

MARWAN IBN MUHAMMAD
THE PASSING OF THE
UMAYYAD CALIPHATE
BY
DANIEL C. DENNETT

Ph.D.

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


Marwan ibn-Muhammad
The Passing of the Umayyad Caliphate

Daniel C. Dennett, Jr.



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1. ... London, 1881.

2. ... London, New York, 1937.

3. ... London, 1907.

Preface

Since the appearance of Wellhausen's Das Arabische Reich und sein Sturz¹ in 1902, it is generally acknowledged that no better or more comprehensive historical synthesis of the Umayyad period has been written. This work, the logical result of the publication of the great Leiden edition of Tabari,² with its companion study, Die Oppositionsparteien in Alten Islam,³ placed the seal on the endeavors of Wellhausen's four predecessors, Weil,⁴ August Muller,⁵ von Krenner,⁶ and Dozy.⁷ Since Wellhausen's death, there have appeared a few historical works which frankly were designed as text books to meet the requirements of the general public. Of these we may mention Hitti's History of the Arabs,⁸ the new edition of Muir's History of the Caliphate,⁹ and Bertram Thomas' The Arabs.¹⁰ Apart

¹ Wellhausen, Julius. Das Arabische Reich und sein Sturz, Berlin, 1902.

² Annales quos scripsit. Abu Jafar Muhammad ibn Jarir at-Tabari. W.J.deGoeje gen. ed. 3rd. series. 23v. Leiden 1879-1893.

³ Wellhausen, Julius. Die religiös-politischen Oppositions Parteien in alten Islam. Abhandlungen der Königl. Gesellschaft der Wissenschaften zu Göttingen. Phil. Hist. Klasse. Neue Folge V Nr. 2. 1901-02.

⁴ Weil, Gustav. Geschichte der Chalifen. 5 vol. Mannheim 1848.

⁵ Muller, August. Der Islam in Morgen und Abendland. 2 v. Berlin, 1895.

⁶ Von Krenner, Alfred. Cultur Geschichte des Orients unter den Caliphen. 2v. Wien 1875.

⁷ Dozy, R. Histoire des Musulmans d'Espagne. 4v. Leiden, 1861.

⁸ Hitti, Philip Khuri. History of the Arabs. London, New York, 1937.

⁹ Muir, Sir William. The Caliphate: Its Rise, Decline, and Fall. T.H.Weir, ed. Edinburgh, 1924.

¹⁰ Thomas, Bertram. The Arabs. London, 1937.

from these general works, there have appeared numerous studies, many based on material inaccessible to Wellhausen. For the history of Khorasan and Transoxania, the publication¹ by W. Radloff of Die alt Türkischen Inschriften der Mongolei and by Edward Chavannes of Documents sur les Tou-Kiu (Turcs) Occidentaux² made available new Eastern sources which have been criticised by Barthold, Die alt Türkischen Inschriften und die Arabischen Quellen³ and Turkestan down to the Mongol Invasion⁴ and by H.A.R. Gibb, Arab Conquests in Central Asia⁵ thus adding considerably to our knowledge of the Eastern part of the empire. For the political history of the early Umayyads, the studies of Pere Henri Lammens add tremendous detail to our⁶ information about the reigns of Muawia, Yazid, and Marwan. In Egypt, the discovery of the Aphrodite Papyri in 1901 and their publication by H.I. Bell⁷ and the criticism and interpretation⁸ of these documents by C.H. Becker in his Islam Studien give us an invaluable picture of Umayyad administration of Egypt. Apart from the brief articles in the learned journals, the most significant work since Lammens is the brilliant monograph by Gabrieli,

¹ St Petersburg, Part I, 1894. Part II, 1899.

² St Petersburg, 1903.

³ Anhang zu W. Radloff, Die alt Türkischen Inschriften. Pt. II. St Petersburg, 1899.

⁴ Gibb, H.A.R. tr. 2nd. ed. E.J.W. Gibb Memorial Series. N.S.V. London, 1928.

⁵ London, 1923.

⁶ In the Mélanges de la faculté orientale de l'Université Saint Joseph. Beyrouth. Vol. I-XII. 1906-1918 passim.

⁷ Greek Papyri in the British Museum. IV, London, 1910.

⁸ 2v. Leipzig, 1924.

Il Califato di Hishan.¹ Finally we should mention K.A.C. Creswell's History of Muslim Architecture in the Umayyad Period² which without reservations we consider the finest product of scholarship in Islamic subjects that has appeared in this century, a brilliant complement to the archaeological research of the Umayyad period which has been in progress since the war and which present day Arab nationalism is so strongly encouraging.

It must be remarked that the researches mentioned above have added to our information about the Umayyad period immense detail which Wellhausen did not have at his disposal, without challenging any of Wellhausen's general conclusions. Nevertheless, the time has come when there is a real need for a critical examination on the basis of new sources of the principal theses advanced in Das Arabische Reich, and it is our intention to analyse and correct some of the statements in this work which to us are no longer tenable.

A study of almost any other caliph than Marwan II might conceivably be conducted without regard for the circumstances that existed prior to his accession, but Marwan ibn Muhammad was the last of his dynasty to ascend the minbar in the East as caliph; his failure to preserve the family power can hardly be explained by personal incapacity since in many respects he

¹ Alexandria, 1935.

² 1. Oxford, 1932.

was one of the most able rulers of his line, and he was certainly the outstanding Umayyad military genius. There is no question that he was the victim of circumstances beyond his control, which had their origins in events which had occurred before his accession. Moreover, the constitution of the empire had certain peculiarities which could not be altered by any act short of revolution, and these peculiarities were the direct antithesis of a sound imperial administration. Therefore, we shall have occasion to examine the important characteristics of the Arab state.

Why did the Umayyad caliphate fall? The Arab historians are emphatic that the Umayyads usurped a political power to which they were not entitled by the laws of God and exercised this power in a partial, arbitrary, and tyrannical fashion, discriminating against the goodly, rewarding the wicked, preserving incompetent and cruel officials in office, and diverting the money due to the faithful to their own pockets.

Perhaps al Masudi puts the case better than anyone else when he causes an Umayyad sheikh to say, "We gave to pleasure the time which should have been consecrated to duty. Our subjects, victims of tyranny, despairing of justice, wished to be delivered from us; the taxpayers, overwhelmed, left our side; our domains were uncultivated; and our finances broke down. We had confidence in our ministers:- they sacrificed our

interests to their own advantage and conducted affairs without our participation. The army, whose pay was always in arrears, ceased to obey us, listened to the suggestions of our enemies, and aided them to defeat us. Finally the small numbers of our allies left us without defense against the attacks of our adversaries. But ignorance of events was one of the principal causes of the fall of our empire."¹

Van Vloten has written a cultural-economic interpretation of the empire. In his opinion, the failure of the Arabs to treat their conquered subjects who had embraced Islam on a footing of social equality produced a renaissance of Iranian nationalism fired by the religious propaganda of Shiite agents in Khorasan and resulted in a revolution which achieved its goal. "The inveterate hatred of a subject population against its oppressor of a foreign race, Shiitism, and the expectation of a liberator or Messiah caused the Khorasanians to embrace the cause of the house of the Prophet."²

Finally we have the view of Wellhausen that the real cause of the fall of the Umayyads was the failure of the caliphs to substitute for the pre-Islamic *asabiya*, or tribal strife, which continued unchecked until the Arab cause itself was lost, a feeling of unity among the conquering people which would preserve them intact against the opposition of those Islamic people who were not of Arab stock.

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1. Al Masudi, Les Prairies d'Or. C. Barbier de Meynard, ed. tr. 9v. Paris, 1861-77, VI, 35.
 2. Van Vloten, G., Recherches sur la domination arabe, le Chiitisme, et les croyances messianiques sous le Khalifat des Omayyades. Amsterdam, 1894, 1.

We shall have occasion to examine all these views. Let us say at the outset that we entirely disagree with the arguments of Van Vloten. Our thesis, which we hope to prove, is this: the revolt in Khorasan, which was due only in part to the social and religious factors so exaggerated by Van Vloten, was certainly the occasion, but not the cause, for the final victory of the Abbasids. When Constantine XI stood on the walls of Constantinople on the night of May 28, 1453,¹ the doom of Byzantium was so apparent that nothing short of a miracle could have saved the city, but when Marwan drew up his troops on the banks of the Zab, on the morning of Jan. 24, 750, it was not obvious that the Umayyads were to wage their last great battle. The army of the caliph was superior to the troops of the enemy in number. There was an abundance of money and of provisions - those essentials without which no commander could rely on the loyalty of his troops. The caliph and his lieutenants in the field had been waging war for the previous five years against a series of Kharajite rebellions; they had been invariably victorious and had enjoyed the prestige and were entitled to expect that confidence which an army places in a brilliantly successful general. The threat to the integrity of the empire, which was so critical under Hisham when a serious Berber revolt in North Africa and a Turkish counter offensive in Transoxania had for a while imperiled the existence

¹ Gustave Schlumberger: *La Siège, la Prise, et le Sac de Constantinople par les Turcs*. Paris, 1914, 271.

of the Arab state, had been overcome, and now on the critical day of Zab, there was no danger of foreign aggression to divert the resources of the government from concentrating all its energy and forces to meet the enemy in Iraq. In the past, a series of crises, of which at least one - the revolt of Ibn Zubair - was more formidable for the cause of the Umayyads, had been suppressed. Indeed, we might even go to the extreme of asserting that the fall of the Umayyads was due entirely to the circumstance that through faulty tactics and one fatal error in the orders of the day, they lost the battle of the Zab.

We wish, nevertheless, to explore the failures of the Umayyads beyond the circumstance that they lost the decisive battle. First, and most important of all, the last caliph, Marwan ibn Muhammad, had not the faintest claim of legitimacy to his title. He was not in the direct line of succession; there were better claimants to the throne living, for he had never been mentioned in any of the Acts of Succession which his predecessors had legalized by the binding oaths of the Muslim community, but worst of all, he was the son of a Kurdish slave, and was disqualified by this fact from holding the caliphate as completely as the hundreds of descendants of slaves and concubines of previous caliphs were disqualified. His brilliant campaigns when he was governor of Armenia and Aderbaijan had been rewarded by the passionate loyalty of the frontier troops under his command,

and with these devoted followers, he had taken advantage of a situation in the central government which was an exact parallel to the circumstances prevailing in Rome in 49 B.C. and, like Caesar with his legions, Marwan had been able to march to the seat of government, Damascus, and usurp by the violence of war the caliphate. The Syrian population, the main support of the dynasty, refused at the outset to recognize the legality of these measures, and enrolled under the standards of legitimate pretensions in open revolt.

The suppression of the Syrian revolt devastated that country, annihilated its military power, substituted for attachment to the reigning house a feeling of sullen resentment, and thus transferred the balance of power from the West of the Empire to the East. These wretched events were brought about through the circumstance that Marwan's predecessor, Yazid III, was in practice, if not in confession, a Kharijite, who rejected the constitutional principles of the state and denied the basis of the sovereignty of the Caliph by which the state had been preserved against the attacks of its enemies.

The second cause of the downfall of the empire was the failure of the caliphs to organize a centralized government. Muawia was the first and only Umayyad to reside in Damascus. Yazid I lived at Hawarin, some sixty miles from Damascus on the road to Palmyra. Marwan I lived with the Kalb Bedouins

in the desert. Abdul Malik divided his time between Damascus, Sinnabra south of Tiberias, Baalbek, and Jabya. Walid I lived in the Belqa (Transjordan) and his son Sulaiman, brought up in the desert, founded Ramla and held his court there. Yazid II lived at Muwaqqar, thirty miles southeast of Amman in Transjordan. Hisham lived and died at Hama on the Euphrates. Walid II lived in the desert twenty years before becoming caliph, and resided variously at Azraq in Transjordan and Qastal on the Belqa between Amman and Hama. Yazid III, was compelled to agree to reside in Damascus before the people would swear allegiance to him, but Marwan II made his home in Harran in Northern Mesopotamia.¹ The entire administration was decentralized to the utmost degree. Each province formed a practically autonomous state with its own diwans under the control of the governor who appointed his subordinates and whose relations with the caliphate were limited to vital questions of general policy. The caliph with his court lived in the neighborhood, usually where he had passed his youth, practicing these arts of poetry, song, and the hunt to which his ancestors had devoted themselves, naming and discharging governors and occupying himself only with pressing matters of state. The implications of such a system are obvious. First and foremost, there was no permanent, loyal organization to support the government, which was purely personal

¹ Creswell, K.A.C. Early Muslim Architecture, 265-6.

and which was good or bad, efficient or corrupt, according to the character of the caliph himself. Coupled to this was the military system. With the exception of the constabulary and the guard, there was no permanent military organization; all Muslims were liable to service in time of need and returned to their homes when not on actual campaigns. There were, of course, on the frontiers permanent military stations, as there were also in the capital cities of the provinces, but they were under the control of the provincial commander, and the caliph himself in the interior of the country had no large permanent body of men exercised in discipline and ready to respond in times of crisis. With this lack of a disciplined force, there was the corresponding failure of the government to invent new tactics and improved methods of warfare. Because of this, in any revolt taking place within the state, the rebels had the great advantage of employing strategy in no way inferior to that of the government troops, in being equally well equipped, in having the same degree of discipline, and in most cases of cherishing a cause the religious and moral principles of which induced greater ardor and greater hopes of victory than would be the case on the government side. Thus if any rabble revolted and united in a common purpose, the expectation of defeat was not foregone nor the chance of victory unreasonable. To this circumstance must be attributed the surprising frequency of

Marajite revolts. In addition to military weakness, the entire police and intelligence service of the caliphate was inadequate, with the result that disaffection, propaganda, and revolutionary designs could flourish without reaching the ears of the caliph or his governors until they culminated in actual insurrection.

In all justice, we should not censure the caliphs for their inability to practice those arts of government which were alien to their people, and the third cause for the failure of the Umayyads at its root is nothing but the basic incapacity of the Arabs to govern or be governed. Ibn Khaldun has expressed this as well as anyone: "Of all people, the Arabs are least inclined to subordination.... They acquire a grossness of manner, a proudness, an arrogance, a spirit of jealousy which indisposes them to all authority....¹ They neglect all the cares of government; to regulate the administration of the state, to provide for the well-being of subject people, to restrain malefactors are occupations of which they do not even think....² The Umayyad preserved for themselves the sovereignty which others had organized. They aspired to great things and disdained small ones. Their children, raised in luxury, came to power and occupied themselves solely with the satisfaction of their passions. Then they neglected to preserve the caliph-

¹ Ibn Khaldun: "Prolégomènes historiques d'Ibn Khaldun." Notices et extraits des manuscrits de la Bibliothèque Impériale XIX Paris, 1852, 313.

² Ibid., 421.

ate. They did not respect the dignity of command and soon they no longer had the power to govern, for God despoiled them of their power, covered them with ignominy, and brought to an end their prospects."¹

Ibn Khaldun's criticism is unjust in one respect: certain of the later caliphs were fully aware of the evils which he mentioned, and among these Marwan is included, and their attempts to establish a principle of the unity of the state and realize it will be discussed later. But the chief point we hope to establish is this: the final crisis which brought to an end the dynasty and the empire was not the uprising of Persian, i.e. non-Arab elements, as Van Vloten maintains, but the assertion of the essential Arab spirit of independence and hatred of discipline.

We have divided this study into four chapters. In the first we shall consider the origin and development of the system of taxation, and in the second, the effects of this system on the maintenance of imperial government. The third chapter is devoted to a discussion of the important administrative institutions, with a special study of the Umayyad army. The fourth chapter contains a biography of Marwan and a criticism of his reign.

In the transliteration of Arabic into English, we have intentionally avoided a consistent system. The names of places and of men which are well known and have an accepted

¹ Ibn Khaldun, op. cit., 311.

English spelling are written according to common usage.
 All Arabic quotations not translated we have written in
 the Arabic script. In all other cases:

ت = t	ط = t	ث = th
ح = h	ح = h	
د = d	ذ = d	
ز = z	ظ = z	
س = s	ص = s	ش = sh
ق = q	ك = k	
خ = kh	ج = j	
ض = dth	ع = 'e'	غ = gh
و = w	ي = y or i	

The Legal Principles of the
Umayyad Taxation System

No problem of Umayyad history has produced more debate or greater differences of opinion than that of taxation. The Arab historians and jurists while disagreeing widely on particular details are unanimous in affirming that the legal principles regulating the treatment of subject peoples and territories acquired by conquest were firmly established in a series of decisions by Umar ibn al Khattab, the second caliph, during whose reign the three most important provinces of the empire, Egypt, Syria, and Iraq, were acquired. The successors of Umar modified in many instances the regulations he had promulgated and departed not only from the literal interpretation of his edicts, but, and this was far more serious, violated the spirit of the underlying theories as well.

What were the main provisions allegedly enacted by Umar?

1.) When a city or land or nation discovered that the Arab forces had invaded its territory and were besieging its fortresses, three courses were open. The inhabitants might welcome the invaders and announce their conversion to Islam. In this case they at once assumed a position of equality with the Muslims. They had to pay the zakat, or tithe, on their land, their flocks, their capital, their merchandise of trade, their dikes and irrigation works in the same proportion and conforming to the same regulations imposed on the Arabs by the

Prophet. The proceeds of this tax were to be devoted to public charity. There were no other obligations or dues, and all private property remained in the legal possession of its former owners. Moreover, the people themselves were entitled to share in the annual stipends and maintenance provided by the state for its warriors and their families and were to participate in the division of four fifths of all booty taken in battle. 2.) If, however, the inhabitants preferred to remain Christians, or Jews, or Magians, they were granted security of life and property and religion against the payment of a tribute which they had to raise themselves by whatever methods were pleasing to them or their leaders, but should they elect to settle their fate by recourse to arms and the outcome of battle, and were conquered, then their territories were forfeit to the Muslim community which took legal title to them but permitted the former owners to work the soil against a payment of a land tax called the kharaaj. Besides this land tax there was also a poll tax called the jizya. Similarly, legal title to land that was found deserted after conquest by the death or flight of its former owner reverted to the Muslim state and became kharaaj land. The caliph or his officials would lease it out to any responsible person who would undertake to cultivate it and pay the taxes. This kharaaj land was to constitute the chief permanent source of revenue of the treasury and it was desirable that it remain in the possession of the state; consequently Umar forbade Muslims

to acquire kharaj land by purchase or coercion, for if land once passed into Muslim hands the only impost that could legally be levied on it would be the tithe. 3.) In the event that the cultivator of the land embraced Islam, he was freed of the jizya, or capitation tax, automatically but was still liable to the kharaj. Should he desert his land, however, and emigrate to a city, he became naturally exempt from kharaj, but the land reverted to the Muslim community, and the caliph through his officials would if possible reassign it to any non-Muslim who could be found to resume cultivation.

These are the basic regulations attributed to the second caliph, and they were accepted as true by Von Kremer, Van Vloten, Müller, Dozy, and the other 19th century Western historians. In their criticisms of the system, the salient fact that impressed them all was the existence of a powerful economic motive for conversion - the exemption from taxation, which if allowed to continue unchecked would bankrupt the treasury by reducing the revenue and increasing the obligation of stipends. To prevent this, the Umayyads in many instances did not exempt new converts from taxation nor admit them to participation in the stipends. This patent injustice engendered deep resentment in the hearts of the new converts and their descendants and was the occasion of a series of revolts, the last of which, beginning in Khorasan, overthrew the dynasty.

These provisions of Umar were regarded by Von Kremer as unfortunate because they created the difficulties which his

successors inherited; however, neither the Prophet nor Umar was to be blamed for not envisaging the empire which was to be created by the movement which they had founded, or for not foreseeing great problems of imperial administration. Motives of state demanded that the caliphs should disregard the basic theory if they were to consolidate their power; it was thus unfortunate that in the year of the Hijra 100 a pious fanatic, Umar II, should have returned to the practice of Umar I, winning applause and what amounted in later days to the Muslim counterpart of canonization for his efforts, but at the same time undermining finances and provoking bitter hostility and desire for revolution against the later caliphs who for practical reasons had to annul his acts.

Another circumstance which impressed these earlier historians was the fact that in administration, the Arabs were not innovators but took over virtually intact the machinery of provincial and local government that had been functioning before the conquest, keeping the records not in Arabic but in Greek or Persian, as the case might be, and maintaining in all but the highest offices the old native bureaucracy. This fact is of course true and has never been challenged.

Wellhausen, however, attacked almost everything else. In his view, the provisions attributed to Umar were nothing short of forgeries invented by the jurists of the late 8th and 9th centuries to give the justification of ancient authority to practices which had arisen through a slow process

of evolution. The origin of Wellhausen's theory undoubtedly was the fact that in certain passages of Tabari the words *kharaaj* and *jizya* are not always employed according to later usage as meaning land tax and poll tax. De Goeje had already noted this in the glossary of the Leiden Tabari. Etymologically *kharaaj* he demonstrated meant capitation tax, while *jizya*, which in Persian usage signified census capitis, certainly was used for land tax in such phrases as:

اشترى من دهقان ارضا على ان يكفیه جزيتها

= he bought from a dihqan land on condition that he would requite him for its *jizya*.¹

Seizing upon this apparent contradiction, Wellhausen enunciated the following theory:

1. The laws established by Umar did not in fact originate with him but were the result of a later evolution.

2. The terms *kharaaj* and *jizya* are synonymous and both signify tribute. Throughout the first one hundred and twenty years of the Hijra no distinction was ever drawn between the land tax and the poll tax.

3. This being so, conversion to Islam did not free a man from the poll tax alone but liberated him from all tribute.

Until now, no one has seriously questioned this thesis. Pere Lammens elaborated it by showing that Umar I did little but legalize the acts of his generals, who followed their own

1. Cf. kharaaj and jizya in the glossary to Tabari.

inspiration without any common understanding or desire for uniformity. "The incoherent decisions of these improvised diplomats were to form the basis of future Muslim law."¹ On the question of the *kharaḥ* and the *jizya*, he is more cautious, asserting merely that "the distinction between *kharaḥ* and *jizya* was posterior to the Sufyanids."² Probably Wollhausen's most enthusiastic disciple is C. H. Becker, whose *Beiträge zur Geschichte Ägyptens unter dem Islam* applies Wollhausen's thesis to the administration of Egypt. H. Idris Bell followed Wollhausen and Becker in his introduction to the *Aphrodito Papyri* but subsequently modified his position. The most recent partisan of the Wollhausen camp is A. S. Tritton³ who has written a very unsatisfactory work to demonstrate that the so-called Covenant of Umar is a forgery.

The great problem confronting those who accept the Wollhausen theory is this: if it is granted that no distinction existed between *kharaḥ* and *jizya* in the early period of the caliphate, but such a difference had appeared before 750, when did the change occur, and where? There is no completely satisfactory answer.

Moreover, while the terms *kharaḥ* and *jizya* may have been synonymous there is no question that from the earliest times revenue was derived from two sources - a tax on land and a tax

1. Lamens, Henri, *Mélanges de la Faculté Orientale de l'Université Saint Joseph, Beyrouth, 1906-1918, V, 695.*

2. *Ibid.*, 705.

3. Tritton, A. S., *The Caliphs and Their non-Muslim Subjects: A Study of the Covenant of Umar, Oxford, 1930.*


on the individual.

We believe that Wellhausen was completely in error, and that the most important regulations attributed to the period of Umar did in fact originate then or immediately thereafter. At the risk of repeating much which has already been said, we propose to examine the entire subject in considerable detail, from the beginning up to the time of Marwan ibn Muhammad. The problem is a crucial one for the appreciation of the Umayyad state. In the account which follows it will be noticed that much reliance has been placed on the Kitab al Kharaḥ of Abu Yusuf. Born in Kufa A. H. 113 (731), Abu Yusuf was thus a contemporary of the last Umayyad caliph and as one of the earliest jurists preserved to us intact is entitled to more confidence than later writers.

The seventeenth year of the Hijra began on the 23rd of January, 638. In the preceding year, the battle of Qādisiyya and the capture of Al Madā'in (the two cities, Seleucia and Ctesiphon on the Tigris) had torn from the Sassanians the province of Iraq. In the West, at the same time the Day of Yarmuq ended Greek rule in Syria. In this seventeenth year of the Hijra, Basra and Kufa were founded and the caliph Umar took the first steps to establish the administration of the newly conquered territories.

According to the custom of the Prophet, the immense booty seized from the fallen enemy in battle or removed from the treasuries and buildings of the captured cities was divided

on the spot, following the authority of Sura VIII 42:

"Know ye that when ye have taken any booty, a fifth part belongeth to God or to the apostle and to the near of kin and to orphans and to the poor and to the wayfarer." The fifth was at once dispatched to Umar, while the remaining four fifths were shared in the following manner: each fighting man received one part for himself, but each cavalrman received two additional parts for the maintenance of his horse. Thus the cavalry obtained three times the amount of the foot soldier.¹ This movable spoil which could be divided on the spot and carried off is called ghanima (from the verb  = to take away as spoil). About it there is no dispute. Since the earliest times the booty obtained in all the campaigns of the empire was divided according to this principle, and the only question that arises in connection with it is the extent to which the Muslim ghawali who took part in a campaign shared in the spoil.

A far more serious matter was that of the land. In Iraq in the fertile district called the Sawad, a large part of the territory was owned by the Sassanian royal house and attendant nobility. It was abandoned by the death of the owners or by their flight to the East. This land, belonging to Kisra, his family and satraps², yielded when first seized

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1. Abu Yusuf Ya'qub: Kitāb al Kharāj, Le Livre de l'impôt foncier. tr. E. Fagnan, Paris, 1921, 27
 2. Abu Jafar Muhammad ibn Jarir at-Tabari, Tārīkh. ed. M. J. de Goeje, Leiden, 1893. Ser. Ia. V, 2468

by Umar a sum estimated from 7,000,000 to 9,000,000 dirhems.¹ In addition there were immense areas still in the possession of the cultivators or joined to the cities where the owners still dwelt.

There was an immediate clamor among the Arab soldiers led by Bilāl ibn Ribah for the division of this territory among the conquerors as *ghanima*. This Umar refused to permit but treated the land as fay, an endowment or investment belonging to the Muslim community the income of which was to be paid into the state treasury and to be expended on the stipends of the *muqatila* and their families.

In the precedent of Muhammad, Umar had justification for what he was about to do. The first land conquered by the Prophet was that of Khaibar. It had been divided up among the faithful after payment of the fifth.² But on other lands acquired by capitulation, Muhammad asserted the right of absolute disposition. Of the revenue they produced he reserved a part for himself and devoted the rest to the public utility.³ These lands were thus intended to be a *fay* of the Muslims. Van Berchem has pointed out, however, that the Prophet thus closely associated his private with the public purse; on his death, however, these lands were not permitted to be inherited

1. Baladhuri, The Origins of the Islamic State by Philip Khuri Hitti being a translation of the Kitāb Futūḥ al-Buldān of the Imam Abu-l'Abbās Ahmad ibn Jābir al-Baladhuri. 2v. Vol. 1. New York 1916. Vol. 2. F. C. Murgotten tr. New York 1924. I, 431, cf. Abu Yusuf, 86.
2. Van Berchem, Mar. La Propriété territoriale et l'impôt foncier sous les premiers Califes. Geneva, 1886, 9.
3. Ibid. 10.

by his family but were immobilized for the advantage of the community and became waqf, inalienable state endowments.¹

So, after a debate with Abdur Rahman ibn Awf, Umar announced this decision:

I have divided movable property among the conquerors after deducting the fifth, but I believe it my duty to reserve the soil and its cultivation and impose on them a kharaj by reason of the land and a capitation (jizya) on each head constituting a fay to the profit of Muslims who have fought, their children, and those who come after them.²

The motive for this he explained as follows: "Allah has given you as associates in the division of the fay those who come after you. If I divide this land, there will remain none for your successors."³ According to Muhammad ibn Ishaq from Az Zuhri, Umar maintained his right to settle the question by an appeal to the Koran, Sura LIX, 6-8:

After the spoils of these which God hath assigned to his apostle, ye pressed not with horse or camel. But God giveth his apostle power over what he will. The spoil taken from the peoples of the cities and assigned by God to his apostle belongeth to God and to the apostle and his kin and to the orphan . . . that none of it may circulate among such of you only as are rich . . . and they who have come after them, say: O Lord, forgive us and our brethren who have preceded us in the faith.

Abu Yusuf states emphatically that Umar touched neither the land nor the inhabitants of the Sawad but imposed a kharaj on the former and a jizya on the latter.⁴ To put this provision into effect, he had the Sawad surveyed, imposed a tax

1. Van Berchem, op. cit., 11
 2. Abu Yusuf, op. cit., 40
 3. Ibid, 37
 4. Ibid, 44

graded according to the value of the crop, vineyards paying the heaviest duty, and then in descending order dates, sugar cane, wheat, and barley. In addition, the poll tax was set at 48, 24, and 12 dirhems per year on the upper, middle, and lower classes respectively.¹ The total revenue amounted to 100,000,000 dirhems.² Of this approximately one eleventh, or 9,000,000 dirhems, came from territories belonging to the Kisra and the nobles who had fled.

We find in Tabari a somewhat different version of Umar's settlement.

They wrote to Umar about the sawafi and he replied to them: "Resort to the sawafi³ which God has assigned to you and distribute it among whom God has determined, four fifths to the jund and one fifth that is owing to me, and if they wish to settle it, this is granted to them." And when he had given them this grant, they discovered that they did not wish to be scattered in the lands of the Persians and they established it as under their control and assigned it to whom they wished to designate. Then they collected the revenue every year and they did not assign any land except to those they agreed on, and they did not agree except on the princes [the old Iranian nobles].⁴

Thus, although the ultimate disposition of the land was the same in both accounts, according to Tabari the decision was made by the Arabs, according to the jurists, by Umar.

Of the two versions, there is something to be said for Tabari. Umar, as we shall see later, was not always consistent in his principles, and, as Lammens pointed out⁵, fre-

1. Abu Yusuf, op. cit., 53-60

2. Baladhuri, op. cit., I, 428

3. Land which after conquest is unclaimed by the decease or flight of the owner.

4. Tabari, Series Ia, V, 2469

5. See above, P. 5.

quently ratified the acts of his generals. What is noteworthy in Tabari's version is that the land was assigned to the old Persian nobility (الأحرار) to manage, and it is clear that these nobles, or dihqans, were responsible for the collection of the tax and the local administration.¹

There is, however, unanimous agreement among all the authorities that the land of the Sawād was subjected to a kharaj and its inhabitants to a jizya. Thus Al Walid ibn Salih from Sulaiman ibn Yasār: Umar ibn al Khaṭṭāb left as-Sawād for those who were still in men's loins and mothers' wombs, considering the inhabitants dixis from whom tax should be taken on their person and kharaj on their land.² Al Hasain ibn al Aswad from Hārithah ibn Muḍarrib³, Khalaf ibn Hisham al Bazzār from Ibrahim at-Taimi⁴, al Cāsīm ibn Sallām from Ash-Shabi⁵ and others report the same thing.

If, then, we are to believe there was no difference between kharaj and jizya in the early period of the conquest, we must disregard completely the overwhelming agreement of all the authorities that there was such a distinction. There are important reasons for accepting their statements.

In the first place, we know that the practice of the Arabs was to take over intact the administrative machinery of the countries which they conquered. Chosroes I had in-

1. Tabari, op. cit., V, 2470 =
2. Baladhari, op. cit., I, 423
3. Ibid., 423
4. Ibid., 426
5. Ibid., 426

كانت الدواقين للجزية مما
أبدىهم والعجارت

troduced new regulations by which the land of the empire was exactly measured and taxed one drachma per jarib of wheat or barley, and in ascending proportion according to the value of the crop, to the maximum of eight drachma per jarib of grapes.¹ This system corresponds exactly with Umar's provisions, and in both the tax on land was imposed in the same proportion and in some instances in the same amount. Moreover, Chosroes placed a capitation tax on all between the ages of twenty and fifty, except nobles, soldiers, priests, secretaries, and others in service of the king, varying according to the person's wealth from 12, 8, 6, to 4 drachma per year.²

That the Sassanian organization was adopted is confirmed in the story that Umar sent for a dihqan of Jawkha and another of Iraq who told him what they had paid previously, and he agreed to the continuation of their taxes.³

We are also told that a lead seal was placed on the necks of those who paid the jizya, and there were 550,000 of them whom Utman ibn Hunaib, Umar's tax agent, so treated.⁴ Excepted from the poll tax were beggars, the poor, the unemployed, the blind, the chronically sick, monks who lived on alms, infirm old men, the insane, and the abbots and monks of those monasteries where the rule of poverty prevailed.

1. Christensen, Arthur, J' Iran sous les Sassanides. Paris, 1936, 361

2. Ibid., 362

3. Abu Yusuf, op. cit., 59

4. Baladhuri, op. cit., I, 423; and Abu Yusuf, op. cit., 60

The general principle of the jizya was that those dependent on charity escaped.¹

Von Kromer has accepted without reservations the proposition that Umar forbade the Muslims to acquire land, and for this he has been justly criticised.² There was good authority for his beliefs. In Tabari we find the order: "It is not permissible to buy the land which is between Hulwan and Al Qadasiya which is the sawafi because this belongs to those to whom God has allotted it as fay.³" It was not to become tithe land by passing into the hands of Muslims.⁴ If the cultivator of any of this territory became a Muslim, his conversion did not free him of the kharaj. A man came to Umar and said: "I have embraced Islam. Free me therefore from the kharaj." Umar refused: "No, your land has been taken by force."⁵

It is apparent from Tabari that Umar's prohibition was intended to apply only to the sawafi - the former possessions of the Kisra, and lands which had been specially set aside as fay. So far Kromer is right. But Umar did not extend this prohibition to all land outside of Arabia. To mention only one instance, he bestowed grants about Kufa on certain individuals.⁶ This was not an unorthodox procedure. The Prophet

1. Abu Yusuf, op. cit., 183.

2. Von Kromer, Alfred, Culturgeschichte des Orients, 2v. Wien, 1875. Eng. tr. S. Akhda Bukhsh, The Orient under the Caliphs, Calcutta, 1920, 86.

3. Tabari, op. cit., V, 2471.

4. Abu Yusuf, op. cit., 132.

5. Van Berchem, M., op. cit., 37.

6. Baladhuri, op. cit., II, 67-69.

in his time had given fiefs¹, and this practice was followed by Abu Bekr. We have already noted that the principle was well established from the beginning that the caliph possessed absolute discretion to determine the disposition of these territories gained from the nation through conquest.²

The third caliph, Uthman, however, conferred large grants to his partisans, and this practice was continued by Muawia and his successors. These grants of fiefs were called qataf and were made up of two categories:

1. Property of the Kisra = royal domain.
2. Hawat: deserted land, the property of those who had fallen in battle or who had fled, and also waste land, desert, or swamp that had never been brought into cultivation.³

Becker has shown that in Syria before Arab times, lands were given to cleruchs or farmed out to high officials, following a practice called emphyteusis: the leasing of fallow land against the undertaking to cultivate it and to pay a yearly rent. If much had to be done to make the land valu-

1. Baladhuri, op. cit., 28. To Bilal, for example, he granted a mountain and some mines. (Abu Yusuf, op. cit., 92.)

2. Abu Yusuf, op. cit., 95. "All land which comes to the caliph as land from which the owners have fled or were killed can be disposed of in two ways as the caliph wishes. He can give it as a fief to a Muslim, - it is then zakat land, or he can leave it to the inhabitants, and then it becomes kharaj land, but if it becomes kharaj land it can never be alienated from this category. The inhabitants have full property rights on it and can transmit it by contract or heritage."

3. Becker, C.H., Islam Studien, Leipzig, 1924, I, 222.

able, the concessionaire might be excused from rent for a certain number of years, but if he failed in his obligations, the land returned to the crown.¹ The Arabs continued the existing custom. The proprietor to whom the lease of the qatal was granted was called the muqta and the act of lease was known as an iqta.² The caliph, who had the right to determine under what category the qatal should be taxed, bestowed it on a Muslim either as 'ushr land, in which case it became private property and paid the zakat, or else as kharaj land, when it was regarded as a lease of the state in return for the payment of rent.³

Although Umar had given some of these fiefs, the generosity of Uthman was so spectacular that he came to be regarded as the originator of the practice.⁴ Among the recipients were Talha, Khalid ibn Wujr, Jarir ibn Abdallah al Bajali⁵ and prominent companions of the Prophet.

1. Becker, *op. cit.*, I, 224.

2. *Ibid.*, 225.

3. Abu Yusuf, *op. cit.*, 79. In later times, Al Walid ibn Abdul Malik gave as fief to some of the troops of Antioch the land of Seleucia lying on the sea coast. He fixed the tax as one dinar and one modius of wheat on each jarab of cultivated land. (Baladhuri, *op. cit.*, I, 223.) This fief, though given to Muslims, then was regarded as kharaj land, for the impost paid was the same amount commonly demanded from kharaj land in Syria and was obviously not the zakat.

4. "The first one to give out Al Iraq in fiefs was Uthman ibn Affan who bestowed pieces of land appropriated from Kiswa and others evacuated by their owners." Baladhuri, *op. cit.*, I, 432

5. Jarir al Bajali had been promised a fief by Umar, who later revoked the grant and bestowed compensation in money.- Baladhuri, *op. cit.*, 425.

In Syria, Uthman ordered Muawia to fortify the coastal cities and give fiefs to those he settled there.¹ Far more important than this, he directed Muawia to settle Arabs in places far from cities and villages to utilize unpossessed lands. Thus, he settled Tamim at Arkabiyah and Cois and Asad at Al Mazahir and Al Madaibir.² Muawia, following the privilege of Roman law by which the emperor was entitled to appropriate a share of the booty himself, seized property in Syria and made it his own private domain and also gave concession to his supporters.³ Besides these land grants, Uthman and his successors gave their families and their associates, as well as prominent men whose favor they desired and whose enmity they feared, concessions of dikes, canals, and irrigation works in Iraq, the exploitation of which gave the owners great profits.

Such was the basis of the immense landed fortunes amassed by the favored aristocracy.⁴ Uthman at his death left 150,000 dinars and 1,000,000 dirhems.⁵ Zubeir ibn al Awwam had property at Basra, Kufa, Fustat, and Alexandria. His heirs inherited besides these lands 50,000 dinars, 1,000 horses, and 1,000 slaves. Talha's income from Iraq was 1,000 dinars per

1. Baladhuri, *op. cit.*, 196

2. *Ibid.*, 278

3. Wellhausen, Julius, *The Arab Kingdom and Its Fall*. Eng. tr. Margaret Graham Weir, Calcutta, 1927, 289. Lammens, H., *op. cit.*, v², 696.

4. Van Berchem, M., *op. cit.*, 42.

5. Al Masudi: *Muruj al-Dhahab*, *Les Prairies d'Or*, ed. and tr. into French by C. Barbier de Meynard, Paris, 1861, IV, 253.

day. Abdur Raïman ibn Awf azZuhri left 1,000 camels and 88,000 dinars. Zaid ibn Thābit's fortune was in excess of 100,000 dinars.¹

We do not know how much dry land was alienated by Uthman in fiefs, nor the proportion of rawāt, or deserted land fiefs, to those fiefs established on soil declared inviolable kharaj land by Umar. That the public domains were still important tracts at the time of Hajjaj is proved by the statement that at the battle of Bair al Jarājim the people burnt the registers and everyone seized what public domain bordered on his land.²

Obviously, the granting of fiefs must have resulted in a serious diminution of state revenue. The only clue to this is the statement of Baladhuri that the revenue declined from 100,000,000 dirhems under Umar to 40,000,000 by the time of Al Hajjaj.³ It must be emphasized that the preceding civil war and Kharajite uprisings were to a considerable extent responsible for such a decrease.

The Jazira, or Mesopotamia, did not fall into Muslim

1. Al Masudi, op. cit., IV, 254.

2. Baladhuri, op. cit., 431. "The estates were in danger not merely from the fact that the Khalifas gave away parts of them. There lurked among the people a general rage against the Latifundia of the state, the rulers, and the great men. They attempted to destroy or obscure the historical titles upon which rested that right of possession which was offensive to them." - Wellhausen, op. cit., 291. It does not follow from the context that the lands thus appropriated included the fiefs of Arab aristocrats as Wellhausen asserts; Baladhuri says they were merely the domains of the state.

3. Baladhuri, op. cit., 428

hands like Iraq as the result of two or three open field engagements, but was conquered piecemeal by 'Iyād ibn Charrā. The terms imposed by the conqueror fall into two different categories. Ar Raqqah, for example, did not capitulate at the approach of the enemy, but was reduced by siege and assault. 'Iyād left the land in the hands of the owners in return for kharaj on it. He also assessed a poll tax to the amount of one dinar on every man in addition to certain [^]cañizes of wheat and some oil, vinegar, and honey.¹

In the case of Ar Ruha, which capitulated, the land was not made kharaj land, but paid a tribute based on the quota of one dinar and two modii of wheat for each man. Harrān, Samāsiat, Nisibin and Carqisiya, as well as practically all the villages and towns of the Euphrates, settled by capitulation. Umar fixed the tax at 48, 24, and 12 dirhems per person in addition to two mudds of wheat, two qists of oil, and two qists of vinegar.²

This is what happened:

1. If in the Jazira a town was taken by conquest, its land became kharaj land and its people paid jizya.

2. If, however, a town capitulated without fighting, its land did not become kharaj land and the legal title to it remained in the hands of former owners. Instead, the people settled for a lump sum to be paid in cash, in addition to a contribution of grain, oil, and vinegar, and the

1. Baladhuri, op. cit., 271.

2. Ibid., 273-4.

amount of this lump sum was based on the male population of the town. The collection of the tribute was confided to the chief man of the town¹ and we must assume that the manner of collection was left to his own discretion. What distinctions were made as to jizya and kharaj were in his hands, not in those of the Arabs.

The provisions applied to the Jazira were not unique, and were embodied in the terms made at the time of Abu Bekr. "The people of Al Hira were 6,000 men, on each of whom fourteen dirhems each having the weight of five qirats were assessed, making 84,000 dirhems in all of five qirats each, or 60,000 of seven each. To that end, Khalid wrote them a statement which I myself have read."² Baniqiyā settled for 100,000 dirhems.³

On the other hand, Mihawand, which was taken by assault, had to pay both kharaj on its lands and jizya on its heads,⁴ as did Dinawar and Sirawan. The terms imposed on the region of Basra and its dependency, Khorasan, were the same as for the Sawad. The taxes were collected in each village or locality by the dihqan, or native chief, and over the whole district was a supervising finance officer to see that all was in order.

Now, when a district surrendered by a treaty of capit-

1. Baladthuri, op. cit., 275.

2. Yahya Ibn Adam, quoted by Baladthuri, op. cit., I, 391.

3. Baladthuri, op. cit., 393.

4. Ibid., 471.

ulation it was called sulhān and paid the lump sum contracted for. If, however, it was overcome by war, it forfeited everything, the land being treated as an endowment for the benefit of the Muslims. Wellhausen has remarked that there was not much distinction between sulhān and conquest except that in the case of the former the tribute was fixed by contract and could not be altered.¹

There was, nevertheless, this one difference, which is not particularly convenient for Wellhausen. If the land was sulhān it paid a lump sum which was collected by one or more of the chief natives of the town. The total sum assessed might be raised either by a land tax, or by a poll tax, or by both. However, if the land was taken by conquest, unless it were situated on a frontier and demanded a special arrangement, it became kharaḥ land and on the individual was placed a poll tax.

In a brilliant essay, De Coeje has discussed the occupation of Syria.

The conquest converted all the land into public domain and the occupant had only the usufruct, for which he paid for each jarīb a certain quantity of produce, or a sum of money. The sale of this land could alienate only the usufruct. The domain still belonged to the state. That is why the kharaḥ continued to be levied even when the occupant became a Muslim. Besides this tax on land, the infidels had to pay a capitation tax called the jizya.²

1. Wellhausen, J., op. cit., 31.

2. De Coeje, M.J., Mémoires sur la Conquête de la Syrie. Leiden, 1900, 135. De Coeje disagreed with Wellhausen's thesis that there was no difference between kharaḥ and jizya. Cf. his review of "Das Arabische Reich", Museum, 10 Jahrgang no. 7. Leiden, April, 1903, 246-7.

There were certain exceptions to the general rule. Some cities capitulated for a fixed quota based on one dinar for every man and one dinar for every jarib of wheat producing land. Such an arrangement was made with Antioch.¹ Other cities, however, like Baalbec² and Hama³ paid the jizya, while their lands bore the kharaj.

The kharaj land of Syria was not taxed in proportion to the yearly yield (kharaj muqāsama) but paid a fixed amount based on a settled valuation (kharaj muqātā'a) which was not altered from one year to the next. Diocletian had introduced a uniform system based on the division of lands into parts of equal value. This was adopted in Syria about the year 500 and was perpetuated by the Arabs in the kharaj muqataa of one dinar per jarib.⁴

The frontier provinces present a unique problem because of the circumstances of their location. In Armenia, for example, the Arab occupation was permanent only in certain villages of the Araxes valleys and in the Tigris and Euphrates basins,⁵ and the conquerors were compelled to leave the country under arms as a buffer to the Khazars.⁶ The main defense of the country was entrusted to the Armenian troops, made up

1. Baladhuri, op. cit., 227.

2. Ibid., 139.

3. Ibid., 201.

4. Van Berchem, M., op. cit., 46-7.

5. Laurent, J., L'Arménie entre Byzance et l'Islam. Paris, 1919, 52.

6. Ibid., 51.

largely of the inferior nobles who as soldiers did not have to pay the capitulation tax and who shared in the booty.¹ Habib ibn Maslamah in his treaty with the people of Tiflis imposed a tax of one dinar on every household with the provision that any one who became a Muslim would be freed of it.²

On the other hand, many villages near the Mesopotamian frontier were reduced by conquest - their lands paid the kharaj and the citizens wore lead seals about their necks to signify that the poll tax had been collected from them.³

Despite these humiliations imposed in certain localities, the general rule was that those who fought against the enemies of Islam were freed of the jizya.⁴ Harwan II in his campaign into one territory of the Khazars imposed terms whereby the inhabitants were required to pay not money, but to deliver a fixed amount of grain each year for the maintenance of the troops.⁵

The submission then of people on the borders was determined entirely by the exigencies of the situation. In Northwest Syria the Mardaites were freed of all tribute and permitted to keep their share of the booty.⁶ In Khorasan cities capitulated on the basis of a lump sum and we find

1. Laurent, J., op. cit., 60.

2. Baladhuri, op. cit., 316-7.

3. Laurent, J., op. cit., 158.

4. Chazarian, Hertitsch, Armenien unter der Arabischen Herrschaft. Marburg, 1866, 65.

Inopuscule, Harop, Die Inneren Zustände von Armenien unter Asot I. Berlin, 1904, 132.

5. Baladhuri, op. cit., 326-7.

6. Ibid., 246.

no mention at all either of the terms *kharaḥ* or *jizya*. Thus, at-Tabasan settled for 60,000 dirhems a year¹, Kahlātan for 600,000², Nisābūr for 1,000,000³, Fasa for 300,000⁴, Abiward for 400,000⁵, Herāt for 1,000,000⁶, Balkh for 400,000⁷, and in Transoxania Ghurak, the lord of Samarkand, settled for 1,200,000⁸.

It is thus perfectly clear that in the Eastern provinces, as Lamens has pointed out⁹, the Umayyads established a sort of protectorate system. The inhabitants enjoyed virtually complete autonomy and the chief task of the native officials was to maintain security and collect the taxes. The important fact is that Khorasan was not regarded as *kharaḥ* land to which legal title was held by the Muslim state. It was left to the indigenous inhabitants who cultivated it. The revenue, however, was collected by the *diggans* who had to raise the yearly required sum of tribute.

We now turn our attention to Egypt. The following is the account preserved to us in *Baladthuri*.

From Abdallah ibn 'Amr ibn al-'Asi: The chief of Misr said to my father: We have heard of what ye did in Syria and how ye assessed poll tax on the

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1. *Baladthuri*, II, tr. by F. C. Murgotten, New York, 1924, 159.
 2. *Ibid.*, 160.
 3. *Ibid.*, 161.
 4. *Ibid.*, 162.
 5. *Ibid.*, 163.
 6. *Ibid.*, 163.
 7. *Ibid.*, 167.
 8. *Ibid.*, 188.
 9. Lamens, Henri, Études sur le siècle des Omayyades. Beyrouth, 1930, 705.

Christians and Jews leaving the land in the hands of its owners to utilize it and pay its kharaaj. If ye treat us in the same way, it would do you more good than to kill, capture, and expel us. My father consulted with the Muslims and they all advised him to accept the terms Accordingly he assessed on every adult, except the poor, two dinars as poll tax, and on every land-owner in addition to the two dinars, three ardebbs of wheat, two qists of oil, two qists of honey, and two of vinegar The statement was submitted to Umar who endorsed it. The whole land became kharaaj land. Because, however, Umar signed the contract and the statement, some people thought that Misr was taken by capitulation.¹

These terms made at Misr were repeated in the case of Alexandria.²

We have a very interesting account of how the kharaaj was collected in each district.

Umar ibn al 'As fixed for the Copts the tribute paid before to the Greeks. That had been allotted justly. If a village had been well cultivated and populous, the tribute was increased: if the people were few and the land neglected, it was diminished. Those who knew the villages, the officials and the heads of the people, came together and examined the state of cultivation; then if they decided on an increase they allotted this between the districts. They met the village headmen and divided it according to the capacity of the villages and the extent of their fields. Then the inhabitants of each separate district assembled with their quotas, and they added together their quotas plus the kharaaj of every district, as well as the sum of their cultivated lands. Then from this sum total they subtracted the faddans (the Egyptian acre) for their churches, their baths, their ships and boats. Then they subtracted enough to meet the entertainment of Muslims and the visits of the governor. Next they estimated the number of workmen and hirelings in each village and gave them shares according to their ability. If there were

1. Balasthuri, I, 338 and 339.

2. Butler, Alfred J., The Arab Conquest of Egypt. Oxford, 1902, 326.

any fugitives (from other places), they were given shares equal to their ability. A share was seldom given except to younger, married men. Then they took what was left of the tribute and divided it among themselves in proportion to the size of their holdings. Then a rearrangement was made for those who were ready to cultivate according to their capacity. If a man could not cultivate his land and pleaded inability, they gave what he could not work to those who could, and he who was able to do more than his share supplied the deficiencies of the weak. If there was a dispute, division was made according to their number. Amr¹ took from the tributaries the appointed sum, neither more nor less. He considered the case of those who surrendered on condition of paying tribute though no sum had been fixed; if needful he fixed it low but if they were rich, he made it higher.²

This account, which Becker regards as trustworthy³, gives us a very instructive picture of how the kharaaj lands of Egypt were taxed. In the first place, it is clear from Maqrizi that the land was not owned by individuals but was regarded as the common property of the taxation district or village to which it belonged. This is what one would expect from the nature of the kharaaj lands. At regular intervals, when the quotas were to be determined there would be

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1. The text reads *Amr* and is so translated by Tritton and Becker. From the context, it seems clear that *Amr* عمرو not *Amr* امر gives a better reading.
 2. There is an English translation of this passage in A.S. Tritton, The Caliphs and their Non-Muslim Subjects, 211-212; a German translation in C. H. Becker, Beitrag zur Geschichte Arabiens unter den Islam, II, 90-91; a French translation in Al Maqrizi: Kitab al-Muqaddim, Description Topographique et Historique de l'Égypte. Tr. G. Bouriant, Mémoires de la Mission Archéologique Française du Caire, Paris, 1855, VII, 220. I have followed Tritton, with some modifications based on the other translations and the Arabic text of al Maqrizi, Kitab al-Muqaddim 2v. Bulaq, 1854, I, 76.
 3. Becker, Beitrag, II, 92.

a meeting of all the interested parties in each locality. Certain local expenses were first considered: these were the upkeep of religious establishments, of the village ferries on the Nile, of public baths¹, and the entertainment of Muslims and the governor on official visits. To defray these, the necessary fiddans of land were set aside. The rest of the land was then allotted in proportion to the ability of the inhabitants to cultivate it. The arrangement seems to have been eminently fair and just, for the tax was reassessed, raised or lowered according to the condition and yield of the soil.

Such is the account from Arab sources of the settlement of Egypt at the time of the conquest. We now turn to the Aphrodite Papyri for information about the administration of Egypt as it existed sixty years later (698-722).

The entire province was ruled by the governor whose residence was Iustat. Here was his palace and the central bureau of administration at the head of which were a few Arab officials who exercised a supervisory control. The chief of these was the Sahib al Kharaaj or Secretary of the Treasury. The directors of the different secretariats of correspondence and revenue were natives, as were all the clerks, - the only minor positions filled by Arabs being

1. Tristram translates carts, not baths. The text reads حماياتهم which Becker has amended justly to حماياتهم. Cf. Becker, Revue footnote, 90.

those of post messengers¹.

There were two main divisions of the country: the eparchies of Upper and Lower Egypt which were in turn cut up into smaller groups of pagarchies, each under its own governor. These pagarchies were the real units of administration. Each pagarch kept a register of the population, of the land, classified in the greatest minuteness as to area and yield, and of the number of vines and palms. In addition to the land survey, the capitation tax on each man, as well as the special imposts on craftsmen, apprentices, merchants, and tradesmen, with full particulars of their professions were entered in the books.

At regular intervals these registers were sent to Fustat and the assessing was done there in the following manner:

1. The treasury officials calculated how much was wanted from each pagarchy.
2. The governor wrote to each pagarch the amount so calculated.
3. The assessors then determined how the quota should be made up and how divided between land and poll tax, who should pay, and how much.

Besides these taxes, from time to time, villages might be required to furnish specified amounts of food stuffs

1. Bell, H. I., The Aphrodite Papyri: Greek Papyri in the British Museum. London, 1910, IV, 25. Cf. Becker, C. H., Historische Studien über das Londoner Aphroditowerk, Islam Studien. Leipzig, 1924, I, 251.

provided either from its own stores or purchased in the open market.¹

When necessary, men were conscripted but received wages for the work they were compelled to perform.²

Each pagarch maintained his own representative in Al Fustat through whom his business with the bureaus was conducted.³ Egypt was thus governed by a highly centralized organization, the whole system being one vast bureaucracy requiring an enormous staff of clerks. Every requisition from the governor to the pagarch no matter how small required a special letter in two copies, one in Arabic, one in Greek. At regular intervals the pagarch went to Fustat to report.

Now the evidence from these papyri makes it perfectly clear that there were two kinds of taxes, a poll tax levied on men only and a land tax levied on all owners irrespective of sex. To equalize matters between artisans holding no land and the peasantry, special trade taxes were imposed on artisans.

That no change in the categories of taxation had taken place between the period of the conquest and that covered by the papyri is certain. The administration had become more highly centralized in Fustat. This phase is naturally not mentioned by Maqrizi, who is describing what took place in

1. Bell, H.I., *op. cit.*, p.XXVII

2. *Ibid.*, p.XXXI

3. *Ibid.*, p.XXIV

each pagarchy. However, in the Papyri we have a remarkable confirmation of Maqrizi's accuracy. Only one important change appeared in the method, the principles of which remained the same. Formerly the quotas of each man were determined on the spot, whereas later they were decided by the central diwans in Fustat on the basis of the governor's census and survey.

The weakness of the Byzantine system was an excessive subdivision of the province into units which enjoyed virtually complete local autonomy. Large domains under the control of local nobles and many villages enjoyed the privilege of autopraxis: that is, they were independent of the control of the Byzantine pagarchs and higher officials, and their connection with the state was limited to the one obligation of paying taxes, which they collected themselves, directly to the treasurer of the eparchy, instead of being subject to the interference of the government's tax officers.¹ In place of this decentralization of loosely connected units, the Arabs abolished the autopraxis domains of the nobles, churches, and villages, and in place reestablished the pagarchy as the real unit of government, but instead of preserving the pagarch as a relatively independent officer whose function was to collect the taxes and preserve order within his territory, the Arabs made him completely dependent on the central bureaus and administration in Fustat.

1. Bell, H.I., The Administration of Egypt under the Umayyad Khalifs. Byzantinische Zeitschrift, 1928, XXVIII, 279.

He did not have the authority to direct the repartition of the quotas among the smaller villages or on the individual land holders of his pagarchy.¹

It will thus be seen that although the Arabs took over the old Byzantine system, they at least made notable improvements in it. The most striking similarity is, of course, that records were still kept in Greek and that the great burden of official detail in administration rested on the shoulders of non-Arab Christians.

But while many of the old duces still held their positions, their influence was greatly weakened and they lost almost completely their independence. The reorganization of the bureaus, the passion for exactness in records, the centralization of the government are improvements which resulted not only in more revenue and a more securely governed country from the Arab point of view, but also in an increased prosperity and amelioration of the condition of the subject peoples.

Finally, we have to deal with the question of the kharaaj and the jizya. "It is clear," says Bell², "that the taxes are those of Byzantine times and are entirely distinct from the Arab jizyah and kharaaj and the methods of assessment and collection were also, in essentials, the same as under the Byzantine Empire. The principles of the Arab jurists do not apply to them."

1. Bell, H.I., op. cit., The Administration of Egypt, XXVIII, 280.

2. Bell, H.I., Aphrodito Papyri, p.XXVI.

It is impossible to accept this view. As we have seen, the Arabs followed three different practices.

1. The former royal domains of Misra and the nobles and the land that had become deserted were constituted as fay and leased to tenants who paid kharaj on the land and jizyah on their persons.

2. Cities and their surrounding lands taken in battle paid kharaj on the lands and the people paid jizya.

3. Cities and lands that capitulated by treaty agreed to pay a lump sum that was calculated in most cases on the basis of the number of adult males capable of paying a poll tax plus the number of productive jaribs of land. The chief men of these cities were made responsible for raising this sum yearly, but it was within their discretion to re-appportion the tax levied on individuals and on land, provided always the agreed-on sum was collected. The Muslim jurists have discussed in great detail the law and the principles applying to each of these three categories.

In Egypt before the Arab conquest, the country was theoretically the domain of the emperor. But there were also municipalities, their adjacent private estates owned by the nobles, and church lands. Thus the country was divided roughly into metropolitan domain and royal domain, much of the former being in the possession of the Copts. The royal domain which fell into the hands of the Arabs corresponds to the first category mentioned above and was treated either as kharaj land according to the system of

Umar in the Sawad of Iraq, or else were given as qatā' or fiefs to deserving Muslims who paid zakat, and the land was known as 'ushr land, and the term 'ushr through use came to be extended so that it covered not only that part of the state domain transferred as fiefs to Arab hands, but all the state domain as well. The metropolitan land, which was largely in the possession of the Copts likewise was established as kharaj land because it was taken by conquest [category 2] and remained so unless it passed into the hands of Arabs by purchase.

Moreover, there was also a poll tax paid by every non-Muslim. The Arab historians and the evidence of the Papyri prove this, and no one denies it. The principles of the Arab jurists do apply, for in no way are the regulations of Egypt different from those of other parts of the empire.

Bell, of course, is not to be blamed, for he confesses that ignorance of Arabic forced him to rely on Becker, who in turn as a blind disciple of Wollhausen had to demonstrate that Wollhausen's thesis of there being no distinction between kharaj and jizya applied to Egypt.

Now Becker's argument is as follows: The conquerors of Egypt had business, not with the country, but with the people. The people paid, not the land.¹ Thus there was really only one tax, a jizya, which should not be considered as a capita-tion tax, but as a tribute paid by individuals. Yet this jizya was composed of apparently two categories, a tax on

the individual, and a tax on land. The former, of course, was a poll tax. To call the latter a *kharaḥ* would be to give the case away, and so Becker coined a new term - the land tax was "kopfsteuerartig". The land tax was really a sort of poll tax because it was collected from individuals as a sum of money. Thus there was really only one tax.¹

Could anything be more absurd? All tax collectors, everywhere, at any time, deal with the people, not with the land. But is this to say that there is no tax on land? The arguments applied by Becker to Egypt are valid for every part of the empire. The one characteristic of Arab taxation, however derived, was the fact that what the Arabs wanted was solid cash, not produce, and only in special circumstances did they collect agricultural produce in lieu of money. In all fairness to Bell, we must point out that he subsequently modified his position.²

Before discussing the changes made in the administration of the revenue under the Umayyads we wish to state here the conclusion of all the Arab authorities of how the status of the *Ahl Dīnī* was altered by embracing Islam during the early period of the caliphate. This will be dealt with in detail later; the general agreement is as follows:³

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1. Becker, C.H., *op. cit.*, *Beiträge*, II, 86.
 2. Cf. Bell, H.I., *op. cit.*, *Byzantinische Zeitschrift*, 1928, XXVIII, 282.
 3. Abu Yusuf, *op. cit.*, 95, 132; Van Berchem, M., *op. cit.*, 36; Baladhuri, *op. cit.*, I, 113, and II, 237; Agnides, Nicolas P., *Muhammedan Theories of Finance*. Columbia Studies in History, 1916, LXX, 368, 374, 403, 406.

If a holder of kharaj land became converted to Islam, he was freed of the jizya, or capitation tax. But if he stayed on his land, he still had to pay the kharaj, for the property was not legally his but belonged to the Muslim community. He might, however, emigrate to the city; in that case, the land reverted to the community. Wellhausen, Becker, and their followers have obscured the issue by asserting that conversion to Islam freed in the old days the convert of all tribute - both kharaj and jizya - while roundly condemning the "false" accounts of the legalists who assert that conversion merely freed from poll tax. Now a convert was freed of all tribute only if he deserted his land, and in this particular sense Wellhausen is correct. The fact was that new converts left their land almost as a matter of course and emigrated to the cities. Obviously they could not be held for taxes on soil they were not cultivating, and so by this emigration they became free both of the capitation and of the kharaj. But that did not mean that the land itself was freed of the kharaj by the conversion of the former cultivators though this is what Wellhausen and Becker would have us imply. On the contrary, it reverted to the community of the tax district in which it lay, and for the community became an additional burden, for the tax was still assessed on it, and if a man or men could not be found to cultivate it, then the burden on those who had not been converted became just so much greater. On the other hand,

if a piece of kharaj land was acquired through purchase or fief with the authorization of the caliph, it might, if he so directed, pass from kharaj land to tithe land since the new owner was a Muslim. Thus conversion of a holder of kharaj land did not alienate it, but purchase or granting of it as fief did, if the caliph or his governor so authorized, for it will be remembered that the caliph claimed from the Prophet the dispensing power in such matters and could always legally make the purchaser pay kharaj.

From the death of Uthman to the accession of Abdul Malik 65 A. H. (685), we have relatively little information about financial affairs. Muawia had been occupied with consolidating the dynasty against the claims of Aly and his sons; with his death, Yazid had to deal with the problem of Ibn Zubeir in the Hejaz and the pretender Hussein. When Yazid died, Ibn Zubeir seemed about to triumph; at the last moment the tribe of Kalb established Marwan on the throne, but his brief reign of eleven months did not settle the disorder, and Abdul Malik was at once confronted with a number of very serious problems, chief of which was the revolt of Mukhtar, occupying the years 686-7, the rebellion of Amr ibn Said in 689, the campaign in Iraq against Musab in 691, and the final campaign against Ibn Zubeir and the siege of Mecca in 692. In order to preserve the Syrian frontier from attack, while he dealt with the

internal rebellions of the empire, Abdul Malik had had to sign a truce with the Byzantines who agreed to keep the peace in return for which he undertook to pay a weekly tribute.

Al Hajjaj ibn Yusuf was sent to Iraq in 693, and about this time Abdul Malik undertook a number of measures of the first importance. The expenses of his campaigns, the fact that he was deriving little income from those regions in revolt and the heavy sums he had to pay in tribute to the Byzantine Emperor must have embarrassed the treasury. He dealt with the matter characteristically. The following is the account of Dionysius Telmaharensis:

In the year 1003 (691-92) Abdul Malik made the *tidil* [that is to say, he taxed the Syrians]. He published a severe edict ordering each man to go to his own country, to his village of origin, to inscribe there on registers his name, that of his father, his vineyards, olive trees, goods, children, and all he possessed. Such was the origin of the tribute of capitation and of all the evils that spread over the Christians. Up until then the kings took tribute from land, but not from men. Since then the children of Hagar commenced to impose Egyptian servitude on the sons of Aram. This was the first census made by the Arabs.¹

This is a very remarkable statement, and its accuracy has been challenged by Chabot² and Duval³. That this was the first census made by the Arabs is directly refuted

1. Dionysius Telmaharensis. Chabot, Jean B.: Chronique de Penys de Tell Mahré. 4th pt. Paris, 1895, p.10.

2. Ibid., 10.

3. Duval, Rubins, Historie Politique, Religieuse, et Littéraire d'Égypte jusqu'à la première Croisade, Paris, 1892, 228.

by Theophanes who says of Umar I -

In this year (Umar) ordered all the territories and land subdued by him to be measured and described, not only according to men, but also a census of fruit trees and plants.¹

Codrenus is in accord. "Umar ordered a census made of all his regions, of men and beasts."² Chabot is wrong when he says, following Duval³ that Theophanes and Codrenus testify to the fact that Umar established the capitation tax; they did not say this, but merely that he took a census and surveyed the land. Bar Hebraeus, however, is perfectly definite on the subject. Umar I, he asserts, originated the capitation tax.⁴

Michael, the Syrian, confirms the story in part. In 1000, [1003 according to Dionysius], he says there was a census of foreigners and many were forced to return to their countries.⁵ This would seem to confirm the account of Dionysius only in respect to a census having been made, but nothing is said of the establishing of the capitation for the first time. Duval has explained the statement by saying that this was not the first census and capitation, but a reorganization undertaken by Abdul Malik. Some light is thrown by a statement of Abu Yusuf. Abdul Malik sent

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1. Theophanes, *Chronographia*, Johannes Classens ed. *Corpus Scriptorum Historiae Byzantinae*. Vol. 33. Bonn, 1839, p. 552.
 2. Codrenus, *Chronographia*, Immanuel Bekker, ed. *Corp. Script. Hist. Byz.* Vol. 34. Bonn, 1839, p. 752.
 3. Duval. *Histoire*. p. 229.
 4. Bar Hebraeus, *The Chronography of Gregory Abdul Farah*. tr. from the *Syriac* by E. A. ...udge. London, 1932. p. 96.
 5. Michael the Syrian, *Chronique*. J. B. Chabot, tr. Vol. 2. Fasc. 3, Paris, 1904, p. 473.

Dahhak ibn Abdur Rahman to the Jazira. He judged the tax was insufficient and took a census. He then calculated the annual income, deducted from that what had to be spent for food and clothing, took into account holidays and festivals, and thus having decided what a man should pay for the necessities of life he determined that each man could and should pay a poll tax of four dinars. Furthermore, he changed the tax on lands. On every hundred jaribs of land within less than one day's journey from a city, he imposed a tax of one dinar, but land more than a day's journey paid half this. And, according to Abu Yusuf, this was also done in Syria.¹

There is no question that the accounts of Dionysius and of Abu Yusuf refer to the same event. It is obvious what Dionysius meant when he said, "Up until then the kings took tribute from land, but not from men." Before this new tax was imposed every man had to provide two mudds of wheat, two qists of oil, and two qists of vinegar paid in kind in addition to a poll tax.² But when Abdul Malik ended the paying in kind, quadrupled the poll tax, and put a money tax on land, it is perfectly obvious that this was an innovation in the eyes of the people, "that the people, not the land" paid.

Abdul Malik's governor of Egypt was his brother Abdul Aziz. At approximately the very same time that the new

1. Abu Yusuf, op. cit., 64-5.

2. Baladhuri, op. cit., I, 273; and Abu Yusuf, op. cit., 64.

revenue laws were going into effect in Syria and the Jazira we read in Eutychius that Abdul Aziz took the nobles of the city of Alexandria, divided them into villages and districts, and imposed on each district a definite tax calculated on the wealth of the land in its cultivation, its vineyards, and its yield.¹ Furthermore we read in the Khittat of Maqrizi: "Abdul Aziz commanded the monks to be taxed, and they were, and the jizya was exacted from them, from each monk one dinar. This was the first time that a jizya was taken from the monks."² In another place we read:

The first who took the jizya from the newly converted Ahl Dīmi was Al Hajjaj ibn Yusuf. Thereupon Abdul Malik ibn Marwan wrote to Abdul Aziz ibn Marwan that he should lay the jizya on the new converts. Thereupon Ibn Hufeira remonstrated with him, "God guard you, O Amir, from being the first to introduce this practice into Egypt. Nor truly the Ahl Dīmi bear the burden of the jizya of their monks. How then can we lay it on the new converts?" So he freed them of the jizya.³

In the history of the patriarchs of Severus ibn Muqaffa, we have substantially the same story. Abdul Aziz, the governor, made his eldest son wali and collector of the revenue

مستخرج

. . . and Asbagh laid a poll tax upon them [the monks] of one dinar from each individual Now this tax of the infidel

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1. Eutychius, ed. Pococke, II, 369-70, quoted by Becker, C.H., op. cit., Beltrāge, II, 98.
 2. Maqrizi, op. cit., Khittāt, Bulaq, II, 492 quoted by Becker, C.H., op. cit., Beltrāge, II, 99.
 3. Maqrizi, op. cit., Khittāt, Bulaq, II, 78.

Al Asbagh was the first poll tax (جزية) paid by the monks. After this, Al Asbagh compelled the bishops of the provinces to furnish a sum of 2,000 dinars beside the taxes on their lands. This sum they paid every year.¹ Abdul Malik then replaced Abdul Aziz, his brother, by his son Abdallah. . . . And when he (Abdallah) received from the people the taxes which they were accustomed to pay, he demanded the double amount from them, inquiring a dinar and two thirds from those who were bound to pay one dinar.² The governor also gave orders that no dead man should be buried until they had paid the poll tax for him, and he appointed a man named Muhammad over this business, so that even the indigent, who could not buy bread, were not buried when they died except by his command.³

What can we conclude from this?

1. Under Abdul Malik's governor, Abdul Aziz, there was made in Egypt in the year 74 A. H. (693) a new census of the lands of Alexandria, and probably of all Egypt, in which the productivity of the soil was reestimated. Then new quotas were imposed on each taxation district. Eutychius asserts that Alexandria and its environs were so treated, but that all Egypt was involved seems to follow from a statement of Maqrizi who reports that there were four "installations" of the diwan in Egypt under

- a. Amr ibn Al Asi
- b. Abdul Aziz ibn Marwan

1. Severus ibn Mucaffa, History of the Patriarchs of the Coptic Church of Alexandria, E. Evetts, tr. Patrologia Orientalis, V, 51.
 2. Ibid., 55.
 3. Ibid., 56.

c. Surrab ibn Sharik

d. Fihar ibn Safwan¹

2. A poll tax was levied on monks of one dinar per head. There can be absolutely no question from the context that this was no land tax, but was an individual assessment. It was an innovation, because as we have seen above² Umar I specifically excepted monks from the payment of poll taxes if they took the oath of poverty, because of the principle that the poll tax should not be imposed on those dependent on charity.

3. There were certainly in this period two kinds of taxes; one, a kharaj based on land, and, two, a jizya on the individual. The land tax is described in perfectly explicit terms and is carefully differentiated from the poll tax. The former is characterized as **خراج و ما يامم** "the kharaj on their estates", the latter by **جمل عليهم** "he placed on them a jizya of one **جزية ديناراً واحداً** **على كل نسيئة** dinar on each human being".³

4. Those who became converted to Islam were exempt from the poll tax; Abdul Aziz made an attempt to compel every convert to pay the jizya, but was dissuaded.

5. These acts taken in Egypt are consonant with the circumstance that the payment of tribute to the Greeks and the expenses of putting down the revolts of Mukhtar,

1. Maorizi, op. cit., Khittat, tr. Pouriant, 268

2. See above, p. 13.

3. Severus, op. cit., tr. Evetts, 51

of meeting the throat of Ibn Zubair, and of dealing with disaffection in Iraq and in Syria must have caused a heavy drain on the exchequer, which it was now Abdul Malik's intention to remedy.

Finally, it is highly significant that in Damascus, in the very same year that these new tax levies were introduced in Syria, the Jazira, and Egypt, namely 74 A. H. Abdul Malik introduced the coinage of gold dinars.¹

Is it merely a coincidence that this measure follows the introduction of a new tax scheme in Mesopotamia whereby land is compelled to pay a tax, not in produce as formerly, but in gold dinars? Is it not in fact probable that these tax measures were introduced partly with the object of collecting gold coin for re-coinage in the new Arab dinar?

Meanwhile, events of importance were occurring in Iraq. According to an account of Jahiz in his book upon the mawali quoted in the 'Iqd of Abûrabbih

Ibn Asîth and Abdallah ibn Jarûd had mutinied against Hajjaj and his experiences with the Iraqites were not happy. The most dangerous he had found to be the Basrans, their religious scholars, their warriors and mawali. Because they were the most numerous and the most powerful, he wished to abolish their claim to a pension and to distribute them so that they should no longer hold close together and form a community. So he said to the mawali, "Ye are barbarians and strangers; ye belong to your towns and

1. Wellhausen suggests this coinage may have been earlier than 74 A. H., p. 213. Of the four dinars of this period known to exist, two are in the Bibliothèque Nationale in Paris. The earliest bears the statement that it was struck in 76 A. H.- Henri Lavoix, Catalogue des Monnaies Musulmanes. Paris, 1887, P.XV. There is every reason for accepting Baladthuri's dating.

villages." Then he scattered them and broke off their alliance as he wished, sent them whither he pleased, and had the name of the place where each was sent marked upon his hand.¹

The second account is drawn from Baladthuri:

There were some lands in Al Iurat whose owners accepted Islam when the Muslims entered, and other land which passed from the possession of the original owners into the hands of the Muslims by gift and otherwise, for reasons of state, and so became tithe land while before it had been subject to the Kharaḥ. So Al Hajjaj made it Kharaḥ land again. Later Umar ibn Abdul Aziz turned it back to sadakah land. Then Umar ibn al-Khair made it subject once more to the Kharaḥ. When Hisham ibn Abdul Malik became caliph, he turned part of it back to sadakah and finally Al Wahid made it all sadakah.²

The third account comes from Tabari, who is explaining the cause for the revolt against Yazid ibn Abi Muslim, the governor of Ifrikiya.

He (Yazid) intended to treat them (the Berbers) according to the treatment of al Hajjaj ibn Yusuf to the people of Islam who dwelt in rural districts and those whose origin was from the Sawad, of the Ahl Dimri. In Iraq there had become Muslims those whom Hajjaj had sent back to their villages and rural districts (*ريثيق*) and he placed the jizya on their necks in the manner it used to be taken from them when they were still infidels.³

And finally from Al Maqrizi: "The first who took the jizya from the newly converted Ahl Dimri was al Hajjaj ibn Yusuf."⁴

What do we learn from these accounts? As we have mentioned before, the caliphs beginning with Uthman had used their dispensing powers to grant certain fiefs from

1. *ed. Eulaq*, 1302, II, 93, quoted by Tollhausen, *op. cit.*, in footnote, 244-45.

2. Baladthuri, *op. cit.*, II, 94.

3. Tabari. *Ila series*, III, 1435

4. Maqrizi, *op. cit.*, *Khittat*, *Eulaq.*, II, 77.

the fay of the Muslims, and those who received this grant paid either kharaḥ or ḥaya as the caliph decreed. Some of this land was in the lower Euphrates region (Al Jurat). Moreover, in the same district were territories which had been bought by the members of the Arab aristocracy of Iraq, or obtained by less honorable means, and they, too, paid the tithe, not the kharaḥ. The land so acquired was of course in defiance of Umar's precepts, but it was legally tithe land if the caliph so decreed. There is, however, good reason to believe that much of it was being illegally held as tithe land. How had this come about? From all accounts of the pride and arrogance of the Iraq aristocracy, it is reasonable to suppose that they would rebel most vigorously against paying the kharaḥ on lands which they had acquired, and their refusal to pay had been condoned by the local governors. Under Muawia, Yazid, and Marwan, the government had never been in a position where it would be good politics to insist on strict legality; indeed, it was Muawia's invariable strategy to buy off his bitterest enemies and disarm them by generosity, and he was not the one to antagonize a few influential Arabs in Iraq at a time when his revenue from other sources was ample.

The need for a different policy now became apparent to Abdul Malik and Hajjaj. It was time to abandon political finesse in consideration of the financial difficulties of the state and the recent treasonable activities of the prov-

ince. Conciliation and generosity would indeed have been regarded by the Iraqites as a sign of weakness and stupidity. Consequently Hajjaj reimposed the kharaj on alienated state lands. He was perfectly within his legal rights in so doing with one exception: some of the territory belonged to people who had accepted Islam when the Arabs had arrived. Their lands had not originally paid kharaj, and it was illegal for Hajjaj to change their status.

Once again we have confirmation of the distinction between kharaj and jizya, and in this Hajjaj was proceeding in an arbitrary manner. Tabari makes it perfectly clear that before Hajjaj the Ahl al-Bimani were freed of the burden of jizya on becoming converted. Now Al Hajjaj illegally imposed this burden of poll tax on the new converts. That it was a poll tax, and not a land tax, is proved by the modifying phrase "jizya on their necks."

As we have said, conversion freed a man from the poll tax, but the kharaj land went on paying its revenue. There was only one way to escape this burden and that was by emigration. The result was that large numbers of peasants became Muslims and deserted their lands to flock to the large cities of Iraq, like Kufa and Basra, where they took up different trades, or else existed miserably on what charity was granted them. They of course attached themselves as clients to their fellow Muslim Arab overlords. Those who were intelligent or skilled in some craft or profession

entered into clientship with men of substance and importance, whom they served as scribes, messengers, business agents, estate managers, and the like. But by far the larger number was merged into the great city mob, referred to in contemptuous terms over and over again. Theirs was the miserable fate of the city poor, - like all mobs they were always ready to serve factions and to rally about any Kharijite or Shiite pretender or wealthy Iraqite who had the money to pay them, that being the sine qua non of getting them to adopt lofty principles. Wellhausen is quite right when he says there is no evidence that these people ever paid a poll tax.¹ They felt slighted only because they were not registered in the diwan of the Maqātila and not made participators in the pension.

It appears that this mob freed from taxation was clamoring for participation in the stipends allotted to Muslims. In addition to this threat to public order, there was the circumstance that Muhtar's rebellion had been supported to a large extent by these very people and there was no guarantee that in the future they would not rise again. Furthermore their immigration to the towns had taken large territories of Kharij land from cultivation. Hajjaj attacked the problem with his customary energy and resettled a certain group of them from Basra presumably not on the lands from which they had fled but in an arbitrary manner

1. Wellhausen, J., op. cit., Note to page 282.

in villages and districts which had been depopulated and which Hajjaj wished to restore to their former productivity, and if we may believe the accounts he branded on them the names of the localities to which they were sent. Furthermore, with due contempt for their rights and with scorn for their inferior status, and probably with some doubts about the genuineness of their conversion, Hajjaj reimposed the poll tax on them, which we are told was the first time the government had ever tried to collect the poll tax from believers. These measures were not carried through with sweeping uniformity or completeness. We are told that Hajjaj's orders concerned only a group of Basra, and that they were not thoroughgoing is proved definitely, as we shall show later, by the fact that large elements of this group continued to dwell in the cities of Iraq and to cause trouble from time to time. The whole problem of fugitives from Kharraj land was a vexatious one; we encounter it again and again in Iraq, and in Egypt the instructions of the governor in the Aphrodito Papyri are filled with directions about the apprehension and return of fugitives.¹

1. Bell, H. I., op. cit., Aphrodito Papyri, p. XL. Specified directions were given by the governor of Egypt to settle the fugitive problem. The local governors were ordered to capture the fugitives who were concealed by the inhabitants and send them back. (Ibid., 1343) In another rescript we read that the fugitives were to be fined and given forty lashes and returned, while those who sheltered them and the local officials who connived at the practice or ignored it or by inefficiency were unaware of it, were to be fined severely. (Ibid., 1384)

The reforms inaugurated by Al Hajjaj endured until the time of Umar ibn Abdul Aziz though not with uniformity. Kharaj land still continued to pass into the hands of Muslims by purchase or by coercion and at the same time the poll tax in kharaj districts was collected from people who had nominally become Muslims. Umar II undertook to reform this injustice.

Before examining the important passages, it now becomes necessary to consider the difficulty already frequently mentioned that Tabari particularly, and other authors also, appear to use the terms kharaj and jizya synonymously. The fact is that both terms have a general and a specific meaning, which is usually quite obvious.

Kharaj as a general term means:

1. The sum total of all forms of revenue collected in a province.
2. Simply "tax".

As a specific term, it signifies the revenue produced from land.

Jizya is employed in the East usually with the specific meaning of poll tax, but in Egypt it may have the general meaning of tax, or total revenue. So it is said:

نقول الجزية جزيتان جزية على رؤس
الرجال وجزية على الارض

We say the tax (jizya) is of two kinds, the jizya (capitation)

on the heads of men and the jizya (land tax) on land.¹

We now turn to the reforms of Umar II ibn Abdul Aziz.

In Tabari is written:

Al Jarrāh (the governor of Khorasan) wrote to Umar II: "I have sent a deputation of two men of the Arabs and a man of the mawali of Beni Muzabbah nicknamed Abul Sa'idā, whose real name is Sa'īh ibn Qurayf, and he is sincere in his religion" Then Abul Sa'idā said (after the deputation from Khorasan had come to Umar), "O Commander of the Faithful, twenty thousand of the mawali have fought on raids, yet they have been granted neither stipend nor maintenance, and a like number of the Ahl al-Bayt have become Muslims yet must pay the khiraj (i. e. all the taxes) and our Amir is moved by tribal partisanship and he is rude. He stands in our minbar and says, 'I come to you barefooted and I am a man filled with love of my tribe. By God, one man of my people is more dear to me than one hundred of the other tribes' . . . and he has governed with injustice and tyranny."

Then Umar said, "It is meet that one like you is sent on a deputation." And Umar wrote to Al Jarrāh: "Observe who prays towards your kibra and free him from the jizya."

Then men hastened to Islam and Al Jarrāh was told, "Men are hastening to embrace Islam merely to escape the jizya; therefore examine them to discover whether they be circumcised or not."

Jarrāh wrote this to Umar and Umar replied, "God sent Muhammad as a prophet and not as a circumciser."²

To the governor of Kufa, Abdul Malik, Umar wrote:

As for the people of Kufa, misfortune and evil and tyranny in [disobedience of] the ordinances of God have befallen them Do not let the productive lands carry the burden of the desolate lands, nor the desolate lands bear the burden of the productive lands, but inspect and consider these desolate lands and take from them only what they can provide and

1. Macrizi, op. cit., Khittat, Balaq. I, 77.

2. Tabari, 1353-1354.

recultivate them that they may again become productive and do not exact from the productive land anything beyond the tax of the kharaj and collect this with mercy and kindness to the people of the soil and do not take of the kharaj except the weight of seven.¹ Let there not be any customs and dues. Impose no tax on those who mint coins nor on the gifts of the festival of Nairuz or on other festivals, nor on the price of paper, nor a tax on messengers, or on the rent of houses; take not the dirhems of a dowry and do not take the kharaj (tax) from the people of the land who become Muslims.²

In Al Maqrizi we read:

Umar ibn Abdul Aziz said, "Whoever embraces Islam saves by his conversion his soul and his wealth. As to the land, that is part of that which God has given to the Muslims. Whoever has made a treaty providing for tribute will pay it and . . . all those who embrace Islam will see their lands and their homes pass into other hands."³

Umar II was of the opinion that Egypt had been conquered by force and that the kharaj was imposed on the villages. If one of the inhabitants died, his tax was imposed on the others and the death did not imply a diminution of the tax. Umar excepted from jizya (capitation) those who had embraced Islam, but before him this was collected. The first who put a jizya on those who had embraced Islam was Al Hajjaj.⁴

Umar wrote to Hayyan ibn Shuraih: "Free of the jizya those who have embraced Islam." Hayyan replied: "The conversions to Islam have resulted in such a loss of taxes that I have had to borrow 20,000 dirars to pay the salaries of the employees of the diwan." Umar replied: "God sent Muhammad as a guide not as a tax collector."⁵

1. The mithkal was the weight of the legal dinar, and the weight of the legal dirhem to that of the mithkal was 7/10. The dirhem weighed 2.97 grams; the dinar 4.25 grams. Thus $\frac{2.97}{4.25} = \frac{7}{10}$

Umar ordered the kharaj to be collected in the legal dirhem, not in heavier dirhems.

2. Tabari, p. 1366-7.

3. Maqrizi, *op. cit.*, Bouriant tr., 221.

4. *Ibid.*, 222.

5. *Ibid.*, 223. Also Baladhuri, *op. cit.*, I, 342.

Severus ibn Muqaffa reports:

Yet this Umar ibn Abdul Aziz, though he did much good before men, acted ill before God. He commanded that there should be no taxes upon the property of the church and the bishops, and he began to set the churches and bishops free from the impost on land . . . and Umar commanded that the poll tax should be taken from all men who would not become Muslims.¹

An account of Al Yaqubi is as follows:

And news reached Umar about Al Jarran which he hated: namely that he was collecting the jizya from those who had embraced Islam and that he was leading the rawaf in raids without giving them stipends and that he was showing tribal partisanship and he wrote to Al Jarran: "Come, and leave behind as your successor Abdur Rahman ibn Muhammad Al Chamady." And he did.²

Michael, the Syrian, says:

Umar ordered that all Christians who became Muslims would pay no capitation and several apostasized.³

There is a brief account in Theophanes:

Umar proceeded with severity against the Christians and those who would renounce Christ and become Muslims were immune from taxes. [ατελευ]⁴

Finally, we have an important statement of Ibn Asakir, discussed by Von Kremer⁵ and translated by Wellhausen which

1. Severus, *op. cit.*, tr. Evetts, 71-72.

2. Yaqubi, *Tarikh of Ibn Wadhuh* known as al Yaqubi. M. Th. Houtsma, ed. 2v. Leiden, 1983, II, 362.

3. Chabot, J.E., *op. cit.*, *Michael the Syrian*, II, fasc. III, 489.

4. Theophanes, *op. cit.*, I, 610. Theophanes, Severus ibn Muqaffa, Michael the Syrian and Bar Hebraeus all dwelt on Umar's harsh treatment of the Christians. In Egypt his severity practically amounted to an order to the people to become Muslims (Severus-Evetts, 71-72). Bar Hebraeus attributes his conduct to revenge for the disaster of Maslamah before Constantinople (Budge, 108-9). From the Christian sources it would seem that the cause for apostasy at the time may as well be explained by the vigorous treatment of the Christians or by the desire of escaping taxation.

5. Von Kremer, A. *The Orient*, 208-212.

we quote in part:

Umar I and the eminent companions of the Prophet agreed to leave the vanquished their lands on condition that they tilled them and paid the kharaj on them to the Muslims. If afterwards one of them embraced Islam, then the kharaj (to be translated as the general tax, but clearly meaning capitation) was removed from his head but his land and house were divided among the village community so that they paid the kharaj on them, while what he possessed in money, servants, and cattle was left to him They were of the opinion that he, as a Muslim had no claim to his land in preference to the village community because the land as a whole had passed to the Muslims as a joint possession Umar held that no Muslim by using coercion right buy a piece of land from these protected persons . . . and disapproved of the Muslims purchasing freely offered lands for the reason that the owners had no real property right to them and also because they wished to reserve the land as a collective possession set aside for the Muslim warriors of the future. . . . In spite of this, many Muslims had long had private estates Umar II did not, indeed, go back upon what had happened up until the year 100, but decreed that there should be no jizya upon the kharaj land which had up until then passed into the hands of the Muslims by purchase, but only the tithe.¹

What, then were Umar's reforms?

1. He decreed that conversion to Islam freed men of the capitation tax. This right had been infringed by Hajjaj and his successors. Umar restored the old practice.

2. He legalized the previous purchases or grants of kharaj land as fiefs to Muslims by decreeing that this land so acquired might remain in the hands of the owners

1. Wellhausen, op. cit., 287-290.

and pay the tithe; therefore, he returned to tithe land certain pieces on which Al Hajjaj had imposed the khiraj.¹

3. Umar II decreed, reestablishing the old principle of Umar I, that from the year 100 khiraj land was the inalienable fay of the Muslims and could not become tithe land by purchase, fief, or conversion of the owner.

The decree of Umar II recorded by Ibn Asakir has occasioned Wellhausen no little difficulty, for he wishes to accept it as genuine for the purposes of refuting Fozy, von Kremer, and Muller for their scorn of Umar II, while at the same time, to accept the account of Ibn Asakir as completely genuine, means rejecting the theory that the regulations attributed to Umar I were fictions of the jurists. He escapes in the following manner.

Ibn Asakir is an author of the 6th century of the Hijra who suffers detraction from the view that had then been long prevalent; namely, that the first Umar and the companions, after Muhammad's death the authoritative regulators of the conditions newly created by the conquest, fixed from the beginning in all questions the standard for the future, and that the disposal of domain lands and the alienation of tribute paying lands were misusages which were in direct opposition to the standard and only arose since the time of the defection which followed with Uthman and the Umayyads. But so far as his accounts are not influenced by this view, we have no reason to doubt that he got them from the old sources.²

Thus with no more reason than that, Wellhausen rejects what is inconvenient and accepts what he wishes for proof.

1. See above, p.44-45.

2. Wellhausen, op. cit., 290-291.

As a matter of fact, Wellhausen is quite correct in pointing out that Umar II is not to be regarded as the man who wrecked the treasury, for like Hajjaj he was engaged in preventing the alienation of state land. He did, however, enormously increase the burden of the state obligations. A number of Transoxian kings who became converted to Islam during his reign needed to pay no tribute and received a pension. The oasis of Iadak near Medina Umar considered to be the former private property of Muhammad, and restored it to the Allids, and in Khorasan he ordered that any surplus of revenue was to be spent there and not forwarded to him. He returned to the custom of pensioning the children and family of the Mughatila and of freeing converts from the jizya. Most of these measures were annulled by his successor.

But Wellhausen is wrong and von Kremer right in the matter of Umar's returning to the custom of his namesake. In the theory that kharaj land was inviolate and could not be alienated, in the order that new converts were freed of the jizya, in the act of restoration of pensions to the families of the fighters, and in all the broad lines of policy, Umar ibn Abdul Aziz was returning to those customs of the early caliphate which practical considerations had caused the Umayyads to abandon.

Two more incidents will close this discussion of taxation.

In the year 110 Al Ashras, the governor of Khorasan, sent to his officials saying:

Find me a man who is pious and virtuous and send him to Transoxania to surron people to embrace Islam. They recommended Abul Saïda Salih ibn Jarif, a mawli of Beni Dhabba Abul Saïda said: "I shall go on the condition that there shall not be exacted from him who becomes a Muslim the jizya since only the Kharaj of Khorasan is on the heads of men." Al Ashras said, "Yes" and he went to Samarcand and its governor was Al Hasan ibn Abi-l-Amarrata Al Kindy, controlling both the Kharaj and the military forces, and Abul Saïda called the people of Samarcand and its surrounding territories to Islam on condition that they would be freed of the jizya, and men hastened to respond, and Churik wrote to Ashras that the Kharaj [general tax] had become bankrupt and Ashras wrote to Ibn Abi-l-Amarrata, "In the Kharaj [general tax] is the strength of the Muslims and I have learned that the people of Toghhd and their likes have not

1. This passage "since only the Kharaj of Khorasan is on the heads of men" is extremely perplexing, and has been avoided by all commentators. Abul Saïda said, "I shall go on the condition that there shall not be exacted from him who becomes a Muslim the jizya

فانما خراج خراسان على رؤوس الرجال

One would ordinarily translate انما by "for", "but", "that". Now انما frequently means "only" but in that case usually modifies the last word of the phrase it introduces. Furthermore, the expression "Kharaj on the heads of men" according to Wellhausen and de Coeje is the expression used when Kharaj is to signify capitation tax. Consequently following Wellhausen one would

for
have to translate this passage "but the Kharaj [capita-
that

tion tax] of Khorasan is on the heads of men". Such a translation is meaningless, for what sense can come from the statement "I demand that the new converts of Transoxania be freed of the Jizya for the capitation tax of Khorasan is imposed on men"? If, however, we translate Kharaj by land tax, انما by "only", and regard the phrase "on the heads of men" as meaning simply "on men" then the passage at once makes sense and means: "I demand that the new converts of Transoxania be freed of the capitation tax as in Khorasan, where the custom prevails that only the Kharaj, or land tax, is paid by Muslims".

become Muslims out of sincere conviction, but that they have entered into it only to escape the jizya. Discover, therefore, who is circumcised and performs the required acts of devotion and who is sincere in Islam and can read a verse of the Koran and free him from this tax" And Abu Saïda continued to prevent them from taking the jizya from those who had become Muslims Then dihqans of Bukhara came to Ashras and they said: "From whom do you collect the kharaj (tax), for all the people are becoming Arabs?" Then Ashras wrote to his officials: "Take the kharaj from those whom you used to take it from and restore the jizya on those who have become Muslims." Then 7,000 people of Soghd revolted Then Ashras associated with Hani ibn Hani, Sulaiman ibn Abi as Sara, mawla of Dami 'Uwāfah as collectors of the kharaj and Hani and the officials insisted on collecting the kharaj and they mistreated the Persians and al Majashshir put 'Amirah ibn Saïd in charge of the dihqans and they were forced to stand and their clothes were torn from them and their girdles were put about their necks and they took the jizya from those who had become Muslims who were weak.¹

This episode has been the subject of wide controversy. Khorasan and Transoxania, as we pointed out above², did not fall into the category of kharaj land, but, at the time of the conquest, the different cities settled for lump sums, the collection of which was left in the hands of the dihqans who doubtless following the old system established by Choaroes I raised their revenue by a poll tax, both paid in money by the individual in proportions determined by the dihqans. In this passage quoted above we have the confusing juxtaposition of kharaj and jizya which led Wellhausen to affirm that the terms were always

1. Tabari, op. cit., 1507-1510
2. See above, p. 23-24

synonymous and meant tribute. However, when Wellhausen considers the reforms of Masr ibn Sayyar, he finds it necessary to remark that this tribute was composed of several categories. It was not a single capitation tax, but was raised by taxes of various sorts; the taxes of the landed proprietors as well as those of the colonists went to swell it, - "even before Masr such Arabs as had acquired landed property had to pay a tax upon it and that to the Persian magistrate, which they certainly did not do willingly."¹

This being the case, is it not possible that this passage may be given a different interpretation? Is it reasonable to assume that Tabari used the terms *kharaaj* and *jizya* in a closely connected passage completely without distinction, or did he intend the two terms to convey different meanings? The latter seems to us more reasonable. If we accept this proposition it means making the assertion that what Ashras originally agreed to permit Abu Saïda to promise was a remission of the poll tax, but not of the land tax. There are several reasons for giving serious consideration to this.

1. By analogy with the old law of Islam, and the practice in all other parts of the empire, conversion did release a man from the capitation tax, without affecting the status of land.

2. Why should Ashras have given consent to a measure if he knew that by its fulfillment the state would be deprived

1. Wellhausen, op. cit., note 480.

of all tribute, and in this act confer a privilege which was far greater than that enjoyed by converts in other parts of the empire?

3. We know the revenue of Transoxania and Khorasan was derived from different categories of taxation, for many of the people were traders and merchants and artisans engaged in manufacturing enterprises who lived in the cities and owned no land whatever, but who contributed their share of the tribute from the poll tax and the special taxes levied on merchants and artisans, while there was an equally important land owning class whose income originated from the sale of agricultural products. Under the Sassanian system the taxes were collected by the *Vāstryōshānsātar*, the chief of farmers, for agriculture was the principal source of revenue.¹ The country produced gold, silver, copper, wool cloth, and rugs, textiles being the principal industry, and the chief article of transit commerce was silk. All these were sources of revenue.² Finally there was the general capitation tax on all between the ages of twenty and fifty, excepting of course the nobles, soldiers, priests, and those in the service of the king, graded according to a man's income.³

This system we know to have been continued by the Arabs. Now in the old Sassanian system the bulk of the

1. Christensen, A., *Iran sous les Sassanides*, 112.
 2. *Ibid.*, 112-121.
 3. *Ibid.*, 361.

revenue was provided by the tax on agriculture, on trade, and on artisans; the general capitation tax produced a lesser amount. Under these circumstances is it improbable to believe that Ashras would feel it a mistake to forego the lesser source of income in order to convert people to Islam?

4. It has been argued that freeing men of a poll tax would not lift a sufficient burden from them to induce them to become converts to Islam. To this we may reply that the poll tax throughout the empire ranged in gold or silver from five to twenty Roosevelt dollars. While no one as yet has undertaken to make a study of the relative purchasing power of a given amount of gold or silver, all are agreed it was very much greater than at the present time. There is no reason to believe that the condition of the average peasant or city worker in those days was materially much better than today, and if a tax of fifteen dollars per year on the average fellahin today is staggering, it would certainly have been so in those days. Finally, the desire of attaining a social status comparable to that of the Arabs without the stigma of capitation was always a powerful motive. In this respect we quote a passage from Baladthuri.

To the nobility of Isbahan belonged various strongholds in Jafrabad in the district of Ath Thaimarah-l-Kuhra in Bihjāwarsān and in the fort of Mārabin. When Jai was reduced, these nobles offered homage, agreeing to pay the kharaj and, because they dis-

dained to pay poll-tax, they became Muslims.¹

Now using kharaj as the general term for tax and jizya in the specialized sense of poll tax, let us reexamine this passage. Abul Saïda offered to convert men on condition that they be freed of the poll tax (jizya). Ashras agreed. Abul Saïda called the people of Samarcand to Islam on condition that they would be freed of the poll tax (jizya) and men hastened to respond. Then Churak wrote to Ashras that the general revenue (kharaj) was becoming bankrupt (because the revenue of the poll tax had been cut off). Ashras wrote to his governor that the maintenance of the general revenue (kharaj) was vital for the interests of the state and that men were being converted only to escape the poll tax (jizya). He instructed him to enquire closely into the new converts and to free from his tax (kharaj - i.e.

(خراج على رواس) only those whose conversion was sincere. But Abu Saïda attempted to prevent the collection of the poll tax (jizya) from those who had become Muslims. Then dihqans of Bukhara protested that the people were becoming Arabs. Therefore Ashras wrote: "Take the taxes (kharaj) as usual and restore the capitation tax on those who have become Muslims." The officials then went to work, humiliating the dihqans and compelling them to render in full the taxes (kharaj) they owed, and they collected again the poll tax (jizya) from the Muslims who were weak (and

1. Baladthuri, op. cit., I, 487-8.

by inference did not dare to try to collect it from the converts of importance).

We contend that this interpretation of a difficult passage merits serious consideration.

The final point in discussion is this: it will be noticed that the first people to object to Abul Saïda's scheme were not the Arabs, but the native prince of Samarcand, Ghurak, and the dihqans of Bukhara. What was their objection? According to Van Vloten, the dihqans as tax collectors doubtless got their rake-off from the surplus and thus found the post very lucrative.¹ "It was as much to the interest of the ruling lord as to that of the Arabs to keep the people paying."²

Wellhausen's explanation one can anticipate. "The fact was, they were responsible for the tribute and could with difficulty produce the fixed amount of the prescribed sums if so many who were hitherto liable for tribute got clear of paying their share."³

Barthold is not in complete agreement with Van Vloten. He admits the financial reasons, but at the same time points out that the spread of Islam was not desired by the indigenous chiefs or princes. Their whole authority rested on the old tradition of the inhabitants, who, if they became

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1. Van Vloten, G., Recherches sur la Domination Arabe, le Chitisme et les Crovances Messianiques sous le Khalifat des Omayyades. Amsterdam, 1894, 22.
 2. Ibid., 24.
 3. Wellhausen, op. cit., 457.

"Arabs" would by this act of conversion destroy the position of the dihqans so that their relation to the Arab Amir would lose all significance.¹

Gibb thinks otherwise. According to him, Ashras' principal aim was to secure the allegiance of the Saghdians, and he hit on Islam as a means. Opposed to him was Qurak who had no desire to maintain himself on good terms with the Arab governor, so he could go on farming the taxes as Van Vloten thinks, or so he would not be embarrassed financially as Wellhausen argues, but his great object was to recover his independence, and if once the people became Arabs then all hope of success was lost.²

Gabrieli, the last to consider the matter, has adopted the views of Barthold and Wellhausen: an Islamization of the country would have wiped out the influence of the native chiefs, who also, being responsible to the Arabs for the full sum of the tribute, would have been compelled in all probability to make up out of their own pockets the deficits resulting from conversion.³ With this explanation we concur.

Finally we come to the last reform of Nasr ibn Sayyar, advanced in a speech made at Balkh in 121 (738):

1. Barthold, W. Die alt Türkischen Inschriften und die Arabischen Quellen. In W. Radloff. Die alt Türkischen Inschriften der Mongolei. Part II. St. Petersburg, 1899. P. 25.
2. Gibb, H.A.R., The Arab Conquest in Central Asia. London, 1923, 69.
3. Gabrieli, op. cit., Il Califfato di Nishan. Alexandria, 1935, 44.

Bahrāsīs used to favor the Magians; he relieved them of their burdens and imposed them on the Muslims. Ishbadad ibn Jurijar (Ishudad, son of Gregory) in like manner favored the Christians, and Aqiba the Jews. I shall favor the Muslims, relieve them of their burdens and impose them on the Mushrikin, with the exception that the kharaj must be paid fully in accordance with the written contract. Now I appoint over you [as tax collector] Mansur ibn Ali al Kharāqā and I order him to act justly to you [if he learns] that a Muslim used to pay the jizya on his head or he is burdened, let him report this to Mansur who will transfer the burden from the Muslim to the Mushrikin.

And hardly had the week passed when 30,000 Muslims came to him who had the jizya on their heads and 30,000 men of the Mushrikin had been relieved of their jizya, and he reimposed the jizya upon the Mushrikin and freed the Muslims of it. Then he reclassified the kharaj until he put it in order. Then he established the tax upon which the agreement was executed. And there was taken from Merv apart from the kharaj 100,000 dirhams in the days of Beni Umayya (i.e. the jizya was 100,000).¹

Here at last Wellhausen has decided that the terms kharaj and jizya no longer are interchangeable, but mean land tax and poll tax. Nasr was faced with the problem of doing justice to the new converts by putting them on an equality with the Arabs, but without impairing the revenue, so that the amount of the fixed sum of tribute should not decrease. By his scheme the tribute was now to be raised entirely from landed property. So the land tax was correspondingly reassessed and collected from all land owners in proportion to their property and was imposed equally on non-Muslims and mawali and Arabs alike. Thus the payment of revenue did not affect people, but things, and so was not a disgrace. The poll tax, however,

1. Tabari, *op. cit.*, 1688-89.

was imposed only on non-Muslims. It was unnecessary for the fixed tribute and might decrease through conversions without unbalancing the budget. It is at this point for the first time that this separation between land and poll tax is made.¹ The occasion was thus a momentous one for the history of Umayyad financial administration. The reform was truly epochal.

There are some serious objections. In the first place, according to his theories, Wellhausen is utterly unable to account for the fact that 30,000 Muslims had had to pay the jizya while 30,000 Mushrikin had escaped, for to believe this would imply that there was a separation between the jizya and the kharaj, which he denies. Therefore, he asserts that the report is "unintelligible and quite incredible" and rejects it entirely. We have seen in the past that it has been Wellhausen's custom to reject as false or incredible anything which does not accord with his thesis, or else to ignore it completely. Let us see, however, whether the entire statement can not be elucidated. Mansur said in his speech:

I shall relieve the Muslims of their burdens . . . except that the kharaj must be paid fully in accordance with the written contract. If Mansur discovers that the jizya used to be taken from a Muslim or he used to be excessively burdened with the kharaj

كان يؤخذ منه جزية من راسه او
نقل عليه في خراجه

1. Wellhausen, op. cit., 480.

then let him relieve the Muslim of his burden and impose it on the non-Muslim.

This can mean only one possible thing: that in the past in Khurasan there used to be two forms of taxation, a *kharaaj* on the land and a *jizya* on the person. Al Madainy, Tabari's authority, is not talking about a present or a future division; he is clearly referring to a practice in the past (**كان يؤخذ**) and that *jizya* means capitation is proved by the words **جزية من راسه** in contradistinction to **خراج** Nasr asserts this practice existed and, furthermore, promises to bring redress. Now the Muslims he is addressing are of course not the Arabs, but the converts, the *mawali* of Balkh. How could this inequality exist?

The answer is not difficult to find. The *dihqans* were in charge of raising the revenue from land, trade, manufacturing, and capitation, of which the quotas were set by the *dihqan* and not by the Arab finance officer whose only concern was to see that the fixed amount was collected. The *dihqan* could put a capitation on some and withdraw it from others. Many of the *dihqans* we know were Muslims. They would pay no capitation themselves and it is perfectly reasonable to suppose that they might free from the capitation other converts. On the other hand, *dihqans* who were not Muslims and who were charged with raising a fixed sum, and who, as Barthold and Gibb and Gabrieli have pointed out, had every reason to wish to repress conversion, the wide-

spread movement of which would destroy completely their social and political significance, would most certainly wish to continue the capitation tax on new converts as a measure of repression to discourage the tendency. Contrariwise, some dihqans might very conceivably free from the capitation their fellow Mushrikin who were enrolled in their local armed forces, or were men of eminence with whom they were on good terms, or in other ways were worthy of favor. And it is because the Arabs exercised absolutely no supervision over the dihqans' practices that it came about that newly converted Muslims were taxed and infidels were freed. One may well question that the numbers involved - 30,000 and 80,000 - are not exact, but that the story is substantially true we have no reason to question.

Is it not a little difficult to believe that Nasr, merely a governor, without the authority of the caliph should attempt to introduce a radically new form of taxation? Actually, the system had existed from the beginning in Khorasan whereby a convert was freed from the capitation. We have reference to it in Abul Saïda's stipulation: the people of Samarkand (in Transoxania) are to be freed of jizya, for only the kharaj (and not the jizya) is imposed on men in Khorasan. The chief evil of the Arab tax administration in Khorasan was that it was not uniform, each dihqan being left to his devices, provided he paid the lump sum. Nasr ibn Sayyar was not an innovator; he was a reformer.

To end the evil he instructed his revenue officer Mansur to investigate personally and for the first time the administration of the dihqans, to see that all Muslims were freed of their poll tax and that all non-Muslims paid it. He also ordered a reassessment of the land, which was no innovation, but a frequent practice, as we have seen.

As we stated at the beginning, if Becker and Wellhausen are right, the great problem comes to determine when the distinction between kharaj and jizya first arose. Wellhausen says it appeared under Nasr ibn Sayyar. Becker has decided that it was effected by 'Ubadallah ibn Al Nabhab the governor of Egypt sent by Hisham. According to Severus Ubadallah numbered the people and cattle, measured lands and vineyards, put a lead seal on the neck of every man over twenty, set up milestones and boundary stones, and having taken all the statistics, doubled the taxes.¹

Becker's choice of Ubadallah as the innovator was necessary since there was no other possible candidate, but he has had to base his case on inference, for Severus tells us only that a new census was taken.

One of the weakest points of the entire Wellhausen theory is the absence of direct statements from any source that what was being done was an innovation and a new legal practice. On other matters the Arab chroniclers are at great pains to explain the origin of a practice. Thus we are told that Uthman was the first to give lavish gifts to

his friends, Muawia was the first to form a personal body-guard, the first to reorganize the postal courier service, the first to restrict stipends to the faithful. Al Hajjaj was the first to compel the new converts to pay the jizya. Marwan ibn Muhammad was the first to change the customary array of troops in battle. Why, then, are we not told that Nasr ibn Sayyar was the first to introduce the distinction that all men paid the kharaj but only non-Muslims the jizya? Abu Yusuf was a young man when this momentous act took place. He wrote the standard work on the theory and practice of taxation; one may peruse it in vain for even the mention of the name Nasr ibn Sayyar, or Ubaidallah ibn al Kablah. Is this not strange? Why are the names of these two great men not found in Baladhuri?

The truth of the matter is, of course, that Nasr and Ubaidallah were engaged in the routine adjustments of provincial administration and taxation which they had the authority to undertake, and they were making their executive decisions in accordance with an accepted legal tradition and practice that had been violated.

If we wished to believe that the distinction between kharaj and jizya was "posterior to the Sufyanids", Abdul Malik has far more right to the claim of being the author of such an act, for he of all the Umayyads made the most noteworthy changes in the government by his introduction of a new coinage, of Arabic for the registers, and of a re-assessment of land.

There is a final point. If one is prepared to place reliance on the authenticity of the ancient sources, even on many matters of minor detail, those passages in the ancient authorities which are disputed as being unreliable must be proven false by incontrovertible evidence. It is not honest to accept some parts and reject others without good grounds, merely because it happens to suit a theory. It is not difficult to detect inaccuracies in minor points in the Arab sources. There are frequent disagreements in matters of chronology, in the order of events, in the numbers of men taking part in a battle, in the words of an orator, and in the causes or motives of some particular act. These are understandable inaccuracies. In the case of taxation, however, the universal agreement on the general principles, found in Abu Yusuf, a contemporary of the Umayyads, in Baladhuri, in Tabari, and in the Christian, Syriac, and Greek sources can not be dismissed lightly. On the basis of their testimony, one must believe that the legal principles underlying the taxation of the *Ahl al-Bayt* and the new converts to Islam did in fact originate during the very early period of the caliphate.

The Operation of the Umayyad Taxation System

It is not possible to determine with any degree of accuracy the income and expenditures of the Umayyad state. The two tribute lists which make any pretense at being inclusive, the *Jirab ad Dawla* of Ahmad ibn Muhammad ibn Abdul Hamid¹ and the report of Aly ibn Ysa², were drawn up in the reigns of al Harun and al Muqtadir respectively, and a comparison of the scattered notices found in Tabari and Baladhuri of the revenues of certain provinces in Umayyad days, with the statements of the two Abbasid treasurers, shows a variation in some cases as great as seventy percent and not in the same direction. Some districts in Umayyad days yielded more revenue than two hundred years later, and others less.

Without much difficulty one can collect enough miscellaneous information from a variety of sources³ to cover several pages with figures. Unfortunately, the arrangement of these figures in a geographical-chronological system does

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1. Preserved in Ibn Khaldoun, Prolegomenes Historiques d'Ibn Khaldoun. Notices et Extraits des manuscrits de la Bibliothèque Impériale. XIX. Paris, 1862. 364-5.
 2. Von Kremer, Alfred. Über das Einnahmebudget des Abbasiden Reiches 306 A.H. (918-9). Denkschriften der Kaiserlichen Akademie der Wissenschaften. Wien, XXXVI, 1888.
 3. Baladhuri, Tabari, Maqrizi, Abu Yusuf, ibn Adari, passim. Cf. ibn Khordadbeh, Le Livre des routes et des provinces, tr. Barbier de Meynard, Journal Asiatique, 1865, Gudama, Kitab al Kharadg, J. A. MacGuckin de Slane tr. Journal Asiatique, 1862. Schwarz, Paul, Die Steuerleistung Persiens unter der Herrschaft der Araber. Der Islam. X, 150. Schwarz, Paul, Iran im Mittelalter nach den Arabischen Geographen. Leipzig, 1896.

not bring order out of confusion or permit one to draw any important deductions beyond the conviction that the miscellaneous notices are in many cases inaccurate and all of them unreliable.

However, if we are without exact data, we have information enough to discern the major characteristics of the tax system. The most striking circumstance is that by far the largest part of the revenue collected was expended in the local administration of the province. Consequently, when it is stated that the tribute collected in Iraq was 100,000,000 dirhems, this does not mean that such a sum was ever paid into the caliph's central treasury. How much he received can be guessed only by analogy from the case of Egypt. In the time of Muawia, the total revenue of that province amounted to 12,000,000 dinars. Out of this amount, the salaries and stipends of 40,000 men had to be met, 4,000 of whom got salaries of 200 dinars each. After all the stipends, hire of clerks, and expenses of local administration had been satisfied, Muawia received a balance of only 600,000 dinars, or five percent.¹ Marwan ibn Muhammad, the last caliph, collected only 200,000 dinars from Egypt, one third as much.² Under Umar II the income from Khorasan so nearly balanced local administrative expenses that there was a question whether there would

1. Maqrizi, *Houriant*. 226.

2. Abu Salih the Armenian, *Churches and Monasteries of Egypt*

3. Evetts, tr. *Anecdota Oxoniensia*, VII, Oxford, 1875, 256.

be any surplus; when a favorable balance did result, that spent it in Khorasan.¹ Hisham was removed from the governorship of Iraq by Farid II and Ibn al-Bal'is was appointed in his place because the revenue of the province had produced no surplus for the caliph.

An even more striking piece of evidence comes from the non-Arab historians. We are told that Hisham constructed large irrigation projects along the Euphrates to bring water to his private estates, and that as a result of his endeavors, his private income was in excess of his total revenues from the empire!²

At first thought, this statement seems incredible, especially since Hisham, among all the Umayyads, has the reputation of exacting the heaviest taxes. On further reflection it does not seem so unlikely. Irrigated land in Iraq was enormously profitable. Khalid at Casri, Hisham's governor in Iraq, himself realized an annual income from his property of 20,000,000 dirhams.³ We have heard of a personal income of 1,000 dinars a day.⁴ In addition to

1. Tabari, 1366.

2. Agapius, *Historia al-Umayyad*. *Histoire Universelle de Agapius de Manbij*, ed. and tr. by Vasiliev, *Patrologia Orientalis*, VIII, 1912, Pt. II, p. 505. Bar Hebraeus, Ernest A. W. Sedge, *The Chronography of Gregory Abul Faraj, the Son of Aaron, the Hebrew Hieromonk, Commonly Known as Bar Hebraeus*, tr. from the Syriac, London, 1912, 113. Michael, the Jacobite Patriarch of Antioch, 1156-1199. Jean Baptiste Chabot: *Chronique de Michel le Syrien*, II, fasc. III, Paris, 1904, 436. Cf. *Levy de Talmud*, Chabot tr. 23-24. Gabrieli, Francesco, *Il Califato di Hisham*, Alessandria, 1935, 131. Al Masudi, *Muruj al-Ahwal*, I 466.

3. Gabrieli, *op. cit.*, 13.

4. See above p. 17.

this, the serious revolt of the Berbers in Ifrikiya and the Turkish counter offensive in Transoxania not only cut off all revenues from the West and East, but put the caliph under the additional obligation of sending reinforcements. From Armenia came Ashot Bagratuni to complain to Hisham that the Kaldjarars and their troops had not been paid in three years. Hisham settled the full amount of their arrears for 300,000 dinars and throughout the rest of his reign the Armenian cavalry received their regular pay.¹ In view of all this, it appears more and more plausible that Hisham's private income was in excess of the state income, and the statement may be regarded as an additional proof that the empire as a whole, regarded as an investment of the caliph, was not particularly profitable. If the caliph's income from Egypt, which was the best organized, among the wealthiest and certainly the most completely pacified province of the Empire, was no more than five percent, it is extremely unlikely that other provinces gave a greater yield. In the periods of conquest, the fifth taken by the state was always considerable, but with the period of retrenchment following the death of al Walid, this source of revenue rapidly contracted, and the yearly summer raids against Rum appear more and more as a rather necessary undertaking for the central treasury. Unlike

1. Chevond, Histoire des guerres et des conquêtes des Arabes en Arménie. tr. Garabed V. Chahmazarian. Paris, 1856, III

other oriental monarchs, the Umayyad caliphs never seem to have amassed vast sums of money in the central treasury.

There were elements both of weakness and strength in this condition. Each province was a virtually autonomous financial entity. The salaries of the governor, of the administrative officials, of all the troops stationed in the province or sent out from it, as well as any others entitled to pensions or emoluments, came from the provincial treasury. Thus, when Muqātil ibn Hayyān brought to Hisham the good news of the death of the Khaqan and mentioned that he had been robbed of 100,000 dirhems by Yazid ibn al Muhallab, Hisham did not reimburse him from the state *Boit ul Mal* but gave him a draft through Khalid al Qasry in Iraq to Asad in Khorasan on the treasury of Khorasan.¹ It was the concern of each governor and his troops, not of the caliph, to see that they collected their pay. The responsibility for local services was thus vested in the locality where it belonged, and the scheme seems to have worked very well as far as the troops were concerned. Instances of their pay being in arrears are practically nonexistent and only in most critical circumstances did the central government have to come to the support of a province.

Such a decentralization of administration and responsibility in times of peace was a great advantage. It relieved the caliphs of the vast burden of petty bureaucratic details, and it placed the interest in the economic prosperity of

each part of the empire on the shoulders of those actually making their residence there.

On the other hand, this decentralization of responsibility made it impossible for the caliph to have a very shrewd idea of the internal conditions of the empire. What knowledge he received was usually derived from the highly partial, carefully argued reports of the governors and it was almost completely impossible to obtain exact information or rather advice should interference be necessary. This was not all. So much of the revenue of each province was consumed in the support of the local forces that there was not enough surplus for the caliph to maintain a large body of imperial troops, permanently stationed by his court, which could be shifted from one part of the empire to another, and in this fact lies the most probable explanation for the fact that the Umayyads never created such a body of fighting men. The one province without a governor was Syria; this was under the caliph's personal rule. It was his see, so to speak, and from Syria came what troops he commanded and most of the money to pay them. The vital, necessary expenses of imperial administration were negligible in comparison to the cost of the provincial self-government. By far the largest activity of the clerks of the diwan at Damascus was confined to the affairs of Syria; the acres of government buildings, the hierarchy of officials, the multitude of scribes so necessary for closely organized imperial systems, did not exist,

and there was a corresponding absence of the financial burden of maintaining such an establishment. The caliph was advised by a few trusted confidants; he had his personal secretaries and they had theirs. Besides these his court consisted of the members of his family and the usual attendants who lived on his largesse, their numbers being in proportion to his generosity and inclination. Under such conditions there existed no real capital, nor was there need for one. It was, therefore, a relatively simple matter for the caliph to move from place to place taking his entire government with him, and he frequently did so.

This was the system originated by the first caliphs. Umar's concept of the Muslim state was an agglomeration of largely autonomous units looking to the caliph as religious leader, the fountain of guidance and advice, primarily a spiritual, not a political chief. The caliph was to be no mulk, or king, but a true successor of the Prophet, the shepherd of the faithful. Money received by him was for the treasury of God, to be expended not in acts of government, but in the relieving of distress of the poor and unfortunate. The conquered lands were a fay, or endowment of the community, the revenue of which was to be divided not only among the soldiers but among all the faithful, who as Muslims deserved it for their innate virtue. The revenue from each district was to go to the Muslims occupying that district almost completely, but where there was a

surplus above needs, that was to be sent to the Hijaz for the support of the pious. To this end, Umar is reported to have established a series of pensions, - the 'ata; beginning with 12,000 dirhems a year for the wives of the Prophet, the amount was scaled downwards to 6,000 for those who fought at Badr, 5,000 for Aly and his sons, 4,000 for those who joined the Prophet after Badr, 2,000 for the sons of Ansars and companions of the Flight, and 800 to 300 for the rest of the people.¹ Not only men, but their wives and infant children shared in these stipends. It was Umar's intention that at the close of each fiscal year all revenue collected would be completely expended in this fashion. The treasury was thus to be the Mal al Muslimin, the property of all. Standing beside this institution was the Mal Allah, into which the fifth taken in war and the tithe were paid; this money likewise was to be expended for charity.

Such a system was the direct antithesis of a firmly established imperial government, for it deprived the caliph of a ready surplus of cash to maintain a vigorous state organism, to provide for expansion, and to meet all exigencies as they arose. Muawia undertook to modify this. When he was finally recognized as caliph he had only the revenues of Syria, for Aly had spent all the money in the treasury

1. Abu Yusuf, op. cit., 66-7; Maqrizi, op. cit., Bouriant, 262-9; Baladhuri, op. cit., II, 242-43.

of Iraq, and Ibn Abbas had absconded with a tremendous sum.¹ His first act was to compel the provinces to contribute to the support of the central treasury.² It is reported that he gave the option to the governor of Iraq of paying 100,000,000 dirhems yearly into the state treasury or resigning his position.³

He next turned his attention to the pension system and restricted the stipends in the holy cities to those who were active soldiers.⁴ This reform was also introduced in Iraq where the restrictions were used as a political instrument, for the menace of an interruption in pay brought the Ashraf, the Muslim aristocracy, to the mercy of the caliph. The central treasury was moved from Kufa to Damascus, the pay of the Syrians was raised and that of the Iraqis lowered.⁵ Thus against the idea that the state treasure was to be a recompense for Islamic virtue, Muawia substituted the concept that money should be paid only for services rendered the state, and diwans contained the names of troops alone, and the *Mal al Muslimin* was transformed into a purely military treasury.⁶

This act was naturally greatly resented everywhere except in Syria. The troops were indignant at being put on

1. Larmens, Henri, Mélanges de la faculté orientale de l'Université, Beyrouth, 1913, VI, 402.

2. Ibid., 403.

3. Von Kremer, Alfred, The Orient under the Caliphs, 190, quoted on the authority of Ibn al Athir, IV, 118.

4. Larmens, op. cit., 405.

5. Theophanes. A.M. 6151, 6152 quoted by Wellhausen, op. cit., 131.

6. Larmens, op. cit., 406-8.

regular salaries without being permitted to participate in the division of any surplus as a bonus, for surpluses now went to the caliph. As Wellhausen has aptly expressed it: "The government used to be supported by the army; now the army was supported by the government." To those who were not soldiers, the action was a direct proof of the tyranny and ungodliness of the Umayyads and formed the real basis for that bitterness and indignation which persisted throughout the period of the dynasty. It was the fiscal policy which formed the major grounds of disapproval of the Kharijite orator in Medina, Abu Hanza.¹

The policy inaugurated by Muawia was continued with different degrees of thoroughness by his successors. For political reasons the first Umayyad had kept on the diwans those not strictly entitled to be there. Abdul Malik was far less generous.² Umar ibn Abdul Aziz abandoned the policy by enrolling on the diwans so far as the treasury would bear the burden, the children of pensionaires. He caused lots to be drawn, and those to whom the lucky lots fell received 100 dirhems and the rest 40.³ Hisham, however, was extraordinarily strict. His edict of "No military service, no pension" he applied to members of his own family who either had to raid or send a substitute if they expected to share in the state's bounty,⁴ and his impartiality and

1. Lamons, *op. cit.*, 416.

2. Wellhausen, *op. cit.*, 299.

3. Tabari, 1367. Cf. Wellhausen, *op. cit.*, 299.

4. *Ibid.*, 1731.

honesty were the later admiration of many. "I checked," said Abdallah ibn Aly, "the diwans of Beni Harwan and I did not find a single diwan more correct and more just to the nation and to the sultan than the diwan of Hisham."¹ And in similar vein Chascan ibn Abdul Manid reported: "There was no one of Beni Harwan any stronger in the penetration into the affairs of his men and his diwans, nor anyone more scrupulous in the investigation and accuracy of his accounts than Hisham."²

Walid II inherited Hisham's full treasury and to curry favor increased the stipends and restored them to the people of Medina and Mecca,³ but he overreached himself in this generosity, and his successor Yazid III was compelled to return to the former allowances, for which he earned the title of Yazid the Decreaser.⁴

It is difficult to determine the actual salary of the troops. From the statement that there were 60,000 fighting men in Basra who received 60,000,000 dirhems a year,⁵ we see that it amounted to 1,000 dirhems per year, and this is borne out by the report that Abu Muslim paid his troops first three, and later, four dirhems a day.⁶ In Khurasan at the death of Quteiba there were 40,000 men of Basra and 47,000

1. Tabari, op. cit., 1732.

2. Ibid., 1733

3. Wellhausen, op. cit., 353.

4. Vasiliev has made an incomprehensible error when he translated يَزِيدُ السَّمِيُّ by "Yazid, the Simple" - Agapius, Kitab al 'Unwan Patrologia Orientalis VIII, 1912, Pt. II, 511

5. Masudi, op. cit., V, 195.

6. Tabari, op. cit., 1969.

of Kufa¹ the yearly support of which force must then have been somewhere between eighty and one hundred million dirhems.

It is thus evident that by far the largest amount of the government's revenue was expended for military requirements.

Now despite the reform of the central treasury undertaken by Muawia, the decentralization of the financial system still continued to such a degree that the yearly income of the caliph could never have been very certain. Consequently the Umayyads began to create private estates for themselves from which there would be an assured income apart from all political factors, but it was Hisham whose reign is especially remarkable for this activity, and to get the money for his enterprises, taxation was increased throughout the empire. Ubaidallah ibn al Nabbah in Egypt wrote that the land could support an increase,² and the revenue of the country, which had been under Sulaiman ibn Abdul Malik 12,000,000 dinars, reached an all time high of 17,000,837 dinars.³ In Ifriqiya an attempt to tax the converted Berbers provoked the revolt of Malsara, and after the Battle of the Nobles in 122 (739) there was a general insurrection. Twelve thousand Syrians dispatched the following year under Kuthūm ibn 'Iyāq were

1. Zotenberg, M.H., Chronique de Abou Djafar Muhammad ibn Jarir ibn Yazid Is'ari traduite sur la version Persane d'Abu Ali Muhammad Boi'ami. 4 Vol. Paris, 1867, IV, 211.
2. Maqrizi, op. cit., Bouriant, 227.
3. Ibid., 283.

utterly routed and it was not until Hanzala ibn Salwān, the Kalbite, took command of the situation that the revolt was broken.¹ Hisham's cupidity in Spain and throughout the empire was something the like of which had never before been seen, according to the continuator of Isidor.² He put a tax on caravanserais, taverns, and small houses, according to Agapius.³

With these resources, Hisham undertook an ambitious program. "He perfected agriculture, developed the manufacture of cloth and rugs, improved arms and weapons, fortified the frontiers, conducted military maneuvers, and constructed aqueducts and reservoirs."⁴

Bar Hebraeus tells us of his canals and plantations⁵ following the accounts of Michael the Syrian⁶ and Dionysius⁷. Al Walid ibn Bukayr, governor of Mosul, completed a new canal in 121 (738) that cost 8,000,000 dirhems alone.⁸ In Iraq the rule of his minister Khalid al Qasri was of great benefit economically to the country, for he constructed canals, restored the bridges, and erected government warehouses and public buildings.⁹

So successful were Khalid's enterprises that they

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1. Ibn Adari, Al Bayan al Muqrib, 2v. tr. by E. Fagnan. Alger, 1901, 50-59.
 2. Morrison, 360, quoted by Gabrieli, op. cit., 123.
 3. Agapius, Kitab al Unwan, op. cit., VIII, Pt. II, 1912, 505.
 4. Masudi, op. cit., v, 466.
 5. Bar Hebraeus, Syriac Chronicle, Tr. Budge, 110.
 6. Chabot, Michael the Syrian, II, Fasc. III, 490.
 7. Chabot, Tonys de Tollmahre, 23, 24., op. cit.
 8. Ibn al Athir, Chronicon quod Perfectissimis Inscibitur. ed. C. J. Tornberg, Leiden 1871, v, 180-181.
 9. Gabrieli, op. cit., 12.

proved to be the chief reason for his fall. Hisham was certainly jealous of his minister who appears to have offered the caliph serious competition in the marketing of grain, for Hisham had to order Khalid to withhold his crop for fear of depressing the usual prices until the Commander of the Faithful had disposed of his own harvest.¹

The improvement of his financial position made it possible for Hisham to undertake a program of public and private building, following the example of his two great predecessors, Abdul Malik and Walid.

The first important structure raised by the Umayyads was the Dome of the Rock in Jerusalem built by Abdul Malik in 72 A.H.² His successor, al Walid, commenced the great mosque of Damascus in 87 or 88 (707-8) importing artisans from Persia, India, Maghrib, and Rus. According to Maqadasi, Walid devoted to its construction the total kharaj revenue of Syria for seven years.³ To Walid likewise belongs the little castle of Amra in the Transjordan desert fifty miles east of Amman.⁴ His fame was great.

The Syrians say that of all the Marwanids, none was better than Al Walid. He gave to the poor, pensioned wounded soldiers, provided slaves

1. Ibn Asakir VI, 77, quoted by Gabrieli, *op. cit.*, 13.

2. Creswell, K.A.C., Early Muslim Architecture, Oxford, 1932, 47.

3. Quoted by Creswell, *op. cit.*, 101. There is a reference likewise quoted by Creswell, *Ibid.*, 101, from the Aphrodito Papyri - "In the name of God, Curra ibn Sharic, to you, people of the village of Aphrodito, pay for the wages and supplies of a carpenter for work on the mosque at Damascus for six months."

4. *Ibid.*, 253.

for the blind and sick, and assigned pensions. Under his reign were many conquests He built public edifices and forts During his rule people talked only of construction and buildings.¹

Hisham built on an even more lavish scale but his energies were not expended on mosques and his works are consequently not so well preserved. It is curious, however, that Gabrieli has not heard of the recent discoveries and states that time has completely obliterated Hisham's work.² Sixty miles northeast of Palmyra and forty miles south of Basafa is the oldest Muslim fortified enclosure in existence, Casr al Hair. It was seen and described by Pietro della Valle (1616-25) and others, but from 1807 until 1925 when Albert Gabriel rediscovered it, its existence had been forgotten. Today it is perhaps the most striking ruin to be found in the northeastern Syrian desert. The walls, built on a cut stone foundation and completed in brick, form an immense square fortification in excellent state of preservation. Within are only the crumbling foundations of residential quarters. Not far off are the remains of a dam and the bed of an artificial lake two kilometers wide and five kilometers long, from which water was taken to the fortress by two subterranean aqueducts. An inscription now lost, but reported by Rousseau - "Bismillah: This city has been built by order of

1. Eol'ani's Tabari, op. cit., IV, 195-6.
2. Gabrieli, op. cit., 151.

Abdallah Hisham, Amir al Mu'minin. This is one of the monuments which the inhabitants of Homs have erected by the hand of Sulaiman, the son of 'Ubad" - has established the identity of the builder, but without this, the statement of Tabari - "Hisham stopped in Rusafa and it was in the desert and he built there two castles and Rusafa is the city of the Romans. Sun built it"¹ - and that of Theophanes - "Hisham began to found palaces in the open country and to create sown fields and gardens and make water channels"² - identify this fortress.

Walid I, Hisham's successor, continued building but he transferred his activity to his favorite resort, the Belca (Transjordan) where twenty miles south of Amman he commenced Mahatta, an unfinished, great walled enclosure 144 meters square with a series of brick arched buildings in the interior.

Severus ibn Maqaffa has an interesting account of this enterprise:

Then Hisham died and the government of the empire was undertaken by a man named Walid. Since, however, his people hated him, he began to build a city named after himself in the desert, for he gave

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1. Tabari, 1733. The Rusafa of Sun, still today an impressive place, is filled with Greek remains, but practically nothing of the early Arab period has been discovered there. M. Daniel Schlumberger of the Department of Antiquities in Beirut, who has been excavating at a smaller Casr al Hair and has made preliminary surveys of Hisham's Casr al Hair, the results of which are as yet unpublished, has expressed the conviction that Hisham's capital was never in the Greek city but was located forty miles south on the site of the present ruins which took their name from the nearest city.
 2. Quoted by Creswell, *op. cit.*, 343. Consult pages 330-345 for a complete discussion of Casr al Hair.

his name to it, but the water was fifteen miles distant from it. He collected workmen from all quarters and built that city by means of forced labor, and on account of the multitude many died every day from the scarcity of water, for though the water was carried thither by 1200 canals daily, yet this was not enough for them, the canals being divided into two bands, six hundred carrying water one day and six hundred the next. Then al Walid was attacked by a man named Ibrahim who killed him. Ibrahim released the enslaved workmen who departed each to his own place.¹

When Yazid ibn al Walid became caliph, he swore to the people an oath not "to put stone on stone, or brick on brick, or construct canals".²

The above accounts of the public works undertaken by the caliphs give support to our thesis that at no time were the Umayyads in possession of large sums of money, and the reproach that unlike their successors in Spain and the Muslims in the Middle East they have left few enduring monuments seems in part due to the fact that they could not afford them. One would ordinarily have supposed that Walid, under whose reign the empire reached its greatest geographical limits, would have had sufficient funds of ready cash on hand to build the great mosque at Damascus without having to pledge the entire revenues of Syria for this purpose; one would equally expect that Hisham, whose territories stretched from the Indus to the Pyrenees, could have accomplished his works without undue strain on the treasury, yet it is noteworthy that the chief com-

1. Severus ibn Maqaffa, Evetts, tr. op. cit., 114-115.

2. Tabari, op. cit., 1334.

plaints of his high taxation came from the Christian authors of Syria and Mesopotamia, where apparently most of the money for his building and irrigation projects was collected. It is even more remarkable that Walid II who is supposed by Wellhausen to have seized an immense amount of treasure stored up by Hisham¹ and whose reign lasted but fourteen months was compelled to rely on conscripted labor for the construction of Hahatta, which, after all, to the eyes of the traveler today is a modest enough structure. That the burden of his undertakings and that of his predecessors fell squarely on the province of Syria is born out by the action of the people of Damascus who refused to recognize Yazid III until he had given a pledge to quit entirely all such undertakings.

Throughout Tabari and the other historians one finds constant reproaches of the stinginess and avarice of this caliph or that caliph, of handsome gifts bestowed on poets and court favorites, of banquets and drinking parties and hunts in the desert, yet one can search the sources in vain for so much as even a hint that any caliph amassed a very considerable sum in his lifetime which he bequeathed to his successor, nor was As 'affan, the first Abbasid, more than ordinarily compensated by the spoils taken from Harwan. Well known are the accounts of the incredible booty seized by Alexander in his conquest; the Arab historians dwell with

1. Wellhausen, op. cit., 353.

pride and enthusiasm on the immensity of the spoil taken from the fallen at Qadasiya, at the Yarmuk, in Ifrikiya, and other places, yet nothing at all comparable to these sums was recovered when the last Umayyad perished.

The conclusion is inescapable. The caliphs were, in contrast to their exalted position, relatively poor. The permanent military commitments of maintaining vast bodies of men under arms consumed the major part of the yearly revenue. Of what was surplus, far too large an amount had to be expended in conciliating important men, leaders of potential political factions.

If it had been possible to overthrow completely the system of Umar, to bring the major amount of provincial revenues into the central treasury, and with this money to create an imperial corp of well disciplined regiments which could be transferred from place to place as circumstances warranted; if at the same time the diwan could have been purged of the incompetent and undeserving, the history of the period would have been far different. It is doubtful, however, if any caliph, however strong, could have accomplished such a reformation.

As it was, the army was the chief beneficiary. Under the Abbasids, the constant complaint was that of arrears in pay; throughout the Umayyad period, however, with almost no exception, the pay of the men was promptly forthcoming, largely because the troops were stationed in the locality from which their stipends were derived, and they saw to it, in

cooperation with their leaders, that there was no delay in meeting their demands.

Nevertheless, in spite of all that has been said, we must confess that not once did the occasion arise when a caliph was unable to cope with a given situation because of need of money. If he lacked the resources to create an imperial force, the revenues from Syria and the surplus from the other provinces were always sufficient to equip and maintain a sufficient body of loyal Syrian troops to subdue a rising in Iraq, in the Hijaz, or in Egypt, and in the last critical days of Marwan's reign, he was able to pay and to put in the field an army much greater than that of his opponents. The Umayyads did not fall through bankruptcy and the financial factor was of no importance at all compared to the greater issues at stake.

Lastly, we shall consider the conditions of the subject population and of the mawali. What sufferings the former underwent could be laid at the door of the local troops and governor, not of the caliph, and this fact seems to have been recognized in Egypt:

After him (Yazid II) reigned Hisham, who was a God fearing man according to the method of Islam and loved all men and he became the deliverer of the orthodox . . . he wrote to Egypt commanding that a receipt in his name should be given to everyone who paid the taxes, so that none might be unfairly treated and that there might be no injustice in his dominions. So God gave him a

prosperous reign and he ruled for twenty-two years and no war continued against him, but everyone who rose up against him was delivered by God into his hands.¹

Such was the Christian judgment of a man allegedly the most avaricious of caliphs. For Hisham's governors, however, Severus has nothing but the deepest hatred.

It is not difficult to find stories of extortion and cruelty, some of the most striking coming from the time of Hajjaj. One day an Arab of the desert approached Hajjaj and asked for a job.

"No", said Hajjaj, "my officials know writing and arithmetic. You do not." "On the contrary," said the Bedouin, "I can figure like the rest." "How then would you divide three dirhems among your people?" The Bedouin replied, "Each one of the three will get a dirhem and the fourth will get one from my pocket." Hajjaj laughed: "The people of Isbahan are three years in arrears on their kharaj. They have reduced to impotence all my agents. By Allah, I wish to inflict on them this ignorant and naive Bedouin; he deserves such an eminent position." The Bedouin went to Isbahan took ten hostages and gave the citizens ten months' grace to pay their taxes. When at the expiration of the fixed time, the taxes were still not forthcoming, he began to cut off the heads of his hostages and put them in the money bags with the inscription, "So and so, son of so and so, has paid his debt." In no time the taxes were paid in full and Hajjaj was so delighted he kept the Bedouin in office until his death.²

Van Vloten has been very diligent in collecting such evidence.³

Tabari regales us with a somewhat similar narrative,

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1. Severus ibn Muqaffa, Evette, tr. op. cit., 73-4.
 2. Masudi, op. cit., V 390-93.
 3. Cf. Van Vloten, Recherches sur la Domination Arabe 1-30 passim

which is so delightful an example of the Arab counterpart of our success stories, and so revealing of the background of Arab administration that it is worth repeating.

Khalid al Qasbi once met in the streets of Damascus a young man of striking figure and pleasing manner. So impressed was he that he offered to help the young man if fortune ever placed him in a position to bestow favors. When Khalid became governor of Iraq, the youth, whose name was Ziyad, thought himself of this promise, and entrusting his small property to a friend, set out for the East to seek his fortune. The story now follows in his own words:

One day Khalid sent for me and said, "Can you write, O Ziyad?" I replied, "I can read but I can not write, may God bless the Amir." Khalid grooved his forehead and exclaimed, "We are from God and to Him we return. Verily, nine tenths of what I expected from you is lacking and there remains to you only the tenth." I said, "O, prince, is this tenth the price of a slave?" He said, "And if it is?" I said, "Buy me a slave who can write and send him to me that he may teach me." Khalid cried, "God help us, surely you are above such a thing!" I insisted, "No, buy me for sixty dinars a slave who can write and figure." And he sent him to me and I was diligent, but I saw him only at night, and in fifteen nights I could read and write what I wished. Now one night I was with Khalid and he said, "I wonder if you have profited by this affair?" I said, "Yes, by Allah, I can write and read what I wish." Khalid laughed and said, "I see you have gained a little thing and are become proud!" "No," said I. Khalid opened a case and took out a paper and said, "Read this dispatch," and I read what was on it and lo, it came from the governor of Rayy. Then he said to me, "Depart. This night have I made you governor of Rayy." So I went to Rayy and arrested the director of the treasury, and he sent me a message, saying that I was a crazy Arab for the Amir had never before put an Arab over the revenue bureaus but only over the military. And he went on to say that if I

would reinstate him as *sahib* of the *Kharaaj* he would give me 300,000 dirhems. Then I reread my commission and I saw I had been appointed only commander of the garrison, and I said, "By God, I don't want to be bankrupted!" So I wrote to Khalid, "When you set me over Bayy I thought you had given me all of it, and now this fellow in charge of the *Kharaaj* tells me he will give me 300,000 dirhems if I maintain him in office." And Khalid wrote back, "Keep what he gives you," . . . and I got what I got. Then I asked to be recalled, and when I returned Khalid made me chief of police.¹

This is a very instructive little story and so in keeping with what other information we possess that, if the particular circumstances are not strictly true, the spirit and background most certainly are. Military posts were filled mostly by Arabs, but local administration and all the details of finance were administered by the *rawali*. The appointment of the *sahib ul Kharaaj* was usually at the disposal of the governor, and in this circumstance seems to have been so recognized by the collector at Bayy who addressed his proposition to *Ziya*, not to Khalid. Sometimes, however, this office was filled directly by the caliph. *Umayya* appointed the *sahib ul Kharaaj* for Kufa who was independent of the governor.² *Sulciman* appointed the minister of revenue in Iraq at the request of Yazid ibn al Muhallab, the governor of Iraq, succeeding al Hajjaj. Ibn Muhallab reasoned as follows:

Iraq has been milked dry by Hajjaj. I shall be obliged if I am to raise the same taxes to en-

1. Tabari, *op. cit.*, 1470-71
2. Von Krenor, *op. cit.*, 189.

ploy violent means, and if I do, I shall resemble Hajjaj. If, on the other hand, I do not send to Suleiman the same gun that Hajjaj sent to al Walid, I shall be disgraced.

Suleiman then named Salih ibn Abdue Rahman finance minister with full responsibility, answerable only to the caliph for his acts.¹ Salih, a rawla of Sijistan, was the same who had been commissioned by Hajjaj to make Arabic the language of the government bureaus in Iraq.² Apart from such direct interference, however, the local governor always appointed his under officials. The caliph reserved the right to intervene and to tell an official who his subordinates should be, but such acts are rare. The custom in the East was for the caliph to name the governor of Iraq, who in turn appointed his chief finance minister for that province and named the governor of Khorasan. The latter appointed a chief finance minister for Khorasan and a series of lesser officials to rule the important cities, and these men in turn named to office the collectors of revenue of their own particular district, but in this hierarchy of officialdom, at any time a superior officer could alter the administrative appointments of his subordinates.³ On occasions, when there were suspicions of dishonesty, the governor or the caliph might send a special officer to check the diwans and accounts.⁴

1. Bel'ami's Tabari, *op. cit.*, IV, 218.

2. Wellhausen, *op. cit.*, 261

3. Cf. Tabari, *op. cit.*, 1509, 1419, 1420.

4. *Ibid.*, 1454.

One of the more serious instances of mismanagement comes from Ifrikiya. According to Ibn al Athir:

The people said they did not wish to revolt against the Imam because of the sums levied on them by those who represented the Imam. But the newcomers said that the agents did not act according to the instructions of the Imam. "Then," they said, "we shall have to inform the caliph." In consequence Maizara and a score of messengers with him were dispatched to Hisham, but they could not obtain audience from him, and then they went to Al Abrash and said to him, "Inform the Prince of the Faithful that our Amir leads us on expeditions with his jund and that he distributes the booty we gain to the jund, saying that the jund is of greater importance for the wars he undertakes; if it is a question of a city to be stormed, we are in the front rank and the jund in the second rank, but instead of getting booty we are told that our reward in heaven will be greater. At the same time, we are reckoned as his brothers. Finally, our oppressors are accustomed to open the bellies of our sheep to extract the foetus, the white fleece of which is destined for the pelisse of the Commander of the Faithful, so that 1000 sheep die to furnish the material for one pelisse. All this we have borne, but when at last they have abducted the most beautiful of our daughters, we have told them that although they are Muslims, we do not find authorization for such conduct in any sacred book or sunna. We wish to know whether or not this conduct is sanctioned by the Commander of the Faithful.¹

After Ifrikiya revolted, Hisham asked for the names of the leaders, and too late discovered that they were those who had come in vain to his court.

It is not difficult to discover other instances of injustice. We may recall the incident mentioned above of Ashras' project to convert the people of Samarkand, his

1. Ibn al Athir. *Annales du Maghrib et de l'Espagne*, tr. E. Fagnan, Alger, 1901, 15-16. Cf. Coverus Ibn Muqaffa, *op. cit.*, tr. Evetts, 87, for the same story.

subsequent reversal of policy, and the humiliating treatment of the dihqans who were forced to pay.¹ Ibn Hubaira ordered Muslim ibn Saïd, the governor of Khorasan, to extort money from the dihqans. He objected, saying, "Those whom you wish to tax are the most distinguished men of the country and they were taxed illegally. For example, Mihzam ibn Jabir paid 300,000, and his assessment was raised unjustly by 100,000 to 400,000, and all those named on your list are required to pay in like proportion." Then Mihzam himself went to Ibn Hubaira and expostulated, saying, "We are the most distinguished men of Khorasan, adventurous leaders in wars, and before us there are people who come to us from an unknown place riding on donkeys and they were appointed our governors, and they have taken our money and have much of it." But despite this complaint, the money was taken.²

"The government of a province was a lucrative post to reestablish a compromised fortune," says Van Vloten,³ and we have seen that it was worth 300,000 dirhems to the collector of the kharaj in Rayy to hold his job. Appointment to office, according to Van Vloten, was tantamount to a license for systematic pillage, but because of the indifference of the Arab chroniclers to the sufferings of the subject population, we know somewhat less than half of what went on. Not only the

1. See above page

2. Tabari, op. cit., 1459-1461.

3. Van Vloten, op. cit., 9.

Arabs, but the *dihqans*, and all people associated with administration in any form profited heavily.¹ In Egypt, certain governors were only too eager to seize upon some irregularity as an excuse for extortion from the Coptic Patriarch, though the caliph personally was not held to blame for this.²

By inference from the advice of Abu Yusuf of what should not be done, we can gather what evils had existed. The practice of farming the taxes was evil.³ If the inhabitants of a district chose a rich man and declared him responsible for their tax, there should be associated with him a man of probity, sincere in his religion, to represent the Imam.⁴ If the governor visited a locality, he should not demand from the villagers a hospitality which exceeded their means.⁵ However, Abu Yusuf is not specific, and as the tyranny of the first Abbasids in their treatment of the subject population far exceeded anything known under the Umayyads, he may be referring to contemporaneous practices.

The picture can be made as damning as one wishes, with examples of illegal extortion and humiliation of the "protected" ahl dhimmi, corruption and avarice of governors, and exploitation of the peasants by the rich nobles of their own

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1. Van Vloten, op. cit., 12-13.
 2. Severus, Evetts, op. cit., 76, 92-104 *passim*.
 3. Abu Yusuf, op. cit., 159.
 4. Ibid., 160.
 5. Ibid., 163.

of Hajjaj. Yazid II had married a niece of Hajjaj, and hence when he became caliph there was a renewed persecution of the Muhallabite faction. Now it was chiefly during this period that the successor of a governor abused his predecessor and extorted money from him under the pretext of requiring a statement of accounts, and when Wellhausen asserts that such conduct was the "general rule" he extends without warrant of fact the particular practice of a period to include the Umayyad rule. After the accession of Hisham, there is only one spectacular instance of such persecution, and that is the treatment of Khalid al Qasri. Van Vloten has accused Khalid of extorting yearly from the people of Iraq 20,000,000 dirhems.¹ But Gabrieli has demonstrated that Khalid got his money, not by a systematic pillage, but by the improvement through irrigation and development of his own lands, and far from amassing an immense sum could raise only 10,000 dirhems for a fine, so great had been his generosity to poor and rich.² When Yusuf ibn Umar "bought" Khalid from Walid II, he was not purchasing the right to extort as much money as possible from him, as Van Vloten says,³ for it does not appear from Tabari that the torture of Khalid yielded large amounts of

1. Van Vloten, *Récherches*, *op. cit.*, 10.
 2. Gabrieli, *op. cit.*, 14. (From Aban ibn al Walid al Bajali, Tariq ibn Abi Ziyad, governor of Pars, and from AzZubair, governor of Isbahan, Rayy, and Qumis, Yusuf is reported to have demanded 50,000,000 dirhems and seems to have got it.) Caetani, *Chronographis Islamica*, Fascs. 4-5, Paris, 1509.
 3. Van Vloten, *op. cit.*, 10.

money. Yusuf's desire seems plainly to have been one of revenge. Furthermore, Hisham would not permit Yusuf to replace the governors and officials of Khorasan named by Khalid and the caliph, and Nasr ibn Sayyar continued as ruler of that province throughout the reigns of Hisham's successors until the victory of Abu Muslim. Gabrieli has piled evidence upon evidence to defend the reputation of Hisham, particularly in his preoccupation with affairs in Khorasan, where a vigorous attempt was made to restore the tribal equilibrium.¹ Nasr ibn Sayyar had become governor of Khorasan in A. H. 120 (737-3) and ruled the country for eleven years without interruption. During this entire period there is no evidence of injustice or extortion or mistreatment of the subject peoples. In the year 121 (738) he put through his reform of taxation - which Wellhausen says was the granting of equal rights in Islam and the establishing of a balance between Arabs and Iranians.² In Gibb's view, Nasr was the first Arab ruler to realize that the government depended for support on the middle classes and the agriculturists, whom he conciliated and his personal influence and honesty composed the quarrels of the natives and reconciled them to him.³ The agreement of all the sources of Tabari on Nasr's ability and wise rule are unanimous. When Yusuf ibn Umar asked one of his

1. Gabrieli, op. cit., 138.

2. Wellhausen, op. cit., 432.

3. Gibb, H.A.R., The Arab Conquest in Central Asia, London, 1923, 92.

henchmen to denounce Nasr before Hisham, he said, "And what shall I blame him for, his experience, or his obedience, or the success of his undertakings, or the administration of the government?" "None of these," replied Yusuf, "Blame him for his age."¹

Khorasan had other good governors besides Nasr. Asad ibn Abdallah was reappointed for a second term by Hisham in 117 (735). The following year he moved the capital from Merv to Balkh, instituted many administrative reforms, and won the good will of the dihqans. In 120, shortly before his death in Balkh, he held solemn court for his friends of the nobility who came bearing him gifts of gold and silver vases and costly jewels. "God bless you, O Amir," said their spokesman, "we have ruled this world for 400 years with mildness and wisdom and dignity. But you came and built palaces in the desert and destroyed Khaqan with his 100,000 men."² Gibb has pointed out that the downfall of the Turks produced a distinctly good reaction among the Iranians for the Turkish yoke was worse than the Arab, and during the period of the ascendancy of the Khaqan, the profitable native and transit trade must have ceased. Asad's relations with the Iranians were distinctly good, as we have seen, and by changing the capital to Balkh and rebuilding its former glory he gratified the national pride of the

1. Tebari, *op. cit.*, 1719.

2. *Ibid.*, 1636-7.

people and attracted many influential men to his support.¹ Asad was a figure it is difficult not to idealize. Intrepid in war, generous to all, celebrated for his verses, he possessed the typical virtues of the Arab said.²

Al Jarrāh ibn Abdallah, recalled by Umar I from Khorasan, though not as great a fighter as Asad, was yet an honest man. "O, people of Khorasan," he said in his farewell sermon, "I came to you in the clothes that are on me, riding my own mare, and I did not gain from you ought save the jewel in my sword." All he had, says the tradition, was a mare and a mule, whose hair had turned gray, and he had to borrow the money for his homeward journey.³

Now anyone who reads Van Vloten carefully will be amazed to discover that the bulk of the scurrilous charges which he hurls against the Umayyads is based on incidents which occurred in the middle period of the dynasty. If, then, the people of Khorasan, the non-Muslim Iranians and the mawali, revolted under the black standard of the Abbasids because of a tyrannical, corrupt, and extortionate government, they did so either

1. Because the burdens were growing progressively worse under the eleven year rule of Nasr ibn Sayyar, or

2. Because of the memory of what had taken place before Nasr.

1. Gibb, op. cit., 88.
2. Gabrielle, op. cit., 65, 67.
3. Tabari, op. cit., 1354-4.

As regards the first proposition, Von Vloten is unable to show that the evils of earlier governors were perpetuated by the last, while all other scholars are agreed that Nasr gave Khorasan the best rule it had ever had. If there is no evidence to support the first proposition, it seems to us that the second may logically be dismissed, and we are forced to the conclusion that something else besides the tyrannical collection of taxes brought about the revolt in Khorasan. These causes will be discussed later in their proper place.

A close examination of the Aphrodito Papyri has likewise resulted in a more favorable attitude towards the administration of Egypt. Bell was the first to point out that however bad the reputation of Gurra ibn Shariq may have been in historical writings he appears in the Papyri as an honorable man, exercising severity in favor of, not against, the taxpayer, keeping a sharp lookout on local officials whom he frequently warned against unfairness, and remitting the taxes when there had been a partial failure of the harvest.¹

Beginning with the evidence of the Papyri, Lamens has extended his own investigation to cover the Umayyad period and has reached the conclusion that in comparison with the government which the Arabs displaced, conditions were greatly improved, and that Umayyad "tyranny" was neither more nor

1. Bell. Aphrodito Papyri, op. cit., Intro. XXXIV - XXXV.

less paternal than that recommended by the Cadi Abu Yusuf.¹ One must never forget that the aim of the Abbasid historians was frequently to show the Umayyads in as unfavorable a light as possible. Moreover, the rhetorical abuse of this poet or that poet whose business it was in satirical contexts to show his opponents in the worst possible light must be accepted with the greatest caution. There is a vast difference between poetic license and historical fact, as Gabrieli has shown in the case of Farazdaq.² Furthermore, the ethical standards of the late nineteenth century are not very reliable yardsticks by which to estimate the emotions and reactions of the eighth century Iranians or Egyptians or Arabs to a "tyranny" and anything short of the most positive evidence must be regarded with proper caution.

From this treatment of the subject population we pass to the condition of the mawla. The term mawla has a variety of meanings as used in Tabari, and it is frequently impossible to determine the exact status of a person so designated. It can mean friend, neighbor, cousin, relation, confidant, son, uncle, guest, lover, follower, or ally by marriage. These are symbolic meanings. In the definition which concerns us, mawla may mean both a client and his patron. The origin of clientship comes from pre-Islamic times. If a master freed his slave willingly, or if the slave were

1. Larmens, Études sur la siècle Umayyade, Beyrouth, 1930, 315-316.

2. Gabrieli, op. cit., 19.

able to acquire the money to purchase his liberty, he then became a client of his former master's family and tribe, occupying a social position between that of slave and free born man. He could not marry a free woman. If he were murdered the blood money paid was one half that of a free man, but if he himself committed a crime, his fine was but half that of a free man. Should a mawla die, his patron might inherit his possessions, but the mawla himself could not inherit from his patron.

A second form of clientship was the result of treaty or association, an agreement entered upon by one group desiring protection from another more powerful body. An example of this in pre-Islamic times is to be found in the Jews of Medina who became the clients of the tribes of Anus and Khazraj.

The third category of mawla were such by marriage, and it is significant that the woman, not the man, determined the relationship. Thus if a person married a woman whose family were clients of a particular tribe, he became the mawla of his wife's tribe.¹

It is with the second category, clientship by association or treaty, that we are principally concerned. During the years of the conquest, the Arabs were faced with the problem of determining the social status of those peoples

1. The clearest discussion of this subject, from which our statements are drawn, is to be found in Jurji Zaydan, Umayyads and Abbasids, tr. Margoliuth, E.J.W. Gibb Memorial Series, London, 1907, 10-20.

who became converts to Islam.

Although it is true that belief in Islam established a man on equal footing with his fellow members of the religious community in the eyes of God, and although the state was a theocracy in theory with no sharply defined limits to demarcate religious from political functions, it is true that the notion of citizenship as we understand that term was not conceived as membership on equal footing in the Islamic state, for whatever the intentions of the Prophet may have been for the all inclusive universality of his religion, the fact remained that to the Arabs, citizenship signified membership in a tribe, and not in the state. It was therefore necessary to associate the non-Arab Muslims with the tribes, and this was done by making them clients, or *mawali*. The one requirement, of course, was that the man, or group of men, about to enter such a relationship be confessed Muslims. Once this requirement was met, the prospective client went to an Arab and said, "Will you be my patron on condition of protecting me, of inheriting from me in case of my death, and of paying blood money in my place during my life?" The Arab would reply, "I accept," and the bargain was sealed.¹ Coincident with such an agreement, the new *mawla* generally changed his name to an Arab one which has resulted in many difficulties, for unless the sources specify his origin, one naturally assumes

1. Zaydan, Jurji, op. cit., 19.

he is of Arab stock.

When we read that so and so was a mawla of such and such a tribe, as for example that Harun ibn as-Siwash was a mawla of Beni Sulaim,¹ we can be almost certain that such a man became a client through an agreement of association. On the other hand, if it is stated that so and so is a mawla of such and such a person, the chances are that he was originally a slave of that person, who had been freed. Such a man was the great Abu Muslim who had been the slave of 'Isa ibn Ma'qil from whom he was purchased for 400 dirhems and presented to the Imam Ibrahim,² and then as an adopted mawla began his career in Khorasan.³ The prospects of those mawali who possessed a good education or came from families of some importance were distinctly promising, and should they have had the good fortune to be attached to a prominent Arab, their well being and success was virtually assured. The loyalty of such mawali to their patrons is uniformly conspicuous; this fact has a significance of the very first order. If an Arab revolted or took an opposing stand on some political question and was joined by other Arabs, the mawali of the Arabs concerned accompanied their patrons as a matter of loyalty and duty, and to argue that the mawali were revolting against the injustices of the social order because

1. Tabari, *op. cit.*, 1693.

2. *Ibid.*, 1726.

3. Wellhausen, *op. cit.*, 519.

the tyranny of the Umayyad governors and their repressive measures "destroyed the hope which nourished the clients and the new converts of becoming equal with the dominant race¹ is to underestimate completely this factor of loyalty. Wellhausen has shown that the rebellion of Ibn Ash'ath did not take its tone from the mawali. The leaders were the most prominent and notable men with some 100,000 other Arabs, and just as many mawali, but it was customary for the former to take their clients into the field with them and make them fight on foot, while they themselves were mounted.²

We have read Tabari with the purpose of discovering instances of mawali deserting their patrons to take up arms for their own cause, and we have been unable to find a single example. On the contrary, the mawali stood by their patrons when other Arabs had deserted. In Marwan II's flight to Egypt, as we shall see later, his only true supporters were his clients. A conspicuous example is to be found in the case of Yazid, a mawla of Nasr ibn Sayyar, who fell into the hands of Abu Muslim. The latter, with the view of enlisting Yazid's support, ordered his wounds to be treated and showed him the greatest generosity and kindness. Abu Muslim at length permitted the mawla to go back to Nasr, predicting to his friends that he would return. Now when Yazid came to Nasr, the latter said:

1. Van Vloten, op. cit., 18.
2. Wellhausen, op. cit., 246.

"Welcome! By God, I did not think the people would spare you except to use you as an evidence or an excuse against us."

And Yazid said, "By God, it is so what you thought; they have made me take an oath not to betray them, and I have said that they prayed prayers at the proper time . . . and they summoned men to the government of the Prophet of God, and I think that their affair will become great, and if you were not my master and if you had not freed me from servitude, I would not have returned to you and I would have remained with them."¹

To the mawālī of ability, government service offered a real career. This was particularly true in the West. For example, Yazid ibn Abī Muslim, who had been the former commander of the guard (*حرس*) of Hujjaj,² was governor of Ifrikiya in 101 (719-20). The most ferocious governor that Egypt or Ifrikiya ever had was a mawla of Beni Saḷūl, Ubaidallah ibn al Ḥabhab, who was appointed by Hisham in 116 A. H. (731) "He was a remarkable chief, a distinguished officer, and an excellent preacher. He knew all the Days of the Arabs and could recite their poems from memory. He began his career as a Kātib (secretary) and fortune led him to be governor of Egypt, Ifrikiya, and Spain. He gave Egypt to his son, al Qāsim, and Tanger

1. Tabari, *op. cit.*, 1959.

2. Ibn Adarī, tr. E. Fagnan, *op. cit.*, 45.

to another son, Ismail.¹ Muhammad ibn Yazid, a mawla of the Ansar, was governor of Ifrikiya from 97 to 100 (716-19) and from 102-103 (722)². Hicham appointed a mawla, Jababa, governor of Kirman.³ Harun ibn as Siwash, mawla of Beni Sulain, was commander of a frontier garrison (را بطرة) in Khorasan.⁴ Nasr ibn Sayyar appointed Hizak ibn Salih, mawla of Amr ibn al Asi governor of Ghazni.⁵ and consulted with al Bakhtary ibn Mujahid, mawla of Beni Shaiban, on important matters.⁶ When ibn Hubeira appointed Muslim ibn Said governor of Khorasan, he said, "Let your chamberlain (عاجبك) be one of your trusty mawali, for he is your tongue and your representative."⁷

Then Muslim asked ibn Hubeira to send him Tawba ibn Ayy Usaid, a mawla of Benu Anbar. When ibn Hubeira met Tawba he was so impressed by him that he said, "A man like this should be a governor," and dispatched him to Muslim ibn Said who said, "Here is my seal. Govern as you think best." Now when Muslim was recalled and Asad ibn Abdallah was appointed governor of Khorasan, Tawba wished to return, but Asad said, "Remain with me for I have more need

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1. Ibn Adari, tr. E. Fagnan, *op. cit.*, 49. Cf. Severus ibn Mucaffa, Evetts, *op. cit.*, 74-104 *passim* for the Egyptian career of Ubaidallah and al Qasim.
 2. Tabari, *op. cit.*, 1435.
 3. *Ibid.*, 1457.
 4. *Ibid.*, 1693.
 5. Tabari, *op. cit.*, 1695.
 6. *Ibid.*, 1661.
 7. *Ibid.*, 1481.

of you than Muslim," and he remained and occupied himself with the welfare of the people and of the army, with the result that he was so loved that the phrase "in the manner of Tawba" became proverbial for good dealing.¹

Mawali who were distinguished for a special ability were continued in office under successive administrations. Thus the old finance minister of al Hajjaj, Salih ibn Abdur Rahman, a mawla from Sijistan, held the same office in Iraq under Yazid ibn al Muhallab, Hajjaj's most bitter enemy.² In Khorasan Saïd Khudaima made a mawla of Bonu 'Uwāfa, Sulaiman ibn Abi -s Barra, Sahib of the Kharaj in 102 (720),³ and eight years later, 110 (723), we find Sulaiman holding the same office under Ashras.⁴ It will be remembered that it was a mawla, Abul Saïdā, whom Ashras appointed to convert the people of Samarkand,⁵ and he was the same who represented the cause of the mawali to Umar ibn Abdul Aziz.⁶ Practically all the important administrative and secretarial posts of the government, as well as the confidential advisers, scribes, estate managers, respected servants, and business representatives of the wealthy Arabs were mawali, who were naturally the best educated and most intelligent men of the empire and were consulted and used whenever there was a need for their

1. Tabari, op. cit., 1481-1482.
2. Ibid., 1306.
3. Ibid., 1421.
4. Ibid., 1509.
5. Ibid., 1507.
6. Ibid., 1354.

special qualifications. A number were recognized as poets of the highest rank. Such a man was Thabit Qutna in Khorasan. Others were celebrated as scholars and divines. Muhammad ibn Ishac, the author of the life of Muhammad, was the grandson of the mawla, Yasar.

For these non-Arabs who had military rather than intellectual ability, a career in the army was open. Seven thousand of them fought for Qutoba.¹ In Khorasan, there were regiments composed of and commanded by Iranians, and some of their leaders were most conspicuous warriors, such as Harith and Thabit Qutna.² Those mawali who followed their patron into battle received both wages and maintenance from him, and he in turn collected an additional stipend registered on the diwan to cover their expenses.³ The method by which independent regiments and groups of mawali were paid is not certain, but it is perfectly apparent that they did receive compensation, for in the two most conspicuous cases when the mawali complained, that of the Berber revolt led by Masaira⁴ and the case of the 20,000 mawali fighting without compensation,⁵ it is clear from the context that the mawali were not asking for a new privilege which had never before been granted, but were complaining against the fact that tyrannical governors had with-

1. Tabari, op. cit., 1290.

2. Wellhausen, op. cit., 595-6.

3. Fries, Nicolaus. Das Heereswesen der Araber zur Zeit der Conquaden nach Tabari. Tubingen, 1921, II.

4. See above page 95.

5. Tabari, op. cit., 1354.

hold the accustomed stipends.

There is no evidence that the mawali regularly employed in government service, holding administrative offices especially in the collection of revenue, serving prominent clients, or fighting side by side with the Arabs against such common enemies as the Turks, were unduly humiliated and despised by their patrons. Most of them were well paid and some few were certainly extremely wealthy. Their services and their unswerving loyalty to their patrons did not go unappreciated, and they were generously accorded the respect and gratitude to which they were entitled. We have mentioned already such men as Tawba and Thabit Qatna. There is in addition to this an interesting passage in Tabari which gives the names of the greatest Arabs of Khorasan, concluding "and there were men of the mawali like these in judgment and ability and knowledge of war, among them al Fadthal ibn Bissan, mawla of Benu Leith, Abdallah ibn Abi Abdallah, mawla of Benu Sulaim, and al Bakhtary ibn Mujahid, mawla of Benu Schaiban."¹

All these men were people of distinction and were treated as such, and the evidence collected by Van Vloten by which he argues that all mawali were subjected to humiliation and were universally despised by the Arabs does not apply to them.

1. Tabari, op. cit., 1544.

These mawali we have been considering represented the middle and upper classes of the society which existed at the time of the conquest. There were, however, many new converts, recruited from the lowest ranks who were to be found in the large cities, particularly in Kufa and Basra, where they were attached to an equally low group of Arabs. A large proportion of them were peasants who had fled from the land. Those who were able to pick up some trade did so; the rest existed in the best way they could, living on what largesse was given them, performing a variety of menial tasks; they were always ready to enlist on the side of anyone who would pay them. As Muslims they were exempt from the capitation, but as city dwellers of no service to the state and taking part in no military campaigns, they received no stipends from the government. In this respect they were on an equal footing with the pure blooded Arabs of the same class, who likewise received no stipends, or but meagre ones, and they were always ready to associate themselves into bands for a joint effort at resistance to that "tyranny" of the Umayyads which, so to speak, kept them off the "relief" rolls, participation in which they felt was their right. For these people, the Arab aristocracy felt the greatest contempt. The story is told of a hot dispute between such a mawla and an Arab. "God give us few like thee," said the former.

The Arab retorted, "God give us many like thee!" On

being asked why he had blessed the mawla in answer to his curse, the Arab replied, "Do not these creatures sweep our streets, patch our shoes, and weave our garments?"¹

There was a saying that three things only stopped prayer, the passing of an ass, of a dog, and of a mawla.² Mukhtar, the Kharajite, lost the support of the Arabs of Iraq who had at one time aided him because they could not endure the privileges and favors he was bestowing in this city mob. When the old army chiefs remonstrated with him, Mukhtar replied, "Those who come over to me by affection must not be treated like those who serve only through compulsion."³ The alienation of the Arabs of Iraq settled the fate of Mukhtar, whose mob was no match for the trained troops that fell upon him. These mawali in Kufa are characterized by terms of degradation. Tabari in referring to them speaks of the *السفلة*, the dregs of society, or simply as *رتاع*, the city mob.⁴ Hasan al Basri refers to them as the *تجرعيل*, the anonymous, unknown people without reputation or standing, and also as the *السفهاء*, the foolish and ignorant mob.⁵ Against these people existed deep racial and social scorn, which was returned with hatred. That they

1. Zaidan, Jurji, op. cit., 72.
2. Ibid., 71.
3. Hollani's Tabari, op. cit., IV, 90.
4. Tabari, op. cit., 1683.
5. Ibid., 1400.

were treated with insolence and contumely is true, and Van Vloten is on surer ground when describing their grievances, but all factions of Arabs so treated them, the anti-Umayyads, as well as the state officials; surprisingly, Hisham for one exhibits no little concern for their well being.¹ It is difficult to see how the caliphs could have improved their lot materially. The revenues of the different provincial treasuries, collected from the ahl diwan were not sufficient to permit the enrollment of every Muslim under the sun on the diwans, if there was to be a penny over for performing the necessary state functions; and a vigorous taxation of the wealthy Muslims to take care of those less fortunate would have been regarded as outrageous and would have resulted in disaster. Nothing could have been more unpopular.

One may yet deny that there were any alleviating circumstances, any justification for the Umayyad "tyranny" toward these low class mawali; from the purely historical viewpoint, there is only one important consideration. How effective were these mawali in their opposition to the state and their participation in rebellion? It appears that their influence was on the whole negligible. The most conspicuous insurrection in which they played a large role was the revolt of Mukhtar, who was a scoundrel of the first order. He had been one of the enemies of Al Hasan

1. Tabari, op. cit., 1634.


taking part in the pursuit of Ali's son when he fled from al Kufa to al Madāin. Then he joined the side of al Husain. Personal enmity against Ubaidallah ibn Ziyad, governor of Kufa, was the origin of his conduct. In 66 A. H. (685) he forged letters authorizing him to act in behalf of Muhammad ibn al Hanafiya, and with the battle cry of "Revenge for Husain" got possession of Kufa. As no one else in his right mind was disposed to put much reliance in Mukhtar, he turned to the mob of mawali. The rebellion lasted a year and a half and when Mukhtar and his men finally surrendered, none was spared. This was the most conspicuous single case of the participation of the mob in a large uprising. Wellhausen has been struck by the fact that the earliest adherents of Mukhtar were the mawali in Khuzarnā near Kufa, and Abu Muslim originally came from the same place.

All this would seem to show that there exists a close connection between the unsuccessful revolution of Mukhtar and the successful one of Abu Muslim. Notwithstanding that the fire in the year 67 seemed to be extinguished by blood, it still glowed on under its ashes and spread from Kufa to Khorasan.¹

The hypothesis is plausible, if one is prepared to believe that resentment passed on from father to son could be the chief motivating factor sixty years after the event. Subsequent to Mukhtar's revolt, there were two other rebellions in which the mawali played a part. Yazid ibn al Muhallab, an Arab with a grievance, undertook to enlist the mob of Basra in his support. Like everyone else, he began by summoning

1. Wellhausen, op. cit., 505.

men to the Book of God and the Sunna of his Prophet, saying that a Jihād against the people of Syria brought greater recompense in the eyes of God than war against the Turks and Ismailites.¹ Yazid was in his rebellion, a political adventurer with personal ambition. Under the Umayyads, the custom of any politician of summoning men to the Book of God and the Sunna of His Prophet was like patriotism today, the last refuge of scoundrels and hypocrites. To no one was this more apparent than to Hasan al Baera, who cried out before the mosque, "O, men, Yazid only a short time ago used to behead those whom you see standing here and sent their heads in haste to Beni Harwan, wishing to curry favor by their execution, and now when he is angry, he raises up bamboo poles on which he has tied some dirty old rags and bawls: 'I call you to the Sunna of the two Umars.' But according to the Sunna of the two Umars, you should put a chain about his leg and return him to the prison where Umar ibn Abdul Aziz had sent him."²

Then in the succeeding days Hasan kept on with his sermons, and no one dared molest him. "Oh, men," he said, "stick to your homes and stay your hands and fear God, your patron (), and do not kill each other for a world that will end and for greed and ambition that will perish . . . Verily, there never was a revolt, except most of its people were orators and poets and light-headed fools and

1. Tabari, *op. cit.*, 1391.

2. *Ibid.*, 1392.

men of no account who were wont to overrate themselves."¹

The greatest danger that can befall any historian of these revolts is to accept the slogans of the different leaders at their face value. The rebellion of Yazid ibn al Muballab was motivated entirely by self interest, which like all politicians he concealed in the cloak of righteousness and resistance to tyranny, yet his own career when he was in power was characterized by extortion and iniquity. Events in Iraq repeatedly demonstrated that the strength of a movement depended on the support it received from the Arab muqatila, not from the mawali. No one perceived this any more clearly than the caliph Hisham in his remarkable instructions to Yusuf ibn Umar, governor of Iraq, for the suppression of the revolt of Zeid ibn Aly in 122 (740).

Call unto you the nobles of the people of the different districts and threaten them with corporal punishment and the confiscation of their property, and whoever has made a compact with Zeid will be slow to go to his succor, and then there will rally about him only the mob and the people of the Sawad and those whom necessity stirs up to a delight in revolution . . . so begin with threats; then bite them with your lash and unsheathe the sword in their midst, and fear the nobles before you fear the middle class, and the middle class before the mob . . . Verily, that which the Commander of the Faithful has feared was the inciting of the vulgar to do that in which they would be unfortunate and misguided, for their fate would be bitter, though for the Commander of the Faithful it would increase his glory.²

Hisham's judgment proved wise. Zeid ibn Aly was de-

1. Tabari, *op. cit.*, 1400.

2. *Ibid.*, 1683-84.

serted by those Arabs who had encouraged him to resist; his movement was suppressed and he was put to death. The mawali of Iraq took part in one more rebellion, that of Ibn Muawia, great-grandson of Jafar, Aly's brother, in 127 (744). Kufa would not receive him, and he departed to al-Medīn where he recruited a rabble of slaves and mawali. For two years he prospered, but was finally routed by Ibn Hakeem in 747. Abu Muslim would have nothing to do with him and he fled to Herat, where he was murdered.

This was the last occasion in which the Iraq mawali took part. When Sa'atba descended on Iraq with his victorious troops from Khorasan, he met with passive reception in that province which played an insignificant role in the triumph of the Abbasids. How Abu Muslim recruited his forces in Khorasan, we shall discuss later in the chapters dealing with Marwan.

Military and Political Institutions

The Umayyad Army

When the conquering Arabs entered Syria and took a city which was so situated as to command strategically a large territory, the Amir left in that place a permanent body of troops larger than the usual garrison.¹ Hard by the city of Homs, at the beginning of the foothills of the Anti-Lebanon where there was a slight elevation overlooking the great plain of the Beqā'a with its routes to Hama, the Euphrates, and the North, the Arabs erected such a military camp. They founded a second near Damascus, a third at Tiberias, and a fourth at Lydda. On the west banks of the Euphrates and the Shatt al Arab, the first conquerors established two more stations on the sites of Kufa and Basra. Amr ibn al 'Asi settled a camp at Al Fustat in Egypt, the name Fustat, now applied to old Cairo, meaning simply a tent or a campground of tents. In these military camps lived the Arab warriors, the muqātila, with their wives and children. At the beginning, they lived apart from the settled villages of the conquered peoples and their camps were little else than a miserable collection of goat skin tents and mud huts, but as the station became permanent, more durable structures were erected and so out of camp sites grew the Arab cities

1. Baladhuri, op. cit., I, 196.

of Kufa, Basra, and Fustat.¹ The Arabs called such a military encampment a jund. The word occurs in the singular and plural forms both in the Koran and in pre-Islamic poetry; it signifies merely a body of fighting men, and may best be translated by the modern equivalent - regiment. During the days of the caliphate, however, the jund greatly increased in numbers until it became a force roughly the size of a present day army division.

Every military force so permanently established was supported by the tax revenue and produce of the town and surrounding territory it controlled. In the course of events, the term jund took on a geographical connotation and came to mean the district ruled by an army division, and presently in Syria these districts became the units of government in the province. It is not certain when this took place. Al Yaqubi tells us that Umar divided the empire into seven districts, including Syria, the Jazira, Kufa, and Basra, and that he established junds in Palestine, the Jazira, Mosul and Cinnisrin.²

Saladthari says:

There is a disagreement regarding the name jund. According to some, Palestine was called "Jund" of the Muslims because it was a collection of many districts, and so was Damascus, Jordan, Hama, and Cinnisrin; according to others, each district which had an army that received its monthly allowance in it was called a jund. Thus,

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1. Reitemeyer, Else. Die Städte-rundungen der Araber in Islam, Munich, 1912, 2, 3.
 2. Yaqubi, Tarich of Ahmad ibn Abu Yaqub ibn Jafar ibn Wahab ibn Madhah known as al Yacubi, H. Th. Houtsma, ed. Leiden, 1883. II, 176.

Mesopotamia belonged to Cinnisrin, but Abdul Malik ibn Marwan made it a separate jund and made its army take its allowance from its kharaj From to the time of Yazid ibn Muawia, Cinnisrin and its districts were included in the province of Homs, but Yazid constituted Cinnisrin, Antioch, Hamij, and their districts as one jund.¹

That the geographical term "jund" was suggested by the fortified camps and applied to the districts of military occupation has been generally accepted. Lammens, who has discussed the problem at some length, points out that the statement of Baladthuri that until the time of Yazid I Cinnisrin was included in the administrative district of Homs directly contradicts Al Yaqubi's assertion that Umar made it a jund.² He therefore, following Baladthuri, attributes the identification of administrative unit and jund to Yazid I,³ and shows that as so constituted, each district had a definite tribal unity, which he believes was part of the caliph's intention. Thus in Cinnisrin, Gais predominated. Homs was peopled by tribes of Yemen, and Damascus by Kalb and Judam.⁴ This arrangement then was a happy solution of the problem of tribal enmity, since opposing groups did not live under the same jurisdiction.

If Lammens is correct in his belief that a single tribal group predominated in each of the Syrian military camps, this situation was unique in Syria. Elsewhere throughout the empire, the Arabs divided a jund into thirds,

1. Baladthuri, *op. cit.*, I, 202.

2. Lammens, *Mélanges*, *op. cit.*, VI, 437.

3. *Ibid.*, 438.

4. *Ibid.*, 440.

fourths, or fifths; each section was separate from the other and contained its own tribe. In Africa, Amari states that each of the settlements, or brigades containing one tribe, was called a jund, and that the force containing all these brigades was referred to by the plural of the word: junūd.¹ We are not in a position to challenge this statement as it applies to the West. In the East, however, the term jund is invariably employed in the singular to mean the entire collective body of men, the sum total of tribal fourths or fifths, stationed in one particular place. Thus we read that Asad transferred the jund of Barūqan to Balkh, where he resettled it; clearly the entire armed force is meant.² During the revolt of Bahlul, Khalid enlisted (جنڈ) a jund of the people of Iraq, probably at Wasit; the governor of al Jazira called out his jund; and Hisham sent a jund of the people of Syria³. All the armed troops of Balkh were called the jund.⁴ In the event of a serious crisis demanding the formation of a large force recruited from different sections of the empire, the army, because it was composed of contingents from different junds, was called in the plural, junūd, or ajnād. Thus Ady ibn Artā, warning the people of Basra against provoking the caliph to send a large expeditionary force from Syria, recalls to

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1. Amari, Michele. Storia dei Musulmani di Sicilia. C.A. Nallino, ed. Catania, 1933, I, 256.
 2. Tabari, op. cit., 1490
 3. Ibid., 1626.
 4. Ibid., 1590.

them the might of the "junud of God in the West".¹

To denote an army in the general sense, the word employed was jaish (from جيش , to master troops); it signified merely a collection of troops. Likewise, askar (عسكر meaning "camp") may denote the army in description of battles.

As we have said, the jund itself was divided into tribal groups. In Kufa there were four such,- (1) the Ansar of Medina (2) Madhiġ and Asad (3) Kinda and Ĥabīa (4) Tamim and Hamdan.² In Basra there were five divisions,- (1) Azd (2) Tamim (3) Bakr ibn Wa'il (4) Abdul Geis (5) Ahl 'Alīa, the latter being the collective group of Quraysh, Bajīla, Geis Allān, Azd, and Kināna.³ This same tribal separation existed in Khorasan, where Nasr ibn Sayyar mustered the fifths.⁴ Maslama divided the jund established at Bab al Abwab into four parts, - the men of Damascus, of Cinnisrin, of Homs, and of Al Jazira.⁵ There was a similar division in Alexandria where each tribal group had its own quarter and mosque.⁶ In times of peace these soldiers followed their own occupations, but when it was necessary to prepare them for a campaign, the leader

1. Tabari, op. cit., 1385.

2. Ibid., 1702.

3. Ibid., 1381-2. Zotenberg is puzzled by the term in his translation of Bel'ami's Tabari and renders it montagnards, highlanders, Bel'Ami's Tabari, op. cit., IV, 211.

4. Tabari, op. cit., 1690.

5. Bel'ami's Tabari, op. cit., IV, 287.

6. Von Kremer, Orient under the Caliphs, op. cit., 108.

of the jund, who bore the title of Amir, summoned each group in the following manner:

Adi called the people of Basra and he appointed over each fifth a man, and he put in charge of the fifth of Azd, al Mughira ibn Ziyad, and over the fifth of Tamim, Muhriz ibn Humran, and over the fifth of Bakr ibn Wail, 'Iran ibn Amir ibn Misma' of Bonu Geis ibn Thalaba. And Abu Munzir, a man of Geis ibn Thalaba, said: "Worily, the flag of leadership should go only to Bonu 'alik ibn Misma". So Adi called Kawth ibn Shaiban ibn Malik ibn Misma' and put him over Bakr ibn Wail, and he called Malik ibn al Mundir ibn al Jarud and put him over Abdul Geis and he called Abdul Aly of the Qureish and put him over the Ahl 'Alia But 'Iran ibn Amir was angry with Adi for depriving him of the flag of leadership of Bakr ibn Wail and giving it to his cousin, so he deserted and joined Yazid ibn al Muhallab.¹

In actual battle, this same tribal distinction was preserved as we see from the following accounts of Asad's campaign against the Khaqan and the Turks in 119:

Now in charge of ordering men for battle was al Qasim ibn Bukhait al Marashy and he placed Azd and Tamim and al Juzjan ibn al Juzjan with his camp followers (*فالمركبة*) over the right wing, and he lined opposite them the people of Palestine commanded by Musab ibn Amr al Khuzā'a and the people of Cinnisrin under Saghra ibn Ahmar, and he placed Rabia on the left wing under Yahya ibn Hudthain and he joined to them the people of Homs under Jafar ibn Manzala al Bahrany and the people of Azd under Suleiman ibn Amr al Maqri, and he placed in charge of the vanguard Mansur ibn Muslim al Bajli and lined up with them the people of Damascus under Hamala ibn Kusaim al Kalby, and to them he added the guard (*حرس*) and the police (*شرطة*) and the servants of Asad.²

1. Tabari, *op. cit.*, 1331-82.

2. *Ibid.*, 1609.

Nothing was more important for the ultimate victory of the army than the skill and ingenuity employed in arranging troops, for the different groups were jealous of one another and it would have been a fatal error to put one tribal section where it would have had to bear the brunt of the battle, or another group in the rear where at a critical moment it could have rushed in, turned the tide, and arrogated to itself the claims of victory. Thus on the right wing Bukhait has skillfully placed Azd (Yemen), Tamim (Mudhar) and a Syrian group led by a man of Khuzāh (Yemen). On the left wing are more men of Azd, with Rabia (Hodar) and Kalbites of Homs. In the vanguard were the Kalbites of Damascus, together with the local Khorasanian guards and police. In this way, each division of the army has a section of Syrian troops with a carefully ordered mixture of the Khorasanian muqātila. To do this job properly was so absolutely vital that the Amir himself, for fear of making mistakes and antagonizing some of his men, frequently did not attempt it, but relied on a professional organizer who bore the title "على تعبئة القتال". In the passage just quoted, Bukhait held this position. Tabari in another place refers to Ubaidallah ibn Habib as being unequalled in Khorasan for such ability.¹ Another officer of equal importance was the (صاحب رأي في الحرب), the director of strategy and tactics. Discussing this,

1. Tabari, op. cit., 1544.

Tabari tells us:

The directors of strategy in war were al Mujashshar ibn Mazāhim as Sulaymī and Abdur Rahman ibn Subh al Kharaqy and Ubaidallah ibn Habib al Hajry, and al Mujashshar could make men assemble about their flags and take arms properly; there was no one like him in this ability, and when any military situation became critical there was no advice and ability like that of Abdur Rahman ibn Subh.¹

Abdallah ibn Abi Abdallah was a similar adviser on matters of strategy.²

The armies were recruited from the junud of Syria, from the Jazira, and from Kufa and Basra, but under the Umayyads we have little mention of troops coming from the Hijaz, from Yemen, or from the Hadramaut. The soldiers who conquered the West and the reinforcements which followed came from Syria. Khorasan had been conquered from Basra and Kufa. According to Wellhausen, al Hajjaj had kept Syrian troops from going to that province, lest they be contaminated by the political notions of the Iraq Arabs.³ In later years, however, the government kept large groups of Syrians in the East.⁴ Side by side with the Arabs fought levies of native troops. We have already mentioned the Berbers⁵ and the Makharars of Armenia⁶. In the East, Basr during the campaigns in 121 was aided by 20,000 men of Bukhara, Samarkand, Fiss, and Ushrusana.⁷

1. Tabari, *op. cit.*, 1544.

2. *Ibid.*, 1548

3. Wellhausen, *op. cit.*, 249, footnote.

4. Tabari, *op. cit.*, 1609, 1725.

5. See above page 95.

6. See above pages 22, 23, 74.

7. Tabari, *op. cit.*, 1690

Every army leader had his secretary who kept the lists of the men enrolled and the stipends to which they were entitled. When the army was engaged in an active campaign, its money was carried with it; otherwise, the troops living in their fund headquarters were paid at regular intervals, probably once a month. The expression in Tabari "from Muharram to Muharram" suggests in some cases a yearly payment.¹ In those battles, however, where the loyalty of the troops was in doubt, very considerable inducements had to be offered. Yusuf ibn Umar promised every man who brought him the head of a Muhallabite supporter 500 dirhems.² Yazid III offered 2,000 dirhems to each man who enlisted against Walid II.³ This practice was not so common when the Arabs were fighting an external enemy like the Turks, and when it did occur, the people who benefited were frequently the Iranian contingents. Junaid, for example, when hard pressed, offered freedom to all the slaves and his promise spurred them on to victory.⁴ In his campaign against Harith ibn Suraj, 'Asim ibn Abdallah offered 300 dirhems a head.⁵ However, in all internal strife like Kharajite or Shiite rebellions, as well as dynastic struggles, it is very rare to find a case where the commander did not offer his troops exceptional bonuses - usually several hundred dirhems for each head or prisoner. The government, besides

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1. Tabari, *op. cit.*, 1826.
 2. *Ibid.*, 1711.
 3. Wellhausen, *op. cit.*, 372.
 4. Tabari, *op. cit.*, 1545.
 5. *Ibid.*, 1579.

paying the troops, had to provide for their maintenance (رزق) and equipment. When reinforcements in Khorasan were required from Iraq, twenty thousand troops were dispatched together with thirty thousand lances and the same number of shields.¹ The government had depots for the storing of arms, and in Damascus it would seem that they were kept in the mosque.²

The customary battle formation was a center in which the Amir stood, a right and a left wing, a vanguard, and a rear guard. Each section had its own commander, and the troops were divided into groups of ten under a decurion (عريف). The Arabs themselves usually were mounted, but large numbers went on foot with the rawali who composed the infantry. With each army travelled slaves and camp followers, the personal servants and orderlies of the fighters, called "shakiriya". A battle began with the shooting of arrows from a distance. Then as the two armies approached men hurled their lances, and finally, at close quarters, both sides drew their swords. Should the Arab infantry be hard pressed, it was customary for some of the cavalry to dismount and fight on foot, while the rest of the cavalry occupied itself with the enemy horse or else harried the foot soldiers. It is extremely difficult to follow the accounts of the order of battle because once the initial charge was made the story focuses on the exploits of individual com-

1. Tabari, *op. cit.*, 1545.

2. *Ibid.*, 1791.

batants.

One is continually impressed by the importance played by trench warfare, a practice adopted from the Persians. In every territory where an attack might be expected at any time, or in the presence of large bodies of enemy troops, the Arabs dug a trench or moat, the so-called khandaq, completely around their camp, piling up the excavated material on the inside to form a wall. Such a fortification was virtually impregnable against an ordinary assault. The cavalry could not be used in the ditch and footsoldiers who descended into it and tried to scramble up the other side were at the mercy of the defenders. Against this defense two courses were practicable. The attackers might lay siege, cutting the defenders off from food and if possible diverting the water supply. Otherwise, it was necessary to bring up siege instruments - catapults capable of hurling large stones, and a defensive shed under which the attackers could fill in the trench while the earthworks behind were being battered in preparation for a general assault.

This, however, did not usually happen. The khandaq remained a temporary defense against night attacks and surprises, a place where a smaller body of men could await the arrival of reinforcements, and once there was a chance of combat under good conditions, the army sallied forth to test its luck in the open field. Besides these temporary

fortifications, there were permanently fortified places. There were towns like Damascus, Homs, Palmyra, Wasit, Hira, Heru, and Samarkand, called *حصن*, citadels within towns, called *قصر*, and castles placed on hill tops in naturally fortified positions, called *قلعة*.¹ To reduce such places was no easy matter, requiring as it did the construction of catapults, scaling ladders, and other siege instruments, and the attacking force might require months before a victory could be gained. This was Marwan's experience before Homs. Indeed, the best that a commander could expect in such a siege was perfidy on the part of some of the defenders who would secretly open the gates, or indicate the most vulnerable part of the wall, or show where it might best be undermined by a tunnel.

In connection with the army, one encounters some technical terms. Thus there is the *كتاب كنيبة* a cavalry *كنيبة* usually some two hundred men, the *حقائب ام قنبر* smaller cavalry group of from thirty to three hundred, the *كراديس* *م. كزذوس*, a regiment formation developed by Marwan II, the *سرية*, or raiding band of one thousand men,² the *قيقاتية*, or archers from Sind, the *طلاية*, or watch, the *عيون* literally eyes, the spy patrols, and the *منادي*, or herald.

Military science showed very little progress during the

1. Fries, Nicolaus. Das Heereswesen der Araber, 35-6.

2. Tabari, op. cit., 1462.

period. Against their external enemies, the Arabs were successful. If they had not developed the science of strategy to the point of the Greeks, they compensated for this shortcoming by a better esprit de corps, a contempt for the enemy, an initial confidence in victory, and to some degree possibly by a reliance in the help of Allah. In the yearly summer raids in Anatolia, they had the advantage of a more mobile force and were ever ready to follow the maxim: he who fights and runs away will live to fight another day. If the Turks in the East could offer equal valor, they were at the disadvantage of being not so well armed, nor had they developed a formation which was a successful defense or offense against the Arab tabiya. The Arabs felt for them the contempt of civilized people for barbarians. The great military problem in Transoxania was how to divide the forces of occupation in permanent garrisons and at the same time to have enough additional mobile troops to meet large bodies of Turks. The Khaqan did not have the primary consideration of maintaining his lines of communication and could descend on any town where information told him the garrison was weak. It was by these tactics that he won his major victories, for the Arabs were always strategically on the defensive, but under anything like equal terms, could defeat the Turks every time. With the death of Khaqan, the Turkish problem ceased to trouble the Umayyads.

While the main bodies of troops were stationed in the

large military towns, the borders were protected by a series of frontier garrisons, the so-called thughur (**ثغور**). When Muawia in 25 A. H. passed the Taurus on an expedition against Amuriah (Amorium), many forts held by the Greeks were vacated and some of these the Arabs occupied.¹ Subsequent to this initial seizure of the strategic points commanding the passes of the Taurus, the Arabs erected a chain of fortresses stretching southwest from Malatiah, where the River Cabaqib enters the Euphrates at its extreme western limit, to Massisah on the Jayhan River, thirty miles east of Adana and the same distance north of the gulf of Alexandretta.

Habib ibn Maslama on an expedition dispatched by Iyad ibn Ghamr, the conqueror of the Jazira and Armenia, first occupied Malatiah (Melitene). It was later recovered by the Greeks. Muawia reestablished it and made it the center for the summer raids against Rum, but after his death during the revolt of ibn Zubeir, the garrison was recalled and the Greeks occupied Malatiah again. When Abdul Malik became caliph, he sent Abdallah, his son, back to this region and the thugr was located at Turandah, fifty miles to the west, where it remained until Umar II moved the troops back to Malatiah which was then held during the rest of the Umayyad period.² Below Malatiah was Madath (Adata) taken in the reign of Umar I. Then came Marash, followed by al Muthaqqab,

1. Baladhuri, op. cit., I, 254.

2. Ibid., 289.

Catarghash, and Baghras, all fortified by Hisham¹, and finally al Massisah, one of the most important fortresses, constructed by Abdallah, the son of Abdul Malik in 84. Every winter some two thousand troops went up from Antioch to garrison Massisah against a possible surprise attack from the Greeks, but in the summer, during the raids which penetrated well beyond this point, the garrison was withdrawn.² Despite some serious sieges³, and an unfulfilled project of Umar II to evacuate Massisah⁴, this garrison was maintained.⁵

In Armenia, there was a large garrison at Dabil, the old Dwin, seat of the Persian marzpan, a few miles north of the Araxes River in a direct line between Lake Van and Lake Gukchah. This was the Arab capital of Armenia.⁶ In Arran at Bardah was another station.⁷ During the reign of Hisham, Maslama made an expedition against the Khazars and established a garrison at Bab al Abwab on the Caspian just north of the Nahr ul Malik or Samur River. Near the source of the western Euphrates, Arzan ar Rum (Erzerum) guarded

1. Baladthuri, op. cit., 258.

2. Ibid., I, 255.

3. Ibid., 290.

4. Ibid., 255.

5. Cf. E. W. Brooks, "The Arabs in Asia Minor" Journal of Hellenic Studies. 1898, 205-208. G. le Strange, The Lands of the Eastern Caliphate, Cambridge, 1930. 120-21, 127-28.

6. Ghazarian, Mertitsch. Armenien unter der Arabischen Herrschaft, Marburg, 1903, 56. Thopdschian, Hagoo. Die Inneren Zustände von Armenien unter Aset I. Mittheilungen des Seminars für Orientalische Sprachen, Berlin, Jahrgang III, 1904, 115.

7. Laurent, op. cit., 52.

the road from Trebizond to the interior.¹ Tiflis on the Kour and Kisal, twenty parasangs south east, guarded the North, and Nakhchevan below Dabil commanded the route into Adorhaijan.²

Transoxania, like Asia Minor, had its garrisons in Bukhara, Samarkand, Kish, Ghash, Khujandah, and other strategic centers. During the reign of Hisham, a new measure was taken to secure the frontiers of Khorasan. This was the invention of the so-called *rabitah* (*رابطة*), mobile regiments of cavalry, which could be shifted from one military station (*رابطة*), to another. Ashras, the governor of Khorasan, invented this force, probably in 110, and appointed as its commander Abdul Malik ibn Dithar al Bahaly.

Besides the thugar, or frontier fortresses, the Arabs also had garrisons in the interior of the conquered provinces, located in every town of any importance. They were called *maslaha* (*مسالحة*) and were under the command of the *sahib ul maslaha* who was either the *'amil* or governor of the town, or subject to him.

To preserve public order in the cities there was a police force called the *shurta* (*شرطة*) under the command of a *sahib us shurt*. The origin of this force is somewhat obscure. Abu Bakr is reported to have established an ad-

1. Laurent, *op. cit.*, 176.

2. *Ibid.*, 178.

3. Tabari, *op. cit.*, 1504.

administration of civil affairs to conserve property and public order, under Abdallah ibn Masud.¹ At Fustat, Uthman appointed a sahib us shurt whose business it was to apply the inflicted legal punishments, keep the prisons, open and close the city gates, and apprehend criminals.² On the other hand, Yaqubi reports that Muawia invented the police troops.³ Whatever their origin, they certainly existed at the time of Muawia and are mentioned repeatedly thereafter. There was a shurta in every Arab town, the commander of which was named by the local governor, except in the capital of a province, or in important cities like Kufa and Basra, where the commander was directly named by the Amir of the province. Besides the shurta, there was the haras (حرس), or bodyguard attached to the caliph and to every Amir of the empire. This, too, according to Yaqubi, Muawia invented.⁴ The commander of the guard seems in some cases to have had other functions. Thus Daud al Barbary was in charge of the guard of Khalid in Iraq, but he was also his chamberlain (على حجابة) and director of the diwan of correspondence.⁵ The commander of the guard of Hisham was the Keeper of the Seal⁶ and as such he was the head of the chancery where copies of every dispatch re-

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1. Echnauer, Walter, "Memoire sur les Institutions de Police chez les Arabes." Journal Asiatique, Series V, June, 1860, XV, 466.
 2. Ibid., 471.
 3. Yaqubi, op. cit., II, 276.
 4. Ibid., 276.
 5. Tabari, op. cit., 1650.
 6. Ibid., 1649.

ceived or sent were filed.¹ From these facts it would seem that the guard, besides its military duty of protecting the Amir, may have been charged with the civil function of seeing that the transmission of dispatches and the execution of the caliph's orders were not interfered with.

Both the shurta and the haras fought in major campaigns with the levied troops. We have already noted one such case² and there are many other instances of it.

The empire, then, maintained the following permanent bodies of men constantly under arms: the shurta, the guard, the frontier garrisons (thugur) along the Taurus, in Armenia, and in Transoxania, the Khorasanian frontier force, or ribata, and the interior garrisons, or maslaha, of which Wasit in Iraq, the station of the Syrian troops who preserved order in that province, and Hira, the garrison for Kufa, were the most important. In Kufa and Basra, order was maintained only by the *haril* and his shurta. The total number of men serving in these permanent forces we are unable to estimate, but it is safe to say that their duties were such that it was impossible to withdraw any large numbers of them from one frontier or locality to serve in a crisis in another.

The greatest military strength of the empire was vested in the Arab *muqātila* of Syria, of Kufa and Basra, and of Khorasan. In times of peace, they lived the life of civilians,

1. Von Kremer, Orient under the Caliphs, op. cit., 193.
2. See above page

managing their estates and practicing the arts of gentlemen. The Arabs of Khorasan became more and more merged with the native population; they adopted the trousers

سراويل of the Iranians, drank wine, celebrated the festivals of Nairuz and Mihrgan, and spoke Persian quite as frequently as they did Arabic.¹ It was on people like these that the caliph and his governors had to rely.

Such was the military strength of the government, and it is easy to infer how completely unreliable it was for accomplishing the great aims of the state. The weaknesses, which were so fatal, were as follows: (1) There was no discipline which taught men to obey and trust implicitly their commanders; lack of discipline meant the absence of all ties of loyalty and duty attaching the men to the caliph as the God appointed ruler of the destiny of the state. (2) Against the infidel, men fought for religion, which was a negligible factor, for booty, which was most important, or for their own protection. They had to be well paid to go against the unbelievers, and even better paid to defend the country from the enemy within. (3) In all battles, they fought not as soldiers of the state, but as members of a tribe, with the result that in place of unity of purpose there reigned a conflict of interests and the disjunctive forces of passion and partisanship. (4) When the muqatila were not under arms, their stipends frequently continued as

1. Wollhausen, op. cit., 493-4.

a heavy burden on the treasury, yet so accustomed did they become to the profitable life of the civilian that it had to be made worth their while to return to martial deeds. They had the time, the means, and the inclination to participate in political and religious struggles, fatal preoccupations of any troops.

Under these circumstances the military forces of the caliph were effective only against a foreign enemy and were worse than useless in cases of domestic strife, for in the many Kharijite and Shiite uprisings, when one group of muqatila turned against another, the rebels had the same training, the same kind of discipline, the same weapons, the same tactics, and the same means as the soldiers fighting for the state, in addition to which they were battling for a holy cause and possessed that inspiration for victory which did not animate the hearts of the soldiers who took the field against them. To make any use at all of such a system required ability and strategy of no mean order. Abdul Malik wrote to Hajjaj when he sent him to Iraq: "If you wish to keep troops loyal to duty, levy them en masse, pay them by the corp, and discover how to attach them to you by necessity."¹ Of these three requisites, the last--to attach the troops to the commander by necessity-- was the most important. In Syria where the people identified their own interests with those of the dynasty, the caliph found it comparatively simple

1. Al Masudi, op. cit., V, 276.

to assure himself of the loyalty of his troops, but in the East, the success or failure of his Amirs depended on their creating a situation which made it profitable and advantageous to a large body of muqatila to support the government's policies. The Amir of Khorasan had to conciliate and flatter those outstanding men whose personal prestige with their own tribal groups commanded the respectful obedience of their followers. Of one of these influential tribal sajids, Ibn Hubeira remarked: "The Lord of Geis is Kawthar ibn Zufar; if he blows a trumpet in the night, twenty thousand men rally about him without asking why he summoned them."¹ There were many Kawthars, and the caliph might select one of them and make him governor. The patronage which the Amir could dispense preserved the attachment of his own tribes to him, and he in turn stuck by the caliph whose favor maintained him in power. But in the meantime, those tribes out of power were conspiring to gain ascendancy. They attached themselves if possible to the heir to the throne, who was bound to recompense them for their services on his succession. The fact that the caliph could rely on only that half of the muqatila which enjoyed political power was very serious. Hisham looked for a solution in the appointment of governors who belonged to neutral tribes. Such a man was Masr ibn Sayyar. When he was appointed, men objected. "Masr has no tribe or family in Khorasan," they said. "I will be his tribe," said Hisham,

1. Tabari, op. cit., 1455.

thus showing his desire to substitute for the dignity of tribal backing the prestige of exorting the delegated power of the Commander of the Faithful. Asad made another attempt at reform when he moved the jund of Barūqan to Balkh in 107. The soldiers had been living in fifths, but in the allotments at Balkh they were together without any tribal distinctions.¹ We have no information that the same strategy was employed elsewhere, but if it was, it did not meet with success. Had the policy of appointing neutral governors been instituted earlier and formed into a tradition, something might have been accomplished, but it was too late for reform when Nasr assumed office, for at the last moment he failed to attach the Yemenites to him because of the vigorous anti-Yemenite policy of the caliph in Syria.

We have repeatedly emphasized the disadvantage of the caliph in not having a dependable military machine to over-awe any malcontents or prospective rebels and to make all hopes of successful resistance unthinkable. A few examples will illustrate this. Then Shawdab, the Kharijite, revolted at the accession of Umar ibn Abdul Aziz, he began with a following of only eighty horsemen of Habia.² The revolt of Yazid ibn al Mahallab is more significant. At the accession of Yazid II he escaped from prison and the first act of the governor of Basra, Adi ibn Artā, was to arrest those members of his family

1. Tabari, *op. cit.*, 1490.

2. *Ibid.*, 1348.

still remaining in the city.¹ In the meantime, Yazid was in the vicinity of Kufa and the governor, Abdul Hamid ibn Abdur Rahman, sent out the shurta of Kufa to arrest him, yet, either through cowardice or disloyalty, it let him escape.² Having passed by Kufa safely, Yazid marched on Basra. What were his forces? He had only seventy men!³ When he approached Basra, Adi at once levied the troops from the fifts, as we have described above, but because he had taken the flag of leadership from Imran, the latter deserted.⁴ The Muhallabids belonged to the Yemenite tribe of Azd, which presently deserted the government to aid Yazid. Worse was to follow. The Hudtharite tribes of Tamim and Abdul Geis were the natural enemies of Azd, and Adi had every reason to believe that they would be reliable in this crisis. The customary soldier's pay had been two dirhems per day. Tamim and Abdul Geis decided the time had come to strike for more. Adi protested that he could not increase the stipends without the authorization of the caliph, whereupon Tamim and Geis marched out of the city.⁵

Adi now had only the shurta, stationed in the citadel, and a few mawali for the defense of the city. Resistance became futile and he surrendered. In the treasury of Basra

1. Tabari, *op. cit.*, 1379.

2. *Ibid.*, 1380.

3. *Ibid.*, 1393.

4. *Ibid.*, 1382.

5. *Ibid.*, 1383.

at that time was a sum of 9,000,000 dirhems.¹ With this to pay his men, Yazid enlisted an army and his power was not shattered until 80,000 troops were sent from Syria.

If the case of Yazid ibn al Muhallab shows the weakness of the government in being unable to seize a man escaped from jail with but seventy followers, and suppress his project, the revolt of Bahlul, the Kharijite, is even more impressive. While on a pilgrimage Bahlul gave his servant a dirhem to buy some vinegar, but the shop keeper would give him only wine. Bahlul then went to the local 'amil to complain. The latter dismissed the charge lightly, saying, "The wine is better for you and your people." Outraged by this, Bahlul went to Mosul where he communicated his grievances to his friends, and at length persuaded forty men to join him.² With this wretched army, he marched south, meditating a comprehensive revenge beginning with the local official who had affronted him and ending with the governor, Khalid al Qasri, himself. One would imagine it would be light work to deal with such a band. On the contrary Khalid was greatly perturbed and left Wasit to go to the garrison of Kufa at Hira. At that time some Syrian troops were en route to India, and Khalid promised that those who would fight Bahlul would be excused and permitted to return to their homes. Six hundred accepted his offer and Khalid reinforced them with two

1. Tabari, *op. cit.*, 1411

2. *Ibid.*, 1622.

hundred of the shurta of Kufa. Bahlul, who in the meantime had picked up adherents, scattered this force, which seems to have been all the governor could muster,¹ and victorious, returned to Mosul where he at once formed the project of marching against the caliph Hisham, and it was not until three army divisions were levied that he was at length defeated.²

These were not isolated incidents, and occurred again and again; the initial helplessness of the government is invariably the most striking feature. In most cases the Amir was forewarned, and occasionally he could take precautionary measures. When Zeid ibn Aly rebelled in Kufa, the threats of Yusuf ibn Umar deprived him of the promised support of the Kufan aristocracy, yet it is remarkable that his affair was permitted to gain the headway it did. Zeid made the mistake of Musein in accepting at face value the promises of the Kufans. The significant fact is that he felt confident that given the support of the Kufan maqātila he could risk defying the armed forces of the empire, and, as it was, the few hundreds that stood loyally behind him put up a terrific struggle which at times threatened to succeed. Had Zeid won an initial victory those who had withheld their support would have flocked to join him; on this he doubtless counted. Indeed, nothing was more important than a victory at the outset against the shurta and

1. Tabari, *op. cit.*, 1624.

2. *Ibid.*, 1626.

additional men that the government could hastily levy, for victory bred confidence and brought support from those who were waiting to see the turn of events, and when a few thousand had joined the rebels, the movement began to acquire momentum, until it reached that point where it was possible to seize the local beit ul mal and divert the income of a district from the state coffers to the pockets of the rebels. Once this was accomplished, everything became simple. As soon as a Yazid ibn al Muhallab, a Dahhak ash Shaibany, or a ibn Muawia got control of the local revenues, he was able to pay and maintain his forces and insurrection became revolution. The inability of the Umayyad caliphs to create an army which would be on permanent footing, and through good pay would be loyally attached to the cause of the State, as well as the failure of the caliphs to purge the ranks of men unattached by loyalty, was the greatest weakness, the Achilles heel of the dynasty. The crisis originating in Khorasan demonstrated this weakness at a time when nothing could be done to reform it, and Marwan II was the unhappy victim.

Administration

From the army, we now turn our attention to some other phases of government. The empire was divided into a number of large provinces and some smaller districts. In the west,

the governor of Ifriqiya who resided at Carawan ruled all North Africa from present day Libya to the Atlantic, and Spain as well. At his disposal lay the appointments of the prefects and sub-prefects over this vast area. Egypt was a separate province under its own governor, with the exception of a brief period during the reign of Hisham when Uaidallah ibn al Babhab governed both Egypt and the West. The province of Syria and Palestine was directly controlled by the caliph. It had no governor, but five Amirs over the five junds of Palestine,- the capital of which was first Lydda and then from the reign of Suleiman and thereafter Ramla,- Jordan with its capital at Tiberias, Ramascus, Homs, and Qinnisrin; the Amirs in turn delegated authority to the 'amil of each town. Arabia was divided into five parts. One governor had under his authority Mecca, Medina, and Taif,- in other words, the Hijaz. Yemen was ruled by a governor living in Sana'a, and the Hadramaut, Oman, and Bahrein each had its governor. In the North, Armenia and Aderbaijan were under one Amir. The Jazira or Mesopotamia at one time was joined to the jund of Qinnisrin, later it was independent, and finally was included with Armenia and Aderbaijan. When Marwan became caliph he lived at Harran in the Jazira and ruled it personally. Finally there was the great province of Iraq, which included Khorasan, Sijistan, Fars, Transoxania, India, and all the other lands lying to the east of the Tigris.

There were then really only four great provinces includ-

ing wide territories where the governor had at his disposal the filling of a number of very important offices, and where he was comparatively independent of the caliph in his executive decisions - Ifriqiya, Egypt, Armenia-Azerbaijan, and Iraq. (The Hijaz and other districts of Arabia, the jund of Syria, Palestine, and Jordan, and the Jazira were without dependencies.)

The most important office at the disposal of the caliph was the governorship of Iraq. When Muawia made Ziyad its governor, he gave him control of Iraq, Khorasan, and Kirman,¹ and this arrangement continued, with some variations to be mentioned presently, throughout the reign of the dynasty. Hajjaj established the capital at Wasit on the Tigris, and from his time, the governor of Iraq filled these offices: he appointed prefects over Kufa, Basra, and al-Medain, as well as prefects of the shurta in these towns; he named also the prefects of Ahwaz in Khuzistan, of Shiraz and Istakhr in Fars, of Isbahan, Hamadan, and Rayy in the Jibal, of Sirjan and Kirman in Kirman, of Kuhistan, of Sijistan, of Kum and of Jurjan. He also had the authority to nominate the Sahib ul Kharaj of these places. His greatest appointment was the governorship of Khorasan, and the man who held that post himself named the prefects of Misabur, Tus, Herat, Merv, and Balkh, as well as the prefects of Tirmid, Samarkand, Bukhara, Shash, and

1. Bel'ami's *Tabari*, op. cit., IV, 16.

Khawarizm beyond the Oxus.¹ The governor of Iraq was directly responsible to the caliph, but the prefects of the dependencies of Iraq were responsible to its governor.

This was without exception the practice until Umar II became caliph. He abolished the governorship of Iraq and made Adi ibn Artā' governor of Basra and its districts and Abdul Hamid ibn Abdur Rahman ibn Zaid ibn al Khattāb governor of Kufa and its districts. Umar also appointed Abdul Hamid's secretary, Abu Zinād.² Moreover, the caliph directly appointed Ash Shābi cadi of Kufa and Hasan al Basri cadi of Basra.³ Khorasan was removed from Iraq and placed under the immediate jurisdiction of the caliph. Umar nominated first al Jarrah ibn Abdallah in 99, who ruled for a year, and then he replaced him by Abdul Rahman ibn Muaim al Gushairy.⁴ Moreover, the caliph appointed directly Abdur Rahman ibn Abdallah as Sahib ul Kharaj of Khorasan.⁵ Mecca and Medina, which had before been under one prefect, were separated; Umar sent Abdul Aziz ibn Abdallah to the former and Abu Bekr Muhammad ibn Amr ibn Hazm to the latter.⁶

In these acts of Umar we must see an attempt to make all his subordinates personally responsible to the caliph instead of to an intermediary. It was a sound idea and re-

1. Tabari, *op. cit.*, 1664.

2. *Ibid.*, 1346.

3. *Ibid.*, 1347.

4. *Ibid.*, 1352.

5. *Ibid.*, 1357.

6. *Ibid.*, 1346.

vealed a preoccupation of this famous man with all the details of administration.

Yazid ibn Abdul Malik, the successor of Umar, followed the practice of his predecessor and appointed Abdur Rahman ibn Sulaiman al Kindi governor of Khorasan.¹ Presently, however, he had to reward Maslama ibn Abdul Malik for putting down the revolt of Ibn al Muthallab in 102, and he did this by restoring all Iraq and its dependencies to Maslama. The latter then named his son-in-law, Said Khudaina, governor of Khorasan. Later when Maslama was unable to raise surplus revenue to send to the caliph, Yazid replaced him by Umar ibn Hubeira, who had been the governor of the Jazira, and he ordered ibn Hubeira to recall Said Khudaina, who had proved unsatisfactory, and to replace him by Said al Harashy, but although the caliph had personally intervened in the nomination, he still preserved Khorasan as a dependency of Iraq.² Al Harashy, because of the circumstances of his appointment, affected to scorn his superior, ibn Hubeira. He jested about his personal appearance, never referring to him as Amir but asking messengers: "How is old Abul Muthanny?" For this insolence, ibn Hubeira on his own authority recalled him and appointed Muslim ibn Said ibn Aslam ibn Zira'a al Kilaby in 104.³

When Hisham became caliph in 105, he made Khalid al Qasri the governor of Iraq in place of ibn Hubeira. Khalid recalled

1. Tabari, *op. cit.*, 1388.
 2. *Ibid.*, 1438.
 3. *Ibid.*, 1453.

joined to the Sahib of Iraq, for Iraq is the source of its provisions, its reinforcements, and its aid when crises appear and misfortune is at hand, for the Commander of the Faithful is far from Khorasan and his help is slow in arriving to it.

After sending this letter, Asim consulted with his friends and they said in indignation: "You tell us after you sent the letter? What's the use? Wait, and Asad will come to you."¹

It is a little difficult to see what Asim's motives were. As his friends foresaw, he had committed an incredible blunder. Hisham took him at his word, returned Khorasan to Khalid al Qasry, who sent Asad back as its governor in 117. The second period of Asad's rule was wise. He crushed the Turks and returned Transoxania to allegiance. He moved the capital of the province from Merv to Balkh, where he erected buildings and offices for the diwans and sponsored a movement for the regeneration of the old capital of Iran.² This act in Gibb's view was highly advantageous. Balkh was nearer to Turkistan and was a better point d'appui for attacking any troubles that appeared across the Oxus. Apart from strategic reasons, Asad's undertaking marked a concession to Iranian national feeling and was rewarded with trust and friendship by the people.³

Asad died at the time of his brother's disgrace in 120. The new governor of Iraq, Yusuf ibn Umar, wished to appoint

1. Tabari, op. cit., 1574.

2. Ibid., 1591.

3. Gibb, op. cit., 80.

his own men to Khorasan. Hisham refused and resumed control of affairs in the East. His method of procedure is worthy of notice. He summoned men who were acquainted with the conditions in Khorasan and asked their advice. They wrote down the names of their candidates and presented them to the caliph. As each name was recited, some one would state an objection but at length Nasr ibn Sayyar was chosen.¹ This is on the authority of al Madainy, who likewise gives a modified version:

It is reported that when the news of the death of Asad reached Hisham, he said to Abdul Karim, "How do you think we should appoint over Khorasan, for I am told that you are well acquainted with its people?" Abdul Karim himself reports: I said, "O, Commander of the Faithful, there is a man in Khorasan resolute and courageous and I shall present his character to you." He said, "What is his name?" I said, "Judaia ibn Aly." Hisham said, "I do not want him; there is an evil destiny in his name. Suggest another." I said, "That eloquent and experienced man, Yahya ibn Nuaim Ash Shaibany." He said, "He is of Rabia and Rabia is not strong enough to hold the frontiers (thughur)." Then I said to myself, "He hates Rabia and Yemen and his preference is for Hudthar," so I said, "Aqil ibn Maqal al Leithy, if you will overlook a small matter." He said, "What is it?" I replied, "He is not temperate and abstemious." Hisham said, "I do not want him." Then I said, "Mansur ibn Abil Kharqa as Sulamy, if you will overlook a little sharp dealing, for his reputation in this respect is not savoury." The caliph said, "Other than him." I said, "Al Mufashshir ibn Muzahim as Sulamy: he is intelligent and brave, although his advice is often given deceitfully." He said, "A liar is no good." I said, "Yahya ibn Hudthein." He said, "Did I not tell you that Rabia cannot hold the frontiers?" And Abdul Karim said, "When I mentioned Rabia and Yemen, I postponed until last the mentioning of Nasr ibn Sayyar who was

1. Tabari, op. cit., 1660.

the most manly of all, the most prudent and skilled in government and politics and I said Nasr ibn Sayyar. Hisham said, "He is the one." I said, "If you will overlook one thing, though he is temperate and experienced and sagacious." Hisham said, "And what is it?" I said, "His tribe in Khorasan is insignificant." The caliph cursed me: "May you have no father! Do you desire a tribe greater than I? I will be his tribe."¹

Such was the method of choosing a governor. Umar ibn Abdul Aziz consulted men in the same way.²

Hisham maintained Nasr as his personal representative. In 123 Yusuf ibn Umar tried to recover control and wrote to Hisham: "Khorasan is like a horse with sores on its back and if the Commander of the Faithful sees fit to join it to Iraq, then let him appoint As'alt ibn al Hakam." As bearers of this message Yusuf sent agents to disparage Nasr's character and accuse him of being in his dotage.³ The attempt failed, for the caliph was loyal to his servant. When Hisham died and Walid II succeeded, the new caliph first confirmed Nasr, and then returned Khorasan to the governor of Iraq, Yusuf.⁴ The abandonment of the very satisfactory arrangement of Umar I and Hisham might well have proved serious. Yusuf ibn Umar at once recalled Nasr. The latter appointed Isma Ibn Abdallah al Asadi to be governor pro tempore, Al Muhallab ibn Iyas over the Kharaj, Musa ibn Warqa over Shash, Hassan of the people of Saghaniyan over Samarkand, and Muqatil ibn Aly over Amul,⁵ it being the

1. Tabari, *op. cit.*, 1661-2.

2. *Ibid.*, 1354.

3. *Ibid.*, 1718.

4. *Ibid.*, 1764.

5. *Ibid.*, 1767.

recognized privilege of a retiring governor to name temporary rulers until his successor should arrive. By slow stages, Nasr started west but before he had gone far news came of Walid's murder. Nasr returned and refused to recognize Mansur ibn Junhur, the new governor of Iraq. When Marwan succeeded, he made ibn Hubeira governor of Iraq, and the latter recognizing Nasr's ability confirmed him in office, but although Khorasan by this act was returned to Iraq, events in the West so occupied the caliph and ibn Hubeira that the old governor was left to himself to play a lone hand until his death.

Whatever changes took place, one fact is clear: ultimate power always rested in the caliph. He could intervene at will, annul the acts of his subordinates, refuse to heed their desires or grant them if he chose. From him undiscussed went out decrees and appointments; his authority and dignity were universally respected by his officials.¹

What sort of men did the caliph choose to represent him? In Syria, the prefects of the junds were frequently members of the caliph's family. Abdul Aziz ibn Walid, for example, was governor of Damascus during the latter part of the reign of his father who sent his heir, Suleiman, to govern Palestine; this was the customary training school for the Umayyads in politics. To the Umayyads also went the leadership of the expeditions against Rum. Abbas ibn

1. Cf. Gabrieli, *op. cit.*, 120, 121.

al Walid led the raids of 94, 95, and 102. Muhammad ibn Marwan was an old campaigner in this territory. Hisham regularly insisted that members of his family take part in these expeditions. His son, Muawia, the ancestor of the Spanish Umayyads, died in 118 or 119 in the land of Rum; his other son, Sulaiman, likewise a great fighter, was to be one of Marwan II's greatest enemies. Most distinguished of all was Maslama ibn Abdul Malik. We find him raiding in Armenia in 95. In 96, he is in Asia Minor. In 97-8 he commands the great expedition sent against Constantinople, and in 102 he is governor of Iraq. Marwan ibn Muhammad from 114 to his accession in 127 was governor of Armenia. War in the West was thus the training school of the Umayyad princes, and we have reason to believe that the prefecture of the Syrian junds gave them their political experience. It is very unfortunate that the Arab historians mention only infrequently the Syrian prefects. Under Hisham, the prefects of but a single jund are known,¹ but when we do hear of them, more often than not the Amir is an Umayyad. The rulership of the holy cities of Medina and Mecca was likewise a favorite post for the training of members of the family. Abdul Malik sent his brother Abdul Azis to Egypt, but this was an isolated instance. The general practice was to keep the family, as much as possible, in Syria.

1. Gabrieli, *op. cit.*, 121.

For the most important post of all, Iraq, the caliphs tried to select the best qualified men. Only two were Umayyads: Maslama, who ruled a year in reward for his suppression of the revolt of Yazid ibn al Muballab, and the son of Umar II who was sent by Yazid III in the foolish hope of conciliating the province. In all other cases, the caliph chose men not of his family. Muawia found a genius in Ziyad. Abdul Malik and Walid possessed a man of even greater ability in al Hajjaj, the outstanding figure of the age. Umar ibn Hubeira al Fasary, who had governed the Jazira under Umar, became governor of Iraq under Yazid II. His son, Yazid, was the brilliant associate of Marwan II. Hisham discovered in Khalid al Qasry a true successor of Hajjaj in genius and ability, but a man who avoided the cruelty of his predecessor. He had gained previous experience as governor of Mecca. Yusuf ibn Umar, who succeeded Khalid, had had fourteen years' training as prefect of Yemen before his appointment. These were no ignorant, unknown men who held the second highest position in the caliphate, nor were the governors of Khorasan. One thinks of the great career of the conqueror Quteiba ibn Muslim. AlJunaid had made a name for himself in India before going to Khorasan in 111. Asad ibn Abdallah had been trained with his brother Khalid. Nasr ibn Sayyar had a lifetime of experience in Khorasan before taking office. Let us take the case of Muslim ibn Saïd:

When Saïd ibn Aslam was killed, al Hajjaj took his son, Muslim ibn Saïd, and educated him with his own (Hajjaj's) children and treated him well and when Ady ibn Arta came he wished to make the boy a prefect and his secretary said, "Appoint him first to an unimportant vilayet and then promote him to a greater dignity if he does well and maintains himself." During the revolt of Yazid ibn al Muhallab, Muslim still forwarded the revenues of his province to Syria, and when Umar ibn Hubeira became governor, he resolved on appointing Muslim to a higher office, and he summoned Muslim one day, but his hair had not yet turned grey, and then ibn Hubeira looked more closely and saw a grey hair in his beard, and said, "Allahu Akbar!" Then he passed the evening with him and others and when the rest had departed, Muslim stayed behind. Now in the hands of ibn Hubeira was a quince, and he tossed it to Muslim, saying, "Would it please you if I made you governor of Khorasan?" Muslim said, "Yes." Ibn Hubeira replied, "Tomorrow morning, then inshallah."

And when dawn came, ibn Hubeira took his seat and men assembled, and he gave to Muslim his commission as governor, ordering him to depart forthwith, and he wrote to the officials of the kharaj that henceforth they were to address their letters to Muslim.¹

Ibn Hubeira in his instructions told Muslim to appoint as his local officials, "imals of excuse. "What," said Muslim, "are prefects of excuse?" Ibn Hubeira replied, "Order the people of each city to choose for themselves, and when they have selected a prefect, appoint him, and if he proves good, that will redound to your credit, and if he is bad, then it is their fault, not yours."²

Saïd Khudaina had done the same thing.

When Saïd Khudaina came to Khorasan as its governor, he summoned the dihqans and he asked their advice about whom he should appoint to rule their villages and they suggested to him

1. Tabari, op. cit., 1457-58.

2. Ibid., 1481.

some Arabs and he named them and later when they were complained of, he said to a deputation which visited him, "I came to this country and I did not know its people, and I sought for advice and suggestions and they suggested certain persons, and when I inquired about them, they were praised to me, and I appointed them."¹

Both Asad and Nasr ibn Sayyar consulted prominent non-Arabs before making their appointments. The picture is by no means as black as some authors have painted it. Von Kremer has said:

The Umayyad court was governed by most unwholesome influences. As early as Yazid II the governorship of Iraq, the most important governorship by far, was given away under the influence of the female favorites of the caliph. A further evil gained ground which later on led to most disastrous consequences. High dignitaries of the court, members of the ruling dynasty, were appointed governors of important provinces, but they never actually assumed charge of their office. They remained at court and had themselves represented by accredited deputies who had scarcely any other object in view than filling, with the revenue, the pockets of their noble chiefs, not neglecting at the same time their own. Thus Hisham appointed Maslamah governor of the United Provinces of Armenia and Adherbailan. But Maslamah appointed a na'ib who administered the province for him.²

Von Kremer is guilty of many inaccuracies, but nothing could be more misleading than this passage. The governor of Iraq appointed by Yazid II was ibn Hubeira. He had indeed ingratiated himself with Hababa, Yazid's mistress, as a matter of good politics, no doubt. The fact does not prove that he was incompetent or undeserving. His rise to fame had come about through the most pious of caliphs, Umar

1. Tabari, op. cit., 1460.

2. Von Kremer, Orient under the Caliphs, op. cit., 215.

ibn Abdul Aziz, who at least thought well enough of him to make him governor of the Jazira. In his rule in Iraq he did nothing to show that he was incompetent. The "later disastrous consequences" for which von Kromer refers us to Ibn al Athir, V, 116, is the result of a misunderstanding or falsification of the accounts on that page. Von Kromer wants us to believe that it was the general custom of provincial governors to stay in Syria and enjoy the life of the court. To prove this he cites the single instance of Maslama. He would have some difficulty discovering others. Actually the governors did go to the places where they were sent. The passage in Ibn al Athir is as follows: "Hisham deposed al Jarrāh from Armenia and Aderbaijan and appointed over it his brother, Maslama ibn Abdūl Malik, and Maslama appointed over it al Harith ibn Amr at-Tayy and in the land of the Turks he destroyed farms and many villages and left his imprint in it."¹ We learn from Tabari what happened. Maslama left al Harith to hold Armenia while he himself conducted a raid against Kaysariyya (Caesarea Mazaka).² He then returned to Armenia and made his brilliant campaigns against the Khazars.³ This activity is further confirmed by Theophanes.⁴ If von Kromer had considered Ibn al Athir V, 129, which tells of Maslama's Armenian campaigns, he might

1. Ibn al Athir, *op. cit.*, V, 102.

2. Tabari, *op. cit.*, 1491.

3. Al Yacubi, *op. cit.*, II, 381, ff.

4. De Boor, ed. A.N. 6221, quoted by Gabrieli, *op. cit.*, 80.

not have made such a charge. His book is frequently misleading because of his readiness to seize on a single fact as an example of common practice. Van Vloten is guilty of the same conduct and it is a little surprising that Wellhausen, who was one of the first to put stress on the Abbasid bias of the historians preserved to us, should himself be ready to draw without question conclusions damaging to the Umayyads, taken from isolated incidents. The truth is that the more one studies the facts critically, the less tyrannical and inefficient Umayyad government appears. Lamens has resuscitated Muawia, Yazid I, and Marwan, showing them in much different and far better light. The Aphrodite Papyri forced people to think better of Umayyad rule in Egypt. Gabrieli shows us Hisham as an exceptional ruler who made some exceedingly wise appointments. Gibb is not without admiration for a number of the governors of Khorasan. The acts of many of the officials that are condemned can be justified by reasons of statesmanship. The acts of others were admittedly bad and cannot be condoned. Yet for every scoundrel, one can point to more than one man of ability and virtue. Whatever one says, it would be false to argue that the officials sent out by the caliph were ignorant rascals bent always on plunder alone. There are certainly a few instances of ignorance and incompetence among some of the minor officials and we have mentioned these already; the bulk of the evidence points the other way. The important posts went to literate men, well

educated in their youth, practiced in war and tried by experience in minor offices; the exceptions to this were rare. That many of these men misused their authority through partiality to their own people is equally true, but to demonstrate that they were materially worse than the consuls and pro-consuls of other empires and other days, would not be an easy task. The great drawback to good government was the vastness of the empire and the slowness of communication. Muawia did not exactly invent the system of relay post every twelve miles, although this is attributed to him by Ibn at-Tiktaka,¹ but he put in order a system that had existed before. We find frequent references to the roads of the and the office of postmaster. Thus, Bishr ibn Kafra, mawla of Salim al-Leithy, was postmaster general (*علي بيك*) of Iraq.² The house of Harran ibn Karima, a mawla, was in Post Office Street (*في سكة البريد*).³ Apart from these isolated references which prove the existence merely of a postal system, our knowledge of it is very scanty. There is no evidence, however, that anything like an intelligence bureau existed, and for the internal conditions of the outlying provinces, the caliph was dependent on the messages of his officials and occasional deputations that came to lay their grievances before him. He was thus bound to rely on

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1. Ibn at-Tiqtaqa: al-Bakri. Geschichte der Islamischen Reiche von Muhammad ibn Aly Ibn Abdal-Malik known as Ibn at-Tiqtaqa. Wilhelm Kildwardt, ed. Gotha, 1860, 129.
 2. Tabari, op. cit., 1845.
 3. Ibid., 1709.

the decisions and judgment of his administrators, who had virtually a free hand in whatever they undertook. It could hardly have been otherwise, and under the circumstances it is remarkable that the empire was governed as well as it was.

Umayyad Political Theory

The Prophet Muhammad brought a religious message to his people, and in his Holy Book, his sayings, and his customs, he left minute regulations for the ordering of the religious and social life of his community, but apart from the command of obedience to the laws of Allah, he established no very satisfactory rules for the theory and conduct of the state as a political organism. This is not surprising, for the concept of the political state was foreign to the tribal life of the people among whom the prophet lived.

Of all his omissions, none was more serious than his failure to provide for his immediate succession, or to determine the qualifications necessary for the leader of the state in the years and centuries which were to come. Muhammad's death was unexpected and caught his followers unprepared. In the confusion of the moment, Abu Bekr was acclaimed as the most worthy; he on the point of death nominated Umar; the latter just before succumbing to a fatal

would chose a committee to select a new caliph, and the decision fell on Uthman, who, proving less amenable to the will of his electors, was murdered through a conspiracy which they either assisted or condoned. The faithful at length recognized Aly, whom Muawia, the governor of Syria, defied. When Aly was murdered, and his son Hasan was recognized as caliph, Muawia persuaded Hasan to sell his rights and when at length the first Umayyad was universally saluted as the Commander of the Faithful, he held his office by virtue of success in arms, and none dared defy him. The matter of the qualifications and appointment of the caliph still had not been settled.

Now, the only thing that Muhammad had made certain was that the origin of all power was Allah. It was Allah who had revealed the religion of Islam to his prophet, and the laws which the latter had formulated were based on inspiration. To obey Allah and submit to his will was the great injunction imposed on all. The problem at once arose how it would be possible to obey a Divinity who was not personally making His will continuously manifest, and the Umayyads asserted that as caliphs or successors to the prophet, obedience to them was tantamount to obedience to Allah, and thus the idea of ruling authority embodied in an omnipotent man, a notion foreign to the Arabs, was introduced. There was no escape from such a solution; it was the only practical interpretation, without alternative, of the system founded by the Prophet. Unfortunately it was not so apparent to a large

number of the pious, who in the blindness of fanaticism maintained the impossible: that the caliph should and could be primarily a spiritual leader, and should not be a political leader. The caliph should not alter any regulations which God had ordained; moreover, he should not be an innovator by promulgating new decrees. Let him lead a life directed by the literal interpretation of the ordinances of Godly behavior, and let him see that his flock did the same; aside from this, let him permit each one of the faithful to go his way, following his own inspiration. Anything ungodly or sacrilegious could not be tolerated; consequently it was not merely the right, but the obligation of any pious man who detected according to his own judgment and interpretation sinful behavior in the affairs of his village, or his province, or of the state as embodied in the caliph, to oppose, himself, and to organize his adherents to oppose the authors of such sin. This was a democratic, if not anarchistic view of government. The most hateful of all human institutions was that of the mulk or king, the engine and instrument of arbitrary tyranny, and no more deadly insult could be hurled at the successor of the Prophet than to address him with the epithet of king. Such was the notion of theocracy, which as Wellhausen has so well explained, "was in critical opposition to the form of the community as it had come to be. It refused to allow that history possesses a legitimising power, that the state follows its own raison

à'otre, the maintaining and increasing of its power."¹

Muawia rejected theocracy as impracticable if the well being of the Arabs, as well as his own, was to be advanced. He perfected the machinery of administration, made permanent the means of acquiring and distributing revenue, consolidated the first conquests, and extended the frontiers of new ones, founded the navy, provided a system of communication, enforced a recognition of his dignity by sitting on a throne and praying apart, and at length, having acted after the manner of kings, is reputed to have gloried in it and to have confessed, "I am the first of the kings."²

Finally, Muawia provided for a successor in a way which was followed by the Umayyads. In pre-Islamic times, chieftainship of a tribe depended on the free birth of the chief with particular emphasis on the nobility of his mother, maturity of years, and acknowledged courage and judgment in affairs. A man fulfilling these requirements was chosen by acclaim. The principle of heredity where the eldest son succeeded his father, did not exist. Muawia did not violate the basic theory, that his successor should be of free birth, and elected, but he did introduce the principle of dynastic succession by causing his son to follow him. As old age drew on, he summoned the leaders of the Syrian tribes and caused them to take an oath to Yazid as the next caliph. After securing their solemn agreement, he sent deputations to the

1. Wellhausen, op. cit., 61.
2. Yaqubi, op. cit., II, 276.

principal men of the empire and induced them by threats, bribes, cajolery, or self interest also to take the oath. The Umayyads continued this method adapted by Muawia.

First of all, free birth was absolutely essential. Of the many sons of the caliphs by slaves or concubines, we hear little. Maslama, the son of Abdul Malik, was the outstanding figure of his age, yet no one could ever entertain the idea of his becoming caliph. When Zeid ibn Aly was meditating revolt, his claims to the caliphate were rejected by his own family and by the Quraysh¹ and he was scorned by Hisham² because his mother was a slave. Zeid's retort that the prophet Ismail was also the son of a slave and that God made no distinctions on whom He chose to do his will convinced no one. Secondly, succession did not always pass from father to son. Walid I, Suleiman, Yazid I, and Hisham were brothers, and the direct line of Abdul Malik's children was interrupted between Suleiman and Yazid I by the election of Umar ibn Abdul Aziz, their cousin. The act of the reigning caliph in determining his successors was binding if the oath had been taken. Thus, Hisham, who wanted one of his own children to follow him, was unable to do this because his brother Yazid II had designated first Hisham, and then Yazid's son Walid II to succeed him, and Yazid's instrument of succession had been made so binding that to

1. Tabari, *op. cit.*, 1672.
2. *Ibid.*, 1676.

break it would have been illegal and might have provoked revolution. Thirdly, the maturity of the heir apparent was an indispensable qualification. Suleiman had wanted to have his young son succeed him, but was dissuaded by Raja ibn Haywa who suggested Umar II. When Suleiman raised the problem that it would be wrong to nominate Umar when Yazid II was absent, Raja suggested that he name first Umar and then Yazid as Umar's successor; this Suleiman did.¹

The Muslim state had in the Koran a written constitution, which the caliph promised to observe, and which he interpreted as the first source of his sovereignty. In addition to this, his right to exercise this sovereignty was granted by the community of Muslims, who in election appointed the legitimate Imam. The will of the community was expressed through the ashraf, the tribal chiefs or aristocracy, together with the prominent descendants of the companions and helpers of the Prophet, and through wufud - (وفود) - delegations or assemblages convening in the mosque to express the opinion of the community. It was such a wufud presided over by Dahhak ibn Geis that Muawia had summoned to recognize Yazid I. A similar wufud proclaimed Marwan I, and when Yazid III after the murder of Walid wished to justify his act of violence, he too assembled a wufud. Without this assent of the community no caliph could legit-

1. Tabari, op. cit., 1341.

imately exercise his authority. At any time, it would have been theoretically possible for the community to refuse to assent to the accession of an Umayyad, - it might have chosen a descendant of Aly or anybody else. After the death of Muawia II, it came perilously close to recognizing ibn Zubair.

Practically, however, two circumstances intervened to destroy the elective, democratic basis of the caliphate. In the first place, the only community that counted was the Syrian community, which because of its superior military power could abrogate and violate the desires of the people of Iraq and the Hijaz. In the second place, since the will of the community was expressed not during an interregnum but in the lifetime of a caliph, the latter was in a position by virtue of his prestige and the forces at his command to dictate the decision that was reached. The assemblage of the *mafud* was thus an act to determine the will of the sovereign, and the "election" of the caliph at most was little more than a legal fiction. It was, however, a fiction that the Umayyads never forgot, for they repeatedly appealed to the will of the community to justify their decrees and their undertakings. This process of justification had continued to the point that in the later days of the dynasty, the caliphs had developed a concrete theory of the Muslim State through which they answered their opponents. The best statement of this theory is found at length in an important letter transmitted from Walid II

through Yusuf ibn Umar to Nasr ibn Sayyar, which we here-
with present in part:

1. God created Islam as his own religion and made it the choicest of his creations. Then he chose of his angels and his people prophets and sent them with Islam and ordered them by it, and in the nations which have passed and the centuries which have gone by, century after century, these prophets were guiding mankind in the straight path, until the grace of God culminated in the mission of Muhammad at a time when the obliteration of learning and the blindness of mankind, the distraction of purposes, the deviation from the paths of righteousness, and the submersion of truth prevailed.

2. God made clear by Muhammad the right path, unveiled by him blindness, and rescued through him from error and corruption mankind, and sealed by Muhammad His revelation.

3. God united in his prophet the Word which had been revealed by the prophets before him, and men responded to his preaching and submitted to the true religion, for no one of the community of Muhammad who heard him, called him a liar or denounced him or slandered him or confuted him.¹

4. God appointed as Muhammad's successors his caliphs, after he had called Muhammad to paradise, and God sealed by him his decree for the execution of his commands and the establishment of his laws and his will. The caliphs who come after Muhammad follow God's precepts and truths as established in Islam, strengthen the bonds of the community by his rope, protect womanhood and bring justice to God's servants, reforming the nations and preventing evil according to the precept of the Koran. Were it not for the restraint of one by means of another imposed on men by God, verily the earth would have been utterly corrupted. (Koran II vs. 252)

5. The caliphs of God follow one another according to what God has caused them to inherit of the affairs of his prophet. He appoints them his successors and no one can oppose their rights without being thrown down by God, nor forsake the community without inviting destruction, nor despise the government of the caliphs nor dispute the judgment of God

1. Tabari, op. cit., 1757.

in his caliphs, and God has always made it possible for the caliphs to overcome those who have rebelled and has made of them a horrible example and an admonition to the rest of the community.¹

6. When your God said to his angels, "Verily, I am about to place one in my stead on the earth," they said, "Will you place on the earth one who will do evil therein and shed blood while we celebrate your praise and extol your holiness?" God answered, "Verily, I know what ye know not." (Koran II vs. 26)

7. And so by the caliphate God makes remain whom he makes remain on the earth of his servants. Verily, God the exalted knows that there is no support for anything nor benefit except by that obedience through which God preserves His truth, for the caliph stops that which is forbidden and maintains that which is sacred, for whosoever accepts what God has commanded receives his reward in the immediate and in the future good for which he is specially destined, but whosoever turns his face from God's commands and his guidance forfeits his share and disobeys his Lord and loses this world and the next, and he is numbered among those whom misfortune overcomes and the forces of seduction conquer for he has been led into the worst of paths and the vilest of deaths with disgrace in this world and torture and agony in the world to come.

8. Now obedience is the head of all this matter and its hight and its saddle and its reign and its angel and its infallibility and its pillars, and by obedience the successful attain from God their happy position and make their reward a matter of obligation on God, but in disobedience is the revenge and anger and torture of the Almighty.²

9. Therefore, adhere to obedience of God in whatever befalls you, for you have seen the evidence of God's judgment on his caliphs by elevating them and by making their arguments

1. Tabari, op. cit., 1758.

2. Ibid., 1759.

prevail and by repelling the falsehood of those who contend against them or compete with them or are haughty to them, for they wished to extinguish the fire of God which the faithful possess.

10. To stop bloodshed and unite His Word and erect pillars of support in the community of Islam, God instituted his caliphate, for the caliphate is the guarantee for the safety and insurance, and overruling of the Muslims in their affairs, and an assurance of their refuge and a resort for their religion¹ and a gathering of disunited elements and a restoring of harmony and a strengthening of the outposts of Islam and a thwarting of Satan who incites men to destroy religion and offend the pious and disjoin that which God has united, and God has fulfilled these things by his caliphs and his party of righteousness whom He entrusts with the enforcement of obedience to Him, and the fulfilling of Islam, for the caliphate is a refuge and a fortress in times of calamity and a safeguard against evil and hypocrisy.²

11. Now the Commander of the Faithful has prayed for God's help, and God has given him guidance; the Commander of the Faithful has seen fit to present to you a covenant for acceptance,³ and if you accept it, you will be acting like those who lived before you and will enjoy the comfort and wideness of hope, the tranquillity of the soul, the satisfaction of harmony, and the knowledge of that which God has ordained as an infallibility, a rescue, a reform, and a life.

12. The Commander of the Faithful, inspired by God, has ordained that Al Hakam, his son, and after him Uthman, shall rule, and he hopes that God has created and moulded for that office the two, and that God has fulfilled in al Hakam the best of virtues, namely fidelity in his opinions, integrity in his religion, manliness, and the exercising of wisdom and prudence.

1. Tabari, op. cit., 1760.

2. Ibid., 1761-62.

3. Ibid., 1763. This covenant or agreement was the oath of allegiance to the two sons of Walid, al Hakam and Uthman, as his successors, which was being sent throughout the empire for acceptance.

Such was the statement of the Umayyad concept of the Muslim state. The caliphate was a divine institution, erected by God to protect the faithful from internal dissension and strife; it was the instrument for enforcing justice, administering the divine laws, and ensuring the well being of all people. By implication, the caliph rejected utterly the doctrine of free will; what had happened in the past was the result of God's will and decree, and consequently its justification, for if God had not wished the Umayyads to rule, he would have made other provisions; the simple fact that they had managed the state and had triumphed over all enemies and dissensions, both foreign and domestic, proved that they had done so with God's assistance, and hence with his approval. To anticipate the charge that they had done evil and shed blood, they cited the objection of the angels to God's plan to institute the caliphate and God's reply, "Verily, I know what ye know not." All which had taken place was in accordance with God's will, since His knowledge and purpose are inscrutable and unfathomable, it does not behoove man to question His wisdom. Surpassing all virtues and all obligations is obedience, and obedience to God in His divinely ordained government is obedience to the caliph, who is elected by the fact that the inspiration and grace of God descended on his predecessor who nominated him, and on the community who elected him; to dispute this is to challenge the doctrine that all that takes place in

the world is a manifestation of God's inscrutable will and purpose; to deny that the caliph rules legitimately is heresy to be rewarded by discomforture during life and damnation thereafter. The caliphate is a fortress, a refuge, and a guarantee for the well being of all Muslims. The caliph continually prays for guidance, and what he ordains and commands can be nothing else than what God has wished.

This same concept of state was eloquently put forward by Hisham in his letter to Yusuf ibn Umar at the time of the rebellion of Zeid ibn Aly:

You know the condition of the people of Kufa in their love for this House (of Umayya) and their custom of putting themselves in situations where they ought not to be, for they have imposed obedience to each other (and not to the state) and they take as their ruling authority only the laws of their religion (as they interpret them) . . . until they incite one another to disregard the unity of the community and at last reach a point where they think lightly of rebellion Now Zeid ibn Aly came to me, the Commander of the Faithful, and I found him a man facile of tongue, naturally eloquent, and endowed with the ability to falsify the word and alter it and influence men by the sweetness of his tongue and the multitude of his sophistries Let him not remain lest the people lend him their ears and he fills them with the softness of his speech and the sweetness of his logic, for the unity of the community is the strong rope of God and His straight religion and the firmest thing to which one clings Know, therefore, that you are standing before the Gate of unity and summoning men to obedience and arousing people against a faction, for you are girded to defend the religion of God . . . so struggle with him who wishes to shatter this Gate through which God has commanded men to pass.

... Verily, the Commander of the Faithful does not wish to see in his nation a condition of inequality which would be a warning example and a cause for destruction, but he continues his supervision over his people, and brings them to guidance, and preserves them from fear, and drags them along the paths of truth and preserves them from destruction as the sympathetic father guards his son and the shepherd watches his flock.¹

The goal of the Umayyads was the firm establishment of a political state deriving its sanctions from its divine origin and institution. Like all states, its purpose was the maintaining of order and justice, the well being of the people, and the increase of its power and prestige, for though a theocracy at its birth, in its development it was to be a political monarchy limited by the assent of the people in the election of the caliph.

Three things opposed the realization of this goal: Kharajitism, tribal particularism, and the political ambitions of the Shites. The latter did not dispute the Umayyad theory of the origin and nature of the sovereignty of the caliph, but asserted merely that it was illegally vested in the descendants of Umayya and should pass in the house of the Prophet through the descendants of his son-in-law, Aly.

"Everyone who rejects the legitimate Imam whom the community in agreement has recognized is a Kharajite." Such is the definition of Sharastani,² and all things

1. Tabari, op. cit., 1682-84.

2. Haarbrücker, F. Abul Fath' Muhammad eschSharastani's Religionsparteien und Philosophen Schulen 2 Pts. Halle, 1850. Pt. I, p. 123.

being considered, as a definition of the political aspects of Kharajitism it is the best. The Kharajites formed no organized party with an irrevocable platform and program to be fulfilled nor did they engage in secret propaganda and conspiracy directed by a cabal from any particular center.¹ They were Arabs to begin with and made their early headquarters around Kufa. Wellhausen has connected them with the early scholars and the Koran readers, i. e. the Muqaha², and these men certainly were found in the Kharajite ranks. Thus Yazid ibn al Muhallab numbered among his supporters As'unaida al Kindy of Basra Malik ibn Rabia, and when Yazid was recruiting his men "this Kharajite took a place apart from them and with him were readers of the Koran."³

Thomson points out that the Kharajites did not derive all their beliefs from purely Arab sources, but were probably influenced in their theological thinking by the Aramaean heathen and Christians and the Persian Christians and Zoroastrians in Iraq,⁴ and he shows that the Kharajite leaders recruited a motley crew of non-Arabs. The partisans of Abu Maryam asfa'di at Kufa in A. D. 659 were non-Arabs, while those of Ubaidallah ibn Mahuz, the Azraqite, were

1. Wellhausen, Julius "Die Religions-politischen oppositions-Parteien im alten Islam." Abhandlungen der Königlichen Gesellschaft der Wissenschaft zu Göttingen. Phil. Hist. Klasse. Neue Folge V, Berlin 1901, p. 10.

2. Ibid., 10.

3. Tabari, op. cit., 1386.

4. Thomson, William "Kharajitism and the Kharajites", F. E. Macdonald Presentation Volume, Princeton Univ. Press, 1955, p. 374.

dyers, smiths, and ragamuffins of non-Arab origin.¹

The first Kharajites, however, were those who seceded from Aly after the battle of Siffin, and they were Arabs of Tamim, Baltr, and Mandan, from Kufa. They rejected the idea that the rule of the Islamic community should possess in its character anything savoring of the temporal. Islam was to be a pure, unsullied theocracy, with the caliph a spiritual leader. In their view, Aly, by submitting to human arbitration his claim to the caliphate which had been divinely ordained, had committed sin, had made himself merely the leader of a political faction engaged in a trial of power to satisfy personal ambition. The commission of sin thus disqualified Aly forever from the caliphate.

Reason proved of no avail and Aly at length marched against these former supporters and broke their power at Nahrawan in 658. He paid for this act with his own life, for he was murdered in revenge by the relatives of those he had slain.

The important Kharajite position was that any true believer could be caliph; this meant the rejection of all dynastic rights. Next the Kharajites asserted that any caliph who committed sin, as they defined it, could be deposed. To determine what constituted sin and where the line separating the believer from the infidel should be drawn became the chief preoccupation of these fanatical

1. Thomson, William, D. B. MacDonald Presentation Volume,
op. cit., 378.

divines, and there were as many different sects or varieties of Kharaġitism as there were differences of opinion on this question. All branches of the Kharaġites, however, were united on one thing, opposition to the Umayyads as temporal, ungodly rulers who were unbelievers. The distinguishing factor of their movement was its negative character. Their slogan was: "We call men to the Book of God and the Sunna of His Prophet and Holy War against Unbelievers," but beyond that they had no program. We rarely hear of a Kharaġite candidate for caliph, or of a platform of reform, or of any kind of new constitution of state. As a movement, Kharaġitism was purely destructive and the Kharaġite goal was little short of anarchy. It was the direct antithesis of the Umayyad concept of state, and as Wellhausen has remarked, Kharaġite philosophy and politics could be summed up by the phrase, "Fiat justitia, pereat mundus."¹ We present in illustration of our discussion the Kharaġite program of Abu Hanzah:

We call men to God and to His Book and to the Sunna of His Prophet, and we take Islam for our religion and Muhammad for our prophet and the Kaaba as our kiba and the Koran for our authority. We summon men to self evident precepts and they are the rule which we follow, and the tradition which we take as examples, and we testify that God is truthful in what he promises, just as in what he judges. We summon men to the unity of the Lord and to faith in his promises and to the execution of the precepts and to the commandment to do good and the refraining from committing that which is forbidden. . . and it is due to the mercy of God that he placed in

1. Wellhausen, "Religiös-politischen Parteien," op. cit., 16.

every interval between prophets wise men who know God (men like the Kharijites) to summon those who went astray from the right path.¹

The Kharijite opinion of the caliphs Abu Harizah has stated as follows:

Abu Bakr acted according to the book and the Sunna, the mercy of God be upon him Umar gathered the bay and allotted the stipends and subdued the regions and instituted the diwans and made men agree on the observance of the fast of Ramadan and punished the wine drinkers and invaded the enemy in their own countries. . . . God have mercy on him. Then Uthman acted contrary to the customs and he failed and went his way. Then Aly ibn Abi Talib ruled and he followed on the path of righteousness and his opinions were sound until he named the Book of God for the arbitration at Siffin and he had doubt in his religion and he did not gain from truth his purpose, nor raise it by a beacon light. Then Muawia was appointed, the accursed by the Prophet of God and son of the accursed, and he used the worshippers of God as servants and he used the money of God for the government and he was deceitful in his religion. Then he died, in error and hypocrisy. Then Yazid, the corrupt, ruled . . . and after him Marwan and his sons. They shed the sacred blood and squandered the sacred money, and as for Abdul Malik he appointed al Hajjaj as a leader in prayer, but he led only to the flames of Hell. . . . (After enumerating the crimes of each caliph one by one, he continues) Beni Umayya have not faced people with a deed effective and far reaching in religion, neither have they perceived the inner meaning of the Koran. They hate the sin of others, but commit greater sins themselves. They see the flagon, but they do not know the cost of it, or the price they will have to pay for it They are tyrannical followers of soothsayers. May God help them. How can they be called believers? O, people of Mecca, you mock me about my men and you complain that they are but youths Yes, my men are young men, but they are matured in their

1. Al Baladhuri: The Anساب al Ashraf of al Baladhuri. Folios 7985-7986.

youth; their eyes are closed to evil, their feet are slow to step into falsehood, and God has brought refreshment to them in the blackness of night; their spines are bent with the verses of the Koran, and when one of them calls out a verse of the Koran in which paradise is mentioned, he lingers longingly over it, and if he passes by a verse in which the Fire is mentioned, he recoils in horror as if the rumbles of Hell were in his ear. My men have joined to the fatigue of their day the fatigue of their night: the earth has scarred their foreheads, hands, and knees through constant prostrations in prayer; their color is yellow, their bodies emaciated . . . but when they see the arrows of the enemy in drawn bows and spears raised aloft and swords brandishing in the air and the regiments of the enemy dashing like lightning and thundering with the thunder of death, they have contempt for all this since their faith is in God's promises.¹

Three points are of particular interest in this speech.

Abu Hamzah has described his followers as young men engaged in constant study and recitation of the Koran, who pass their days and nights in study and prayer. As we have already mentioned, many Kharijites were pious readers and scholars; they became fanatic through devotion and cared little for life or death. Next, Abu Hamzah asks, "How can the Umayyads be called believers?" They had committed sin upon sin; as unbelievers consequently they should be deposed and slain. The Umayyads held that Islam was a matter primarily of faith. The believer was he who confessed that there was no God but Allah, that Muhammad was His prophet, and the Koran His word. The caliphate as a divine institution made the caliph immune from unbelief. "He who

1. Baladhuri, Ansab. op. cit., 7937.

stands in the caliphate for three days will never enter the Fire of Hell," Hisham is quoted as saying.¹ Against this doctrine of justification by Faith the Kharajites advances the doctrine of justification by Works. A believer was a man who had not committed sin. An evil act was the only necessary evidence of infidelity needed to prove that the committer of it was not a sincere Muslim. Most interesting of all is the accusation against Muawia: "He used the money of God for the government." This was a repetition of a statement Abu Hamzah made in an earlier speech to the people of Mecca: "Accept our word and follow us, and ye shall have a reward like the one which the best of us would receive, and an equal share in the division of the fay."²

This at once raises the question of the extent to which the Kharajites fought solely in defense of ideas, and the extent to which they were animated by material considerations. Since the days of Muawia it had been customary "to use the money of God for the government" instead of sharing equally the total income of the state among the Muslims. The great reproach among the pious of Iraq was indeed that the Umayyads had formed a government at all, for the Kharajite conception of a nation was the impossible one of state without a government. We have seen this demand for a division of the fay before. Thus when Zeid ibn

1. Tabari, op. cit., 1747.

2. Baladhuri, Ansab., op. cit., 7985.

Aly revolted, he used the following summons: "We call you to the book of God and the Sunna of His Prophet and Holy War against tyrants and protection of the defenseless and stipends to those deprived of their rights and a just division of the fay among people equally."¹ One is led to wonder whether the withholding of the stipends was not a principal grievance.

The worst period of Kharajite rebellions was during the reign of Abdul Malik. Following Mukhtar's outbreak came the fearful uprisings of the Azraqites from A.H. 76-78 against whom al Muhallab fought bravely. In the Jazira from A.H. 76-77 came the revolt of Shahib of Bonu Schaiban. From the year 80 until the time of Marwan II there were less serious outbreaks like those of Shawdab and Bahlul, but these were suppressed without much difficulty. The leaders were invariably Arabs, but they did not hesitate to recruit what help they might from any sources. One recalls the famous remark of Hasan al Basri: "There never was a revolt except most of its people were orators and poets and scoundrels," and his charge that they enlisted "the ignorant, unknown people". Zeid ibn Aly, though a Shiite, seems to have followed Kharajite tactics. There is a very interesting account of a message he sent to Mesopotamia to enlist aid, "O you Jews and Christians, accept a dogma which is common to us, and know we worship

Tabari, op. cit., 1687.

only one God You know what your position is. Men have been sent to destroy your religion and shed your blood and take away that which belongs to you. Come to me"1 The Kharajites, too, had not hesitated in extremities to enlist non-Muslim support.

Even though the Kharajites themselves did not overthrow the Umayyads, their importance must not be underestimated, for it was they who provided the slogans and the arguments for those who did - this was their great service. If, as it has often been said, the cause of Ali was the cause of the province of Iraq, if the Abbasid revolution was in part the assault of Iraq Arabs on Syrian Arabs, the cause of the province was immeasurably advanced by the Kharajites. They dramatised the issue, they were assiduous in pointing out the crimes of the Umayyads, and they provided the basis from which the Umayyads could be legally attacked, for in the many uprisings they cast on the government the reproach of being the shedder of Muslim blood, and much as the Abbasids may have disliked the Kharajites, they found the methods employed by the government against the Kharajites a good argument to turn against the Umayyads. When the Kharajites were at last defeated by Hajjaj, their center shifted from Iraq to Mesopotamia, where they continued to cherish quietly their ideas. The chance to strike suddenly appeared when Marwan II became caliph. The blow they dealt him was a heavy one and prepared the way for the

1. Bel'ami's Tabari, op. cit., IV, 302.

success of Abu Muslim and Cahtaba.

It is not our purpose to discuss at great length the problem of the tribes. That, in our opinion, has been done completely. What we shall try to do here is to describe as briefly as possible the serious crisis which was about to develop with the death of Hisham.

In the endless struggle between Mudhar and Yemen, that is between Qeis and Kalb, the key to the whole situation is this most important of facts: it was the group of Kalb which put the Umayyads in power. Long before Islam, the tribes of Kalb were in Syria, and the Qeis, who settled north of them were newcomers. When Muawia came to Syria as its first governor, he got his support from Kalb. Naila, the wife of Uthman, was of Kalb and when her husband was murdered, the Kalb supported Muawia in his demand for revenge. Muawia married a woman of this tribe who became the mother of Yazid I. When Muawia II died, it seemed as if ibn Zubeir was about to be recognized as caliph. At the last moment, Kalb once more rallied about Marwan and at Marj Rahit in 684 inflicted a crushing blow on a Qeis coalition of Sulaim, Amir, and Ghatafan, led by Dahhak. Thus Kalb had established the Sufyanids and when their line passed out, in a most critical time, Kalb established the Marwanids. This fact Kalb never forgot, and expected from the Marwanids eternal gratitude.

The three great caliphs after Muawia, Abdul Malik, Walid, and Hisham, tried as far as possible to maintain an equilibrium. The great governor of Iraq, Al Hajjaj ibn Yusuf, was

a Thaqafite, and as such of Qeis, but of party spirit and partiality he was singularly free, as Wellhausen has demonstrated.¹ Nevertheless, it was Hajjaj who was responsible for the great rift. Al Muhallab, Hajjaj's great general, was of Azd, that is of Yemen, to which Kalb belonged. Him Hajjaj provoked to insubordination, and him Hajjaj imprisoned. This act was interpreted by the Kalbites as a stroke of tribal vengeance directed against them personally. Then, shortly afterwards, Hajjaj died, and after him Walid I, the new caliph, Sulaiman, though his mother was a Qeisite, took the part of the Yemenite Muhallabs, and Qeis was humiliated. During the reign of Umar II, party strife was in abeyance. Yazid II, however, had married a niece of al Hajjaj and was a thorough Qeisite partisan. Under his reign came the revolt of Yazid ibn al Muhallab and the assault on Azd - Yemen - Kalb interests. Ibn Hubeira, the Fazarite, was a Qeisite through and through. Hisham tried to end tribal politics by discharging ibn Hubeira and appointing Khalid al Qasri of Bajila, a neutral tribe, but as Khalid had supplanted a Qeisite, ibn Hubeira, he was regarded by the Qeisites as their natural enemy; they worked and conspired to bring about his fall. At length they were successful, and Khalid was replaced by Yusuf ibn Umar, a Qeisite of Qeisites, like Hajjaj, of Thaqif. Then Hisham died, less than a decade before the fall of his dynasty, the Qeisites were firmly in power, riding the crest of the wave. Kalb was humiliated

1. Wellhausen, op. cit., 259.

and depressed, and worst of all was burning with the sense of ingratitude at the hands of the Umayyads who, the Kalbites felt, owed everything to them. Preparations were made for revolt in Syria. In Khorasan, the Kalbites were represented by a coalition of Azd and Rabia against Ceis and Tamim, the latter enjoying a temporary power under Nasr ibn Sayyar. This situation of Ceisite power and Kalbite determination for revenge is the clue, indeed the basic fact, for what was to take place under Marwan II.

The third ground of opposition to the Umayyad state came from the Shites. We shall not in this chapter discuss their aims at any great length. Briefly, however, the Shiite position was that the caliphate was not a temporal office. Through the ages in unbroken succession, the Word of God had passed from one prophet to another until the time of Muhammad, after whom it was passed on in direct succession through the descendants of Aly. According to this notion, Aly should have been the first caliph, and Abu Bakr, Umar, and Uthman were usurpers; after Aly his sons should have followed, for they in the Shiite view possessed the supernatural qualities of prophecy, knowledge, and the wisdom of God, and as possessors of the divine word were the only possible legitimate successors of Muhammad. The Umayyads who did not possess within them this divine spark were illegitimate usurpers of the power.

This was the view of the partisans of Aly. Unfortunate-

ly for them, the descendants of the Prophet's son-in-law were without conspicuous ability. There was not among them a single man of outstanding powers, able to capture the imagination and win the respect of the Arab world. The most notable effort put forth by the Aliids was the attempt of Mukhtar, the humbug, who asserted he was representing them, and the next attempt, that of Zaid, was a miserable fiasco. The direct descendants of Ali were a negligible factor in Umayyad high politics, and as such were ignored by the caliphs. Their prominence results from the literature which sprang up about them.

There was, however, another branch of the Prophet's family, the descendants of Al Abbas. As early as the year 100, they had formed a political party with a platform borrowed from the two other opposition groups. They took over the Kharajite arguments of the wickedness and consequent illegitimacy of the Umayyads; like the Kharajites they too summoned men to the rule of the Book of God and the Sunna of his Prophet. From the Aliids, they adopted the principle that the caliphate should be hereditary in the House, that is the house of the prophet, but in their propaganda they were careful not to draw too close a distinction between which branch of the prophet's house the succession should follow, the Abbasid or Aliid. In this way they avoided the militant hostility of the Aliid group. It must be borne in mind that theirs was entirely a political program. They pursued it under cover for years without much success and

without serious interference. The Umayyads, and particularly Hisham, were of a tolerant opinion and failed to estimate the importance of what was secretly taking place; indeed, until Hisham's death there was no particular reason for the Umayyads to take vigorous action. It was only when the Abbasids were able to capitalize on tribal dissension and use the Kalb as the instruments of their victory that success became easy to grasp.

Hisham died in February, 743, after a reign of twenty years, and we conclude our chapter by a consideration of the condition of the empire at this moment. Wellhausen has been very harsh in his judgment of the reign of one of the greatest of the caliphs. "Hisham was popular nowhere, and everywhere had heavy misfortunes. He left the broad kingdom in a far more disconsolate state than he had found it, and it was not mere accident that the propaganda of the Abbasids became active in his time."¹

This is not one of Wellhausen's happier generalizations. Hisham had made serious mistakes, particularly at the beginning of his reign, but in his later rule he had atoned for many of his errors. In the East, he had shattered the power of the Turks, who were not again to trouble the caliphs of his dynasty, and he left in Khorasan the wisest and most able of governors, a man who conciliated the dihqans and mawali alike. Order reigned on the Eastern frontier. In Armenia, he had been just to the nakharars

1. Wellhausen, op. cit., 350.

and had secured their support; with their assistance his generals had ended the Khazar pressure on the frontiers. Against Rum he had not been conspicuously successful, but he strengthened the fortifications and secured the boundaries. The Berber revolt in Ifriqiya he had suppressed, and obtained once more the allegiance of the West. In internal affairs, he had reorganized the financial system, laid the basis of a large independent income apart from the state revenue and bequeathed to his successors a treasury in perfect order, with the state in the strongest financial position of its history. He personally had never taken sides in party strife and as far as was possible had attempted to maintain an equilibrium. In government he had been attentive to small and to great matters and had made Khorasan and the East the object of his special solicitation. It is difficult to see how any observer of the year of his death could have foreseen what was to happen.

Nevertheless, Hisham had made two fatal mistakes, the results of which he could not have foreseen. Before his death, he knew that his successor, Walid II, would be a worthless scoundrel, yet respect for the will of Yazid II stayed his hand, and he left the succession unaltered. Finally, he died leaving as governor of Iraq, Yusef ibn Umar, a Ceisite of the worst, whose nature had not revealed itself in its true light because of the restraining hand of the caliph. The results of these two errors, we shall now explore in our study of the reign of Marwan.

Marwan ibn Muhammad

The date and the circumstances of Marwan's birth are obscure and the testimony of the sources conflicting. According to Tabari, Marwan's mother was a slave belonging to Ibrahim ibn al Ashtar, and the day al Ashtar was killed she was taken by Muhammad ibn Marwan. Tabari implies that at that time she was pregnant and later gave birth to Marwan "on the bed" of Muhammad, who recognized the child as his son.¹ Inasmuch as al Ashtar was killed towards the end of 72 A. H. (Sept.-Oct. 691), Marwan may have been born in 73 A. H. According to Baladhuri, Marwan's mother was a Kurdish woman, and he adds that she was the slave of Musab, or the slave of Zumri, Musab's cook, and fell into Muhammad's hands. Musab was killed in the same battle as ibn al Ashtar, and consequently this too fixes the date of Marwan's birth in 73 A. H.² That Marwan's mother was the slave of Musab is confirmed by Eutychius.³

If these accounts are true, Marwan would have been fifty-eight or nine years old when he was killed in 132 A. H. Tabari states that some say he was sixty-nine, or sixty-eight, and others that he was fifty-eight,⁴ Yaqubi that he

1. Tabari, *op. cit.*, III, Ser. I, 51.

2. Baladhuri, The Ansab al Ashraf of al Baladhuri, *op. cit.*, Fol. 771.

3. Eutychius: Said ibn Batriq: Eutychii Patriarchae Alexandrinum Annales. L. Cheikho ed. Corpus Scriptorum Christianorum Orientalium. Scriptores Arabici. Ser. III, V. 6, Beirut, 1906; Vol. 7, Beirut, 1909, VI, 47.

4. Tabari, *op. cit.*, 51.

was sixty-four or sixty-eight,¹ and Abul Fida that he was sixty-two.² These differences of opinion we may dismiss lightly, for in the obituary notices of practically all the caliphs and famous men, there exists a similar confusion about age. However, there are two other notices worthy of attention. In summarizing the events of the year 76, Tabari remarks: "And in this year also was born Marwan ibn Muhammad."³ This statement is confirmed by Taghri Bardi who says, "In this year (76) Muhammad ibn Marwan raided the land of Ruz from Balitiyya and in it Marwan ibn Muhammad al Jady, known as the Ass, was born, the last caliph of Bone Umayya."⁴ Ibn al Athir has a similar report.⁵ If these are true, Marwan would have been four years younger, and the suspicion at once arises that the statement that his mother was a slave is an unfounded libel. There is at least some evidence for this belief. Baladthuri reports, "Al Madainy says and a group of people say that the mother of Marwan was an Arab of the tribe of Tanukh, but that is false."⁶ Despite Baladthuri's peremptory rejection of al Madainy's account, the latter's reliability is of a very high order.⁷ The matter is one of great

1. Yaqubi, *op. cit.*, II, 414.

2. Abu al-Fida: *Abulfedae Annales Muslimici Arabice et Latine. Opera et Studis, Io. Iacobi Reiskii. Hafniae, 1784-94.*, I, 488.

3. Tabari, *op. cit.*, II, Ser. II, 940.

4. Taghri Bardi, *Annales*. T. G. J. Juyboll ed. Leiden, 1853. 215.

5. Ibn al Athir, *op. cit.*, IV, 338.

6. Baladthuri, *Ansab.. op. cit.*, Fol. 771.

7. Cf. Wellhausen, *The Arab Kingdom, op. cit.*, P. XV.

importance, for if Marwan were not of free birth he would most certainly have been disqualified according to the universal opinion of his house from holding the office of caliph, and this fact, together with the circumstance that he had taken the caliphate by an act of violence would explain the hostility of his house to him. It seems strange that in the different accounts of his reign, we do not find the reproach of his enemies that he was of ignoble descent, for such criticisms abound in the case of other bastards of the family. Furthermore, Yazid ibn Umar ibn Hubeira wrote to him, "Verily, I marvel at you. How can you swear allegiance to that Yazid who slew Valid? Verily, there is not a single member of Beni Marwan who does not desire the caliphate, and you are one of them and you are their sheikh."¹ Would ibn Hubeira have said what he did say if Marwan had not been of free birth?

On the other hand, there is another piece of interesting evidence. In later life, the last Umayyad was a striking figure. Baladhuri tells us that he had white beard and hair, a full blooded red complexion and blue eyes. His underlip projected like a camel's, he had a massive chest, and his shoulders were enormously broad and the ends so elevated "that if you looked at him from behind you would have thought that on his shoulders two legs were set up."²

1. Baladhuri, Ansab, op. cit., Vol. 772.

2. Ibid., 771.

Abul Fida gives us a similar account. "He had a big head, dark blue, reddish eyes, and a thick white beard."¹ In the Persian Tabari, we are told that he was "known as the man with the great blue eyes."² These physical characteristics are hardly those of the pure blooded Arab, and seem to have made some impression for this reason. The red complexion and the blue eyes certainly might have been inherited from a mother of the North. Wellhausen, without further consideration, refers to Marwan as "a bastard from a side branch of the reigning family,"³ and we are prepared to accept this statement with the reservation that at least one good authority, al Madainy, contradicts it, and the other reports are so conflicting as to be open to some suspicion.

Marwan first makes his appearance as leader of an expedition to the West. There is an account in Taghri Bardi that in the year 105 he led the summer raid against Rum and took Kuniyah (Iconian).⁴ Ibn al Athir has the same report, adding that Marwan also took Kamaikh, but the general commander in the West for that year seems to have been Saïd ibn Abdul Malik.⁵

The next scene of Marwan's activity is Armenia. Al Jarrah ibn Abdallah, who had been recalled from Khorasan by Umar II, was sent to Armenia as governor by Yazid II in 104. In 107

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1. Abu al Fida, *op. cit.*, I, 433.
 2. Bel'ami's Tabari, *op. cit.*, IV, 340.
 3. Wellhausen, *op. cit.*, 371.
 4. Taghri Bardi, *op. cit.*, 282.
 5. Ibn al Athir, *op. cit.*, V, 94.

he was replaced by Maslama ibn Abdul Malik who delegated his authority temporarily to Harith ibn Amr while he raided in Rus. In 111, Maslama was recalled and Hisham again sent al Jarrak ibn Abdallah. The following year, 112 (730), there occurred the greatest disaster that a Muslim army had yet encountered in the east. At Ardabil the Turks killed al Jarrak and annihilated his troops. In this crisis Hisham turned first to Saïd ibn Amr al Harashy, who was sent to save the situation, and shortly thereafter to Maslama ibn Abdul Malik.¹ Maslama arrived at a time when al Harashy was winning victory after victory. He had driven the Turks northward and had collected such enormous booty that each soldier, it is reported, received as his share 1700 dirhems. The fifth was sent to Hisham.² The Muslim prisoners, including three of the family of al Jarrak, were liberated.³ Envious of Harashy's success, Maslama imprisoned him, but was compelled to restore him to honor when the word of this injustice reached Hisham. In the meantime, Maslama appointed over his vanguard Marwan ibn Muhammad⁴ and associated with Marwan Suleiman ibn Hisham and al Abbas ibn al Walid.⁵ Mark well the presence of these last two men; in the stormy years of Marwan's caliphate they were to play a vital part.

Marwan made a brilliant reputation for himself in this campaign and acquired renown for his personal valor. While

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1. Tabari, *op. cit.*, 1530-31
 2. Bel'ami's Tabari, *op. cit.*, 283.
 3. Gabrieli, *op. cit.*, 78.
 4. Al Yaqubi, *op. cit.*, II, 331.
 5. Bel'ami's Tabari, *op. cit.*, IV, 286.

others held back, he continued in hot pursuit of the enemy, and when the day was over and he had not returned, people would say to Maslama, "Marwan has been killed." And in admiration for his bravery, the old campaigner would reply, "By God, was he killed before we could greet him with the caliphate?"¹ Maslama seized Dab al Abwab (Derbend) on the Caspian and established there a jund divided into four parts of the people of Lamases, Ginnierin, Hons and Jazira.² He then proceeded north from Derbend, but overreached himself and was forced to retreat to his headquarters.³ With the completion of this campaign, Maslama disappeared from the scene and Marwan became governor. According to Ibn al Athir, Marwan returned to Rusafa in 114 where he interviewed Hisham, made some complaints against Maslama, and was appointed governor forthwith and returned with reinforcements of 120,000 fighters.⁴ This account is not substantiated in the other versions. According to Bol'ami's Tabari, the capital was temporarily fixed at Derbend with Marwan as governor. He was then replaced by Said ibn Amr al Harashy who ruled for some months, and then, when Said became blind and asked to be recalled, Marwan was sent back as governor, a position which he held until he became caliph. That Said enjoyed a second period of governorship after the departure of Maslama

1. Al Yaqubi, *op. cit.*, II, 381.

2. Bol'ami's *Tabari*, *op. cit.*, IV, 287.

3. Ibn al Athir, *op. cit.*, V, 129-130.

4. *Ibid.*, V, 132.

and before the appointment of Marwan is confirmed by Baladthuri¹ and by Chevond.² Thus it seems certain that Said al Harashy and not Maslama was governor just before Marwan, as Gabrieli has demonstrated.³ The question at once arises as to whether Marwan actually returned to Hishan, who appointed him governor and gave him reinforcements, or whether Marwan was confirmed while still in Armenia. In spite of the discrepancies between ibn al Athir and the older sources already mentioned, it still would have been quite possible that Marwan did in fact return to Syria for an interview with Hishan. All accounts, however, are in complete agreement that Marwan was finally appointed governor over Armenia and Aderbaijan in 114 (732)⁴.

In ibn al Athir, under the year 114 Marwan's conquests are enumerated. He conquered the King of Sarir, Tuman, Zirikiran, Manzin, Sughdan, Tirashanshah, Lakz, Sharwan, and Dudaniya, making terms with the different rulers on the basis of a fixed amount of grain to be sent to al Bab each year and a certain number of slaves.⁵ The same story is to be found, without dates, in Baladthuri.⁶ Actually, however, it is extremely unlikely that Marwan attempted these things

1. Baladthuri, *op. cit.*, I, 325.

2. Chevond, *Histoire des Guerres et des Conquêtes des Arabes en Arménie*. Garabed V. Chamazarian, tr. Paris, 1856. 110.

3. Gabrieli, *op. cit.*, 81.

4. Wellhausen is wrong when he says, "Marwan made his first appearance in the year 115 and was put over at least Armenia and Aderbaijan." *op. cit.*, 371.

5. Ibn al Athir, *op. cit.*, V, 133.

6. Baladthuri, *op. cit.*, I, 325-327.

in his first year of office, and the statements of ibn al Athir, as we shall show, probably represent a summary of his accomplishments during his twelve years as governor. Agapius tells us that Marwan went to Armenia in the eighth year of Hisham's reign (114) but made his first campaign against the Khazars in the eleventh year of Hisham (117).¹ This is certainly born out by the facts.

Marwan went directly to Dwin, or Dabil, the capital of Armenia, where he was honorably received by the Makharars. His first act was to make a decision between the rival factions of Bagratouni and Mamikonian. Marwan decided for the former and Ashot Bagratouni was appointed batric of Armenia, the native representative of Arab rule. Marwan then arrested the two opposition leaders, David and Gregory, sons of Sembath Mamikonian, and sent them to Hisham, who exiled them to Yemen.² Having thus settled the political problem, Marwan turned his attention to military affairs. During the war against the Khazars, beginning with the death of al Jarrah and ending with Maslama's victories, the native Armenian troops led by their feudal commanders, the Makharars, had not been paid. With Marwan's permission, Ashot went to Hisham, who received him with honor and gave him the money to meet the arrears in pay, 300,000 dinars, and promised that in the future the Arab commitments would be

1. Agapius Mabbugensis: Kitāb al 'Unwan: Histoire Universelle. Agapius (Mabboub) Evêque de Menbidj. A. A. Vasiliev, ed. tr. Pt. II, Patrologia Orientalis, VIII, 1912. 507-8.
 2. Chevond, op. cit., 110.

promptly met. Ashot then returned.¹ In the meantime, Marwan had pushed north from Tabil to select a suitable base for expeditions to the north. He chose a site sixty miles from Tiflis and one hundred and twenty from Bardthah, presumably on the Eur River, and here he built the military city of Kical.² When the city was finished and Ashot had returned, the Armenians and Arabs joined forces and marched up to Bab al Ahrab and then entered the land of the Khazars which had been overrun by the Slavs. Tharkhou was taken, and after a great slaughter of the enemy, Ashot and Marwan returned to Bardthah, where a fifth of the booty was sent to Hishar and the remainder divided honorably among the Arabs and Armenians.³ The exact date of this expedition is not given. It probably took place in the summer of 115, or 116.

In the summer of 117, Marwan organized two expeditions. One reduced three fortified cities of al Jan and the other encamped before Tmanshak, and its people capitulated by treaty.

The next year, 118, Marwan entered the land of the king, Warris. The king fled to the Khazars. Marwan laid siege to his fortified town and set up catapults. In the meantime, Warris was killed by someone he had treated unjustly and his head was sent to Marwan, who exposed it to

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1. Ghevond, op. cit., 111.
 2. Baladitxari, op. cit., I, 325.
 3. Ghevond, op. cit., 111-112.
 4. Ibn al Athir, op. cit., V, 137.

the people of his garrison; they surrendered and many were killed.¹

The most ambitious of all Marwan's raids occurred in 120. He entered the land of al Ian and then proceeded northward into the Khazar territory, passing by Balanjar and Samandar until at length he reached the seat of the Khazar Khagan, al Baitha, at the mouth of the Volga. The Khagan fled. Then Marwan returned.²

This same year Marwan's lieutenant, Ishaq ibn Muslim al Uccaly, raided Tumanshah and reduced its fortresses.³

The following summer Marwan again went north to the land known as as'arir, which took its name from the king who possessed there a marvelous throne (sarir). This country lay west of the Caspian north of Derbend and included that territory occupied by the Russian province of Daghestan. Marwan reduced first one castle and then another, killing and plundering as he went. He then came to a third fortress called Chumik wherein was the daughter of the king. The king fled to a fortified town, Khizaj, in which was his golden throne. Marwan defeated him there and in a treaty the king agreed to provide 1,000 slaves and 100,000 mudds of wheat. Marwan then went to Azrubatran and Tman. Both lands capitulated. He advanced on Hamzin and after a siege of some months, it surrendered. Thence he continued to

1. Ibn al Athir, op. cit., 157. Taghri Bardī, 310.

2. Ibid., 160. According to Taghri Bardī, 315, this expedition took place in 119.

3. Ibid., 170.

Maadaz (Sindian), Kairan, and Filan and after reducing them followed the coast to Tabarsaran.¹ At the conclusion of these campaigns in 121, Marwan had brought under complete submission the northwest provinces, and thereafter they remained at peace. According to the Georgian chronicle, after taking Derbond and the regions to the north, Marwan went west through Northern Anatolia, ravaging the country, until he stood before the walls of Constantinople. This account testified to the great reputation which Marwan made for himself, but contains anachronisms of as much as sixty years, and confuses the earlier campaigns of Muavia and Sulaiman /⁹ with Marwan's. It is of no historical value.²

During the remaining five years of his administration, Marwan occupied himself with the peaceful consolidation of his conquests. He established a degree of public security which had not been known before. Criminals, thieves, and bandits were brought to swift justice, and the raids and feuds of internal factions were suppressed.³ Marwan also seems to have given great attention to the ahl dimmi, whom he treated with great fairness, and whose treaty rights he rigorously respected. The principal charge which he made against the traitor Thabit ibn Nuaim was that he had seized violently the money, food, and fodder of the ahl dimmi.

1. Ibn al Athir, op. cit., 130; Baladhari, op. cit., I, 326-327, al Yaqubi, op. cit., II, 331-32; Taghri Bardī, op. cit., 317-13.

2. Brosset, M. F. Histoire de la Géorgie, 2 vol. 4 fasc. St. Petersburg, 1849-57. I, 238-244.

3. Chevard, op. cit., 112.

Marwan's indignation was great.¹

Once in two years he journeyed to Kusafa to visit Hisham and to report on conditions in the province.²

Gabrieli has justly praised his rule. Marwan did not extend the boundaries of the empire, for in Daghestan and beyond Arab rule was one in name only, Derbend or Bab al Abwab on the Caspian being the most northerly point under complete Arab domination. But Marwan, whose tenacity and organizing capacity were conspicuous, with the aid of his lieutenant, Ishaq ibn Muslim al 'Uqaily, and the cooperation of the Armenians under Ashot Bagratouni strengthened the Arab control over the northwest and brought terror into the hearts of the Khazars, who did not for a long time venture to repeat the raid of 112.³ Marwan might have remained in the province indefinitely, if momentous events had not occurred in Syria. We now direct our attention to those circumstances leading up to his march on Damascus.

When Yazid II arranged the act of succession, his eldest son, Walid, was eleven years old, and he was but fifteen when his father died in 105. As it was unthinkable that a boy should succeed to the caliphate, Yazid had nominated his brother, Hisham, and after him Walid.⁴ At first, Hisham treated his nephew with respect and consideration, but as Walid grew older, he associated with a motley crew

1. Tabari, *op. cit.*, 1373.
 2. *Ibid.*, 1371.
 3. Gabrieli, *op. cit.*, 84.
 4. Tabari, *op. cit.*, 1740.

of posts, sports, and drunkards to the great displeasure of the caliph. When at length his conduct went beyond all limits, the caliph tried to find some responsibility which would be a sobering influence. He gave him the serious obligation of leading the pilgrimage in the year 116.¹ Hoodless of the solemnity of the occasion, Walid set out, taking his hunting dogs with him, and when he proposed among other things to use the new cover of the Kaaba as a tent for his gaming and drinking, even his friends were scandalized. When the news reached Hisham, he approached Walid with the proposition that he renounce his claims and swear allegiance to Maslama ibn Hisham. This Walid indignantly rejected, as well as the request that he agree to recognize Maslama as his successor. Having failed in a direct approach, Hisham then attempted to see what could be done secretly. He obtained from his uncles, Muhammad and Ibrahim, as well as from certain men of the tribe of Abs and others, an undertaking to support Maslama.

In the meantime, Hisham continued to direct reproaches against Walid and at length accused him of being an atheist. Walid replied in a scornful verse:

O, you who ask about our religion,
 We are of the religion of Abu Shakir.
 We take our liquor sometimes straight
 And sometimes mixed,
 Sometimes hot, and often warm.

The caliph was furious, for Abu Shakir was the nickname

1. Tabari, op. cit., 1572, 1741.

of his son, Maslama. The impression Walid had made in the pilgrimage of 116 had been terrible. Hisham now decided it would be good policy to gain support in the Hijaz by making it possible for the people to see for themselves the difference between Walid and Maslama. Maslama consequently led the pilgrimage of 119. He behaved in the most dignified and godly manner, and what was more important, distributed among the inhabitants of the holy cities the stipends of which they had been deprived. He was received with honor and enthusiasm, and a poet of Medina said;

O, you who ask about our religion,
 We are of the religion of Abu Shakir,
 The giver of beautiful mares and bridles.
 He is no Magian or Kafir.¹

Encouraged by this success, Hisham now approached Khalid al Qasry who, as a recognized leader of the Yemenite faction, might be expected to oppose Walid. Khalid, however, was unexpectedly stubborn. He announced that he was unwilling to violate the sacred oath he had taken.² Checked by this rebuff, Hisham resorted to violent means. He scourged Iyadh ibn Muslim, Walid's secretary in Musafa, and also his friend Suhail, a former governor of Damascus. He ordered Walid to exile his closest companion, Abd us Samad, and finally revoked Walid's stipends. These measures were of no avail and only embittered the man against whom they were directed. "God has caused men to give me a solemn covenant and has destined me to my life . . . no one but God can cut me off

1. Tabari, *op. cit.*, 1742.
 2. *Ibid.*, 1743.

from it before my period,"¹ Walid replied. Hisham could not sincerely deny this, and as a last resort turned to Abu Zubair for counsel. "O, Hisham," he said, "would men be pleased with Walid if something should befall me?"

"O, Commander of the Faithful, behold, he has an oath of allegiance on the necks of men."

Reluctantly Hisham was forced to admit the sacredness of an oath, which even his closest friends hesitated to violate. He shrank from an unconstitutional act of violence, relinquished his hopes forever, and wrote Walid a letter of apology and an exhortation to reform.² He spent the rest of his life putting his affairs in order and when he died, a disappointed man, in February of 743, he left his successor a full treasury; even the last dirham had been accounted for.

As soon as the news of the accession of the new caliph reached him, Marwan sat down to write a letter of congratulation and advice.

No accession of a caliph has come to us in which we have more hopes and none in which we are more greatly satisfied than your accession, O Commander of the Faithful, and I have stretched forth my hand to swear allegiance to you and I have confirmed it by solemn oath and written testament

To those who have shown their obedience, be generous with the money of God which He has given you Men expect much of you, hoping you will give bounty to them on account of the favor which they have bestowed on you. Therefore, increase the stipends, that he who was before you may be surpassed

Had I not wished to keep protected the fron-

1. Tabari, *op. cit.*, 1746.
2. *Ibid.*, 1747.

tiers which I hold, verily desire would have prompted me, so that I might meet the Commander of the Faithful, to appoint a man in my stead without your leave, and I would have come to see the Commander of the Faithful in person, but verily, the compensation of your favor, however great, does not compensate for my remaining here, in my opinion.¹

This was a flattering and highly politic letter, but one is led to question its sincerity. Harwan certainly foresaw trouble in the future, but for the present he wished to preserve the influence and power of his command in the Northwest. His presence was certainly not necessary to maintain the frontiers, but he knew full well that if he once came to Syria where he would be in the power of the caliph, the chances of his reappointment would be problematical; while he remained in Armenia he could resist and oppose the appointment of anyone to supersede him since his prestige was too great to be trifled with.

Walid accepted Harwan's advice at its face value. He gave slaves to the lame and blind, increased the stipends by ten dirhems in all parts of the empire except Syria, where he gave men twenty, and he doubled the grants to the associates of his own house. His expectation was that in this way he could secure the permanent favor of all factions and that people would overlook the conduct of his private life, which was still scandalous.

This expectation might conceivably have been fulfilled, had it not been for three circumstances: the persecution of

1. Tabari, op. cit., 1752-54.

prominent Umayyads, a vigorous pro-Mudharite policy, and the attempt to secure oaths of allegiance to the two sons of 'alid, al Hakam and Uthman, both of whom were boys barely past the period of puberty.

When Hisham was trying to get support for the succession of his son, Maslama, it will be remembered that he secured the cooperation of Ibrahim and Muhammad, his uncles, sons of Hisham ibn Ismail al Makhzumi. 'alid arrested them on the 13th Shaban, 125 (June 5, 743), and delivered them to Yusuf ibn Umar, whom he had confirmed as governor of Iraq, and Yusuf, on the pretext that they had embezzled state funds, put them to death by torture.¹ He gave Sulaiman ibn Hisham one hundred lashes, shaved his head and beard, and sent him in exile to Oman. Yazid ibn Hisham was imprisoned. The two sons of al Sa'qa'ia, 'alid and 'Abdul Malik, had been Amirs of Sinnjarin and Homs. Although they both sought sanctuary at the grave of 'alid's father, he seized them and had them tortured to death.²

'alid next undertook to secure an oath of allegiance to his two sons, al Hakam and Uthman. Yusuf ibn Umar in Iraq complied, and doubtless compelled the prominent men of the province to do likewise; it is not certain that Nasr ibn Sayyar in Khurasan did so, for he was recalled almost immediately after receiving 'alid's letter.³ In Syria, however, 'alid encountered unexpected opposition. Sa'id ibn

1. Tabari, *op. cit.*, 1768.

2. *Ibid.*, 1783.

3. *Ibid.*, 1764.

Daihan ibn Suhail refused to give allegiance, saying that the boys had not reached puberty. For this he was cast into prison. Khalid al Qasri and others refused for the same reason.¹

Finally, we come to the matter of Khalid al Qasri. He had been ruler of Iraq for fifteen years, from 105-120, where he had tried to keep himself above tribal prejudice. When he was recalled, he was succeeded by a pronounced Coisite, Yusuf ibn Umar, who pursued him with his vengeance as far as the caliph would permit. Khalid settled in Damascus and continued an active life in support of his old master. Both he and his sons took part in the raids against Rum and the protection of the coast against the Byzantine navy. During their absence, one summer, a bandit gang descended on Damascus, pillaging houses and setting fires in the city. This outrage the colleagues of Yusuf in Damascus represented to be really the acts of Khalid's mawali. They, together with the women and other members of his family, were cast into prison and subjected to the deepest humiliation. The real culprits were at length caught, but not before bitter words were exchanged between Khalid and Hisham.²

With the accession of Walid, Khalid's enemies saw their chances for revenge improving. The caliph's mother was Umm al Hajjaj, the daughter of Muhammad ibn Yusuf, al Hajjaj's

1. Tabari, *op. cit.*, 1776.

2. *Ibid.*, 1815-16.

brother. Yusuf ibn Umar belonged to the same family and was permitted to continue his rule in Iraq. Khalid had furthermore infuriated the caliph by refusing to bend to his will in the matter of the oath of succession. The opportunity was now approaching. The burden of the increased stipends in the treasury had left the caliph short of ready funds, and he determined to recall Yusuf ibn Umar from Iraq for an accounting, and appoint Abdul Malik, the grandson of al Hajjaj, in his place. Yusuf accordingly made his preparations. He hastily gathered all the money at his command, "the likes of which no man had ever seen before," and set out for Syria. On his arrival, he met Hassan an-Nahabi, who explained the political situation. Yusuf gave Hassan 500,000 dirhems and told him to spend it where it would do the most good; "divide the money in proportion to your knowledge of men." This Hassan did, with complete success. The comrades of the caliph magnified Yusuf to the skies, and when the latter offered Khalid 50,000,000 dirhems on one condition,- that Khalid be given to him,- Khalid accepted. The old man was taken to Iraq. His feet were crushed, then his legs and thighs; finally he expired when a plank laden with weights was placed across his chest. During this ordeal, he uttered not a word.¹

This act of wanton cruelty sealed the caliph's fate. No other argument was needed by the men of Kalb. The first

1. Tabari, op. cit., 1778-1780.

to respond were the poets; to inflame the Yemenites a poem was written and attributed falsely to Khalid:

What an awful catastrophe has befallen the enemy!
 We are the governors of force.
 We caused them humiliation and calamity.
 Behold, Khalid is a prisoner.
 Why do they not save him if they are men?
 He was the master of old.¹

Such a taunt could not be suffered, yet the man who organized revenge had not himself received personal injury from Khalid. The leader was Yazid ibn al Khalid ibn Abdul Malik, a first cousin of the caliph. Against the established political principles of his family, he advanced the Karajite doctrine that sin constituted unbelief and was grounds for deposing the caliph. He gave himself out as humble and pious and went around uttering darkly, "Contentment with al Khalid is not enough for us."² The first conspirators consisted of a group of Qudha'a and Yemen, some people of Damascus, and a number of others, outstanding of whom were Mansur ibn Junayr of Kalb, Humaid ibn Nasr al Lakhmi, al Asbagh ibn Lu'ala, and asSara ibn Ziyad ibn 'Ilaqa. These men had been agitating almost from the beginning of Khalid's reign. They had approached Khalid al Qasri to enlist his support, but the latter loyally shrank from a violation of his oath; he even warned the caliph, without disclosing the names of the ring leaders. For this refusal to betray a trust, he was imprisoned.

1. Tabari, *op. cit.*, 1781.
 2. *Ibid.*, 1777.

When Khalid was killed, the plans of the conspirators prospered. Members of the families of Hisham and Walid I, together with the relatives of those two sons of al Caliph 'a who had been murdered, and men of Yemen came to Yazid with an oath of allegiance. The recognized sheikh of the Umayyads at this time was the same al Abbas ibn abi Walid who had fought with Marwan under Maslama, and he had now to be consulted. Amr ibn Yazid al Makhary had said to Yazid, "Do not act, but consult al Abbas first, for he is lord of Rome and Persia: if he swears allegiance to you, no one will oppose you, and if he refuses, men are more obedient to him than to you. If, in this latter contingency, you still wish to act according to your own opinion, give out that al Abbas has sworn allegiance to you."¹

Al Abbas, who was prudent and far seeing, was horrified at the plot. "Slowly, O Yazid," he said. "Verily, in the breaking of the oath of God is the corruption of religion and the world."

Yazid promised to quit his endeavors, but fresh support now came from two prominent men, al Aghaf, the Kalbite, and Yazid ibn 'Anbasa an akcaly, who undertook to make secret propaganda. All this became known to al Abbas who threatened to bind Yazid hand and foot and deliver him to the caliph.² It would have been well if he had done so. The plot also

1. Tabari, *op. cit.*, 1784.
2. *Ibid.*, 1785.

reached the ears of Marwan who at once dispatched the following letter to Saïd ibn Abdul Malik ibn Marwan:

You are one of the pillars of the people of your house and I have learned that some of the vile people of your house have decided on a business . . . namely, the breaking of their oath of allegiance. Verily, they have opened a door which God will not close until much of their blood has been shed . . . Now, you are nearer to them than I am, so employ secret strategy and discover their intentions by pretending to follow them, and when you have acquired knowledge of their designs, threaten to disclose their secret and convince them by your tongue and frighten them by mention of the consequences . . . What they have endeavored will result in the loss of God's favor and the destruction of the government, so hasten the matter while the rope of friendship is yet taut, while people are quiet, and the tinghar (frontiers) are intact . . . Verily, to each person of our house are auspicious tokens that God will transfer his favor. God protect you from this. Keep me informed of their affair. May God preserve you in your religion and pull you out of what he has put you in.¹

This letter Saïd took to al Abbas, who once again summoned Yazid, warned him of the fatal consequences of his action, and threatened to expose him. Yazid again promised not to act, but his henchman, Bishr ibn al Walid, continued to dispute with al Abbas, who exclaimed, "O Benu Marwan, verily I do believe that Allah has permitted your destruction."²

The feelings of the elder Umayyad statesmen are perfectly obvious. The caliphs before them had held firm to one rock, one principle: that the basis of their sovereignty was the will of God as revealed in the divine inspiration of the Muslim community which had sworn a sacred oath of allegiance to the

1. Tabari, op. cit., 1786-7.

2. Ibid., 1788.

caliph. Once recognized, the caliph was secure in his authority as the executor of a sacred mission, and he could not be challenged on the grounds that he had committed sin. The adherence to this principle was the only means of preserving the unity of the state against the unceasing attacks of its enemies; now some of the ruling family were about to employ the same arguments and the same weapons as their enemies. The result was destined inevitably to prove fatal.

Despite his promise, Yazid continued with his plans, and at length marched on Damascus. En route he stopped at the completely Kalbite village of al Mizza and knocked on the door of the sheikh, Muawia ibn Masad al Kalby. "My feet are covered with mud and I hate to dirty your rugs," he said as he entered. Ibn Masad looked at him for a moment and replied, "That which you seek us for is dirtier."¹ Despite these misgivings, he gave Yazid his oath of allegiance.

The next evening Yazid reached Damascus. What followed is just another example of that truly incredible negligence and laxity of the Umayyad internal administration. Walid was somewhere in the desert with his friends. Surely, he must have had an inkling of what was brewing; everyone else certainly knew about it. The conspiracy had been under way for at least nine months. If the caliph had suspicions, he had failed to take precautions. The Amir of Damascus, Abdul Malik ibn Muhammad ibn al Hajjaj, to escape the plague, had

1. Tabari, op. cit., 1789.

left the city. That night, of all nights, the chief of police, Abul 'Aj, was drunk. He was captured before he knew what had happened, together with the treasurer and the postmaster.¹ In the mosque was a great store of arms, which Yazid seized. Next morning, the principal conspirators arrived with their contingents. Abdur Rahman ibn Masad came from Kizza with 1500 men, Yaqub ibn Mu'ayyir with men of Darayya, Humaid ibn Habib al Jaldiy with the people of Fair al-Murran, followed by the others. Once the city had fallen, the next act of the conspirators was to secure the person of its governor. Abdur Rahman ibn Masad was ordered to attend to this and he arrested Abdul Malik ibn Muhammad ibn al Hajjaj at Qatan, and returned with 60,000 dinars to support the rebels, a very tidy sum.² At this point, the associates of the pretender expressed their unwillingness to continue without expectations of reward. To Mansur ibn Junaid al Kalby, Yaqub ibn Abdur Rahman ibn Sulaim al Kalby, and others, Yazid promised governorships; the rest were given 1500 dirhems on the spot, and Abdul Aziz, the grandson of Abdul Malik, was named commander of the force to march against the caliph. The proceedings thus far had been almost completely sordid. They were to continue to be so. Yazid came to terms with Abu Muhammad, the great grandson of Muawia. There was difficulty recruiting men to march against the caliph, and it was not until 2000 dirhems a man were offered

1. Tabari, *op. cit.*, 1790.

2. *Ibid.*, 1793.

that 300 fighters were assembled.¹ The first object was to arrest al Abbas before he could get to the caliph, and to secure his support. This task was left to Mansur ibn Jundar, who fulfilled it well. Once the oath was extracted from al Abbas, the old man exclaimed as his flag was unfurled, "Verily, this is one of the tricks of Satan, and it is the ruin and destruction of Benu Marwan."² Al Abbas would have done honorably to have refused. His captors would hardly have dared to slay him.

Walid, now warned of what had happened, hastened to al Bakhra, a fortress in the desert. Here he received word that five hundred men of Homs were coming to his assistance. Benu Salama ibn Halcan and Benu Ithman ibn Bashir agreed to stand by; another supporter was a nephew of that al Abrash who had been the closest friend and confidential adviser of Hisham; he appeared with some of his own tribe, the Benu 'Amir of Kalb, from Palmyra. But the loyalty of the caliph's supporters was not great. His messenger to the people of Homs deserted for 5,000 dinars in cash, on condition that he fight the caliph. Muawia ibn Abi Sufyan ibn Yazid ibn Khalid who commanded Walid's right wing went over for 20,000 dinars and the Amirate of Jordan.³ Abdul Aziz, Yazid's commander, next summoned the troops of the caliph to the Book of God and the Sunna of His prophet.⁴ The 'Amir of Kalb from Palmyra refused to

1. Tabari, *op. cit.*, 1797.

2. *Ibid.*, 1779.

3. *Ibid.*, 1806.

4. *Ibid.*, 1797.

attack their own tribes and went off. The rest followed and the defection was complete.

However wretched his life had been, the caliph died honorably; resistance was futile and there was no point in selling his life dearly. The first to scale the walls discovered Walid, reading the Koran. "Today," said the caliph, "is like the day of Uthman."¹ They slew him while he prayed. Walid well understood the consequences which were to follow. "The murder of Uthman," said Wellhausen, "was more epoch-making than almost any other event of Islamic history. From that time the question to whom the leadership of the theocracy belonged was fought out with the sword. The Jamme-gate of civil war was opened and never again closed, and the murdered Khalifa is on that account called the 'opened gate'."² The circumstances of Walid's murder were exactly parallel to those of Uthman's, and the attendant consequences to the perpetrators the same. The dead caliph's head was exposed in Damascus. One man had the decency to protest to Yazid, "You should set up only the heads of Kharijites, but this is the head of your own cousin, and the caliph as well, and I greatly mistrust if you set it up that the hearts of men will be filled with sympathy for Walid, and the people of his house will be angry and desirous of revenge."³

Yazid was contemptuous of this advice. A courier walked about the city with the head on a pole and paraded with it in-

1. Tabari, op. cit., 1300.
2. Wellhausen, op. cit., 50-51.
3. Tabari, op. cit., 1307.

to Walid's own house, where his family grieved for him. The caliph was murdered on Friday, the 23th of second Jumada (April 17, 744).

Tabari summarizes his end in these words:

The greatest of crimes which Walid committed against himself was when he ensured his own destruction by the turning against him of the sons of his two uncles, the sons of Mishan and of Walid, together with the corruption and turning against him of the army of Yemen, who were the greatest part of the army of Syria.¹

How true were the reports of his debaucheries? Some of the stories told about him were doubtless fictions, but the testimony of all sources, Arab and Christian, are unanimous on the viciousness of his personal conduct. In addition to this, we have a large collection of his poems which reveal his character. It would be difficult to assert that they are all spurious. The evidence of archaeology, however, is not conclusive as to Walid himself, certainly proves beyond all question that the accusations of the drunken conduct of some of the later Umayyad princes are justified. The frescoes at Qusayr 'Amra in the desert where Walid played, with their pictures of nude women, drinking, hunts, and lute playing are attributed to Walid I, but this little pleasure house must certainly have been visited by the second Walid.² Within easy journey of Azraq, Walid's headquarters, were several other Umayyad pleasure houses. Excavations now in progress at Jericho and Tubgha

1. Tabari, *op. cit.*, 1775.

2. Crosswell, *Muslim Architecture*, 253-264.

have brought to light conclusive evidence of the gay life enjoyed by these princes. Such conduct was obviously common, and it would be impossible to argue on the basis of the evidence that Walid was guiltless of debauchery.

A terrible deed of violence had been committed, and it is absolutely essential to recall the principal men involved. The avenging furies were to pursue each one in spectacular fashion in the years to follow, and their efforts to escape retribution convulsed the empire. These were the principal leaders:

1. Abdul Aziz ibn al Hajjaj ibn Abdul Malik.
2. Mansur ibn Jamhur al Kalby.
3. Al Asbagh ibn Kula al Kalby with his sons and members of his family.
4. Husayn, Abdul Rahman, Yazid, Walid, and Hisham, all sons of Masad al Kalby, with members of their family and the Kalbite adherents of the village of al Mizza near Damascus.
5. Yazid III and his two brothers, Bishr and Masrur.
6. Haraid ibn Masr al Lakmay.
7. Haraid ibn Habib al Lakmay.
8. As'ara ibn Ziyad ibn 'Ilaga.
9. Abu 'Ilaga as'aksaly.
10. Yazid ibn al 'Aqqar.

To these ten there were joined after Yazid had been recognized as caliph:

11. Sulaiman ibn Hisham.
12. Al Abbas ibn al Walid.
13. Yazid ibn Khalid ibn Abdallah al Qasri, and the other members of Khalid al Qasri's family.

The immediate reaction to the caliph's murder was the exultation of Kalb in its triumph and vindication. The victory was celebrated by the poets of Yemen. Khalaf ibn Khalifa sang:

Kalb and Madhij and Anbaq
 Have quieted an echo which hooted
 Like an owl during the night, not sleeping.
 They left the prince of the faithful with Khalid,
 His nose on the ground, but not in prayer.
 If you occupy us from our callings
 Verily we have occupied al Walid
 From singing with his entertainers.¹

Abu Mihjan, a sawla of Khalid's, sang:

Inquire of Walid and inquire of his army,
 Did any soul of Mudhar come and protect him?²

And Nasr ibn Said al Ansari exulted:

The dogs of Damascus devour him
 As if the parts of his body were those of a pig
 And they left the remnants of his body
 Like the entrails of a sheep
 Upon the ropes of a tent.
 You have made your sword the decisive instrument.³

After the first flush of victory, Yazid undertook to establish his rule. It became at once apparent that conservative opinion was revolted by the actions of the conspirators. The governor of Homs under al Walid was a Marwan, a grandson of Abdul Malik. He was intelligent, honorable, and handsome, and had given the people an administration which had suited them exactly. With his approval, they now revolted. The cowardly surrender of al Abbas ibn Walid was avenged by the destruction of his property and the imprisonment of his children. This act drove al Abbas into the protection of Yazid. A summons was then drafted to the other funds: "Do not enter into obedience to Yazid if Walid's heirs still live, but swear allegiance to them

1. Tabari, *op. cit.*, 1523.

2. *Ibid.*, 1524.

3. *Ibid.*, 1524.

or to the best man you know, on condition the stipends are paid."¹

Yazid at length sent an army commanded by Masrur ibn al Walid against Homs. Shortly thereafter Suleiman ibn Nishan, who had escaped from his exile in Oman after seizing the public monies, arrived in Damascus. Yazid sent him to join Masrur. In the meantime, the people of Homs had chosen Abu Muhammad as-Sufyani as their leader. The caliph then dispatched additional forces under Abdul Aziz, the slayer of Walid, and Nishan ibn Masad of Mizza. Homs was defeated. Abu Muhammad as-Sufyani and Yazid, the great grandson of Muawia, were cast into prison in Damascus with the two sons of al Walid, al Nakan, and Uthman.

The people of the junds of Palestine and Jordan, following the summons from Homs, expelled their governors and swore allegiance to two popular Umayyads, Yazid ibn Suleiman ibn Abdul Malik and Muhammad ibn Abdul Malik. Suleiman ibn Nishan then came from Damascus with a cavalry troop of 5,000 and quickly restored allegiance. Yazid now appointed the following prefects:

Ibrahim ibn al Walid, governor of Jordan
Zhib'an ibn Rawh, governor of Palestine
Masrur ibn Walid, governor of Cinnisrin
Muawia ibn Yazid ibn al Hudthein, governor of Homs.²

Muawia was the son of that ibn al Hudthein al Kalby who had summoned the men of Walid II to the book of God and the Sunna.

1. Tabari, *op. cit.*, 1326.
2. *Ibid.*, 1534.

All Syria had now submitted, and Yazid convoked a *mafud* in Damascus to inaugurate him into office. To this assembly he delivered a very remarkable speech which we quote in part:

O you men, I have not rebelled out of wickedness, nor out of unashamedness, nor out of indulgence in the good things of the world, nor out of a desire for authority and power . . . but I have revolted as the revenger of God, of His Prophet, and of his religion, calling you to God and to His Holy Writ and to the laws of the Prophet, God bless him.

But when the pillars of true guidance were toppled and the fires of the righteous extinguished and there appeared that stubborn tyrant, he who made violate the inviolable that committer of every innovation, although he was a confessed believer in the Book, . . . I fought against him till God put at rest from his iniquity the people and the countries; by the power and might of God it was done, nor was it accomplished by my power and my might.¹

O people, I pledge to you that I will not put one stone upon another, nor a brick on brick, nor construct canals . . . nor transfer money from one district to another until I have satisfied the district of that locality and the poor people of that town . . . I shall never close my door to you, lest the strong devour the weak, nor will I lay burdens on the people of your *jizya* such as would force them to emigrate from your lands and cease to have offspring, and you will receive your stipends from me every year, and your maintenance every month until life becomes productive among the Muslims, and the farthest shall be the nearest and the last shall be first.

If I fulfill my promises to you, then it behooves you to listen, to obey, to cooperate, but if I fulfill not my undertakings, then it is up to you to depose me . . . If you know of anyone who is celebrated for his righteousness who will give you the same as I am giving you, and if you prefer to swear allegiance to him, then I will be the first to take an oath to him and enter into his obedience.

O men, obedience is obedience to God, and you should obey the caliph provided that he obeys God,

1. Tabari, op. cit., 1834.

but if he disobeys God, then he in turn deserves to be disobeyed and killed.¹

This speech is almost pure Kharijite in its essence and states the important doctrines of that sect as well as any Kharijite himself could state them. Yazid asserted that any righteous man could be caliph and offered to swear allegiance to anyone more deserving if he could be produced. Furthermore, he maintained that although Walid was a confessed Muslim and had acknowledged the Koran as the Word of God, he was nevertheless an unbeliever because he had committed sin, and as an unbeliever had been legally and justly executed. The commission of sin was justification for the breaking of an oath. Finally, Yazid announced that if he too should be guilty of sin, it was the duty of the people to depose him.

These words of the new caliph might be interpreted as an insincere attempt to justify a murder: they might be regarded as an expression of a doctrine invented after the act as the only conceivable excuse for its perpetration, were it not for the fact that Tabari tells us explicitly that Yazid had long been a Chailanite.² According to Shahrastani, Abu Marwan Chailan ibn Marwan adDimashki held that a non-Qureish could be Imam and that anyone who adhered to the Koran and the Sunna and received recognition through the agreement and acclaim of the community could be caliph.³

Yazid, by his act and now by his speech, had rejected

1. Tabari, *op. cit.*, 1835.

2. *Ibid.*, 1537.

3. *Man-shahrastani, op. cit.*, I, 160.

the political doctrines of the Umayyad state. In addition to this, his promises to spend tax money in the district where it was raised and his other undertakings meant the abandonment of that Umayyad fiscal policy which alone had made possible the existence of the state and amounted to a sharp criticism of Muawia, Abdul Malik, Walid, and Hisham, his most illustrious predecessors. This was obvious to Marwan who said when the speech was reported to him, "What is the matter with him? May God kill him! He has slandered us all."¹

After the oath of allegiance had been exacted from men in Damascus, the next task confronting the caliph was the fulfillment of his obligations to the principal conspirators. Mansur ibn Jumhur of Kalb received the plum in his appointment as governor of Iraq. He is described as a Medouni Arab, severe and coarse in his manner, who had joined Yazid for two motives: indignation at the killing of Khalid al Qasri and belief in the tenets of the Ghailanites. This appointment was opposed by those who had accepted Yazid's speech at its face value. "You should have nominated a man of religion, virtuous, wise enough to consider and weigh the evidence in suspicious matters, a man learned in laws and their definitions," said Yazid ibn Mujara al Chassary.²

Yazid had no alternative. Besides, he announced that his policy would be one of complete Kalbitism. "Had I not

1. Tabari, op. cit., 1836.

2. Ibid., 1833.

wished to avoid bloodshed, I would have destroyed Qais," the caliph replied.

Mansur ibn Jafar arrived in Iraq in May, 744. His first act was to attempt to arrest his predecessor, Yusuf ibn Umar. The latter escaped and fled to the Belqa of Transjordan, where he was found, disguised in women's clothes. He joined al Hakam and Utman in the prison in Damascus.

Yazid had provided Mansur with a long letter to be read to the people of Iraq. In it the spirit of Kharijism was even stronger, if possible, than in his speech in Damascus. Yazid discussed at length the nature of an oath of obedience, which he said was taken to God, not to man. He promised to adhere to the Book and the Sunna and guaranteed that the cherished hopes of Iraq were now to be fulfilled.¹

The conduct of the new governor, however, gave the lie to this letter, and the opposition of the populace crystallized so rapidly that barely two months after his arrival, he was replaced in July, 744, by Abdallah ibn Umar ibn Abdul Aziz, the son of the pious caliph Umar II. This was a political move on the part of the caliph, who trusted that Abdallah would be accepted as proof of his sincerity. Ibn Umar proved to be as weak as he was pious. His first act was to distribute to the general public the stipends formerly withheld from them. The Syrian garrison murmured at this. "Do you divide among these people our fay, and they are our

1. Tabari, op. cit., 1843-45.

enemies?"

This complaint the foolish governor transmitted to the people. "I have desired to return your fay, for I know that you have more right to it and these deny me and they complain of me."

There was an immediate clamor. The populace surged outside the garrison, and the troops, thoroughly disgusted by the conduct of their commander, called him a liar and denied they had said what he had quoted. The people of Kufa then revolted, but when one of the natives of the city quieted them, Ibn Umar rewarded him with a dress of honor and the appointment as prefect of police and collector of Kharaaj for the Sawad. To the Kufans, this was more an act of weakness than of generosity.¹

The events in Syria were being observed in Armenia with the closest attention, and Harwan was already preparing to strike when the situation became favorable. To Charir, the brother of the murdered caliph, he wrote a letter exhorting him to revenge. "The people of Syria were the best of God's creatures in respect to obedience and most faithful to a covenant; now they have denied the order of God and have renounced their oaths With me is a group in whose hearts God has instilled complete obedience I shall not raise up for that Cadarite, Yazid, my garment."²

1. Tabari, *op. cit.*, 1854-55.
2. Ibid., 1850-51.

Marwan, nevertheless, did not renounce his allegiance, and to a messenger sent ostensibly to get money to pay a debt but in reality to discover the sentiments of the governor, Marwan professed his loyalty to Yazid. The man ingratiated himself with the governor and when he at length prepared to depart, Marwan summoned him and said, "If you are able to go fast, or to fly, fly, for there is going to be a revolt in the Jazira in six or seven nights." The governor, however, professed to have nothing to do with what was to take place and said it was merely information he had acquired. "There is no person of any importance to whom I have not given pleasure and favor, so that he will tell me what is concealed in his soul."¹

The event foretold took place. Abdul Malik, the son of Marwan, surprised Walid's governor of the Jazira, Abda ibn Rabah al Ghassani, and drove him to Syria. He then made Sulaiman ibn Abdallah ibn 'Ula the governor and notified his father of what had taken place. This happened in the summer of 744.²

When Marwan was informed of the successful attempt of his son, he decided to act at once. His first care was to leave the country in order; therefore, he commanded Ishaq ibn Muslim al 'Uccila, the chief of Geis, to go to Bab al Abwab, where he was well liked, and with him went a Yemenite contingent under Thabit ibn Ma'im al Judary. Thabit was an

1. Tabari, *op. cit.*, 1353.

2. *Ibid.*, 1370.

unprincipled scoundrel. He had been guilty of inciting to mutiny the troops sent by Hisham to quell the Berber revolt in Ifriqiya after Kuthum ibn Iyadh had been killed. For this Hisham had imprisoned him, and he had been released only when some Kalbites of Damascus had persuaded Marwan to intercede with the caliph in his behalf. Marwan doubtless felt that his generosity would at least be returned with loyalty, but he discovered that his confidence had been misplaced. As soon as his back was turned, Thabit organized the Syrian Yemenite troops, who broke into open revolt and demanded to be allowed to return to Syria. By this act they cut themselves off from their pay and proceeded to live off the country. Marwan turned back in fury. They excused themselves by saying, "We used to obey you with obedience to our caliph, but he has been murdered." Marwan thought it prudent to give in; they delivered Thabit, who was imprisoned, and then all marched for Harran "and Marwan ruled them firmly in his journey and not one of them was able to do harm or injustice to a single villager, nor could they obtain a single thing unless they bought it."¹ At Harran, Marwan made a halt. The Yemenite Syrians continued to their respective Syrian junds.²

Marwan hesitated now to march, and almost immediately

1. Tabari, *op. cit.*, 1873.

2. Cf. al Yaqubi, *op. cit.*, II, 403. Baladhuri has wrongly associated Thabit with the Kharrajite Musafir al Qasab, saying that Thabit appointed Musafir governor of Armenia and Aderbaijan. (Vol. I, 323.) It was Bahhak Ashshai-barny who appointed Musafir governor.

Yazid offered to make terms and confirm him as the governor of Armenia and Aderbaijan as well. Marwan accepted. In the days that followed men came to him secretly with oaths of allegiance,¹ but whether they supported him as caliph or avenger is not clear. It was part of Marwan's strategy to insist that he had no interest in power for himself. History now began to repeat itself. As Muawia in Syria had called for revenge for the murdered Uthman, Marwan clamored for revenge for the murdered Walid. He had dispatched a delegation from Jazira led by Muhammad ibn Abdallah ibn 'Ulatna to Yazid III, ostensibly to convey his homage, but almost certainly to conspire and report, for Marwan instructed them to remain after the completion of their mission. It would seem, too, that he was in correspondence with the people of Homs and with Yazid ibn Umar ibn Mubaira in Qinnasrin.² He had not long to wait, for he certainly could not have been in Harran more than four or five weeks when news reached him that on the twentieth of Dhul Hijja, October 3, 774, Yazid had died.³ Marwan made immediate preparations to depart. He left his son with 40,000 of the rabita, or frontier force, at ar-Raqa on the

1. Al Ya'qubi, op. cit., II, 403.

2. Baladhuri, Ansab., op. cit., Fol. 472.

3. Tabari, op. cit., 1874. Elias Nisibinis says the twelfth of Dhul Hijja, September 25, 744, "thus rightly" remarks Wellhausen, op. cit., 369. The difference is one of but eight days, and why Elias, who has made some serious errors of chronology, should be specially preferred by Wellhausen is not obvious. Cf. L. J. Delaporte, La Chronographie d'Elie Bar Sinaya, Metropolitaine de Nisibe, Paris, 1910, 104.

Euphrates as a precaution to hold his rear in case matters turned out badly. With the rest of his forces he marched first to Sinnisrin. Here his ally, Yazid ibn Umar ibn Hubairn, delivered the predominantly Saisite town to his allegiance, as well as the two brothers of the dead caliph, Bishr and Masrur ibn Walid, who had been prefects of Homs and Sinnisrin. Marwan imprisoned them both. Meanwhile stirring events were taking place in Homs. There the citizens, though predominantly Kalbite, had never been able to endure the murder of the caliph, bad as he may have been. When Yazid died, they refused to give allegiance to Ibrahim, his brother, and Abdul Aziz ibn al Hajjaj, the same who commanded the force that slew Walid, was sent by Ibrahim to force the people to allegiance. He had with him the fund of Parascus but at the approach of Marwan raised the siege and hastily retreated. The people of Homs now came out and gave an oath to Marwan, not as caliph but as avenger of the murder of Walid and champion of the rights of his imprisoned sons.

Ibrahim then sent the man who hitherto had been regarded as the most competent commander of the Umayyad forces, Suleiman ibn Mishan, leader of numerous expeditions against Rum, campaigner with Marwan in Armenia under Maslama, a man of intrepid spirit and courage.

Suleiman led his forces to the plain of the Bekaa and stopped at the spring known as Ain al Jarr, a short distance from Baalbec on the Damascus road, the traditional site where

Noah was alleged to have entered the ark and where his tomb is still pointed out to the curious traveller. Marwan approached from Bair al Abrash and, when the two forces were in sight of each other, sent word to Sulaiman that if he would free al Mahan and Utman, Marwan would personally guarantee that no harm would befall the conspirators who had killed their father. It was a splendid gesture, but hardly more; Marwan certainly could not have expected that his offer would be accepted. A cavalry engagement commenced the battle and the day went on with neither side accomplishing much. Marwan, however, decided to attack if possible from the rear. He detached a group of three thousand horsemen with laborers to proceed East towards the Anti-Lebanon mountains. Trees were felled to construct a bridge across the Jarar River flowing from the spring, and the force passed over. The tactics are understandable, but not the construction of the bridge. The stream in question is little more than a rivulet which could easily be forded, especially by the cavalry, and in the late autumn when the engagement took place and the snows of the mountains had melted, should have offered no problem whatever. The maneuver, however, was successfully executed, and Sulaiman was unaware of what had happened until the cries of "Allahu" Akbar were heard in the rear. The rout was complete. The people of Homs showed no mercy in the revenge they exacted and after they had slaugh-

tered 17,000 of the enemy, they had to be stopped from the carnage by the intervention of the contingents from Sinnarān and the Jazīra. The account in Tabari is his own without mention of other authority. An identical version is found, as might be expected, in Ibn al Athir, V, 244. Baladhuri, however, gives a different story. Harwan wrote a letter to the people of Palestine saying, "I have stopped at Fair al Abrash and Sulaiman is at Ain al Jarr. I have observed his army myself and I have seen a great army and I am coming to you by such and such a way." Harwan instructed his courier to permit this message to fall into Sulaiman's hands. The latter was deceived and deserted his naturally defensible position to prevent Harwan from uniting with the sympathetic people of Palestine. Harwan promptly occupied his position and in the battle that followed, Sulaiman was caught at a disadvantage and defeated.¹ The battle took place on November 12, 744.² Harwan's forces were outnumbered three to two. From the prisoners, he exacted an oath of allegiance to al Hajar and Utman, Walid's two sons. He then let them depart in peace. Two Kalbites alone were slain, al Walid ibn Masad of the illustrious family of al Mizza, and Yazid ibn al 'Uqar; both had been among the murderers of Walid.

The rest of the history of the Umayyad period might be written in terms of the attempts of the conspirators and

1. Baladhuri, *Ansab*, *op. cit.*, - 773A

2. Al Yaqubi, *op. cit.*, II, 413.

their associates to escape the deserved retribution which pursued and finally caught up with each one. Sulaiman fled to Damascus and a council was hurriedly convoked of the leaders:

Sulaiman ibn Hisham
Abdul Aziz ibn al Hajjaj ibn Abdul Malik
Ibrahim, the caliph
Yazid, son of Khalid al Qasry
Abu 'Ilasah as-Sakafy
Al Asbagh ibn Nu'aim al Kalby.

It was agreed that the day was lost and flight imperative. Marwan's guarantee of protection had been rejected and there was no question what the attitude of al Hakam and Uthman would be once they were released. Yazid ibn Khalid al Qasry sent his mawali to do the dirty work and the two young boys were slain, together with Yusuf ibn Umar.¹ Abu Muhammad as-Safyany alone escaped by barricading the door of his cell, and Marwan entered the city before the assassins could reach him. Sulaiman seized all the money in the treasury he could get, and with the others fled to the desert.

Marwan's first act was to give honorable burial to the two young boys and to Yusuf; then he met Abu Muhammad as-Safyany who had been released, and the latter publicly saluted Marwan as caliph. Marwan feigned astonishment and demanded an explanation. Abu Muhammad then set forth that both al Hakam and Uthman had reached manhood. Both were competent to decide on matters of state and had revealed to Abu Muhammad that it was their will, in case of mishap, that

1. Tabari, op. cit., 1379; Baladhuri, Ansab, op. cit., 773B.


Marwan should succeed them.¹ The people of Homs then rose and gave their recognition to the new caliph. "God knows I never sought it, neither night nor day," he said.²

It is difficult to say how well the episode had been staged-managed. Tabari certainly intended to give the impression that Marwan was aiming at the caliphate from the beginning, without explicitly asserting this. Agapius states that from the start he "pretended" to be seeking revenge for al Walid and justice for his sons.³ After the event, the whole affair must have seemed like the master stroke of a consummate politician. In his first propaganda, Marwan had hotly disclaimed all motives of personal gain; he appeared in the role of a crusader for righteousness. Yet it must have been perfectly obvious to him that his proclamation meant death for the two boys imprisoned in Damascus. In the older accounts preserved in Baladhuri, however, Marwan is treated as being genuinely sincere. It is difficult to believe this.

It is essential now to consider exactly the legal status of the caliph. He was recognized on the basis of the treasury will of al Hakam. The right of al Hakam to delegate the succession was open to serious question. The act of succession announced by Walid was considered invalid by many, first because an oath of allegiance could not be

1. Tabari, op. cit., 1390-91.
2. Baladhuri, Ansab, op. cit., 773B.
3. Agapius, op. cit., 513.

taken to a boy, and second because many people had refused to ratify it. Furthermore, al Hakam had never actually been caliph, unless one was prepared to accept the allegiance given only at the instigation of Marwan from Homs and Qinnasrin a few days before his death, and if, despite his nomination, he had never acted as caliph nor been universally recognized, how could he presume to delegate an authority he had never possessed? Until the moment when Abu Muhammad sprang his coup, no one, unless Yazid ibn Mubalira be excepted, and certainly not the people of Homs, had the least idea that the campaign Marwan was leading them on was to result in his own elevation to power. Therefore, the caliph ruled by virtue of the military power of the army he had brought with him from the Jazira; to it alone he owed the caliphate. In addition to this, he was not in the line of direct succession, as the following table shows.



Two distinguished brothers of Hisham and sons of Abdul Malik still lived, Saïd and Muhammad. Of the sons of Walid I, there

were Bishr, Masrur, and al Abbas. Yazid, the son of Sulaiman, enjoyed great popularity in Palestine. Hishar had a number of sons. Apart from the Marwanids, there were distinguished descendants of Umayya. All told, there were more than a dozen men who by any principle of dynastic succession had far more right to the throne than Marwan. Most serious of all, Marwan's mother was a slave, and ignoble birth was a complete disqualification, particularly when there were other pretenders of distinguished descent. Many of these Umayyads of course had been partners with Yazid III, and would never have been recognized, but one outstanding fact of Marwan's reign, is that although he conciliated other Umayyads and gave many of them lucrative posts, he received the willing cooperation of not one and was compelled to imprison some of those who had been his earliest supporters, including that very Abu Muhammad as-Sufyani who had been the first to recognize him.¹ It was partly due to this circumstance that from Syria, formerly the support of the dynasty, there now came only sullen acquiescence that compelled the caliph to transfer the capital to Harran in the Jazira, the source of his power.

Finally, Marwan had gained the throne by the help of A'ala, on whom he had to rely, not from choice, but from necessity. At the outset of his career, he had been singularly free from party spirit. Nevertheless, he had lost

1. Tabari, op. cit., III A Ser. I, 43.

the Yemenite section of his army when Thabit ibn Mu'awiyah rebelled in Armenia and the Syrian contingent marched home from Harran. The remainder of forces came from the troops that had long lived in the Jazira, descendants of the first settlers in Diyar Bakr and Diyar Rabi'a. They were Qeis to a man. In Syria, victory had been made possible by the support of Yazid ibn Mubairah and the Qeisites of Hinnisrin. Lastly, as the revenger of the Qeisite Khalid against the Kalbite Yazid, Marwan was compelled, not by tribal prejudice, but through the fact that state politics and tribal politics had become so closely connected that they could not be divorced, to throw his weight on the side of Mu'thar against Yaman.

Marwan was recognized as caliph on 26 Safar, 127 (December 7, 744).¹ There are some disagreements now as to what followed. According to Tabari, Marwan showed a most conciliatory spirit. To Sulaiman ibn Hisham and Ibrahim, the quondam caliph who had by this time reached Palmyra, he granted aman, that is, full pardon and freedom and guarantee of security. He next summoned the people of the junds and offered to appoint whomever they chose. The people of Homs chose Abdallah ibn Shajarah al Kindy, a Yemenite. Jordan asked for Khalid ibn Muawiyah ibn Marwan, and Palestine demanded Thabit ibn Mu'awiyah al Judary, also of Yemen. It seems incredible that Marwan should have tolerated the appointment of Thabit, who had rebelled against Hisham and a-

1. Elias Nisibinis, Delaporte, op. cit., 105.

gainst him; the caliph stuck by his offer, however, and after obtaining the most solemn oaths from Thabit, installed him in office. The people of Damascus selected Zamil ibn Amr al Jabrany. These affairs having been settled, Marwan returned to Harran.¹ The most striking characteristic of these dispositions is the fact that Marwan at the outset attempted to show that he was above tribal prejudices; of the four prefects, three were of Kalb, and one an Umayyad. It was an eminently wise and statesmanlike move. Why then did Syria revolt the moment his back was turned?

Following the account of Tabari, Wellhausen has been greatly impressed by Marwan's moderation and has rejected as false the statement of Theophanes² that Marwan put to death the accomplices in the murder of al Walid and mutilated others.³ At the same time, according to Theophanes, Marwan carried off to Harran all the treasure of the country. In Michael, the Syrian, we read: "Marwan came to Damascus, took the royal treasures and money amounting to 3,000 camel loads and went to Harran. The Westerners complained of him because he did not reside with them."⁴ Bar Hebraeus, who generally follows Michael, confirms this statement.⁵ Dionysius Telmaharensis reports: "Marwan, knowing the perfidy of the occidentals to him, wished to

1. Tabari, *op. cit.*, 1892.

2. Theophanes, *op. cit.*, 6235.

3. Wellhausen, *op. cit.*, 377.

4. Chabot, *Michael the Syrian*, *op. cit.*, II, fasc. III, 505

5. Eudge, *The Chronography of Bar Hebraeus*, *op. cit.*, 112.

move the royal treasures to Mesopotamia. The occidentals protested violently and turned against him. He declared to them, 'I do not wish to take the money to Mesopotamia, but only to Damascus, since there is established the capital of the Kingdom.' The people permitted him to take treasure to Damascus; they even accompanied him and took it into the city. Then, after three months he suddenly departed and took the treasure to Harran where he went to live. After that, war did not cease during his reign."¹

Agapius tells us: "Harwan cut off the hands and feet of some, and crucified others, massacred many, and sent the rest into exile. He then ordered that the treasury of the kingdom be added to his own private treasury."²

Now it would seem possible that Agapius and Theophanes in describing these massacres are confused with what took place after the first revolt of Haris, which occurred in the same year, were it not for the account we have in the *Ansab al Ashraf* of Baladhuri. Abdul Aziz ibn al Hajjaj, one of the ring leaders tried to escape but was caught and executed. This is also confirmed by Abu Hanifa ad-Dinawari.³

Harwan said, "There still remain with me some scoundrels who would start rebellion." And he sent in pursuit of those who had a part in the

1. Dionysius Tolmarenensis, Chabot, *op. cit.*, 41-42.

2. Agapius, *op. cit.*, 515.

3. Dinawari: *Kitab al Ashraf At-Tawdīl* of Abu Hanifa Ahmad ibn Hanafī ad-Dinawari, Vladimir Ginzburg, ed. London, 1888, 350.

killing of al Valid, and two hundred of them were captured, and he killed some and cut off the hands of others, and he captured Ishaq ibn Ibrahim ibn al Valid and Sulaiman ibn Yazid ibn Abdul Malik and forced them to swear allegiance to him. Then he carried off what was in the treasury of Damascus and went to Harran.⁴

The silence of Tabari in the face of such evidence cannot be used as an argument. The agreement of Theophanes, Agapius, and Baladhuri on the execution of some of the conspirators, together with the agreement of all the others that Marwan carried off the money, is conclusive.

Because Tabari did not mention the jund of Qinnisrin as one which had chosen a governor, Wellhausen states, "Qinnisrin as Geisite is included with Mesopotamia and separated from Syria."² Unfortunately, this statement now appears as a hasty conclusion. Marwan named Abdul Malik ibn al Kawthara as governor of Qinnisrin, and it continued as one of the five districts of Syria.³

We must then reconsider Marwan's conduct in somewhat different light. He made it clear at the outset that if possible he did not wish to play tribal politics and showed that he was willing to permit the districts where the Yemenite tribes predominated to be governed by their own people. This was prudent and wise. To Sulaiman ibn Hisham, who had been in exile in Oman and had played no part in the murder of Valid, he could afford to be generous; Ibrahim, the Deposed, was a pathetic weakling. There is no evidence that he had

1. Binawari, op. cit., 350.
 2. Wellhausen, op. cit., 377.
 3. Baladhuri, Ansab., op. cit., 773B.
 4. Ibid., 773B.

cooperated with his brother Yazid; he was a negligible factor and it would have been unnecessary cruelty to punish him. Marwan had promised to revenge Walid; this he attempted to do, and the commander Abdul Aziz met a well deserved death, but the other ring leaders escaped, and the punishment of the caliph fell on some of those miserable eight hundred men who had permitted themselves to be hired for 2,000 dirhems each. They might well have been spared, for their execution merely resulted in desire for retribution. The greatest mistake the caliph made, however, was the removal of the money of the province, together with the government, to Harran. Marwan doubtless felt the hostility of many in Syria, and like all his predecessors, showed a homesickness for those regions where he had spent most of his life. Hisham had been brought up in Basafa and it was there he established his capital. Sulaiman before his accession had lived in Ramla in Palestine: when he became caliph he erected there the great mosque and government buildings. Both the Walids as boys lived in the Trans-Jordan desert, and there they held their courts. Marwan's father, Muhammad, during his term as governor of Aderbaijan and of the Jazira resided in Harran, and now the son felt the urge to return. This curious attachment of the later Umayyads to the scenes of their childhood was a serious weakness and an interesting commentary on the form of government, which as we have remarked before was so completely decentralized into virtually

autonomous units that the tasks of the central, federal government were not arduous, and it could consequently with ease be moved from one place to another. The principal function of the caliph was the appointment of his administrators, who corresponded with him from time to time and provided him with what surplus revenue they could collect. Apart from this, his duties were not many.

Considering the disaffection of many parts of Syria, and the fact that the new prefects who had been chosen by the people and not by the caliph had no cause to be attached through sentiments of loyalty and gratitude to him, Harwan should certainly have stayed in the locality where he could keep a constant watch on popular sentiment and deal with all signs of disaffection promptly. Instead, after spending three months in Larnesus, he departed at the end of March 745 for his home, leaving behind him feelings of resentment. Three months later, he was returning to deal with the inevitable.

As soon as Harwan had departed to Harran, Thabit ibn Ma'in for a third time revealed himself as a man without trust or honor. He began to send seditious messages to the people of Hama, calling upon them to revolt. They did not immediately respond to his call, but Thabit got in touch with some of the twelve conspirators and at length formed a party headed by al Asbagh ibn Husala with his sons, Hisham ibn Masad of al Misza and Muawia the Sakaki; they were joined by the Kalb of Amor and about a thousand others.

Marwan, apprised of what was taking place, set forth hastily from Harran and arrived at Hama the same day that the conspirators had reached Homs, the day after the breaking of the fast of Ramadan. (1 Shawwal 127 = July 6, 745.) The inhabitants of Homs admitted the Kalb forces, who then barred the gates and prepared for a siege. The next day, July 7, 745, Marwan appeared before the city and demanded to know why the people had broken their oath. They denied that they had revolted; (hence it appears that the insurrection was not as general as Wellhausen has imagined,¹) and they threw open the gates of the city. Marwan entered. Al Asbagh and as-Saksaky escaped to Palmyra, but Huala and Mirafisa, al Asbagh's sons, with thirty other prisoners were put to death. Five hundred others had fallen in the battle.² Marwan stayed long enough to pull down some of the walls, and then hastened to Damascus, where Yazid, the son of Khalid at Emory, with the Masada and Kalbites of Mizza were besieging the city. The movement was easily suppressed, Yazid and Abu 'Ilaca were slain, and the city of Mizza was razed to the ground. In this campaign, according to Chevond, Marwan was assisted by Ashot Bagratouni with 15,000 Armenian archers, and the punishment of the rebels he describes as horrible. Not only was there an indiscriminate slaughter of men, but women and children suffered as well, and the bellies of pregnant mothers were

1. Wellhausen, *op. cit.*, 379.

2. Tabari, *op. cit.*, 1892-3.

ripped open.¹ This is probably an exaggeration, as such a carnage is not mentioned in other sources.

Marwan still had to deal with Thabit. He had collected a large group of 'Akhm and with the promise, "O children of Sakhm (Yemen), I am not of Khalm if I do not take Syria from the children of Cois," laid siege to Tiberias.² Abul Ward was sent against him and raised the siege. Thabit fled to Palestine, where Abul Ward pursued him and captured him with his four sons, Muaim, Harir, Turan, and Rifaat. Only the latter was spared. Marwan cut off the hands and feet of the others. It was a necessary and well-merited act.³ All Syria was now submissive with the exception of Palmyra. Before leaving Damascus, Marwan summoned Muhammad, Saïd, and Balkara, the sons of Abdul Malik, together with the sons of Sulaiman, Yazid II, and Hisham, and also the prominent men of Quraysh and the chiefs of the tribes. In their presence he married his two sons, Ubaidallah and Abdallah, to two daughters of Hisham, Umm Hisham and Ayesha, and then had allegiance sworn to them as his successors⁴ in Muharram, 123, October 745, after Marwan had been three months in Syria.⁵ He then advanced to al-Qastal, three days' march from Palmyra, and sent ahead al-Walid, the nephew of Abrash, a prominent man of the Kalb of the city, to see if the inhabitants were willing to accept

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1. Cheyond, *op. cit.*, 115-116.
 2. Baladhuri, *op. cit.*, 775.
 3. Tabari, *op. cit.*, 1894.
 4. *Ibid.*, 1895.
 5. Baladhuri, 775, *op. cit.*

amnesty or wished to stand a siege. They accepted Marwan's offer of amnesty and returned to allegiance; only Muawia as-Sakaky, 'Isma ibn al-Muqshar'irra, and 'Ufayl ibn Haritha, who had been leaders of the Kalb who entered Hama, distrusted Marwan's aman, and they fled to the desert.

All Syria now appeared to be in submission, and so Marwan issued commands for the enlistment of the muqatila of the province to join him in the campaign against the Kharrajites of Iraq, but before these men had been recruited, he set out himself, accompanied by Suleiman ibn Hisham, Ibrahim the Deposed, Sa'id ibn Abdul Malik with his brothers, and the children of Walid I and Suleiman. Clearly Marwan did not intend to leave any Umayyads behind him to stir up disaffection. At ar-Raqqa on the Euphrates, Suleiman ibn Hisham professed that he was wearied by the forced marches and asked if he might rest a few days. Marwan granted his request, and while Suleiman stayed behind, the caliph hastened with the rest of his men to join ibn Hubeira in Iraq.

In the meantime, the recruits from Syria arrived at Basafa, a short distance from ar-Raqqa, and sent word ahead to Suleiman that they were prepared to recognize him as caliph. "You are more pleasing than Marwan and more worthy of the caliphate, and the devil has made Marwan slip," they said.¹ The adherence to an oath had become meaningless after the murder of Walid, and the Syrian troops now renounced Marwan and proclaimed Suleiman. They then returned to Khassaf outside

1. Tabari, op. cit., 1903.

Aleppo about the first of November, 745. The minute that Marwan learned the news, he gave up his projected campaign in Iraq and, leaving Ibn Hubaira to maintain himself on the defensive, turned back: determined that this time he would make an example of the Syrians that they would not forget. Sulaiman had left some of his family and his cavalry behind in the fortresses of al Hany. Marwan summoned them to surrender, but they refused. Marwan said, "I warn you and I threaten you that if you oppose a single man who follows me, or if any man of my army suffers injury from you, the results, by Allah, will be on your heads and you will have no man from me."¹ He then passed by, and the people came out and harried the stragglers on his rear. Marwan had no time to waste on them. He continued in lightning marches and at length caught up with Sulaiman at Hama, before the latter could entrench himself properly. Marwan attacked the enemy without delay before Sulaiman had time to muster his forces in battle formation. Marwan had given orders that no prisoners were to be taken, except those who were slaves. Thirty thousand lay dead on the field when the battle was over; thousands of Arabs to escape death said that they were slaves, and Marwan promptly sold them. Among the dead were Ibrahim and Khalid one of the uncles of Hisham, a brother of those two uncles who had supported Maslama when Hisham had tried to get men to depose Walid II. Khalid had a big belly and was enormously fat; he was panting

1. Tabari, op. cit., 1909.

when they brought him in and Marwan said to him, "O you scoundrel, was there not enough wine and singing girls in the city to satisfy you without your joining this rascal, Sulaiman, and fighting me?"

Khalid replied, "O Commander of the Faithful, he forced me to join him and I implore you, by God, to show mercy."

The caliph answered, "You lie, wretch. How should he force you to rebel with your singing girls and wine skins and guitars?" He had him slain on the spot.¹ Sulaiman and the remnants of his army fled to Homs where they proceeded to fortify the city as rapidly as possible and rebuild the walls that had been pulled down. Marwan should have followed them at once before they had completed their work; instead, he turned rapidly East to that fortress in al Mani where the mawali of Sulaiman had defied him. He set up catapults, battered down the walls and of the three hundred within, he made a horrible example. Once again he turned West, marching for Homs.

The inhabitants of that city were by now in despair. They had no reason to expect mercy, and a group was formed under the leadership of Muawia asSaksaky, one of the three who had fled from Palmyra and had not accepted Marwan's amn. "Let us take an oath unto death, and let us agree not to separate after we once catch sight of the caliph un-

1. Tabari, op. cit., 1910.

til we all perish."¹ Their plan was to lay an ambush for the caliph as he approached. Marwan, however, had taken unusual precautions. As he drew near the city, he brought his men in perfect battle formation, marching them along easily defensible ground; they were prepared for the ambush. Muawia asakhsaki was captured. "Spare my life," he said, "for I am the greatest horseman of the Arabs."

"You lie," said Marwan. "The one who captured you is the greatest horseman."

He was slain with 6,000 others in the ambush.² When the news reached Sulaiman, he appointed his brother Saïd to hold the city, and himself escaped to Palmyra. Marwan then sat down before the city for a long siege which, according to Tabari, lasted for ten months. Baladhuri likewise tells us the siege lasted "ten months, more or less".³ Elias Nisibinis, on the other hand, stated that it lasted four months and twenty-two days.⁴ Vollhausen has accepted the dating of Elias.⁵ The battle of Khussaf took place during the first days of November, 745. By the first of December Marwan must have finished with the destruction of Sulaiman's mawali at al Hani and have returned to Homs. Tabari informs us that the siege was over by the end of August, 746.⁶ It had thus lasted for nine months, and

1. Tabari, *op. cit.*, 1910.

2. *Ibid.*, 1912.

3. Baladhuri, *Ansab.*, *op. cit.*, 775B.

4. Elias Nisibinis, *Relaporte*, *op. cit.*, 129.

5. Vollhausen, *op. cit.*, 332.

6. Tabari, *op. cit.*, 1913.

from the time of the battle of Khussaf, ten months. During the siege Marwan erected eighty catapults and battered the walls day and night. The citizens at last offered to surrender if they were given aman, and they promised to deliver 'Aid, Utman, and Marwan, the three sons of Sulaiman, to the caliph. The offer was accepted.

During this campaign, the emperor Constantine V crossed the Syrian thugur.¹ According to Baladhuri, the Greeks made terms with the garrison at Mar'ash and the people evacuated it and left for the Jazira or for Qinnisrin, whereupon the Greeks destroyed the city. When Marwan had finished the campaign of Homs, he sent troops up to Mar'ash, which was rebuilt.² According to Agapius, Constantine marched as far as Balouk, but hastily retreated on learning Homs had fallen.³

When the siege of Homs came to an end, Marwan destroyed the walls as well as those of Baalbec and Damascus.⁴ Syria now lay prostrate at Marwan's feet. Those men of Kalb who survived, the caliph exiled.

The third Syrian campaign marked the turning point in Marwan's policy of political conciliation. At the end of the first campaign, he permitted important offices to pass into the hands of Kalbites and Umayyads. At the conclusion

1. Theophanes, op. cit., 6237.
2. Baladhuri, op. cit., I, 294-295. Cf. Alfred Lombard, Constantin V, Empereur des Romains. Paris, 1902. 207-8.
3. Agapius, op. cit., 519.
4. Theophanes, op. cit., 6237; Michael the Syrian, Chabot, op. cit., II, III 505; Agapius, op. cit., 520.

of the second, he still treated many of the Umayyads with generosity. To the Kalb of Iakhyra and to artisans of Yazid III he granted amnesty. When these measures failed to produce the desired results, Marwan abandoned entirely his former policy, cast in his lot with 'oia, and at the conclusion of his third campaign had utterly smashed to bits any possible Syrian resistance after the most horrible slaughter that the Arabs of that province had experienced. The Kalb strength in the West was annihilated. The consequences for the cause of the Umayyads were fatal. If Marwan was not again to be troubled by Syria, it was also true that never again could he draw from Syria that military support which had hitherto maintained his dynasty against all assaults. The fighters of Iraq had never been a match for the Syrian troops, trained as they were in a more invigorating climate and practiced in arms by the yearly campaigns against him. The completion of the third civil war resulted in the transfer of the balance of military power from the West to the East; the strongest fighters and greatest body of men under arms were now in Khorasan. Marwan had only the troops of Mesopotamia to rely on. More than any other circumstance the real cause for the downfall of the Umayyad dynasty had now appeared in the destruction of Syrian military strength. Marwan had saved the throne for himself, but in doing so he and the Umayyads who opposed him had committed political suicide.

The campaign in the West was over. Suleiman had fled

to Iraq, and, free at last to act, Marwan marched East to deal with a situation which for over a year had been threatening the very life of the empire. At this point, we shall summarize the events that had taken place in Iraq after the death of 'alid.

It will be remembered that Yazid III after getting allegiance sworn to him in Syria had sent Mansur ibn Jumar, the Kalbite conspirator, to Iraq as governor, and that within two months, Yazid sent Abdallah ibn Umar II in July of 744 to replace Mansur, who continued to live in the province.

Ibn Umar at once adopted a policy of extraordinary leniency and gave stipends to the people. When the news of the generosity of the new governor had circulated, there came to Kufa among others a certain Abdallah ibn Muawia ibn Abdallah ibn Jafar ibn Ali Talib, a descendant of the first cousin of Ali, the Prophet's son-in-law. Ibn Muawia, as he is called, was a great friend of the governor, who gave him the handsome pension of 300 dirhems a day.¹ Matters went on peacefully enough until word came of the death of Yazid, October 3, 744, and the accession of Ibrahim, but before ibn Umar could make the necessary preparations for having an oath of allegiance sworn to Ibrahim, there arrived simultaneously two men, one a courier with the intelligence that Marwan was marching on Syria, and the other no less a person than Ismail, the brother of Khalid al Qasri, who, fleeing the

1. Tabari, op. cit., 1891.

wrath which was to come, had forged a commission of the pseudo-caliph Ibrahim appointing him governor of Iraq. This commission Ismail showed to the Syrian troops of Kalb stationed in the province. They supported Ismail, who was at once attacked by Ibn Umar and compelled to abandon his pretensions. Ibn Umar, foreseeing that Marwan was to be on the side of Ceis-Mudthar, and having already alienated Kalb-Yemen by the attack on Ismail, decided to adopt a strictly mudtharite policy, which he soon made apparent to all by granting large stipends to the Mudtharites and giving not a penny to the Yemenites. The result was an instant revolt, breaking out in the first winter months of 745, led by a certain Umar ibn al Chadthban. The governor, perceiving that he had made a mistake, now sent secretly to the Yemenites the money they were clamoring for. These proceedings disgusted the people of Hufa, and, in the words of Tabari, "when the Khita perceived Ibn Umar's weakness, they blamed him and got courage to act against him and they called to Abdallah ibn Muawia to accept their oaths of allegiance".¹

Now again, the results of the killing of Walid became apparent. Mansur ibn Junaid and Ismail at Casry joined Umar ibn al Chadthban, and the three with all the Syrian Yemenite troops took an oath of allegiance to Ibn Muawia. The Umayyad cause had indeed fallen to a low point when

1. Tabari, op. cit., 1883.

the Syrians in Iraq were ready to acknowledge a member of the house of Ali. With united forces, they marched against Ibn Umar, who was in the garrison of Hira. The governor, however, held the trump card, for by good fortune there was with him a large supply of cash. He offered 500 dirhems for every head that was brought to him, "and when men saw that he was keeping his promise, they cried out to the people and by God it was hardly a moment until you saw about five hundred heads thrown down before him."¹

The battle was just another illustration of the facts we have already mentioned in our chapter on the Umayyad military institutions. Ibn Muawia was routed and took refuge in the citadel. There is no question what an al Hajjaj would have done under these circumstances, but the pathetic governor was of another stamp. He sent word to Ibn Muawia that if he would only get out of the province he might go in peace where he pleased.² The offer was accepted and Ibn Muawia went to al Madain on the Tigris. Here he was joined by his former adherents at Kufa, and having recruited an army, he marched to the East and seized the province of Fars, making his capital Istakhr, where he remained happily ruling his domains for the next three years. We shall leave him there for the present, for a greater danger was now approaching.

The murder of al Walid, the cause of all Umayyad woes,

1. Tabari, *op. cit.*, 1886.

2. *Ibid.*, 1887.

was the signal for a Kharajite uprising in the provinces of Jazira and Aderbaijan which had become the center and breeding ground for these revolutionaries. At Kafartatha, thirty miles southwest of Hardin and fifty miles west of Misihin, a certain Bahdal ash Shaibany, a Kharajite, collected two hundred men and went to war. As usual, the forces of the rebels at first were small. Another group of Kharajites, however, had taken the field somewhat earlier, in June, 744, led also by a man of Shaiban named Bistan. According to Baladthuri, this Bistan was a Baihasite and used to kill babies, saying, "I kill the little creatures to send them to their Creator."¹ Bistan began his revolt with thirteen men in Aderbaijan by murdering the governor; he then advanced to Mosul with a force of forty and at al Hinabat near the city on market day, he slew eighty men. By now he had recruited a large force of Rabia and marched to Shahrazar, then to Madain, where he defeated the governor. After this success, Bistan moved north again until he came face to face with the forces of the other Kharajite, Bahdal. The two bands attacked each other to determine which had the favor of God; Bistan was slain and of his men only fourteen escaped, and they fled to Marwan. The revolt had begun in the summer of 744 and this battle occurred in the early spring of 745, after Marwan had been recognized as caliph. Some time later, Bahdal died of

1. Baladthuri, Ansab, op. cit., 778A.

plague and the Kharijite leadership passed to Dhahhak ibn Geis, also of Shaiban. He went to Shahrazur, just across the Mesopotamian frontier in the province of Jibal, and there recruited an army, of which Abu Ubaida said "there had never been gathered any number like them to a Kharijite before".¹

While these events were taking place, Ibn Umar expelled Ibn Mas'ud from Iraq. The governor who had started out as a Kalbite, who had then supported the Geis on news of Marwan's victory, and who shortly thereafter when revolt broke out among the Syrian troops of Kalb had returned to the Kalb fold, now received word of his recall on the arrival of an Nadhar ibn Said al Harashy, whom Marwan sent to be governor of Iraq. We know of no better way to illustrate the weakness, the incapability, or the irresolution of that political turncoat, Ibn Umar, than to list the prefects of Kufa and of its police whom he appointed and discharged in the ten months from July 744 to April 745.

Governor of Kufa	Prefect of Kufan Shurta
1. 'Abdallah ibn al Abbas al Kindi	1. Umar ibn al Cadhiban
2. 'Asim ibn Umar II	2. "
3. Umar ibn Abdul Hamid ibn Abdur Rahman ibn Zaid ibn al Khattab (of the family of Umar I)	3. Al Fakar ibn 'Utaibah al-Sady
4. Umar ibn al Cadhiban	4. "
5. Walid ibn Hassan al Ghassany	5. Aban ibn al Walid
6. Ismail ibn Abdallah al 'Asry	6. "
7. Abdul Samad ibn Aban ibn Na'man ibn Bashir al Ansar	7. "
8. 'Asim ibn Umar II	8. " 2

1. Tabari, *op. cit.*, 1900.
2. *Ibid.*, 1902.

When Anhadthir ibn Sa'id reached Kufa, the Yemenite troops refused to recognize him and left the city for Hira, where Ibn Umar was staying, and encouraged Ibn Umar to refuse to recognize Marwan's new governor. He consequently made a compact with the conspirators in the death of Walid, who one by one were arriving from Syria to join those already in Iraq, and he soon had Ismail ibn Abdallah al Qasri, with other members of Khalid al Qasri's family, Mansur ibn Jurair, and the sons and family and sawall of al Asbagh ibn Du'ala, the leading Kalb of Bakayra, on his side.

Anhadthir with the Qais-Mutharite faction then began a series of daily combats with Ibn Umar and the Kalb-Yemen coalition, but neither side suffered heavily; the pre-Islamic "days" of the Arabs were revived as of old, and the satirical poems and accounts of individual heroism on both sides form the substance of the narrative.

The internal strife of the Syrians presented a favorable opportunity for Dhahhak to strike and early in April he marched on Kufa. At his approach, both parties agreed to compose their quarrel and entered into a compact of mutual defense with the understanding that the battles would be renewed after Dhahhak's defeat.¹ The alliance, however, was weak and the circumstances were not those to produce cooperation and valor on the part of the Syrians. Dhahhak's forces were but one seventh the size of the defending army, but he won a decisive victory on April 14, 745, and Kufa fell into his

1. Tabari, op. cit., 1901.

hands. Both factions of the Syrians fled to the government fortified capital at Wasit, which now contained the rival governors, Ibn Umar and An'adhr. Neither would yield to the other, and so they agreed to deal with Ishaq separately. During Rabi' al Awwal, Ramadan, and Shawwal, - May, June, and July, - 745, both sides independently made ineffectual attacks on Ishaq's Kharijites in Kufa. Harwan, who had been preparing for a campaign against Ishaq was called to Syria by the first revolt of Hama, July 7, 745. In the absence of effective support from the caliph, all groups began to reconsider their position. An'adhr in disgust left the province with his Mu'tharites and returned to the Jazira. Ibn Umar and the Yemenites were then left to carry on the struggle.

In the war against Ishaq, Jafar ibn al Abbas al Kindy had been slain, and, according to all rules of Arab society, 'Ubadallah ibn al Abbas al Kindy, Ibn Umar's first governor of Kufa, was bound to revenge unto death the killing of his brother, but instead, he set the example by going over to Ishaq and swearing allegiance to him. A wave of disgust passed through the Syrian camp. The poet, Abu Ata, said mockingly:

Say to 'Ubadallah: Had Jafar been living
 He would not have gone to another
 If you were dead.
 He would not have followed the turncoat
 But would have revenged you,
 In his hand a sword, so heavy
 Against those who have killed your brother
 And called infidel your father.¹

1. Tabari, op. cit., 1904.

Ubaidallah replied in verses too insulting to be mentioned. His act, however, had left a great impression, and presently the other Yemenites thought better of his example. The first to follow was Mansur ibn Jadhra, who went to Ibn Umar with this advice: "I have never in my life seen men like these Khara'ites and why do you fight them and only occupy them from troubling Harwan? Give them what they want and keep them between you and between Harwan; if you give them what they want, they will leave us and go to Harwan and their hot pursuit and their power will be directed against him and you will be at peace in your position as governor. If they overcome Harwan, well, that is certainly all to the good and what you wished right along, and you will have aman from them, but if Harwan defeats them and you have desired to oppose and fight him, you can do so at your leisure."

Ibn Umar said: "Do not be hasty, but wait until we have pondered this matter a while."

Mansur retorted: "What is it we should ponder? What else is possible except to join them We are only warding off from Harwan their attack and occupying them from him. I am going to join them." And he went out and stood before their ranks and bawled, "I am on your side. I wish to submit and obey the word of God."¹

Ibn Umar at length perceived the wisdom of this advice and himself with the Syrian Yemenites under him entered the

1. Tabari, op. cit., 1967.

allegiance of the Kharrajite. This betrayal of the Umayyad Syrian cause occurred August 13, 745.¹ Habbak confirmed ibn Umar as governor of Iraq. He had in the meantime directed all the tax revenues of the *awlad* from the government to his own coffers, as was invariably the case in such insurrections, with the result that he had the ready money to pay and equip as many troops as the Umayyads.² With this great advantage he marched north again.

Meanwhile, two events of utmost seriousness had taken place in Armenia. Gregory and David, those sons of Combath Marikonian, had been freed by Walid from the exile in Yemen into which they had been sent by Marwan and Hisham, and they returned to Armenia at the moment that Marwan left Harran to capture for himself the caliphate. They united their forces and set out to kill Ashot Bagratuni, who fled to Marwan with 15,000 archers as he was setting out in June, 745, for his campaign of the first revolt of Homs. During Ashot's absence, Marwan's governor, Ishaq ibn Muslim, had succeeded in getting hold of David Marikonian and killing him. Ashot returned in late summer of 745 and was reestablished as patric of Armenia. In the autumn of 745, Marwan was undertaking the third Syrian campaign against Sulaiman, and during the second siege of Homs, Gregory Marikonian came to an agreement with Constantine V who had selected the moment for an invasion. With promise of foreign aid

1. Tabari, op. cit., 1908.

2. Ibid., 1899.

and the cooperation of his own faction, Gregory was able to seize the power from Ashot Bagratouni, who was betrayed by the Baharans and executed.¹ Ishahak had taken advantage of this situation and during his summer campaign of 745 got in touch with a Khazajite kinsman, Musafir al-Qasab, stationed at Deb al-Abwab. Musafir rose against Ishaq ibn Muslim al-Hucily, the governor, and collecting his forces came to Ardabil in Adorbaifan where he was appointed governor of that province by Ishahak. Musafir maintained his position against Ishaq until the Abbasids were firmly established.²

These events deprived Marwan for the rest of his reign of the active support which might normally have come to him had the loyal Ashot Bagratouni been living, and had not the faithful Ishaq been occupied with Musafir. It was only from the Jazira, then, that Marwan could raise an army.

As Ishahak now travelled north from Kufa, Marwan was hastening to meet him with the forces levied in Syria, when the treason of al-Man ibn Hisham sent him back. Yazid ibn Hubaira was left to hold the Jazira in a purely defensive campaign. Ishahak occupied Mosul and the war came to a standstill during Marwan's siege of Hama, until the early summer of 746. As soon, however, as it seemed reasonably certain that the Syrian campaign would prove a success, ibn Hubaira marched to Iraq and took up a position at Ain Taur,

1. Chevond, *op. cit.*, 115-121.

2. Baladhuri, *Origin of the Islamic State*, *op. cit.*, I, 323; Al Yaqubi, *op. cit.*, II, 454.

due south of Hit, some distance to the west of the Euphrates. Here he was attacked by al Muthannir, the governor of Kufa, in cooperation with Mansur ibn Jazira. The governor was slain, but Mansur succeeded in escaping to Kufa, collected the Yemenites, and fled to ar-Ruhba where Ibn Hubaira again attacked him and beat him. Mansur then shut himself up in the fortress of Wasit where he was joined by reinforcements from Khalkin under 'Abida ibn Sa'ad.¹ Ibn Hubaira now began a tedious campaign to bring Iraq to order again.

In the meantime Khalkin advanced from Mosul with 120,000 men and laid siege to Hama, held by Abdallah, the son of Marwan. The people of Jazira cried to Marwan for help and Ishak ibn Khalid wrote, "The Kharijites have spread throughout the land of Jazira and have burned and slaughtered without distinction, and I fear that those who are with you in Syria will desert their posts and return to their homes in Jazira while you are conducting this siege."

The caliph replied, "If the enemy, all of them, surround me I will not move. Either I shall conquer them, or I shall be killed in the attempt."

Marwan then wrote to his son Abdallah in Misbin to recall Ibn Hubaira from Iraq, but Abdallah replied, "We have no need for Ibn Hubaira; those who are on our side are enough and let Ibn Hubaira remain in Iraq, for it is defenseless."

The caliph replied, "O my son, you have a good and a brave opinion." And he pushed with renewed energy the siege

1. Tabari, op. cit., 1915-16.

of Homs.¹

Thalibak, with the revenues of Iraq behind him, was able to pay his horsemen 120 dirhams per month and the infantry men with mules 100 dirhams.² We have had occasion before to emphasize the fact that in Umayyad times armies fought not for principles but for money. Invariably a Kharijite or Shi'ite leader began with a few score loyal followers, and then made headway only when he had seized the funds necessary to hire fighters. Such was the case with Thalibak.

When the Syrian campaign ended in August, 746, the caliph hastened to raise the siege of Misbin. Thalibak in the meantime had been joined by Sulaiman ibn Hisham, who brought up his men, including prominent Umayyads, and saluted the Kharijite as caliph! To what pass had matters come when the sons of Hisham could join an anti-Umayyad rebel! The entire country was convulsed by the report, and Shabail ibn Azra and Habb'ah said:

Do you not see that God has indeed revealed his religion when Quraysh prays behind Bakr ibn Sal? (Shalban)³

Marwan arrived in time to save Misbin. A battle was fought at Kafartatha and that night, Thalibak's body was found among the slain.⁴

The Kharijites elected as their successor al-Khalibary

1. Baladhuri, *Ansab*, op. cit., 781 A.
2. Tabari, op. cit., 1939.
3. *Ibid.*, 1913.
4. *Ibid.*, 1939.

who now inflicted on Marwan the one disgrace of his career. With only four hundred men, he made a surprise raid on the caliph's army. Without considering resistance, Marwan jumped on his horse and galloped off as fast as he could, leaving his sons and all his men behind. The army had no time for flight and al Khaibary penetrated to the caliph's tent and with a sweep of his sword cut the ropes. His intention had been to break through the ranks and slay the caliph before anyone could resist, though it might cost him his own life. When Marwan's army saw the size of the Kharijite raiding force, it fell on them and Khaibary and the rest were slain. The courier who brought the news of victory galloped six miles before he caught up with the caliph.¹ After this episode, Marwan reorganized his entire method of fighting, abandoning the sufuf, or long lines of men, for smaller and more mobile units called haradisi رگرا دیسی²

The Kharijite leadership now passed to Shaiban ibn Abdul Aziz who consulted Sulaiman ibn Hisham and accepted his advice that all should return to Mosul. Marwan encamped on the Tigris outside the city where he built a khandaq for his own defense and commenced a tedious siege of six months.³ Ibn Hubeira in the meantime was prosecuting the war with success in Iraq. Hira fell to him, and then Wasit. Ibn Umar was among the prisoners sent to Marwan, who cast him into

1. Tabari, op. cit., 1940.

2. Ibid., 1944.

3. Ibid., 1944.

jail in Harran.

The victory in Iraq made it possible for Ibn Mu'awiyah to send reinforcements to Marwan in Mosul, and a force started north under 'Amir Ibn 'Ubayd Allah al-Harithi. The Kharijites sent out troops to prevent him from joining Marwan, but they were routed when he in turn received help from the caliph in the nick of time. Mosul now, instead of being a refuge for the Kharijites, threatened to become a death trap. Famine spread through the beleaguered city until a loaf of bread sold for one dirhem.¹ Therefore, in August, 747, Shaiban and Sulaiman led their forces out of the city and went to Hulwan and thence to Istarik in Pers where they joined Ibn Mu'awiyah who had already given refuge to Mansur Ibn Jundak. In Wellhausen's words: "Ibn Mu'awiyah, in himself very insignificant, was for a short space raised to a great eminence by the circumstances; he would certainly never have dreamed beforehand that such a thing could happen. Shiites, Kharijites, Malbites, Abbasids, Umayyads were all united under him. All differences seemed to be adjusted in the fanatical enmity to Marwan."²

Against this coalition Marwan sent 'Amir Ibn 'Ubayd Allah with thirty thousand of the rabite.

In the summer of 746 when Dhahhak took Mosul there occurred a revolt in the Hadramaut led by the Ibadites under

1. Zalathuri, op. cit., 1940.

2. Wellhausen, op. cit., 393-94.

Umar ibn Salim, who like all the Kharijites of this period belonged to the tribe of Thaiban. Among these Thadites was a certain Abdallah ibn Yaqza, who was known by the sobriquet of Talib al Haqq, the Seeker of Truth. When the Hadramut had fallen into his hands, he advanced on Yemen where he was able to establish himself at Sana as sole ruler of the province. At the time of the pilgrimage of 127 (747) he sent to Mecca a henchman of his, Abu Hanza. The governor of Mecca at this time was Abdul Wahid ibn Sulaiman. He made an agreement with Abu Hanza to remain at peace until after the second return from Mina concluded the ceremonies. He then revolted and without opposition from the governor who fled to Medina, got control of Mecca. Abdul Wahid raised an army in Medina, but as the troops left the city they passed the remains of a slaughtered sheep, and shortly thereafter the standard bearer had the misfortune to tear his flag on the branches of an Egyptian thorn bush. After two such bad omens, the men lost heart and returned to the city.¹ Abu Hanza now marched on Medina with a following of only four hundred and on October 17, 747, routed what troops Abdul Wahid could gather at Cudaid. The governor fled to Syria and Abu Hanza entered Medina on October 29th.² There he made the speech which we have had occasion to quote in the previous chapter on our discussion of the Kharijites. His rule, however, was short.

1. Tabari, *op. cit.*, 2006
 2. *Ibid.*, 2008.

The Kharijites having been driven from Mosul with Ibn Muljara in close pursuit, Marwan was able to spare a force to be sent to the Hijaz. It is notable that he could not recruit his men from Syria. Instead, he collected 4000 people of the Jazira under Abdul Malik ibn Muhammad ibn Atiyya. Each man received 100 dinars, an Arab horse, and perfect equipment, "the best that ever was seen in the Hijaz".¹ Ibn Atiyya met Abu Hanza outside Medina. The pious fanatic wished to employ theology before arms and shouted to Marwan's commander:

"What do you say about the Koran?"

"We put it in the bottom of a cornsack."

"What do you say about the money of an orphan?"

"We eat his money and make a whore of his mother," was the contemptuous reply.²

The battle went on until evening came when Abu Hanza cried, "O Ibn Atiyya, behold God the exalted has made night a time for rest, so you rest and we will rest."³ Ibn Atiyya was not to be moved by such an appeal; he fought on into the night and the exhausted Kharijites were massacred. The Hijaz was quickly returned to allegiance to Marwan. Ibn Atiyya then advanced on Yemen where he slew the Socker of Truth.⁴

1. Tabari, *op. cit.*, 2014.

2. *Ibid.*, 2013. The word **اليتيم** "orphan" does not mean as in English, a person who has lost both his father and mother, but only a person whose father is dead.

3. *Ibid.*, 2013.

4. The Kharijite revolt of Abu Hanza is described in great detail in Baladhuri, *Ansab*, *op. cit.*, Vol. 784-789 and in a condensed version closely following Baladhuri in the *Kitab al-Ahbari*, *op. cit.*, 97-100.

Meanwhile, Ibn al-Muharrir was bringing to a victorious conclusion his campaigns in Persia. Shaiban fled to Sijistan where he perished. Mansur ibn Jumhur and Sulaiman ibn Nishan escaped to India¹ where they remained until the reign of Abul Abbas, who sent al-Fuwayyih ibn Zubair to India to slay Mansur.² Sulaiman received ayn, but then was slain in Bagdad by the order of the caliph in 134.³ Ibn Muawia sought refuge from Abu Muslim, who had no desire to have an Alid in his ranks, but permitted him to continue to Herat where he was treacherously murdered.

Harwan had been declared caliph in December of 744. For three years and three months he and his generals had fought unceasingly a series of brilliant campaigns the likes of which had never before been seen. The tenacious persistence of the caliph had won both hatred and admiration. He received the nickname of "The Ass of Mesopotamia" for his endurance. At last in the spring of 748 it seemed as if all his enemies had been routed, and he returned to Harran for a much needed rest, but it was a sad and weary world that he surveyed from his capital in Mesopotamia. All the original conspirators in the death of al-Walid had either perished or fled to the limits of the empire where the arm of the law could not touch them. Revenge was full and complete. The worst Kharijite revolt in the history of the dynasty had been shut-

1. Tabari, op. cit., 1946, 1979.

2. Ibid., III A, Cor. I, 80.

3. Al-Faqih, op. cit., II, 431.

tered to fragments. In Iraq, in Arabia, in Syria all was peaceful; only in the outer limits of Adorbaifan on the shores of the Caspian was there war; there Isaac Ibn Muslim was conducting a stubborn siege of the Kharrjite fortress of al Kilab.

The peace in the West, however, was a peace of utter exhaustion. To the calamities of war were now added the calamities of pestilence. The bubonic plague appeared. In the Jazira 400,000 perished; in Syria 20,000 men died each day for a month. To plague was added famine. Villages became deserts and people half crazed with hunger ate the manure of beasts and the skin of sheep. Then it was that Marwan "himself made penance before God and wrote a letter to all the empire to do the same". A series of earthquakes destroyed buildings in Damascus and razed Tiberias. Spring floods killed thousands in Hama, Hama, Hama, and Baulbec.¹

The price of the caliphate was the destruction of the vital power of the West, and in weakness and exhaustion Marwan now awaited for two years the blow that was being prepared in Khorasan. To events in that province we now turn our attention.

We have shown that all the troubles that occurred in the West were the direct results of the murder of Walid, and we now hope to prove that the revolution in Khorasan had its origin in the same fatal act.

1. Michael the Syrian, Chabot, II, Fasc. III, 508-510, op. cit.; Dionysius Telmaharensis, Chabot, op. cit., 42; Theophanes, op. cit., 6237; Agapius, op. cit., P.O. VIII, 521.

Walid II had first confirmed Nasr ibn Sayyar as governor of Khorasan, but near the end of his reign he joined that province to Iraq, and Yusuf ibn Umar, following the instructions of the caliph, ordered Nasr to collect gold and silver vessels, falcons, swift horses, female dancers and castanet players, and the best performers on the lute to be found in the East, and bring these personally to the caliph.¹ The order amounted to a discharge from office, and Nasr understood it as such. Fortunately there was good excuse for delay in the time required to gather the gold and the dancers and Nasr, despite urgent messages to hasten his departure, delayed as long as possible. When at length he commenced the long journey he had not travelled far before word reached him of the murder of the caliph and the accession of Yazid III.² He consequently went back to Nery, returned the presents he had collected from the dihqans, and liberated the slaves and performers.³ Yazid, however, he hesitated to recognize, and he flatly declined to surrender his jurisdiction to Mansur ibn Jur'um, and when the latter sent his brother to be the new governor of Khorasan, Nasr refused to admit him to the province and kept him cooling his heels at Rayy.⁴

This act amounted to a virtual declaration of independence, for the governor had defied his superior authority,

1. Tabari, *op. cit.*, 1765-6.

2. *Ibid.*, 1767.

3. *Ibid.*, 1846.

4. *Ibid.*, 1845.

and his old commission having expired with the death of the caliph, he ruled without any legal right or title and derived what authority he possessed from the acquiescence of the people he governed, or the support of a powerful faction of those people. In this arbitrary act was the origin of the misfortunes about to follow. We have said before that the crucial fact, the key to the understanding of the events in the last years of the Umayyads, was the circumstance that 'Abis had long been in power and Kahlb, the former supporters of the Umayyads, was filled with resentment and waiting for the day of revenge. Mansur ibn Jansir was of Kahlb; the new caliph had adopted an out and out Kahlbite program, with the result that Kahlb now anticipated a change of affairs in Khurasan, but these expectations were thwarted by the refusal of the old governor to permit his Kahlbite successor to replace him.

Azd of Yemen was the first to murmur and would certainly have risen against a less popular and less respected man than Nasr, who, desirous of gaining support from all sides and wishing to show that he personally was above party faction, appointed to important posts in Tukharistan, Sulistan, and Khawarizm, as well as to minor offices in Khurasan, leaders of the Kahlb-Yemenite faction. Yemen professed to be content and one of their poets said:

I say to Nasr: I have sworn allegiance
 Over the head of Bakr and its allies,
 Here is my hand.
 You have levelled Khurasan
 Mooth for the Muslims

And if the men of Islam have united
You have spent the taxes for this union.
You have been a protector of neighbors
And have made secure
The people of this country.
You went at the head of the army
Of the two Easts,
Giving unto them the milk which
They have taken.
We will fulfill our covenant with Quraysh
And we have given our oath of allegiance
Not in haste, for we meant it.
We have found Quraysh to be merciful;
Our allegiance is no mockery.¹

Good feeling, however, was of short duration, and the Yeminites became restless and seditious, waiting for an opportunity to strike. The chance came when Nasr had to make the regular payment of the stipends. He had been forced to spend the coined dirhems for the gold and silver vessels alid had demanded, and he now proposed to satisfy the demands of the treasury by distributing those vessels among the troops. A clamor was organized in the mosque during the Friday prayer, the leader being a mawla of Azd with the startling name of Abu Shaitin (father of two devils) who, as Nasr finished a recitation from the Koran, stood up and shouted: "The stipend, the stipend."² Others took up the cry. A leader and agent provocateur of the Azd-Yeminite faction now dominates the stage. His name was Juca'a ibn Aly ibn Shabib ibn Barara ibn Saraim al Ma'ny, but he was known after his birthplace, Kirman, as al Karmany. Nasr had treated this man in the past with more consideration than he deserved. He had made him head of the bureau of cor-

1. Tabari, *op. cit.*, 1047-48.
2. *Ibid.*, 1856.

respondence, had saved his life when Yusuf ibn Umar wanted him slain, and had paid for him a fine he was unable to discharge. Gratitude, however, was not one of al Karmany's strong points; he was at heart an incorrigible opportunist, of whom one of his critics remarked, "If al Karmany were not able to gain authority and government except through the aid of Christians and Jews, he would by God, become a Christian or a Jew!"¹

This agitator now began to experience success, and when the governor sent to inquire what his intentions were, he replied, "As to the obedience of Fana Marwan, my intention is to draw the sword and seek revenge for Manu al Mahallab."

Nasr at first refused to take al Karmany very seriously and to the Mu'tharites who demanded that he be slain, the governor replied, "No, I shall give him 100,000 dirhams, and as he is stingy, he will not give any to his men, who will know of his fortune and desert him."²

When al Karmany's insolence surpassed all bounds, the governor at length imprisoned him, July 14, 744, but he was almost immediately delivered from prison by his partisans of Azd.³ Nasr now prepared to take severe measures and al Karmany submitted and swore to be quiet. Nasr consequently pardoned him and gave him arms. Karmany's good conduct was of short duration, for he discovered in two remarks of Nasr

1. Tabari, *op. cit.*, 1859.
 2. *Ibid.*, 1858.
 3. *Ibid.*, 1861.

justifiable grounds for breaking his word. The governor in a speech had mentioned the tribe of Azd, saying: "When they are trustworthy, they are the most noble of people, but when they are not, they remind me of the verses of al Akhtal when he said:

Frogs on a dark night talk to each other
And their voices betray them to the sea snake.¹

Shortly afterwards came news that Mansur ibn Jumhur had been discharged and replaced by Ibn Umar, and Nasr said as he made the announcement, "God has discharged him and appointed a good man, son of a good man."²

This insult against the Kalbite Mansur, and the unfortunate remarks about Azd, al Harany accepted as a personal affront, and he began gathering men and taking arms. Nasr called on him to desist, "I fear we shall all be destroyed and these Persians will find joy in our misery."³

The appeal was of no avail, and al Harany now proposed that inasmuch as Nasr had no real legal status, he be deposed and that a man of Bakr ibn Ball (that is, of Rabia, who though Mudtharite had long been allied with Azd) be chosen until the caliph himself made known his decision. Such a suggestion struck Nasr in his most vulnerable point, and the governor foresaw civil war in the near future. Fearing that a tribal struggle would offer an excellent opportunity for the reappearance of al Harith ibn Sureif who had been

1. Tabari, *op. cit.*, 1863.

2. *Ibid.*, 1864.

3. *Ibid.*, 1864.

living with the Turks, Nasr now made the serious mistake of assuming that a free pardon to Harith and a recall from his exile would eliminate him as a factor in the conflict about to commence. The caliph was consulted, and obliged with a pious letter in his best vein:

Now we wish to treat this community according to the Book of God, the exalted, and the Sunna of His Prophet; there is no power except in God and we have described to you the contents of our seal. Therefore, accept our amn, you and those with you, for you are our brethren and our helpers.¹

It was an admirable letter to dispatch to one who himself had summoned men to the Book of God and the Sunna.

When al Harith reached Harv on 27 Jumaida, 127 (April 5, 745), he received a warm welcome. Nasr gave him fifty dirhems a day, and Harzabana, Nasr's wife, presented him with a fur coat, which he sold for 4,000 dinars, employing the money to recruit followers. Nasr then offered him a prefecture and 100,000 dinars, but the old hypocrite replied, "I am not of this world, nor of men of indulgence. All I ask is the Book of God, the exalted, and conduct according to the Sunna, and the appointment of virtuous officials."²

Van Vloten, who with complete naïveté accepts implicitly the political speeches of his heroes, calls al Harith "a pious Muslim, ascetic and reformer, rebel and liberator of the oppressed, playing a Messianic role".³

1. Tabari, *op. cit.*, 1368.

2. *Ibid.*, 1389.

3. Van Vloten, *Recherches*, *op. cit.*, 28.

It would be nearer the truth to say that he was a good politician with an excellent sense of what would sway the public; as men today are swayed by an appeal to various forms of patriotism, so among the Muslims there was no more effective argument than to proclaim oneself the follower of God and the Prophet: this strategy in dialectic was employed by high and low in all parts of the empire; the caliph himself, as we have seen, stooped to use it, like any Kharijite or Shi'ite. It would be far from the truth to believe for a moment that a man who was using these catch words himself practiced what he advocated. In his first appearance, al Harith had led the Turks against the Arabs and had personally been responsible for the slaughter of thousands of the pious; on his defeat he had lived for years among the polytheists.

Now in his second appearance, he resumed the program for rise to personal power which he had been compelled to abandon. What Nasr had feared Harith would do if he were left among the Turks, he now proceeded to undertake after his recall. He got in touch with al Harmany and informed him that if Nasr acted according to the Book of God and appointed virtuous governors, he would stand by him, otherwise he would assist al Harmany.¹ Having been willing to ally with Turks, it meant nothing to Harith to join forces with a man whose confessed aim was tribal revenge and satisfaction.

1. Tabari, op. cit., 1890.

In the meantime, word had reached Khurasan of the victory of Marwan, and to him Nasr took an oath of allegiance. To Harith the news offered an excellent excuse. He said that the aman and promises he had received came from Yazid, not from Marwan, and that consequently he was under no obligations.¹ Nasr by this time had received through Ibn Mubaira Marwan's commission confirming him as governor, and although his position was now greatly strengthened he still was willing to cooperate and do anything within reason. He agreed to consider appointing anyone that Harith recommended, and he offered him any post he desired. Harith declined office for himself, but demanded that Salim ibn Alwaz, prefect of Nasr's guard, be dismissed. The governor then had his secretaries take down the names of those men Harith would choose and agreed to submit the matter to a board of arbitration.² It at once became apparent that Harith was aiming not at appointing good governors, but at putting his own men in office, and the committee which Nasr permitted Harith to dominate, instead of deciding what men should be named, announced the deposition of the governor himself. When Harith at last stood forth in his true character, Nasr resolved to abandon conciliation and prepared for the worst, since it was apparent that his enemy's sole object was the destruction of Umayyad rule in the East and the setting himself up as prince of Khurasan. Harith rode his horse into the mosque and cried,

1. Tabari, *op. cit.*, 1917.

2. *Ibid.*, 1913.

"I am not pleased with you as Imam."

Nasr replied, "How can you have a mind and intelligence when you have spent your life in the land of the polytheists and have made war on the Muslims?"¹

The governor attacked Harith's men and put them to flight; their leader sought refuge with al Karmany, to whom the Azd were flocking, and the rebels took an oath of allegiance to al Karmany as the lawful governor. The alliance, however, was an unnatural one, for Harith was largely supported by his own tribe of Tamim, of Mudhar, and when the combined forces defeated Nasr's Mudharites in an engagement, the Azd of Karmany made fun of the Mudharites. The men of Tamim resented the jibes, and they furthermore recalled how Karmany and the Azd had treated them on the occasion of Harith's exile, when at Balkh he had ripped open the bellies of fifty men of Tamim and cut off the hands and feet of three hundred and crucified others.² Nasr, informed of what had happened, saw at once that from an alliance both parties would pass into open hostilities, and he concluded to let them fight it out among themselves; consequently, he deserted his capital and went off to Maysabur. It was March of the year 746.

Al Karmany at once occupied the deserted capital and in the Friday prayer borrowed the thunder of Harith and cried, "All I seek is the Book of God and the Sunna of His Prophet."³

Meanwhile, Harith was having troubles of his own. Bishr

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1. Tabari, *op. cit.*, 1924.
 2. *Ibid.*, 1923.
 3. *Ibid.*, 1930.

ibn Jurmuz said to him, "I fought on your side in the belief I was seeking justice, but now that you are with Karmany, I perceive that you fight only that men may say, 'Harith has conquered,' and these battles are only tribal struggles, so I will not fight for you any more."¹

Others felt the same way. "By God," cried alma ibn Abu Abanlan, "I will never follow Harith, for I have yet to see him when he was not full of treachery."

And Al Muhallab ibn Iyas exclaimed, "I shall not follow Harith for I have never at all seen him except with his horse in battle."²

As others appreciated the fact that Harith was no saint, but a coarse, rough, bloodthirsty fighter, their defection increased; Karmany attacked, the enemy was routed, and Harith slain. His body was crucified on the gate of Marv on 23 Rajab, 123 (April 22, 746).

Thus perished ignobly and deservedly the greatest enemy of the Umayyad cause in Khorasan.

Tribal warfare, however, received fresh impetus, since Karmany's Yemenite followers regarded their victory not as the overthrowing of Harith, but as the defeating of his Tamim-Mudharite adherents. These events had been taking place during the second siege of Homs by Marwan, and the reports of the Geis victory in Syria, together with the Geis-Kalb civil war that had been raging in Iraq, inflamed both factions the more in Khorasan. The government of the province had come to an

1. Tabari, *op. cit.*, 1931.

2. *Ibid.*, 1934.

end; Marv and the East were held by the Yemenites and Karmany, Naysabur and the West of the province by Nasr, who against his will had been forced by circumstances into a complete Ceisite policy. The situation was an exact parallel to that which had existed in Iraq during the opposition of Mu'athir ibn Sa'id, Marwan's Ceisite governor, and ibn Umar, the Kalbite. In Iraq, it will be remembered, Khalhak, the Kharijite, took advantage of the rift to strike, and gained victory when Yemen enrolled under his standards. Events in Khorasan now precisely paralleled those of Iraq to the minutest detail. Abu Muslim took advantage of the lack of government to strike; as in Iraq both Yemen and Mu'athir allied temporarily against the common enemy, then as in Iraq Yemen went over to the side of the enemy, and the day was won for the Abbasids. To the progress of their conspiracy we now turn our attention.

In this thesis, it has been our contention that the Umayyads were overthrown, not as the result of a revolution in Khorasan, but because of a revolution in Syria. The Abbasid historians and apologists, judging events in retrospect and being under obligation to defend the "blessed" dynasty, have placed great weight on the religious and theological significance and particulars of their success and have succeeded in presenting the rise of the Abbasids not as a political but as a religious movement. Neither Tabari nor Baladhuri has been as guilty of this misrepresentation as some of the later historians, among whom al Masudi, as a blind partisan of Abbasids, is quite the worst. Their accounts have been accepted on their

face value by Van Vloten, but to a much lesser degree by Wellhausen. Moreover, since it is an incontrovertible fact that the people who profited by the change of dynasty were the Iranian Muslims, Van Vloten and the other have adopted as a hypothesis the notion that the Abbasid conspiracy was managed, directed, and at length brought to triumph by a movement of Iranian nationalists led by Iranian patriots.

There is no direct evidence whatsoever to support this hypothesis. To substantiate his thesis Van Vloten has attempted to show that the condition of the Iranian Muslims was so indescribably horrible, that they were such wretched victims of exploitation, that in self defense they must have organized an Iranian movement. We have had occasion already to comment on the nature of the Umayyad rule.

The great difficulty in writing about the problem is the lack of satisfactory evidence. We know who the Abbasid leaders were: they were Arabs; but we have not the foggiest idea of the proportion of Arabs to non-Arabs in the forces these leaders commanded. For many years, Iranian mawali had fought side by side with the Arabs against the Turks and were paid for doing so, and we shall later have occasion to point out one spectacular incident to show that a large body of Iranians were fighting with the Syrians against Abu Muslim. The fact that Abu Muslim himself was a non-Arab has been a favorite talking point, but here again we are left to guess his motives. He was a purchased slave presented to Ibrahim, the Imam, and the latter, recognizing him as possessing superior talents in intelligence and ability, employed him as his agent and made

it worth his while, but was Abu Muslim acting as the servant of his master or as the servant of Iranian nationalists, out of lofty principles, or for self interest? We do not know. All that can be said is that the most conspicuous fact that stands out in a careful investigation of the relation of the Arabs to their mawali is the unswerving devotion of the latter to their patrons. When the Arabs took sides on a question, the mawali took also the same sides as their patrons. If they had ability, they were entrusted with tasks of large responsibility and they handled confidential matters of the greatest delicacy. They received rewards commensurate with their services.

Again the accounts of the origin and spread of the Abbasid conspiracy during the last thirty-two years of the Umayyads in many cases bear the imprint of later manufacture.¹

Finally, we must point out that if a man developed a new theological or philosophical belief and found a handful of men who were ready to support him, he was considered by the historians as the founder of a "sect" which was recorded in the histories as bearing his name. We have no knowledge of the size or importance of these sects, nor the numbers in the early days who responded to the propaganda conducted by different agents sent from Kufa. Did these men secretly enlist in Khorasan by scores, or hundreds, or thousands, or tens of thousands? We do not know, but the absence of any reference to the serious anti-Umayyad activity of these people before

1. Cf. Wellhausen, op. cit., 503, 506, 512, 514.

the advent of Abu Muslim seems to indicate that their numbers and importance were negligible.

The entire religious and non-Arab aspects of the Abbasid revolution certainly require a careful re-study, but inasmuch as it is our contention that these aspects were not the crucial historical factors in what took place, we shall pass over them with the observation that it is likely that no one will ever be able to discover the real truth from the mass of conflicting evidence.

Three groups challenged the right of the Umayyads to be caliphs of Islam. The first were the Aliids, the direct descendants of Ali through his marriage with the Prophet's daughter, and they based their claim to the throne on blood relationship with the Apostle of God. A second group of Shiites held the belief of the transmutation of the spirit from one body to another and particularly from the Prophet to his heirs. As the legitimate Aliids would have nothing to do with them, they picked on a son of Ali who had descended not from Fatima but from another wife, Manafiya, and this son of Ali was known by his mother's name, ibn Manafiya, and received conspicuous support in the pretensions of Mukhtar. His adherents alleged that he had a divine, not a human, nature, and endowed him with various miraculous qualities. Ibn Manafiya had a son, Abdallah Abu Hashim, to whom the divine nature of the father passed. This Abdallah Abu Hashim had a party of his own, and shortly before he died, in 98 A. H., he went to Humayma and made over by will to

Muhammad ibn Ali, the Abbasid, his pretensions as Imam, or so the Abbasids allege.¹ There is a cryptic report in Tabari:

Abu Hashim went out to Syria and met Muhammad ibn Ali ibn Abdallah ibn Abbas and he said, "O cousin, I have knowledge I shall impart to you, but do not mention to anyone that matter which men are awaiting from you." He said, "I know and no one shall hear it about you."²

The third group, of course, were the Abbasids, who by this will had supposedly acquired the rights of the second; the fact remains that all three parties continued to exist side by side and engage in propaganda in their own interests. The message that their emissaries attempted to spread we do not know very clearly. A large part of it was, of course, anti-Umayyad, the preachers setting forth cogent arguments against the usurpation of the caliphate, but beyond signifying that the caliphate belonged in the house of the Prophet and discussing various metaphysical and theological points, it does not seem that the message was any more specific. The preachers themselves, of course, were aware of the Imam whom they were trying to establish.

In the year 100³ or in 103 or 104⁴ the Abbasid Muhammad ibn Ali created for himself in Khorasan a local party headed by seventy men, of whom twelve were appointed leaders. We have two different lists of these men.⁵ In the first list

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1. Wellhausen, *op. cit.*, 503.
 2. Tabari, *op. cit.*, III, Ser. I, 24.
 3. *Ibid.*, 1353.
 4. *Ibid.*, 1938.
 5. *Ibid.*, 1353, 1938.

are eight Arabs and four mawali, but in the second list, while the eight Arabs still remain, all but one of the mawali are replaced by Arabs, with the exception of a man whose status is not given. We do not know whether some of the mawali died or were replaced through policy. Following are the twelve disciples; the names of those who continued to serve from the beginning are starred.

- | | | |
|--|---|------------------|
| 1. Sulaiman ibn Kathir* |) | |
| 2. Malik ibn al Moitham* |) | All of the tribe |
| 3. Ziyad ibn Salih |) | of Khaza'a |
| 4. Falha ibn Ruzaiq* |) | |
| 5. Musa ibn Ka'b* |) | |
| 6. Isa ibn Ka'b |) | All of Tamim |
| 7. Lahiz ibn Suraij* |) | |
| 8. Al Qasim ibn Mufashia* |) | |
| 9. Sahtaba ibn Shabib* - of the tribe of Tayy | | |
| 10. Abu Daud Khalid ibn Ibrahim* - of the tribe of Shaiban | | |
| 11. Aalam ibn Salan (unknown) | | |
| 12. Shibl ibn Tamim* - mawla of Bona Hanifa. | | |

It seems to us highly significant that of the twelve leaders of the Abbasid party, ten, and possibly eleven, were Arabs of means, and not Iranians. It also seems unlikely that nine of them should have held their positions for thirty years until the outbreak of their war, and it is probable that they were appointed after A. H. 100, which year had a certain mystic significance when great events were expected to occur, and which is therefore under suspicion as the starting point of the Abbasid campaign. There is no question, however, of the authenticity of the list from A. H. 125 on, for all twelve are repeatedly mentioned as participating in one event or another.

During the twenty-five years from 100 to 125, Muhammad, the Imam, conducted his propaganda without any visible success. The events of these years have been minutely summarized by Wellhausen¹ and need not detain us here. When Ibrahim succeeded his father, the Abbasid cause was prosecuted with greater vigor.

In the last year of Muhammad's life, 125, there came to him from Khorasan Sulaiman ibn Kathir and three other Arabs. They brought with them 100,000 dirhems and articles worth 30,000 dirhems representing the contribution of the party to the Imam's campaign. This year Abu Muslim was purchased and given his freedom, but he remained with the Imam. Muhammad informed them that he had not long to live and his successor would be Ibrahim.² The next year Ibrahim sent Ibn Mahan to Khorasan to announce his assumption of his father's claims and to receive the campaign funds that the party had collected. The money was delivered and carried to Ibrahim.³

The following year, 127, Sulaiman ibn Kathir, Lahiz ibn Guraiz, and Sahtaba ibn Shabib, the same apostles who had made the journey to Muhammad in 125, again returned to Mecca and presented Ibrahim with 20,000 dinars, 200,000 dirhems, musk, equipment, and articles of value. This money the Imam ordered them to give to Ibn 'Urwah, the mawla of his father. At the same time the Imam appointed Abu Salama his agent in

1. Wellhausen, *op. cit.*, 507-513.
 2. Tabari, *op. cit.*, 1769.
 3. *Ibid.*, 1869.

Kufa and ordered the party to pay Abu Salama the funds collected in the future.¹ By far the most interesting feature of the testimony so far is the matter of raising money for the support of the movement. The contribution given by each man amounted to one fifth of the income from his property each year.² From now on the outstanding feature of the campaign was its purely political nature; religion, if it played a part, is not obvious and we are in complete agreement with Van Vloten when he says, "They (the Arabs like Sulaiman ibn Kathir) were won over by the missionaries only because they were addressed in terms of their political sentiments without being initiated into secret doctrines."³ Their political sentiments were closely connected with tribal problems: six of the Arab leaders were of Yemen, the two outstanding being Sulaiman of Khuzay'a and Qahtaba of Tayy. The other four were of Tamim, who though of Mudhar had stood aloof from many of the partisan struggles and represented the Bedouin Arab point of view more strongly than any other group. They were, of all the tribes, least amenable to the idea of the discipline of the state.⁴ In the struggle that was to follow, Khuzay'a played the leading role and were fighting for revenge against Mudhar, while both Khuzay'a and Tamim attacked the state, not because it was tyrannical, but because it maintained enough

1. Tabari, *op. cit.*, 1916.

2. *Ibid.*, 1917.

3. Van Vloten, *Recherches*, *op. cit.*, 52.

4. Cf. the article *Tamim* in the *Encyclopedia of Islam*.

forms of orderly government to restrict the individual liberties which the Arab heritage prized above all else.

The Arab leaders lived in the districts surrounding Marv, where they possessed estates, and their influence was greatest in the villages where they dwelt. There they were the local magnates receiving the allegiance and following of their fellow Arab tribesmen and their mawali, and in these localities the principal Abbasid strength was centered.

Ernst Herzfeld, the archaeologist, has asked the question, "Why was Khorasan selected as the point of the Abbasids for their propaganda?" and gives no satisfactory answer beyond quoting the proverb: "Khorasan is the quiver of God out of which he shoots an arrow if he is angry with a people."¹

Van Vloten falls back on the geographer, Ibn Idrisi, who said:

The people of Kufa are partisans of Ali and his descendants; those of Basra are Uthmanians who preach neutrality, saying, "Better to be the Abdallah (servant of God) that one kills than the Abdallah who kills." The inhabitants of Mesopotamia are Kharijites; they are degenerate Arabs, half Christian Muslims. The Syrians recognize obedience only to Muawia and the Umayyads. They are the enemies of all true Muslims. The Moabites and Medians think only of Abu Bakr and Umar. Thus there remains to us only Khorasan. There one finds a people, numerous and strong, of generous hearts which passions do not divide and whom fear does not make tremble, an army of brave men of powerful stature, of bearded faces and of formidable voices inspiring terror."²

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1. Herzfeld, Ernst: "Khorasan: Denkmalsgeographische Studien zur Kulturgeschichte des Islams in Iran" *Der Islam* XI, 1921, 107.
 2. Ibn Idrisi, de Goeje. ed. 315, quoted by Van Vloten. *Recherches* 45-46.

Van Vloten has discovered an important argument without perceiving how it affects his own case. The point is that if the Arab empire of the Umayyads was to be overthrown, no one had the military strength to do this except the Arabs, and where else were the Arabs to be found, save in Khorasan? The Arabs of Kufa were too apathetic, those of Syria too loyal, those of Egypt too contented, and those of the West too far removed from the center of the empire to be interested in imperial politics. Khorasan was the only part of the empire where there were large bodies of Arabs, familiar with war as the results of their campaigns against the Turks. The majority had been sent out from Iraq and were not attached by loyalty to the cause of the Syrian caliphs. The object of Abbasid hate politique was not to arouse the Iranian mawali, but to acquire by some means the adherence of the Arabs. After years of indoctrination with the idea that the Umayyads held a usurped power, after years of assuring people that they were in fact very badly treated, the Abbasids had built up a negligible following of men who were convinced that what they had been told was true, but beyond that point, the movement did not progress, nor were there encouraging signs until that fateful act, the murder of Walid, precipitated first Syria, then Iraq, and finally Khorasan into civil war and tribal struggle. To illustrate the interdependence of one event upon another, we enclose the following chronological table.

Syria	Iraq	Khorasan
<p>127</p> <p>1. Walid II dies Feb. 744</p> <p>5. Yazid III dies Sept. 25 744.</p> <p>6. Marwan wins at Ain al Jarr, Nov. 18, 744</p> <p>7. Marwan Caliph, Dec. 7, 744</p>	<p>2. Mansur ibn Junkur gov. of Iraq, May, 744</p> <p>3. Bistam the Kharijite revolts, May, 744</p> <p>4. Ibn Umar, Gov. July, 744</p> <p>5. Ikhshak's revolt in progress</p> <p>7. An Nadhr-Geis vs. Ibn Umar-Kalb.</p>	<p>2. Azd-Yemen faction make trouble for Nasr.</p> <p>4. Al Karmany arrested July 14, 744.</p> <p>5. Harith ibn Suraj recalled</p>
<p>128</p> <p>9. 1st Revolt of Homs, July 7, 745</p> <p>11. Ten month siege of Homs, Nov. 745 to August 746</p>	<p>8. Ikhshak takes Kufa April 14, 745</p> <p>10. Ikhshak master of all Iraq.</p> <p>11. Ikhshak still master of all Iraq.</p>	<p>9. Harith reaches Harv July 745</p> <p>10. The Imam Ibrahim sends Abu Muslim to Khorasan for the first time.</p> <p>11. Harith, vs. Nasr, vs. al Karmant</p>
<p>129</p>	<p>14. Sept. 746. Ikhshak slain. Marwan besieges Mosul 746 to 747, Ibn Hubeira fights in Iraq.</p>	<p>12. Nasr flees to Maysabur March, 746</p> <p>13. Harith killed by Karmany in Harv, April 746.</p> <p>14. 746-747, Nasr in Maysabur and Karmany in Harv. Kudthar vs. Yemen.</p>
<p>130</p> <p>18. Kharijites in Medina and Mecca.</p>	<p>17. August, 747. Mosul capitulates to Marwan</p> <p>18. Ibn Huhara's campaign against Kharijites and Ibn Muawia in Iars.</p>	<p>15. Black flag unfurled, June 10, 747.</p> <p>16. Sulaiman ibn Kathir leads first Abbasid prayers June 26, 747.</p> <p>17. August, 747. al Karmany killed. Nasr regains Harv.</p> <p>18. Sept. 747. the son of Karmany joins Abu Muslim with Yemenites. Nasr flees. Harv falls to Abbasids, Dec. 747</p>
<p>131</p> <p>19. Spring of 748. The Kharijite rebellion is suppressed.</p>	<p>19. Spring of 748. Ibn Huhara victorious. Flight of Kharijites, Ibn Muawaa, and Ibn Sulaiman. All Iraq at peace.</p>	<p>19. Spring of 748. Beginning of Qatiba's march to the West.</p> <p>20. Nov. 9, 748 Nasr dies.</p>

In the year 128 A. H. (745-6) it will be observed that Marwan was besieging Hama, Dihlak was master of Iraq, and Nasr ibn Sayyar was fighting al Karany and Harith. The time had arrived, if ever, to strike. The leaders in Khorasan recognized their chance, and according to Tabari "when party strife arose in Khorasan and when the rope (of unity) began to tremble, Sulaiman ibn Kather wrote to Abu Salama (in Kufa) asking him to write to Ibrahim to request the latter to send a man of the people of his house, and Abu Salama wrote to Ibrahim and he sent Abu Muslim."¹ This momentous step took place in 128. To the party, Ibrahim gave the following instructions:

Behold this tribe of Yemen! Honor them and settle between their backs for verily God will not fulfill this affair except by them. And behold this tribe of Habia. Blame them for their affair; and behold this tribe of Hudhar, verily they are an enemy near the House. Therefore, slay him whose affair you doubt.²

With Marwan fighting Kalb in Syria, and with Iraq held by a Kalb-Kharajite coalition, there could be no question that it was Abbasid strategy to get control of Kalb in Khorasan. For one year Abu Muslim remained in Khorasan and we can only guess at the progress he made, for the party did not venture to come out into the open. Nasr was in Maysabur and Karany in Harv; but neither was engaged in active fighting. In this circumstance is the

1. Tabari, *op. cit.*, 1949.
2. *Ibid.*, 1937.

explanation of Abu Muslim's silence. He could not attack or come into the open until Yemen and Huthar were again at active war, when he would hold the balance of power and be able to employ his remarkable talents for diplomacy. The year came to an end, and with it the summons of Ibrahim to Abu Muslim to report. The Imam may have been displeased that no progress was being made.¹

Consequently on Second Jumada, 129, (March 1, 747) Abu Muslim and seventy of the preachers began the long journey back to Mecca in the disguise of pilgrims. The first stop was at Dindanaqan where the prefect asked Abu Muslim his business. He said he was a pilgrim, but then in secret told the prefect his true business. We have no idea what argument was used, but the official was won over. The next stop was Diward, 120 miles due west of Mary, and from there the group went to Nasa, a journey of another thirty miles. At Nasa, Abu Muslim got in touch with his agent, an Arab, Asid ibn Abdallah, of the Yemenite tribe of Khuz'a'a. Continuing westward, Abu Muslim crossed the frontier into Gumis. Here a letter was waiting him from Ibrahim, ordering him to return to Mary and send Cahtaba in his place to Mecca. The Imam also enclosed a note to Suleiman ibn Kathir. Abu Muslim retraced his steps. At Nasa he was arrested, but the Arab captain of the guard, to whom in secret he revealed his real business, joined the conspiracy and released him.

1. Tabari, op. cit., 1949.

The traitor was al Muf adthal 'asfulemy.¹ Finally, either on 21 Shaban or 1 Rameethan 129 (May 7, or 16, 747),² he reached Marv. He went immediately to the suburb called Safidanj or Mikadanj. This was the Yemenite village of the Khuz'a'a tribe and the home of Sulaiman ibn Kathir. Abu Muslim delivered his letter to Sulaiman who was instructed therein to publish immediately his propaganda and call all who would answer the summons to the party. Again let us point out that it was the Arab Sulaiman, and not the rawla who was instructed to make the first public announcement.³

The word was sent out and adherents flocked to Safidanj, where on June 10, 747 the black flag, on which was written Sura XXII.40: "A sanction is given to those who because they have suffered outrages have taken up arms, and verily, God is well able to succor them," was unfurled. A more appropriate verse could not have been discovered. After the unfurling of the flag, those present were initiated into the meaning of the two symbols, the shadow and the cloud: "the cloud covers all the earth and so does the mission of Barni Abbas, and the earth is never free of shadows, and so shall it never be without the caliphate of Abbas for ages."⁴

After these ceremonies had taken place, the contingents of the different leaders from Marv began to arrive, until

1. Tabari, *op. cit.*, 1951.

2. *Ibid.*, 1952; 1953.

3. *Ibid.*, 1952.

4. *Ibid.*, 1954.

presently Abu Muslim had some three thousand men assembled in Safidanj. On the festival of Itr (the breaking of the fast of Ramadan) June 26, 747, the Arab Sulaiman ibn Kathir led prayer for the first time in the name of Abbasids and for the occasion, following the command of the Imam, he introduced a complicated ritual and new order of the service, to distinguish it from the custom of the Umayyads.¹ Abu Muslim now undertook his first military action. He moved thirty miles south of Marv on the road leading to Marv ar-Rud, and there in a town called Jiranj he constructed a khandaq and by this fortification blocked the main lines of communication to the south-east and east. To the east and north-east of Marv, Mass was already cut off from Balkh and Transoxania by the presence of al Khammar and his men. There were one thousand men in this khandaq commanded by such prominent Arabs of Yemen as Qiyad ibn Sayyar al Azdy and Khidan ibn Armar al Kindy.²

Meanwhile, another Abbasid agent of Tamin, Khazim ibn Khuzaima wished to get control of Marv ar-Rud. At first his tribe objected, but to them he replied: "I am only one of your people who wishes to get control of Marv. If I perchance conquer it, you will have it as well as I; if I am killed, then I have finished my affair with you."³ In the civil war which was raging with all sides desiring power and with Marv, the capitol of the province, the goal, the sug-

1. Tabari, *op. cit.*, 1955.

2. *Ibid.*, 1957.

3. *Ibid.*, 1959.

gestion of Khazim appealed to the Tamin, who authorized him to raise a force outside the city. In this manner Marv ar-Rad passed out of the orbit of Umayyad jurisdiction forever.

There now appears in the scene in Khorasan a new figure, Shaiban, the Kharijite. The previous history of this man has hitherto been unknown; he suddenly appears in the pages of Tabari. Wellhausen among others has been much puzzled by him; "with his considerable following, he cannot have so suddenly sprung from nowhere as he seems to have done."¹ The mystery of this figure is now cleared up by the information in the *Ansab of Baladhuri*, who devotes a special chapter to his history. When Ibn Hubeira took Isha, Mahmal sent as reinforcements to Mansur ibn Jundar, Ubaida ibn Sawwar, in whose forces was this man Shaiban, called the Little. Ubaida sent him with a group to build a khandaq and control the bridge on the east branch of the Ruyfates. Shaiban, the Little, held his position for a month against the attacks of Ibn Hubeira's general, Atiyya, the Thalabite. Ibn Hubeira then arrived himself and caught Shaiban off his guard in a surprise night attack. The Kharijites were routed and Ubaida ibn Sawwar was slain. Shaiban and a number escaped and made their way to al-Medain, where they joined Mansur ibn Jundar, and on the approach of Ibn Hubeira, both Shaiban and Mansur

1. Wellhausen, *op. cit.*, 498.

fled to Fars where they enlisted under ibn Khawla.¹ After the fall of Mosul, Marwan sent ibn Mubara to Fars, and Shaiban fled, first to Jiraf and then to Sijistan. Here he received a letter from al Karmany, saying, "You and we are opposing Marwan. Come to me and let us unite for the purpose of fighting the agents of Satan." Shaiban, the little, accepted the invitation and with his Kharijites marched to Khurasan to join al Karmany.² The Kharijites who fought against Nasr thus had their origin in Mesopotamia or Aذربaijan and did not represent a local Kharijite movement recruited from the established residents of Khurasan, as has been formerly believed.

During the summer of 747 while Abu Muslim and his followers were unfurling the flag and establishing themselves in Safidanj, Nasr ibn Sayyar with his Mudharite supporters was making an attempt to regain Marv and defeat al Karmany and Shaiban, his ally. Salim ibn Akras made the first attack for Nasr and was routed with the loss of four hundred men.³ He then sent Malik ibn Asar who suffered a worse defeat and seven hundred Mudharites perished.⁴ Abu Muslim, perceiving how affairs were going, employed strategy:

and when Abu Muslim realized that each side had wounded the other and that there was no help for them, he wrote two letters to Shaiban and he told one messenger: "Take that road which goes through the lands of the Mudharites and if they should oppose you, good, and they will take your letter

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1. Baladhuri, *Ansab*, op. cit., 733B.
 2. Ibid., 784A.
 3. Tabari, op. cit., 1971.
 4. Ibid., 1972.

and read it, as follows:- 'I see in the people of Yemen no loyalty, no good, no faith, and no reliability, and I hope that God will show you what you want and if I remain, I shall leave to them (Yemen) neither hair nor nail.'¹

Abu Muslim sent the other letter to Haiban through Yemenite territory, and this letter praised Yemen and rebuked Mu'thar. At the same time he wrote offers to both Nasr and al Harany pledging his support. His aim was twofold: to avert the enmity of each side and to encourage each side to continue the disastrous struggle. It now became apparent to Nasr that victory was unlikely without help from the caliph, and to Harwan he wrote an appeal, enclosing the celebrated verse:

I see among the ashes the flickering of hot coals.
I presume there is some flame in them.
Fire can be kindled with two pieces of wood
And so can war; its beginning is words.
And I say, out of my wondering,
Would that my poem take effect:
Is Umayya awake, or sleeping?

Harwan was still encamped before Mosul and was in no position to aid. He replied: "Cut off the wart yourself."²

Then Nasr turned to Yazid ibn Mubeira, who by now had virtually acquired control of Iraq, and said:

Inform Yazid with the best of words
I speak the truth.
I have learned there is no good in lying.
Khorasan is a land wherein I have seen
Eggs, which, were they hatched,
Would be the talk of the world.
Now the chickens have two years' growth
And how they have grown.
When they fly, they are still covered with down,
But later when they fly,
They will fan the flames of war.
O, what a flame.

1. Tabari, *op. cit.*, 1972.

2. *Ibid.*, 1973.

Ibn Hubeira replied, "There is no victory save in numbers, and I have not a man."¹

According to Baladhuri, Yazid Ibn Hubeira was jealous of Nasr because the latter had not corresponded with him before, had ignored him, and had not reported to him how the affair in Khorasan had come about, and when Nasr wrote, "Reinforce me with 1,000 Syrian turbanis and send to me every day one or two men so that the people of Khorasan will see that I am being reinforced," he refused to answer his letters.

Ibn Hubeira was so involved with his own affairs that he could not possibly have detached a large body for service in Khorasan, but as Nasr pointed out, the moral effect of the arrival of only a few men would have been of incalculable benefit, since it appeared to all sides that Khorasan was completely severed from the empire, as far as the will of the caliph or governor of Iraq was concerned.

Having been thus deprived of assistance from without, Nasr saw that the quarrel between him and al Karmany, who by now was receiving military aid from Abu Muslim, must be composed, and so he wrote to Karmany, setting forth the inherent dangers and expressing a desire to meet him in person in Marv to draw up a friendly agreement. Karmany accepted the proposal, but at the last moment Nasr perceived that Abu Muslim was still in his camp; he suspected treachery and sent the son of Harith ibn Sureij in his place, with

1. Tabari, op. cit., 1974.

2. Baladhuri, Ansab., op. cit., 791a.

an armed guard. Karmany, as events turned out, was apparently acting in good faith, for he was discovered away from the majority of his forces. Unfortunately Nasr himself must have intended evil, because he knew that the agent he sent desired nothing more than revenge for al Karmany's killing of his father. Ibn Harith attacked the Yemnite leader and slew him. This event took place in August, 747.¹

The ultimate consequence of the murder was the final alienation of Yem. For the time being, there still appeared some hope of reconciliation. Abu Muslim instructed the Arab, anadhtar ibn Muslim, to lead a force against Herat, the governor of which was Isa ibn 'Adil alLeithy. The Herat garrison and police were insufficient to do more than preserve public order within the city and they were outnumbered and quickly overpowered. Isa fled.

All the Arabs recognized the danger, and Nasr made heroic efforts to unite them. He first approached the Kharijite Sulthān, who had no more use for the Abbasids than for the Umayyads, and almost succeeded in convincing him that if Abu Muslim won, he would most certainly lose, whereas his designs still might be accomplished if he united with the other Arabs until the Abbasid cause was ruined. Sulthān ibn Kathir, warned of the negotiations, saw Ali, the son of al Karmany, whom he taunted with failure

1. Tabari, op. cit., 1975.

to revenge his father's death. Ali prevailed on his ally, Shaiban, to break off negotiations. Nasr was not dismayed and repeated his efforts to win over Shaiban. "By God," he wrote, "this matter is going to become surely so serious that you will regard your business with me of slight importance in comparison with it."¹ To both Shaiban and to Ali al Karmany, Nasr referred to the recent capture of Herat, and they at length agreed to a conference. Yahya ibn Kua'im ibn Kubeira presented the alternatives: "Choose," he said, "whether you will be destroyed before Mudthar, or Mudthar before you."

They asked, "How is this?"

Yahya replied, "Behold, this man whose cause has been declared for only a month now has an army the size of your army. Make peace with Nasr, for if you come to terms with Nasr, they will fight Nasr but leave you alone, because the matter is in Mudthar, whereas if you do not become reconciled with Nasr, they will make terms with him and fight you. Put your affair with Abu Muslim's men ahead of your affair with Nasr, even for one hour, and your eyes will rejoice at their being killed."²

Nasr had abandoned any hope of cooperation with Yemen; what he desired merely was a truce to give him the opportunity to settle the Abbasid danger. Both the Yemenites and the Kharajites at length perceived the merits of Nasr's case and

1. Tabari, *op. cit.*, 1966.

2. *Ibid.*, 1966.

agreed to withhold their attack to await events. If Nasr won, the struggle would be resumed; if, on the contrary, he and the Muthharites were annihilated by Abu Muslim, the Yeminites could view his destruction not with displeasure. Shaiban consequently agreed to open negotiations. All parties met in Mary and a written treaty was drawn up and subscribed to by Nasr, Shaiban, and Ibn al Marwan, the contracting parties pledging to keep the peace for one year.¹ Nasr then reoccupied the capital. He had won a diplomatic victory of the first importance.

The elation of the governor was intense and he shortly found increased satisfaction in a new episode. A deputation of scholars, lawyers, and divines went out to investigate for themselves the program of the Abbasids. It is highly significant that Abu Muslim flatly refused to be drawn into controversy, to discuss the merits of his case, or to reveal the nature of his message. He rebuffed them, saying: "Your affair is in good deeds and your abstaining from the unlawful is better for you than this. We are engaged and we need your help more than we need your questions, so excuse us from answering."

The delegation was indignant, rejected the Abbasid claims, and so informed Nasr when they reported to him. "May God reward you with good, that people like you have searched out this fellow and known him," exclaimed the

1. Tabari, op. cit., 1967.

governor.¹

Abu Muslim found himself as a result of the truce in a very dangerous predicament. The object of his diplomacy had been to detach Yemen from Mu'athar, and when he was on the point of victory, Nasr had turned the tables and had won an agreement which, if it held, would result in the destruction of the conspiracy. In late July he had moved his headquarters from Safidanj to Makhman; Wellhausen's theory that he wished to escape from the influence of Sulaiman who controlled that village is a guess with little to commend it.²

Abu Muslim's total forces at this time numbered only 7,000 men. He took a census, enrolled each man in the registers, and fixed the pay at three to four dirhems per day.³

In view of the treaty and the smallness of his forces, Abu Muslim was in an extremely precarious position, and seeing that it would be possible for Nasr to besiege

1. Tabari, *op. cit.*, 1965.

2. Wellhausen, *op. cit.*, 529. Cf. pp. 522-529 for the difficult problem of fixing the chronology of these events.

3. Wellhausen says three to four dirhems per month, 524, but this is nonsense. Tabari reports *أعطاهم ما كانوا يأخذون* 1969, without stating whether the money was paid on a daily, weekly, or monthly basis. In our chapter on military institutions, we cited evidence to show that the salary of troops amounted to 1,000 dirhems a year, or 3 dirhems per day. In this chapter, we have pointed out that Dhahhak paid his Kharijites 120, or 180 dirhems, per month - that is, 4 or 6 dirhems per day. It is incredible to imagine that Abu Muslim's men would have been content with one thirtieth of the standard rate.

him in his khandaq and cut him off from water supplies, he moved his position to Alin which was more easily defended and where the water supply was reliable.

Sulaiman ibn Kathir now undertook the mission to break the truce, and his efforts were rewarded with partial success. It was inconceivable that Ali ibn al Karamany could long permit his father's death to go unavenged, and as the true son of a treacherous father, he thought lightly of a written obligation. Sulaiman played on his emotions and ibn Karamany denounced the treaty. His associate, Shaiban, could not be detached. The Kharajite was a man of different stamp and possessed some scruples at least. "Treachery is not permissible," he said.¹ Ali ibn al Karamany now requested a personal interview with Abu Muslim and the latter came to him, and when he greeted him, Abu Muslim saluted al Karamany as Amir of Khorasan!² This was an act of brilliant diplomacy. It signified to al Karamany, and Abu Muslim intended it to signify that the Abbasid party recognized Karamany's cause as just, would fight to help him realize his claims, and on victory would confirm the fruits that had fallen to him. Abu Muslim did not ask ibn al Karamany to ally with him; he had allied with ibn al Karamany. In this episode we have the second of a series of curious facts. The first was the delegation of scholars with whom Abu Muslim refused to talk. The question arose then, - Had Abu Muslim and the Abbasid conspirators when they openly

1. Tabari, op. cit., 1937.

2. Ibid., 1937.

published their message made it clear to the people of Khurasan that it was the Imam Ibrahim whom they were supporting as caliph? Had they explained their justification for so doing? Or had they merely attacked the Umayyads as illegally usurping the caliphate, called for their deposition, and asserted that the caliphate should belong to the House, that is, the House of the Prophet, without making it understood which branch of the House of the Prophet, and which individual of that house they were fighting for? The latter alternative seems not altogether improbable, despite the fact that Tabari assures us that the unfurling of the Flag was done in the name of Beni Abbas. Ibn al-Harmany certainly understood that both he and Abu Muslim were engaged in the common purpose of overthrowing the Umayyads, but it is extremely doubtful if he appreciated the implications of the agreement to which he had now set his hand. Consequently on September 15, 747, he and his men of Yemen promised to join Abu Muslim.

Abu Muslim now set up the forms of a government. He appointed prominent Arabs to guard the gates of his fortified town. He formed a sharta commanded by Abu Nasr Malik ibn al-Heitham, a guard, whose chief was Abu Ishaq Khalid ibn Uthman, two bureaus of correspondence and army affairs, and he named the Tanimite al-Qasim ibn Mujashi'a cadi.¹ His appointees were Arabs, not mawali. Meanwhile, Edward

1. Tabari, op. cit., 1968.

had been gained by the attack of Asid ibn Abdallah.

The work of diplomacy, however, was not yet finished. Nasr's position was growing desperate, and he wrote to Abu Muslim proposing a deputation and conference, having been led to believe that there was still a chance to gain Abu Muslim's support and calculating wrongly that if he could first crush Karkany and Yemen there would be time enough to deal with Abu Muslim. The fox seized on the request with joy and suggested that both Nasr and Ibn al Karkany send him delegates to present their respective cases; it is probable that Nasr was as yet unaware of the engagement between the Yemenites and Abu Muslim. When the delegates arrived, the stage had already been prepared for them. After each side had spoken, Sulaiman ibn Kathir arose and cast his vote for the Yemenites. After him Abu Mansur Talha ibn Husayn did the same. Then Yazid ibn Shafiq as-Salami spoke and said, "Mu'thar is the murderer of the family of the Prophet, and the supporters of Bonu Umayya and the party of Marwan al Jady, and our blood is on their necks, our money is in their hands, and our miseries come from them, and Nasr ibn Sayyar is the governor of Marwan over Khorasan. He executes his orders and he prays to him from his minbar and he names him Commander of the Faithful, and before God we are innocent of all this, even if Marwan were the Commander of the Faithful and Nasr were on the path of true guidance. Therefore, we have chosen Ali ibn

al Karmany and his son of Mahtan and Habia."¹

The Mu'tharite delegates went back in shame and humiliation. The Yemenites were elated. By this act, Abu Muslim had publicly disgraced Mu'thar and publicly announced his support of Yemen. It is noteworthy that he said nothing of the mission of Bonn Abbas, but called merely for the destruction of Umayyad rule. The Yemenites accepted Abu Muslim whole-heartedly, flocking en masse to his camp; the events of Iraq were repeated in Khurasan and on this day the Abbasid cause triumphed. With the Arab Yemenites behind him, Abu Muslim had gained for the Imam the object of his diplomacy, for he possessed the military power necessary for victory. The combined forces attacked Nasr, and Marv fell nine days past of Second Jumada, 130 (February 14, 748) according to one account,² or January 15, 748, according to another.³

The governor still held the citadel and Abu Muslim offered to treat with him, but Lahiz ibn Qaraiz recited an apt quotation from the Koran, - XXVIII:14 - "Verily the nobles consult to slay thee. Begone, for I speak as a friend." Nasr understood the reference, excused himself briefly to make his preparations to accompany the delegates to Abu Muslim, and by this device gained time to escape from the city.⁴ He travelled one hundred miles southwest to

1. Tabari, *op. cit.*, 1986.

2. *Ibid.*, 1984.

3. *Ibid.*, 1987.

4. *Ibid.*, 1990.

Sarakhs on the Herat River, where three thousand men joined him. From Sarakhs, fleeing westward, he passed by Tus and halted at Naysabur, his capital from 746-747, and there awaited events.¹

Shaiban, the Karajite, now found himself in an embarrassing position and fled to Sarakhs. Abu Muslim wrote him demanding an oath of allegiance and Shaiban replied, "But I asked you for an oath of allegiance."²

Abu Muslim then ordered forces sent from Bivard to Sarakhs. They attacked Shaiban and killed him.

The Abbasid leader now turned his attention to Balkh and sent the Arab general, Abu Daud, one of the twelve apostles, with an army to take the city. The governor, Ziyad ibn Abdur Rahman al Gushairy, fled and Balkh fell. Abu Daud left behind as governor Yahya ibn Mu'aim and returned to Marv. No sooner had he departed than Ziyad, who was in Tirmid, was joined by prominent Arabs, but most significantly by the non-Arab inhabitants of Balkh and Tirmid, together with the kings of Tukharistan. Balkh was recaptured.³ Abu Daud returned, again occupied the city, and this time left Utman ibn al Karmany as governor. Once again, on his departure, the same coalition took the city. For the third time, Abu Daud came back and seized Balkh. By now, it had become apparent to the two sons of al Karmany that

1. Tabari, op. cit., 1991.
 2. Ibid., 1996.
 3. Ibid., 1993.

what they desired was not to be gained from Abu Muslim, who, suspecting their feelings and finding them no longer of use, had them assassinated.¹

Qatiba ibn Shabib, the dominating figure from now on, arrived at this point from the Imam Ibrahim, bearing his commission as commander-in-chief of the Abbasid forces. To him Abu Muslim surrendered the command.

Before continuing with the final campaigns, it is necessary to summarize certain features which appear to us as significant.

1. In the original army formed by the Abbasid leaders at Saffidanj, there were certainly many mawali, that is Iranian Muslims, but we do not know how many. The original three thousand who marched from Marv were formed into numerous contingents, led by Arabs, whose names Tabari has mentioned. It is certain that many of the mawali were present in the capacity of followers of their patrons whom they were duty bound to accompany to war. Of other Iranians who acted as free agents, we have practically no information.

2. Abu Muslim, as the agent and servant of the Imam Ibrahim, was recognized as a superior authority in matters of advice and tactics, but on public occasions the real leader was Suleiman ibn Kathir, who first unfurled the Black Flag, who first led the prayer, who personally conducted the negotiations with Shaiban and with ibn al Karamany, and who decided for Yemen against Muthar in the famous meeting of

1. Tabari, op. cit., 1999.

the rival delegations, a meeting in which Abu Muslim played no public part at all.

3. The Abbasid strength was located in the villages about Marv wherein the Arab leaders had their estates, and in one other place, Bihard, to the west. Marv unad was taken by the desire of the Tamim therein to dominate the city. The two other cities acquired by the Abbasids prior to the arrival of Sa'atiba were Herat and Balikh. Both towns were held by small garrison which were no match for the superior forces sent against them. Moreover, in Balikh the town was twice recaptured by forces composed of the non-Arab population and led by the kings of Bukharistan.

4. Tabari specifically informs us that missionaries were sent throughout Transoxania to win allegiance for the cause, but despite this, despite the fact that during the tribal wars in Khorasan when government had ceased to exist, when it would have been impossible for either side of the Arabs to send as much as a man, not a single city in Transoxania revolted or seized the opportunity to expel the Arab garrison.

5. The Abbasid forces before the defection of the Yemenites did not exceed 7,000 men, who represented about the number that the Arab leaders were able to pay and maintain in the field. At any time, this force could easily have been annihilated by the government had it not been occupied by tribal civil war.

6. The triumph of the Abbasids was gained by the adherence and cooperation of the Yemenite forces. In this diplomatic victory the Yemenites were won over by political arguments alone and did not understand that they were fighting to establish the claims of a rival caliphate.

7. The goal of the Yemenites was the seizure of power and independence for themselves to enjoy the political fruits of governing the province, and also the escape from the discipline of Imperial government.

8. The leaders of the vanguard and right and left wings, the commanders of the police and guard, the cadí, the officials of the divan, and the generals who commanded all the expeditions and garrisons of the Abbasids, with the single exception of the commander of the force sent from Hiyar to kill Shaiban, were Arabs, whose names and tribes Tabari has carefully recorded.

Under these circumstances, it seems to us extremely difficult to follow the arguments of Van Vloten that a rising of Iranian nationalism, a desire for equal rights under Islam produced the Abbasid victory. Wollhausen has followed Van Vloten to some degree, but he admits the Arabs organized the mawali and says, "It was not the Arabs per se, but the ruling Arabs, that were to be fought against and that by virtue of Islam, because they ruled unjustly and unlawfully, supported the godless Umayyad regime, and did

not recognize the equal rights of the other Muslims in the theocracy."¹

We would not for a moment deny the existence of the desire for equal rights in the theocracy of the non-Arabs; what we do doubt is that these non-Arabs were the instruments by which equal rights were attained. If feelings were as strong as Wellhausen and Van Vloten have imagined, it seems to us absolutely incredible that mass risings in other parts of Khorasan and in Transoxania did not immediately follow the civil war and the capture of Marv by Abu Muslim. We are in complete agreement with Gibb when he writes:

Iranian enthusiasm for Abu Muslim is true only in the period after his success. In our most authentic records there is no trace of a mass movement such as has so often been portrayed. His following was at first comparatively so small that had the Arabs been more willing to support Nasr at the outset, it is practically certain that it would have melted away as rapidly as the following of Harith ibn Mar'ath at his first reverse. Nothing succeeds like success.²

Abu Muslim was a skilled diplomat, but no man of war, as the Imam Ibrahim well understood, and Qahtaba, one of the outstanding military figures of his age, now assumed leadership of the movement. Abu Muslim's work was done; he remained in Khorasan as the Abbasid representative until he was found inconvenient and murdered.

Under Qahtaba, military events dominate the scene and

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1. Wellhausen, *op. cit.*, 535.
 2. Gibb, H.A.R. Arab Conquests in Central Asia. London 1923. 94.

move with extraordinary rapidity. Al Qasim ibn Mujashid's in Sarakhs and Jalwar ibn Larrar from Bizard were ordered to converge on Masr in Maysabur and catch him in the pincers of an attack delivered simultaneously from two directions.¹ Against Masr's son, Tamin, who was at Kawadagan, Qalataba himself marched. He conquered the city and Tamin perished. When he learned of his son's death, Masr hastily retreated from the forces advancing on Maysabur and, leaving Khorasan behind him, fled to Qamis. Now at last Ibn Hubeira and Marwan were in a position to send help, and Hubata ibn Lanzala, who had just finished with the last remnants of the Kharrajite campaign, appeared with ten thousand men. Instead of resisting Qalataba in his westward advance, Hubata led his men past the Alburz Mountains into the province of Jurjan on the southeastern shores of the Caspian, intending to strike at Khorasan from the rear. Qalataba at once gave up the westward march and hastened north to meet the threat. He arrived in Jurjan in July of 743 and addressed his men: "You are fighting the remnants of the people who set fire to the House of God." They attacked with enthusiasm and Hubata and the 10,000 with him were slain, August 1, 743.² One would have supposed that the grateful populace would have rejoiced at this liberation from Arab rule. On the contrary, their opinion was united in opposition after the killing of Hubata. When Qalataba heard this, he returned

1. Tabari, *op. cit.*, 2000.

2. *Ibid.*, 2005.

and put thirty thousand to the sword, "without making any distinctions", Tabari tells us.¹

Nasr redoubled his pleas to Ibn Hubaira for more aid. "Help me with 10,000 before you have to help me with 100,000 who will be of no avail."²

While still in Jurjan, Qantaba ordered his son, Hasan, to march on Samis, and September 1, 743, Nasr fled to Rayy. Ibn Hubaira in the meantime had answered the request for 10,000 men by sending 3,000, but as they approached Rayy, Nasr fell ill and died on November 9, 743. He was in his eighty-sixth year. Of all the governors of Khorasan, there had never been a greater than Nasr Ibn Sayyar. He was terrible in war and mild in peace. He commanded the respect of the Iranians as well as the Arabs. As a poet, he was justly famed, as a lawgiver, judge and administrator he was widely esteemed. Only in his old age did he fail his caliph, and the failure was due not to weakness but to moderation, conciliation, and tolerance. A younger man would have struck down the enemies of the Umayyads without mercy, and Nasr's advisers implored him to execute Harith ibn Sureij and al Karmany while he had them at his mercy, but the old governor felt that by the show of justice, mercy, and a willing desire to see their point of view and meet their demands within reason, bloodshed might be avoided, but he failed to estimate the extent to which events in the West had

1. Tabari, *op. cit.*, 2016.

2. *Ibid.*, 2016.

moved passions in the East. Long before the end, he perceived what the outcome would be, and he raised his voice in warning, but when it was too late; the warning passed unheeded and the strength to enforce it had vanished. Above all other factors, his failure was due to that most vulnerable spot of all Umayyad institutions, the army. Troops who were attached by loyalty to their tribal chieftains, and not to the state, were valueless in a crisis. When he died, Marwan lost the most sincere, the most devoted exponent of the Umayyad state as an institution and all that that state stood for.

With the passing of the governor, the men who had served under him fled like sheep first to Hamadan, and then to Nihawand, forty miles south. Nihawand was virtually impregnable. Qantaba's son, Hasan, sat down before the city to lay siege. Ibn Mubaira was now thoroughly aroused and ordered Ibn Mubara, who but recently had terminated his campaign against Ibn Khawla and the Kharijites in Pars, to march as rapidly as possible to Nihawand and raise the siege. Ibn Mubara proceeded with a huge force, estimated variously at from 50,000 to 150,000, but there were very few Syrians among them; the majority were slaves and people of Iraq who had been impressed into serving, besides a considerable body of Khorasanians. The only trained fighters were cavalry men, and Tabari tells us that in the order of the battle, the day was lost because Ibn

Mihabara had no infantry to match the soldiers of Sahtaba. The caliph's army was annihilated, and in the spoil there were so many slaves, lutes, flutes, and wine jugs they could not be counted.

The siege of Mihawand meanwhile had been continuing throughout the spring of 749, and in June of that year, Sahtaba arrived to help his son. The beleaguered army treated for honorable surrender and Malik ibn Adham al Bahaly, the commander, received aman. Sahtaba entered the city, and when all were in his power, treacherously announced that the aman was good only for the Arabs whose commander had negotiated the terms. To the Khorasanians who had refused to join Abu Muslim and who stood by the Syrians, Sahtaba in fury showed no mercy. To a man they were put to the sword.¹

Marwan had by now roused himself, and his son, Abdallah, had placed the vanguard of his troops under Uthman ibn Safyan in Shahrzur. Sahtaba sent a detachment under Abu Amr to lay siege to the city and in battle on August 10, 794, Uthman was routed and the city fell.²

Marwan in the meantime had levied what soldiers he could gather in the Jazira, in Mosul, and in Syria, and undertook to construct a line of trenches running from the east bank of the Tigris opposite Mosul to the upper Zab River and when they were completed, he took refuge within. To ibn Hubeira he sent Hawthara ibn Suhail al Bahaly with

1. Tabari, op. cit., III A Ser. I, 7.

2. Ibid., 9.

reinforcements. Ibn Hubaira then marched to Jalula, the scene of the final defeat of Yazdegerd in 637 and rebuilt the old Persian Khandaq, the remnants of which were still visible. Jalula was seventy miles from Bagdad and commanded the Great Khorasan Road, then as now the direct approach through the mountain passes to Kermanshah, Hamadan, and the East. On Sahtaba's approach, however, he retired thirty miles to the west on the same road and re-fortified himself at Daskara. It was Ibn Hubaira's intention to be attacked, but Sahtaba had no desire to test his mettle against a general of equal or greater capacity than he. He sent his son Hasan on a reconnoitering expedition and, on learning that Ibn Hubaira was firmly entrenched and not likely to move, he executed a brilliant manoeuvre marching north and west around Ibn Hubaira, crossed the Tigris above present day Bagdad, headed due west to the Euphrates, which he crossed at Dirzina near Anbar, and then marched down the west bank of the Euphrates for Kufa.¹

When Ibn Hubaira learned of this, he held a council of war, and Hawthara made what to us seems a brilliant suggestion. His plan was that Ibn Hubaira should march east at once and in the absence of a defending army recapture Khorasan.² However, it seemed best to Ibn Hubaira to save Kufa and he set out in that direction at once. In those days the Euphrates branched into two forks which discharged

1. Tabari, *op. cit.*, III A Ser. I, 10.

2. *Ibid.*, III A, Ser. I, 13.

their waters into the Great Swamp. Kufa stood on the west fork, and between the west and east forks was the region called the Upper and Lower Baluja. Ibn Mubeira marched into the Upper Baluja and occupied a position twenty-three parasangs up stream from Kufa on the east bank. Sahtaba faced him on the opposite shore, and on August 27, 740, forded the stream. It was an unwise move, for the army that crossed was at a serious disadvantage. For Sahtaba, the decision to attack was fatal, and he was slain as his horse came out of the water. His men, however, were more fortunate and succeeded in putting the Syrians to flight. Ibn Mubeira went to Wasit and shut himself up in the fortress. This was a mistake for he most certainly should have joined the caliph at Mosul.

Meanwhile, an event took place in Kufa which had its origins in the days of Walid II. In the city was Muhammad ibn Khalid, the son of Khalid al Qasry, and the chance came to strike another avenging blow. The day Sahtaba was slain, he collected a band, expelled the governor and police, and seized the city. He raised the black flag and was recognized as Amir by Hasan, the son of Sahtaba, who had succeeded to the command of his father. Kufa fell to the Abbasids without the army from Khorasan even entering the city, and Hasan at once marched for Wasit.

Within two or three weeks after the fall of Kufa to Muhammad ibn Khalid, Abul Abbas secretly entered the city.

In the early summer of 749, Marwan through the perfidy of an Abbasid messenger, and through the warning of Kasr ibn Ayyar, had been fully informed of the conspiracy, and he gave orders that Ibrahim, the Imam, be arrested. The mildness of the caliph's order is inexplicable. When he at last obtained full knowledge of the plot, why did he not send a band of men to Husayna and wipe out as traitors the whole family of Benu Abbas? We cannot answer this question. Instead, one officer was sent to make the arrest. He stated his business, and Ibrahim with his sons accompanied him. When they reached the point where the road branched east to Kufa, the sons implored the Imam to defy the messenger and accompany them. He was on the point of yielding to their entreaties, but the plea of his wife that in that case Marwan would destroy all the members of the family still residing at Kufa prompted him to continue. He went to Harran where he was imprisoned and where shortly afterwards he was poisoned.¹

In Tabari's account of Abul Abbas in Kufa, two points are of particular interest. He tells us again the history of the Abbasid conspiracy and asserts that when Muhammad ibn Ali, Ibrahim's father, sent a propaganda agent to Khorasan, he instructed this agent to summon men to acceptance of the house of the Prophet, but he specifically forbade him to mention the name of the Imam to whom people were

1. Tabari, op. cit., 1974-75. III, Ser. I, 26-27.

being summoned.¹

The second point of interest is even more significant. Abu Salama, who was a mawla and who was the representative of the House in Kufa, himself did not know whom he was expected to recognize as caliph. When Abul Abbas arrived and went into hiding, Abu Salama was disconcerted to discover that on learning of the death of Ibrahim, Abul Abbas considered himself the true caliph. He declined to reveal to the Khurasan party leaders the whereabouts of the Imam; he refused to advance to Abul Abbas 100 dinars which he desired, and Tabari tells us that he proposed to summon men to recognize another than Abul Abbas.² Al Masudi tells us that on learning of the death of Ibrahim, Abu Salama wrote a letter to Abu Muhammad Abdallah ibn Hasan ibn Musoin ibn Ali, the Alid, inviting him to come forward and be recognized as caliph.³ It was only by chance that Abu Humaid, the Khurasanian leader, met Sabiq, Abul Abbas' servant, who revealed the hiding place of his master.⁴ These facts to us seem further proof that the arguments of the Abbasid conspiracy had been confined almost exclusively to anti-Umayyad attacks and were almost entirely of a political, and not of a religious, nature.

In the first sermon which Abul Abbas preached as Imam in Kufa, there is further confirmation of our belief. The

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1. Tabari, op. cit., III, Ser. I, 24.
 2. Ibid., III A, Ser. I, 34.
 3. Al Masudi, Les prairies d'or, VI, 93.
 4. Tabari, op. cit., III A, Ser. I, 27.

whole speech was in the nature of a justification. Abul Abbas began by asserting, "God has chosen us over Islam and its people and raised us to an elevated dignity." To substantiate this statement he quoted three verses from the Koran:

1. XLII - 22. "For this I ask no wage of you save love of my kin."
2. XXVI - 214. "Warn thy relatives of nearer kin."
3. VIII - 42. "Of booty, one fifth belongs to God, the apostle, and to the near of kin."

He then disposed of the Aliids by saying, "The erroneous Sabites claim that other than we are more worthy for leadership and the command and the caliphate, but their faces are hateful."¹

After this he returned to a rehearsal of the crimes of the Umayyads. Abul Abbas was ill at the time he spoke, and being unable to continue, he relinquished his position in the minbar to Ibad ibn Ali who continued with a recitation of Umayyad crimes, which, he asserted, consisted of: "their claims of absolute discretion in the handling of your fay, your zakat, and your booty."² This, we believe, had been right along the most telling Abbasid argument, and had been employed by all groups, Shiites as well as Karajites. The standing grievance, the greatest "tyranny" lay in the fact that the Umayyads clung to the principle that the state should pay only for services rendered to the state, that the very existence of government depended


1. Tabari, op. cit., III A, Ser. I, 29.

2. Ibid., 31.

on the setting aside of surpluses of revenue for the needs of administration and the transferring of funds from one province to another as occasion required. Those opposing this obvious necessity insisted that all tax money be divided totally among the believers in the district where the money was raised, and the Abbasids played on their desires. It is amusing to reflect that under the Blessed Dynasty, taxation was more onerous and the distribution of stipends far more inequitable than the Umayyads could have dreamed of.

We now return to the final military events of Marwan's reign. Abu Awn, who had been victorious at Khairazar over Utman and the vanguard of Abdallah ibn Marwan at the end of August had marched to a position on the south bank of the upper Zab, where he had established himself in a khandaq. He and the other men with him were of the Yemenite tribe of Tamy. Abdul Abbas, after being recognized as caliph in October, 743, sent Abdallah ibn Ali with a large force to join Abu Awn.

Marwan had established his camp on the north bank of the River Zab in a triangle, defended on two sides by the Tigris and the Zab, and on the third side by a khandaq. Some distance up stream Abdallah ibn Ali and Abu Awn were in a fortified camp on the south bank of the Zab. The following map shows the strategy of the battle.



There are many figures given as to the size of the caliph's army. Tabari speaks in one place of 120,000 men.¹ Chevond speaks of 300,000.² Theophanes tells us that Abu Muslim, having destroyed Cois in Khorasan, made an expedition into Persia (Fars) with Sahtaba, that Sahtaba defeated ibn Imbarah and then took 100,000 men of ibn Imbarah's army, adding them to his own forces, that marched against ibn Hubeira, had 200,000 men, that at Zab Marwan had 300,000 in his camp, and that in the battle which followed it was possible to see one man slay

1. Tabari, op. cit., III A, Ser. I, 45.
 2. Chevond, op. cit., 123.

thousands and two men slay tens of thousands.¹ In the Persian *Tabari*, we are told that Marwan raised 100,000 men at Mosul.² *Binawari* reports that Marwan had 30,000 men.³

On the other hand, *Tabari* tells us that Marwan had 3,000 of the professional regiments of the *Muharrat*, *Dukaniya*, *Sahsahiyya*, and *Rashadiya*,⁴ and quotes the statement on the authority of Marwan's secretary, *Abu Musa ibn Masab*, who said:

When Marwan fled and *Abdallah ibn Ali* appeared in Syria, I asked for a man and he granted it to me, and one day I was sitting with him and he was reclining when Marwan was mentioned and his flight, and he said to me, "Did you witness the battle?" I said, "Yes, may God bless the Amir." He said, "Tell me about it." I said, "On this day, Marwan said to me, 'Count the number of my men.' And I said, 'I am only the sahib of the pen and I am not the sahib of war.' And Marwan looked to right and to left, and he said, 'I have 12,000 men.'" And *Abdallah* sat up and he said, "May God kill him. Did he not count in the diwan that day more than 12,000 men?"⁵

Balathari tells us that *Abdallah* had 12,000 men, and does not indicate that Marwan's forces were much greater.⁶

It is highly probable that both sides were fairly evenly matched. *Abu Awn* had three thousand men when he left *Shahrazar*, the bulk of the *Khorasanian* troops were fighting *ibn Mubaira* at *Wasit*, and *Abdallah ibn Ali* left

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1. *Theophanes*, *op. cit.*, 6240.
 2. *Bol'ami's Tabari*, *op. cit.*, IV, 337.
 3. *Abu Hanifa ad Binawari*, *op. cit.*, 363.
 4. *Tabari*, *op. cit.*, III A, *Par.* I, 40.
 5. *Ibid.*, 45-47.
 6. *Balathari*, *Ansab*, *op. cit.*, 792.

with a detachment from Iraq which probably contained only a few thousand. Harwan himself in actual fighting men doubtless had no more, but in those days, the armies were accompanied by vast hordes of slaves and camp followers, whose numbers are included in the figure of those taking part in the battle.

Harwan occupied an easily defended position and it would have been wise to await the attack there. Instead, however, he committed the same mistake as Qutayba and resolved to cross to the south side of the Zab to take the offensive. Consequently he constructed a bridge of boats and his son, Abdallah, led half the army across. To prevent the crossing, Abdallah ibn Ali sent al Muharik ibn Ghaffan with a detachment, but he was late in arriving and was utterly routed by Walid ibn Muawia.¹ The caliph's forces at once undertook to fortify themselves in a khandaq as rapidly as possible. The morning after this camp had been established, Harwan began to lead the rest of his men across the bridge of boats to occupy the new position. Musa ibn Kab advised Abdallah ibn Ali to attack at once, and the Abbasid with all his forces, left his camp and moved down stream towards the caliph. It was a cold January morning and there was a heavy frost on the ground; the marching of the men sounded "like the camels treading upon dried wheat."²

1. Tabari, *op. cit.*, III A, Ser. I, 39.
2. Baladhuri, *Ansab*, 791, *op. cit.*,

As the enemy approached, the caliph was filled with apprehension because he had not had time to prepare his position and fortify himself properly. His one hope was for a delay in the attack. "If the sun sets today and they do not fight us, we shall be the ones who will deliver it to Jesus, Son of Mary (i. e. our dynasty will last till the Day of Judgment), but if they fight us before sunset, then we are to God and to him we return."¹

Harwan consequently gave emphatic orders that no attack was to be made, but Walid ibn Khawia disobeyed the command and with his cavalry made the initial charge. The caliph was beside himself with fury, but there was nothing to do except to make a general assault. Abdallah ibn Ali ordered his cavalry to dismount, to stick their spears upright in the ground, and to crouch behind their shields. The upright spears interfered with Harwan's cavalry attack, and the arrows fell harmlessly off the shields of the enemy. This strategem compelled the caliph to abandon his cavalry tactics and fight the engagement on foot. To the tribe of Gutha'a he cried, "Dismount!" They answered, "Say it to Benu Sulaim!" He shouted to Benu Takzak, "Dismount!" They retorted, "Say it to Benu 'Amir." Then he turned to as-Salan, "Dismount!" "Say it to Ghatafan," was the reply. In desperation he addressed the same con-

1. Tabari, op. cit., III A, Ser. I, 40.

mand to the Sahib as-Surta. The latter replied, "No, by God, I shall not expose myself." Marwan said, "I shall do you grievous harm." The head of the police answered in pathetic recognition of the situation, "I would to God that you could."¹ The caliph's forces fled in a mad dash to recross the bridge and regain the fort on the north side. The Abbasids pursued and turned rout into slaughter. "They departed from us as if they were a cloud; God granted us their backs, and we cut down the bridge which led to their retreat as they crossed it," runs the Abbasid version of the battle. More people were drowned in the river than perished by the sword. The hearts of the caliph's men were not in the fight. He had levied as many Kalb as Qeis, and at the critical moment, Kalb took its final revenge and said, "Tell Qeis to dismount," and Qeis refused to bear the brunt of the battle. The results of the great civil war in Syria had recoiled on the caliph. He had no loyal Syrians to rely on, and the men of the Jazira and Mosul were faint hearted.

There are conflicting accounts of another episode which took place on the day of Zab. According to Tabari, Marwan ordered his son, Abdallah, to go to that place in the camp where the money bags were kept and to promise to all who would dismount a prodigious sum of money. As Ab-

1. Tabari, *op. cit.*, IIIA, Ser. I, 40, 41; Baladthuri, Ansab, op. cit., 792.

Abdallah galloped off to execute this order, the men thought he was fleeing and broke their ranks.¹ According to Baladhuri, the caliph felt ill and nauseated, and retired momentarily to seek relief, with the result that his withdrawal was interpreted as flight.² All accounts agree that some such mistake was made either by the caliph or by his son, and that the act was interpreted by the army as flight. Tabari summarizes the battle by saying, "Marwan made no dispositions at all that day except they resulted in misfortunes."³ The same picture is given us by Agapius from his authority, Theophilus the astrologer, who was an eye witness of the battle, and he tells us that the soldiers of Marwan lacked courage and ardor, while the men of Abdallah were firm and won victory.⁴ The battle was over by late afternoon of the eleventh of second Jumada, 132, January 24, 750.

Marwan and his sons escaped, but many prominent Umayyads met death in the Zab. The caliph fled to Harran, his capital. In prison there, were Said ibn Wisam, and his two sons, Uthman and Marwan as well as Abdallah ibn Umar II, the ex-governor of Iraq, and al Abbas ibn al Walid, the man who had lacked the courage to resist Yazid III when he demanded that he join the group who killed Walid II. They

1. Tabari, *op. cit.*, IIIA, Ser. I, 42.

2. Baladhuri, *Ansab*, *op. cit.*, 792.

3. Tabari, *op. cit.*, IIIA, Ser. I, 42.

4. Agapius, *op. cit.*, 525.

all escaped from prison. Shurahil ibn Maslama ibn Abdal Malik, the son of that Maslama, the greatest of the Umayyad generals to fight the Greeks, together with the Patriarch of Fourth Armenia were killed by the people of Harran as they fled from prison. When Marwan arrived one man alone still remained in his cell because he considered escape dishonorable. He was Abu Muhammad as-Sufyani who had told Marwan of the will made by the murdered al Mahan ibn Khalid II and who was the first to salute Marwan as caliph.¹

Marwan remained in Harran for twenty days, collecting men and money and preparing for flight. Then he hastened westward and for the last time the avenging hand of Khalid al Qasri, most loyal and most wronged of Umayyad servants, reached from the grave to strike down the Umayyad cause. With Marwan was Ismail, Khalid's brother, who tells us:

Marwan said to me, "I have decided to take my family and go till I come to one of the cities of Rum, and I shall write to the Emperor, and fugitives will rally to me and our group will become powerful." This was an opinion which I hated his for, and also for his conduct to the people of Yemen and his killing whom he had killed or whom and his preference for Cois, so I replied, "May God preserve you from submitting to the rule of the polytheists and letting them control you and your people, but seek refuge in Syria until you can get to Egypt."²

As events were to turn out, if Marwan had fled to Rum and had been received by the Emperor, the excesses committed by the Abbasids in Syria, which produced a series of revolts

1. Tabari, *op. cit.*, IIIA, Ser. I, 43.

2. Baladhuri, *op. cit.*, 792E; Al Masudi, Les prairies d'or, *op. cit.*, VI, 82.

and the raising of white flags in the principal cities in the years 751-752 would have created for the caliph a party, and he might have regained the empire. The advice to go to Syria was perfidious. The people there remembered only too well the last visit of the caliph to them. He stopped briefly at Qinnisrin where people resisted him. As he went by Homs, the inhabitants pursued him and he was saved from destruction then only by the bravery of his mawali who accompanied him. Damascus would have nothing to do with him; the Kalb in the city cursed the caliph and even the qeis stayed away. To the governor of Palestine, Marwan complained bitterly, "O itamhis, men have stood aside from us and especially qeis in whom we placed our reliance and in whom we misplaced our favor, for we withdrew our favor from those people who were the real support of our government and we have experienced in qeis neither loyalty nor gratitude."¹ Too late Marwan realized that Syria was the support of the Umayyads, and Kalb the strongest group of Syria. When he destroyed the loyalty of the people of the west by setting himself up as the avenger of the murder of the profligate qeisite, Walid II, he destroyed his dynasty. "The attachment of Marwan for the tribe of Hizar (Mudhar-qeis) left him no succor: indeed, he was betrayed by them. When he passed by Qinnisrin, the Tanukhites fell upon him . . . he had to

1. Baladhuri, Ansab, op. cit., 793.

fight Harith ibn Abdur Rahman al Harashy in Damascus, Hashim ibn Arr, the Qeisite, and the Arabs of Madhij in the Jordan Then Marwan knew that Ismail ibn Abdallah had given him perfidious advice."¹

Marwan fled to Egypt, and his conduct there is described by Severus ibn Muqaffa, from the account of the secretary of the Coptic Patriarch Michael I, 744-763, who was an eye witness of the events which took place. The first years of Marwan's reign were a period of peace and prosperity for Egypt, until the caliph became hard pressed for funds and sent as governor Abdul Malik ibn 'Usa ibn Masir.² The governor seized for Marwan all the gold, silver, copper, and iron he could acquire, and collected special contributions from the merchants.³ On Michael the Patriarch he imposed a staggering assessment, and put him into prison when he was unable to pay.⁴ This high handed conduct provoked an invasion of the Nubians.⁵ In the meantime, Marwan in his flight committed atrocity upon atrocity, if the Christian sources may be believed, and he arrived in Egypt where a revolt of the Bashmurites, who refused to pay their taxes, had broken out. Against these rebels Marwan fought in vain. His forces were only 3,000 men; a princely offer added 1,000 recruits, who were

1. Al Masudi, op. cit., VI, 84-3; al Yaqubi, op. cit., II, 414.

2. Evetts, op. cit., P. O. V 113.

3. Ibid., 119.

4. Ibid., 134.

5. Ibid., 144.

given 10 dinars each,¹ and 2,000 Egyptian Muslims of their own accord, in addition to prisoners who were freed, swelled his forces. To Alexandria he sent his nephew to get money and support, but the Copts revolted and Marwan sent an army which devastated the city. The patriarch, Michael,² was arrested and subjected to torture in order to induce him to write to the Bachmarites to lay down their arms, but they refused to obey and demanded revenge instead for the patriarch.³

All Egypt was in turmoil, the Christians in revolt, the Nubians invading from the south, and the Muslims holding back from support of the caliph. When word came of the approach of Salih ibn Ali and the Abbasids, Marwan determined to desolate the land in the path of the advancing enemy, so that no food for the men or fodder for the horses could be found. He set fire to the city of al Fustat, destroyed every boat he could find on the Nile and all the food and provisions in the storehouses.⁴ The accounts in Severus ibn Muqaffa are so horrible as to be almost unbelievable, were they not confirmed by Tabari.⁵ On the eighteenth of July, 750, the Abbasid forces at length reached the east bank of the Nile, facing Marwan on the west bank. Before the eyes of the enemy

1. Evetts, *op. cit.*, p. 2. v 159.

2. *Ibid.*, 160. "Magrizi's Geschichte der Copten." F. Wustenföld, tr. *Abh. der Konig. Gesell. der Wiss. Zu Gotttingen.* III-IV, 1845-50. p. 58.

3. *Ibid.*, 162.

4. *Ibid.*, 168-9.

5. Tabari, *op. cit.*, III A Ser. I, 49.

he tortured the patriarch and would have slain him had not his son, Abdallah, warned him that in the event of his defeat, the Christians would treat him badly. The caliph was utterly dismayed and exclaimed: "How shall I fight them?" for he knew not what to do.¹ Meanwhile, the natives revenged his conduct by showing to the enemy a ford across the Nile. Marwan's army was routed and with only four hundred followers, he took to flight, leaving behind him his two sons who set out for Ethiopia. Escape was impossible, and at Basir Defednu the pursuers caught up with the caliph.² He was slain on August 6, 132. His enemies cut off his head and impaled his body on a stake. As the head rolled in the dust, the tongue fell out and was seized by a cat, and Salih said, "Had time shown as no other wonders than the tongue of Marwan in the mouth of a cat, there would have been in this example, an object lesson, and a sermon."³

Thus ignobly ended the rule of the Umayyads. Surveying their government in retrospect, one observes that the chief weakness was not that it was too tyrannical, but that it was too democratic. The implacable individualism of the Arab was conciliated and not suppressed. The caliphs were tolerant, too tolerant of the seditious elements which plotted against the state, and they struck at traitors after they had taken arms, and not before. The program and ambitions of Aliids

1. Evetts, *op. cit.*, 178.

2. *Ibid.*, 137. Cf. H.E. Amelineau, "Les Derniers jours et la mort du Khalife Marwan V d'après l'histoire des patriarches d'Alexandre." *Journal Asiatique* 11^e Ser. IV, 1914, 443.

3. Baladthuri, *Ansab, op. cit.*, 73; Ibn al Athir, *op. cit.*, V, 327.

and Abbasids were well known, but these enemies within the house were permitted to live in peace and pursue the objects of their desire. Leniency to its enemies undermined the state and wrought its destruction.

The Umayyads preserved for the Arabs the social institutions which they had enjoyed in pre-Islamic days; the Arabs felt on the contrary that the caliphs were seeking to undermine these institutions and they overthrew the state, and by their act they destroyed themselves. The Arab conspirators in the Abbasid plot too late realized their mistake, and the last words of Sulaiman ibn Kathir were: "May God curse Abu Muslim and make his face as black as this cluster of grapes. We dug a river with our hands and another let the water in it."¹

Of all the summaries of the Umayyad period, both ancient and modern, none is more true or more concisely stated, in our opinion, than the celebrated observation of Ibn Hisham:

Thus ended the Umayyads who, in spite of the distinguished men numbered among them, formed a dynasty which founded neither a great city nor a great fortress. Each one of them continued, after being elected caliph, to inhabit the home or the property where he had happened to reside before his accession. They did not compel the faithful to address them with servile epithets calculated to set forth and enhance their own authority, nor did they compel people to kiss the ground before them, or their feet. They occupied themselves solely with appointing and discharging the governors of distant lands belonging to them: Spain, China, India, Khorasan, Armenia, Yemen, Syria, Iraq, Egypt, Mag-

1. Maqrizi, *Kitab an-Nazariya wal Takhasis*. Gerhardus Vos. ed. Leiden, 1888, 52.

krib, and other regions. Under the foreign dynasty (Abbasid) the bureaus were no longer Arab; the strangers of Khorasan became the masters and man behold the renaissance of the unjust administration of the Chosroes, with the single difference that an order went forth prohibiting injury to the companions of the Prophet.¹

1. Quoted by Ibn Adari, E. Pagan tr. 68-69.

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