

US POLICY TOWARDS AFGHANISTAN, 1942-1991


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Preface

The foreign policy of the United States towards Afghanistan has attracted attention of many developing countries. After independence of the United States Afghanistan sought to make a direct diplomatic relation with the former but was not successful. Between the two world wars US maintained some indirect contacts with Kabul and in 1942 it established direct diplomatic relation with Afghanistan and involved itself in the country's development program. Although the US extended financial help to the Afghan rulers it did not give any direct military and political support to them. US reactions to the 1973 and 1978 *coups* were not so strong.

Why the United States delayed diplomatic recognition to Afghanistan? What was the US role towards Afghanistan between the two world wars? How did the USA develop its relations with Afghanistan after the Second World War? Why the USA did not give the Afghans any military help? Why it did not support the Afghan demand on Pushtunistan issue? What was the US reaction to the 1973 and 1978 *coups* and the Soviet occupation of the country? Why did the US change its policy towards Afghanistan after the Geneva accord and the Soviet withdrawal?

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These complex questions have remained unanswered. It is not also very easy to answer the above-mentioned questions authoritatively and satisfactorily. Written sources are collected on the contemporary history of Afghanistan especially American policy towards the former. However on the basis of available materials it is possible to find out at least some preliminary and tentative answers to the questions raised above. The present study is in no way an ambitious one but aims at revealing certain complex issues that dominated the shaping the US policy towards Afghanistan.

The study is divided into five chapters. The first chapter is devoted to the discussion of Afghanistan's geo-political situation that created a great concern for British Indian policy makers as well as the European powers particularly Russia. The

second chapter discusses the Afghan foreign policy down to the Second World War. In the third chapter US interest in Afghanistan, its economic and military policy towards Afghanistan are discussed. The fourth chapter makes an effort to discuss briefly the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan and analyses the US reaction to the event. The fifth chapter attempts to discuss US policy towards Afghanistan after the Soviet withdrawal. The conclusion summarizes the whole discussion on the subject and evaluates the US policy towards Afghanistan.

For this study some original documents have been consulted besides a number of scholarly works published on the subject- these are Louis Dupree's *Afghanistan* (1980); Thomas T. Hammond's *Red Flag Over Afghanistan* (1985) and Abdul Samad Ghau's *Fall of Afghanistan An Insider Accounts* (1989) were specially helpful. The materials including journals, diplomatic papers, government documents available to the researches till 1995 have been thoroughly reviewed. An interview with Afghan charge *de* Affairs in Bangladesh, Ghulam Mohammad Sukhanyar, was rewarding. He very kindly supplied this researcher with some contemporary documents.

Besides a copy of the Geneva Accord (1988) two maps of Afghanistan have been appended. One indicating country's national and international boundary and important roads; the other represents the geo-political and strategic importance of Afghanistan in world context.

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
I like to acknowledge my indebtedness to a number of persons and institutions for the successful completion of this study. Syed Mohammad Shahan Shah Shaheen, a former student of history, first suggested me to take up this subject and introduced me to Professor Dr. K.M. Mohsin of the Department of History who kindly accepted me as a M. Phil student. I wish to record my thanks and gratitude to my supervisor, who despite his usual pressure of works very kindly went through the chapters and offered useful suggestions for improvement. I am thankful to the Bangladesh Institute of International and Strategic Studies specially to its library staff - Mr. Nasiruddin and



Mr. Emdadul Haque who helped me in various ways. Without their co-operation I would have missed much valuable materials that were collected for BIISS Library. I owe a deep appreciation to the authority of Dhaka University Central Library specially to Mr. Amanullah and Mr. Ratan Kumar Das, for their courtesy and co-operation extended to me during my work in the Library. I am highly indebted to Professor Mohammad Ibrahim of the Dept. of Islamic History and Culture, University of Dhaka, who helped me by lending a number of important books on Afghanistan from his own collections. I am grateful to the Afghan charge the affairs in Dhaka with whom I had detailed discussion about the recent crisis in Afghanistan. The authorities of the Dhaka University granted me a scholarship for two years for my research. Without this scholarship it was not possible to complete the present work.

I will never forget the affection of my friends- Sajjad Hussain, Farid Amin and Mrs. Lucky who always helped me whenever I needed it.

I would also like to express my special thanks to Mr. Md. Masudur Rahman and the authority of Shuvessa Computer who took extra care to compose the thesis.



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US Policy Towards Afghanistan, 1942-1991

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Chapter One

Geo- Political Background of Afghanistan

Afghanistan is located in Central Asia and bounded by Iran on the west; on the north by former Soviet Asia, more particularly by the republics of Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan and Tajikistan; on the extreme northeast, at the tip of the Wakhan corridor by the People's Republic of China; on the east and south by Pakistan. The country shares its total international frontier of 5,770 k.m. with these neighbors as follows: China (71 k.m), Pakistan (2466 k.m.); Iran (850 k.m.) and the former Soviet Russia (2383 k.m.).¹ The physiography of Afghanistan may be divided broadly into four geographic zones: the central and northern mountain ranges and the three low land basins grouped around them, the northern lowlands of the Amu Daryah known in ancient times as the Oxus, the Kabul river basin in the east, and the Helmand basin in the south west. The principal mountain system of the country is the Hindu Kush, which with its various offshoots extends for about 966 kilometers from the Pamirs, a range in the north-east, to the borders of Iran in the west. The Hindu Kush mountain system can be divided into six zones: the wakhean corridor Pamirs knot (the roof of world), Badakhshan, the central mountains, the eastern mountains, the northern mountains and foothills and the southern mountains and foothills. The remaining part of the country, which consists of deserts and plains surrounding the Hindu Kush, can be divided into the following five zones - the Turkestan plains, the Herat-Farah lowlands, the Seistan Basin-Helmand Valley, the western stony desert and the south-western sandy deserts.² Although the climate varies sharply between the highlands and lowlands, it is everywhere dry. Its remoteness from the ocean deprives the region of the moderating effect produced by water, with the result that winter tends to be extremely cold and the

summer very hot. The temperature in the winter in the Hindu Kush mountain of the northeast falls to 26^oC (-15^oF) but in the south-west in summer it reaches 48.8^oC (12^oF). Snow and rain fall from January to April, the rest of the year is dry.

Out of the area of about 653000 k.m.³, about 12 percent is cultivated annually; with an average rainfall of only about ten inches; agriculture and irrigation, therefore, depend upon its rivers originating from the mountains and hurrying down to north-east and south. The main river of the country, the Amu Daryah (12.50 k.m.) forms the border between Afghanistan and Russia for one hundred and forty k.m.⁴ rises in the Hindu Kush and flows, north-west ward in to the sea of Aral; the Hari Rud in the north and north west its valley is one of the most fertile in Afghanistan. The Kabul River, which is largely unnavigable is 611 k.m. long, joins the Indus at Attock in Pakistan; the Helmand, the longest river (1126 k.m.) in the country which flows into Hamun, an inland lake. Its (Helmand) water has been used from the remote past for irrigation. In addition to this main four major rivers the Panjshir Logar, Loghman and Kumar are major perennial rivers in the east. The Surkhab, Kundus, Kokcha, and Band-i-Amir are perennial tributaries in the north.⁵

Although Afghanistan is mainly mountainous, there are fertile valleys and plains, which, with irrigation from small rivers and wells, grow fruits, vegetables and cereals. Principal crops are wheat, barley and varieties of vegetables. The major industrial crops- cotton and sugar grow in the north, while in the south and east grapes, melons and peaches of high quality are profitable export crops. But production is limited owing to shortage of modern machinery, fertilizer and high quality seeds. The most important export commodities are dried food and Karkul skins while the imported goods are machinery, motor vehicles, petroleum products and textiles. Afghanistan is rich in mineral

resources- silver, copper, coal, iron, lead, gold, chrome, talc, rubies and *lapis lazuli*. Opium is also an important cash crop in many of the areas such in Northern Afghanistan.

Though the country has a bright prospect, is economically backward because of the political instability that began in 1978 by the Russian occupation, secondly, the lack of necessary sea port and navigable rivers has hindered economic expansion. As a land locked country it is entirely dependent on transit facilities from its neighbors for its international trade and transportation within Afghanistan is poorly developed. To mention its causes Donald N. Wilber said "ever since world trade shifted from the cumbersome overland transport routes between Asia and Europe to the ocean lanes and the route through the Suez Canal, communications across Afghanistan have lost their economic significance. Having remained outside the territorial limits of the British Empire and Commonwealth, the country did not reap the benefits of strategic rail and road networks, as did its neighbor Pakistan. In fact Afghanistan's involuntary role as buffer state between Russia and British India discouraged foreign companies and governments alike from contributing to the growth of modern communications within it."⁶ With this external circumstances, violent spring floods created a constant problem to maintain good road system. Transport, before the introduction of motor vehicles and paved roads in the twentieth century, was by animals, the camel being the long distance carrier. Much merchandise is still transported on camel or pony-back. Lacking railways and with few navigable rivers, it relies on roads as the mainstay of its transport system. But most paved roads linking major centers, have been carpeted with American and Russian assistance were heavily damaged during the war with the former Soviet Russia and became almost inaccessible.

The major road, 4800 k.m.⁷ long, forms a great circle, which begins at Kabul, leads north through the Salang Tunnel to Taskhurghan and west to Mazar-i-Sharif, continues west to Meymanah and Herat, then swings south east to Kandahar, and finally goes north east to Kabul. The great circle route is joined by important roads from neighboring countries- Russia, Iran and Pakistan. From the crossing of Amu Daryah at Termez in Russia a road runs to Mazar-i-Sharif, the principal road of entry from Iran crosses the frontier at Islam Qaleh and leads to Herat. Two major roads from Pakistan join the road system at the Khybar Pass, an important trade route for centuries, and at Chaman, in Baluchistan.

The population of Afghanistan was estimated at 17,420,000 in 1998.⁸ Its distribution tends to the location of the rivers, their pattern of flow and discharge, and the technological means available for harnessing the water, so that densities are greater on the plateau's of the central high lands and in the valley of the Kabul river and its tributaries, and very low in the Arid Helmand basin. Densities of population are also in high mountain ranges. Islam is the religion of all Afghans with the exception of few inhabitants of foreign origin. Approximately 80% of Muslim population including the Pushtun who claim to be true Afghans, most of the Taziks (The Plain Taziks), the Uzbeks, and the Turkmans- belong to the Sunni sect of Islam. About 18% are adherents of twelve sect of Shites and the other 2% belong to Ismailaye and a few obscure sects. Thus inevitably, Islam has shaped the whole structure of Afghan society.

The population of the country is composed of many different ethnic and linguistic groups. Thirty-two languages belonging to four linguistic families are spoken in Afghanistan. Thus language has been a major element in the self-conceptualization of Afghan ethnic group. The most important of these groups

are the Pushtuns,⁹ who speak Pushtu. The Pushtun are divided into two major sub-tribes: the Ghilzais¹⁰ and the Abdalis¹¹ who together make up half of the population, and who from 1747 had been the dominant political element in the country. Besides Pushtun there are many ethnic groups in Afghanistan- Uzbek, Hazara, Aimak, Beluchi, Nuristani, Kafirs and others. Therefore, many writers compared Afghanistan with living museum of races.¹² The Tajik, who speak Persian, comprise 30% of the population and live in Northern Afghanistan. The Hazaras constituting the third largest distinct ethnic group live in the Bamyan region. They speak a dialect of Persian and are nearly a million in number. The ethnic groups included 800,000 Aimaks belonging to the four tribes Firuzkuhis, Taimuris, Jamshadis, and Taimuris, 100,000 Baluchis, 200,000 Brahuis, in the south-west, 200,000 Turkomans, 1000,000 Uzbeks, 1000,000 Nuristanis, formerly known as Kilirs, and 200,000 Qizilbashes or Redheads.¹³

It is difficult to write a clear history of the lands of the Hindu Kush, the site of modern Afghanistan, which was invaded repeatedly throughout its long history by foreigners- Persians, Greeks, Scythians, Huns, Mongols, Arabs, Turks, English and Russians, because of its strategic location. The first information about Afghan antiquities came from nineteenth century travelers who described ancient ruins and brought out coins and other objects they had found. Serious archaeological investigation was undertaken from the beginning of the twentieth century by some foreign archaeological missions.¹⁴ The discoveries of several prehistoric sites suggest that early men inhabited the caves and rock shelters of northern Afghanistan about 50,000 years ago and that farming communities in Afghanistan were among the earliest in the world.¹⁵ Many of these new inhabitants were Aryans,¹⁶ who killed many of the local inhabitants and intermarried with others.

In mid 500 BC. Darius, a Persian Emperor of the Achaemenid dynasty, founded by the Persian armies of Cyrus the great (in 549-540 B.C) controlled northern Afghanistan, a region then called Bactria.¹⁷ The Persians ruled Bactria till about 330 B.C. when it was invaded by Alexander the Great (329-327 B.C), who defeated the last Achaemenid ruler, on his march toward India. After his death in 323 B.C. a struggle for his empire begun, the eastern part fell under the domination of his commander Seleucus Nicator (350-280 B.C.), who founded the Seleucid dynasty and later under that of the Indian king Chandragupta Sandroctus (322-298 B.C.) of Indian Maurya dynasty. In about 250 B.C. the Seleucid Governor of Bactria Diodotus I, asserted his independence and founded a line of twenty nine kings and three queens of the Greco-Bactrian kingdom.¹⁸ For a time these rulers were able to stave off invasions by tribal people from the north, but they could not withstand the successive waves of the Parthians, notably a Saka tribe¹⁹ and Yuch Chich, probably a Turanian hoard from Eastern Turkistan.

After the Yuch Chich settled in Bactria, one of its five clans the Kushans became dominant and founded the Kushan empire. The Kushan kings adopted Buddhism and took over whatever remained of Greco-Indian culture.²⁰ The zenith of Kushan power reached, under its most famous king Kaniska whose rule stretched from beyond Mathura to Kabul then from Bactria to the frontiers of China.²¹ In the third and fourth centuries Kushan power was greatly reduced by the expansion of the Sasanian empire of Persia and finally destroyed at the end of the fourth century by a Turkic people of Central Asian origin called the White Huns or Ephthalites. Ephthalite domination lasted for a century till the Western Turks, another newly arrived tribal group from Central Asia, made an alliance with the Sasanid Khosrow Anushirvan and destroyed their power in about 565. The Turks ruled Afghanistan till their defeat by the Chinese Tang

dynasty in 658 AD. From 659 to 751 AD, sixteen kingdoms north and south of the Hindu Kush recognized the authority of the Chinese emperor.²²

By the middle of the seventh century the flame of Islam grew brightly. After capturing Persia and Central Asia the Arab army under Abd-al-Rahman invaded Afghanistan in 652. But their first invasion did not end in conquest. Although in 672, Kabul, Herat and Balkh came under Arab rule, the peoples of Afghanistan revolted and returned to their old beliefs as soon as the Arab armies returned. In fact Islam was not fully established in Afghanistan for several centuries. According to Ibn Hawkal, as much later as the tenth century many of the people of Afghanistan were 'idolaters' and much of Afghanistan was still under the rule of local non-Arab *Sardars*.²³

With the breakdown of the Abbasid Caliphate independent states began to rise in the eastern parts of the Abbasid dominions. The first of these, the kingdom of the Tahirids, was established in Khorasan, the territory around Herat and Meshad. The next dynasty was the Saffarid (867-908), established in Seistan by a bandit named Yaqub-ibn-al-Layth-al Saffar-as-Saffar, but the Saffarid line ended with the death of his brother, Amr, in 902. By AD. 900 both Saffarids and Tahirids had been replaced by still another kingdom, centered in Turkistan under the Samanids (874-999), with Ismail (reigned 892-907) who created the golden age of Bukhara. Ismail, the outstanding figure of this dynasty, extended his power to the Persian Gulf southwards and eastwards from the borders of India to the neighborhood of Baghdad.²⁴ In 999 AD, the Samanid state was destroyed by the Ilak Khan, chiefs of Uighur state centered in Kashgar.²⁵ The Samanids, although patronized education and culture, had some limitations which ultimately brought about their fall. They employed many

Turkish slaves in high positions. As a result their strength grew so enormously as the power was transferred to the slaves.

Alaptagin, a Turkish officer of the Samanids, assumed control of the town of Ghazni in 962, and his successors extended their rule over most of Afghanistan as well as the Punjab and Sind. The greatest king of the Ghaznavi dynasty was Sultan Mahmud, who came to power in 997 and shortly afterward was recognized by the Caliph of Baghdad as the temporal heir of the Samanids. Mahmud consolidated his position in the north against the Qarakhanid Turks who under their leaders, the Ilak Khans had overthrown the last of the Samanid and had entered south of the Oxus. His "encouragement of literature, science and art was as remarkable as his genius for war and for government."²⁶ He led seventeen successful raids into India. His armies returned from the rich cities of India with great treasure and Ghazni gradually turned into a flourishing city for literature and art.

After Mahmud Ghaznavid kingdom, then stretching from the Arabian sea to central Asia and from India to the Persian Gulf, was weakened under his successors and gave away to the Ghurid Kingdom²⁷ in the middle of the twelfth century. Alauddin, a Ghurid king, in 1140, captured and burnt the city of Ghazni a deed for which he received the title of Jahan Suz (The earth burner). His successor Muizuddin Mohammad Ghuri, in 1186, finally uprooted the Ghaznavids from their last defences in the Panjab, the remaining descendants representatives of the Yamini dynasty of Ghazni. But the Ghurids in turn were routed early in the thirteenth century by Mohammad Shah, ruler of another dynasty of Central Asia, which was subsequently swept away by the Mongol under their leader Ghengis Khan. Towards the end of the fourteenth century the famous central Asian military leader Taimor or Tamerlane, known to the East as

the “Lord of the fortunate conjunction”²⁸ conquered Afghanistan; and leaving his grandson, Pir Mohammad in charge at Kabul, Taimur moved on to the Indian subcontinent from where he returned to Samarkand. A descendant of Tamerlane, Zahiruddin Mohammad Babur took over Kabul in October 1504 and then moved on to India where he founded the Mughal dynasty in Delhi in 1526 which lasted over three centuries. Babur established his capital at Agra and all eastern Afghanistan up to the Hindu Kush became a part of the Mughal empire. Afghanistan now entered upon a period of which it was fought over by the rulers of the Mughal empire, centred in India, and those of the Safavid dynasty, in Persia. Usually the Mughals held Kabul and the Persian held Herat although occasionally troubled, by Uzbek raids: while both powers disputed the ownership of Kandahar, “an important trade and strategic center, situated on the road from Iran to India”.²⁹ Therefore, it had been an object of the long struggle between the Safavids and the Mughals. Kandahar was seized in 1595 by the Mughal Emperor Akbar, recovered in 1622 by Shah Abbas, recaptured by Shah Jahan in 1637, and in 1649 occupied by Shah Abbas II.³⁰ Three efforts were made by the Mughals to recapture the place but all of them failed. The cost of these campaigns was estimated at 120 millions of rupees, or more than half the imperial revenue of 220 millions. The empire weakened to such an extent that no further attempts were made to restore Indian influence in southern Afghanistan; the country as far north as Char Bagh remained in the hands of the Persians.³¹

During the period of Mughal-Saffavi dominance on Kandahar, new forces began to rise in Afghanistan as the hitherto mutually antagonistic Pushtun tribes for the first time made an experimental attempt to unite. The first step towards this direction was taken by the Ysufzais, whose home lied in the Swat and Bajaur valleys and the plain of north Peshawar. In 1667 under their leader

Bhagu, they crossed the Indus with a force of 5000 clansmen and invaded Pakhil, a plain tract lying east of river, through which ran the principal road to Kashmir.³² Soon he was followed by other bands of Yusufzais who plundered the western Peshawar and Attock districts. The Mughal Emperor Aurangzeb sent Amir Khan, one of the highest grandees of the realm, to meet the danger and he succeeded in suppressing them; and there was no general rising of the frontier tribes till 1672 when the tactless action of the *Faujdar* of Jalalabad caused another discontent among the Khayber clans. The Afridis rose under their chieftain Akmal Khan, "a born general who crowned himself king struck coins in his own name, and proclaiming war against the Mughals, summoned all the Pathan clans"³³ the Khattaks, Sherwanis and Ghilzai, to join the national movement and closed the Khaybar pass, which was the line of communication between Delhi and Kabul. Mohammad Amir Khan, now governor of Afghanistan was attacked by the Afridis at Ali Masjid, situated at the Kabul side of the Khaybar pass, on May 1672 and the Mughal suffered heavy losses. Mohammad Amir Khan and some of his officers, succeeded in escaping to Peshawar but every thing was lost; ten thousand men were slain, the entire camp property, valued at twenty million rupees was plundered and 20,000 men and women including the governor, his mother, wife and daughter who were dragged into captivity for sale in Central Asia. This signal achievement increased the fame and resources of Akmal Khan, and his revolt rapidly spread through the entire Pathan land from Attock to Kandahar. Khushal Khan, the great poet and hero of the Khattaks clan, now joining Akmal, became the main spirit of the national opposition and inspired the tribesmen with his pen and sword alike. Aurangzeb, who was determined to meet the threat of Akmal Khan effectively, Mahabbat Khan, who had governed Afghanistan before, and achieved success in dealing with these people, was recalled from the Deccan and sent to Kabul as viceroy for the fourth time.³⁴ A fresh expedition led by

Mahabbat Khan, Shujat Khan and Raja Jaswant Singh was sent with large forces to subjugate the Pathan leader. However, this expedition also proved a disaster due to lack of co-operation among the Mughal generals.

These defeats obliged Aurangzeb personally to conduct a two year campaign (1674-76) against the Pathans. After quelling the revolt of the Pathan tribes in December 1675, he left the North West Frontier for Delhi. Mir Khan (later Amir Khan), the son of Khalil Ullah, was appointed governor of Kabul in 1677 and continued to rule the province with great ability and success till his death twenty years later. Under him (1678-1698) peace and prosperity in these area was restored.³⁵

In the closing years of the seventeenth century the position of the Afghan tribes under the Safavid rule was very precarious. In reply to the tightening of the tax system and arbitrariness of the Shah's officials, the Ghilzai, who like the Abdalis, for long showed a preference to Persian rule, now felt that they had nothing to gain from the Safavis and that they might, after all, be better off under the Mughals.³⁶ Initially they had no intention of rebelling against the Persians. "But a sudden switch in policy occurred when, late in 1703, as a result of a attack by the Beluchis which the commandant of Qandahar Abdullah Khan proved powerless to resist, Gurgin Khan, well known for his cruelty, was appointed governor general in May 1704 and dispatched together with his forces from Kirman to Qandahar".³⁷ However, the policy of terror Gurgin pursued only provoked a revolt among "the warlike tribe to Ghilzai," who at that time were said to have consisted of some 50,000 families.³⁸

In April 1709 the Ghilzai, led by Mir Wais, chief of the Hotaki clan descended from their northern strongholds, killed Gurgin Khan and seized the

city. Mir Wais declared the independence of the Afghans at Kandahar.³⁹ Three powerful Persian armies, one after the other were sent against him, but Wais inflicted crushing defeats on them and made his independence secure. After these defeats with the Ghilzai the Safavid Government was unable to send fresh forces to Kandahar, from where the Ghilzai tried to build an Afghan nation state.

Mir Wais was undoubtedly a remarkable man. Although it is not certain whether Mir Wais ever entertained the idea of marching on Isfahan himself and of supplanting the Shah, it is certain that he was the first Afghan through whose leadership, for the first time, the Afghans were able to obtain independence from Safavis rule of Persia. In this sense Mir Wais was the pioneer of the national independence of the Afghans. Mir Wais died in 1715 and was succeeded by his brother Abdul Aziz also known as Abdullah, who soon lost the confidence of the Ghilzai for his unpopular policy of submission to Persia and was killed in March 1716 by Wais's eldest son Mahmud, an ambitious man, who was not satisfied with the title given by Sultan Hussain,⁴⁰ and the executive post of Kandahar, but was desiring to capture Persia. He went on to conquer south and central Iran, including Isfahan. And both internal and external situations inspired him to attain his object. In 1722, Mahmud, encouraged by favorable situation⁴¹ marched on Ispahan with 20,000 men. On 8 March, on the plain of Gulnabad, some twenty kilometers from the city, the Afghans were met by a Persian force of 42,000 men, provided with sufficient artillery.⁴² After an initial success in the war, that was compared with the battle of Kadesia,⁴³ the Persians were completely routed, and the Afghans besieged Isfahan. The city could offer no effective resistance. After six months siege, owing to famine, Shah Husain surrendered and abdicated the Persian throne in favour of Mir Mahmud. Thus, the old aged Safavi dynasty was demolished, and the Afghan rule was started in

Persia. During the first few months of Mahmud's reign, the country enjoyed better government than it had enjoyed for over half a century.⁴⁴

But the Afghan rule at Isfahan lasted for only eight years, as from the beginning Mahmud was facing some serious problems. Although Mahmud was able to defeat the main force of Persia, he had no control over Isfahan, Kirman and Seistan. Second, the Ghilzai at Isfahan, were few and far from home: they were bitterly hated by the Shia Persians, as much for their creed as for their cruelty.⁴⁵ Third, although Isfahan fell to the Afghans many provinces of Persia were following the Safavids. Fourth, in the west and north west frontier of Persia the Sultan of Turkey and the Tzar of Russia became rivals of Mahmud. Fifth, the revolt of Tahmasp II, son of the defeated Shah, distressed Mahmud. To subdue Tahmasp II, who proclaimed himself Shah at Kazvin in 1722, Mahmud sent a force of 5000 troops, but finally the Afghans were defeated. At last the growing ambition of Mahmud led to his murder on 25 April 1725 by his own men. He was replaced by his cousin Ashraf.

The new king was "modest and brave" but he came to power at a time when the Afghans in Persia were threatened from all sides. The Russians were advancing from the north and the Ottoman Turks began to occupy western provinces of Persia, capturing Hamadan, Eriven and Tabriz in spite of heroic defenses of the two cities. However, a treaty was concluded by which the provinces held by Turkey were ceded to her. In return Ashraf was recognized as Shah of Persia.⁴⁶ But from the other side he faced serious trouble. The fugitive Tahmasp II, who was then staying in Mazendran, along with Fathe Ali Khan Kajar of Astrabad, and Nadir Kuli Beg, a member of powerful Afshar tribe, declared war against Ashraf and marched to invade Meshad. In November 1726 during the course of Meshad, Nadir was appointed the commander in chief in

the place of Fathe Khan, rumored that he would soon march upon the Abdalis. Upon hearing this impending danger the Sadozai leaders settled the differences with the rival factions and made peace with one another. Allahyar Khan was allowed to continue in Herat, and Zulfiqar Khan was made the governor of Farah. But the attack of Nadir on the Abdalis was obstructed for more than years. Toward the end of April 1729 A. D. the Persian conqueror marched upon Herat. On receipt of this news, the Abdalis advanced from Herat to meet him but finally they were reduced to subjection. They not only submitted but many of their chiefs enlisted in the army of the victor, who had determined to recover Persia from the Ghilzais.⁴⁷ Allahyer was appointed governor of Herat on behalf of Tahmasp and the Persians started home wards towards the end of the month. After invading Meshad and Herat Nadir, decided to march against Ashraf. Ashraf hastened northward to meet him. But he was defeated at Damghan in October and during the retreat Ashraf himself was murdered by a Baluchi chief in Seistan. Thus, "Nadir had accomplished his first great task of exacting full and complete vengeance on the Ghilzai invaders."⁴⁸ He occupied the capital, where Tahmasp was set upon the throne, although the power rested in the hands of his ambitious victorious general.

After consolidating his position in Persia, Nadir intended to continue his campaign against Turkey under its disfavorable conditions.⁴⁹ But early in 1730 a report reached him from his eldest son Riza Kuli Khan that Zulfiqar Khan made another bid for independence, heading a revolt of some of the Abdalis, instigated by Husain Sultan Ghilzai of Kandahar; even they advanced on Meshad and defeated its commander Ibrahim Khan who had advanced to meet the invader. The siege of the city continued for thirty-one days. Zulfiqar Khan then returned to Herat. To meet this emergency, Nadir Khan came back to Meshad on October 31, 1730 and on March 13, 1731 left it to the final subjugation of the Abdalis of

Herat.⁵⁰ Zulfīqar Khan appealed to Kandahar for help and Saydal Khan, one of the most distinguished generals of Ghilzais, was sent to his aid. In an engagement at Estam Qaleh (kafar Qaleh), near the Afghan boarder, the Afghan made a surprise attack on the Persian camp, and nearly captured Nadir who with only eight men was isolated in a small tower.⁵¹ However, finally, Zulfīqar was defeated by Nadir and was bound to sue for peace. In response to the request of Zulfīqar and Abdalis, Allahyar was reappointed governor of Herat. Zulfīqar Khan returned to Farah in 1732, on receiving reinforcements, Nadir renewed siege operations with great vigor and Herat was forced to surrender on 16 February 1732. Allahyar Khan surrendered for the last time and retired to Multan and Zulfīqar Khan was driven from Farah. Zulfīqar Khan and his younger brother Ahmad Khan fled away to seek shelter at Kandahar where they were thrown into prison by their self-sought host, Mir Husain, brother of Mir Mahmud. But Nadir was not satisfied with the fall of Herat and Farah as the Abdalis would come back, as soon as he returned to his country. He therefore, transferred 60,000 Abdalis, along with Ghani Khan Alikozai and Nur Muhammad Khan Ghilzai, to the districts of Northern Khurasan, to which he had already transferred some 50,000 families, among these tribes men being 12,000 families of Afshers, including 2000 families of his own sections, the Kiriklu. Impressed by their valour and marital qualities, in spite of their constant violation of pledges, Nadir treated the Abdalis with courtesy and recruited many of them in to his own army. Soon after the defeat of the Abdalis, Nadir deposed the weak Tahmasp and eventually assumed the royal power.

After acquiring power Nadir decided that his next campaign would aim at regaining Kandahar for Persia. In 1737 he advanced with an army of 80,000 consisted mainly of cavalry against Kandahar which after initial resistance finally surrendered after a year siege. In Kandahar he found the Abdali chief

Zulfiqar and his fifteen years younger brother Ahmad Khan.⁵² Nadir set them at liberty and fulfilled his promise, that he had given the Abdalis during his campaign of Dagestan.⁵³ On the insistence of young Ahmad Khan, Nadir placed him on his personal staff as an orderly officer. So he found a chance to prove himself as a brilliant fighter during Nadir's expedition of India and Turkey. "The pretext given by Nadir for his invasion of the Mughal empire was his desire to punish certain Afghan refugees who had crossed the Indian frontiers during his operations against Ghilzais. But there is no doubt that real reason was the intention to emulate the exploits of Alexander, Mahmud and Taimur, and at the same time to extract from the wealthy and decadent Mughal Empire sufficient booty and treasure to pay the armies he would require for further campaigns against Turkey."⁵⁴ At the end of May Nadir marched to north, crossing the Indian frontier at Chasham-Mukhmur seized Ghazna and Kabul. He then advanced to India and defeated the enormous Mughal army without any difficulty at Karnal, north of Delhi, in 1739. Having sized the jewels and treasure of the capital, including the famous peacock throne and Koh-i-Noor Diamond,⁵⁵ he returned to Persia.

In 1740 A.D. on his way back to Persia, Nadir advanced north ward and subdued the Uzbek king Abul Fayeze of Bukhara, and Ilbars Khan of Khiva. Nadir was now at the zenith of his fame and power. In the northern side his empire extended from the Oxus river to the south of Sind. His failure in Dagestan against the Lesghians, who had been supported by Russia, outbreak the rebellions immediately in the Sirwan, Fars and Astrabad provinces all of which were crushed without much difficulty.⁵⁶ But in Seistan the rebellion of Ali Kuli Khan, the eldest son of Ibrahim Khan,⁵⁷ and the revolt of Kurds of Kuchan made the situation more critical. The distrusted officers of his Persian guards assassinated Nadir in 1747.

Upon the assassination of Nadir Shah, Ahmad Shah Abdali with a contingent of 4,000 Afghans decided to march back to Kandahar, and after some encounters with the Persian force, captured on the way a treasure convey, together with the famous diamond, the Koh-i-Noor. After nine prolonged meetings the Afghan chiefs of Abdali and Ghilzai elected Ahmad Shah, whose origin and family were the noblest of them all, their king. In response to the wishes of the Afghan tribes he assumed sovereign powers and took steps to establish an Afghan national monarchy cut off from Persia.⁵⁸

Ahmad Shah was obsessed by the vision of a union of various Afghan peoples under the rule of his tribe and family. He realized that this difficult task could be achieved by a "loosely-knit system- a sort of feudal federalism in which the independent prerogatives of the tribal chiefs would remain unimpugned by the central power provided they gave it military support."⁵⁹ Ahmad Shah appointed prominent Abdali chiefs to important positions and constituted a royal council of nine chiefs, which played an influential part in the policy making in civil administration and military operations⁶⁰ Begi Khan entitled Shah Wali Khan, was appointed his chief minister (Ashraf-ul-Wuzara), Jahan Khan commander in chief and Shah Pasand Khan chief of the army. He made Kandahar his capital and adopted the title of Dur-ra-ni (Pearl of the time), which caused his tribe henceforth to be known as Dur-ra-ni.⁶¹

After assuming power in Kandahar Ahmad Shah's first step was to subdue Kabul and Ghazni as his mastery over the Afghans could not be completed without the assertion of his authority over these two places. Therefore, he opened negotiations with Nasir Khan, the governor of Kabul, promising him confirmation in his post if he agreed to pay an annual tribute of

five lakhs. But Nasir Khan “an ambitious and intriguing man” refused Ahmad’s demand for surrender and raised a mixed force of Hazaras and Ghilzai to defend the city. The king, therefore, marched from Kandahar against Nasir Khan with a large force, took Ghazni on the way, and attacked Kabul. After a skirmish, Nasir fled to Peshawar, and fortified the passes leading to India. The Dur-ra-ni force captured the fugitive’s harem. When this news reached Nasir Khan that his women and children had been treated with all the respect due to their position, he returned and offered his submission to the Afghan king.⁶²

By making himself master of Kabul and Peshawar Ahmad Shah completed the recovery of the Persian heritage. In January 1748, the king crossing the Indus river on a bridge of boats with 12000 troops, marched against Lahore and occupied it. Upon hearing this news, the Mughal Governor of Lahore, Hayatullah Khan, who invited Ahmad Shah Abdali to invade India, now changed his mind⁶³ and fled toward Delhi. At this news Mughal emperor Mohammad Shah sent a strong army against the Afghans. Having set up a local government under Jalhe Khan, an Afghan chief of Kasur, Abdali left Lahore with an army of thirty thousand horse to meet the advancing Mughal Army. The Mughal army was defeated by the Afghans at Sirhind.⁶⁴ But at the battle of Manupur the Afghans were defeated by the Mughal heir apparent, and was forced to return to Kandahar, where Lughman Khan⁶⁵ rebelled against the king. Having suppressed the revolt of Lughman Khan, and encouraged by the Indian affairs,⁶⁶ Ahmad Shah invaded the Punjab for the second time in 1750 and defeated its new governor Muin-ul-Mulk.

Meanwhile in the spring of 1749 Ahmad marched on Herat with an army of about twenty five thousand men and horse that included a force of Baluchis under their chief Nasir Khan. This city had been ruled by Shah Rukh, a grandson

of Nadir Shah, who from his capital Meshad maintained a weak rule based mainly on his grandfather's reputation. The real power in Herat belonged to Mir Alim Khan, an Arab Commander of Seistan, who was represented by the governor, Mohammad Amir Khan. After a siege of nine months Mohammad Amir Khan was murdered. The Shah then moved to Meshad, defeated Mir Alim Khan in a battle, and captured it. The Perians, although desperately defended the city, and repulsed several Afghan attacks, finally surrendered to the besiegers. Ahmad Shah replaced Shah Rukh on the throne in return for a large sum of money.⁶⁷ Ahmad Shah drew his attention to extend his empire to the west of Persia. But his further advance was hindered by the people of Nishapur, and by Mohammad Husain Khan of Kajar tribe of Astrabad. As a result Ahmad Shah was forced to give up his design to conquer Persia and returned to Herat.

From Herat he sent a strong force under his minister Begi Khan, who secured the submission of Balkh, Badakhshan and other provinces north of the Hindu Kush, thereby completing the new kingdom which exists till today. After these invasions the Shah turned his attention to the Punjab, as the revenue promised to him from this place under the treaty of 1749 had not been paid. In December 1751 the Afghan army advanced towards Lahore and defeated its governor Muin-ul-Mulk. The Mughals formally ceded the Punjab and Multan to Ahmad Shah, who pardoned Muin-ul-Mulk and re-appointed him governor of Lahore.⁶⁸

In 1756 Ahmad Shah occupied Delhi. Following the example of Nadir, he took advantage of the situation and arranged his elder son Timur Mirza's marriage to Alamgir's II daughter, and received the provinces of the Punjab and Sind as dowry.⁶⁹ In the summer of 1757 Ahmad Shah decided to withdraw to Kabul leaving Delhi in charge of Najib-ud- Daula, the Mughal Nawab of Oudh.

Timur Mirza was appointed the Afghan viceroy of the Punjab with Jahan Khan, a Barakzai Sarder as his advisor. But the rising power of the Maratha confederacy⁷⁰ forced him to take the field again and defeated the Marathas at the third battle of Panipat (1761), which is regarded as one of the decisive battles of history.

Next year Ahmad Shah defeated the Sikhs, and annexed Kashmir, thus brought under him- an area stretched from the Atrekk River to Delhi and from the borders of Tibet to the Indian ocean at the crossroads.⁷¹ But, according to Fraser Tytler, "it was a short lived Empire. Already in Ahmad Shah's lifetime signs were apparent that it was not possible to retain hold of northern India from a base in Qandahar. In an attempt to arrange a settlement of the Panjab Ahmad Shah recognized in 1761 the Mogul Prince Shah Alam II as Emperor of Delhi, while in 1767 he gave up the central Panjab to the Sikhs, retaining under his own control Peshawar and the northern Panjab."⁷²

The Afghan king now stopped further campaigns owing to his illness, which caused him to entrust the reins of government to his second son Timur Mirza. In February 1772, at a council of Durrani-nobles, he named Timur as his successor. He himself retired to a fortress in the Soliman Mountains where he died on 23 October 1772. Ahmad Shah spent his entire life for the glorification of his country. As a brilliant military commander, a good administrator, a capable ruler, a patron of education and culture and finally as the father of a nation he still lives in the heart of the Afghans.⁷³

Ahmad Shah was succeeded by his son Timur whose reign of twenty years though uneventful showed signs of disintegration of the Empire. Much of his reign was spent in quelling the rebellion of the feudal chieftains. Timur also

moved his capital from Kandahar to Kabul. During his time the Durrani empire included Kashmir, Lahore, Multan, Peshawar, Afghanistan south of the Hindu Kush, Herat, and the provinces of Balk and Khum in the Amu Daryah valley. But his failure to nominate an heir and the consequent struggle for mastery which convulsed Afghanistan from 1793 to 1819 caused the disintegration of the Durrani empire.

In 1793 after the death of Timur his fifth son Zaman, who was governor of Kabul, seized the throne with the help of Sardar Pyenda Khan, an influential Barakzai chief, and hardly assumed control of the government. But his elder brothers Humayun and Mahmud, governors of Kandahar and Herat respectively took up arms against him. Humayun was defeated at “ Kalat-i-Ghilzai,” and forced to take refuge in Persia. After defeating Humayun, Zaman Shah turned south to punish the Mir of Sind, when he learnt that Mahmud was advancing against him from Herat. He quickly settled with Mir Fathe Khan of Talpura for arrears of tribute and turned back to deal with Mahmud, who fled to Persia leaving Herat in Zaman Shah’s hands. But the enmity of the Sikhs, who sized Lahore, excited Zaman Shah.⁷⁴ He then turned to India. But the British authorities now considered that his presence in India would constitute a serious danger. They induced Fathe Ali Shah of Persia to bring pressure upon the Afghan king and to divert his attention from India. The Shah went a step further, helping Mahmud with men and money and encouraging him to advance on Kandahar. But all his efforts failed and ultimately he surrendered to his pursesmen and was handed over to Mahmud, and was blinded. He was forced to take refuge in India where he had lived for fifty years as a British pensioner.⁷⁵

Mahmud, who had little administrative ability, ruled Afghanistan for only three years. He took no interest in the welfare of his people, abused the nations

treasure on his personal pleasures and left the affairs of state in the hands of Fathe Khan, his adviser. "But while Khan was overreaching his power to solidify the governments hold on the fringes of the kingdom, Mahmud mishandled thing at the court. He made the mistake of letting his Quizilbash guard overly practice their Shia form of religion. This deviation from Sunni doctrine was so objectionable to the majority of Muslim that it helped spark a rebellion that put Shuja, a whole brother of the deposed Shah Zaman, on the throne in 1803 for a reign of six years.⁷⁶ Shah Shuja made his Wazir Shir Mohammad, whose valuable role helped him to capture the throne, but whom he by no mean entirely trusted. His reign was made continuously uneasy by internal problems and external threats. The Sikhs of the Punjab were encroaching upon Afghan territories from the east, while the Persians were threading from the west, and the Shah could not conceal Fathe Khan, who made several plots against the Shah. "One of these plots carried out by Dost Mohammad, the youngest of Fathe Khan's twenty brothers, brought about the escape of Mahmud from prison".⁷⁷

Toward the end of his reign Shah Shuja felt the pressure of British interests in his country. He received a British mission at Peshawar headed by Mount Stuart Eliphinstone who sought Afghanistan's co-operation against the possible invasion of Napeleon Bonaparte, then at the zenith of his power in Europe. On 7 June 1809, Shuja signed a treaty of Alliance and Friendship with Great Britain⁷⁸ and promised to oppose the passage of foreign troops through his territory. But hardly, had the mission left Peshawar, however, when news was received that Mahamud and Fathe Khan seized Kabul and marched on Peshawar. The two armies met at Gandamak; royal troops were routed, Shuja was defeated and exiled to India, leaving his treasure to the victors.⁷⁹ Shah Mahmud again took the throne and re-established Afghanistan as a major power

by planning and carrying out the re-conquest the provinces of Sind, Beluchistan and Kashmir. Fathe Khan, who now controlled the affairs of state, appointed his brothers in different important posts. Dost Mohammad the youngest of the brothers, was placed in charge of the royal guard. The Barakzai domination, thus increased throughout Afghanistan. But this situation incited jealousy of Kamran, Mahmud's eldest son, who had enmity with Fathe Khan. The chance came in 1816 when Fathe Khan and his younger brother Dost Muhammad had been sent to defend Herat against a Persian army inexcusably violated the harem of the ex-ruler, and looted the Jewelry of its inmates and even of their cloths.⁸⁰ This incident seriously excited Shah against Fathe Khan and ordered that he should be blinded.

The immediate result of this dastardly and foolish act was a revolt among the powerful Mohammadzais, who were still at large and in posts of importance, against the Sadozais.⁸¹ Dost Mohammad, who had fled to Kashmir, now raising an army with the aid of Mohammad Azim Khan marched against Kabul and captured the city by the treachery of Ata Mohammad, whom the Barakzais promptly blinded.⁸² After arriving at Ghazni Mahmud advanced toward Kabul, but he was defeated by Mohammad Azim Khan and fled to Herat.

The rest of the country was divided among the Barakzai brothers. Among these brothers Dost Mohammad, the ablest of the brothers, secured Kabul, Ghazni and Jalalabad in 1826. Within these restricted boundaries Dost Mohammad restored order and encouraged trade, but his endeavors to regain his Indian possessions were frustrated by the Sikhs who taking advantage of Dost Mohammad's engagement with Shah Shuja occupied Peshawar in 1834.

In 1836 he sought help from the British Government against the Sikhs and the Persians, but the British rejected his appeal. Dost now turned to Russia for help. In 1837 the Persians, instigated by Russia attacked Herat and a Russian envoy came to Kabul. Persian attack on Herat in November 1837 and Jean Witkiwicz's visit to Kabul prompted the British Government to ask Dost Mohammad to expel the Russian envoy from Kabul. These British demands were refused, and in March 1838 an Anglo-Indian army invaded Afghanistan and installed Shah Shuja, a grandson of Ahmad Shah. Dost Mohammad escaped first to Balk, then to Bukhara and finally surrendered to the British who sent him in exile to India.

The Afghans, however, refused to accept a ruler supported by British army. In November 1842 Akbar Khan, a son of Dost Mohammad, led a successful revolt against Shah Shuja and the British army. Shuja along with a large number of British troops were destroyed at the hand of Afghans. To restore its prestige the British forces re-entered Kabul and after rescuing the British prisoners they left Afghanistan in December. Dost Mohammad was released from custody and allowed to resume his throne. Relations between Afghanistan and British India remained tense until 1855, when he signed a treaty with the British which ensured his neutrality during the great revolt of 1857.⁸³ Dost Mohammad reigned Afghanistan till his death in 1863. During his last twenty years he occupied Kandahar, Mazar-i-Sharif, Kataghan and Herat.

After Dost Mohammad's death the inevitable struggle for succession broke out among his sixteen sons. At last in 1869 Sher Ali, the third son of the late Amir and his chosen successor, defeated all his rivals and united the whole of Afghanistan under his rule. He organized the Afghans to the path of progress. Among his remarkable works were the establishment of the first Afghan postal

service and the founding of the weekly newspaper *Shamsun-Nahar*.⁸⁴ The Amir also attempted to organize a regular army on the European model, but in this he was unsuccessful. Despite the efforts of Sher Ali, Afghanistan remained a undeveloped country. "Almost forty years of internal war and invasion had halted its progress; the power of the chiefs and the predatory tribes had risen as the authority of the Amir and the central government dwindled."⁸⁵ Upon these the policy of Great Britain and Russia on Afghanistan made the country a pawn between these two powers.

As the Russians acquired territory bordering of the Amu Daryah, Sher Ali and the British were engaged in the Second Afghan war began (1878). On 21 November 1878 British Armies invaded Afghanistan and by the end of the year they captured Jalalabad and Kandahar, and the Kurram valley. Sher Ali fled and eventually died in Mazar-e-Sharif in February 1879. His successor, Yaqub Khan, ceded the Khyber Pass and other areas to the British and the control of Afghan foreign relations passed to the British hand. But the murder of the newly arrived British resident in Kabul started new hostilities. The British marched on Kabul and Kandahar and in 1880 recognized Abdur Rahman, a nephew of Sher Ali, as Amir. In return, Abdur Rahman had to surrender to the British control of Afghanistan's foreign relations. During his reign most boundaries of Afghanistan were fixed as they remained today. The British drew the eastern, southern, and western boundaries, and the Russians and the British drew the boundaries to the north. Afghanistan became a 'buffer' between British India and the Russian empire. Amir extended his control throughout the territory within these boundaries. Despite the defamiation of the Durand Line, the Amir succeeded in building a reunited Afghanistan and in giving the country a strong central power.⁸⁶ Abdur Rahaman died in October 1901 and was succeeded by his eldest son Habibullah Khan, who was less favourably inclined towards

Britain than his father. Habibullah followed his father's example in his conduct of both external and internal affairs. In 1905 he signed a treaty that secured to the British government full control of Afghan foreign relations in return for a subsidy of 18 lakhs rupees a year and permission to the Amir to import munitions through India. In March 1907 Habibullah visited the viceroy, Lord Minto, and toured India for some two months and returned to Afghanistan with satisfaction.⁸⁷ In August 1907, the British and Russian governments concluded a convention pledging mutual respect for the territorial integrity of Afghanistan. The Amir refused to give his consent to the clauses of the treaty that destroyed the independence of Afghanistan.

Though Amir Habibullah disliked the Europeans but he was impressed by the European technology. He took the first steps toward the introduction of modern education and industry. In 1911 he founded a bimonthly Persian-language paper, *Siraj-al-Akhbar*, that "soon became a forum for the expression of Pan-Islamic policies and tended to influence Afghan foreign policy along the lines of Islamic solidarity".⁸⁸ In fact during the World War I, the Afghans were pressuring the Amir to join the Central powers, especially when Turkey entered the war against the Allies. Despite internal and external pressures he maintained neutrality during the war. This policy antagonized his subjects and was one of the main causes of his assassination in 1919.

On Habibulla's death his brother Nasurullah seized power but was deposed by Amanullah, the third son of the late Amir. The new king was determined to remove his country completely from the British sphere of influence. Therefore, in May 1919 Amanullah declared war against the British and his army invaded India. Although the invasion was unsuccessful, but the peace treaty that was

signed with Great Britain in August recognized the complete independence of Afghanistan.⁸⁹

Amanullah now turned his attention to internal administration and began many reforms to modernize his country. The nation's first constitution was adopted in 1923, the titles of the nobility were abolished, education for women was ensured, and other sweeping measures at the modernization of traditional institutions were enforced. In 1926 Amanullah Khan changed his title from "Amir" to "King."

After returning from a European tour that lasted from December 1927 to July 1928, he began to work for rapid westernization of Afghanistan. Like the Shah of Iran Amanullah followed Kamal Ataturk of Turkey for his reform programs. "But unfortunately he was no Ataturk and Afghanistan was not Turkey."⁹⁰ His innovation brought him into conflict with reactionaries who rigidly opposed modernization. It is not easy to say which of these drastic reforms caused the most unrest among the tribesmen, but the removal of the veil in public and the education of girls soon inflamed public opinion to danger point. In January 1929 the king abdicated in favour of his elder brother, Inayatullah, who three days later fled from Kabul to join his brother in Kandahar.⁹¹ A brigand from the Koh-i-Daman, the Bacha-i-Saqa (son of the water carrier) seized the throne under the title of Habibullah Gazi. After some unsuccessful attempts to resist Amanullah fled for Italy, where he died in 1960.

After a period of chaos, Nadir Khan, Amanullah's cousin and former war minister was elected king. Nadir Khan was however a soldier of experience and a born administrator. Supported by his four brothers, he gradually restored order in the kingdom, and then devoted his attention to consolidating the country. In

foreign affairs he sought an amicable relation with his two powerful neighbours and did his utmost to maintain the peace along the Indo-Afghan frontier.

In 1931 Nadir adopted a new constitution. Under the constitution he began a program of gradual reform but he was assassinated by a schoolboy in 1933. "... yet the foundation he had laid were so solid that his twenty years old son, Mohammad Zahir Shah succeeded to the throne without incident. Under the guidance of his experienced uncles, the new king continued his father's cautious and realistic policy."⁹²

On the outbreak of the Second world war Shah proclaimed and maintained neutrality, until persuaded in 1941 at the request of the British and Soviet Union, to expel more than 200 German and Italian nationals from the country. Although this action was a breach of neutrality, it ensured Afghan tranquility for the rest of the years. During the war United States established diplomatic relations with Afghanistan. In 1947 the British withdrawal from India created a political vacuum in Central Asia, which gravely affected Afghan policy.

References

1. *Encyclopedia of the Third World* (ed.) George Thomas Kurian, vol. 1, New York, 1987, p. 31.
2. Arnold Fletcher, *Afghanistan Highway of Conquest*, p. 5.
3. *The New Encyclopaedia of Britannica*, vol. 1, London, 1981, p. 164.
4. Syed Muhammed Qasim Rishtya, *The Rivers of Afghanistan*
5. *Encyclopaedia of Asian History*, Op. cit., p. 18.
6. Donald N. Wilber, *Afghanistan its people its society its culture*, p. 190.

7. *Merit Student Encyclopedia* (ed.) William D. Halsey and Others, vol. 1, New York, 1985, p. 118.
8. *The Europa World Year Book*, 1988, London, p. 323; but after the Soviet invasion many Afghans took shelter in Iran and Pakistan.
9. Pushtun or Pakhtun is the name of the language. The people are called Pushtun or Pakhtun in the singular. Its plural form Pushtuna or Pakhtuna has given rise to the form Pathan.
10. From the ancient period the Ghilzais and the Abdalis had been inhabiting the province of Kandahar and Ghazni. Among these two tribes the Ghilzai were the first who played an important role in the history of Afghanistan. There are several opinions about the origin of the great Ghilzai tribe. W. H. Bellow, a modern historian sought to identify them with the Turkish tribe known as the Khalaj, but his view was opposed by Raverty who described the Ghilzais as real Afghans. The Ghilzais identified themselves as the descendants from Nooh through Zahak. However by the assessment of different opinions it seems that the Ghilzai tribe most probably are a mixed race. But living for a long time they possess the characteristics of the Afghans and came to be known as the Afghans. During the reign of Shah Abbas the Ghilzais, first came into prominence. In consequence of their continued pressure the Abdalis moved from the neighborhood of Kandahar to the province of Herat. As a result the Ghilzais became much more powerful in Kandahar. The Mughal-Safavi dominance (1595-1649) on Kandahar gave the Ghilzais an opportunity to play off on power against the other. Nevertheless they like the Abdalis, for long showed a preference for Persian rule, despite the fact that they were staunch Sunnis. There were two reasons for this preference. First, the tolerant and liberal attitude of Shah Abbas I, Second, the Ghilzais seriously hated the Beluchis and the Hindus who were then under the Mughal rule. Therefore, it seemed that in 1653, when Dara Shiku, son of emperor Shahjahan made his unsuccessful attempt to regain Kandahar from the Safavis, the Ghilzais supported the latter. But in the reign of Shah Sultan the Ghilzais were oppressed by the Shite clergy. As a result they became the rival of the Safavis. Mir Wais, chief of the Hoteki tribe became the leaders of the rebels.
11. The Abdali tribe of the Afghans traces its origin to Abdal, the fifth in descendant from Qais of Israelite extraction. Qais embraced Islam during the time of Prophet Mohammad and was given the name of Abdur Rashid. Abdal, son of Tarin, was the grandson of Sharaf-ud-Din, whose father,

Saraban, was the eldest son of Abdur Rashid. According to some historians Abal is not his real name. It was the title conferred upon him by an *abdal* or Saint. Khaja Abu Ahmad Abdal of the Chistia order in appreciation of his service. However the Abdalis are the descendants from the first wife of Aabdal, whose grandson Alias Zirak, son of Isa, was the immediate ancestor of the Popalzais, the Barkzais, the Alikozais and the Musazais. To the Popalzais belonged Umr, whose second son Sado, obtained the concessions from Shah Abbas I in 1598, and lent his name to the branch of his descendants, called the Sadozais. Like their Ghilzai rivals, the Abdalis also showed their gratitude to the Shah of Persia by assisting him against the Mughals. But after the accession of Shah Sultan on the throne of Persia, the Abdalis changed their policy towards Isfahan. The policy of terror pursued by Shah Sultan increased popular discontent among the Abdalis.

12. *The Cambridge Encyclopaedia of the Middle East and North Africa*, (ed.) Trevor Mostyn, (London, 1986), p. 293.
13. *The Encyclopaedia of the Third World*, Op. cit., p. 32.
14. Vadim Masson, "Archaeological Monuments and Afghanistan's Ancient History". *Afghanistan: Past and Present*, (ed.) 'Social Sciences Today' (Moscow, 1981), p. 8.
15. *Merit Student Encyclopaedia*, (ed.) William D. Halsey and others, vol. I, New York, 1985, p. 119.
16. A central Asian people migrated to Persia and India in Prehistoric time.
17. Percy Sykes, *A History of Afghanistan*, vol. I, p. 45.
18. *The Encyclopaedia Americana*, vol. I, p. 253.
19. According to Arnold Fletcher, the Sakas were a branch, apparently, of the Scythian nomads who in Ancient times had ruled the Eurasian steppes from the Hungary plain to Mongolia.
20. Donald N. Wilber, *Op. cit.*, p. 12.
21. *The New Encyclopaedia of Britanica*, vol. I, London, 1981, p. 173.
22. Donald N. Wilber, *Op. cit.*
23. Guy Le Strange. *The Lands of the Eastern Caliphate Mesopotemia, Persia and Central Asia from the Moslem Conquest to the time of Timur*, p. 416.

24. Percy Sykes, *Op. cit.*, vol. I, p. 183.
25. Wilhelm Barthold. *Turkistan Down to the Mongol Invasion*, London, 1928.
26. Percy Sykes, *Op. cit.*, vol. I, p. 192.
27. The kingdom of Ghur had emerged in the mountains of western Afghanistan. Its people were Shansabhani Tajiks, and in no way connected with the original pathans.
28. Arnold Fletcher, *Op. cit.*, p. 37.
29. Marim Arunova, "Glimpses From the History of the Liberation Struggle of the Afghan People in the 18th Century" (ed.) 'Social Sciences Today' *Op. cit.*, p. 61
30. Percy Sykes, *Op. cit.*, vol. I, pp. 304-316.
31. G.P. Tate, *The Kingdom of Afghanistan A Historical Sketch*, p. 28.
32. Jadunath Sarkar, *A Short History of Aurangzib*, p. 139.
33. *Ibid.*, p. 142.
34. *Ibid.*, p. 143; *The Cambridge History of India* (ed.) Richard Burn, vol. IV , pp. 238-39
35. *Ibid.*, p. 146.
36. Laurence Lockhart, *The Fall of Safavi Dynasty and the Afghan Occupation of Persia* p. 83.
37. *The Cambridge History of Iran*, (ed.) Peter Jackson and Laurence Lockhart, vol. VII, p. 315.
38. Laurence Lockhart, *Op. cit.*, p. 85.
39. G.B. Malleson, *Afghanistan*, pp. 225-226.
40. In the early years of the eighteenth century the Abdalis, who were then consisted of about 60,000 families, declared independence in Herat under the leadership of Abdullah Khan Sadozai, the fifth son of the Sado. To Subdue the Abdalis Shah Sultan sent Persian armies, one after another to Herat, without any success. At this Shah became so anxious that in 1718 he moved his capital from Isfahan to Qazivin.

41. During 1717-1719 the political situation in the Safavid state became more and more strained. The liberation movement of the Dagestan tribes had grown. the Baluchis revolted in Kirman, the Uzbeks invaded Khorasan. The Arabs from Masqat conducted operations on the Persian Gulf coast and seized Bahrain.
42. Percy Sykes, *Op. cit.*, vol. I, p. 326.
43. Professor Ashrafuddin compared the Gulnabad with the Battle of Kadesia, that was held in 637 between the Arabs and the Persians.
44. Laurence Lockhart, *Op. cit.*, p. 191.
45. Arnold Fletcher, *Op. cit.*, p. 39.
46. Percy Sykes, *Op. cit.*, vol. I, p. 328.
47. *Ibid.*, 330; Ganda Singh, *Ahmad Shah Durrani Father of Modern Afghanistan*, p. 11.
48. Percy Sykes, *Op. cit.*, vol. I, p. 331.
49. At this period the Ottoman empire was weakened owing to the deposition of Sultan Ahmed III.
50. Ganda Singh, *Op. cit.*, p. 12.
51. Percy Sykes, *Op. cit.*, vol. I, p. 332.
52. Ahmad Khan, son of Zaman Khan Sadozai, was later, elected the grand-chief of the tribe and was crowned as the Shah of the Afghans under the royal title of Ahmad Shah Durrani.
53. Nadir was pleased with the Abdalis services during his campaign in Dagestan in 1734-1735, and promised to grant them their denied thing. The Abdalis asked him to restore themselves in their original home, Kandahar.
54. W.K. Fraser Tytler, *Op. cit.*, 41.
55. The early history of Koh-i-nur diamond is obscure. It is said that about 1656 it was presented by Mir Jumla to the Mughal emperor, Shah Jahan. In 1665 it was seen by Jean- Baptiste Taverniar in the treasury of Aurangjeb.
56. Percy Sykes, *History of Persia, Vol. II*, p. 269.

57. Ibrahim Khan was a brother of Nadir Shah. He was killed in an ambush in the mountains of Dagestan.
58. G. B. Mallason, *Op. cit.*, pp. 273-74.
59. John C. Griffiths, *Afghanistan Key to a Continent*, p. 26.
60. Ganda Singh, *Op. cit.*, p. 339.
61. The Abdali tribe is identical with the Durrani. Ahmad Shah changed the name in consequence of a dream and assumed the title of Shah Dur-i-Durran or Pearl of Pearls.
62. Arnold Fletcher, *Op. cit.*, p. 44
63. Ganda Singh, *Op. cit.*, pp. 39-44.
64. Percy Sykes, *Op. cit.*, vol. I, p. 354.
65. Luqman was the son of Ahmad Shah's elder brother, Zulfiqar Khan. On his departure for Ghazni and Kabul, Shah appointed him naib or deputy governor at Kandahar. But finding the Shah busy with his Indian campaign away from his own country, Luqman Khan attempted to capture the throne.
66. Shortly after the battle of Manupur the Mughal emperor Mohammad Shah died and was succeeded by his son Ahmed, who had hardly any experience in the administration.
67. Ganda Singh, *Op. cit.*, pp. 82-88
68. *Ibid.*, p. 121
69. Percy Sykes, *Op. cit.*, vol. I, p.358
70. At this time the predatory Marathas, who had firm control over the Deccan from their capital at Poona, formed a powerful and aggressive state under the rule of the Peshawar.
71. H.A.S. Jafari, *Indo-Afghan Relations : 1947-67*, p.2
72. W.K. Fraser Tytler, *Op. cit.*, p.64
73. Ganda Singh, *Op. cit.*, pp. 328-346
74. Arnold Fletcher, *Op. cit.*, p. 62
75. *Ibid.*, p. 67
76. Mary Bradly Watkins, *Op. cit.*, p. 49

77. Arnold Fletcher, *Op. cit.*, p. 66
78. Mary Bradly Watkins, *Op. cit.*, p. 50
79. Percy Sykes, *Op. cit.*, vol. I, p. 388
80. *Ibid.*, p. 390
81. W.K. Fraser Tytler, *Op. cit.*, p.68
82. *The Cambridge History of India*, (ed.) Sir Richard Burn, vol. IV, p. 488
83. Mary Bradly Watkins, *Op. cit.*, p.
84. Arnold Fletcher, *Op. cit.*, p.126
85. *Ibid*
86. *Ibid.*, pp. 149-150
87. W.K. Fraser Tytler, *Op. cit.*, p. 179
88. Ludwig W. Adamec, *Afghanistan, 1900-1923 A Diplomatic History.*
p.101
89. George Lenczowski, *The Middle East in World Affairs*, p. 232
90. Kuldip Nayar, *Report on Afghanistan*, p.115
91. W.K. Fraser Tytler, *Op. cit.*, pp.210-216
92. George Lenczowski, *Op. cit.*, p.239.

Chapter Two

Afghanistan's Foreign Relations till 1945

In the nineteenth century, Afghanistan became a focal point of international conflict between Great Britain and Russia. These two western powers competed with each other for establishing control over the country from the beginning of the nineteenth century. Russia wanted an outlet to the Indian Ocean and began to expand toward Afghanistan. Britain wanted to protect its Indian empire which was threatened by Russia's expansion. Britain was anxious to eliminate this threat but her attention was temporarily diverted toward the new danger in Europe - the rise of Napoleon in France. Napoleon signed the treaty of Tilsit with the Tzar in July 1807 to fulfil his desire to advance towards India. The British government, alarmed at a possible invasion of India by Napoleon and the Russians, sought to secure their north-western approaches. In 1809 the British rulers concluded a defensive alliance with the king of Kabul. A few months later the King died and the dynastic struggle once more isolated Afghanistan until Dost Mohammad ascended the throne of Kabul. In 1836 he appealed to the British for assistance against the Sikhs and the Persians. The Amir's request was rejected as the British had no desire to interfere in the affairs of other state.¹ To put diplomatic pressure on the British government, the Amir then made overture to Persia and Russia. But the news of Persian attack on Herat in November 1837 and the news of Jean Witkiwicz's visit to Kabul made it clear to the British that any French threat to India was imaginary and the threat from the north can not be over ruled.² In 1837 the governor-general of India sent captain Burns to ascertain Dost Mohammad's attitude and seek his co-operation against the Persians. But the Amir did not pay any serious attention to the British demand.

As a consequence a combined force consisting of the British and the Sikhs, captured Kabul in July 1839 and placed Shuja on the throne. On 12 November Dost Mohammad finally surrendered to the British and was exiled to India. But the British occupation of Afghanistan aroused a tribal revolt which prompted the British forces to reoccupy Kabul in 1842. But they decided on the immediate evacuation of Afghanistan. In January 1843 Dost Mohammad was allowed to return to Afghanistan to resume his authority. Although Amir's activities³ during the Second Sikh war in 1848 aroused suspicion in the British minds, the relations between the British government and Dost Mohammad remained on the whole friendly.

The threatening attitude of Persia towards Herat and Kandahar compelled the Amir to establish friendly relations with Great Britain which also believed that British interests could be served by an Afghan Alliance. On 30 March 1855, an Anglo-Afghan treaty of peace and friendship was concluded. According to Fraser Tytler, "this treaty did little more than reopen diplomatic relations but it gave assurance that the British had no aggressive intention against the integrity of Afghanistan, and on the other side it pledged the Amir to be the friend of the friends and Amir of the Amiries of the Honorable East India Company."⁴ The friendship was put to test in October 1856 when a Persian army encouraged by the Russians besieged Herat. The British not only helped the Amir with money and arms, but also declared war against Persia and sent a force from Bombay. The Persians came to terms and left the city in March 1857. The Amir also, on the other hand, maintained his friendship with the British during the Indian revolt of 1857.⁵

After the death of Dost Mohammad the inevitable struggle for succession as has all ready been said earlier broke out among his sixteen sons. The dynastic troubles which lasted five years opened the way for foreign intervention and Russia advanced steadily southward and reached Samarkand in 1868. After Sher Ali had finally established his position in Kabul as his father's successor, Bokhara became a vassal state of Russia. This proved to be dangerous for Sher Ali. He then turned to British India for support against Russia. The British government refused to offer any assistance on the ground that by the Anglo-Russian agreement of 1873 the Russians had formally accepted the Amu Darya as the limit of their southward extension. But Sher Ali was not happy with the overall British attitude to his problem. Therefore, he demanded from British a definite statement about Russian's aggression. The Viceroy of India Lord Northbrook favoured him by giving the Afghans a guarantee of help with money, arms and troops should the Russian's invade, but the Viceroy's proposal was not accepted by the Home authority in London who followed a non-intervention policy towards Afghanistan. But the new British government followed a positive policy about Afghanistan. Alarmed at the growing aggression of Russia towards Afghanistan, the British diplomats tried to establish a direct contract with Afghanistan by dispatching a Mission to Kabul.⁶ But Sher Ali's reception of a Russian mission at Kabul and his refusal to receive a British one, on British terms, led directly to the Second Anglo-Afghan war (1878-80). On 21 November a large contingent of British army entered the three great passes leading into Afghanistan and by the end of the year they captured Jalalabad and Kandahar. The British invasion prompted Amir Sher Ali to request military help from the Russians, but his request was turned down.⁷ The Russians advised him to make peace with the British.

In May 1879 Sher Ali's successor, a more docile monarch concluded the treaty of Gandamak with the British. By this treaty he agreed that the British would retain control of the Khyber Pass and of the districts of Kurram, Pishin and Sibi. Thus, two entry gates to Afghanistan from India were secured to the British government, who were to retain the control of all relations with the independent tribes inhabiting the territory and directly connected with these passes.⁸ The important clauses of the treaty forced the Amir to conduct his relations with other foreign states in accordance with the advice and wishes of the British government, which reserved the right to send a permanent British resident to the Afghan capital and dispatch at any time agents with sufficient guard to the Afghan borders. But "there could be no talk about Afghanistan's independence ... after the Gandamak peace."⁹

In accordance with the Article 4 of the treaty of Gandamak, a British resident, major Cavagnari with an escort of three British officers and seventy five sepoy reached Kabul in July 1879. But the British triumph was, however, short-lived. On 3 September 1879, Cavagnari and his staff were murdered in Kabul by the Afghan troops.¹⁰ When the news of Cavagnari's tragic death reached India the British forces again occupied Kabul. Yaqub was forced to abdicate and was sent to India where he died in 1923. The British assumed control of Kabul and the surrounding country including civil administration. But the country was by no means quiet. Realizing the negative result of their presence in Afghanistan the British finally decided to leave Afghanistan. The problem was that they have to set in the throne of Kabul a person who must be friendly. Fortunately for the British, they found such a person with Abdur Rahman, Sher Ali's nephew.

In July 1880 Abdur Rahman was informed that the British were prepared to recognize him as Amir of Kabul. But he was required to submit foreign

affairs to the British who would be prepared to assist the Amir in repelling unprovoked aggression on his dominions. Khyber Pass and Kurram Valley will be controlled by the British, an arrangement already agreed by the Gandamak treaty. These terms were accepted by Abdur Rahman. The agreement left the Amir free to rule internally but bound him to follow British advice in all his relations with foreign powers. By 27 April 1881, all the British troops left Afghan soil and Abdur Rahman was in control of the entire country.¹¹

Shortly after the British had left Afghanistan in 1880 Russia again started its aggressive activities in Central Asia. Khiva and Merv were annexed in quick succession and the Russian army invaded Afghan territory and occupied Panjdeh opening the way to Herat and the Indian Ocean.¹² The British rushed in the defense of Herat, the outer bastion of India's defenses, and mobilized two army corps in India. For a while the two great powers were on the brink of war. Perhaps the rise of Germany in Europe as a rival to both Russia and Britain prompted the two powers to come to an agreement, "which in fact gave Panjdeh to the Russians in exchange for a various satient's of territory on the Amir's side of the Oxus. Russia agreed to make no further advance southward."¹³ At the beginning of 1889 Russian military operations near the Afghan border caused the British to repeat the warning that an advance on Herat would mean war. However, tensions were relaxed by diplomatic moves. But in 1892 disputes again broke out over the Russian claim over the whole of the Pamirs, "where the two new empires in Asia met the oldest surviving empire of the continent at the north-western extension of the Tibetan tableland".¹⁴ After prolonged negotiation, an agreement was concluded between the British and the Russian governments in 1895 determining position of influence of Great Britain and Russia with regard to the Pamirs.

Although Abdur Rahman came to power with the British help, he was very cautious about the British military pressure. He did not permit British military advisors or troops to be stationed in his country, and never allowed their envoy to properly discharge his duties. The Amir also protested the extension of British railroad from old Chaman to new Chaman, and, when it was completed, he ordered his subjects not to use it, as the Amir believed that the extension of the railroad was one of the first moves of the forward policy in Pushtunistan territory.¹⁵ As a result the British were extremely annoyed with the Amir. Consequently relations between the Amir and the British became strained.

The major issue between the two countries was of course the fate of the eastern Pushtuns, who lived in the regions lying between Afghan and British territories, and often, resisted the British. The British suspected that the Amir had a hand in the tribal unrest in the frontier region. Therefore, Viceroy Lord Lansdowne sent a mission to Kabul to negotiate for delimiting the frontier between Afghanistan and British India. At last both the governments came to an understanding regarding their sphere of influence. On 12 November 1893 Abdur Rahman signed the frontier agreement known as the Durand Agreement. As a result the government of India lifted the embargo against Afghanistan and increased the amir's annual subsidy from twelve to eighteen lakhs.¹⁶ The Durand Agreement pledged each party not to interfere in the territories of the other lying beyond the Line.

Abdur Rahman's successor Habibullah had some trouble with Lord Curzon over the renewal of the Anglo-Afghan treaty. On two occasions Curzon invited the new Amir to India to discuss about the agreement but twice Habibullah refused saying "since it was not necessary to renew the alliance at the death of Queen Victoria, it was unnecessary to take such action now at the

death of his father."¹⁷ Curzon was annoyed with Habibullah's behavior and threatened to stop Amir's subsidy and arms shipment to Afghanistan. As a result all communications with the Government of India had been stopped for about three years.¹⁸

But Curzon's attitude towards Afghanistan in demanding a new treaty was not supported by the British Government. King Edward strongly opposed any military action in Afghanistan and ordered the Indian authority to send only a British Mission to the Amir's court.¹⁹ On the other hand in a sudden change of attitude, perhaps influenced by the event of Russo-Japanese war, the Amir invited a British Mission to Kabul to discuss matters of common interest. On 20 December 1904, during Lord Curzon's absence from India, the acting Viceroy Lord Ampthill sent a mission under Louis W. Dane, Foreign Secretary to the Government of India to Kabul. Dane was instructed to settle a series of problems that had greatly disgusted the British. These among others included the Afghan boycott of the Quetta-Chaman railroad, cessation of incidents on the Indo-Afghan border, the demarcation of the frontier, and a new treaty on the same lines as the one the British had concluded with Abdur Rahman.²⁰ But Dane's proposals were not accepted by the Afghans. "They wanted the British to join them at once in an attack on Russia, and to engage in an elaborate scheme of military co-operation which would have involved the construction of a railway into southern Afghanistan and British co-operation in the defence of Kandahar and other posts".²¹ In spite of strong protests from India the British Government showed liberal attitude to the Afghans and directed the Indian Government to accept the Amir's proposals and conclude a treaty. Thus, on 21 March 1905, Louis Dane signed a treaty that secured to the British Government full control of Afghan foreign relations in return for a subsidy of 18 lakhs rupees a year and permission to the Amir to import arms through India.²²

The Anglo-Afghan treaty of 1905 seemed profitable for both the parties. According to foreign observers, especially the Berlin *Neue Preussische Zeitung*, it was a diplomatic triumph for India, owing to the reverses of Russia in the Far East.²³ The Secretary of State expressed his satisfaction.²⁴ British historians like Arnold Fletcher and L. Adamec agreed that the treaty introduced an immediate triumph for the Amir. Without financial aid it was also found in the British activities that he was an independent ruler of Afghanistan. Actually King Edward VII in a message of welcome addressed Habibullah as "Your Majesty."²⁵

In June 1906 Habibullah accepted the British invitation to visit India. One of the reasons for his change of mind was the departure of Lord Curzon, who was most seriously hated by the Afghans. After two months visit of India he returned to Afghanistan fully determined to implement to the best of his ability his declared policy of friendship with the British Government.²⁶

Meanwhile Russian pressures on both Afghanistan and Britain for direct relations between Russia and Afghanistan continued. In 1900 Russia requested Habibullah to establish direct relations with the Afghan government to settle border and other problems.²⁷ But the Amir replied that his policy was identical with that of his father and replied that all future communications should be addressed through the government of India. In 1903 friction had arisen between Russia and Afghanistan owing to the alleged destruction of boundary pillars in the neighborhood of Herat.²⁸ The Amir informed all incidents to the British government and expressed his apprehensions to them. But the British, realizing the new condition in Europe notably the emergence of Germany as a rival of both Britain and Russia, then willing to settle up their differences in Asia. The

anxiety over the expansion of German power and internal political agitation, the Tzarist Empire was also interested to settle its differences with Britain. As a result in August 1907 a treaty was signed between the two powers by which Russia considered Afghanistan as outside the sphere of its influence and agreed to confer directly with Britain on all matters relating to Afghanistan. Britain in turn agreed not to occupy or annex any part of Afghanistan nor to interfere in the internal affairs of the country. Thus by mutual consent Afghanistan emerged as a semi-independent 'buffer state' with British influence in foreign affairs. But the Anglo-Russian treaty had not been ratified by the Amir.²⁹

It became increasingly difficult for the Afghans to ignore the economic and ideological as well as the political implications of the global changes that had been taking place in the years before world war I. The Russian revolution of 1905-7, the constitutional movement of Persia in 1906, the Young Turk movement of 1904 and the writing of Jamaluddin Afghani influenced the modernist and nationalist elites of Afghanistan. This had an impact in the Young Afghan party led by Mahmud Tarzi.³⁰ who had been exiled by Abdur Rahman but repatriated under Habibullah.

Upon the outbreak of the world war I, powerful anti-British elements in the court of Kabul, including the Amir's son Amanullah and his influential brother Nasrullah, put pressure on the Amir to join the Central Powers, specially when Turkey entered the war against the Allies.³¹ But the Amir, who was well aware of both the geographic distance between Afghanistan and the Central Powers decided that the interest of Afghanistan would be served by staying neutral, at least for the time being.³² Consequently despite agitation by modernist nationalists for Jihad against the British, he announced the neutrality of Afghanistan in the war. "And so in spite of the Turkish entry into the war, in

spite of the plots and machinations of his brother, Nasrullah, and the war party in Kabul, and in spite of the influence of the German-Turkish Mission which managed to reach Kabul in 1915, the Amir honored his pledged word and maintained neutrality throughout the course of hostilities.”³³

The strength of the Afghan nationalist movement induced Habibullah in 1916 to demand that Afghanistan would be represented at the coming peace conference, and just before his death, in February 1919, he wrote to the Viceroy of India, asking recognition by the Peace Conference of “the absolute liberty, freedom of action, and perpetual independence” of his country. But the British government showed very little interest in the Amir’s aspirations.³⁴

Amanullah’s first major political act was to proclaim Afghanistan’s complete independence. But the British reluctance about Afghan independence led him to make decision of using frontier Afghan tribes against the British government of India.³⁵ At the same time he was preparing himself diplomatically to confront the British. One of his diplomatic action in this regard was to make friendship with the new regime in Russia, whose anti-British stance would be used against the British. On 7 April 1919 Amanullah sent a message to Lenin in which he greeted the new regime in Russia and expressed his desire to establish friendly relations with it.³⁶ In his reply Lenin warmly welcomed Amanullah’s gesture.³⁷

In May 1919 the Afghan army crossed the Indian frontier, but the war was brief and inconclusive. “Having suffered losses in World War I, however, and with no desire for another debilitating occupation like those of the nineteenth century, the British accepted an Afghan bid for a truce and opened negotiations”.³⁸ After a month’s discussion a preliminary peace treaty was

concluded at Rawalpindi by which the British gave up all supervisory claims and the Amir lost his subsidy.³⁹

But the worsening of Anglo-Afghan relations resulting from aggressive British frontier policy and the provisions of the Rawalpindi treaty prohibiting the import of arms through India, forced Amanullah to seek closer relations with Soviet Russia and to turn to the latter for weapons. Mohammad Wali Khan, after his reception by Lenin in October 1919, had begun discussion with Soviet government to explore the possibility of a Russo-Afghan treaty. Apart from creating an atmosphere of good will among the parties, the discussion did not produce any concrete results. In late 1919, Alexander Bravin, the first Soviet ambassador arrived in Kabul and continued the negotiations earlier started in Moscow.⁴⁰ The Bravin negotiations were, however, overshadowed by Afghan activities in Soviet central Asia where Pan-Turanism gained importance. In January 1920 another mission under Z. Sultz reached Kabul to continue the negotiations.⁴¹ But Soviet Russia's internal situation, its uncertain promises of help to Afghanistan did not bring any fruitful result.

As the probationary period stipulated in the Rawalpindi agreement came to an end, the British, probably in a bid to forestall a Russo-Afghan alliance, offered the Afghans to discuss about a new agreement. But there were so many areas of strong disagreement that the discussion finally foundered. The Afghans now signed a treaty with the Soviet Union in September 1920 and it was ratified by Moscow on 28 February 1921. The Russo-Afghan treaty provided for the exchange of diplomatic representatives and the opening of Soviet consulates in Herat, Maimana, Mazar-i-Sharif, Kandahar and Ghazni, an annual subsidies of one million gold rubles and a supply of arms to Afghanistan; the transfer of Panjdeh to Afghanistan; and the construction of the Kushk-Herat-Kandahar-

Kabul telegraph line.⁴² None of the terms was fulfilled. On 6 July 1921, the new Russian ambassador, Feodor Raskolnikov, had arrived in Kabul and paid 500,000 rubles being the first installment of the annual subsidy of one million. But Panjdeh that was captured by Russia in 1885 was not returned to the Afghans. Afghanistan opened its consulates in Tashkent and Merv in addition to its mission in Moscow. Russia, which had already opened its mission in Kabul, opened consulates in Herat, Maimana and Mazar-i-Sharif.⁴³

During the negotiations of Soviet-Afghan treaty, the Afghan diplomatic mission, under Wali Khan made a tour of European capitals seeking recognition, inviting foreign technicians, and trying to establish commercial relations. From Moscow the mission visited Berlin where arrangements were made for the engagement of German engineers and air personnel. In Rome the mission was received by the King and the Foreign minister, and a treaty was signed for commercial and consular relations.⁴⁴ Lord Curzon, Secretary of State of Foreign Affairs, lodged a protest to the Italian government stating that Britain still considered Afghanistan as lying within its sphere of political influence.⁴⁵ However, a treaty was also signed with France providing for the exchange of diplomatic representatives.

When the mission arrived in Washington, it was received coolly. The Harding administration said that the question of diplomatic interchange between Kabul and Washington must be reserved for future consideration. But the American cool treatment to the mission, according to Abdus Samad Ghaus, was the result of British interference.⁴⁶ In August 1921 the mission arrived in London where the meeting between Mohammad Wali Khan and Lord Curzon was abruptly discontinued. Curzon said that the negotiations in Kabul were the affair of Afghanistan and India and not his concern; he also refused to introduce

the mission with the King and referred them to the India office for this purpose.⁴⁷

The news of these incidents caused a considerable anger among the Afghans, who were now confirmed that the British would never be reconciled to the independence of Afghanistan and wished it to remain within the sphere of their influence. Amanullah now refused to sign a treaty with the British government, and ratified the Russo-Afghan treaty on 13 August 1921.⁴⁸

The British, who were quite disturbed by this treaty, approached the Afghans with their objections and presented their distress to the Soviet government. Realizing Afghanistan's advantage to enter into a treaty with Britain Amanullah concluded a new treaty. The Anglo-Afghan treaty of 1921 reaffirmed Afghan independence and the existing boundaries, provided for the exchange of diplomatic representatives and the establishment of British consulates, gave Afghanistan transit and customs facilities in India, and pledged mutual co-operation in maintaining tribal peace in frontier regions. On the basis of the treaty, a trade convention was also signed between the two countries in 1923.⁴⁹ But in spite of these developments relations between Britain and Afghanistan did not improve.

In spite of the cordial relations in 1920 and 1921 Amanullah and the Russians played a double game of ostensible friendship while contending for control over Turkistan. Before the Bolshevik Revolution, Lenin and Stalin promised that all peoples of the Russian Empire would be granted the right of self-determination, even including secession. But their promises were not kept. As a result of Bolsheviks proclamation Bukhara and Khiva, located just north of Afghanistan, asserted their independence and made a close relations with

Afghanistan. Amanullah was delighted by these incidents in Central Asia and began to dream of forming a Central Asian confederation.⁵⁰ “Such a confederation would have provided an excellent buffer against Russian encroachments from the north, as well as furthering Afghanistan’s own Pan-Islamic aspirations.”⁵¹ Amanullah opened diplomatic relations with Bukhara and Khiva to give them legal recognition as sovereign states. But Bukhara and Khiva did not remain independent for long. The Soviets sent the Red army to reconquer Bukhara, Khiva and other Muslim populated areas. This antagonized the Afghans, who established contact with the Basmachi and dispatched Afghan soldiers to the aid of Bukhara. In September 1920 the Red army captured Bukhara and Khiva and forced the rulers to flee into exile in Afghanistan.⁵² Amanullah gave them refuge and sent aid to the Basmachi. Enver Pasha, hero of the 1908 Turkish revolution joined the Basmachi in December 1921 and maintained communications with the Afghan ambassador in Bukhara. In early 1922 he united various Basmachi bands.⁵³ As the movement was gaining strength, he was killed in a skirmish, in August 1922.

After the Russo-Afghan treaty of 1921 Soviet diplomats and agents tried to influence Amanullah and his advisors. The Bolsheviks sent some Indian revolutionaries to Kabul, where they allowed to establish a “Provisional Government of the People of India”, and plans were made to train and equip an “Indian Liberation Army”.⁵⁴ In May 1923 Lord Curzon strongly protested against the anti-British activities of Soviet agents in Iran, Afghanistan and India.⁵⁵ When in 1924 a rebellion broke out against Amanullah’s social reforms, the British sent Abdul Karim, a son of the former Amir Yaqub Khan, to overthrow Amanullah. The rebellion, however, was put down with the help of Russia and Germany.⁵⁶

But in 1925, Afghan and Russian interests came into conflict. The Russian troops occupied a small island, Urta Tagril in the Amu Daryah river. This island was seized on the ground that as the main channel of the river had shifted to the south of the island, the island itself, which once belonged to Afghanistan, now rightfully belonged to the Soviet Union. But the real reason for the intervention apparently was to prevent the island from being used by Uzbek and Bashmachi rebels from the Soviet Central Asia to infiltrate into Soviet territory.⁵⁷ However, the dispute was settled in favor of Afghanistan by the pact of Neutrality and Non-Aggression, signed at Paghman in August 1926. But Amanullah, who wanted reformative changes, was not enthusiastic about very closer ties with Russia and avoided too much cordiality with the Soviet Union. To offset dependence upon either the Russians or the British, he sought technical aid from other European powers. Among the European countries, Germany's offer seemed most acceptable and the least dangerous of the technically advanced nations who could provide right kind of assistance needed for Afghanistan. On 3 March he, therefore, concluded a treaty of Friendship with Germany.⁵⁸ Anglo-Afghan relations suffered from the grumbling problems created by the unsubdued tribes on the Indian frontier, and in 1926 Afghanistan protested formally in London that the "forward policy" of the new British government was incompatible with friendly Indo-Afghan relations.⁵⁹

A conciliatory gesture toward Russia was made in 1927 when Afghanistan agreed to an air service between Kabul and Tashkant. Negotiations for a trade agreement began at the same time, but when the Soviet Government denied permission for the transit of goods imported to Afghanistan from a third country over Russian territory, the negotiations broke off.⁶⁰ In November 1927 Amanullah renewed ties with Persia and signed an Afghan-Persian treaty of

friendship. Friendship treaties with Poland and Finland were also concluded in the subsequent years.⁶¹

When rebellion broke out against Amanullah towards the end of 1928 the Soviet government suspected the British hand behind it. According to Agabekob, the former Soviet Secret Police official, in a meeting held between Gholam Nabi, Amanulla's ambassador at Moscow, his brother Ghloam Jilani, the Afghan minister of foreign affairs, and Vitalii Primakov, a former Soviet military attache at Kabul, it was decided that Gholam Nabi will be given military support to save Amanullah. Assisted by the armed men Gholam Nabi crossed the Oxus but could not advance beyond Mazar-i-Sharif.⁶² His army gave up and withdrew to Russian territory when he heard that Amanullah had already fled to Italy.

In June 1930 a Soviet force went into Afghan territory in pursuit of one Ibrahim Beg, Basmachi leader, who was engaged in frontier raids; but they had to withdraw in the event of strong protests from Kabul and London. However, the violation of Afghan territorial integrity by Russia, made the Afghans realize that the relation with the Soviet should be further normalized. Next year the Afghan army forced the rebels to cross into the Russian territory where Ibrahim Beg was captured and executed. To avoid further misunderstanding with Moscow Nadir Shah removed the Soviet refugees of Afghan Turkistan to Bukhara.⁶³

Nadir's anti-Basmachi operation apparently pleased the Russians, and a new treaty of friendship and non-aggression was concluded between Afghanistan and Russia. Good neighborly relation with Russia facilitated

expansion of trade and commerce between the two neighbors. Later a postal agreement was also signed between the two countries.⁶⁴

Nadir maintained his foreign policy very tactfully. To balance the influence of the great powers - specially Britain and Russia, he limited their participation on the development program of his country and sought the help of Germany, France, Italy, Switzerland, Poland and Czechoslovakia whom he thought to be politically neutral. It may be stated that the foreigners participated in the development programs of Afghanistan, "were engaged only as operating experts and not as key executives."⁶⁵ In November 1930, Afghanistan also concluded a friendship treaty with Japan and Estonia. Emphasizing the Islamic character of his regime, Nadir developed cordial ties with Iran, Iraq, Saudi Arabia and Turkey.⁶⁶

After his death, King Zahir who was at first largely dependent on his uncles, continued his father's foreign policy. In 1934 Afghanistan joined the League of Nations under the sponsorship of Turkey and Afghan representatives took part in the disarmament conferences.⁶⁷ As a mark of developing relations between the USSR and Afghanistan, arrangements for co-operation in locust eradication and transit rights for Afghanistan across Soviet territory was further ensured.⁶⁸ In 1938 the two countries agreed by mutual consent to close their respective consulates, largely as a result of the Afghan's fear that the Soviet consulates in northern Afghanistan could be used for subversive activities.⁶⁹

Anxious to strengthen relations with its Muslim neighbors and improve its international stature Afghanistan signed the Treaty of Sa'adabad with Iran, Turkey and Iraq which "bound the contracting parties to observe non-interference in each other's internal affairs; to respect the integrity of each

other's frontiers; to abstain from aggression against any member; to prevent groups and actions subversive to a member's government; and to consult with each other in such international conflicts as might effect them."⁷⁰ But the signatories of the Saadabad Pact failed to adhere to the treaty terms as the political atmosphere in Europe and East and South East Asia became critical and a war like situation prevailed.

By 1938 German economic and technical co-operation with Afghanistan had attained significant proportions. Facilities for industrial growth and the construction of schools and government buildings were largely made possible by German technical advice and credits. Japanese, East European and French collaborations were also needed for development activities.⁷¹ In August 1939, Afghanistan signed an "extensive financial and commercial agreement" with Germany.⁷² When the Second World War started in Europe in September 1939, Germany's presence was more visible in Afghanistan.

In 1941 Russia, principal supplier of manufactured items, stopped all exports through Afghanistan's northern frontier as during the war it was not considered profitable to transact business with a marginally useful trading partner like Afghanistan.⁷³ Soviet action caused bitterness among the Afghan people, and made them largely dependent upon imports from India. However, India came to her rescue with food, gasoline, and textiles, and even shipments of arms.⁷⁴ This improved Anglo-Afghan relations persuaded the Afghan government to comply request of the Allied powers for the expulsion of non-Allied nationals.

During this period Afghanistan had its first taste of diplomatic ties with the United States. Diplomatic relation was established between Kabul and

Washington in 1942. In 1944 China also opened diplomatic relations with Afghanistan and signed a treaty of friendship to promote trade relations. Thus, towards the close of the war Afghanistan's relations with the principal Allied powers reached a state of reliable friendship.⁷⁵ After the war there had been significant developments in the diplomatic relations of Afghanistan. The events in South Asia and the beginning of the Cold war between United States and Russia, however, largely dominated the foreign policy of the country.

References:

1. Arnold Fletcher, *Op. cit.*, p. 80.
2. George Lenczowski, *Op. cit.*, P. 47
3. The Sikhs for many years had offered to restore Peshawar to the Afghans if Dost Mohammad would help them against the British. After the outbreak of the second Sikh war the Sikhs appealed to Dost Mohammad for help in return for the cession of Peshawar. In fact in April 1848 Amir, capturing Peshawar, advanced to Attock, which was held by Colonel Herbert, and defeated the British. But in February 21 at the battle of Gujrat the Afghans were seriously defeated by the British Army. As a result Dost Mohammad gave up all hopes of obtaining Peshawar as he realized that Gujrat battle was a crushing defeat for the Sikhs who would eventually surrendered to the British.
4. Fraser Tytler, *Op. cit.*, p. 123.
5. Arnold Fletcher, *Op. cit.*, p. 67
6. Fraser Tytler, *Op. cit.*, pp. 135-138.
7. Henry S. Bradsher, *Afghanistan and the Soviet Union*, U.S.A, 1985, p. 10.
8. G.P. Tate, *Op. cit.*, p. 174.
9. A page from the History of the Eastern Question, *The Anglo-Afghan Discord*, vol. I, Issue, 1 St. Petersburg 1982, p. 12 (in Russian).
10. Arnold Fletcher, *Op. cit.*, p. 134; G.N. Molesworth, *Afghanistan 1919, An Account of Operations in the third Anglo-Afghan War*, p.15.

11. G.P. Tate. *Op. cit.*, p. 179.
12. Fraser Tytler. *Op. cit.*, pp. 158-160
13. John C. Griffiths. p. 41.
14. *Ibid.*, p. 42
15. Abdul Samad Ghaus. *The Fall of Afghanistan An Insiders Account*, p. 13; Arnold Fletcher. *Op. cit.*, p. 163.
16. R.C Majumdar and Others. *An Advanced History of India*. Madras. 1994, p. 830.
17. Ludwig W. Adamec. *Op. cit.*, p. 31.
18. R. C. Majumdar and Others. *Op. cit.*, p. 891.
19. For such a decision there was a reason- according to Henry Rawlinson a high official of Indian Council, an anti- British movement was observed among the Muslims of northern India. If Russia could use this discontent, the foundation of the British empire in India will be shaken.
20. Ludnig W. Adamec. *Op. cit.*, pp. 43-49.
21. Fraser Tytler. *Op. cit.*, p. 178.
22. *Ibid.*, p. 179.
23. Ludwig. W. Adamec. *Op. cit.*, p. 62.
24. *Ibid.*, p. 62.
25. *Ibid.*, p. 66. Arnold Fletcher. *Op. cit.*, p. 174.
26. Fraser Tytler. *Op. cit.*, p. 179.
27. Bruce Amstutz. *Op. cit.*, p. 9
28. Percy Sykes. *Op. cit.*, p. 232.
29. Abdul Samad Ghaus. *Op. cit.*, pp. 23-24; Arnold Fletcher. *Op. cit.*, p. 173.
30. Mahmud Tarzi (1866-1935) the most influential of early Afghan journalists, was a member of the ruling Mohammadzai clan and a descendant of Paynda Khan, one of its leaders. During the reign of Amir Abdur Rahman he was exiled in Turkey, where he learned modern education and witnessed the progress of the reform movements. During the reign of Habibullah he returned to Afghanistan and became a devoted worker for reforms and progress.

31. The people of Turkey, Afghanistan and India belong to the sunni sect of Islam. For this reason the demand of Turkish Caliph in the question of Islamic brotherhood gained momentum in India and Afghanistan.
32. Abdul Samad Ghaus, *Op. cit.*, p. 25
33. Fraser Tytler, *Op. cit.*, p. 194.
34. Abdul Samad Ghaus, *Op. cit.*, p. 27.
35. Arnold Fletcher, *Op. cit.*, p. 187; Percy Sykes, *Op. cit. vol. II*, p. 268.
36. Ludwig W. Adamec, *Op. cit.*, P. 142.
37. *The Times* (London), 13 June, 1919, p. 12.
38. Anthony Arnold, *Op. cit.*, p. 9.
39. Richard S. Newell, *The Politics of Afghanistan*, p. 53.
40. Abdul Samad Ghaus, *Op. cit.*, p. 36.
41. Ludwig Adamec, *Op. cit.*, p. 147
42. *Ibid.*, p. 162; George Lenczowski, *Op. cit.*, pp. 232-233.
43. Abdul Samad Ghaus, *Op. cit.*, p. 42.
44. Percy Sykes, *Op. cit.*, vol. II, pp. 291-292.
45. Ludwig W. Adamec, *Op. cit.*, p. 42.
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49. Abdul Samad Ghaus, *Op. cit.*, p. 44.
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52. Harish Kapur, *Soviet Russia and Asia 1917-1927: A study of Soviet Policy Towards Turkey, Iran and Afghanistan*, pp. 222-225.
53. Anthony Arnold, *Op. cit.*, p. 14.
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58. Donald N. Wilber, *Op. cit.*, p. 180.
59. *Ibid.*
60. Percy Sykes, *Op. cit.*, vol. II, p. 308.
61. Donald N. Wilber, *Op. cit.*, p. 180.
62. Henry S. Bradsher, *Op. cit.*, p. 16; Louis Dupree, *Afghanistan*, pp. 451-454.
63. George Lenczowski, *Op. cit.*, p. 239.
64. Ludwig Adamec, *Op. cit.*, p. 203.
65. George Lenczowski, *Op. cit.*, p. 238.
66. Donald N. Wilber, *Op. cit.*, p. 181; Abdul Samad Ghaus, *Op. cit.*, p. 51.
67. Arnold Fletcher, *Op. cit.*, 237.
68. V. Gregorian, *The Emergence of Modern Afghanistan*, pp. 375-76.
69. Abdul Samad Ghaus, *Op. cit.*, p. 56.
70. Donald N. Wilber, *Op. cit.*, p. 182.
71. Richard S. Newell, *Op. cit.*, p. 62.
72. V. Gregorian, *Op. cit.*, p. 380.
73. Gunther Nollou and Hans Jurgan Wiehe, *Russian South Flank: Soviet Operations in Iran, Turkey and Afghanistan*, p. 107.
74. Donald N. Wilber, *Op. cit.*, p. 182.
75. *Ibid.*

Chapter Three

US Interest in Afghanistan

“American foreign policy is the product of a very different tradition.”¹ After independence it had followed the policy of isolation for a long time. As a result the country reached high degree of economic and military development. It established its hegemony in Latin America, routed the European power from the Caribbean region and took special interest in several countries of Asia including China. But in the end US could not maintain its policy of isolation. It became involved in the First World War and a change was brought about in its foreign policy. Later it also joined the Second World War. Immediately after the war US gave first priority to the continuation of the war time alliance, and specially to the willingness of the Soviet Union to join in a concert of power operating through the United Nations Organization.² But the domination of Soviet Russia in the Communist Countries particularly Eastern Europe, and the establishment of a Communist Government in China compelled the US to change its foreign policy. To prevent further Communist expansion it created the Marshal Plan, North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and South-East Asian Treaty Organization (SEATO). Soviet Russia, on the other hand, continued its efforts for the expansion of Communism by extending financial and other support to the developing countries.

It may be mentioned that like other countries the US foreign policy was also directed by its own economic, ideological, political and military interests. Although the President of America was responsible for taking decision about foreign affairs, he could not apply paramount authority on this issue. The Congress has some authority in the matter specially the Committee of Foreign Affairs of the Senate played an important role in foreign affairs. National

Security Council, Foreign Secretary, Advisor for National Security Council Affairs, Adviser for White House, Defense Office and CIA assist the president in making the foreign policy.³

The people of Afghanistan, who were practically sandwiched between the Russian and British pressure, were eagerly watching the emergence of America in world politics. became interested in establishing close relations with her for their own national interest. In the past Afghan efforts to become an ally of the United States could not succeed. In 1921 King Amanullah sent a high level diplomatic mission headed by Mohammed Wali to the west to obtain recognition of Afghan independence. The mission was cordially received in the USSR and Europe but it was received half-heartedly in Washington. In 1928 King Amanullah desired to visit Washington, but he was informed that his visit to US will be treated as unofficial, and his programme will be limited to meeting the American President Coolidge over a lunch.⁴ As a result the King declined and returned via USSR, where he was warmly received. Amanullah's successor Nadir Shah also wished to enlist the cooperation of the United States in the development of Afghanistan. But his efforts failed to obtain US cooperation for his country's development. According to A. Samad Ghaus, Afghanistan's remoteness and lack of knowledge in the United States about its internal conditions discouraged the American government and American investors from getting involved in Afghanistan".⁵)

In 1933, Mohammed Zahir Shah succeeded his father as a young King of Afghanistan. His government again sought United States co-operation. Liberal terms were offered to American businessmen to operate in Afghanistan. For instance, American airlines were asked to develop Afghan civil aviation and a consortium of oil companies which included Taxaco and Seaboard was allowed to explore possibilities of finding oil in Afghanistan.⁶ But the State Department

was not in favor of making diplomatic relation with Afghanistan. Wallace Murry, the leading American expert on the Middle was a powerful bureaucrat who not only opposed diplomatic recognition of Afghans but also confused the American leaders about the country. When David Joffo, an American businessman, accompanied by Adolf Sabath, a congressman from Illionis, urged for recognition of Afghanistan, Wallace Murry argued against it stating that “Afghanistan is doubtless the most fanatic, hostile country in the world today. There are no capitulatory or extra-territorial rights to protect foreigners. There is no pretense of according to Christians equal rights with Moslems. There are no banks and treasure caravans are plundered. The British have for years absolutely forbidden any white British subject from entering Afghanistan and though Nadir Shah is sound, he cannot control the tribes and will soon fall.”⁷

However, prominent American diplomats and businessman were able to influence President Roosevelt about according recognition to Afghanistan. In 1934 the President, finally, broke the bureaucratic impasse and granted diplomatic recognition through an exchange of personal letters with King Zahir.⁸ In 1935 the United States appointed the American Minister to Iran as the accredited US representative to Afghanistan, but it was not until 1936 that the US charge the Affairs in Iran visited Afghanistan and concluded a treaty of friendship. No diplomatic mission was set up, and the United States continued to deal with Afghanistan through British offices. In 1937 the Afghan government demonstrated its confidence in “American altruism” by granting the Inland Exploration Company of New York a 75 year concession for the exploration and exploitation of Afghanistan’s oil resources.⁹ However, this project was never brought to fruition, as soon after the company started its explorations the Second World War broke out and the Americans withdrew to safe places. Afghan leaders repeatedly tried to get an American diplomatic mission in Kabul. But the US always showed reluctance to set up a permanent mission there.

Washington, however, felt that Afghanistan might turn to Germany, Italy, France and Japan for diplomatic support. By 1938 the Germans not only contributed to a large extent development activities in Afghanistan but they also increasingly involved in the modernization of Afghan army. When the World War started in Europe in September 1939, Germany's position was well established in Afghanistan. A considerable number of German technicians, teachers, engineers and businessmen were working in the country. During the war these agents became very active in stirring up the frontier troubles to keep the British troops in India.¹⁰ For this reason when Germany attacked the USSR in June 1941 Britain and Soviet Union jointly occupied Iran and asked Afghanistan to surrender all the Axis nationals and residents working in her territory. A *Loe Jirga* of tribal chieftains was convened and after a heated debate it endorsed the governments willingness to comply with the Allied request. It was in mid-November that the Germans and Italians finally left Kabul. Washington was not even informed about the demand to expel the Axis nationals, and the US leaders suddenly realized that important moves were being made in the Middle East and that American interests required a resident mission in Kabul. Therefore, the United States established direct diplomatic relations with Afghanistan during the war. Although it was obvious that the United States was motivated by wartime necessities, the measure nevertheless pleased the Afghans, who for many years had sought the establishment of such relations.¹¹ On 6 June 1942, the American mission was opened in Kabul, and the first resident American minister Cornelius Van H. Engert, who had been the first American official to visit Afghanistan in 1922, came to Kabul twenty years later with secret instructions to negotiate for transit routes to Russia and China should German and Japanese offensives interrupt those through Iran and Burma. There was even serious talk of building a railroad through Afghanistan, but these were kept secret as contingency plans.¹²

Engert faced another serious problem on his arrival in Kabul. By 1942 Afghanistan was facing very serious economic crisis, as world war II escalated further and Japan and the United States were involved in it. Wartime restriction on shipping space and strategic materials prevented Afghanistan from exporting its goods or importing vital necessities. The single largest source of foreign revenues before the war had been the profitable London market for Karkul skins. During the war London stopped importing such luxury items, and the prospect of an American market also dimmed when the United States joined the war. As a result Afghan trade was virtually paralyzed during the war. In these extremely difficult circumstances, Engert, supported by American diplomats in Washington and British colleagues in Kabul managed to provide Afghanistan's most urgent needs. This sympathetic action earned much gratitude, admiration and goodwill for America. It provided the golden years for American diplomacy. It was not surprising therefore that the American minister could be seen at the residence of the Afghan Prime Minister for dinner or playing bridge. Afghanistan was also able to build up a considerable dollar balance by exporting lambskins (Karkul) to the United States.¹³ In fact for a number of years, specially during the war, Afghanistan enjoyed a monopoly in this field. After the war Afghan-American trade increased, and as the table (no. 1) shows the balance of trade became favorable for Afghanistan.

Table: 1: Growth of Afghan-American Trade, 1942-1948

	Exports to U.S. (thousands of dollars)	Imports from U.S. (thousands of dollars)
1942	8,171	110
1943	10,091	97
1944	20,709	416
1945	33,412	843
1946	35,538	4,001
1947	2,992	6,678
1948	34,508	4,307

Source: U.S Bureau of Census, Reports No. 120 and 420 for calendar years 1942-1948 (based on U.S. customs office reports).

In addition to Karkul skin the United States bought pistachio nuts and coarse wool. Afghanistan, on the other hand, imported rayon cloth, cotton and woolen goods, glassware, cutlery, and large quantities of machinery and other instruments.¹⁴

Although Afghanistan accumulated some hard currency in dollars by exporting Karkul skin to America the economic condition of the common people remained at the pre-war level. Two-thirds of its population led a pastoral life in unprotected hilly areas. Karkul exports had, however, suffered a serious setback after the war owing to competitive markets offered by South-West Africa and the Soviet Union as the following table (no. II) shows.

Table II. Imports of Karakul undressed skins into the US., 1944-1948

Year	Afghan	Russian	S.W. African
1944			
No. of skins imported	1,823,900	1,173,700	1,850,900
Declared value	\$ 10.00	\$8.03	\$5.00
1945			
No. of skins imported	2,739,400	1,741,450	2,492,400
Declared value	\$11.57	\$ 10.03	\$6.19
1946			
No. of skins imported	3,030,300	2,339,200	2,207,850
Declared value	\$ 11.20	\$ 11.44	\$ 8.17
1947			
No. of skins imported	174,400	1,971,847	2,003,600
Declared value	\$ 10.00	\$ 9.10	\$ 5.95
1948			
No. of skins imported	3,437,800	1,501,700	2,059,300
Declared value	\$ 9.63	\$ 9.33	\$ 7.48

Source: U.S. Bureau of Census, Report No. FT 110 for calendar years 1944-1948 (based on U.S. customs offices returns)

It was clear that if Afghanistan wished to achieve greater material progress she needed to develop export items other than Karkul and fruits. The Afghans realized that if South-West African skins continued to displace Afghan skins in the American market, Afghanistan's economy will be severely hit. After the war the Afghan leadership therefore looked for ways to improve the economy and living standard by using its wartime accumulation of foreign exchange.¹⁵ They concentrated, upon the construction of an irrigation and hydroelectric power complex in southern Afghanistan to use the waters of the Hilmand and Argahandeb rivers. According to Arnold Fletcher, "most probably this idea had originated with students who after returning from the United States with engineering degrees had been promptly assigned to high places in the Afghan government and who had been impressed with the success of the Tennessee Valley Authority."¹⁶ When the project was first formulated before the war, a number of Japanese engineers had been employed by the Afghan government to supervise the Afghan laborers working with picks and shovels.¹⁷ The Afghans realized that the United States, a non-colonial as well as a wealthy country emerged as a global power in post-world war international politics. The Afghans, therefore, turned to the United States for aid and advise.

In 1946 the Afghan approached the United States for repairing old irrigation dams, building new canals, and undertaking other development works in the Hilmand River Valley in Southern Afghanistan. But the first approach to this direction was turned down by the United States. Nevertheless the Afghan rulers continued their efforts in strengthening relationship with the United States. The new Prime Minister Shah Mahmud stated in 1946- he was "...convinced that America's championship of the small nations guarantees my country's security against aggression. America's attitude is our salvation. For

the first time in our history we are free of the threat of great powers using our mountain passes as pathways to empire. Now we can concentrate our talents and resources on bettering the living conditions of our peoples.”¹⁸ The Afghan government signed a \$ 17 million contract with the Morrison Knudsen Company of Boise, Idaho, a firm with experts to build roads and airfields for repair and restoration of four irrigation dams, the construction of new irrigation canals, and the rebuilding of 450 kilometers of highway, all in the Hilmand Valley, west of Kandahar.¹⁹ Soon a number of American engineers and technicians came to Afghanistan and established their camp in Kandahar and Grisk. As a gesture of goodwill subsidiary company Morrison Knudsen Afghanistan, Inc. was also set up at San Francisco.²⁰

Besides economic co-operation the Afghans also sought American help in the field of education. A number of American teachers were invited to work in Afghanistan usually on three years contract. Most of them were assigned to Habibia College, although a few of them went to Kandahar. Dr. Paul Bushnell, professor of education at Wooster College, Ohio, was appointed as the director of Habibia College, which soon had the services of fourteen American instructors including four women. They successfully completed their assignment. During these days of Afghan-American cordial relations the diplomatic missions of the two countries were raised to the status of embassies, and a career diplomat, Eli Palmer was appointed as the first US ambassador to Afghanistan.²¹

The Hilmand project was no doubt an ambitious undertaking for the Afghan government. But soon it was realized that the project suffered from some serious problems as bad cost estimates, cultural conflicts, breach of trust and bureaucratic delays. By 1950 the budgeted funds were exhausted for the

preliminary engineering and construction works, the revised estimate was raised to 40 million.²² In this situation, the government turned to the United States for assistance. In 1949 Afghan Minister of National Economy Abdul Majid Zabuli went to Washington and requested credits for more than \$100,000,000 for completion of the Hilmand Valley and related projects. But the State Department referred him to the US Export-Import Bank for discussing details about the credit. The experts of the bank were bewildered by the complexities of a balanced integrated development plan. Although the full loan application was supported by Morrison Knudsen, which had considerable political influences in Washington, the bank eventually approved a short-term (eight years) loan of \$21 million at 4.5 percent interest and fund to be spent for the Hilmand project only.²³ The Afghan government, which renewed economic development as the means of enhancing its domestic support, was disappointed with the small size of the loan and its high interest rate. But the Afghan political leaders put more emphasis on the political effects of American involvement, so they accepted the loan, and the construction works continued for another two years.²⁴ In 1952 an additional amount of \$ 18,500,000 on slightly more liberal terms was sanctioned for the purpose.²⁵

While the development of the aid component in Afghan-US relation gave some satisfaction, the American response to Afghan proposal for political support of the Pushtunistan issue was virtually nil. In 1947, with the end of British rule in the subcontinent two independent countries were created. From the very beginning of the birth of Pakistan Afghanistan had been putting forward the demand for Pushtunistan, a state designed to unite the people of the tribal territory lying between the two countries. But Pakistan dismissed the claim summarily, as Afghanistan had long before accepted the Durand Line being the dividing line between them. As a result of disagreement, Afghanistan, a member

of the UN from September 1946, cast the only vote in the UN General Assembly against admission of Pakistan to the UN in September 1947, and urged that the North-West frontier area should not be recognized as a part of Pakistan until Pathans of that area were given the opportunity to opt for independence.²⁶

In December 1947, Afghanistan raised the issue of Pushtunistan, and propaganda war was launched against Pakistan which led to several Pakistan-Afghanistan border clashes between 1948 and 1951. Pakistan stopped Afghan petroleum imports for about three months on the ground that the Afghan tankers did not comply with the Pakistani safety measures. After border clashes in 1950, Pakistan closed the frontier and in the same year the Soviet Russia signed a barter and transit agreement with Afghanistan.²⁷ Although Soviet operations in Iranian Azerbaijan and Central Asia made the Afghans doubly cautious in seeking Soviet support. But there was no alternative to Soviet help to survive Afghan economy as America did not respond to Afghan request for political support over the Pushtunistan issue as well as for military assistance.

The Americans had little knowledge about Pushtunistan and related issues. They only knew about it from the British, who had no sympathy for the Afghan position. Besides, the Americans were impressed by the English-speaking, British-trained and pro-Western Pakistani officials, who were able to convince Washington of the value of Pakistan as a bulwark of Western concepts wedged between left-leaning India and backward, unfamiliar Afghanistan.²⁸ They also pointed out that Russia had grown an interest in Afghanistan and might intervene "whenever its broader objectives would be served."²⁹ Therefore, the United States did not wish to antagonize Pakistan by supporting an independent Pushtunistan. Besides, "both Afghanistan and Pakistan were friendly towards the United States and hostile towards the Soviet Union, and

since it was obvious that the conflict was not in its own interest, the United States proposed on three occasions to help mediate the dispute, once offering to act as mediator, and subsequently suggesting the good offices of Egypt and Turkey³⁰ for an amicable settlement. Although each time the American proposal was accepted by Afghanistan, it was rejected by Pakistan, which argued that the matter was an internal one and therefore not subject to mediation. The Afghan believed that only the United States was capable for finding a honorable solution of Pushtunistan problem because of its influence in Pakistan.

The question of military aid to Afghanistan was also turned down by America. In 1944 towards the end of the World War the Afghans approached General Patrick J. Hurly, head of an official American mission then on a visit to Afghanistan, for US armaments as well as military training for their officers in the United States. They provided him with a list of their arms requirements, but their request was ignored.³¹ In late 1948 requests for weapons to maintain internal security against tribal uprisings were again refused.³²

In 1950 the US Embassy in Kabul recommended for approval of arms sales to Afghanistan "to exclude Soviet influence, cement Afghan-American friendship, maintain internal security and promote settlement of difference with Pakistan."³³ Obviously the US embassy in Kabul had realized the importance of the Pushtunistan issue and the need for its early settlement and understood the necessity of not upsetting the armament balance in the region too drastically in favor of Pakistan. Therefore, on 12 March, 1951 George Mc Ghee, Assistant Secretary of State visited Kabul to discuss the request of Afghan war minister for supply of arms.³⁴ But the request for arms did not receive any positive response from Washington. The State Department advised President Harry S.

Truman to tell the then Afghan Prime Minister, who was on a visit to America, that the United States was unable to furnish military assistance to Afghanistan and that, so far as the latter's security was concerned, it would be well advised to rely on the system of collective security provided by the UN charter. But the Afghans did not give up their attempts to obtain military assistance from the United States. A formal request with a list of arms was again placed before George Merrill, US Ambassador to Kabul for consideration.³⁵

Merrill was instructed by Washington to communicate to the Afghan Prime Minister that "the arms requested will cost \$25 million that have to be paid for in cash. Transit through Pakistan will have to be arranged with no help from the United States. The sale will have to be made public and it would help if the Pushtunistan claim is dropped."³⁶ As the American term was not acceptable to Afghan government, Shah Mahmud called it a "political refusal." According to the Afghan government Afghan efforts to enlist American political support failed because the United States had decided to choose Pakistan as one of its trusted partners in its struggle to contain Communist expansion.

During this period Afghan relations with Islamic countries were generally good. Its relation with western European countries, specially France was generally warm. At this stage the Afghans were able to enlist German support to their economic development. Meanwhile the concept of nonalignment attracted the young generation of Afghan royal family who felt that this would be an ideal policy for Afghanistan without jeopardizing its good relations with the United States and other Western countries. Such a reorientation of Afghan attitude required a change of outlook and undoubtedly a change in leadership.

In early September 1953 Mahmud Shah Khan resigned as Prime Minister, Mohammed Daud Khan was appointed in his place. It was easy for Daud to become Prime Minister at the age of forty one, because his generation of the royal family had become fed up with his uncle, Shah Mahamud. The younger generation showed their dissatisfaction for several reasons: first, the slow progress of economic development and social reforms along with Hilmand valley, second, gradual dependence on the West, especially on the United States, had perished Afghanistan's neutrality and complicated its relations with the Soviet Union, and third, failure of previous government in gaining adequate support for the Pushtunistan issue.³⁷ Daud was determined to solve these problems. In view of the American's negative attitude to Afghanistan's problems, he decided to seek Soviet Union's assistance and support. However, before embarking on such a shift in Afghan policy, he decided to ask the United States for development aid and military supplies once more.

In November 1953 the Afghans approached the United States for a non restricted loan of 36 million dollars from the Export-Import Bank, to finance a program of integrated economic development. But the Bank granted the \$18.5 million dollars to be used only for the Hilmand project, and rejected the request for permission to use part of the loan to pave the streets of Kabul. Like the 1949 loan this one had an amortization period of eighteen years and an interest rate of $4\frac{1}{2}$ % percent.³⁸ By this response it was clear that the Americans were not ready to participate fully in Afghanistan's intensive development as emphasized by Mohammad Daud.

On December 1953, US Vice President Nixon arrived in Kabul for a two day visit and a series of meetings with Afghan leaders. During his stay in the Afghan capital Nixon promised US economic assistance to Afghanistan, and

urged the Afghans not to pursue Pushtunistan issue, which, according to him, had no justifiable basis and created an unnecessary conflict with Pakistan. The Afghans were greatly dissatisfied with Nixon's lack of consideration for the Afghan feelings and his superficial knowledge of a matter that made one of the principal factors of the country's foreign policy. In view of the cool atmosphere of the talks, the Afghans did not raise the more important issue of US military assistance to Afghanistan. As a result the first high level contact between Afghan government and the new Eisenhower administration practically produced no satisfactory results.³⁹

In spite of this cool atmosphere the Afghans renewed in 1954 their request for armaments from the United States. Foreign minister Mohammad Naim, was sent to Washington to make a personal appeal to US Secretary of State John Foster Dulles. In a belated letter Dulles informed the Afghan ambassador, Kabir Ludin, and Pakistani ambassador Amjad Ali "that after careful consideration, extending military aid to Afghanistan would create problems not offset by the strength it would create. Dulles urged instead that Pushtunistan dispute be settled."⁴⁰ It was frustrating for the Afghans that their confidential request to the United States was revealed to their rival and that they were asked to abandon the sensitive Pushtunistan issue. Such treatment towards Afghanistan by US was prompted by Pakistan's joining the Baghdad Pact and CENTO. According to Louis Dupree, "The Daud government officially stated the Americans refused to give Afghanistan military aid because the Afghans would not sign the required Mutual Security Agreement or join the Baghdad Pact. The unofficial American version of Afghanistan's reluctance to join the Baghdad Pact differs somewhat. According to U.S. diplomats on the scene at the time, some in the Afghan military wanted to join the Pact, but demanded assurances that they would be defended by the U.S. to join the Pact, but demanded assurances that they would

be defended by the U.S. if their acceptance of arms aid precipitated a Russian invasion or major subversive efforts inside Afghanistan. For strategic (Afghanistan is not all that important to the defense of the free world), logistical (how to defend Afghanistan given its geographic position), and pragmatic (few believed the Soviets capable of sending the Afghans massive military assistance) reasons, American military planners decided against such assurances.”⁴¹

Rober G. Neumann, who served as ambassador to Afghanistan from 1966 to 1973, said that Secretary of Sates Dulles refused the Afghan request because, in view of Afghanistan’s “location and poor communications, an enormous logistics effort would have led to be undertaken by the US, where the risk of escalating the cold war would have been high”.⁴² According to Neumann, US “recognized tacitly that the Soviet Union had a legitimate interest in stability along with its southern boarder, while the US interest was of a lesser degree, that is, to help Afghan protect their independence”.⁴³ Neumann’s successors Theodore L. Eliot, Jr., who agreed with Dulles, added that Dulles was influenced by two other factors: (i) the United States had close relations with Pakistan, which was a much more important country, and (ii) Washington was afraid that sending military aid to Afghanistan would so alarm the Soviets that they would take some serious measure against Afghanistan.⁴⁴ However, it may be said that because of the underlying geographic location, and political situation US policy basically remained unchanged towards Afghanistan until the communist-led *coup* in April 1978.

After the rejection of the arms request by the U.S government Daud opened negotiations with the USSR on their long standing offer of a military aid which the Afghans had previously ignored. Although the “simmering Pushtunistan”⁴⁵ issue was being pursued more vigorously by Afghanistan, no

major crises between the two countries had occurred. But this issue came to head late in March 1955, as Pakistan emboldened by its accession to SEATO and by American political and military support, announced the fusion of three West Pakistanis provinces and the Baluchistan State Union into a "one unit" system by 31 May⁴⁶. Afghan reaction to this measure was prompt and negative, they felt that the destruction of Pushtun identity was Pakistan's primary goal. Therefore, on 29 March, Prime Minister Mohammad Daud denounced Pakistan's decision as a hostile move, warning Karachi of the "grave consequence"⁴⁷ likely to ensue if Pakistan persisted in its plan. But Pakistan replied that the measure was an internal matter and therefore should be of no concern to Afghanistan. Following this a mob estimated at 15000 persons attacked and damaged the Pakistani embassy in Kabul, Jalalabad and Khandahar, destroying public and private property and burning Pakistani flag. As a reaction to these outrages Afghan consulates in Peshawar and Quetta were attacked by government inspired mobs.⁴⁸ These incidents led to a temporary suspension of relations between the two countries. Pakistan recalled its diplomatic and consular representatives from Afghanistan and imposed a blockade on Afghanistan transit which dealt a serious blow to the Afghan economy.⁴⁹

To over come its transit problem Afghanistan sought American assistance in building about sixteen hundred kilometers of a new transit route across Iran to the port of Chahbahar on the Persian Gulf. But both Iran and United States found the proposal economically unrealistic and practically rejected it.⁵⁰ The rejection of the proposal and the American support for Pakistan turned Afghan public opinion against the United States so much so that there were threats of handing over the Hilmand Valley project to Soviet technicians.⁵¹

By contrast, the USSR cunningly stepped in to rescue Afghanistan with offers of transit facilities, political support and military aid. In the middle of 1955 Afghanistan negotiated a new agreement on duty free transit of Afghan goods across Soviet territory, based on Article 6 of the 1921 treaty between the two countries.⁵² This was a Soviet attempt to divert its economic dependence for India to the north.⁵³ In December two principal leaders of the Soviet Union, Premier Nekoly A. Bulganin and Communist Party Secretary Nikitai S Khrushiech visited Kabul as part of their new policy of wooing the third world and consolidating Russo-Afghan ties. On this occasion three agreements were signed in which the USSR extended a loan of \$ 100 million, long term development loan to Afghanistan, confirmed the 1931 treaty of neutrality and non-aggression for the subsequent ten years, and expressed Soviet support of Afghan views regarding Pushtunistan. Another secret agreement (made few months later) provided for extensive military aid to Afghanistan.⁵⁴

The assurance for large-scale Soviet economic aid to Afghanistan, Soviet support for Pushtunistan, and especially the Russo-Afghan military agreement caused a change in the American attitude to Afghanistan. The United States undoubtedly prompted in part by cold war situation came forward to help Afghanistan recover from its precarious position. Soon after the country's arms deal with the Soviet Union the United States National Security Council recommended that the United States should continue its efforts "to resolve the Afghan dispute with Pakistan and to encourage Afghanistan to minimize its reliance upon the Communist block for military training and equipment, and to look to the United States and other free world sources for military training and assistance."⁵⁵ To prevent Afghanistan from becoming a Soviet satellite the United States showed renewed interest in Afghanistan's economic development. With the establishment of the ICA, subsequently the Agency for International Development (AID), American government assistance to Afghanistan started

first in a modest way mainly in irrigation, transportation, and education; and much of it has gone into the Hilmand Valley project. The United States aid program undertook major road building projects to give Afghanistan better transportation links with Pakistan, partially offsetting growing Russian transportation connections.⁵⁶

American assistance was directed more to dominate the development of Afghan communications and transportation by making Afghanistan a modern air centre comparable to its historic Central Asian role in caravan days. ICA provided \$ 10 million in grants and \$ 5 million in loans for Morrison Knudsen to build a modern airport at Kandahar, which intended to become a major refueling point for flights across southern Asia. But before the airport was opened in December 1962, modern jets had come into operation speeding across the area without refuelling.⁵⁷ Therefore, the airport was then labeled by the State Department “a monument to poor planning. Kandahar was not attractive for tourists, and not suitable for an International Jet center and “since all must be imported by truck across the mountains, the airport is not economic even as a refueling point.”⁵⁸ In 1976 the airport was launched, it handled only 6,600 international passengers, compared with 106,000 at Kabul.⁵⁹ Nevertheless the Afghans insisted on the continuation of the airport as part of American support for Afghan civil aviation. The American feared that if they rejected the project the Afghans would find it difficult to organize the local airline, Aryana, and ultimately the Soviets would not hesitate to organize it to extend their political supremacy one nearby Asian countries. So Washington continued its support for Kandahar air port and Pan-American World Airways took Aryana in hand. But some diplomatic historians would like to argue that the real cause of building the airport was to explore the potentiality of Kandahar as an air base where bombers could safety land after attacking Soviet targets in Siberia or Central Asia.⁶⁰

The most important contribution of the United States to Afghanistan was the development of education in the country. After World War II the number of Afghan students in the United States for advanced studies had increased to the point that by 1962 over one thousand Afghans had received higher studies in America. Besides government initiative the ICA, and such private foundations as the American friends of the Middle East, with assistance from the US government, have signed contracts with Columbia and Wyoming Universities to bring a number of American teachers to Afghanistan. A number of them were appointed to the Afghan School of vocational Education (originated by an American, Richard Soderbungh) and others to the University of Kabul, the Technological Institute, and the Teacher Training School.⁶¹ American participation in the building of a new campus for Kabul University complemented the older French efforts in law and medicine and German assistance in science and economics. Thus, the education, agriculture, and engineering colleges under the University came to depend primarily upon American aid for their laboratory equipment and professional staff.⁶²

In 1956–1959, United States donated 130,000 tons of wheat to Afghanistan under the terms of PL-480-11, much more than its sale of wheat a few years back.⁶³ In 1958, the U.S Export–Import Bank also agreed to extend a loan for the construction of a railroad link between Kandahar and Chaman, a railway terminal on Pakistan side. This project did not materialize mostly because of tense Afghan-Pakistan political relations.⁶⁴ In latter 1950s, U.S assistance totaled \$ 148.3 million where as Soviet assistance came to \$ 246.2 million. This greatly pleased the Afghan government, which derived benefit from the U.S aid as well as from the Soviet assistance.⁶⁵ In this way differences were gradually resolved between Washington and Kabul, and the Americans were demonstrating increasing interest in Afghanistan's geopolitical situation and the significance of its neutrality. But the U.S commitment to Afghanistan

remained ambiguous, when Special Presidential Assistant James P. Richards in early April 1957 as a part of his tour of the Middle East to explain the Eisenhower Doctrine, visited Kabul.⁶⁶ In the communiqué, that was issued towards the end of the visit it was not clear if the country would be protected by the Eisenhower Doctrine- i.e. whether it would enjoy U.S armed support in the event of a Soviet invasion.⁶⁷ Yet the Afghan-American understanding resulted in the exchange of high-level visits between the two countries.

In June 1959, Mohammed Daud officially visited the United States, where he discussed with President Eisenhower and John Foster Dulles and conferred with Samuel C. Waugh, president of the Export-Import Bank. He also addressed both houses of the U.S. Congress and signed an Afghan- American cultural agreement with Dulles.⁶⁸ Judging from the contents of the joint Afghan-American statement, it became obvious that the American leaders appreciated Afghanistan's political stance and were desirous of continuing to assist Afghanistan in its development efforts. American suspicion about Daud's leftists leanings was also eliminated to a large extent by this visit. According to a *New York Times* article published at the time of Daud's visit, Afghanistan “had maintained her independence including what State Department officials call a wholesomely leery attitude toward the Soviet Union.”⁶⁹

On 9 December 1959 President Eisenhower paid an official visit to Kabul to meet King Mohammad Zahir. He was enthusiastically received by the Afghan and discussed matters of mutual interest with the King and Mohammad Daud in a cordial atmosphere. During his visit to Afghanistan Eisenhower assured the Afghans of continued American interest in assisting Afghanistan's development program. Both the countries agreed that the president's visit had further strengthened friendly relations between the two countries⁷⁰

The closure of the Afghan-Pakistan border had greatly increased Afghanistan's trade and logistical dependence on the Soviet Union. To reduce the growing Soviet influence in Afghanistan, the United States took efforts to bring about a reconciliation between Afghanistan and Pakistan. In October 1961, President Kennedy offered America's mediators to Kabul and Islamabad to enable them to reestablish relations and eventually settle their dispute. This proposal though welcomed by the Afghan leaders was not received well by Pakistan. Between October 19 and November 17, 1961, President Kennedy's special envoy, Livingston T. Merchant then US ambassador to Canada, met with the leaders of Afghanistan and Pakistan. His mission failed to convince either party to compromise on Pushtunistan issue. Although he did not succeed in breaking the Afghan-Pakistani deadlock, his meetings with the Afghans gave an opportunity to realize the origin of the dispute with Pakistan and its importance. The Afghan rulers hoped that these meetings would at least improve American understanding of Afghanistan's position. For several years the Shah of Iran, a close ally of the United States had also been involved in trying to find a solution to Pak-Afghan differences. But the irreconcilable positions of both the countries prevented him from making any substantial progress even on smaller border issues.⁷¹

The closure of the Afghan-Pakistani border for three years also affected American projects in Afghanistan more severely than any other projects. The United States could not ship its aid materials via the Soviet Union as the Germans, the UN and other donors had been practicing after a new Afghan-Soviet trade and transit agreement. In early 1962 the Afghans briefly opened the border for the passage of some American heavy equipment that was badly needed for completion of Kandahar-Kabul road and improvements in the Hilmand Valley project. But the bulk of American materials intended for

American projects in Afghanistan rotted and rusted in Karachi, Peshawar, and Chaman. In 1961 the Afghans once again asked the Americans for assistance in building a new transit route from the port of Chabahar in Iran to Zahidan on the Afghan-Iranian border and from there to Kandahar. But the Iranians and the Americans did not agree with this proposal. In 1962 a transit route was then established that ran from the port of Khurramshahr on the Persian Gulf to Herat. Although this route was difficult and long than the Tehran-Herat route, and Khurramshahr's port facilities were not enough to handle the increased traffic, the United States began dispatching all its assistance to Afghanistan through Iran.⁷²

The closure of the Afghan-Pakistani border also created a most serious problem in exporting Afghan grape, melon and others fruits to India and Pakistan because without the Pakistani market support it was not possible to transport these perishable items to other markets. In this pressing circumstance United States and Soviet Union tried to help Afghanistan by airlifts of its important fruit crops. The US provided free cargo flights to India ten flights a week for forty weeks from Afghanistan, whereas the Russians provided fifteen flights a day, all most all to the Soviet Union, but their flights were not free.⁷³

In spite of the difficulties with Pakistan, during Daud's Premiership Afghanistan witnessed an unprecedented development in economic, social and military sectors. But his stand on Pushtunistan issue created serious agitation among the Afghan leadership as well as the army, the new intelligentsia, business community and unemployed youths. In fact in March 1963 Zahir Shah dismissed Daud to obviate the difficult economic crisis created by the breach of relations with Pakistan. Within a month from this event the border with Pakistan was reopened and normal trade and transit resumed.

In September 1963 King Zahir Shah and Queen Homaira paid a state visit to the United States. During his visit a joint declaration was issued, in which Washington reiterated its readiness to help the Afghans in their economic development. In addition, it also supported Afghanistan's traditional policy of safeguarding its national independence through non-alignment, friendship and cooperation with all countries. The United States for its part placed great importance on Afghan's continued independence and national integrity.⁷⁴

In 1964 Zahir Shah introduced his new democratic reforms, which included a constitution, a parliament, election, freedom of press and freedom of political parties. But unfortunately his new democracy did not work satisfactorily. With the political failure there was also slow economic growth during the constitutional period. With the end of cold war, United States and Soviet Union had lost much of their interest in Afghanistan. As a result economic assistance to Afghanistan from the two super-powers had decreased between 1963 and 1973. King Zahir, however, maintained good terms with both the United States and the USSR. During the Indo-Pakistan war in 1965 and 1971 Afghanistan remained neutral. Afghanistan's positions regarding Vietnam was not very different from that of the majority of non-aligned nations. During the visit of US Vice President Spino Agnew in Kabul in 1969 Afghanistan justified its neutral position about Vietnam.⁷⁵

In the late sixties and during the seventies, as a result of the Vietnam war and detente with both China and the Soviet Union the US generally withdrew from South Asia. It left the region to be managed by the Sino-Soviet rivalry as long as neither of these powers tried to establish a position of dominance. In July 1973 when Daud with the help of the Soviet trained army officers staged a

coup and ousted his cousin King Zahir Shah, the United States showed no great concern. The American experts in Afghanistan, Louis Dupree and Richard Frye agreed with the State Department that the coup was more nationalist than communist.⁷⁶ Second, although a number of American foreign policy analysts – Harrison, Albin Rubinstein, Francis Fukuyama, Thomas Hammond, realized that the coup was planned or encouraged by the Soviets, they could not convince their home government.⁷⁷

After coming to power Daud continued his earlier policies of hostility towards Pakistan with the support from the USSR. But soon he realized that he was surrounded by pro-Russian leftists, whose ultimate target was a communist Afghanistan. Daud, who used the leftists to gain power, now began to dismiss them from government offices. Mohammad Naim assured Theodore L. Eliot, Jr., new US ambassador to Kabul, “of Afghanistan’s desire to have the friendliest of relations with the United States and stressed the need for a strong American economic presence in Afghanistan, not only to help the country’s economic advancement but also to assist Afghanistan politically. He further told the ambassador that the Afghan government wanted to stem attempts by “young people imbued with leftist ideas” in the government apparatus and outside it who were bent on stirring up Afghan-US relations”.⁷⁸

On 1 November 1974 US Secretary of State Henry A. Kissinger paid an official visit to Afghanistan. He met Mohammad Daud, and other high-ranking Afghan officials in Kabul. Kissinger told Daud that the United States valued Afghanistan’s friendship and attached great importance to its stability, independence, and its policy of nonalignment. But at the same time he said, these could not be safeguarded unless Afghanistan was politically and economically strong. Mentioning US decision to assist Afghanistan, Kissinger

announced that he would send a senior official of the US AID to Kabul to cooperate with Afghan government in undertaking new projects and seeking ways of accelerating the completion of existing ones, like the Hilmand Valley project.

During his meeting with the Afghan leaders Kissinger also raised the Pushtunistan issue that created a serious situation in the Afghan-Pakistan border. Daud assured Kissinger that he would try for a peaceful solution of Pushtunistan's dispute. Kissinger expressed his satisfaction to the Afghans commitment and hoped that soon Afghanistan and Pakistan would be able to settle their long-standing differences. He held out that friendship between Kabul and Islamabad would contribute to the consolidation of peace and stability in the region and that such a development would be highly welcomed by the US government. At the end of Kissinger's visit, a joint US-Afghan declaration was issued in which the warmth of US-Afghan relation was reflected and the U.S commitment to cooperate with the Afghans in achieving their economic-development goals was again reiterated.⁷⁹

In January 1975, high official of US AID, Assistant Administrator Robert Nooter, visited Afghanistan and held talks with the Afghan Minister of planning and other Afghan officials. During his stay in Kabul Nooter informed the Afghans that the AID would provide technical assistance for maintenance a drainage system in the Hilmand Valley. He also signed with the Afghan leaders an additional \$2 million loan for the building of electoral transmission lines between Kajaki, a dam on the Hilmand river, and Kandahar. Later in the month the head of US AID Daniel Parker, visited Afghanistan and met with high Afghan officials. His visit increased US participation in Afghanistan's development, specially in completing the Hilmand Valley project.⁸⁰ In addition a

number of agreement concerning US assistance in the provision of school textbooks, the development of the Kabul University, rural schools and rural health care centers were signed between the Republic of Afghanistan and the United States. By 1978 the United States had extended \$532.87 million in economic aid to Afghanistan, of which 71% was in the form of grants.⁸¹

At the invitation of the Secretary of State Kissinger, Mohammad Naim, paid an official visit to Washington from June 29 to July 1, 1976. Although his visit to Washington was normally a goodwill trip, it nevertheless significantly contributed to strengthen conditions for further extension of Afghan-US cooperation. By the invitation of the government of Afghanistan, Secretary of State Kissinger, visited Afghanistan for the second time in August 1976. At that time Afghanistan had already been taken a major step to improve its relations with Pakistan. Kissinger conveyed his satisfaction about the renewal of cordial relations between Kabul and Islamabad. He also reconfirmed his government's continued desire to participate closely in Afghanistan's development.⁸² Daud welcomed the accelerated pace of US involvement in Afghanistan's social and economic development.

However, during Kissinger's visit to Kabul and in other contacts with the Americans there was no indication that Washington had given pressure on Bhutto to adopt a more friendly attitude towards Afghanistan. The real interest of the United States was to see an Afghan-Pakistan reconciliation for the sake of regional harmony. To promote their own economic and technical assistance to Afghanistan, America also encouraged its allies –Iran, Saudi Arabia and Kuwait to help Afghanistan financially. At the same time America was trying to free Daud completely from the Soviet block.

In the summer of 1977, President Jimmi Carter invited Mohammad Daud to the United States for an official visit. In his invitation letter to Daud, Carter also praised Afghanistan's nonalignment, welcomed the positive efforts of the Afghan president in improving Afghan-Pakistani relations, and expressed the hope that he could meet Daud in the near future to discuss matters of common interest. But Daud's visit to US never materialized due to the communist takeover in April 1978.

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Chapter Four

US Reaction to Soviet Occupation of Afghanistan

As has been discussed in chapter two the root of Soviet occupation of Afghanistan in 1979 may be traced to the “Great Game” of power politics between Russia and Britain. From the days of Peter the Great, Russia had been searching for an outlet to the warm waters of Indian Ocean. In fact Russia wanted to establish a dominant position in Afghanistan, but the presence of British power in the Indian subcontinent was a positive obstacle to it. Russia’s defeat in the Russo-Japanese war of 1904-1905 and British concern over the growing challenge from Germany led to the two former adversaries subsequently to negotiate a far-reaching *detente*. In 1907, Russia and Britain agreed to a buffer role for Afghanistan and confirmed the status quo with respect to Afghanistan and its Central Asian periphery. Thus for the time being the Great Game in Afghanistan was abandoned by both Russia and Britain.

After the Bolshevik revolution in Russia in 1917, the Soviets established diplomatic contacts with Afghanistan in 1919, signed a friendship treaty in 1921 and a treaty of neutrality and mutual non-aggression in 1931. It also provided limited economic and military aid to King Amanullah of Afghanistan. The policy of friendship towards Afghanistan was adopted for three reasons: first, Soviet leaders were determined to support the national bourgeois in the developing countries to weaken the hold of the imperialist countries, and to gain time for the emergence of an indigenous communist movement. Secondly, during the nineteenth and twentieth centuries to maintain a balance in its foreign policy the Afghan rulers played Soviet Union against the British and vice versa. Third, the Soviets feared that Afghan rulers might dream of Central Asian

confederation under their influence and they could seek British assistance in the fulfillment of their design. Because of these mutual suspicion and mistrust the Soviet-Afghan relations were restrained during pre-world war II era. However, the post-world war period became more favorable for the USSR.

Immediately after the war the Afghans turned mainly to the United States, which was still involved in the regional power struggle for alliance structure. As a result Afghanistan had to face new changes in the international system. With the departure of the British from India and the establishment of India and Pakistan as independent states, Afghanistan started to press claims to the Pushtu-speaking tribal areas of Pakistan, and this policy intensified its desire for modernization, especially in respect of weapons. Sardar Daud's regime (1953-1963) initiated rapid modernization at a vast scale. Pursuing King Amanullah Khan's policy he embarked upon secular policies though in a more cautious way. He abolished *Purdah* system and arrested the *Ulema* who opposed his policies. Taking advantage of the cold war situation he received large economic aid from both Russia and America. But because of Pushtunistan issue he established closer relations with the Soviet Union. In 1956 Soviet Military Mission arrived in Kabul and chalked out long term and short term plans. Afghanistan was offered low interest loan for the purchasing of Russian armaments. Several thousand Afghan military officers were sent to Soviet Russia for training whereas only several hundreds were sent to USA. Most of them, who went to Russia for training, returned home with pro-communist views. King Zahir, realizing this did not allow them to rise to top position. In fact many of these officers were resentful and opposed the royal government.¹ It was not surprising, therefore, that army officers played an important role in the ouster of the King in 1973 and in the communist seizure of power in 1978.

Daud's resignation in 1963 revived the demand for a return to liberal parliamentary system. In 1964 King Zahir introduced a "New Democracy" program, which included a constitution, a parliament, election, freedom of press and freedom to form political parties. During this period of political liberalization the communists in Afghanistan, who had so long been working in a disorganized manner, launched the first leftist political party Peoples Democratic Party of Afghanistan (PDPA) on 1 January, 1965. Taraki was elected Secretary General of the Party and Babrak Karmal was chosen deputy Secretary-General of the party. In the election of 1965 Babrak Karmal, Dr. Anahita Ratebzad, Nur Mohammad Nur and Fezanul Haq Fezan were elected members of the *Wolsi Jirga* (the lower house of parliament). Nur Mohammad Taraki and Hafizullah Amin were defeated in the election. The PDPA candidates did not run as members of the unofficial party but represented themselves to the electorate as militant reformists.² Taking advantage of the freedom of the press in 1966 the PDPA headed by Taraki started a newspaper called *Khalq* (masses), which published six issues between April 11 and May 16, 1966.³ But for several reasons in 1967 the PDPA split into two rival groups, one committed to Taraki, a very impractical romantic revolutionary, and the other to Karmal, a conventional Marxist ideologue.⁴ Babrak Karmal and his followers began publishing their weekly newspaper *Parcham* (Banner) from March 1968. In the 1969 parliamentary election only two members of the PDPA- Babrak Karmal and Hafizullah Amin were elected to the *Wolsi Jirga*.⁵

The 1964 constitution failed to bring stability. From 1964 to 1973 five Prime Ministers were not able to go far in imposing enlightened democratic ways in an hostile environment. Moreover, the King's half-hearted advance towards constitutional monarchy failed to satisfy the rising political aspirations of the progressive Afghans. A serious drought in 1970-1972 retarded economic

development and heightened social tension. This situation paved the way of capturing power for Daud who had a close ties with the USSR and the pro-Moscow Afghan military officers. The Afghan army, who were not satisfied with the King, staged a bloodless coup in July 1973 with the help of a group of army officers and ousted the king and abolished the monarchy. Afghanistan was declared a republic.

The resumption of power by Daud was welcomed by Moscow as it thought the return of Daud, surrounded by pro-Soviet army officers was a significant step in the furtherance of their interests in Southwest Asia. In fact it was necessary not only to actively support the new-leftist regime in Kabul but also to increase Afghanistan's dependence on the Soviet Union, to extract maximum benefit from the unexpectedly new favorable conditions. Russia offered a large scale military and economic aid to Afghanistan. By 1975 the Russians and the Afghans had agreed on over seventy projects for improving Afghan economy.⁶

As the Parchamists helped Daud, the latter rewarded Parchamists by appointing several leftists to government positions including Faiz Mohammad, who became minister of the interior. He gave important positions in the armed forces to officers close to Parcham, including Major Abdul Qader and Mohammad Aslam Watanjar⁷ both leaders helped Daud in the 1973 coup. In addition he assigned them administrative responsibilities in the provinces but most of them eventually became disillusioned with massive corrupt practices and ultimately quit.⁸

Although Daud came to power with the help of leftist army officers, his Marxist policy had no ideological basis. He just used them as a means to gain

power. With Russian economic backing, he was able, in the early years at least to improve the Afghan economy and even achieve a small balance of payments surplus. But like virtually every other Afghan ruler in similar circumstances, he found it increasingly necessary, psychologically and politically, to assert his independence.⁹ Therefore, concerned over his dependence on Soviet aid in 1975 he began to resuscitate the fence-sitting policies. He removed all representatives of *Parcham* from offices and did not permit representative institutions. The left wing minister of the interior was replaced by rightists and Major Abdul Qader was relieved of his command.¹⁰ All these policies antagonized the members of the PDPA whom he had used as the political base of his own team at the time of the coup. But as the PDPA was divided more on the basis of personality and not on substantive issues were not able to protect Daud's repression; they looked to Moscow for inspiration.¹¹

Daud acted very much like the autocrat he was. In 1977 he promulgated a new constitution, which provided for a single party system besides investing enormous powers in Daud as the head of state, chief executive commander in chief of the armed forces and leader of the sole political party and only two newspapers- *Anis* and *Zomhoriat* were allowed to be published instead of earlier nineteen in number.¹²

In foreign affairs Daud sought to replace declining American aid as a counter-weight to the Soviets by turning to the Middle East oil states- Saudi Arabia and the Persian Gulf states. He also tried to settle the Pushtunistan dispute and suspended support for Baluch separatists in Pakistan. He attempted to strengthen his ties with the truly non-aligned members and extended his whole hearted support for the non-aligned movement. To this end in the early spring of 1978 he made trips to India, Pakistan, Egypt, Libya, Turkey and

Yugoslavia.¹³ He also planned to visit Washington to meet President Jimmi Carter. By making closer ties with these countries Daud desired to make Afghanistan less dependent on the USSR. But his new foreign policy gave the Russians little reason to retrain their Marxist protégés inside Afghanistan from attempting to bring down his republic. Presumably the Soviet Union made serious efforts to unify the leftist movement in Afghanistan. In July 1977 both Parcham and Khalq were united and poised to strike before Daud inflicts a final blow on them. Meanwhile a list of reliable leftist officers were ready to advance against Daud. In November the leftists assassinated his close associate Ali Ahmed Khoram, the minister of planning whose murder seriously agitated the Afghan government specially Daud's Interior Minister Nooristani who according to a report told a number of his friends that the time had come to "finish off" the communists before they got too strong.¹⁴

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On the night of 17 April 1978 Mir Akbar Khyber, a leading Parchamist ideologist was assassinated by persons later identified as Khalqis.¹⁵ His murder was the kind of spark that the communist leadership was waiting for to set off a large-scale anti government explosion. Two days later the PDPA, blaming the assassination on the CIA, staged a surprisingly large demonstration of some 15000 to 20000 people during Khyber's funeral and shouted slogans against Daud, United States and CIA agents.¹⁶ This was the first public demonstration against Daud. Increasingly worried about the intensity of the protest, Daud moved swiftly to arrest the major communist leaders, including Taraki, Amin and Babrak. But his actions were not decisive enough. There was no concerted move against leftist military officers and Hafizullah Amin, who was under house arrest, through his teenage son Abdur Rahman was able to communicate with the Khalqi officers to issue them detailed instruction to stage an anti-Daud *coup*.¹⁷ Only some 600 men, 60 tanks and 20 war planer were involved in it.¹⁸

Col. Abdul Qadir, who had personal grievances against Daud, had played a key role in 1973 coup was also the key figure in 1978 coup d'état as well. The communists took over the control on 27 April, killed President Daud and his brother Mohammad Naim.

Taraki was elected the President of the new regime and also held the post of the Prime Minister. He also retained the Secretary Generalship of the PDPA, which he had held from the very beginning of the party. Hafizullah Amin, who was younger than Taraki, more energetic and ruthless,¹⁹ was elected deputy Prime Minister as well as foreign minister. Babrak Karmal, as the leader of the Parchamists, was named Vice President of the Revolutionary Council and senior deputy Prime Minister. Eleven members of the cabinet belonged to Khalq while ten were selected from Parcham.²⁰ Both the Revolutionary Council and the Cabinet were made up entirely of party members, who had been earlier put behind the bar for their political activities. It may be mentioned that although military personnel had carried out the *coup*, only three of them were included in the cabinet—an indication that the party, in the Leninist fashion, would be the 'vanguard' of the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan.

After capturing power Taraki though promised a foreign policy of non-alignment and good relations with all neighbors but in fact he aligned himself with Russia. From the very beginning of his regime he had enjoyed the absolute backing of Moscow. Russia was the first to grant diplomatic recognition on 30 April 1978²¹ and it was shortly followed by the members of the Soviet block. India was the second country that extended its diplomatic recognition to the new Afghan government.²² Within six months thirty agreements were concluded between Afghanistan and the Soviet Union with commitment for more than 14,000 million US dollars and twenty five agreements were concluded with the

communist countries.²³ Taraki invited several hundred of Soviet military and civilian advisers to strengthen and control the Afghan Army, Air force and other sectors. Daud's seven year plan was replaced a five year plan with Soviet assistance.²⁴

Although the new regime was reluctant to identify itself with a communist regime it was apparent that it was in fact communist. Party members were referred to in the press as "Comrade", and the new name for the country "Democratic Republic of Afghanistan" was similar to the names used by several communist states. The Peoples Democratic Party had a Secretary General, a Politburo, a Central Committee, and a Control Commission just like the Communist Party of the Soviet Russia.²⁵ The Afghan press was filled with references to Marx, Lenin, class struggle "the victorious world proletarian movement", and the party as "the vanguard of the working class".²⁶ Speeches of the party leaders were obviously on the Marxist line. On 7 November 1978, the anniversary day of the Bolshevik Revolution, Hafizullah Amin said the *Saur* Revolution was a continuation of the Russian event. "Though we are not the first socialist country of the world, we have the honour of being the neighbour" of it.²⁷

The selection of the first cabinet, announced on 1 May 1978, suggests an attempt to achieve a delicate balance between the Parcham and Khalq factions. But within three months rivalry between the two groups resumed. Because of policy differences, personality clashes, different ethnic background and social bases Parcham broke away from the Khalq. In absence of the Khalq Babrak Karmal failed to gain military support. But Moscow, which was not satisfied with Taraki's effort to bring a counter coup detat against the Khalq government decided to disassociate itself from the government.²⁸

In fact in July 1978, leading Parchamists were posted as ambassadors—Babrak to Prauge, Nur Ahmad Nur to Washington, Dr. Anathia Ratebzad to Belgrade, Dr. Najib to Tehran, Abdul Wakil to the UK and Mahmud Barayali to Pakistan. In August 1978 Colonel Abdul Qader were charged with engaging in a conspiracy hatched by Babrak's supporter to over throw Taraki and was imprisoned. With him the chief of staff of army Lt. General Shapur Ahmad Zai, the minister of public work, Major Mohammad Rafi, the minister of planning, Sultan Ali Keshmand, the minister of frontier affairs Nezamuddin Tahzeeb, and a number of others met the same fate. In October the five above-stated ambassadors were declared traitors and ordered to return to Afghanistan but they defied.²⁹

Along with the purging of the Parchamists, Taraki pressed for radical economic, social and cultural changes with a zeal that alienated traditional and religious elites, religious and nationalist middle class and the common people of rural areas. The forced retirement of administrators who served under Daud resulted in the shortage of competent personnel. Young party members without training or experience suddenly became deputy ministers, managers of state enterprises or chairmen of state committees, much to the disgust of older bureaucrats with long years of service.³⁰ As a result it was difficult for the government to plan and carry out its program.

In mid-October 1978, Taraki introduced the national flag by replacing the Islamic green flag with a red flag carrying a star just like that of the Soviet Republics. This was quickly followed by a twenty year treaty of friendship and co-operation with Russia. The provisions of the treaty, including Article IV called on the signatories to “consult each other and take agreed and appropriate

measures to ensure security, independence and territorial integrity”³¹ Article 8 called on the parties to create “an effective security system in Asia on the basis of joint efforts of all countries of the region”³² -a proposal Moscow had been pushing from 1969. Similar treaties, as noted by some western diplomats, Moscow signed with India and Vietnam in 1971 and 1978 respectively. However, by this treaty Russia had apparently reached its goals of ideological congruence and strategic alliance. An observer remarked: “The haste with which the treaty with Afghanistan was signed indicates that the Soviet Union was perhaps anxious for an institutional framework that would enable it to deal with its own immediate and long term objectives and also serve as a basis for a possible military action on its parts.”³³

Although at that time Afghanistan was not in a position to invade any country, there was an obvious need for more Soviet arms and advisors just to keep the country's security from the external threats. At first there was little opposition to the Khalq regime as the people did not know much about the new regime and the government had not yet got sufficient time to carry out its new policies. But when the government was taking its revolutionary measures seriously, it was not surprising that opposition developed.³⁴ and since Afghans had a long tradition of fighting for their right, the opposition inevitably took the form of revolt. By the summer of 1979, security became highly uncertain even in the largest cities. Uprisings and mutinies occurred at Herat, Jalalabad, Kandahar, Pul-i-Khumri, Pakhtia, Nangrahar, Kapisa, Uruzgan, Parwan, Badghis, Balkh, Ghazni and Parwan.³⁵

The Afghan Government was seriously embarrassed after the murder of US Ambassador, Adolph Dubs by some extremists on 14 February 1979. “Until then U.S.A like other western states with a history of involvement in

Afghanistan, had adopted a cautious policy of continuing its aid programs in full, without paying much attention to the Pro-Moscow orientation of the Taraki government, or its rhetorical outbursts against US imperialism".³⁶ But after this tragic event American assistance in Afghanistan was brought to an abrupt end. US officials in Kabul were concerned only about the future of US finance for the Helmand-Arghandab Valley Authority, for which so much US finance and prestige had already been involved. The staff of the American embassy were sharply reduced and a new charge de affairs came.³⁷ This change of US policy towards Afghanistan was taken by Soviet and Afghan officials as if the resistance was being inspired, and even conducted by Americans.

By March 1979, after the elimination of Parchamists in July 1978, the leadership of the Khalq showed increasing divisiveness. Khalq strongman Amin had so increased his political power that he compelled Taraki to hand over to him Prime Ministers portfolio. On 27 March Amin became the Prime Minister, taking over direct responsibility for the government from Taraki. Taraki retained the titles of President, Secretary General of the PDPA and became President of the new Homelands High Defense council, but he gradually became only a figurehead.³⁸

Moscow's reaction to the Herat uprising was to rush military aid to Kabul. The arms aid was followed immediately by a visit to Afghanistan in early April by a top level military team headed by General Alexi Yepishiv, first Deputy Minister of Defense and General Secretary of political affairs for the Russian Army and Navy. Yepishiv's visit coincided with the deliberate massacre of the entire male population of the village of Kerala, northeast of Kabul. Over eleven hundred people were shot by Afghan troops and police under the direct command of Soviet advisers because the village was suspected of having

supported the insurgents.³⁹ Despite this brutal action resistance was increasing day by day and the Taraki regime faced a near collapse.

By this time the Soviets had made up their mind to intervene militarily as they were not happy with the domestic policies of Khalq government which seemed to be loosing more areas to the rebels, even in the provinces around Kabul. *Daily Telegraph* in an editorial noted Moscow's dilemma in these words: "Moscow's dilemma is whether to risk seeing Afghanistan slip out of the Russian sphere—after having only so recently been brought into it or whether bearing in mind the Soviet Union's large Muslim populations to take the possibility of even bigger risk of becoming directly involved in a battle with resurgent Islam."⁴⁰ It may be noted that the Soviet Union started identifying Afghanistan from June 1979 as 'a member of Socialist Community'. According to Moscow—because of wrong policy of Khalq government it became weak. So the leadership had to be changed. At this stage Amin was also alarmed.

In July Amin took over direct control of military operations and proposed to change the cabinet. Watanjar was shifted from defense to the interior ministry, Mazdooryar from interior to frontier affairs.⁴¹ It was hoped that the revolts might be suppressed. But the role of the army in fighting on behalf of a hated regime popularly identified with the Russians was distasteful to many nationalists Afghan officers. Russia was extremely frustrated about the Afghan situation. Meanwhile most of the organized opposition to the leftist Afghan government clearly had come from anti-Soviet Muslims. The Soviets feared that a success of the present regime would be pro-west, perhaps even allowing the Americans a special position in Afghanistan. Moscow now decided to intervene in a big way and formulated a plan of action. General Ivan G. Pavlovsky, commanding General of all Soviet ground forces was sent to Afghanistan in

mid- August of 1979. Pavlovsky stayed in Afghanistan for two months along with a group of army commanders including eleven generals he brought with him.⁴²

The Soviet government finally decided to remove Amin from power. Taraki's visit to Moscow in September 1979, after attending the sixth Non-aligned Summit in Havana provided Brezhnev with an opportunity to plot against Amin, who was then in full command in Kabul. But suspecting a plot against him Amin staged a counter coup on 16 September, killed Taraki and seized power himself.⁴³ Next day Amin through a broadcast over Kabul radio proclaimed himself as Chairman of the Revolutionary Council, that is, President and Secretary General of the PDPA Central Committee.

Amin's assumption of power was not acceptable to Moscow but it did not react sharply. Instead followed a cautious policy of wait and see as Amin had control of the Afghan army, the police, and the cabinet and there was no way of overthrowing him except through intervention, for which the Soviet leaders were not then ready. Therefore, Brezhnev and Kosygin pretended that Amin had their full support, and sent him a telegram of congratulations on the occasion of his election to the top government and party positions.⁴⁴ They offered to give more military equipment worth 6.7 million-dollars and send KGB experts to help him improve the efficiency of his secret police.⁴⁵

In addition, the Soviet may have decided to give Amin another chance to see whether he could strengthen his government, get more popular support, and suppress the insurrection. But Amin's policy made the Soviet leaders very uneasy. They suspected that he was trying to imitate Sadat, the late President of Egypt. Amin, who probably fearing Moscow's renewed attempt to overthrow

him, reestablished damaged relations with the United States and Pakistan. He had already met at least fourteen times with Adolph-Dubs, the American ambassador to Afghanistan. On 11 September, the day Taraki returned from Moscow, Amin told the American charge de Affairs J. Bruce Amstutz that he wanted to have a friendly relations with the United States. Amin also held talks with Archer Blood, the American charge de affairs in Delhi, who was transferred to Kabul after the assassination of Adolph Dubs, and asked him for resumption of economic aid.⁴⁶

The pro-US policy of Amin regime was specially pronounced in the month of December 1979 on the occasion of the inauguration of the plenary founding session of the National Organization for the Defense of Revolution in Kabul. On 5 December 1979, Amin as President of the Revolutionary Council and Prime Minister, reiterated: "We are hoping the United States will revise its stand vis-a-vis Afghanistan and expand its relations according to our good wishes".⁴⁷

Amin's intentions to reduce his dependence on the USSR led to a Soviet decision to replace him either by assassination or by military force. After completing his study of Afghanistan situation G. Pavlovsky returned to Moscow in October, 1979 and probably influenced the decision to go ahead with the plan for the invasion. Accordingly preparation for the collection of personnel and equipment began in Russia. Specialists such as engineers, gunners, and radar operators were called to duty; tactical aircraft were flown to Central Asian airports; airborne units were assembled, a ground satellite station was set up, and a command and control system was established.⁴⁸

On 28 November, a Soviet Deputy Minister of internal affairs, Lieutenant General Viktor S. Paputin arrived in Kabul, ostensibly for the purpose of discussing “mutual cooperation and other issues of interest” with officials of the Afghan Ministry of the Interior. On 30 November Paputin held meetings with the Afghan deputy minister of the interior and other high officials and, on 2 December he met Amin at his Palace, known as the House of the People.⁴⁹ After holding a series of talks with various people for a couple of weeks Paputin left for home. According to T.T. Hammond “his real mission was to help prepare Kabul for the invasion by getting control of the Afghan police, pressuring Amin to step aside in favour of Babrak, persuading the former to invite the Soviet Union to send large number of troops into the country, or, if all those failed, assassinating Amin.”⁵⁰ According to plan shooting occurred in the Palace on 17 December Amin escaped, but his intelligence chief was seriously wounded and was flown for medical treatment to Tashkent, from which he returned six months later to face execution by the Babrak government for treason.⁵¹

By late November, US intelligence had detected Soviet troops mobilization in Turkmenistan. This exercise was taken as a routine military movement.⁵² But the US speculation was wrong, because while attempting to get rid of Amin, the Soviet continued their military preparation for an invasion. In early December, when the Soviet army already began to enter Afghanistan, U.S clearly understood that the Soviets were preparing to invade Afghanistan, and they realized that it was not a move to help Amin, but a move like the invasions of Hungary and Czechoslovakia.

By the mid-December, 1979 an army of 1500 men equipped with tanks and artillery, was airlifted to the Bagram airbase, forty kilometers north of Kabul,⁵³ thus enabling the Soviets to take effective control of the base. This

contingent was deployed along the road to the Salang Pass tunnel to clear the way for the 357th Mechanized Rifle Division, which advanced from north. Close behind them at Bagram came a parachute regiment that landed on 21 December.⁵⁴ Concurrently, the Soviets airlifted a number of small units into the Kabul municipal airport.⁵⁵

On 22 December 1979 Washington broke its silence on developments in Afghanistan as well as along the USSR's border, but the Soviet propaganda machine denied that Moscow had sent any combat troops into Afghanistan. On 23 December, *Pravda* reported: "Western, and particularly American, mass media have recently been disseminating deliberately inspired rumors about some sort of Soviet "interference" in Afghanistan's internal affairs. There were allegations that Soviet "combat units" have been introduced in Afghan territory."⁵⁶ Despite this propaganda the Soviet troops began to land at Kabul airport. Before allowing the Soviet planes to land, the Afghan Air force asked the President's Palace for orders. The Russian advisers had already obtained Amin's clearance for landing of a small, tried contingent from Moscow to fight rebels within the Afghan army.⁵⁷ Under this pretext, the Russians not only landed their planes at Kabul but they began flying into the Soviet-built military air bases at Bagram and at Shindand, one hundred and five kilometers south of Herat in the west, and the American built airport at Kandahar in the south.⁵⁸ For two days and nights, as many as 200 flights of AN-125, Am-225 and 11-76s landed in Kabul while two motorized rifle divisions crossed the northern frontier.⁵⁹ One division proceeded from the western side-Kushka, Herat, Farah and Kandahar and the other from the eastern border-Termez, Mazar-e-Sharif, Kabul and Gardez.⁶⁰ Within three or four days about 5000 Soviet troops were landed at Kabul air field.⁶¹ On 27 December, Amin received a courtesy call from the Soviet Minister of communications, Nikolai V. Talyzin who had arrived in

Kabul on 24 December for a friendly visit.⁶² The Soviet armed units began to move into Kabul and the central communications complex for the government under the control of Afghan Air force, was taken over and its officials were killed by a Soviet commando team.⁶³

The key person in this operation was no less than Nikolai V. Talyzin. The central part of the Kabul City including the radio station was quickly brought under Soviet control, but the fighting continued at Darulaman, where Amin was staying.⁶⁴ Amin and several members of his family were killed in the Tajbek Palace. The following day, two motorized rifle divisions crossed the frontier to support the troops⁶⁵ that had been air lifted. Thus completed the occupation of the country. On 30 December, *Pravda* again reported that the USSR sent troops to Kabul in response to repeated requests by the Afghan Government. *Pravda* also argued that the USSR was obligated to send military help under the provision of the Soviet-Afghan Friendship Treaty of 5 December 1978 and the UN charter.⁶⁶

By the end of December 1979, in fact over the Christmas the Soviet troops were in full control of the major towns, airfields and highways, and by the next mid February 85,000 Soviet troops equipped with 1750 tanks, 2,200 artillery and 400 aircrafts were firmly stationed in Afghanistan.⁶⁷ The Amin government was replaced by a new puppet government headed by Babrak Karmal, who had been exiled to East Europe by Taraki. Karmal took over as the new Prime Minister and Chairman of the Revolutionary Council of Afghanistan. The Soviets and Karmal administration criticized Daud, Taraki and Amin, and identified Amin as CIA agent.

The Russian invasion of Afghanistan was strongly condemned by the international community. US, China, Western and Muslim countries, non-aligned nations, regional groups, associations and other individual countries— all condemned the invasion strongly and devised their policies according to their interests. On 28 December, President Carter told a meeting of the National Security Council that the invasion represented a turning point in Soviet-American relation. He used the hot line to convey his strong opposition to the Soviet action and asked for the withdrawal of Russian force. He warned that failure to do so would have “serious consequences for Soviet-US relations.”⁶⁸ *The New York Times* described Carter’s message as “the toughest diplomatic exchange” of the Carter presidency.⁶⁹

On 28 December 1979, Carter issued a statement from the White House stating: “such gross interference in the internal affairs of Afghanistan is in blatant violation of accepted international rules of behavior. This is the third occasion since world war II that Soviet Union has moved militarily to assert control over one of its neighbor. ... The Soviet action is a matter of concern to the entire international community.”⁷⁰ In a television interview with Frank Reynolds on 31 December Carter made the statement that, “my opinion of the Russians has changed most drastically in the last week then ever in the previous two and a half years before that”.⁷¹

Soviet invasion of Afghanistan threatened the peace of the whole area of South Asia and Middle east, especially the oil rich Gulf states. In fact on 23 January 1980, following his predecessors, Carter issued a stern warning in the form of what has now come to be called the Carter Doctrine. The core of the Carter doctrine was a fifty word declaration: “Any attempt by any outside force to gain control of the Persian Gulf region will be regarded as an assault on the

vital interests of the United States of America, and it will be repelled by use of any means necessary, including military force”⁷² The President also declared, “verbal condemnation is not enough. The Soviet Union must pay a concrete price for its aggression”.⁷³ He announced a series of political and economic sanctions against the Soviet Union

He also banned visits by top US officials to the U.S.S.R. and announced that no new consular offices would be opened either in the United States or in the Soviet Union on reciprocal basis. The export of high technology and strategic items to Russia was prohibited.⁷⁴ Flights to the United States by Aeroflot, the Soviet national Airline were reduced from three to two a week.⁷⁵ Soviet fishing in the US coastal waters was severely curtailed, and the shipment of American phosphates in exchange for Soviet ammonia was suspended.⁷⁶ American grain shipments to Russia were reduced. Only 8 out of the 25 million metric tons ordered for 1980 would be delivered.⁷⁷ These measures hit the USSR economically as many of the Soviet economic targets for the eighties were planned on the basis of technology to be imported primarily from the US.⁷⁸ To implement ‘the policy of denial’ Carter sought the co-operation of Japan and the countries of Western Europe, and sent state department officials to hold consultations with those Governments.

Directed by the US government western countries and international development agencies stopped all aid to Afghanistan. India, however, did not stop its flow of aid to Afghanistan. Most UN and international development agencies suspended aid to Afghanistan as they believed that the political condition of Afghanistan was not safe to implement the projects. A picture of the flow of foreign aid from the United States and international agencies⁷⁹ can be seen from table III below:

Table III :

Economic aid from the United States and international agencies (In \$ millions)

	1979	1980	1981	1982	1983	1984
US Economic Aid:	10.6	0	0	0	0	0
Loans	0	0	0	0	0	0
Grants	10.6	0	0	0	0	0
Eximbank	0	0	0	0	0	0
International Agencies:	89.5	2.0	2.1	7.3	0.8	0
IBRD	0	0	0	0	0	0
IDA	55.1	0	0	0	0	0
ADB	20.1	0	0	0	0	0
UNDP	14.3	2.0	2.1	7.3	0.8	0
IMF SDRs:	0	0	0	0	0	0

Sources: US Department of State, Country Reports on Human Rights practices from 1981-1985.

Afghanistan traditionally experienced a deficit in its trade balance, the value of imports always exceeding exports. This gap, however, was filled by remittances from workers abroad, receipts from foreign tourists, and foreign aid. After the Soviet occupation all these were stopped. As a result the trade imbalance continued to increase and grew to an estimated \$ 210 million. Exports were valued in FY 1983 at around \$ 670 million and imports at \$ 880 million.⁸⁰ The decline of US exports to Afghanistan after 1979 reflected the cut off of US economic aid, although US imports of Afghan goods remained remarkably constant, as shown in table 4. US imports from Afghanistan in 1984 included licorice root, Kashmere goat hair, and oriental rugs. US exports to Afghanistan mostly were aircraft parts, cigarettes, and second-hand cloths.

Table IV:

US-Afghanistan trade⁸¹ (In \$ millions)

Year	US exports to Afghanistan	US imports from Afghanistan
1979	66	12
1980	11	6
1981	6	13
1982	10	11
1983	5	8
1984	8	13

Sources: Afghanistan Forum Newsletter, vol. XIII, May 1985

Cartar's decision to suspend the sale of seventeen million tons of food grain affected the American farmers. In order to minimize the suffering, he announced that the undelivered grain would be removed from the market by price support and storage to be built at government cost, and finally the stocked grain will be supplied to the overseas countries. But his proposed measure were criticized in the American press. Western Europe were not ready to sacrifice their growing trade with Soviet Union. The US farmers protested against his decision, calling it unwarranted interference in the foreign policy of the country.⁸²

On 20 January 1980, Carter warned the Soviet Union that US athletes will not participate in Olympic Games scheduled for Moscow in July unless Soviet troops were withdrawn from Afghanistan within a month. When the Soviets did not comply to leave Afghanistan, US Government ensued its compliance with the boycott and also urged other nations not to join the Olympic games. Although US request was not fully effective, many states including United States, Japan, China, West Germany and Several smaller nations abstained from the Olympic games. As a result the games became a contest within the Soviet

bloc, with a few medals won by outsiders.⁸³ It was a serious blow to Soviet leaders, who had been trying for many years to hold Olympics in Moscow.

A number of military measures were also carried out against USSR. By the approval of the Senate the SALT-II treaty, that was signed between Carter and Breznev on 18 June 1979, was withdrawn. Carter decided to strengthen US military power, maintained a permanent naval presence in the Indian Ocean to enhance its military presence by seeking regular use of facilities in Oman, Kenya and Somalia and to reinforce its military facilities on the Islands of Diego Gracia.⁸⁴ He declared the Persian Gulf region as a sphere of “vital interest of the United States” and reaffirmed the US decisiveness to defend it “by use of any means necessary including military force”.⁸⁵ Subsequently he planned to create a Rapid Deployment Force, which could be used in the crisis of the third world.

The military related act that created a great concern for Moscow was the visit to China in January 5, 1980 by Secretary of Defense Harold Brown. Although the visit had been planned in December 1979, it acquired great significance because of the Soviet invasion. During his stay in Peking Brown expressed that American and Chinese views “are very closely parallel about the need to strengthen other nations in the region and each side will take appropriate action on its own toward that end”.⁸⁶ Brown also said that if other powers, obviously Russia according to T.T. Hammond, “threaten the shared interest of the United States and China, we can respond the complementary actions in the field of defense as well as diplomacy”.⁸⁷ Although nothing was said by Brown on the supply of Chinese arms to the Afghan rebels but it can be assumed that this was a topic of discussion also. Following this a high level Chinese delegation visited Washington in March 1980 to discuss further measures that could be adopted to counter the Soviet invasion.⁸⁸

For an effective intervention in the Afghan crisis the US needed co-operation from third world countries. But the prospects of such co-operation were bleak. "From the Golan Heights to South-west China the ruins of American policy failures lay strewn across the path of potential Soviet advance. The Arab-Israeli deadlock had left Syria and the Palestine Liberation Organization committed to pro-Soviet positions. The United States had no diplomatic relations with Iraq since 1967. A virtual state of war existed with Iran. India refused to condemn the invasion and was concentrating much of its diplomatic energy on remaining friendly with Moscow. The ASEAN governments were only capable of offering moral support."⁸⁹ Under these circumstances Washington looked to Pakistan. The Carter administration had been in close touch with Ziaul-Haq's Government from the beginning of the crisis. To consolidate Pakistan's support and co-operation Carter sent a US team under Brezneski to Islamabad in early February 1980. After detailed discussion between the two sides a joint statement was issued saying that- the Soviet action posed a threat "to the peace and security of Pakistan, the region, and the world."⁹⁰ Warren Christopher, then Under Secretary of State also stated that "much of what has been done in the United Nations and Islamic Conference to bear pressure on the Soviet Union has depended on Pakistanis leadership." He also spoke of "a common assessment of the Soviet threat" and "a unity in our determination" to meet the Soviet challenge.⁹¹

The announcement of military economic assistance to Pakistan created a serious misunderstanding both in and outside the United States. It had two reasons:⁹² First, any kind of military assistance to Pakistan was sure to arouse India's opposition and thus will defeat the idea of a collective regional pressure on the Soviet Union for withdrawing its forces from Afghanistan; Second, there was no guarantee that the arms supplied would be used only to meet the threat to

Pakistan's security and not against Zia-ul-Haq's internal opposition. The United States, therefore, proposed a package of economic and military aid worth only \$400 million to Pakistan to be extended over two fiscal years. Pakistan was, however, given the assurance that if it accepted the offer, other friendly states would come forward with more aid. Ziaul Haq, who asked for a substantially higher amount rejected the American offer as "peanuts" and gave the impression that it was anxious to avoid all confrontation with the Soviet Union.⁹³ The US, however, decided to keep the level of its aid low because it did not want to alienate India, an important regional power. Meanwhile America was also trying to seek India's co-operations in building up pressure for the withdrawal of Soviet troops from Afghanistan. After rejecting the American offer Zia turned to his Muslim neighbors to build a common front against the Soviet Union. However, this situation was changed during Reagan's presidency.

The Carter doctrine was not considered appropriate for US interest in the third world⁹⁴ and failed to unite the U.S foreign policy makers and became one of the major issues during the presidential election campaign. In addition Carter's ineffective measures during Soviet occupation of Afghanistan, and hostage crisis in Iran shocked the Americans. It finally led to the defeat of Carter in November, 1980 and Ronald Reagan took office in 1981. Now a major consensus was created in the American minds that to ignore the Afghan struggle would mean allowing the Soviet Union to consolidate their gains in the south and turn Afghanistan into a forward base for further expansion. Secondly, the US believed that it had a strong ideological reason to support the independence of a free people. Thirdly, Washington had a substantial geopolitical interest in containing the thrust of Soviet expansion in the south, and preventing it from reaching the oilfields of the Persian Gulf. Fourthly, it was felt that as the leader of the free world the US had a moral obligation to advance the Afghan struggle

for a successful end as this would assure neighboring states that Washington was able to recognize and protect its own interests as well as those of its friends. On a more broader level it would act as a deterrent for the future adventures by the Soviet Union towards Iran or Pakistan.⁹⁵

To pursue its new policy towards Afghanistan the US stepped up its assistance to Mujahidin who were engaged in guerilla war against the Soviet-backed Kabul government. Officials in the United States agreed that aid should be provided as discreetly as possible, so as to deny Moscow the propaganda that the resistance is externally inspired. Only non-combat supplies such as food, cloths, medicine and communications equipment were to be sent directly through Pakistan. As Pakistan provided shelters to nearly three million Afghan refugees, served as a conduit for arms to the rebel groups and permitted them to operate from within its own territory, it legitimately deserved large-scale military and economic assistance from the United States. Consequently in September 1981 an agreement was signed between the two sides on a package of US military and economic assistance to Pakistan worth \$32.00 million over a six year period.⁹⁶ The US Under Secretary of State, James L. Buckley in a statement to the joint meeting of the three sub-committees of the US Congress Committee on Foreign Affairs in September 1981 said, “we are all actually aware of the vital stakes the US and the West have in the volatile region of South-West Asia. The chaos in Iran and the invasion of Afghanistan have added dramatically to the instability of the area... we are seeking nothing more, nor less, than to help restore stability to South-West Asia and to protect our interest in the Persian Gulf...unlike the Soviet Union, we do seek, in admitted pursuit of our own self-interest is to prevent the Soviets from achieving their goals...this we can do by helping the nations of the area contribute to regional defence by making them better capable of looking after themselves.”⁹⁷

From the very beginning of the Soviet invasion resistance activities against the Soviet occupation increased day by day. Moscow alleged that the US Government openly assisted the resistance forces, but the US authorities never admitted such a role. The US Department of State consistently declined to comment on questions about what, if anything, the United States was doing in this regard. Such evidence as existed was indirect, coming mostly from members of the Congress or American news media.

The US reaction to the Soviet invasion was evident about two weeks after Senator Birch Bayh (D-Ind.), Chairman of the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, said on NBC-TV's "Today" program: "we did take certain steps to help them [the Afghan resistance] do what any group of citizens should be able to do in a country".⁹⁸ A week later, *The Washington Post* and *The New York Times* both carried articles claiming that the United States planned to supply arms to the resistance groups. *The New York Times* stated: "The United States began an operation to supply light infantry weapons to Afghan insurgent groups in mid-January, White House officials said today. The decision to funnel arms to rebel forces resisting Soviet troops in Afghanistan was made by the Special Coordination Committee of the National Security Council... It was subsequently approved by the President, a senior official of the Council said... The arms sent to Afghan insurgent groups are largely of Soviet design including Kalashnikov AK-47 automatic rifles, according to the official."⁹⁹

The most explicit accounts of alleged American aid in Afghanistan appeared first in a television report and then in an article written by Carl Bernstein in *The New Republic*. He wrote: "A year and a half after Soviet troops marched into Afghanistan, the US Central Intelligence Agency is coordinating a

complex, far-flung program, involving five countries and more than \$ 100 million, to provide the Afghan resistance with the weaponry of modern guerrilla warfare.... The result is an emerging anti-Soviet alliance-the United States, China, Pakistan, Egypt, and Saudi Arabia that... is effectively countering the most blatant Soviet aggression of the postwar era. Planning for the operation was personally ordered by President Carter.... In the hours after the Soviets crossed the Afghan border, the President told a meeting of the National Security Council that the United States had a "moral obligation" to help arm the resistance."

"The United States has provided financial assistance, \$ 20 million to \$ 30 million to start, considerably more since; has arranged the purchase of some weapons in the international arms market, and is the operation's primary planner and coordinator. Saudi Arabia has undertaken the other major financing role, equal to or greater than that of the United States.... The Egyptians have provided training for the Afghan guerrilla fighters and serve as the major source of arms-supplying weapons obtained from the Soviet Union during the years of Egyptian- Soviet friendship, and tons of replicated Soviet armaments, turned out in factories on the outskirts of Cairo. The Reagan administration has since reviewed the clandestine operation and ordered it expanded."¹⁰⁰

By May 1983 a news report indicated that the United States may have increased its arms aid. From Washington, DC, *The New York Times* reported: "The United States has stepped up the quantity and quality of covert military support for Afghan insurgents fighting Soviet forces and the Soviet-backed government in Kabul, according to Administration officials.... President Reagan made the decision last fall [1982] with the purpose of forcing Moscow to pay a higher price for its more than three-year-old effort to assert control over

Afghanistan.... The arms are brought to Pakistan by ship and aircraft and then trucked to the border areas.... A large portion of the arms came from old Egyptian stockpiles of Soviet weapons and that the Saudis and the United States were paying the bills. The total cost of the operation is estimated to have been between \$ 30 million and \$ 50 million a year for the last three years, with the United States paying about half.”¹⁰¹

On 3 July 1983 Secretary of State George P. Shultz encouraged the Afghan refugees in Pakistan at a camp near the Khyber Pass saying: “fellow fighters for freedom, we are with you.”¹⁰² Four months later, on 1 October, Secretary of Defense Casper W. Weinberger visited probably the same refugee camp. When asked for arms, he replied: “we will do all that we can.”¹⁰³ Thus it was clear that the US had a great sympathy for the Mujahidin and showed eagerness to give more aid to them, although a few academicians and journalists were not in favor of giving more aid to the resistance movement.

In October 1984, for the first time in the US legislative history, the Congress openly voted in support of a liberation movement. The US Senate and the House of Representatives unanimously called for extending effective support to the Afghan people in their fight for freedom and said; “it would be indefensible to provide enough aid to the freedom fighters to fight and die but not enough to advance their cause of freedom”.¹⁰⁴ Although it was never admitted but in fact a large amount of military aid was covertly channeled to the Afghan resistance. American aid to Afghanistan was progressively increased- it was reported to be around \$75 million in 1984; \$280 million in 1985 and \$500 million in 1986.¹⁰⁵

Meanwhile US efforts to reach a solution through the UN sponsored Geneva proximity talks between Pakistan and Afghanistan continued. The talks was based on the four instruments of peace.

1. Withdrawal of the Soviet troops immediately from Afghanistan
2. Voluntary return of the refugees to their country. (estimated 3.6 million refugees sheltered in Pakistan).
3. Non-interference in the internal affairs of states.
4. Guarantees from the Super-powers for its own non-resumption

The proximity talks began in April 1982. The first round of talk was exploratory but as a result of Geneva II, in April 1983, a twenty three page draft agreement was circulated for consideration by the parties who were to meet again in June. Diego Cordovez, the special representative of the United Nations Secretary-General, claimed that 95 percent of the agreement was ready and also expected that Geneva III would produce a preliminary accord and the negotiations would then be directed to the implementation phase.¹⁰⁶ But Geneva III failed because George Shultz, US Secretary of State, told Shahabzada Yaqub, on 25 May 1983, that the United States Government considered the proposed agreement unworkable in the absence of some provision for the replacement of the Karmal regime in Kabul by a more representative government.¹⁰⁷ But the real cause was that US, which was to be one of the guarantors of the agreement, saw no compulsion or benefit in endorsing a document that did not fully meet its objectives and interests in Afghanistan. It seemed the Reagan Administration was not yet willing to let the Soviet Union off the hook. It was also significant that two weeks before, the US administration, for the first time, leaked information about arms supplies to the Afghan Mujahidin through Pakistan.¹⁰⁸ This must have greatly embarrassed Islamabad which had constantly denied

such involvement. Despite this set back, Diego Cordovez continued his diplomacy. In December 1985, the US accepted Pakistan's request to serve as a "guarantor" of any accord that May result from the talks. At the same time US helped the Mujahidin by arms and money against Russia. As a result the Mujahidin continued the struggle against the Communists, who faced financial and military set backs.

After the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan in December 1979 Soviet-American relations came to its lowest ebb. But soon after Gorbachev became the Kremlin Chief, had sent feelers to Washington for improving relation between the two countries. Although relations remained cool during the first month, gradually the ice began to melt and subsequently the summit meetings were held between Gorbachev and President Reagan. By late 1987, Gorbachev had determined to put an end to the conflicts in Afghanistan. Stalemate on the battlefield, domestic problems and a desire to improve relations with the United States encouraged him to do so. The Soviet desire to resolve the Afghanistan issue through a negotiated political settlement at Geneva, was elucidated by the apparent softening of the Soviet stand. The first indication of the Soviet resolve for military withdrawal from Afghanistan, came on the eve of the Gorbachev-Regan summit in early December, 1987. In a press conference in Washington at the conclusion of the summit in December, 1987, Gorbachev said: "In Afghanistan we want to achieve a settlement of the situation put an end to the bloody internal conflict and prevent replaces."¹⁰⁹ He also stated that "We do not want the establishment of a pro-Soviet regime in Afghanistan, However, the American side should also clearly state that it does not want to see a pro-American regime there."¹¹⁰

In addition, the spirit of accord between the USSR and the USA after the summit, indicated that both superpowers were eager to settle the Afghan issue so that they could get ahead with more pressing business such as ratification of the newly signed INF (Intermediate-range nuclear forces) accord and strategic arms reduction negotiations. Further elucidation of Moscow's desire to withdraw from the war was also cleared by the statement of Soviet foreign Minister, Edward A. Shevardnadze who, during a trip to Kabul in the first week of January, said- "We would like the year 1988 to be the last year of the stay of Soviet troops in your country."¹¹¹

Moscow's move for an Afghan accord, coincided with the Reagan-Gorbachev summit planned for May 1988 and Moscow wanted to ensure that Washington and Islamabad put minimum demands. While the primary concern of the US and Pakistan was to achieve confidence that a Soviet withdrawal would be expeditious and permanent, an accord would protect the interests of the Mujahidin. President Reagan publicly reassured US support to the Afghan resistance in a New Year's message. Michael H. Armacost, Undersecretary of State and National Security Council Director for the Middle East, Robert B. Oakley went to Islamabad to work out the terms of negotiation with Pakistani leaders.¹¹²

On January 7, US Secretary of State George Shultz said that an acceptable agreement must provide for the end of Soviet military aid to Kabul, and that the withdrawal schedule must be "front-end-loaded", so that once it starts there's a certain inevitability to it, there's no turning back". Shultz also demanded that, notwithstanding any US role as a guarantor, a cut off aid to the resistance would not be simultaneous with the beginning of the Soviet withdrawal. This apparently

responded to the concerns of those in the US administration and the Congress who feared a “sellout” of the Afghan resistance.¹¹³

The terms set for an accord created controversy between the United States and Pakistan as well as within policymaking circles in both the countries. Pakistan, which had previously insisted that an internal settlement was a matter for the Afghans themselves, began to emphasize the need for the formation of a transitional regime to prevent a law and order situation after a Soviet withdrawal. The Soviet negotiations insisted on a “safe and orderly” pullout and on assurances that the future government of Afghanistan would not be a hostile one. Pakistani leaders emphasized, accordingly, the need for the resistance to accept a transition regime including some elements of the ruling People’s Democratic Party of Afghanistan (PDPA) government.¹¹⁴ They, however, showed no preference for President Najibullah.

On 8 February 1988 Soviet leader Gorbachev hastened the process toward a settlement by offering to withdraw Soviet forces over a period of 10 months, beginning from 15 May, subject to an accord by 15 March at the impending U.N. sponsored negotiations at Geneva. This was longer than Pakistan’s demand of an eight-month time frame, but was considered by many analysts to be acceptable to Pakistan. Gorbachev also indicated that a major portion of the troops could be withdrawn as early as possible but reiterated that an accord was hardly anything to do with prior internal political settlement which he said was “a purely internal Afghan issue.”¹¹⁵ On 9 February Diego Cordovez announced that the next Geneva round would begin from 2 March- his announcement was made after three weeks of shuttle diplomacy in the region. Pakistan, however, remained publicly unwilling to sign an accord with the Najibullah government

and still demanded the establishment of a “legitimate responsible, broad based government.”¹¹⁶

There were also some problems for the US Administration. The news of a secret understanding that the US had agreed to cut off arms supply to the Mujahidin once the withdrawal of the Soviet troops began, sharply divided the policy makers in the United States. One group favored an agreement that promised to withdraw the Soviet troops from Afghanistan and the other felt that the Soviet Union must be made to pay the price for its misadventure in Afghanistan. The split was best illustrated by the reaction of *the New York Times*. On 11 February, in an editorial it charged that some hardliners in the Reagan Administration were jeopardizing the swift Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan by standing in the way of agreement to stop aiding Afghan Mujahidin on the removal of Soviet troops. The following day, A. M Rosenthal in his column urged the United States to play a trick about its “incredible commitment” to stop aid to the resistance movement when the Russians would begin to pull out. He advocated phased cut-off of American arms supply.¹¹⁷

The secret understanding between Moscow and Washington also greatly shocked the US Congress. On 25 February, 1988 Robert A. Peck, deputy assistant secretary for near Eastern and South Asian Affairs, in a testimony before the House Foreign Affairs sub-committee on Asia and Pacific Affairs said: “The obligation which the United States would undertake as a “guarantor” would relate exclusively to our own policies and actions. We would bear no responsibility for the actions of others, or for the successful implementation of the agreement as a whole. We and the Soviet Union would agree to the same basic commitment regarding non-interference and non-intervention. We would be prepared, if completely satisfied with the overall agreement, to prohibit US

military assistance to the Afghan resistance. We would expect the Soviet Union to show reciprocal restraint under the Geneva Accords in stopping its military support for the Kabul regime....We will, of course, continue non-military humanitarian assistance and assume the Soviet will do the same. The commitments of all the parties would enter into effect on an agreed date following signature; at the present time this is expected to be at the end of 60 days."¹¹⁸

Peck's statement annoyed some Senators. On 29 February, Senate majority leader, Robert C. Byrd declared on the floor of the Senate. "I am shocked at the language ---- I am not only shocked I am stunned. This does not comport with what Secretary Shultz and the President have said to me ... This would be a sell-out by the United States, if I understand it correctly....and it would be a shameful sell-out."¹¹⁹

In late February thirty Senators wrote to President Reagan urging him not to agree to cut off aid to the resistance before the completion of a Soviet withdrawal and cessation of Soviet aid to Kabul. Reportedly, Reagan wrote to Robert Byrd to assure him that any US aid cut off would have to be "matched by cessation of similar aid" to Moscow's clients in Kabul.¹²⁰ The President's assurances apparently failed to have the desired effect. In fact the Senate passed a non-binding resolution (S. Res. 386) on 29 February, 1988 by 77-0 vote that the US arms supply to Afghan Mujahidin should not restrict until it was clear that the Soviet Union had ended its military occupation of Afghanistan.¹²¹

Moscow's desire to settle the Afghan problem created a divergence of interest between the United States and Pakistan. According to Richard P. Cronin, "US policy makers appeared to view the issue primarily in the context

of US-Soviet relations, and seemed to look toward a Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan and an agreement on the elimination of intermediate range nuclear weapons as the crowning achievements of the Regan administration's strategy towards Soviet Union."¹²² Pakistan, on the other hand, had a more immediate interest in the question of who would rule Afghanistan after Soviet withdrawal, and what kind of settlement would provide for the expeditions return of some three million Afghan refugees a serious burden for Pakistan Government. Pakistan sought in vain to get its terms for an accord accepted during intense negotiations in February with both United States and the Soviet Union. But on 10-11 February in the meeting at Islamabad Soviet First Deputy Foreign Minister Yuli Vorontsov, refused to yield on the question of a transitional regime. As a result Pakistani foreign Minister Noorani flew to Washington for urgent consultations, a week before Secretary of State Shultz's scheduled visit to Moscow. Although US officials, including the US ambassador to Pakistan, Arnold Raphel gave a statement of support and understanding of Pakistani's position, ignored the Pakistan's demand of a transitional government.

After discussion with Gorbachev and Shevardnadze in Moscow on 21 and 22 February, Shultz reported that he had no doubt about the desire of the Soviet Union to leave Afghanistan, but the question of "how" remained to be answered. Without revealing details of the meetings, Shultz indicated that the question of a future government in Kabul "is fundamentally up to the Afghans," thus suggesting a lack of support for Pakistan's demand for a transitional regime as a condition for signing an accord.

The UN talks at Geneva that began on 3 March obtained an early agreement on a nine month withdrawal time frame, beginning from 15 May, with 50% of the troops to be withdrawn in the first three months. A final

settlement was delayed for two reasons: first, Pakistan demanded for a transitional regime before the Soviet withdrawal, second, outside the formal framework of the Geneva talks, US insisted on the right to extend support to the resistance so long as the Soviet Union continued to aid the Kabul Government.¹²³ On the interim government issue raised by Pakistan, Soviet Deputy foreign Minister Yuli Vorontsov in an interview to *Pravda* on 18 February 1988 stated that: "Creating a government has nothing to do with the Geneva talks because the agreements discussed there aim at setting the external aspects of the Afghan problem, such as the cessation of foreign interference, including military intervention and Soviet troop withdrawal. It is not ruled out that artificial obstacles will be created and some new conditions set or excuses made to delay the signing of the agreements."¹²⁴ Eventually Pakistan gave up the demand for the interim government, possibly in acknowledgement by the fact that it was outside the scope of the Geneva talks.

By the middle of March 1988, the Reagan Administration under pressure from the critics had revised its earlier position. It indicated to the Soviet Union that it would not end its aid to the rebels unless the Soviet Union agreed to stop aid to the government in Kabul. But the US proposal was not acceptable to the Soviet Union on the ground that it meant interference in its bilateral relations with Afghanistan a sovereign state and a UN member which had diplomatic relations even the with United States itself. The US contention was also not tenable because it put a sovereign state at par with the rebels.¹²⁵ However, as a result the proximity talks in Geneva by 25 March had faced a dead lock with the US insisting on the acceptance of the concept of "symmetry in aid cut off and the lack of response on it by the Soviet Union."

Suddenly significant developments took place on the issue of Afghanistan and finally the stalemate was broken. On 26 March, the Soviet Foreign Minister, Edward Sheverdnadze and the US Secretary of State, George Shultz, in a meeting in Washington, reaffirmed a strong commitment made in the Washington Summit in December, 1987 to make an intensive effort to complete a treaty on the reduction and limitation of strategic offensive arms (START) and all integral documents at the earliest possible date- preferably during the time set for signing the treaty when the two leaders would meet in May-June 1988. In the Washington meeting the Soviets reportedly declared to leave out of Afghanistan by the end of the year, but rejected a U.S proposal for a moratorium on aid to either side in the conflict for the duration of the withdrawal and following three months.

However, an exchange of correspondence between Shultz and Shevadnadze in late March and early April opened the way for a resolution of the dispute on the basis of 'positive symmetry'. On 8 April, 1988 a US official confirmed that the Soviets had indicated their willingness, to accept the US formula to break the remaining deadlock at the peace talks on Afghanistan. Senator Humphrey and fourteen other Senators wrote to President Reagan on 12 April to show the letters and other secret documents on the issue. But the State Department did not oblige.¹²⁶

All demands by the US had subsequently been agreed to and the UN announced that the accord on Afghanistan was now finalized and open for signature on 14 April, in the presence of the both the US and the Soviet Union representatives. On 13 April President Reagan announcement, "I believe that the US can now join the Soviet Union as a guarantor of the Geneva instruments".¹²⁷ The instrument included:

- i. Bilateral agreement between Afghanistan and Pakistan on the principles of non-interference and non-aggression.
- ii. A declaration of guarantee by the US and the Soviet Union.
- iii. Bilateral agreement on the voluntary return of refugees.
- iv. Agreement on the inter-relationship between the instruments that tie all of these together. It provides for the Soviets to begin a phased troop withdrawal beginning from 15 May and to withdraw 50% of their troops in the first three months and to complete the withdrawal of all troops by 15 February, 1989.

In addition to the four principles Shultz sent a note to UN Secretary General Perez de Cuellar and circulated it to the members of the UN stating: "...The United States has advised the Soviet Union that the US retains the right consistent with its obligations as guarantor, to provide military assistance to parties in Afghanistan. Should the Soviet Union exercise restraint in providing military assistance to parties in Afghanistan, the US similarly will exercise restraint."¹²⁸ By this note the US clarified its position on the accord.

Senator Gordon Humphrey, a Republican hard-liner and a staunch supporter of the rebels, bitterly denounced the accord as a 'slow sellout' and described it as a poor deal, a very bad deal. According to him the administration had rushed into the agreement with the Soviet Union because it was over-eager to have the Moscow Summit in May 1988. He declared, "This is just a rolling out the red carpet prior to the Summit."¹²⁹ and held state department responsible as it had been in charge of the whole issue but the President was his real target of attack. Like Humphrey, Henry Kriegel, Executive Director of the Committee for Free Afghanistan, criticized the pact as "a slow motion sellout." He believed

that the President had been misguided by his advisers— Secretary Shultz, under Secretary of State Michael Armacost and Secretary of Defense, Frank Carlucci, who were soft towards Kremlin. His idea was not wrong. Reagan accepted the accords because all his advisers—Secretary of States Shultz, National Security Adviser Lt. General Colin L Powell, the CIA Director William H. Webster, Secretary of Defense Frank C. Carlucci and Chief of staff, Howard H. Baker, Jr. urged him to do so. These persons “he said, “changed the issue from victory for the Mujahidin to detente with the Soviet Union. As a result of the treaty the Soviet Union would be able to trade openly with the United States in high technology.” Kriegel also feared that the agreement would eventually enable the Soviet Union to annex resource-rich northern Afghanistan, leaving to the Mujahidin arid south.¹³⁰

On the other hand many Congress members welcomed the Geneva accord. Charles Wilson (D.Tex) gave three reasons for his satisfaction: first, the Russians got their ass kicked, second, “they were leaving”, and third, “rebels will continue to have the bullets until the Soviets cross the borders. Senator Byrd who had earlier denounced the accord now said “I am ready to give this agreement a chance”. Dante Fascel, Chairman of the House Foreign Affairs Committee, asserted that the agreement was not a sell-out of the resistance forces by the US.¹³¹

The Reagan Administration welcomed the agreement. President Reagan called it “historic” and complemented the Afghan people for their brave struggle without which success would not have been possible. He said, “We take great pride in having assisted the Afghan people in this triumph.” and assured them of “continued support”. He also praised Pakistan for its role and pledge “our continued friendship and support” to the country. Shultz described the accord as

a "major national and international success in bringing about the removal of Soviet forces from Afghanistan and setting the condition for the return of refugees in dignity and safety and for the development of a government in Afghanistan under the wishes of its people. He described Pakistan as "basically, the architect of these accords" and assured American support for the re-settlement of the refugees.¹³² After the Geneva agreement US provided \$142 million a year in humanitarian aid to refugees and Mujahidin. About \$73 million out of this amount was spent on the people living in the area under the control of the Mujahidin; rest was spent on providing assistance to refugees in Pakistan. This aid was administered by UNHCR and the world food program. Washington welcomed the appointment of Prince Sadurddin as UN co-coordinator for humanitarian assistance to Afghanistan, and also promised to extend to him all possible co-operation.¹³³

As a number of Congressmen belonging to both the parties greatly appreciated the role of Pakistan whose requests for arms and economic assistance for Afghanistan received favorable consideration. On 26 April 1988, Congressman John Porter and Charles Wilson introduced a bill in the Congress for multinational contribution for reconstruction of Afghanistan. The proposal was to raise one billion dollars fund to which the US would contribute \$250 Million. However, Congress wanted to be certain about a stable and efficient government in Kabul. The flow of aid would began only after Moscow stopped its assistance to Kabul government and the US to Mujahidin.¹³⁴

The withdrawal began on 15 May 1988 on schedule, and US. Officials estimated that half of the Soviet forces-about 50,000 soldiers-were withdrawn by 15 August, as required by the accord. However, after the Geneva agreement, US continued its aid to the Mujahidin through Pakistan belying the doubts raised

in the Congress by many conservatives who expressed their concern in a Congressional Resolution. The US continued the supply of weapons to the Mujahidin and at the same time urged the Soviet Union to stick to the time schedule and prevented the Mujahidin from accepting any face saving agreement for the Soviet Union. It may be noted that all these weapons were sent to the Mujahidin through Pakistan because it was not possible for US to send its military supply to the Mujahidin without using Pakistan's territory despite the Pakistani promise in the accord that it would not interfere with Afghan affair any longer.

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48. T.T. Hammond, *Op.cit.*, p. 98
49. *Kabul Radio*, 2 December 1979, in FBIS/ME, 3 December 1979, pp. S1-2
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Chapter Five

US Policy After Soviet Withdrawal

The Geneva agreement opened the way for the withdrawal of Soviet forces but failed to bring peace in Afghanistan or put an end to the external interference in the country. The absence of a provision in the accord for a cease-fire may appear to some observer as an indication that the signatories had agreed that the warring parties in Afghanistan were to fight out victory for one over the other. Both the US and Russia continued their arm supply to the Mujahidin and PDPA government respectively. After the Geneva agreement US policy was based on the assumption that the PDPA government would not last long. Special Adviser to the Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs Khalizad also stated that the Nazibullah regime was crumbling faster than even the most optimistic Mujahidin had anticipated.¹ But this was not the correct assessment of the whole situation. In fact the PDPA government lasted longer than it was expected. While committed to leave Afghanistan, the USSR attempted to strengthen the Kabul regime militarily with the hope that the existing Kabul regime would be able to survive as the Soviet leaders thought that the complete victory of the US-backed Mujahadin would mean a devastating defeat for them. For its survival and consolidation of power the regime made relentless efforts in broadening its power base at home and liberalizing its economic policies with the outside world. One of the main components of Kabul regime's national reconciliation was the formation of a coalition government. The forces which were going to be a part of this coalition comprising the opposition forces, which included the refugees, the second rank commanders, the clergy, group representatives, moderate forces, intellectuals, socio-political figures, most of whom resided in the west, former king Zahir Shah's supporters in Afghanistan, the PDPA, the left

block as well as the peasant justice party of Afghanistan and the Islamic Party of Afghanistan.² But this effort failed because hardly any group showed keen interest in the reconciliation. Instead the Mujahidin went cautiously over to the offensive. To strengthen the Mujahidin's capacity the US also remained strongly committed to supporting them even after the Geneva Agreement. Along with the supply of weapons it continued to insist on the necessity for the Soviet Union to respect the withdrawal schedule. It also refused to put any pressure on the Mujahidin to accept any face saving agreement for the Soviet Union.³

But two issues emerged as sources of conflict between the Mujahidin and the United States. During the initial months of withdrawal, the Mujahidin were planing a major push to capture the cities- Ghazni, Gardez, Kandahar, Jalalabad and even Kabul.⁴ The purpose of the Mujahidin strategy of concentrating their attacks only on major targets was to capture a major city, preferably near the Pakistani borders where the Islamic Unity of the Afghan Mujahidin (IUAM), the alliance of seven Afghan guerrilla groups in Peshawar, could establish a parallel government.⁵ Both Pakistan and America wished to restrain the IUAM from attacking Kabul while the Soviets were still there. The specialists of both the countries encouraged the IUAM to proceed to Kabul slowly by cutting off the few highways that allowed food and fuel supplies, thereby making the besieged city solely dependent upon relief supplied by air-planes that could be threatened by Stinger missiles.⁶

Therefore, during Moscow Summit (from 29 May to 1 June 1988) Gorbachev complained to Reagan about the violations of accord and warned Pakistan of serious consequence if the latter would not desist from interfering in the internal affairs of Afghanistan. Moscow also threatened that if the violation continued, the withdrawal of the troops might be delayed.⁷ But Soviet warning

and threats had no impact on Pakistan as the US justified its supply of arms to Mujahidin as long as the Soviet Union continued to support the Kabul regime.

It may, however, be regarded as a pressure tactic aimed at ensuring a better representation for the Mujahidins in the coalition government to be constituted soon in Afghanistan as the Americans were not ready to install an Islamic fundamentalist regime in Kabul. It was possible that if the share for the Mujahidin in the future Afghan government be satisfactory to the US interests, Washington would have no rational ground to keep its arms flowing into the rebel hands.⁸

The Reagan administration, even in the absence of an interim government, took various steps to assure the IUAM of its continued support and to promote unity among them. In response to Mujahidin pressure to recognize them as a provisional government, Washington assured them of recognition of their provisional government “controlled territory and established a civil administration, possessed the capacity to assume the international obligations of Afghanistan, enjoyed broad support and possessed the attributes of effective government.”⁹ It was also added that they would earn recognition from the United States provided “they stuck together and worked with the commanders”.¹⁰ Washington’s major purpose in encouraging an interim government was to reserve the right to provide whatever forms of support it considered appropriate. This latitude would reduce pressures on Islamabad for violating the Geneva accords, and also would establish a direct pipeline of support to the Afghan resistance.¹¹

But the US intelligence reports on Afghanistan were not absolutely correct for it relied excessively on Pakistan’s Inter Services Intelligence (ISI).

The ISI which controlled Pakistan's Afghan operation and acted as the liaison between the US and the Mujahidin was not keen on a political settlement. It needed a military victory both to strengthen the military in Pakistan's domestic politics and to install Gulbuddin Hekmatyar in power in Kabul. As a result Hekmatyar would remain a puppet of the ISI and consequently ensure the new Kabul regime's dependence on Pakistan. Therefore, Pakistan supplied the lion's share of military and economic assistance to Gulbuddin Hekmatyar- head of the Hezb-e-Islami Party.¹² Primarily the US also gave its support according to Pakistan's choice, as Hekmatyar was thought to be more dependable. But this assumption proved wrong as he was found responsible for most clashes that had taken place between Mujahidin groups and there was also strong evidence that his party sold Stringer to Iran. Therefore, in July 1988 US embassy in Islamabad began to put some pressure on the Pakistani government to reduce the supply of arms to Heakmatyar.¹³ The US was, however, not satisfied with Pakistan's role in Afghanistan. So to bring about the speedy fall of the Kabul government Washington appointed Edmund Mcwilliams as a special envoy to co-ordinate US policy directly with the Majahidin.¹⁴

Meanwhile Diego Cordovez, who was empowered to pursue the formation of an interim government took some steps in this regard. The Mujahidin saw in Diego Cordovez's endeavors an attempt to keep the members of Kabul government in power and refused to negotiate with him. The US also opposed his move. As a result when Moscow proposed to Hasan Sharaq as Najibullah's replacement, both Washington and the IUAM rejected.¹⁵

Failure to attract the Mujahidin forces to a broad-based government forced Moscow to open direct negotiations with them. At the end of November 1988 Soviet officials held direct talks with the representatives of the Mujahidin

in Peshawar. In November a high level discussions were held in Taif, Saudi Arabia between Prof. Burhanuddin Rabbani, Chairman of the IUM and Vorontsov, Soviet Ambassador to Kabul. But the discussions failed as the Mujahidin did not agree to participate in Nijibullah's government. Under the circumstances the USSR adhering to the condition specified in the Geneva accords withdrew all its troops from Afghanistan by mid February 1989. But the Communist regime still survived. The Mujahidin, who wished immediate fall of Najib, began rocket attacks on Kabul. Serious conflict began in Kandahar between the government force and the Mujahidin, who tried to stop the supply of food and other necessary commodities. To force the Afghan government to surrender it was a inhuman tactic. According to Robert Newman, US Ambassador to Afghanistan, "it was not a matter of culpable offence to use foods as tactic, such an embargo would bound the Kabul regime for submission and the over all suffering will be decreased." On 11 February 1989 Marlin Fittewater, White House official, stated that the US will continue its assistance to the Mujahidin as long as the Soviet Union continued its support to the Kabul regime.¹⁶ Moscow protested, without any concrete result, the US-Pakistan interference in the international affairs of Afghanistan.

By these activities it seemed that the US had no immediate plan to end the Afghan crisis. Instead it followed a dilatory policy as it would mean; firstly, the loss of material resources of the Soviet Union; Second, it would do irreparable damage to Moscow's image in the third world in general and in the Islamic World in particular. The US might have intended to convert the Afghan crisis to an East-South conflict or at least to a conflict between Communism and Islam, thus gaining a plus point. Third, it would limit the Soviet capability to respond to the US offensive in other regions of the world.¹⁷

Consequently in February 1989 the IUAM without the participation of both Zahir Shah and the Iranian based groups convened its own Shura (Assembly) in Rawalpindi, Pakistan, at which an interim government in-exile (known as the Afghan Interim Government, AIG) was formed. The AIG, however, was officially recognized by only four countries- Saudi Arabia, Bahrain, Sudan and Malaysia and soon received diplomatic recognition from OIC. But in mid-1989 the unity of the Mujahidin forces was seriously weakened by internal violence between the various guerrilla groups, while the AIG was divided by disputes between the moderates and the fundamentalists. After the Soviet withdrawal US main purpose was to make a moderate Islamic government in Afghanistan, which could easily be influenced by the west. Therefore, in June, the US government appointed a special envoy to the Mujahidin. But when the US understood that the fundamentalists, under the leadership of Gulbuddin Hekmatyar, was going to dominate in Kabul, it withdrew its support and began to reduce financial aid and military supplies to Peshawar based IUAM and to undertake the difficult task of delivering weapons and money directly to guerrilla commanders and tribal leaders inside Afghanistan. The others, particularly, Saudi Arabia and Pakistan too began to play dubious game to install a person more amendable to them, but failed.¹⁸

After the fall of USSR in 1991 the US lost all its interest about Afghanistan. The Bush Administration however kept its interest alive in Afghanistan in view of the continuation of the Najibullah Government with Soviet support. However, in the wake of unprecedented development in US-USSR relations and the Soviet cooperation in several areas of international affairs, notably in the second Gulf War the Bush Administration looked for an alternative to wind up its operation in Afghanistan. Consequently an agreement was signed by Washington and Moscow in September 1991 to discontinue their

respective military assistance to the Mujahidin and the government forces.¹⁹ It also urged upon Pakistan, Saudi Arabia and Iran to do likewise. Since then the US state Department lost all interest and direct contact with the Afghan affairs except extending financial assistance for humanitarian purposes.

Although both the Afghan Government and the Mujahidin welcomed the super-powers attempt on arms supply, neither side showed any sign of implementing the proposed cease-fire, and indeed, the fighting intensified around Kabul. In April 1992, Najibullah handed over power to a coalition of Mujahiddin groups. Though Burhanuddin Rabbani was installed as president in June 1992, the country was rocked by civil war which had continued over the next three years till 1996.

During all these years of political and social unrest and widespread violence in Afghanistan momentous changes in Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union and eruption of conflicts in the former Yugoslavia and in a number of African countries dominated the international scene so much that Afghanistan appeared to have been reduced to an insignificant position. With the failure of the United Nations in resolving the Afghan crisis through peaceful negotiations among the warring factions, other big powers, including the United States, did not come forward to take active interest in the affairs of Afghanistan. The Afghan question thus gradually became more or less a sub-regional issue.²⁰

The post cold-war US policy did not also change with regard to Afghan conflict. US financial assistance for humanitarian purposes also declined sharply. When in September 1996 a new opposition group, the Taliban²¹ captured Kabul and executed the former president Nazibullah, United States had shown renewed interest in Afghan affair. On the economic side, an American

consortium had completed a feasibility study for a multi-billion dollar gas and oil pipeline project covering Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan, Afghanistan and Pakistan. At the Ashkabad ECO Summit a memorandum of understanding was signed to this effect among the four countries. In June 1996 Pakistan press reports indicated that the consortium representatives in Islamabad secured go-ahead agreement from different Mujahidin groups operating in Afghanistan. On the political side a friendly sunni regime in Kabul could be a springboard to harass the regime in Iran.²² But its enthusiasm was short-lived, as the Taliban militia turned out to be hard core fundamentalists who ordered strict observance of all Sharia rules and principles including prayer, growing of beards, forbidding cigarettes, music movie and women education and at the same time closed down the girl's schools. Therefore when on 17 October Robin Raphel, Assistant Secretary of State for South Asian Affairs, was asked whether the United States supported the Taliban movement, she said: "We support no group, no individual and we have given no support to the Taliban. We have talked to the Taliban and urged them, as we have urged other groups in Afghanistan, to stop fighting and get on with the process of national reconciliation."²³ Regarding Taliban actions in Kabul, she said: "We have been very disturbed by early action on the part of the Taliban authorities in Kabul. The brutal execution of the Soviet-era president, Najibullah, and the very strict proclamations on women- this has been shocking, not only to the West, but shocking to countries in the region and in the Arab world. We believe very strongly in a policy of no reprisals against other groups and that the women must be free to work and go to school. There are many international organizations working in Afghanistan, delivering services particularly to women and children. They need Afghan women working with them, delivering these services. If the Taliban authorities in Kabul want the international community to support them and to help reconstruct Afghanistan they will need to adjust these policies. There are also literally tens of thousands

of war widows, women who are responsible for large families in Afghanistan. They must be allowed to work and put food on the table. So we very strongly urge the Taliban authorities to loosen these policies and let women get back to the workplace, because there's so much to be done to rebuild Afghanistan.”²⁴ In addition the Taliban's continued defense of Osama-bin-Laden²⁵ complicated US relation with the former. The US claimed to have strong evidence that Osama-bin-Laden operated terrorist activities under the Taliban shelter. The United States, therefore, not only distanced itself from Taliban, but also supported UN embargoes on Afghanistan.

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21. Taliban in Pushtu means students. It is more respectable than *chanrea*, the usual term for students. From late 1994 onwards Pakistani print and electric media started projecting the Taliban, termed as a "new breed of

warriors" or "soldiers of God", who were first noticed in September 1994. Initially they were described as an unknown group of religious students. It is not certain who started this movement. A number of countries including Saudi Arabia and United States suspect that the Taliban originated in Pakistan and from its soil it started their activities.

22. Sreedhar (ed.) *Taliban and the Afghan Turmoil, The Role of USA, Pakistan, Iran and China*, New Delhi, p.37
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25. Born in 1957 in Saudi Arabia Osama bin Laden belongs to a very rich Laden family, originally from Hadaramouth, Southern Yemen. He is number 17 of 52 children of his father. His father made huge fortunes in running a construction company in Saudi Arabia. It was reported that all government contracts went to his father's firm and the Laden family was known to be close to the Saudi royal family. He inherited a part of his father's fortune. Some say about US \$ 300 million dollars. Osama started his career as an engineer and is known to be quiet, and deeply religious. His career took a sharp turn at the age of 24 when he was deeply shocked at the invasion of Afghanistan in 1979 by the former Soviet Union. He left Saudi Arabia and joined the Afghan Mujahideen to oust Soviet Communist army from Afghanistan. During 1979-89 CIA and Pakistan intelligence agencies (ISI) gave all armed and logistical assistance to Osama and his followers to defeat the Soviet army in Afghanistan. Many suggest that the close contact between CIA and Osama made them aware of each other's strategy in guerrilla warfare. Even some of his training bases were reported to be built by CIA. After the defeat of Soviet forces in Afghanistan in 1989, he returned to his business in Saudi Arabia. However this was interrupted by the Gulf War in 1990. He is known to have opposed the presence of US troops in Saudi Arabia but his views were rejected by the Saudi government. He started a campaign to force US out of Middle East in the wake of Gulf War and to "liberate" the holiest cities of Mecca and Median from western influence. He lost his Saudi citizenship for his actions. He went to Sudan and eventually pressure was put on the Sudanese government to expel him from the country. Finally he had to leave Sudan and took refuge in Afghanistan in 1996. From then he has been staying in Afghanistan as a guest of Taliban government. It is suspected by Washington that bin Laden was the main

person behind the September 2001's attacks on the twin tower in New York and Pentagon, although Osama denied his involvement in the attack. Reports suggest that he established an organisation, Al-Qaeda (meaning 'the Base') in 1998 to fight against America because he believes that the presence of US troops in Saudi Arabia has violated the sanctity of the holy places. His training centres are reported to hold 2000 men at a time and it is believed he has 5,000 Arab fighters waging war along with local Taliban forces.

Conclusion

From the mid-eighteenth century a separate independent Afghan political identity began to emerge. It was based on the dominance of the Pushtun over the other ethnic groups, and the overall kingship of the Dur-ra-ni royal family. Following the end of the Sadozai lineage in 1835, the country was disturbed by dynastic wars. It was, on other hand, became a political game between Great Britain and Russia. Consequently the country became a "buffer state" between these two western powers. By the Anglo-Afghan treaty of 1919 the British government recognised the independence of Afghanistan.

[The establishment of Afghanistan as a sovereign state encouraged the Afghan rulers to make diplomatic relations with the outside world. The people of Afghanistan were eagerly watching the emergence of America in world politics and became interested in establishing a close relation with the United States. But the Afghans efforts (from 1921 to 1933) in this regard did not succeed. The United States considered Afghanistan, a country with few natural resources and relatively little strategic significance, not so important. Afghanistan's location between Russia and British India also discouraged America to take any active interest there. The bilateral relations among the United States and Afghanistan started only in 1935 when the former extended diplomatic recognition to Afghanistan. Another eight years elapsed before the US opened its mission in Kabul in 1943.]

The Soviet Union's involvement in the Second World War and subsequently in the cold war, coupled with the British withdrawal from India, gave Afghanistan a freedom of action in foreign affairs that it had never known before. It turned to the US, in the post-war era, for aid and advice. However, the

Sino-Soviet rivalry as long as neither of these powers tried to establish a position of dominance. Consequently, the US economic aid to Afghanistan gradually narrowed. From 1965 to 1975, it amounted to only \$150 million. When Daud, in July 1973, with the help of the Soviet trained army officers staged a coup and ousted his cousin King Zahir Shah, the US showed no great concern; it kept its low profile in Afghanistan and continued its modest economic aid program. But through its allies- Iran and Saudi Arabia, the US tried to bring Daud to the Western Camp. In fact Daud was overthrown and killed in a bloody uprising led by the Peoples Democratic Party of Afghanistan. After the revolution although the US convinced that Kabul's new rulers were communist it did not take an alarmist view of the situation in Afghanistan and was tolerant of the intimate Soviet-Afghan relations. Despite Pakistan's pleas it refused to extend any aid to Afghan Mujahidin who had been active from the summer of 1978.

However after the fall of the Shah of Iran in January 1979 and the murder of Adolph Dubs- US ambassador to Kabul, it re-assessed the significance of the *Saur* Revolution and of the growing ties between the Soviet Union and Afghanistan. By August 1979, all aid to Afghanistan was stopped, peace corps volunteers were withdrawn, no new ambassador was appointed. Only covert assistance to the Afghan Mujahidin in the form of medicines, communication equipment and technical advice continued. Deeply involved in the hostage crisis, the US policy makers felt uneasy about Soviet intention in Afghanistan. Despite its knowledge of Soviet troops movements in early December 1979 the reaction of the American government to the invasion itself strongly suggests that it was caught off-guard.

In less than a week, President Carter announced a series of embargoes against the Soviet Union. He also took bilateral initiatives to strengthen political and military resistance against the Soviet aggression. Much of his efforts was focused on Asia. Carter asked his defense Secretary Harold Brown to make his long-awaited trip to Peking to negotiate over economic and military co-operation with the Chinese People's Republic. The general feeling was that there was need for co-operation with China.

The Carter administration had been in close touch with Zia-ul Haque's government in Pakistan since the beginning of the crisis. To strengthen the bond of co-operation he decided to make Pakistan militarily strong enough to withstand pressure from the north. But it was agreed that any military aid to Pakistan particularly from the United States would arouse opposition from India. By the close of Carter's term of administration in 1981 the general feeling in the US was that American inaction in Afghanistan gave a dangerous signal as it might encourage Moscow for a Soviet invasion in Iran. Pakistan and other neighboring countries. In fact President Reagan shifted his policy and attempted to check the Russian by strengthening Pakistan and arming the rebels in Afghanistan. Zia-ul-Haque, who sought to compensate for his domestic unpopularity by securing external endorsement, was also prepared to allow Pakistan to be used as a base for the Mujahidin operations against the Russians. Consequently an agreement was signed between the two sides on a package of US military and economic assistance to Pakistan. During the period from 1980 to 1988 the United States reportedly orchestrated an expanding multilateral program of some \$ 2 billion in weapons aid to the Afghan guerillas. Suffering financially and militarily and also due to international pressure Soviet Russia finally agreed to withdraw its troops from Afghanistan and signed the Geneva agreement.

The accord opened the way for the withdrawal of Soviet forces but failed to bring peace in Afghanistan. Both the USA and USSR continued their arms supply to the Mujahidin and the Kabul regime respectively. When US realized that the fundamentalists were planning to make an Islamic government in Kabul, it began to put some pressure on the Pakistani government to reduce the share of arms supply to Hekmetyar. Because US would not favour a fundamentalist government in Kabul, it would instead consider it as "an unfortunate development." As a result after the Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan the USA practically left the scene.

These internal developments as well as the fall of Communist Russia, and the second Gulf war obliged the Bush administration to keep its interest alive in Afghanistan as the Najibullah government continued with Soviet support. Consequently the US and Russia reached an agreement for discontinuing military assistance to the rebels and the government forces respectively. US also encouraged Pakistan, Saudi Arabia and Iran to do the same. Since then the US State Department lost direct contact with the Afghan affairs except extending financial assistance for humanitarian purposes.

Although in April 1992, Najibullah handed over power to a coalition of Mujahidin groups, the country was rocked by civil war. The first Post Cold War presidency in the US led by Bill Clinton (from January 1993) did not appear to have evinced any interest in resolving the Afghan conflict. US financial assistance for humanitarian purposes also gradually decreased. When in 1996 the Taliban captured Kabul and executed the former president Nazibullah, United States had shown some interest in Afghanistan for its geo-political, geo-strategic and geo-economic interest in central Asia. But the Taliban's strict

adherence to Islamic fundamentalist views and continued defense of Osama bin Laden complicated US relation with the former. The US claimed to have strong evidence that Osama bin Laden continued terrorist activities against America under the Taliban Shelter. United States therefore, not only distanced itself from the Taliban, but also supported UN embargos on Afghanistan. The attack on world trade centre and Pentagon in USA on 11 September 2001 created a new danger for the Afghans who have given shelter to Osama bin Laden. Surprisingly twenty years ago America had chosen Pakistan to help the Afghans now it has again chosen Pakistan to attack Afghanistan.]

APPENDIX (A)

*Agreements
On Political Settlement
Relating to Afghanistan*

GENEVA, APRIL 14, 1988

*Bilateral Agreement
Between the Republic of
Afghanistan and the Islamic
Republic of Pakistan on the Principles of Mutual Relations,
in Particular on Non-Interference
and Non-Intervention*

The Republic of Afghanistan and the Islamic Republic of Pakistan, hereinafter referred to as the High Contracting Parties,

desiring to normalize relations and promote good neighborliness and cooperation as well as to strengthen international peace and security in the region;

considering that full observance of the principle of non-interference and non-intervention in the internal and external affairs of states is of the greatest importance for the maintenance of international peace and security and for the fulfillment of the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations;

reaffirming the inalienable right of states freely to determine their own political, economic, cultural and social systems in accordance with the will of their peoples, without outside intervention, interference, subversion, coercion or threat in any form whatsoever;

mindful of the provisions of the Charter of the United Nations as well as the resolutions adopted by the United Nations as well as the resolutions adopted by the United Nations on the Principle of Non-Interference and Non-Intervention, in Particular the Declaration on Principles of International Law Concerning Friendly Relations and Cooperation Among States in Accordance with the Charter of the United Nations, of 24 October 1970, as well as the Declaration on

the Inadmissibility of Intervention and Interference in the Internal Affairs of States, of 9 December 1981;

have agreed as follows:

Article I

Relations between the High Contracting Parties shall be conducted in strict compliance with the principle of non-interference and non-intervention by states in the affairs of other states.

Article II

For the purpose of implementing the principle of non-interference and non-intervention each High Contracting Party undertakes to comply with the following obligations:

- (1) To respect the sovereignty, political independence, territorial integrity, national unity, security and non-alignment of the other High Contracting Party, as well as the national identity and cultural heritage of its people;
- (2) To respect the sovereign and inalienable right of the other High Contracting Party freely to determine its own political, economic, cultural and social systems, to develop its international relations and to exercise permanent sovereignty over its natural resources, in accordance with the will of its people, and without outside intervention, interference, subversion, coercion or threat in any form whatsoever;
- (3) To refrain from the threat or use of force in any form whatsoever so as not to violate the boundaries of each other, to disrupt the political, social or economic order of the other High Contracting Party, to overthrow or change the political system of the other High Contracting Party or its government, or to cause tension between the High Contracting Parties;
- (4) To ensure that its territory is not used in any manner which would violate the sovereignty, political independence, territorial integrity and

national unity or disrupt the political, economic and social stability of the other High Contracting Party;

- (5) To refrain from armed intervention, subversion, military occupation or any other form of intervention and interference, overt or covert, directed at the other High Contracting Party, or any act of military, political or economic interference in the internal affairs of the other High Contracting Party, including acts of reprisal involving the use of force;
- (6) To refrain from any action or attempt in whatever form or under whatever pretext to destabilize or to undermine the stability of the other High Contracting Party or any of its institutions;
- (7) To refrain from the promotion, encouragement or support, direct or indirect, of rebellious or secessionist activities against the other High Contracting Party, under any pretext whatsoever, or from any other action which seeks to disrupt the unity or to undermine or subvert the political order of the other High contracting party;
- (8) To prevent within its territory the training, equipping, financing and recruitment of mercenaries from whatever origin for the purpose of hostile activities against the other High Contracting Party, or the sending of such mercenaries into the territory of the other High Contracting Party and accordingly to deny facilities, including financing for the training, equipping and transit of such mercenaries;
- (9) To refrain from making any agreements or arrangements with other states designed to intervene or interfere in the internal and external affairs of the other High Contracting Party;
- (10) To abstain from any defamatory campaign, vilification or hostile propaganda for the purpose of intervening or interfering in the affairs of the other High Contracting Party;

- (11) To prevent any assistance to or use of or tolerance of terrorist groups, saboteurs or subversive agents against the other High Contracting Party;
- (12) To prevent within its territory the presence, harboring, in camps and bases or otherwise, organizing, training, financing, equipping and arming of individuals and political, ethnic and any other groups for the purpose of creating subversion, disorder or unrest in the territory of the other High Contracting Party and accordingly also to prevent the use of mass media and the transportation of arms, ammunition and equipment by such individuals and groups;
- (13) Not to resort to or to allow any other action that could be considered as interference or intervention.

Article III

The present Agreement shall into force on 15 May 1988.

Article IV

Any steps that may be required in order to enable the High Contracting Parties to comply with the provisions of Article II of this Agreement shall be completed by the date on which this Agreement enters into force.

Article V

This Agreement is drawn up in the English, Pashtu and Urdu languages, all texts being equally authentic. In case of any divergence of interpretation, the English text shall prevail.

Done in five original copies at Geneva this fourteenth day of April 1988.

*For the Government of
Republic of Afghanistan:*

Abul Wakil

*For the Government of the
Islamic Republic of Pakistan*

Zain Noorani

*Bilateral Agreement
Between the Republic of
Afghanistan and the Islamic
Republic of Pakistan on the
Voluntary Return of Refugees*

The Republic of Afghanistan and the Islamic Republic of Pakistan, hereinafter referred to as the High Contracting Parties:

desiring to normalize relations and promote good neighbourliness and cooperation as well as to strengthen international peace and security in the region.

convinced that voluntary and unimpeded repatriation constitutes the most appropriate solution for the problem of Afghan refugees present in the Islamic Republic of Pakistan and having ascertained that the arrangements for the return of the Afghan refugees are satisfactory to them.

have agreed as follows:

Article I

All Afghan refugees temporarily present in the territory of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan shall be given the opportunity to return voluntarily to their homeland in accordance with the arrangements and conditions set out in the present Agreement.

Article II

The Government of the Republic of Afghanistan shall take all necessary measures to ensure the following conditions for the voluntary return of Afghan refugees to their homeland:

- (a) All refugees shall be allowed to return in freedom to their homeland;

- (b) All returnees shall enjoy the free choice of domicile and freedom of movement within the Republic of Afghanistan;
- (c) All returnees shall enjoy the right to work, to adequate living conditions and to share in the welfare of the state;
- (d) All returnees shall enjoy the right to participate on an equal basis in the civic affairs of the Republic of Afghanistan. They shall be ensured equal benefits from the solution of the land question on the basis of the Land and Water Reform;
- (e) All returnees shall enjoy the same rights and privileges, including freedom of religion, and have the same obligations and responsibilities as any other citizens of the Republic of Afghanistan without discrimination.

The Government of the Republic of Afghanistan undertakes to implement these measures and to provide, within its possibilities, all necessary assistance in the process of repatriation.

Article III

The Government of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan shall facilitate the voluntary, orderly and peaceful repatriation of all Afghan refugees staying within its territory and undertakes to provide, within its possibilities, all necessary assistance in the process of repatriation.

Article IV

For the purpose of organizing, coordinating and supervising the operations, which should effect the voluntary, orderly and peaceful repatriation of Afghan refugees, there shall be set up mixed commissions in accordance with the established international practice. For the performance of their functions the members of the commissions and their staff shall be accorded the necessary

facilities, and have access to the relevant areas within the territories of the High Contracting Parties.

Article V

With a view to the orderly movement of the returnees, the commissions shall determine frontier crossing points and establish necessary transit centres. They shall also establish all other modalities for the phased return of refugees, including registration and communication to the country of return of the names of refugees who express the wish to return.

Article VI

At the request of the Government concerned, the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees will cooperate and provide assistance in the process of voluntary repatriation of refugees in accordance with the present agreement. Special agreements may be concluded for this purpose between UNHCR and the High Contracting Parties.

Article VII

The present Agreement shall enter into force on 15 May 1988. At that time the mixed commissions provided in Article IV shall be established and the operations for the voluntary return of refugees under this Agreement shall commence.

The arrangements set out in Article IV and V above shall remain in effect for a period of eighteen months. After that period the High Contracting Parties shall review the results of the repatriation and, if necessary, consider any further arrangements that may be called for.

Article VIII

This Agreement is drawn up in the English, Pashtu, and Urdu languages, all texts being equally authentic. In case of any divergence of interpretation, the English text shall prevail.

Done in five original copies at Geneva this fourteenth day of April 1988.

*For the Government of the
Republic of Afghanistan*

Abdul Wakil

*For the Government of the
Islamic Republic of Pakistan.*

Zain Noorani

*Declaration
On International Guarantees*

The Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and of the United States of America,

expressing support that the Republic of Afghanistan and the Islamic Republic of Pakistan have concluded a negotiated political settlement designed to normalize relations and promote good neighborliness between the two countries as well as to strengthen international peace and security in the region;

wishing in turn to contribute to the achievement of the objectives that the Republic of Afghanistan and the Islamic Republic of Pakistan have set themselves, and with a view to ensuring respect for their sovereignty independence, territorial integrity and non-alignment;

undertake to invariably refrain from any form of interference and intervention in the internal affairs of the Republic of Afghanistan and the Islamic Republic of Pakistan and to respect the commitments contained in the bilateral agreement between the Republic of Afghanistan and the Islamic Republic of Pakistan on the principles of mutual relations, in particular on non-interference and non-intervention;

urge all states to act likewise.

The present Declaration shall enter into force on 15 May, 1988.

Done at Geneva, this fourteenth day of April 1988, in five original copies, each in the Russian and English languages, both texts being equally authentic.

*For the 'Government of the
Union of Soviet socialist Republic*

Edward Shevardnadze

*For the 'Government of the
United States of America*

George Shultz

*Agreement
On the Interrelationships for the Settlement of the Situation
Relating to Afghanistan*

1. The diplomatic process initiated by the Secretary General of the United Nations with the support of all governments concerned and aimed at achieving through negotiations, a political settlement of the situation relating to Afghanistan has been successfully brought to an end.

2. Having agreed to work towards a comprehensive settlement designed to resolve the various issues involved and to establish a framework for good neighbourliness and cooperation, the Government of the Republic of Afghanistan and the Government of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan entered into negotiations through the intermediary of the Personal Representative of the Secretary-General at Geneva from 16 to 24 June 1982. Following consultations held by the Personal Representative in Islamabad, Kabul and Teheran from 21 January to 7 February 1983, the negotiations continued at Geneva from 11 to 22 April and from 12 to 24 June 1983. The Personal Representative again visited the area for high level discussions from 3 to 15 April 1984. It was then agreed to change the format of the negotiations and, in pursuance thereof, proximity talks through the intermediary of the Personal Representative were held at Geneva from 24 to 30 August 1984. Another visit to the area by the Personal Representative from 25 to 31 May 1985 preceded further rounds of proximity talks held at Geneva from 20 to 25 June, from 27 to 30 August and from 16 to 19 December 1985. The Personal Representative paid an additional visit to the area from 8 to 18 March 1986 for consultations. The final round of negotiations began as proximity talks at Geneva on 5 May 1986, was suspended on 23 May 1986, and was resumed from 31 July to 8 August 1986. The Personal Representative visited the area from August 1986. The Personal

Representative visited the area from 20 November to 3 December 1986 for further consultations and the talks at Geneva were resumed again from 25 February to 9 March 1987, and from 7 to 11 September 1987. The Personal Representative again visited the area from 18 January to 9 February 1988 and the talks resumed at Geneva from 2 March to 8 April 1988. The format of the negotiations was changed on 14 April 1988. When the instruments comprising the settlement were finalized and, accordingly, direct talks were held at that stage. The Government of the Islamic Republic of Iran was kept informed of the progress of the negotiations throughout the diplomatic process.

3. The Government of the Republic of Afghanistan and the Government of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan took part in the negotiations with the expressed conviction that they were acting in accordance with their rights and obligations under the Charter of the United Nations and agreed that the political settlement should be based on the following principles of international law:

- the principle that states shall refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state, or in any other manner inconsistent with the purposes of the United Nations;
- the principle that states shall settle their international disputes by peaceful means in such a manner that international peace and security and justice are not endangered;
- the duty not to intervene in matters within the domestic jurisdiction of any state, in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations;
- the duty of states to cooperate with one another in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations;
- the principle of equal rights and self determination of Peoples;

- the principle of sovereign equality of states;
- the principle that states shall fulfill in good faith the obligations assumed by them in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations.

The two governments further affirmed the right of the Afghan refugees to return to their homeland in a voluntary and unimpeded manner.

4. The following instruments were concluded on this date as component parts of the political settlement:

A Bilateral Agreement between the Republic of Afghanistan and the Islamic Republic of Pakistan on the Principles of Mutual Relations, in particular on Non-Interference and Non-intervention;

A Declaration on International Guarantees by the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the United States of America;

A Bilateral Agreement between the Republic of Afghanistan and the Islamic Republic of Pakistan on the voluntary return of refugees;

The Present Agreement on the Interrelationships for the Settlement of the Situation Relating to Afghanistan.

5. The Bilateral Agreement on the Principles of Mutual Relations, in Particular on Non-Interference and Non-Intervention; The Declaration on International Guarantees; the Bilateral Agreement on the Voluntary Return of Refugees, and the present Agreement on the Interrelationships for the Settlement of the Situation Relating to Afghanistan will enter into force on 15 May 1988. In accordance with the timeframe agreed upon between the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the Republic of Afghanistan there will be a phased withdrawal of the foreign troops which will start on the date of entry into force mentioned above. One half of the troops will be withdrawn by 15 August 1988 and the withdrawal of all troops will be completed within nine months.

6. The interrelationships in paragraph 5 above have been agreed upon in order to achieve effectively the purpose of the political settlement, namely that as from 15 May 1988, there will be no interference and intervention in any form in the affairs of the Parties; the international guarantees will be in operation; the Voluntary Return of the Refugees; and the phased withdrawal of the foreign troops will start and be completed within the time frame envisaged in paragraph 5. It is therefore essential that all the obligations deriving from the instruments concluded as component parts of the settlement be strictly fulfilled and that all the steps required to ensure full compliance with all the provisions of the instruments be completed in good faith.

7. To consider alleged violations and to work out prompt and mutually satisfactory solutions to questions that may arise in the implementation of the instruments comprising the settlement representatives of the Republic of Afghanistan and the Islamic Republic of Pakistan shall meet whenever required.

A Representative of the Secretary-General of the United Nations shall lend his good offices to the Parties and in that context he will assist in the organization of the meetings and participate in them.

He may submit to the Parties for their consideration and approval suggestions, and recommendations for prompt, faithful and complete observance of the provisions of the instruments.

In order to enable him to fulfil his tasks, the Representative shall be assisted by such personnel under his authority as required. On his own initiative, or at the request of any of the Parties, the personnel shall investigate any possible violations of any of the provisions of the instruments and prepare a report thereon. For that purpose, the Representative and his personnel shall receive all the necessary cooperation from the Parties, including all freedom of movement within their respective territories required for effective

investigation. Any report submitted by the Representative to the two governments shall be considered in a meeting of the Parties no later than forty-eight hours after it has been submitted.

The modalities and logistical arrangements for the work of the Representative and the personnel under his authority as agreed upon with the Parties are set out in the Memorandum of Understanding which is annexed to and is part of this Agreement.

8. The present instrument will be registered with the Secretary General of the United Nations. It has been examined by the representatives of the Parties to the bilateral agreements and of the States-Guarantors, who have signified their consent with its provisions. The representatives of the Parties, being duly authorized thereto by their respective Governments, have affixed their signatures hereunder. The Secretary-General of the United Nations was present.

Done at Geneva, this fourteenth day of April 1988, in five original copies, each in the Russian, Pashtu, Urdu and English languages, all being equally authentic. In case of any dispute regarding the interpretation the English text shall prevail.

*For the Government of the
Republic of Afghanistan*

Abdul Waki

*For the Government of the
Islamic Republic of Pakistan*

Zam Noorani

In witness thereof, the representatives of the States Guarantors

*For the Government of the
Union of Soviet Socialist
Republics*

E. Shevardnadze

*For the Government of the
United States of America*

G. Shultz

Memorandum of Understanding

I. Basic Requirements

a. The Parties will provide full support and cooperation to the Representative of the Secretary-General and to all the personnel assigned to assist him:

b. The Representative of the Secretary-General and his personnel will be accorded every facility as well as prompt and effective assistance, including freedom of movement and communications, accommodation, transportation and other facilities that may be necessary for the performance of their tasks. Afghanistan and Pakistan undertake to grant to the Representative and his staff all the relevant Privileges and Immunities provided for by the Convention on the Privileges and Immunities of the United Nations;

c. Afghanistan and Pakistan will be responsible for the safety of the Representative of the Secretary-General and his personnel while operating in their respective countries:

d. In performing their functions, the Representative of the Secretary-General and his staff will act with complete impartiality. The Representative of the Secretary-General and his personnel must not interfere in the internal affairs of Afghanistan and Pakistan and in this context, cannot be used to secure advantages for any of the Parties concerned.

II Mandate

The mandate for the implementation-assistance arrangements envisaged in Paragraph 7 derives from the instruments comprising the settlement. All the staff assigned to the Representative of the Secretary-General will accordingly be carefully briefed on the relevant provisions of the instruments and on the procedures that will be used to ascertain violations thereof.

III Modus Operandi and Personnel Organization

The Secretary-General will appoint a senior military officer as Deputy to the Representative, who will be stationed in the area, as head of two small headquarters units, one in Kabul and the other in Islamabad, each comprising five military officers, drawn from existing United Nations operations, and a small civilian auxiliary staff.

The Deputy Representative of the Secretary-General will act on behalf of the Representative and be in contact with the Parties through the liaison officer each Party will designate for this purpose.

The two headquarters units will be organized into two inspection teams to ascertain on the ground any violation of the instruments comprising the settlement. Whenever considered necessary by the Representative of the Secretary-General or his Deputy, up to 40 additional military officers (some 10 additional inspection teams) will be redeployed from existing operations within the shortest possible time (normally around 48 hours).

The nationalities of all the officers will be determined in consultation with the Parties.

Whenever necessary the Representative of the Secretary-General, who will periodically visit the area for consultations with the Parties and to review the work of his personnel, will also assign to the area members of his own office and other civilian personnel from the United Nations Secretariat as may be needed. His Deputy will alternate between the two headquarters units and will remain at all times in close communication with him.

IV. Procedure

(a) Inspections Conducted at the Request of the Parties

I. A complaint regarding a violation of the instruments of the settlement lodged by any of the Parties should be submitted in writing, in the English language to the respective headquarters units and should indicate all relevant information and details.

II. Upon receipt of a complaint the Deputy Representative of the Secretary-General will immediately inform the other party of the complaint and undertake an investigation by making on-site inspections, gathering testimony and using any other procedure which he may deem necessary for the investigation of the alleged violation. Such inspection will be conducted using headquarters staff as referred to above, unless the Deputy Representative of the Secretary-General considers that additional teams are needed. In that case, the Parties will, under the principle of freedom of movement, allow immediate access of the additional personnel to their respective territories.

III. Reports on investigations will be prepared in English and submitted by the Deputy Representative of the Secretary-General to the two governments on a confidential basis. (A third copy of the report will be simultaneously transmitted, on a confidential basis, to United Nations headquarters in New York, exclusively for the information of the Secretary-General and his Representative.) In accordance with Paragraph 7 a report on an investigation should be considered in a meeting of the Parties not later than 48 hours after it has been submitted. The Deputy Representative of the Secretary-General will, in the absence of the Representative, lend his good offices to the parties and in that context he will assist in the organization of the meetings and participate in them. In the context of those meetings the Deputy Representative of the Secretary-General may submit to the Parties for their consideration and approval suggestions and recommendations for the prompt, faithful and complete observance of the provisions of the instruments. (Such

suggestions and recommendations will be, as a matter of course, consulted with, and cleared by, the Representative of the Secretary-General.)

(b) *Inspections Conducted on the Initiative of the Deputy Representative of the Secretary General*

In addition to inspections requested by the Parties the Deputy Representative of the Secretary-General may carry out on his own initiative and in consultation with the Representative inspections he deems appropriate for the purpose of the implementation of paragraph 7. If it is considered that the conclusions reached in an inspection justify a report to the Parties, the same procedure used in submitting reports in connection with inspections carried out at the request of the Parties will be followed.

Level of Participation Meetings

As indicated above, the Deputy Representative of the Secretary-General will participate at meetings of the Parties convened for the purpose of considering reports on violations. Should the Parties decide to meet for the purpose outlined in Paragraph 7 at a high political level, the Representative of the Secretary-General will personally attend such meetings.

V. Duration

The Deputy Representative of the Secretary-General and the other personnel will be established in the area not later than twenty days before the entry into force of the instruments. The arrangements will cease to exist two months after the completion of all timeframes envisaged for the implementation of the instruments.


VI. Financing

The cost of all facilities and services to be provided by the Parties will be borne by the respective governments. The salaries and travel expenses of the personnel to and from the area, as well as the costs of the local personnel assigned to the headquarters units, will be defrayed by the United Nations.

App:



Map



Appendix C. Afghanistan's Strategic Position. This map originally appeared in Yaacov Vertzberger, "Afghanistan in China's Policy," Problems of Communism, vol. 31 (May-June 1982).

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