. These principles were: (i) "in a democratic society it is desirable for all citizens to have a voice in the affairs of the state, and for as many as possible to play an active part in public life". (ii) "The public interest demands the maintenance of political impartiality in the Civil Service and of confidence in that impartiality as an essential part of the structure of Government in this Country".¹

Guided by the fundamental principle of maintaining the non-partisan character of the administration, the Committee offered a modified approach. The Civil servants were divided into two categories. First, all the industrial civil servants and the non-industrial staff in the minor and manipulative grades, with a few exceptions, were to be entirely freed from restrictions, except those imposed by the statute, (for instance, the Official Secrets Acts).² Secondly, above this level, they refused to draw any distinction; the remainder were all to be subject to existing rules. The first part of the recommendations was

1 Report of the Masterman Committee, Cmd. 7718, 1949, p.13

2 MacKensie, P.J.M. & Grove, J.R.: Central Administration in Britain, 1957, p. 156

put into effect in 1950. The second part was quite unacceptable to staff associations. The matter was referred to a joint Committee representing both sides of the National Whitley Council. This led to a compromise which was accepted by the government. The essence of this compromise is to divide the Civil Servants into three categories.¹

Firstly, there is a politically free category. To this category belong all the industrial and non-industrial civil servants in the minor and manipulative grades as suggested by the Masterman Committee. They form about 62 per cent. of the Civil Servants. Secondly, there is an intermediate category. It covers roughly the middle ranges of the service from typists to higher clerical officers, and they are permitted, subject to a code of direction, to undertake all forms of political activities except parliamentary candidature. 22 per cent. of the Civil Servants belong to this category. Thirdly, there is a politically restricted category. It includes the administrative and executive classes, the corresponding departmental classes and those of equivalent status in the scientific, professional and technical Civil Service. They can vote in elections and belong to any political party which is not illegal. They are debarred from all other political activities in national politics. They can participate in local affairs, subject to departmental permission. They represent 16 per cent. of the Civil Servants.²

1. Political Activities of Civil Servants, Cmd. 8783, 1953.

2. Ibid. p.11

These changes remove many 'indefensible anomalies', and also represent significant relaxation of the old system. Most of the British Civil servants except the higher ones enjoy substantial political freedom. The British approach represents an excellent reconciliation between the vital need to preserve public confidence in the political integrity and impartiality of the Civil Service on the one hand, and the political rights of the Civil servants on the other. It is very difficult to be exact as to whether it has led to any harmful consequence; but the indications are that it has produced no harmful effects. It is due to two main reasons. First, the grant of political rights to civil servants in Britain is the product of a lengthy evolution, marked by cautious experimentation. "There the evolution of political rights of civil servants, has moved, step by step, towards rather liberal and differentiated solution", writes Prof. F. M. Marx.¹ Secondly, the British Civil servants individually, and their staff associations collectively, are discreet, judicious and responsible in political matters. Previous rules and regulations and the self-regulating bureaucratic values are contributory to this consummation. The grant of political rights to 84 per cent. of the civil servants is a significant feature of the process of democratisation of the public administration in Britain.

¹ Marx, F.M: The Administrative State. (An Introduction to Bureaucracy). 1957, p. 149

It will not be wise to indulge in any facile generalisation on the basis of British experience, because the very high level of political maturity which Britain has attained may not be present in another country. The question, therefore, of the retention or removal or even relaxation of control on the political rights of the Civil Servants depends on the conditions obtaining in each country. There seems to be no formula which is capable of universal application. "The answer", Professor Finer says, "must differ in each society, for not all are on exactly the same level of public spirit, political maturity, social equanimity".¹ Conditions in Pakistan are not ripe for any significant change in this direction. Political maturity is yet to develop properly and firmly among the people. The people are overwhelmingly illiterate. Only a little over 18 per cent. can read and write. Apart from this, there have been allegations of political corruption on the part of many Civil Servants. Mr. Gurmani pointed out in a statement in 1957, "In Pakistan, however, the administrators have taken upon themselves the task of making and unmaking ministries. The result is that at present the country is being ruled by a coterie of foolish politicians and the 'king-maker' administrators".² Mr. Gurmani occupied very high positions in the government. He did not, however, cite any instance in support of his statement. But there have been numerous instances when some of the Civil

1 Finer, H: The Theory & Practice of Modern Government, 1950, p. 885

2 The Pakistan Times, October 20, 1957. Mr. Gurmani was a member of the Central Cabinet and later on Governor of the Province of West Pakistan.

Some officials were weak and could not resist the political pressure which had been brought to bear on them. Some of the officials who had the courage and honesty to resist such pressure were transferred to 'penal' stations.¹ To many of the politicians in power the temptation was great to use the influence of government officials to secure power. In the Punjab elections of 1951 the influence of the officials was used to such an extent by the politicians to put pressure on the voters that the Electoral Reforms Commission recommended the dissolution of the ministries on the eve of elections.² This shows that many of the politicians were devoid of any sense of responsibility. The policies and activities of self-seeking politicians who had been dominant in the political field after the death of Quaid-i-Azam Jinnah, seemed to have done a positive dis-service to the country by destroying the non-political character of many of the civil servants. Commenting on this, in the context of the Indian situation, Mr. Gorwala said, "One of the worst dis-services any political party could do the country would be to destroy this non-political attitude on the part of government servants"³ Again, some of the civil servants themselves revealed a tendency to become politicians. Two of the very senior and top-ranking officials occupied two very high political offices immediately on resigning their

1 For detailed information see Callard, K: Pakistan (A Political Study), 1957.

2 Report of the Electoral Reforms Commission, 1956.

3 Government of India, Report on Public Administration by G. B. Gorwala, 1953, p.23

positions as officials. One of them became the Finance Minister in 1951. Prior to that he was the Secretary-General to the Government of Pakistan. In that capacity, he had organised and headed the Civil Service in Pakistan. Originally, he had been a member of the old Indian Audit and Accounts Service. Subsequently he had become the Prime Minister and remained in that position from 1955 to 1956. The other one had been a civil servant for twenty-eight years, and had been Secretary to the Ministry of Defence from 1947 to 1954 when he was appointed the Minister of the Interior. Subsequently he became the Governor-General and ultimately the President of Pakistan with the inauguration of the new Constitution in 1956. There is nothing wrong if a Civil Servant resigns his job, and joins any political party and then comes to occupy political office. In these two cases they had been Civil servants immediately before they came to occupy political offices. The suddenness with which they moved from their positions as Civil servants to political offices as Ministers creates a strong suspicion that they had been politicians in the guise of Civil servants. Without casting any reflection on their personal conduct, it may be said that the example they set before the Civil servants cannot in any way inspire them to maintain their political neutrality and impartiality. This is, indeed, very unfortunate.

Hence, the critics argue that the Civil servants as the largest occupational group should remain without political rights to maintain the political neutrality of administration. The grant of political

freedom, the critics fear, will lead to a situation in which a Civil Servant will use his official position to help his political career and his political career to improve his official position. This will destroy public confidence in the neutrality of administration.

Nevertheless, we think that there should be no dogmatism about the political rights of the Civil Servants. What is necessary is a pragmatic and cautious approach to the issue. It seems that it may be worthwhile to make a modest experiment in granting political rights to a group of Civil servants in the lower grades. They might be permitted to contest elections to local bodies - corporations, municipalities, district boards and union boards - as independent candidates after obtaining the permission of the Government. The exercise of political rights by them might be subject to two conditions. First, they would enjoy this right for a specified period of time. If they show moderation, discretion and wisdom in exercising this right, the period could be extended. Secondly, the Unions of these Civil Servants should agree to observe a code of discretion to guide the political activities of their members. The code can be formulated by joint consultation between the government and service associations. If the experiment proves a success, the government can apply it to other categories of Civil Servants.

Some suggestions.

Development of public morality takes a long time. In the meantime,

Instances in which corrupt officials are brought to book should be widely known. But it is necessary to see that propaganda to educate the public opinion on these matters should be carried on in such a way as not to give the impression that the whole Civil Service consists of suspects and corrupt persons. It will have a demoralising effect on the morale of the Civil Service. The political leaders and politicians have a great deal of responsibility in this connection. They must submit to self-denying ordinances and must not in any way use the officials for personal and party ends. Thirdly, measures for the improvement of the standards of conduct and integrity leave much to be desired in two particular respects. Measures for the improvement of the conditions of service are inadequate so far. They need revision. The case for the appointment of a Commission with comprehensive terms of reference as suggested in this monograph seems to be urgent. Again, the various employee associations are not making earnest efforts to improve the professional standards of their members. Most of these associations are not treated with sufficient consideration and trust by the government. The office-bearers of these associations often fail to realise that all their efforts and energies are not to be concentrated on the improvement of pay-scales alone, but should also be directed to the building up of sound ethical standards among their members. Fourthly, the various organisational and personnel measures adopted by the government need to be strengthened and improved on the lines

suggested in the above paragraphs. ^{The} Organisation and Methods Units have been set up in the President's Secretariat for a co-ordinated and scientific approach to the problems of administrative efficiency. The Organisation and Methods units have also been set up in some other departments. The former is to guide, co-ordinate and inspect the work of the departmental units. Systematic increase of Organisation and Methods activities may result in the improvement of administrative efficiency. Organisational improvement, it may be pointed out, alone will not increase administrative efficiency but more adequate attention should be paid to personnel improvement on the lines suggested in this monograph to improve the standards of integrity. Commenting on this Mr. Parnwell remarks, "No administration problem is solved by organisational change alone. Government consists in the acts of human beings, and organisation can at the best do no more than contribute towards the co-ordination, control, speed and effectiveness of these acts. If at any level human beings engaged in the work of government are inexperienced, ill-trained, lacking in suitable abilities, disaffected, self-centred or indolent there is much to be done quite outside the field of organisation before Government can achieve a high level of integrity and efficiency".¹ But the existence of these handicaps, Mr. Parnwell points out, does not in any way reduce the significance of right organisation.² The entire recruitment and training policies and arrange-

¹ Report by L. Parnwell on Organisation & Methods in the East Pakistan Government (Colombo Plan, Technical Co-operation), 1958, p. 2.

² Ibid.

ments are to be directed towards the improvement of the standards of conduct among the civil servants. Fifthly, the conception of disciplinary action should not be restricted, as at present, to specific acts or omissions on the part of the civil servants, but should also be extended to take into account efficiency, lack of initiative and interest in the performance of their official duties. Discipline should be given a broader connotation. Disciplinary procedure should be simplified on the lines suggested in this monograph. Sixthly, continuous emphasis within the Civil Service should be laid on moral standards, primarily by the long shadow of the conduct of senior officers. The individual example of the senior official, it may be pointed out, will have a salutary effect on the morale and conduct of subordinate officials. "Professional standards will become part of the civil servant's personal standards largely through the inspiration and example provided by colleagues whom he admires or for whom he feels personal regard. Good human relations are generally necessary for the retention of professional standards", says Professor Ascher.¹ This statement contains a substantial element of truth if allowance is made for a bit of exaggeration. In British India the examples and standards of conduct of the I.C.S. and other superior officers played an effective role in improving the ethical standards of junior and subordinate officers. The senior officials

1 C.S. Ascher: Professional & Ethical Standards for the Conduct of Civil Servants - a paper submitted to the 11th International Congress of Administrative Science, 1953:

now-a-days are yet to realise fully that their leadership can play a very significant role in building up higher professional standards of conduct among their subordinates.

In Britain the Civil Service enjoys a world-wide reputation for honesty, integrity and impartiality. If we analyse the reasons for this happy state of affairs, we find that a strong and high professional ethic, reasonably good terms and conditions of employment, a high level of political maturity keeping the Civil Servant outside political and other public controversies are mainly responsible. A country wishing to maintain high standards of conduct and integrity among its Civil Servants should do well to pay adequate attention to these factors.

CHAPTER SEVEN

Conclusion

The Civil Service which Pakistan inherited from British India at the time of independence and partition was born in response to the basic functions carried on by the Government in the past. The main functions of the government were confined to the maintenance of law and order, collection of revenue and administration of justice. The machinery of the Civil Service that was created was admirably suited to these purposes. Under the stress of social and economic necessity some changes took place in this system from time to time but fundamentally and broadly the methods and outlook of the Civil Servants, the task they performed and the system on which they worked remained unchanged.

After independence the position vastly and materially changed. There have been fundamental changes in the objectives and functions of the government and they are nowhere more marked than in the social and economic fields. The social and economic objectives of the government have been stated in the following words: "The economic and social objectives of Government's policy are well known. They are to develop the resources of the country as rapidly as possible so as to promote the welfare of the people, provide adequate living standards and social services, secure social justice and equality of opportunity and aim at the widest and most equitable distribution of income and property."¹

1 The First Five Year Plan (1955-60). Vol. I. 1956, p. 7

These aims have been further enshrined in the Directive Principles of the Constitution of 1956.¹ The state shall endeavour, inter alia, to provide each man and woman with the basic necessities of life such as food, clothing, housing, education and medical aid. In order to realise these objectives which would involve a gradual process, the Government of Pakistan have embarked on comprehensive programmes of social and economic development on the basis of successive five year plans. Planning for socio-economic development has become the most important continuing activity of the government. We have moved into an era of planning: planning for mass well-being.

As the instrument of the government, the Civil Services have to be put against this new perspective of the state and its true purposes and functions. The Civil Servants are called upon to assume new responsibilities which are increasing in scope, variety and complexity as development expands and acquires tempo, with successive five-year plans adding urgency to the problem. The question has arisen whether the inherited organisation of the Civil Services is adequate or appropriate for fulfilling the needs of a government which has a fundamentally different character and objectives from the previous administration.

The gravamen of charge against the Civil Service is that with a major shift in government policies from regulating the life of the community to positive actions for promoting its welfare, the Civil Servloe

1. Articles 28 and 29

has become 'outmoded and seriously inadequate'. "Originating in the necessity for a uniform system of law and order and revenue administration over the whole of the Indian sub-continent as a symbol of its political unity under British rule, the scope of its command extended gradually with the expansion of the Government's sphere of activities. But its own evolution - the increase of its cadre strength, the improvement of its methods of recruitment, training, posting and promotion, and most important of all, the reorientation of its outlook - has not kept pace with the enlargement of its responsibilities. This disparity has come to the fore since independence with the emergence of development as the Government's supreme task¹. This is true of other Central Superior Services besides the C.S.P. It is generally recognised that if the Civil Services are to occupy their true positions effectively and usefully in the new setting, they must undergo a series of reforms designed to make them stronger in organisation and number, broader-based, less entrenched and more varied in talent, deeper in knowledge, higher in quality and integrity and, last but not least, wider in outlook.

The discussion in the previous chapters has indicated that some re-orientation has been brought about in the organisation of the Civil Services since independence. But the actual re-orientation, as emphasised in the preceding discussion, falls far short of meeting the increasingly complex needs of a state committed to the socio-economic welfare of its people. The main defects of the programmes of personnel reform

1 First Five Year Plan, Vol. I. 1956, p. 122

are that they have lacked comprehensiveness, imagination, boldness and scientific thinking which are so vitally and urgently needed in the transformation of the weakened Civil Services into a highly efficient and honest instrument of national welfare. There is no doubt that the magnitude of the problem of reform is vast and its nature highly complex. The process has to be a continuing one. The reforms introduced and the results achieved so far indicate that there is a considerable lack of breadth of views and ideas, clear and hard thinking, firm direction and sustained effort in the field of personnel administration in Pakistan. The success of socio-economic planning is a matter of urgency in Pakistan. The high quality of the public administration is one of the vital factors to achieve success in this field. But adequate consciousness of this fact does not appear to have gripped the mind of the Central Government. No more important task confronts those in charge of country's affairs than that of improving and continuing to improve, by all means at their disposal, the quality of the Civil Services in Pakistan.

The Civil servants in order to be effective in their new tasks have not only to possess high quality and new skills but also a more forward-looking attitude and a larger capacity to win public confidence and support. The outlook of the Civil Services has also to undergo changes. The Civil servants should have a progressive outlook. On the intellectual side, the main ingredients of a progressive outlook are: readiness to accept new social ideas, responsiveness to new urges of the

nation, preparedness to learn and try new techniques of human relations, eagerness to understand the social and human implications and consequences of official acts, willingness to profit by criticism, a self-critical and introspective attitude and several other allied traits. On the moral side, they can be summed up in the relentless effort to make the Civil Service true to its name. The Civil servants owe to the community and to themselves the duty of living up to their high positions by making themselves as useful as possible. They should be constantly alive to the needs and problems of the people, establish an identity of aims and interests with them, meet them on equal terms, try to win their confidence and willing support and co-operation, and in short, establish a living human fellowship with the people.² There is no 'magic formula' for bringing about the kind of transformation that is called for. Nevertheless, the process must be consciously, deliberately and purposively assisted and accelerated. The basic requirement is a self-reforming effort on the part of the Civil Service itself. But this effort must be helped by civil service policies in matters like organisation, recruitment, training, conditions of service and conduct. After discussing the general requirements for bringing about radical reform in the field of personnel development, it may be useful to summarise here the main suggestions made in the previous chapters with regard to the lines on which the reform of the Civil Services should proceed in future.

The following changes are necessary in the structural organisation of the Civil Services. First, the existing barriers between the C.S.P.

1). *The First Five Year Plan, op.cit. vol. I, 1956, p. 132*

2). *Ibid.*

and other non-technical Central Superior Services should be removed by integrating them into a single unified Civil Service. The existing services should be converted into branches of this single unified Civil Service, all having identical scales of pay, prospects of promotion, retirement and pension rules and leave. The established rights of the existing incumbents should, however, be protected. A single unified Civil Service, apart from ensuring a supply of general administrators with a broad sweep of the field of administration and integrated outlook and a better utilisation of talents in the service, would greatly reduce the existing cobwebs of narrow departmentalism, class-consciousness, mutual jealousies and complexes in the services. It would develop a consciousness of unity and homogeneity in the Civil Service because all the Civil Servants would then be members of the same fraternity. Second, a common pool consisting of posts of common service nature, posts requiring all-round experience, posts involving administrative leadership and high-level co-ordination, should be instituted. The Pool should have two sections - one for higher executive posts and the other for higher secretariat posts. It would thus constitute a new elite corps of senior officers and administrative leaders with elements drawn from all the branches of a single unified Civil Service on the basis of merit and ability. Third, the hierarchy within the administration needs revision and elaboration to meet the requirements of an administration geared to socio-economic planning and administration. Fourth, rigid stratification within the Civil Service needs to be greatly relaxed. Cadres should

be enlarged and made more flexible. Vertical mobility needs to be improved by adequate promotional opportunities. It would improve the human relations within the Civil Service, provide incentives to lower officers and develop personnel potentialities for the benefit of efficiency in administration. Horizontal mobility, wherever appropriate, should be improved for the sake of better administrative co-operation.

Fifth, the specialist civil servants whose role and number are increasing within the administration should be accorded due recognition. The specialists Civil Servants having great administrative gifts and ability should be transferred to the rank of general administrators. All measures and conventions should be adopted to create better understanding and co-operation between the generalist Civil Servants and the specialist civil servants. Certain technical services should be organized on an all-Pakistan basis like the existing C.S.P. It would not only satisfy the expanding demand for competent technical manpower and ensure a high standard of efficiency and performance by enlarging the field of recruitment but would also ^{serve as} ~~be~~ a lever for national unity which Pakistan needs so vitally. Sixth, the Establishment Division which serves as the Central Personnel Agency should be located in the President's Secretariat and not in the Ministry of the Interior as at present, to enable the President to be directly and intimately associated with personnel administration which is highly desirable to improve the morals of the officers. It would also enable the Secretary of the President's Secretariat to offer official leadership in this matter. Besides, the Central Personnel

Agency should have adequate and well-trained staff answerable to its important tasks in personnel administration.

In the field of recruitment the basic problem is to get the right kind of people for various services. The existing methods and techniques of recruitment need a thorough re-examination and re-assessment and too much adherence to them is to be avoided. First, if the recruitment of officers is to be improved, the eighty per cent. of the vacancies in the Central Services - higher and lower - filled on the basis of a provincial quota designed to provide for the representation of the provinces in the Services should be progressively reduced. Merit alone should ultimately be the basis of recruitment to all the services. Secondly, vigorous efforts should be made to invent new techniques and methods of recruitment by a process of broad job analysis and 'follow-up' inquiries if recruitment is to play an important and effective part in finding men not only of ability and right stamp but also of executive capacity for the Services. A Research Unit within the Federal Public Service Commission to construct new recruiting tests and to assess their usefulness by 'follow-up' enquiries should be set up without delay. Third, the psychological testing of the candidates still at an experimental stage must be made more elaborate and intensive. Fourth, the introduction of the pre-Board technique of interview would be a useful step in the right direction. The "Assessment Form" giving the Interview Board the factual history of the previous records of the candidates should be continued. Fifth, Method II as a new technique of recruitment which has proved a

success in Britain might be tried on an experimental basis in Pakistan. Sixth, the long standing complaint about the misuse by ministries and departments of their power to make temporary appointments must be effectively dealt with by the use of new and appropriate practices. Rigid adherence to the regulations with regard to this matter is necessary. Seventh, the office of the Federal Public Service Commission should be strengthened in size to enable it to cope with its various tasks expeditiously and effectively.

Finally, mere improvement in the methods and techniques of recruitment will not go very far in enabling the government to build up a first-rate staff at all levels, unless it is accompanied by a few other fundamental reforms. The most urgent reform in this direction is the radical overhaul of the entire educational system of the country at all stages and more particularly at the higher level. A sound and thorough general education of a high quality is the primary foundation of an efficient Civil Service. A radical reform of the educational system will improve the tone and quality of education and apart from other things, will improve the quality and calibre of the candidates who seek to compete for the Civil Services. The task is urgent, immediate and fundamental and cannot brook any delay in view of the rather unsatisfactory intellectual attainments of most of the recruits to the various higher services.

Selection is but the first step. Having secured the requisite material, they have to be helped to be at their best. The Civil Servants need to be more consciously and deliberately directed towards higher

ideals and standards of service. This can only be done by a planned and purposeful training. The need for systematic training has been accepted. But the existing arrangements for the training of the Civil Servants needs to be considerably elaborated, intensified and strengthened. First, the courses of study for the higher category of Civil Servants should be made more comprehensive by the inclusion of the fundamentals of social sciences - political science, public administration, economics, sociology, statistics and international institutions and organisations. The nature of training must be related to the new functions of the Civil Servants. Second, the two Academies should be amalgamated into a single one. Apart from helping to develop esprit de corps among the higher officers, it would mean bigger libraries and better equipment so urgently necessary. University professors should be associated with ^{the Academies} ~~Civil Servants~~ to carry on the necessary instruction and advising. Third, the Police Training College should be well-organised and equipped. Fourth, the management of the Academies and training institutes should not be left to the departments as at present: They should be governed by an Executive Council consisting of Civil Servants, University professors and distinguished members of the public. Fifth, the practical training of all the higher Civil Servants should be more systematic and elaborate. The five months' practical training of the C.S.P. officers, for example, might be extended to cover a year to enable them to have a thorough grounding in district administration. It also needs more effective supervision. Sixth, the one year academic

course which the young recruits to the C.S.P. pursue in the Universities of Oxford and Cambridge should be continued. Seventh, the training of the middle level and lower civil servants is very important. Existing arrangements for training where they exist should be made more elaborate. Training needs to be made compulsory for them. Training arrangements for the clerical staff should be made without delay. The curriculum should include, apart from other things, a course on human relations.

In eighth place, in-service training should be more carefully devised and made more elaborate by making adequate provisions for refresher courses, conferences, group discussion and mobility between departments and between the centre and the province to equip the officers for higher responsibilities. The grant of sabbatical leave on a wide scale would be a useful step in this direction. The creation of an Institute of Public Administration would go a long way in stimulating research on problems of public administration. It would serve as a valuable centre for research, and dissemination of new ideas on administration. Civil servants, University professors and members of the public could get together for scientific discussion on problems of government and administration. The Universities should be encouraged to start departments of public administration. The establishment of an Administrative Staff College on the ideals and model of the one at Henley in Britain would remove a great lacuna in the training arrangement for higher administration. Finally, the setting up of adequate machinery for the co-ordination and central guidance of the training schemes within the Central

(1) Three National Institutes of Public Administration were set up.

(2) An Administrative Staff College was set up in 1960.

Personnel agency would contribute towards the effectiveness of training programmes and arrangements. The appointment of a Director of Training and Education would be a useful step in this direction.

The general conditions of work form the main factors which determine the attractiveness of employment and retention of staff. To maintain the standards of the service, they must be kept sufficiently good to attract and retain people of the best type and officers should then be able to develop their ability and efficiency and preserve their contentment and morale at a high level. Exaggerated regard for economy would not be conducive to high professional standards and might prove more expensive in the end. On the other hand, too liberal conditions might elevate the officers into a caste in a poor country like Pakistan and too poor conditions of service would impair efficiency and morale on the other.

First, the pay structure needs to be rationalised to provide for living wages to the lowest categories of Civil Servants. The existing disparity between the lowest and highest levels of pay should be narrowed to give a more balanced pay structure. Second, the scales of pay of the Superior Civil Servants should be made more uniform. This can be done by integrating them into a single unified Civil Service. The adequacy of their pay scales needs competent investigation. Third, adequate provision for flexibility should be there in the pay structure so that it can keep pace with the fluctuating prices, a common phenomenon in a growing economy of an under-developed country. Fourth, some

comparison between the Civil Service remunerations and the remunerations in outside comparable employments would be highly valuable for the proper flow of man of ability into the Civil Service. Fifth, retirement benefits should make more adequate provisions for the economic security of the family and dependants of the officers. Sixth, retirement benefits should be carefully and judiciously used for the elimination of the unfit from the Civil Service. Seventh, promotions at the higher levels of the service should be based on merit. Those who are able must be provided with adequate opportunities for the utilisation of their ability. The spirit and enthusiasm of the able and the efficient must not be allowed to be drained away by being held down at the end of a long queue. In this, increased opportunities providing greater responsibilities and interest are as much important, and even more than, actual advancement. Eighth, the machinery for promotion must be above suspicion. It must satisfy all concerned that however defective and faulty, it at least seeks to reward merit, that it is genuinely inspired by the interest of the public service, and that it seeks no personal or private ends. The system of carefully devised reports on officers, the judicious use of promotion committees, adequate publicity to all the vacancies to be filled by promotion, the limited competitive examination, the right of appeal by those adversely affected and interview might provide a more satisfactory basis to assess merit as the criterion of promotion.

The work of the Civil Servant is closely bound up with the welfare of society and the high standards of integrity and morals of the Civil

Service are an important aspect of the national well-being. Low standards of integrity of the Civil Servants reflect adversely and unfavourably upon the prestige and status of Government. There has, unfortunately been considerable deterioration in the standards of integrity in almost all ranks of the Civil Services despite the existence of comprehensive conduct rules, elaborate disciplinary procedure and general and special punitive measures. Punitive measures cannot go very far in improving the standards of integrity among the Civil Servants. Professional standards of conduct among the Civil Servants could be improved by paying attention to a few positive things. First, honesty should be made a positive virtue. Relentless efforts need to be made to discover and reward officers who are well-known for their unquestionable probity by placing them in key and high positions. Second, the ministers and politicians must submit to self-denying ordinances and must put the interest of the public before their own personal and party interests. Vigorous and effective leadership on the part of the high-ranking officials by their own personal examples of higher standards of conduct would go a long way in improving the ethical tone of the Civil Services as a whole. Higher integrity at the higher levels of government - political and administrative - will not be without its powerful impact on the moral tone of the Civil Servants as well as the citizens. There is considerable truth in the dictum of Confucius when he says, "the example of those in high places is like the breeze, and the behaviour of ordinary people is like the grass. When the breeze blows upon the grass,

the grass assuredly bends in the desired direction¹. Third, the development of right kind of public opinion, improvement of the conditions of work, systematic Organisation and Methods activities and more adequate provision for effective supervision of the work of the officials would greatly contribute to the improvement of the moral tone of the Civil Servants. Fourth, the disciplinary procedure should be simplified by maintaining a proper balance between the requirements of justice and security and the need for speedy and strong action. Everyone should have the right of appeal against proposed punishment. The conception of discipline needs to be broadened to take into account inefficiency, lack of initiative and interest in the performance of duties. Fifth, the security measures to deal with 'security problems' should be administered in a judicious, discreet and discerning manner. Finally, the existing restrictions on the political rights of the civil servants, particularly at the higher levels, need to be maintained in the interest of preserving the non-partisan character of administration which is a matter of enormous importance in Pakistan. Nevertheless, a modest beginning should be made in relaxing the restrictions on the political rights of certain categories of lower officers. If it yields good results, the experiment may be extended to other categories of Civil Servants.

In the end, we think that a thorough and comprehensive review of the organisation of the services should be undertaken to make the existing administrative instruments better fitted to serve the needs of an ad-

D. Quoted in "On Matters Administrative" by Gorwala, A. S., (Bombay), 1958, p. 2.

ministration geared to socio-economic planning and administration. This review should be undertaken by a high-level commission, consisting of an outstanding public leader and a few high-ranking officers representing different categories of services. The terms of reference of the Commission should be comprehensive, but broadly stated. Its examination should be directed towards a general review of the existing administrative organisation and the structure of the services, with a view to their integration into a single unified Civil Service, so remunerated as to attract the best available talents. The Commission should also review and examine exhaustively the policy, the rules and regulations relating to recruitment, training, promotion and conduct of the personnel in order to put them on a scientific basis. It should also suggest measures to bring about a closer association between the service and the people. Finally, it should also examine the rules of business, delegations of executive and financial authority to provide for a more efficient and expeditious transaction of government business.

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