

RARE BOOK

The History of Mussalmans in India with special
reference to the Rise and Growth of the All-India
Muslim League (1906 - 1940)

A DISSERTATION

Submitted in partial fulfilment of the requirement
for the degree of Master of Arts in Islamic History
& Culture (Group "D") at the University of DACCA,

PAKISTAN

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P R E F A C E.**RARE BOOK**

The following pages embody a study of the Muslim politics in India ~~from~~ 1906 to 1940. In 1906 the All India Muslim League was formed to promote among others "the political rights and interests of the Mussalmans of India". In 1940 the League transformed itself as an organisation to fight for "autonomous national States" for the Muslims in Muslim majority areas in India. In the study emphasis has been laid on the politics of the League though other developments of the Muslims have been casually referred to.

The dissertation is the result of a year's study during which the author had also to take written examination in two out of four papers for his M.A. Examination in Islamic History & Culture (Group 'D') at the University of Dacca. Besides a very - limited time at the disposal of the author, he had to grapple with paucity of materials. The League Office could not help and the author was verbally informed by an official of the League that the records were left in Delhi at the time of the partition of the country in 1947. The author had therefore to depend on scattered records available at different places. Search for materials took the author also to Calcutta and Aligarh in India. Party pamphlets and propaganda literature helped a good deal in mitigating the absence of written records of the League. Occasionally events remembered by old Leaguers have been used in understanding different problems and in this respect Maulana Akram Khan has been very much helpful.

Attempts have been made to remain objective in treatment of the subject; but the author is in doubt as to the extent of his success in this respect. Too much of quotations have often been indulged in with the same purpose.

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A perusal of the following pages may induce one to feel that it is more a political biography of Mr. M.A. Jinnah, but Jinnah was the soul and flesh of the League since 1916. The League without Jinnah from 1929 to 1933 was a dead organisation.

The subject has been treated in a chronological order. Each chapter as its heading signifies, deals with the peculiar development of the League during the particular period. Chapter I dealing with the background is, however, an introductory one. The dissertation is followed by a few appendices.

The idea for writing this dissertation came from Mr. A. Majed Khan, Lecturer in Islamic History & Culture, at the University of Dacca who undertook despite various pre-occupations to supervise the work from beginning to end.

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November 10, 1956.

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ABBREVIATIONS USED :

A.I.M.L	=	All India Muslim League .
I.N.C.	=	Indian National Congress.
N.V.N.C.	=	Non-Violent-non-Co-Operation.
R.T.C.	=	Round Table Conference.

CHAPTER I

Background of the foundation of The All India Muslim League. (1906)

The aftermath of the mutiny of 1857 completed the process of the demoralisation and degeneration of the Muslims in India. The last Mughal - Bahadur Shah¹ who had been forced to accept the nominal headship of the armed rising against the British East India Company was exiled to Rangoon where he died. His sons were killed. The consequences of this upheaval were still more disastrous on the Mussalmans of India as a whole. They were looked upon with suspicion by the victors who followed a systematic retaliatory policy against them.

The Company's Government was replaced by the Government of the British Crown, and the new Government despite the Queen's declaration of non-discrimination against any particular section of her subjects, forced the Muslims to feel the full brunt of the British vindictiveness. "The pre-mutiny policy of suppressing the Muslims," observes, Mehta and Patwardhan, "was now carried out with such thoroughness that at the end of it (i.e. the mutiny) we find the Muslims of India, a proud and brave people, reduced to the position of illiterate masses with their spirit broken and their pride humbled to the dust".²

The policy of the British in India was from the beginning "divide and rule". It was openly said by Elphinstone: "Divide et impera was the old Roman motto and it should be ours".³ As early as in 1840 Lord Ellenborough wrote: "It seems to be most unwise when we are sure of the hostility of one-tenth (Muslims), not to secure the enthusiastic support of the nine-tenth (Hindus), who are faithful."⁴ I cannot close my eyes that this race (Muslims) is fundamentally hostile to us and therefore

1. Spear - Twilight of the Mughals - Page - 203
2. Mehta & Patwardhan - The Communal triangle in India-Page-21
3. Quoted in Muslim Politics" by S.Mukherjee- Page - 15
4. Ibid - Page - 15.

therefore our true policy is to conciliate the Hindus." Thus the British attitude was already determined in favour of the Hindus as a class of people even prior to the mutiny. The Hindu participation in the mutiny was also looked upon very lightly. ¹ "But though the Hindus also joined in the revolt," writes Mukherjee, "the British turned upon the Mohammedans as the real enemy." The Muslims were systematically kept out of all honourable vocations of life and the Government sought the co-operation of the majority community of the country to run its administration. The extent of Muslim suffering has been graphically set forth in "The Indian Mussalmans" by W.M. Hunter who quotes a Calcutta Persian Paper (Durbin of 14th July, 1869) as saying, ² "All sorts of employment, great and small, are being gradually snatched away from the Mohammedans and bestowed on men of other races, particularly, the Hindus. The Government is bound to look upon all classes of its subjects with an equal eye, yet the time has now come when it publicly singles out the Mohammedans in its Gazettes for ³exclusion from official posts. Recently when several vacancies occurred in the office of the Sundarbans Commissioner, that official, in advertising them in the Government Gazette, stated that the appointments would be given to none but Hindus".

This "step-motherly" attitude of the Government had serious reactions amongst the Muslims. Their suspicion and hatred for the British grew stronger and their first reaction was to keep aloof and to boycott the British. ³ Thus while other communities were taking full advantages of the education provided

1. Quoted in "Muslim Politics" by S. Mukherjee - Page - 15
2. Hunter, William - The Indian Mussalmans - Page - 167
3. Noonan, M - Our Struggle - Page - 1

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by the Universities of Calcutta, Bombay and Madras the Muslims of India under the pretext of a false sense of prestige kept themselves sedulously aloof from all connections with the Western culture. But some of the liberal Muslim leaders began to think in a different way. They were convinced that British rule was too powerful to be resisted and the Muslims, if they wanted to go ahead, should be loyal to the Government and share in the opportunities provided by them! Nawab Abdul Latif was a prominent member of this School of thought. In 1863 he founded the Mohammedan Literary Society in which the middle and Upper class Muslims of Calcutta gathered. This Society started a movement in favour of contemporary British culture. It was mainly due to the efforts of this society that the study of English language and literature was introduced in Hastings' Calcutta Madrasha and some other Muslim Institutions. Politically, the movement of Abdul Latif was Pro-British. It opposed the so-called Wahhabi movement against the British and declared India "darul Islam"³.

The movement started by Nawab Abdul Latif was further strengthened by Sayed Ameer Ali, the great Muslim historian and Scholar. In 1876 Ameer Ali founded the Central National Mohammedan Association in Calcutta. This Association was aimed at creating the spirit of Islam amongst the Muslims of India, in bringing them closer to their cultural heritage and in harmonizing the Muslim culture with that of the modern one. Politically this was also a Pro-British movement.

But these earlier cultural movements led by Nawab Abdul Latif and Syed Ameer Ali had little effect on the Muslim masses. While the Pro-British Scholars and thinkers believed that the salvation

1. Smith, W.C. - Modern Islam in India - page - 5

2. Ibid - Page - 5

3. Ibid - page - 6

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of the Mussalmans of India lay in not disregarding the European learning and co-operating with the British, the Deobond School of thought headed by some prominent Ulamas believed that close contact with the British would lead to the destruction of Islam and were of opinion that orthodoxy was the only remedy to the existing social and political evils.

At this critical juncture in the history of Muslim India Sayed Ahmed Khan and his small band of sincere and selfless patriots appeared on the scene. Syed Ahmed fully realised that if the Muslims were to achieve power and strength they must equip themselves with Western education and scientific knowledge and co-operate with the British. The task before him was great. The relation between the Government and the Muslims as we have already observed was that of suspicion and hostility. Syed Ahmed however successfully performed the two fold functions of changing the attitude of the Government towards the Muslims and attracted the Muslims towards Western education and culture. In 1875 he established the M.A.O. College and in 1886 he laid the foundation of Muslims Educational Conference for creating a fervour for education amongst the Muslims. In 1866 Syed Ahmed established a "British Indian Association" at Aligarh which has been described as "the forerunner of the Congress" by Professor Gurmukh Nihal Singha in his "Land-marks in Indian Constitutional and National Development". This organisation, during its short existence made several useful and effective representations to British Parliament, and to Government of India, regarding grievances of the Indian people.

In the beginning of his political activities Sayed Ahmed made sincere efforts to bring about amicable relations between the various

1. Singha, G.N. - Landmarks in Indian Constitutional and National Development page - 372.

communities of India. The Hindus, however, in the meantime, taking full advantage of Western education became well versed in all the "arts and guiles of British diplomacy". They had already started the Indian Association in 1876. In 1885 Mr. Allan Octavine Hume, a retired civilian, in collaboration with Mr. W.C. Banerjee and some other Hindu and Christian leaders organised the Indian National Congress for closer Association of the Indians with the Government. The first President of the Congress in his address declared: "There is no more thoroughly loyal and consistent well wisher of the British Government than myself and friends around me".¹ Thus the Indian National Congress at its outset was a Hindu-dominated Pro-British body. Three local Indian Associations - the British Indian Association, representing the Zamindars, the Indian Association representing the middle classes and the Central Mohammedan Association co-operated with the Congress at its second session held in Calcutta on the 23th December 1887.² The Congress leaders tried to get the Muslims in its fold by putting up Badruddin Tayebji in the Presidential chair at the Madras session in 1887 and again Rahmatullah M. Sayani at the Calcutta session in 1896.³ "We were straining every nerve", says Surendra Nath Banerjee "to secure the co-operation of our Mohammedan fellow country men in this great national work".³

But in the wake of the nationalist movement started by the Indian National Congress there came simultaneously a Hindu religious revival all over the country. The respect for the Vedas and the Bhagabat Geeta, the revival of some of the religious rites and ceremonies of the Hindus assumed a great political significance in the hands of political leaders like Dayananda, Bal Gangadhar Tilak and others.⁴ "Some aspects of the movement" observes the writer of "Parliamentary Government in India" "such as objection to the slaughter of cows and demonstrations in honour of the memories of Hindu National heroes like Prithwiraj, Ranapratap and Shivaji, became soaked with political significance of a communal character."⁵

1. Quoted in Pakistan by Muhammad Habibullah. P. 16.

2. Rajput, A.B. - Muslim League Yesterday & Today - Page - 15

3. Banerjee, S.N. - A Nation in making - Page - 108

4. Singha Roy, B.P. - Parliamentary Govt. in India - Page - 403

5. Ibid - 403.

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and even in the early days of the Congress movement they proved a handicap to national solidarity." "It was due to this Hindu character of the movement that the Indian National Congress could not attract the Muslims to its fold in large numbers. Sayed Ahmed closely watched the Congress movements for sometime. He firmly believed that the time had not come with the Muslims to participate in the Congress. He came out with an open statement against the Muslims joining the Congress in a meeting of the Mussalmans who had assembled at Lucknow for the second session of the Moham- medan Educational Conference on the 23th December 1887. In a force- ful speech he urged upon the Mussalmans to keep away from the Con- gress and generally warned them against the inevitable results of its basic demands. He made two points of the Congress' demands crystal clear. One was that if the higher services were to be filled after competitive examinations they would all go to the Hindus who were educationally far advanced than the Muslims. Se- condly, if Western democracy in its present form were to be in- troduced in this country, Muslims will always be in a minority of one to four. Explaining the second point, he said :

"The second demand of the National Congress is that the people should elect a section of Viceroy's Council. They want to copy the English House of Lords and the House of Commons. The elected members are to be like members of the House of Commons. Now let us imagine the Viceroy's Council made in this manner. And let us suppose, first of all, that we have universal suffrage, as in America, and that all have votes. And let us first suppose that all the Mohammedan electors vote for a Mohammedan member and all Hindu electors for a Hindu member and now count how many votes the Mohammedan member will have and how many the Hindu. It is certain that the Hindu member will have four times as many, because their population is four times²

1. Alberuni, A.H. - Makers of Pakistan, Page + 40

2. Ibid

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as numerous. Therefore we can prove by Mathematics, that there will be four votes for the Hindu to every one vote for the Mohammedan. And now how can the Mohammedan guard his interests? It will be like a game of dice, in which one man had four dice and the other only one!"

The effect of the speech was far-reaching. The Muslims welcomed it and kept away from the Congress. The leaders of the Congress vehemently condemned it. Even ¹Mr. Hume called it "sheer madness". Messrs. Asok Mehta and Achhut Patwardhan in their study of "the communal Triangle in India" have suggested that ²the change of Syed Ahmed's attitude towards the Congress and towards the introduction of democratic institutions in India was influenced by European Professors of the Aligarh College. As a matter of fact the character of the Congress movement and the attitude of some of its leaders towards the Congress made Syed Ahmed suspicious of the Hindu motive and since 1867 all his efforts were directed to see that the Muslims were not left behind the sister community in a remorseless struggle for existence. The European Professors of the Aligarh College who used to help him might have some contribution in this regard at a later stage but it was not ³"a sudden change came over this great man". On 15th January 1883 - eleven months before Mr. Theodore Beck, his supposed mentor in new politics arrived in India - Syed Ahmed, while speaking on Lord Ripon's Local Self Government Bill observed :-

⁴The system of representation by election means the representation of the views and interests of the majority of the population, and in countries where the population is composed of one race and one creed, it is no doubt the best system that can be adopted. But, Mr Lord, in a country like India, where caste distinctions still flourish, where there is no fusion of the various races, where religious distinctions are still violent, where education in its modern sense had not made an equal or proportionate

1. Alberuni, A.H. - Makers of Pakistan - Page - 41

2. Mehta and Patwardhan - The communal Triangle in India - Page-23-24.

3. Ibid - Page - 23

~~4. Quoted in Alberuni, A.H. - Makers of Pakistan - Page - 43-44.~~

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progress among all the sections of the population, I am convinced that the introduction of the principle of election, pure and simple, for representation of various interests on the Local Boards and District Councils would be attended with evils of greater significance than purely economic considerations. So long as differences of race and creed, and the distinctions of caste form an important element in the Socio-political life of India, and influence her inhabitants in matters connected with the administration and welfare of the country at large, the system of election pure and simple cannot be safely adopted. The larger community would totally override the interests of the smaller community, and the ignorant public would hold Government responsible for introducing measures which might make the differences of race and creed more violent than ever." ¹

The worst fear of Syed Ahmed was soon proved to be true. The Indian Council's Act of 1892 increased the number of seats in the Central and Provincial Legislative Councils, granted their members the right of discussing and putting questions to the government on matters of public importance and laid the foundation of, more or less, a system of election. But the system of joint electorate put the Muslims in a serious disadvantage as the Hindus by virtue of their numerical strength simply ignored the minority community. None of the outstanding Muslim leaders like Syed Ahmed, Syed Ameer Ali, Agha Khan and others could be elected due to the fact that majority of the voters who were Hindus cast their votes on communal basis. This was an alarm signal for the Muslim leaders. ² "We were actually aware" declares Agha Khan, a contemporary witness, "that ~~we~~ we had, long been neglected, that to the Hindu majority - as represented by its leaders in the Congress party - we seemed a tiresome splinter in the flesh of the body politic, and that though

1. Quoted in *Al-Bummi*, A.H. - *Makers of Pakistan* 43-44.

2. Quoted in *Evolution of the Muslim League* by Mirza Ali Azhar, article published in *Pakistan Standard* 14.8.54

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there was great talk of nationalism, we were not ever considered in the aspirations that were being fostered, the plans that were being laid".

* On the 30th December 1893 Sir Sayed Ahmed convened a meeting of the leading Mussalmans of India at Aligarh, with a view to consider the future line of action of the Muslims in political matters of India.¹ All possible courses were discussed in the meeting and it was found that it will be unwise for the Muslims to join the agitation against the Government either with the Congress or independently. On the other hand it was considered suicidal to keep themselves out of politics. The meeting felt the necessity of an all India political organisation of the Muslims as against the Indian National Congress, which was to adopt a modified line of political activity in the greater interest of the Muslim society. Thus the "Mohammedan Anglo-oriental Defence Association was formed in the meeting on the same date. The meeting seriously criticised the system of joint electorate and put forward a demand for the introduction of separate electorate system.

The Muslim renaissance movement which was being headed by Syed Ahmed and his colleagues at Aligarh turned the Hindus definitely hostile to the Muslims, for they had not fallen in with their programme and had considered it impolitic to take part in any kind of agitation against the British Government. The activities of Swami Sradhananda, the founder of the Arya Samaj movement and Balgangadhor Tilak, a Marhatta Chitpavan Brahman was largely responsible for the antagonism between the two major communities of India. ²In 1893 Tilak organised an "Anti-cow killing Society" at Poona. The same year he inaugurated annual public

1. ~~Idid~~ - Page NOMAN, M - MUSLIM INDIA. Page 59

2. Chirol Valentine - Indian unrest - Page - 134.

festival in honour of Ganesha or Ganapati and thus founded an institution against the Muharram festival of the Muslims.

"Tilak's onslaught in Poona upon Ranade, his alliance with the bigots of orthodoxy, his appeals to popular superstition in the new Ganapati celebrations, the racial fanaticism in the 'Anti-cow-killing' movement and last but not least in importance, his control of the Press and the note of personal violence which he imparted to news paper 'Polemics,' represents the progressive stages of a highly organised campaign which has served as a model to the apostles of unrest all over India".¹ The result of all these activities ultimately found expression in several communal riots. And the gulf of difference between the Muslims and the Hindus became wider and wider.

The Urdu-Hindi controversy, which started in 1867 when a few influential Hindu leaders of Benaras contemplated the removal of Urdu language and Persian character from Government offices, took a serious turn after the death of Syed Ahmed. The gravity of the language controversy had convinced Sayed Ahmed that, the Hindus and the Muslims "will not join whole-heartedly in anything."² "This was the first occasion" writes Hali, the biographer of Syed Ahmed, "when he felt that it was now impossible for the Hindus and Muslims to progress as a single nation and for any one to work for both of them simultaneously".³ Since 1893 the Hindus started vigorous campaign to dislodge Urdu from all government offices and change its script from Persian to Devanagiri : "The Lieutenant Governor of the United Provinces, Sir Antony issued a circular on the 13th April 1900 giving effect to the Hindu demand."⁴ This circular came as a serious blow to the Muslims. They found themselves seriously affected in their educational and cultural life.

1. Chirol, Valentine - Indian unrest. Page - 40-41
2. Quoted in Alberuni - Makers of Pakistan. Page - 25
3. Ibid Page - 25
4. Noman. M - Our Struggle - Page - 2.

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2 Nawab Mohshin ul Mulk and Nawab Viqarul Mulk, the two successors of Sir Syed Ahmed considered it to be a serious attack on ~~the~~ Muslim culture and convened a Conference of the leading Muslims of the United Provinces at Aligarh (1900)! The Conference viewed with grave concern the attitude of the Government towards the Muslims, strongly protested against the Circular and asked the Government to reconsider its decision. But the Government turned deaf ear to the Muslim demands. These complex circumstances awakened the Muslims from their long slumber and they now fully realised the necessity of united action to safeguard their interests. "In the manner in which the Muslim rights are being trampled upon and attacked from all sides and the tone of the number of articles that are being published against us, it is impossible for the Mussalmans to keep their tongue tied and be a mere passive observer" - wrote Nawab Viqarul Mulk in a memorable letter to Nawab Mohshin ul Mulk.²

Nawab Viqarul Mulk now came out in the field of active politics, ~~he started a political and social organisation of the Muslims at Aligarh in 1901 but could not make it successful.~~ Towards the end of 1901 a representative Committee with the Muslim leaders of different provinces was formed at Lucknow at the initiative of Nawab Mohshin ul Mulk.³ The Committee was entrusted with the task of chalking out the future line of action of the Muslims. After a full fledged survey of the existing political circumstances the Committee decided to form a Muslim Association in every Province with district and town branches. The whole scheme was published and hailed by the Muslim leaders. ⁴ Thus, an Association⁴ namely, The

1. Noman, M - Muslim India - Page - 59

2. Ibid - Page - 62

3. Ibid - Page. ~~62-63~~ 63

4. Ibid - Page 63-64

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Muslim Political and Social Organisation was formed at Aligarh. Though the organisation was short lived yet it was successful in creating a sensation among the Muslim intelligentsia of the sub-continent. It infused hopes into the minds of the Muslims and helped the formation of the historic Simla deputation in 1906.

About this time came the question of the partition of Bengal. The Lieutenant Governor of Bengal had the charge of 78 millions of men almost twice the population of the United Kingdom. As a result of this huge area under one single unit with head-quarter at Calcutta Muslim populated East Bengal was seriously neglected. With a view to promote administrative efficiency Sir John Elliot proposed the partition of Bengal in 1896 but the proposal in 1896 but the proposal was not given effect. In July 1905 the partition proposal was renewed by the Governor. Lord Curzon, the then Viceroy¹ undertook a tour in Eastern Bengal, convened a special meeting at Dacca and officially declared the formation of the new province of Eastern Bengal and Assam. The new province included the whole of Assam and Rajshahi, Chittagong and Dacca divisions of Bengal. The eastern district now included in the new province gained enormously by the change, which was at the same time only an act of justice to the large Muslim majority who received but little consideration from Calcutta.² But the partition caused inconvenience or material loss to the absentee landlords, pleaders and money lenders and some of the merchants of Calcutta, Anglo-Indian as well as Hindu native. Calcutta which had developed as a centre of the Hindu upper and middle class felt shocked at the idea of partition whereby the hinter-land of East Bengal was to be taken out of its direct control. So the

1. Banerjee, S.N. - A Nation in making - Page - 188

2. Chirol, Valentine - Indian Unrest - Page - 81.

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Hindu upper class and merchants of Calcutta started the anti-partition movement which was ultimately taken up as a national cause by the Hindu leaders. Partition was interpreted as an attempt to hamper their activities by cutting half of the "Nation" adrift from its "intellectual" capital. This well calculated cry appealed to many of the Hindu "moderates" also and in Calcutta feeling ran very strong. The anti-partition demonstrations were organised in Calcutta and in the Mofussil towns and the wildest reports were circulated amongst the masses. Nationalist leaders like Gokhale, Bepin Chandra Pal and Dadhabhai Naoroji openly allied themselves with the cause of the ~~Hind~~ Hindus. Sir Surendranath Banerjee, editor of "The Bengali" started the Swadeshi movement boycotting the British goods.

Anti-partition meetings were organised all over the province and as Mr. Lovett wrote in his "History of the Indian National Movement". :-

"As purely sentimental appeals were ineffective to excite sufficient popular sympathy, the leaders of the anti-partition movement searching for a national hero endeavoured to import from Bombay the cult of Shivaji and appealed to the religion of the multitude by placing their efforts under the patronage of Kali, the goddess of destruction and strength".²

The anti-partition movement by the Hindus and the Congress leaders' support to it seriously effected the Hindu-Muslim relations all over India. The vehemence with which the Hindus opposed the partition which was a genuine demand of the Muslims reacted in the development of a new psychology among the Muslims. The Muslims became more anti-Hindu as ^{they} could not

1. Chirol, Valentine - Indian unrest. - Page 82

2. Lovett, Vernay - History of the Indian National Movement.
Page - 62.

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explain anti-partition movement except as anti-Muslim move of the dominant Hindus. Hindus and Muslims began to fall apart so far as political interest was concerned.

Meanwhile Lord Minto was appointed Viceroy of India to succeed Lord Curzon. Lord Morley, the Secretary of State for India while introducing the Indian Budget for 1906 in the House of Commons ^{al-} hinted a new measure of reforms for India ^{by} declaring that "the Governor General is about to appoint a small Committee from his Executive Council to consider what reforms in this direction can be expediently carried forward".¹

The proposed constitutional changes caused ^{a fear in Muslim mind} ~~the doubt~~ that the Hindus who were educationally advanced, politically conscious and better organised would further advance their position through the foreshadowed reforms. The Muslim leaders became active to put forward their demands and the grievances before the Government. The activities of the 'loyal' Muslim leaders and their opposition to the Congress had impressed Lord Minto. Moreover the growing agitation of the Congress had ^{changed} ~~imposed~~ the British policy towards the 'peaceful' Muslims. On the 28th May, 1906 Lord Minto wrote, "As to Congress there is much that is absolutely disloyal in the movement and that there is danger for the future I have no doubt. I have been thinking a good deal lately of a possible counterpoise to Congress aims."² On 10th August, 1906 Mr. Archbold, Principal of the Aligarh M.A.O. College wrote a letter to Nawab Mohshin ul Mulk in which he said that he has been informed by Colonel Dunlop Smith, the Private Secretary of the Viceroy "that His Excellency is agreeable to receive the Muslim deputation".³ Nawab Mohshin ul Mulk ^{decided to} ~~availed~~ the opportunity and ~~decided~~ to wait upon His

1. Noman, M. Muslim India - Page-70

2. Mary, Countess of Minto - India Minto and Morby - page-28-29.

3. Mehta and Patwardhan - The Communal Triangle in India -Page-62.

Excellency the Viceroy in the form of a deputation. It was suggested to prepare an address formulating the Muslim grievances and demands. The address was prepared by Nawab Imadul Huq and Syed Hasan Bilgrami. The scheme was welcomed by the Muslim leaders and the Nawab Saheb was greatly assisted by Mohammad Ismail Khan, Shahebjada Aftab Ahmed Khan, Moulvi Mohammad Yakub, Sardar Mohammad Yakub Khan, His Highness the Agha Khan and Principal Archbold. His Highness the Agha Khan was elected the leader of the deputation. The deputation which consisted of thirty six members representing every Province and every class of the English educated Muslim Society. They waited upon the Viceroy on the 1st October 1906 at Simla.

The prayers of the deputation were as follows :-3

- (A) A due proportion of Mohammedans should find place in gazetted and the subordinate and ministerial services of all Indian Provinces.
- (B) Mohammedan judges are not frequently appointed to the High Courts and Chief Courts of Judicature.
- (C) The local authority should in every case be required to declare the number of Hindus and Muslims, entitled to seats on Municipalities and District Boards, and the proportion is to be determined in accordance with the numerical strength, social status, local influence and special requirements of either community.
- (D) Senates and Syndicates of Indian Universities may be similarly dealt with.

1. Noman - Muslim India - Page - 74

2. Noman, M. - Muslim India - Page - 76

3. Sen, Sachin - Birth of Pakistan. Page 53 54

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- (E) Important Mohammedan land owners, lawyers, merchants and representatives of other important interests, Muslim members of District Boards and Municipalities and Muslim Graduates of a certain standing (say, five years) should be formed into Electoral Colleges for election to the Provincial Councils.
- (F) If Indian members are appointed on the Viceroy's Executive Councils, claims of Muslims should not be overlooked.
- (G) ~~They asked for~~ A Mohammedan University "as the centre of our religious and intellectual life" *should be established.*

The deputation further demanded the introduction of the system of separate Muslim representation to the local bodies and Councils, "Commensurate not merely with numerical strength but also with their political importance and value of the contribution which they made to the defence of the empire".¹ And in consideration of the "position which they occupied in India, a little more than hundred years ago, and which the traditions have not naturally faded from their minds."¹

² "Minto then read his answer, which he had thought out most carefully". "It was impossible writes Mary Minto, "to promise them (i.e., the Muslims) too much for fear of offending other Communities, but as he spoke, in very clear distinct tones, murmurs of satisfaction passed through the audience".² Among other things Lord Minto said to the Muslim deputation :-³

³ "Your address, as I understand it is a claim that in any system of representation, whether it affects a Municipality, a

1. Azhar, M.A. - "Muslim League" an article published in the Pakistan Standard 14. 8. 54.

~~2. Ibid - Page - 2.~~

2. Mary, Countess of Minto - India, Minto and Morley - Page-45-46.

3. *Ibid Page 46-47*

- ~~17~~ -

District Board or Legislative Council, in which it is proposed to introduce or increase an electoral organisation, the Moham-
medan community should be represented as a community. You point
out that in many cases electoral bodies as now constituted, can-
not be expected to return a Mohammedan candidate, and that if
by chance they did so, it could only be at the sacrifice of such
candidate's views to those of a majority opposed to his own com-
munity, whom he would in no way represent, and you justly claim
that your position should be estimated not merely on your numeri-
cal strength, but in respect to the political importance of your
community and the service it has rendered to the empire. I am
entirely in accord with you." The Viceroy also agreed that "Any
electoral representation in India would be doomed to mischievous
failure which aimed at granting a personal enfranchisement re-
gardless of the beliefs and traditions of the communities compo-
sing the population of this continent". Thus the deputation suc-
ceeded in securing separate electorate for the Mussalmans.

The success of the Simla deputation and the granting of
separate electorate, is a turning point in the history of Mus-
lim India. It created a sensation throughout the country and
prepared the ground for further political movements. The leaders
of the Simla deputation particularly Nwab viqar ul Mulk decided
to convene a meeting of the leading Muslims of the subcontinent
with a view to decide the future course of action and to form
a strong Central organisation of which should guide the politi-
cal activities of the Indian Muslims. On the 4th of October
1906, H.H. the Agha Khan wrote a letter to Nwab Viqarul Mulk
regarding the importance of separate electorate wherein he sug-
gested the formation of Provincial associations "with the aim

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of safeguarding the political interests of Mohammedans in the various portions of India, and similarly some Central Organisation for the whole". The idea of a permanent political organisation of the Indian Mussalmans thus engaged the attention of prominent Muslim leaders of the country. On the 9th of November 1906 Nawab Salimullah of Dacca issued a Circular suggesting the formation of an "All India Muslim Conference", and invited almost all the Muslim leaders of the sub-continent in the "East Bengal and Assam Educational Conference".

The East Bengal and Assam Educational Conference opened on the 29th December 1906, at Dacca. On the 30th December the leaders of Muslim India assembled on the panel to discuss matters of political interest. On the motion of Nawab Salimullah which was seconded by Mr. Mazharul Huq, Nawab Viqarul Mulk was elected to the Chair. Prominent amongst those who attended the meeting were Nawab Viqarul Mulk, Nawab Mohshin ul Mulk, H.H. the Agha Khan, Hakim Ajmal Khan, Moulana Shaukat Ali, Moulana Mohammad Ali, Sir Hasan Imam, Mr. Mozharul Huq, Sir Ali Imam, Moulana Jafar Ali Khan, Moulana Abul Kalam Azad, Shahebjada Aftab Ahmed, Khawja Ghulam us Saqaline, Raja Nauser Ali, Sheikh Abdullah and Nawab Salimullah. After serious discussion of the various problems of Muslim India by the distinguished leaders Nawab Salimullah moved the following resolution :-³

"Resolved that this meeting composed of Mussalmans from all parts of India assembled at Dacca decide that a Political Association be formed and styled All India Muslim League, for the furtherance of the following objects :

1. ~~For the purpose of~~ *Rajput, A.B. - Chronology of struggle for Pakistan*
~~8. 11. 54~~ *THE PAKISTAN STANDARD 14. 8. 54*
2. Dewan Abdul Hamid - Nawab Salimullah, an article published in the daily Azad. 4. 3. 56.
- ~~1. Rajput, A.B. - Muslim League yesterday and today Page 10-21~~
3. *Nouran, 11 - Muslim India Page 78*

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- "(a) To promote among the Mussalmans of India, feelings of loyalty to the British Government and to remove any misconception that may arise as to the intention of Government with regard to any of the measures.
- "(b) To promote and advance the political rights and interests of the Mussalmans of India and to respectfully represent their needs and aspirations to the Government.
- "(c) To prevent the rise amongst the Mussalmans of India, ~~of India~~, of any feeling of hostility towards other communities without prejudice to the other aforementioned objects of the League".

The resolution was duly supported by Hakim Ajmal Khan, Moulana Jafar Ali Khan, Sheikh Abdullah and Moulana Mohammad Ali and was unanimously accepted. H.H. the Agha Khan was elected the permanent President of the All India Muslim League.

Thus the foundation of the All India Muslim League was laid which was destined to bring about a significant change in the political map of the Sub-continent and gave birth to Pakistan.

CHAPTER II

THE ALL INDIA MUSLIM LEAGUE

PRIMARY PHASE

(1907 - 1910)

The All India Muslim League started as a Pro-Government organisation representing the upper class Mussalmans of India. Almost similar forces worked behind the formation of the two great Indian organisations; the Indian National Congress and the All India Muslim League. The Indian National Congress was founded on the initiative of ~~Mr.~~ Mr. A.O. Hume, a retired civilian.¹ The Viceroy Lord Dufferin; however, feeling the lack of any loyal opposition to stimulate the Government, deliberately encouraged it to take a political character.¹ Similarly the Government of Lord Minto encouraged and welcomed the formation of the AIML as a counterblast to the Indian National Congress. Despite various attempts of the Congress leaders to win the support of the Muslims, the Mussalmans as a community had never identified themselves with the Congress.² "The Mohammedan Community", admits Sir Surendra Nath Banerjee, "under the leadership of Sir Sayed Ahmed had aloof from the Congress. They were working under the patriotic Association in direct opposition to the national movement".² The Muslim opposition to the Congress was due to so many reasons. Politically the Muslims were still bound in their profession of loyalty to the British Government which their leaders considered to be necessary after the aftermath of the ~~meeting~~ suppression of the Mutiny.

1. Sitaramya. P - History of the Indian National Congress Vol. I - page - 15.

2. Banerjee S.N. - A Nation in Making. Page - 108.

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The Mussalmans as a growing middle class wanted representation in the jobs and services and their horizon of thinking could not go beyond it. The Hindus on the other hand were far advanced than the Muslims economically, socially and politically. So the clash of interest was inevitable. The Mussalmans gradually drifted away from the Congress and found "their natural moorings in the congenial atmosphere of the Muslim League". ~~It is~~

It is said that the British Policy of "divide and rule" was responsible for the alienation of the Muslims from the Congress. It cannot be denied that the policy of the Government influenced the outlook of the Muslim leaders of the time and encouraged their separatist tendency. But it would be unfair to place the entire responsibility on the British Government or on the Muslim community. It might be said that the bankruptcy of the Congress leadership was also responsible for it. The Hindu leaders of the Congress failed to give a secular lead. To them nationalism had become Hindu nationalism. Hindu religious rites became part of the procedure and programme of the purely political movements. The attempted revival of Hindu civilisation in India frightened the Muslims against the Hindu motives. The absence of ^{Congress} sympathy with Muslim public opinion ~~for~~ and ~~the Congress~~ the identification of the Congress with the Bengal annulment movement convinced the Mussalmans that their interests were not secured in the hands of the Indian National Congress and hence they became much more united under the leadership of the All India Muslim League.

The Award of separate electorates to the Muslims had deeply offended the Hindus who, in 1906, resumed their agitation against the partition of Bengal with redoubled fervour. The Swadeshi movement was also at its height in Bengal. The song

1. Singha Roy, B.P.- Parliamentary Govt. in India. Page - 406.

of Bande Matram was adopted as a National song by the Congress, ~~who claimed to champion for the union between the Hindus and the Muslims.~~ Sir V. Lovett in his "History of the Indian National Movement" says :

"Years before a Bengali named Bankim Chandra had written a novel based on incursions by some bands of Sanyasis, fanatical Hindu banditti, who in the year 1772, after a severe famine, had descended ~~upon~~ Bengal, their ranks swollen by a crowd of starving peasants, and had obtained temporary successes against some Government levies under British officers. The novel contained a song which was adopted as a Marseillaise by the antipartitionists, and has since become famous as "Bande Matram" - Hail, Motherland From the context of the novel it seems that the Sanyasis appeal was rather to his mother's land, the land of Mother Kali, than to his Mother land."

Bande Mataram and other effusions of a more militant character were eagerly taken up by the masses of Hindu youths who thronged the numerous Schools and Colleges in Bengal under needy discontented teachers. Indeed it was to enlist these facile recruits that the Calcutta leaders addressed their main efforts.... The whole agitation was Hindu, and was strongly resented by the Muhammedans, who form the majority in Eastern Bengal and had derived substantial and obvious advantages from the new arrangements". The "National mourning" and the "Ceremonies" which were observed on the occasion of the anti-partition movement included the Rakhi Bandhan, fasting, bathing in the Ganges and other Hindu religious ceremonials. Thus the nationalism which was put forward by leaders like Mr. Surendra Nath Banerjee was Hindu Nationalism.

The All India Muslim League was formed at a very crucial moment in the history of Mussalmans in India, ~~and~~ ^{it} immediately took

1. Lovett, V.-A History of the Indian National Movement. Page-62-63.

up the causes of the Muslims. ¹ The Muslim League in its very first session at Dacca gave a serious warning to the Government that in case ~~the case~~ the Partition was annulled the Muslims all over India would view it with great alarm! From all these it must be clear that the questions of separate electorates and the partition of Bengal seriously affected the Hindu-Muslim relations in India. ² The Congress started movement for joint electorate of the Hindus and the Muslims and allied itself with the antipartition movement of Bengal. ² The Muslim League on the otherhand took these two important causes of the Muslims. The Muslim League had thus to take the challenge of the Congress. The Muslim League was gradually coming into wide spread existence and the work started at Dacca was pushed with great force. ³ In 1907 the representatives of Muslim League from all over India gathered at Karachi and accepted the constitution of the organisation. ³ The meeting was presided over by Sir Adamjee Peerbhoy. The resolutions passed related to adequate Muslim representation in the new Councils, to Muslim places in the Public service, and to Muslim ~~loyalty~~ loyalty to the Government. A branch of the Muslim League had been started in London under the Honourable Syed Ameer Ali and the League decided to help it financially. The ~~xxxxx~~ formation of such an organisation was essential in order to make contact with the British ~~and the~~ public and to counterblast the onesided propoganda of the London branch of the Congress.

The educated class was now well prepared to steer the Muslim fate. The Muslim League then submitted its own views on the Government despatch on the proposed reform scheme and tried to impress upon the authority regarding the genuineness of their demands.

The principles of the promoters of the League were expounded in a letter addressed by the Agha Khan to a meeting of the Deccan

1. Noman-M-Muslim India-Page - 95. 2. Lovett- A History of India National Movement. Page - 75

3. Ibid. 75

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branch. ² "He wrote that amid much that was good in India, they saw a growing indiscipline and contempt for authority, a striving after change without perceiving whether change would lead and the setting up of false and impracticable constitutional ideas. No man who loved the country as the Indian Muslims did could stand idly by and see India drifting irrevocably to disaster. Prosperity and contentment could only be reached by process of development and evolution working on natural lines. These processes required the existence of a strong, just and stable government, a government securing justice and equal opportunity to all minorities as well as majorities. It was the duty of all patriots to strengthen British control under which had been effected the amazing progress of a century".¹

In 1908 the scheme of reforms was published. The despatch of the Secretary of State, Lord Morely differed in vital parts from what the Viceroy had recommended. The number of seats allotted to the Muslims were simply based on their numerical strength. Moreover the scheme merely fixed the number of Muslim members who along with others were to be jointly elected by all, the Hindus and Muslims. Though the election of Muslims was thus guaranteed, yet since the number of Hindus in most constituencies were far greater than those of the Muslims, the candidate who had more sympathy of the Hindus, rather than of the Muslims had every chance, ~~to be~~ to be returned. Therefore, the scheme was not ~~an~~ acceptable to the leaders of the Muslim League and their struggle continued. Khan Bahadur Nawab Ali Choudhury criticising Lord Morely's despatch declared : ~~It~~ Since the Hindus in most

1. Ibid - page - 75.

2. Muslim League - M.A. Azhar, article Published in the Pakistan Standard 14.8.54.

provinces will naturally be in the majority the Muhammedan who is more in sympathy with the Hindus, may obtain more votes than another Muhammedan candidate who is preferred by the Muhammedans. Surely in that case the Muhammedan interest will by no means be served when the right man is not elected. It sounds very well to hear that the Hindus and the Muhammedans should work together in harmony, but past events are a criterion to assure us that a difference exists between the Hindus and the Muhammedans and that their interests, aims and objects cannot be one."

The reform scheme was put forward before the Council session of the All India Muslim League which was held at Amritsar in 1908.² Mr. Ali Inam the President of the session availed of this opportunity to criticise the scheme that did not fulfil the aspirations of the Mussalmans. He made a whole survey of the situation in India. He recalled the Viceroy's pronouncement at Simla and regretfully concluded with the moral that "here is illustrated the peril of not relying on the advice and Council of the Man on the spot."³ The London branch of the Muslim League took up the case with the British Government. A Muslim deputation headed by Syed Ameer Ali met the Secretary of State in London and presented an address in which the demand for the separate electorate was reiterated and emphasised.

Just after the Amritsar session a rift was created in the rank and file of the All India Muslim League.⁴ Mr. Syed Ali Inam the President of the Amritsar session after meeting with Mr. Gokhale published a long statement which to some extent differed with

1. 'Muslim League' an article by M.A. Azhar. Pakistan Standard, 14.8.58.

2. Noman.M-Muslim India. Page - 102. 3. Muslim League - M.A. Azhar, Pakistan Standard 14.8.54.

4. Noman, M. Muslim India. Page - 102
~~4. Sen. S. The Birth of Pakistan - page - 57.~~

~~1. Noman. M. Muslim India. Page - 102.~~

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the views expressed by him in the Amritsar session. Nawab Viqar-ul Mulk took it as an objection. The controversy was however ended in cordiality.

The third Council session of the 'All India Muslim League was held at Delhi with the Prince of Arcot in the chair ^{though} ~~and~~ His Highness the Agha Khan was the permanent President of the League.¹ Hakeem Ajmal Khan, Chairman of the Reception Committee in his address strongly depreciated the Hindu opposition to the introduction of separate electorate and considered it to be vital for the Muslims. The Prince of Arcot, the President of the session tried to answer the charges brought by the Hindu leaders against the separate electorate. In course of his speech as the President of the League H.H. the Agha Khan declared that the functions of the Muslims in the Councils would be three fold. "In the first place they must co-operate, as representative Indian citizens, with other Indians in advancing the well being of the country by working wholeheartedly for the spread of education, for the establishment of free and universal Primary education, for the promotion of Commerce and industry, for the improvement of Agriculture by the establishment of Co-Operative Credit and distribution Societies and for the development of all the natural resources of the country. Here indeed is a wide field of work for Hindus and Muhammedans acting together, in forwarding practical measures that must tend to the permanent welfare of the country. In the second place, our representatives must be ready to co-operate with the Hindus and all other sections of Society in securing for them all those advantages that serve their peculiar conditions and help their social welfare,² for although the two sister

1. Ibid.

2. Chirol, Valentine - Indian unrest. Page- 132-133.

communities have developed on different lines each suffers from some peculiar weakness in addition to the misfortunes, common to general economic and educational backwardness. And then our representatives must watch and promote social measures exclusively for the benefit of their Muslim Co-religionists with the co-operation, we hope, of the Hindu members, for we too have needs that are not known to them and which we alone can fully understand". Honourable Syed Ameer Ali, the President of the London branch of the Muslim League sent a memorable speech to be read in the Delhi session, wherein he proposed the division of the work of the League into four sections viz., (1) Political, (ii) Educational, (iii) Economic, and; (iv) Social. But this scheme could not be implemented as Mr. Mohammad Aziz Mirza Honorary Secretary of the All India Muslim League in his Annual report read in the Nagpur session of the League admitted that "owing to the dearth of leisured workers we have as yet been able to achieve but little".

The All India Muslim League took up the separate electorate issue as life and death question of the Indian Muslims. Before the Morely Minto reform was published they waited upon the Viceroy Lord Minto and placed before him the following demands :-²

- (1) Communal representation in accordance with their numerical strength, social position and local influence, on district and Municipal bodies.
- (ii) An assurance of Muhammedan representation on the governing bodies of Universities.
- (iii) Communal representation on Provincial Councils, election being by special electoral Colleges composed of Muhammedan landlords, lawyers, merchants and representatives of other important interests, University graduates of a certain standing and members of district and Municipal Boards.

1. Report of the Honorary G.S. of the League read in the Nagpur session in 1910. published by the A.I.M.L.
2. Ambedkar, B.R. - Thoughts on Pakistan Bombay, Thacker & Co., Ltd., Rampart Row - 1941-page-247-248.

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(iv) The number of Muhammedan representatives in the Imperial Legislative Council should not depend on their numerical strength and Muhammedan should never be in an ineffective minority. They should be elected as far as possible (as opposed to being nominated), election being by special Muhammedan Colleges composed of land-owners, lawyers, merchants, members of Provincial Councils, Fellows of Universities etc.

These demands were granted and given effect to in the Act of 1909.¹ Under this Act the Muhammedans were given (1) the right to elect their representatives. (2) The right to elect their representatives by separate electorates (3) the right to vote in the general electorates as well and (4) the right to weightage in representation.

The Provisions were applied to all provinces except the Punjab and Central Provinces. It was not applied to the Punjab because such special protection was considered unnecessary for the Muhammedans of the Punjab and it was not applied to C.P. because it had no legislative Council at the time.²

The Muslims won their battle for separate electorates inspite of Hindu opposition; it was incidentally the first victory of the All India Muslim League against the ~~xxx~~ more powerful Congress - and the acceptance of their demands became the cornerstone of all future constitutional changes. But it will not be uninteresting to recall that Mr. Mohammad Ali Jinnah, the future architect of Pakistan was one of the strongest opponent of this demand at that time.

The introduction of separate electorate in the Morely - Minto Reforms meant an important political concession to the Indian Muslims. Both in the Muslim League and in the Congress however,

1. Ibid.

2. Ibid. Page -

there were still some who hoped that better sense would prevail upon the Hindus and the Muslims, and lead the two communities to Co-Operate with each other in their political struggle. Sporadic attempts were being made to fill up the breach between the Congress and the Muslim League. It was suggested that a Conference of the Hindu-Muslim leaders be held for the purpose of exchanging views and holding friendly discussions on all questions affecting the general well-being of the country. ¹An influential delegation on behalf of the All India Muslim League headed by H.H. the Agha Khan attended the Congress-League joint Conference which was held at Allahabad in 1910. The Conference was attended by prominent leaders like Sir Surendra Nath Banerjee, Mr. Gokhale, Sir Sundar Lal, Pandit Madan Mohan Malavia, Sri Tej Bahadur Sapru, Pandit Matilal Nehru, Lord Sinha, Maharaja² Darbhanga, H.H. the Agha Khan, Nawab Viqar ul Mulk, Sir ~~B~~ Ibrahim Rahmatullah, Mr. M.A. Jinnah, Mr. Hasan Inam, Moulana Mohammad Ali and Hakeem Ajmal Khan. ³The questions discussed and finally referred to the various select committees were (1) the the establishment of Panchayet (ii) solution of Hindi-Urdu controversy (iii) the lowering of the rate of interest (iv) National education (v) The Arya Samaj movement (vi) the playing of music before the mosque and the cow sacrifice (vii) the efforts to be made to stop litigations (viii) the cancellation of the principle of forced auction of mortgaged properties and such other matters. ²But the Allahabad Conference of which much was expected did not produce the desired result. The Conference ended in a failure due to the lack of sincere feelings of co-operation of both the parties.

In the meantime the All India Muslim League was being organised all over the Country. ³In East Bengal and Assam the "Pro-

1. Noman - Muslim India - page - 113. 2. Ibid.

3. Report of the Honorary General Secretary of the League read in the Nagpur session in 1910. Published by the A.I.M.L.

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vincial Mohammedan Association which was previously organised as a rival institution to the League was amalgamated with the Provincial League due to the sincere efforts of Syed Nwab Ali Choudhury of East Bengal and Mr. Mohammad Aziz Mirza, the honorary Secretary of the A.I.M.L. As a result the League became the only powerful Muslim organisation in the new Province of East Bengal and Assam.

The fourth Council session of the All India Muslim League opened on the 28th of December 1910, at Nagpur, central Province. Mr. Sayed Nabiullah presided over the session. H.H. the Agha Khan, permanent President of the A.I.M.L. was also present on the dias. Mr. Mohammad Aziz Mirza the honorary Secretary of the League in his Annual Report gave a detailed account of the activities of the League during the year under review. He also recollected the service of the Muslim League and its leaders towards the achievement of the Muslim interests in India. The session appreciated the attitude of the Government towards the Muslims and expressed its loyalty to the British crown. Among various other resolutions the Council urged upon the Government to extend the principle of communal representation to all local bodies and Municipalities and demanded adequate representation of the Muslims in services.²

CHAPTER III

A Change in outlook

1911-1916

Events of 1911 and years following were disturbing to the Muslims. The corner stone of the League policy so far followed was rudely shaken. New events released new force and the League was bound to react. The All-India Muslim League was, it may be recalled, an organisation conceived, formed and controlled by the upper class people of the Society. Most of the leaders of the League were 'ever loyalists' and were inclined to preach loyalty to Government amongst its members. The withdrawal of British support to the "Muslim cause" of disappointed and disillusioned the architects of the League.

In December 1911 their Majesties the king and queen of England came to India for their coronation. On December 12, 1911, the Coronation Darbar was held at Delhi and the settled fact of the partition of Bengal was unsettled by the proclamation made by His Majesty. This gave a rude shock to the Muslims. Even the most conservative Mohammedans were disappointed and irritated by the ~~annulment-~~ ~~religion~~ of the partition of Bengal when the predominantly Mohammedan Province of Eastern Bengal was merged once more into a largely Hindu predominant West Bengal. The proclamation at Delhi coming after years of prolonged and violent agitation by Bengal Hindus convinced the people as nothing else could, that political agitations paid good dividends. All over Indian Muslims were perturbed. Nawab Viqar ul Mulk was the first to give expression to the Muslim points of view. On return from the Darbar Nawab Viqar ul Mulk wrote an article on "The Fate of Muslims in India" which appeared in the Aligarh Institute Gazette of the 20th December 1911, and in which after politely but firmly criticising the decision of the Court he said: "It is now manifest like the mid-day sun that after seeing what has happened lately, it is futile

1. Albeuni. A. H. Makers of Pakistan PP. 110-11.

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to ask the Muslims to place their reliance on Govt. Now the days for such reliances are over. What we should rely on, after the grace of Allah, is the strength of our right arm, for which we have before us, the example of our worthy countrymen".

He wrote other articles on the subject and gave expression to the same feeling in a private letter :

"..... This policy of the Govt. is like artillery passing over the dead bodies of the Muslims without realising whether any life remained in the bodies and whether they would be hurt".¹

This attitude of the Nawab was criticised by some of the Hindu and Anglo Indian papers. Moulana Md. Ali supported the standpoint of Vigar ul Mulk and wrote a series of articles in the 'Comrade' dealing with "the Announcement".

The Hindu press and the Hindu leaders rejoiced over the announcement of ~~the partition~~ ^{relating to} Bengal and considered it a victory over the Muslims. While praising the British Govt. some of the Hindu leaders including the President of the Indian National Congress Pandit Bishan Narain Dhar did not spare the Muslim League and vehemently denounced the separate electorate. Mr. Ambika Charan Mazumder expressing his opinion, ^{on} the ~~announcement~~ ^{announcement} of partition, said :

"³Every heart is beating in Unison, with reverence and devotion to the British throne" overflowing with revived confidence, ingratitude towards British statesmanship, some of us never faltered, no, not even in the darkest days ^{of} our trials and tribulations in our conviction and in our faith in the ultimate triumph

1. Ibid , 110-11

2. Noman. M. ♥ Muslim India pp. 120

3. Ibid. Page - 123.

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and vindication of British Justice". The Muslims on the other hand condemned this measure of the Govt. It was a betrayal of the Muslim cause and their shock was tremendous. As Lord Minto told the House of Lords.

"We told the Musalmans that the partitions was a settled fact and we over and over again asserted that it must continue to be so. We assured the Mussalmans population of Eastern Bengal of our appreciation of their loyalty and our determination to safeguard their interests I should think there could have been scarcely a Civil servant in India who has not declared that it would be impossible for the British Government to revise the decision it had come to as regards the maintenance of the Partition of Bengal."

Nawab Sir Salimullah presiding over the Council session of All India Muslim League held at Calcutta in 1912 drew a prophatic conclusion from the episode.

"The partition gave us a great opportunity to bestow ourselves, and it awakened in our hearts the throbbings of a new National life which went pulsating through the various sections of our community in Eastern Bengal we felt sure that the people of East Bengal particularly the Muslim, would be immensely benefitted by a sympathetic administration easily accessible, and always ready to devote its time and attention ^{exclusively} ~~inclusively~~ to their welfare.... our ill-wishers at once perceived that the partition would necessarily bring to the fore^e the long neglected claims of the Muslims of East Bengal; and although we ~~never~~ never got more than what was justly our due, what little we gained was so much loss to them ...

1. Rajput. A.B. - Muslim League. PP. 23.

2. Synond. R. - The Making of Pakistan PP. 41-42.

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The annulment of the partition has appeared to put a premium on sedition and disloyalty and created an impression in the minds of the irresponsible masses that even the government can be brought down on its knees by a reckless and persistence defiance of constitutional authority. Moreover it has discredited British rule to an extent which is deeply to be regretted".

The annulment of the partition was not the only calamity which was responsible for the change in the outlook of the All India Muslim League, ~~may~~ of the Muslim India towards the British Government.

The British occupation of Egypt, the Anglo French agreement with regard to Morocco, the Anglo-Russian agreement with regard to Persia and Italian invasion of Tripoli ~~was~~ ^{were} considered to be the gradual development of a scheme in which all the Christian powers were involved for the extinction of the temporal power of Islam.

The Balkan wars of 1912 - 13 ~~exposed~~ the great European conspiracy against Turkey. The Indian Muslims of All Classes and Schools of thought naturally sympathised with their Co-religionists. ¹The dismemberment of Turkey evoked wide spread discontentment amongst Indian Mussalmans and the indifference of the British government to the interest of Turkey was interpreted by the young Nationalist Muslims as a clever move to get rid of the sickman of Europe". ² ~~Their~~ ^{the} roused ~~the~~ indignation of the Muslim of India and the young Muslims students committee all over the country including that of Aligarh ~~was~~ ^{were} rudely disturbed. They openly showed their sympathy with Turkey and collected funds to help her. ³ ~~The~~ students of the Aligarh University sacrificed all their luxuries

1. Symond, Richard - The Making of Pakistan. Pp. 41-42.
 2. Noman. M. - Muslim India. Page - 125.
 3. Ibid. Page - 129.

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and took to simple diet with a view to saving money and help their Turkish brethren. The Muslim theologicians who had already begun to take interest in the political movements of the country came forward to help the propagation of Pan-Islamism and gave a great impetus to the movement in favour of Turkey. The Indian Mussalmans despatched a Medical mission to Turkey under the leadership of Dr. M.A. Ansari. The sense of world brotherhood of Islam was at its height amongst the Indian Mussalmans. They began to read new ~~and~~ Anti-British poems and essays and expressed sorrow over the defeat of Muslim powers. The situation has been aptly summarised by Smith in the following words:

¹"Muslim literary figures poured forth their discontent and their works were warmly appreciated. Akbar's caustic epigrams and satires, Shible's wistful and pungent "Trouble in the Balkans, Iqbal's nostalgic "ode to once - Arab Sicily" and his puzzled complaint to God - these and much else in the same vein roused the middle class Muslim discontent and satisfying gave it expression."The writings of Maulana Abul Kalam Azad, Moulana Muhammad Ali and Zafar Ali Khan in al-Helal, Comrade and Hamdard and in the Zaminder awakened the Muslim masses from their long slumber and tremendously influenced them.

The Muslim League as champion of the Muslim cause which was so long limited to a smaller section of people now developed as a result of the propaganda of the different Muslim papers and the younger generation of the intelligentsia to a much more widely based organization in which the older and reactionary section became a minority. The absence of the Aga Khan and differences with Ammer Ali were no longer looked upon as a severe loss to the organization. Principle rather than personality became more dominant.

1. Smith. W.e - Modern Islam in India. Page - 226.

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While the events in the various Muslim countries were engaging the attention of the Mussalmans of India, further disillusionment was caused to them by the well-known Cawnpore mosque incident of 1913. Government wanted to dismantle part of a Cawnpore Mosque, Religious sentiments of the Muslims ^{were} ~~was~~ intensely roused and they mobilised their strength to defend the mosque. Government resorted to terrible violence and a number of innocent Muslim lives were lost. Consequently the indignation of Mussalmans of India against the British Government reached its high water mark. The matter however was settled by the personal intervention of Lord Harding, the Viceroy. But the Muslims could not forget the incident and the memories of the Cawnpore Shahids were ~~is~~ celebrated by them. There were other reasons which were driving the Indian Mussalmans from their loyalty to the British Government. ¹In August, 1912, the majority of the Muslim leaders could not come to terms with Government regarding the condition under which a Muslim University was to be started at Aligarh. The educational policy of the Government was suspected by the leaders and they resented it. ¹

The All-India Muslim League could not escape the influence of circumstances. It fully realised the futility of depending entirely on the promises, assurances and patronage of the British Government and appointed a Committee to consider the future line of action in the light of the past events. The ²Secretary of the League asked different persons to express their opinion on the questions and as a result of this exchange of views and deliberations the Council of the All India Muslim League recommended change in its creed which was to be the demand of "Self Government for India" under the *aegis* of the British crown. ² ³The Muslim League made a strong representation to the Government of

1. Noman. M. - Muslim India. Page - 129. 2. Ibid. Page 126-27
3. Ibid. Page 127.

India requesting the foreign office to impress upon Italy in favour of Turkey. Moreover they asked the Indian Muslims to boycott Italian manufactures as "Measures of Retatiation".

The Annual Session of the All India Muslim League was held at Lucknow under the Chairmanship of Mian Muhammad Shafi. The session adopted the recommendation of the Council regarding the change in the creed of the League. Thus the All-India Muslim League ^{in 1913} proceeded one step forward than the Indian National Congress whose object was the attainment of Colonial form of Government. Mian Muhammed Shafi, the President of the session in clarifying the position said : "The adoption of the alternative proposal put forward by some of our friends that the League should set up colonial form of Government in India as its ultimate goal is in any opinion inadmissable as well as politically unsound. The Political conditions internal and external prevailing in the British colonies have no analogy whatsoever with that obtaining in India and I am in entire accord with my friend, the Hon. Mr. Jinnah in thinking that the adoption of any course other than the one proposed by the Council would be absolutely unwise".¹

The League also began to show inclination for greater Co-Operation with other communities in India. And amongst others accepted the following resolution in the Lucknow session in 1913.

"That the All India Muslim League places on record its firm belief that the future development and progress of the people of India depend on the harmonious working and Co-Operation of the various communities and hopes that the leaders of both sides will periodically meet together to find a modus operandi for Joint and concerted action in questions of public good."²

1. Ibid. Page - 128.

2. Ibid.

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Mr. Syed Wazir Hasan, the Secretary of the League said that "The ideal of self government which the All-India Muslim League has placed on its programme is an important step towards the formation of the great nationality for the building of which all Indians are aspiring". These decisions of the All-India Muslim League and the radical change in its creed were warmly welcomed in the nationalist circle and the subsequent attempt of Congress-League unity was crowned with success.

But the old and more conservative leaders of the All India Muslim League could not support this change in the object of the League. H.H. the Agha Khan, permanent President of the League served his connection with the League at this stage.¹ Another controversy took place in London between Mr. Ameer Ali, the President of the London branch of League and Mr. Muhammed Ali and Syed Wazir Hasan who were there on deputation on behalf of the All India Muslim League and of the Indian Muslims.² Mr. Ameer Ali demanded that the London Branch of the League should function as an independent body which was unacceptable to the leaders of the present body. The controversy was however amicably settled through the mediation of H.H. the Agha Khan.

Moulana Muhammed Ali and Syed Wazir Hasan who had been to London towards the end of 1913 to place the Muslim grievances regarding the Cawnpore mosque and the Bulkan wars came back disappointed. The Secretary of State for India could not find his way to receive the deputation. This attitude of the British Government fully convinced the Indian Muslims that they cannot expect justice from them unless they are strong enough to enforce this demand.

1. Singha Roy., B.P. - Parliamentary Government in India.
Page-409.

2. Noman. M. - Muslim India. Page - 131-132.

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¹ Moulana Mohammad Ali and Syed Wazir Hasan were able to ~~XXXXX~~ ^{on} pursue Mr. Mohammad Ali Jinnah, who was then/a Congress deputation in London, to join the All India Muslim League but ¹ on condition that he would not be a party to any League policy that would go against the Congress principles. ² The Indian National Congress at its Karachi session held on December 27, 1913, welcomed the adoption by the Muslim League the ideal of self Government for India. ² The stage was thus set up for the formation of League-Congress amity. The anti-Muslim policy of the British, meanwhile, was constantly pushing the Muslim League in to the fold of the Congress.

This was the background of events when the first world war broke out in 1914. British political misconduct forced the Turks to join the axis powers. The British about the same time declared their protectorate over Egypt. Consequently the indignation of the Indian Mussalmans against the British rulers rose to a very high pitch. The Government on her part, passed the Defence of India Act, suppressed the inflammatory Muslim periodicals like ~~al~~ al-Helal, Comrade and the Zaminder and put the top ranking Muslim leaders including Moulana Mohammad Ali into jail.

The Defence of India Act suppressed the agitation of the Indian Muslims against the Government for the time being. But the anti-British feeling itself continued. One great achievement of the All India Muslim League during the years 1913-1915 was the growing sense of unity with the Hindu leaders of the Congress as against the tyranny of the British Government. But there had been a sharp difference of opinion in the rank and file of the League since the adoption of 'self-Government' as its object.

1. Noman. M. - Muslim India. Page - 132

2. Saiyid. M.H. - Mohammad Ali Jinnah - A Political Study.
Page - 92-93.

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The conservative and reactionary elements in the League did not like the holding of the session of the League on account of the war.¹ Furthermore the spirit of unity between the League and the Congress which was gaining ground day by day was not liked by them. But the young nationalist and the more influential group was in favour of holding the session in order to ventilate the grievances of the Muslims under the changed circumstances.

The session of the All India Muslim League was opened at Bombay in 1915 with Mr. Mazharul Huq in the Chair. The Indian National Congress was also having its session in the same city. The Co-Operation of the Congress and League and the friendly attitude of the Hindus and the Muslims towards each other was a marked feature of this session.² Prominent Congress leaders like Mr. S.P. Sinha (President), Hon. Mr. Dinshaw E. Wacha, (Chairman of the Reception Committee) Mr. Surendra Nath Banerjee, Mrs. Annie Besant, Mrs. Sarojini Naidu, Pandit Madan Mohan Malavia, Mr. M. K. Gandhi, Mr. Horniman and R.N. Mudalkar attended the League session. The Muslim League strongly criticised the Defence of India Act, and the Press Act of the Government of India. The imprisonment and internment of Muslim leaders like Moulana Mohammad Ali, Saukat Ali, Zafar Ali Khan and others were very much resented by the League. The President Mr. Mazharul Huq significantly spoke of the new trends .¹

"These are times when new forces are coming into play and new ideals are convulsing Muslim Society which have to be carefully nursed and fostered and must not be frittered away in senseless dissensions. True organisation is the secret of the strength of a Society, and we must be so organised that our voice will command ^{and} compel respect and the country and the Government recognise in it the well considered and unanimous opi-

1. Ibid - page - 115.

2. Noman - Muslim India page - 137.

3. Noman - Muslim India - page 140.

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nion of the entire ~~and~~ community which it would not be easy to ignore. We cannot go on dissipating our strength in fruitless and harmful attempts at compromise that only hamper us in our onward progress. Our League has done most useful work. It is a Progressive body and is ready to adapt itself to the interest and the time". Mr. Mazharul Huq ~~British Government~~ openly accused the ^{British government.} for having neglected Indian affairs and declared. "But in the case of India the Government of the country has been conducted on lines which were not conducive to any good results. The children of the soil have no real share in the Government of their own country. Policy is laid down and carried on by non-Indians which oftener than not, goes against the wishes of the people and ignore their sentiments. Unless and until ^{India} has got a national government and is governed for the greatest good of the Indian people I do not see how she can be contended. India does not demand but she does require the light of the Indian sun for her own children".

Though the Muslim League adopted 'self government' as her objective since 1913, it was only in the Bombay session of the League that they openly challenged the British Government. This positive change in the outlook was so rapid that Moulana Mohammad Ali ~~ha-~~
~~rously~~ remarked :- ✓

So rapid had been the progress of the Mussalkans that a mildewed critic from among their own community observed that Lord Sinha, the Bengalee President of the ~~Bombay~~ Bombay session of the Indian National Congress, had travelled thither by the same train as his Bihar neighbour and brother-lawyer who presided over the Muslim League, and the two had borrowed one another's Presidential Addresses in order to compare notes. By some unfortunate

1. Ibid. Page - 141-142.

2. Ibid. Page - 146.

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mistake Lord Sinha read out the halting and hesitating address of the ever loyal Muslim while the ever loyal Muslim read out the piquant and pungent ~~Muslim~~ address of the ever disloyal Bengalee. (laughter). But, said the critic with more wit than wisdom, the two presidents forgot to take back their own productions and by an irony of fate Moulana Mazharul Huq had read to his Muslim audience as his own the pungent oration characteristic of the Bengalee, and Lord Sinha had done like wise and read to the Congress delegates the cautious and halting address of the ~~ever loyal~~ 'ever loyal' Muslim".

But the Bombay session of the All India Muslim League could not become an unique success due to the ill-intention of the reactionary and discontented elements who opposed the holding of the session from the very beginning. ¹ They were out to create chaos and were actively supported ~~by~~ by the government officials and the police. An ordinary interpellation between the president and Moulana Hasrat Mohani over a trifling matter was the ~~the~~ scene of an uproar. The President found it difficult to continue the proceedings and adjourned the session. The rest of the proceedings were conducted in Taj Mahal hotel.

The leaders of the All India Muslim League were convinced that no form of self government is possible in India unless the two great communities, the Hindus and the Muslims are closely united. Mr. ~~Mahammad~~ Mahammad Ali Jinnah who had become the 'I' 'ambassador of Hindu Muslim unity since 1913 in a long speech appealed for harmonious relations between the Hindus and the Muslims in course of which he said : ²

¹ Is India to be ruled jointly by England, Scotland, Ireland and the dominions ? Are we to be handed over to this Imperial Parliament and to be thus ruled and ~~the~~ to be governed by the colonies ? Are we not to have a status or locus standi in this Imperial Parliament ? I feel sure that I am expressing the opinion

1. Ibid. Page - 147. 2. Ibid. Page - 158.

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of the entire educated people of this country, that India will never ~~allow~~ allow herself to be relegated to such an intolerable position."

When Mr. Jinnah ^{then} moved a resolution that a Committee be appointed to prepare a scheme of reforms for the consideration of the British Government and that it should be authorised to confer and consult with other political organisations. The ~~resolution~~ resolution was accepted. The Congress which was holding its session in the same city reciprocated the League gesture by authorising the All India Congress Committee to confer with the League Executive and frame a joint scheme for self-government.

The path that lead to the Unity of ~~the~~ two major political organisations of the country was now clear of all obstacles. In 1916 a Joint meeting of the representative of two parties was held at Calcutta under the presidentship of Sir Surendra Nath Bangerjee. A draft proposal for the League-Congress Pact was prepared and referred to the annual sessions of the two great organisations which were to meet at the same time at Lucknow in December 1916.

The Lucknow sessions of the All-India Muslim League and the Indian National Congress endorsed the Congress-League agreement known to ~~the~~ history as the Lucknow Pact, which was submitted later to the British Government for consideration.

The Lucknow Pact was the culmination of the new spirit of the ~~new~~ All-India Muslim, League. The League ceased to be an organisation of 'ever loyals' and the loyals after attempting to break the League broke themselves away.

1. Ibid. - page - 148. 2. Ibid. Page - 150.

2. See Appendix - II.

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The Lucknow Pact opened a new era of harmony and brotherly relations between the Hindus and the Muslims and thus greatly influenced the history of freedom movement in India. By this Pact the Indian National Congress recognised the Mussalmans as a separate political entity. This was incidentally a victory for the Muslim League.

CHAPTER IV

ATTENTION DIVERTED

(1917 - 1922)

The League - Congress scheme of 1916 gave rise to a new movement in India. The Home Rule League which was founded by Mrs. Annie Besant in 1917 began to mobilise public opinion *and* agitate for the implementations of the agreed scheme of the two leading political organisations of the country. The movement spread like wild fire. The cry of Home Rule ^{was} raised from each and every corner of the country. But soon Mrs. Besant was interned.

The internment of Mrs. Besant was condemned by the leading political organisations. She was immediately succeeded to the Presidentship of the Home Rule League by Mr. Jinnah. A joint ^{meeting} ~~session~~ of the All India Muslim League and Indian National Congress which met in Bombay on the 27th and 28th of July 1917 expressed grave concern over the situation in the country and strongly protested against the internment of Mrs. Besant and two of her co-workers. The joint session also took a decision to petition to the Parliament in support of the scheme of reforms adopted by the All India Muslim League and the Indian National Congress. The League - Congress session further demanded that an authoritative pronouncement be made by the Imperial Government stating the policy of making India a self-governing member of the British empire at an early date.

The British Government ignored the demand for Mrs. Besant's

1. Noonan, M - Muslim India - page 163-164.

release but were prompt to come out with an important announcement of Constitutional ~~institutions in India~~ reforms.

¹ "The policy of His Majesty's Government, with which the Govt. of India are in complete accord", announced the Secretary of State for India on the 20th August 1917" is that of the increasing association of Indians in every branch of the administration and the gradual development of self-governing institutions with a view to the progressive realisation of responsible government in India as an integral part of the British empire. They have decided that substantial steps in that direction should be taken as soon as possible, and that it is of the highest importance as a preliminary to considering what these steps should be, that there should be a free and informal exchange of opinion between those in authority at Home and in India. His Majesty's Government have accordingly decided, with His Majesty's approval, that I should accept the Viceroy's invitation to proceed to India to discuss these matters with the Viceroy and the Government of India, to consider with the Viceroy the views of local Governments and to receive with him the suggestions of representative bodies and others

Ample opportunity will be afforded for public discussion of the proposals which will be submitted in due course to Parliament".

The pronouncement of the 20th August and the news of Mr. Montagu's visit to India was received with mixed reaction both by the Hindus and the Muslims. On the 6th of October 1917 both

the Muslim League and the Congress decided to wait in the form of a deputation on the **Secretary** of State for India and His Excellency the Viceroy. But the declaration of Mr. Montague's intending visit to India had a further reaction in the growth of a number of mushroom organisations which came out to put their respective suggestions to the Crown's minister. It was also an occasion to reveal the internal weakness of the All India Muslim League. The Punjab branch of the League was a stronghold of the "loyals". They did not like the idea of a League-Congress joint action against the British Government. The Punjab branch under the leadership of Mian Mohammad Shafi disagreed with the Central body and was subsequently disaffiliated. The League Congress joint deputation waited on the Secretary of State for India on the 26th November and submitted the "Memorandum of the Nineteen" a scheme of Post war reform that had the Lucknow Pact as its basis.²

Despite a joint front with the Congress the League had not lost sight of its fundamental demand - recognition of the Muslim rights as distinct from the rights of the Indians as a whole. The session of the All India Muslim League was held in Calcutta. Moulana Mohammad Ali, the President - elect for the session could not attend, as he was interned in Jail under Defence of India Act. Raja Mohammad Ali Khan Saheb of Mahmudabad, the permanent President of the League conducted the proceedings of the meeting. The Presidential chair was kept vacant in honour of Moulana Mohammad Ali. Raja Saheb paid high tribute to Moulana Mohammad Ali and vehemently criticised the policy of the Government specially the Defence of India Act. Raja Saheb while speaking on the League - Congress scheme declared :-

1. NOMAN., M. Muslim India Page - 166
2. Saigid, M. H. - Mohammad Ali Jinnah - A Political Study. P.P. 813

" Gentlemen, in your behalf I affirm here our complete adherence to that scheme, which is the irreducible minimum of our demands. Here I may say that the bed-rock of our demands in relation to our communal interests is as firm today as it was in 1906. And therefore in any scheme of constitutional reform in the Government of this country, this cardinal fact should not in our opinion be lost sight of.

The separate representation of the Indian Mussalmans in the Legislative Councils, has admittedly been conducive to better relations between the two communities of India. It has contributed to the contentment of Mohammedans in as much as it has softened if not altogether eliminated the galling sense of unmerited importance in influencing Indian policy from the minds of the community which by reason of its number, its position and its importance, felt that it could not justifiably resign itself to the inevitable lot of hopeless and therefore dejected minority."

The Montague-Chelmsford report prepared after four months of prolonged negotiations and discussions was signed at Simla on April 22, 1918 and was presented to Parliament. The publication of recommendations created uproar in India. It contained no recognition of the League-Congress joint demand. It satisfied none. It was widely condemned as inadequate, unsatisfactory and disappointing. "The scheme is unworthy to be offered by England or to be accepted by India - wrote Mrs. Besant. The session of the All India Muslim League which held in Bombay under the Presidentship of Raja Saheb of Mahmudabad condemned the

1. Noman - Muslim India - Page - 175

2. Quoted in "India Old and New by Chirol, Valentine. Macmillan Company Ltd., St. Martins Street London. Page - 151.

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Montegux - Chelmsford, ^{Ref. No.} Regarding the criticism which the authors of the Report made on the League - Congress joint scheme, Raja Saheb said :-

¹ "But to disqualify the whole scheme in the manner in which I am constrained to say Lord Chelmsford and Mr. Montegu have done is calculated to create, if has not already created, the impression that these statesman embarked on their work of investigation with a not altogether unbiased mind against the scheme the publication of the Report as a result of this visit has plunged the whole country in a state of intense excitement. It has stimulated thought and provoked keen controversy. The question is being hotly debated as to whether it should be accepted by the country or not, whether or not the proposals it contains satisfy the aspirations and the expectations raised by the announcement itself, whether in one word they constitute a substantial step towards the realisation of responsible Government. That they have caused disappointment in our minds cannot and need not be denied. They have fallen short of natural and legitimate expectations".

But inspite of all opposition by the Muslim League and the Congress against the Montegu Chelmsford proposals, a bill which was based on these proposals was approved by the Select Committee, of the British parliament and became the Government of India Act 1919.

While the excitement was already high after the publication of the Montegu-Chelmsford report, further fuel to the fire was added by the recommendations of the Rowlatt Committee which

became an Act of the Imperial Legislature in 1919. In 1918 the British Government had appointed a Commission with Sir Sidney Rowlatt as the Chairman and Kumar Swami Sastri and Provash Chandra Mitter as members to probe into the existing state of violent excitement in India. The Commission submitted its recommendations in 1918. It gave special powers to the executive to deport individuals, to set up special tribunal for trial of political offenders without juries and to control press. [‡]The Bill inspite of the opposition of the Indian members of the Council was passed into law and became Act XI of 1919 as "The Anarchichal and revolutionery crimes Act". While the recommendations of the Rowlatt Committee were being considered by the Government, Mr. Jinnah resigned his membership of the Imperial Legislative Council as a protest against the Rowlatt Bill. [¶]"I feel that under the prevailing conditions" declared Mr. Jinnah while tendering his resignations "I can be of no use to my people in the Council, nor consistently with one's self respect is co-operation possible with a Government that shows such utter disregard for the opinion of the representatives of the people at the Council Chamber and the feelings and sentiments of the people outside".

The Rowlatt Act was characterised by the Nationalists as the "Black Act". And there was a wide spread agitation demanding its repeal. Protest meetings were held all over the country and Hartal was observed in several places. Gandhi launched Satyagraha movement of passive resistance in protest ~~of the Act~~. But the Government increased the repressive measures

1. Ambedkar, B.R. - Thoughts on Pakistan - Page - 315.

2. Ibid - Page - 315.

in higher and higher degrees, Indiscriminate arrests were made, promiscuous floggings and whippings were continued, the properties of the "rebels" were confiscated and Martial Law was proclaimed in the Punjab. The policy of repression culminated in the massacre of Jallinwalabagh at Amritsar on April 13, 1919. On that day about 20000 people had assembled within a walled meeting place to protest against the Rowlatt Act and the repressive measures of the Government. They were mercilessly machine-gunned by general Dyre and his troops. About 2000 thousand people were killed on that tragic occasion. The massacre plunged the whole country into deep gloom. Protests were raised from every quarter. Even the liberals expressed their resentment. The Government called it an "error of judgement" but the explanation satisfied none. Mr. Jinnah was very violent in his language in condemning the Government. ¹"That Star Chamber Legislation", observed Mr. Jinnah, named after the notorious chairman of the Rowlatt Committee "was launched by the Government of Lord Chelmsford and it resulted in the "Celebrated Crimes" which neither the words of men nor the tears of woman can wash away. "An error of judgement" they call it. If that is the last word, I agree with them, an error of judgment it is, and they shall have to pay for it if not today than tomorrow. One thing there is which is indisputable and that is this the government must go and give place to complete responsible government. Meetings of the Congress and Muslim League will not effect this, We shall have to think out some course more effective than passing resolutions of disapproval put forward to the Secretary of State for India and we shall surely find a way even as France and Italy had and the new-born Egypt, has."

1. Quoted in Noman, M. - Muslim India - Page - 192.

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While the Indian public feelings were excited over the Government of India Act 1919 and the Rowlatt Act new events engaged their attention. The Khilafat of Turkey was in jeopardy. The Ottoman empire already "a sick man" of Europe was now threatened with complete annihilation.

Though Mr. Wilson and Mr. Lloyd George, the President of America and the Prime Minister of Britain respectively, had promised to maintain the integrity and safety of Turkey, after the war, however, every step was being taken in the opposite direction. European powers secretly proposed the partition of Turkey, amongst themselves. The Indian Mussalmans took the matter very seriously. Forgetting everything of their problems within the country they rushed to secure the safety of the Khilafat - the age long religio-temporal institution of Islam. Thus the Khilafat movement was started in India. The main objective of the movement was two fold: "to preserve the Khilafat and to maintain the integrity of the Turkish empire".

The Khilafatists in the beginning restricted their activities to petitioning the British Government for the preservation of the Khilafat. A memorial on behalf of the Indian Muslims regarding the dismemberment of Turkey and the Khilafat was sent to His Excellency the Viceroy on January 1, 1919². And again a second one was sent on December 12, 1919 with apparently little result. The dictating terms of the treaty of Sevres infuriated the Indian Mussalmans. The release of the Ali Brothers towards the end of December 1919 after a four years internment gave a great incentive to the Khilafat movement, which now ceased merely to send humble petitions.

1. Ambedkar, B.R. - Thoughts on Pakistan - Page - 142.
2. MITRA - INDIAN ANNUAL REGISTER. 1920, VOL I

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In 1920 the Mussalmans organised the Khilafat Committee. Within a very short time the Khilafat Committee became so powerful an organisation that the All India Muslim League faded almost into insignificance. The Khilafat Committee became the only representative organisation of the Mussalmans. Islam and its age - long institutions rather than domestic problems engaged their attention most. The entire energy of the Mussalmans was engaged for an external cause. The whole country was agitating against the threatened extinction of the Khilafat.

The coming of the Khilafat movement into prominence at the expense of the AIML represented the Indian Mussalmans' psychology of holding the problems of non-Indian Islam dearer to that of their own domestic problems, - a state of mind which operated until the demand for Pakistan was voiced by them.

¹The All India Khilafat Conference met in Bombay on February 20, 1920. Besides issuing a manifesto for the Preservation of Khilafat with Khalifa's Control over the Holy places of Islam, the Conference decided upon a delegation being sent to England and France to represent the Indian Muslim sentiments over the question of Khilafat and to persuade the victors to keep the Turkish Khilafat uninjured.

²Accordingly the Indian Khilafat delegation consisting of Moulana Mohammad Ali (President) Mr. Syed Hussain, Moulana Syed Sulaiman Nadvi and Mr. Hasan Mohammad Hayat (Secretary) left India in February for England. The delegation ² was received by Mr. Fisher, the British Minister on the 2nd March 1920.

1. Mitra- Indian Annual Register 1920 Vol. I.

2. Mitra - Indian Annual Register 1920 Vol. I.

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The deputation met the British Prime Minister, addressed the Parliament and held successful public meetings in England and France. The point of view of the Indian Mussalmans over the Khilafat question was aptly clarified by Moulana Mohammad Ali while in Europe. Speaking in Paris on March 21, 1920, he said:-

"A vast majority of the Muslims of the world recognise the Sultan of Turkey to be the Commander of the Faithful, and the successor, and Khalifa of their Prophet. It is an essential part of this doctrine that the Khalifa, the Commander of the Faithful, should have adequate territories, adequate military and naval resources, adequate financial resources. But for what purpose? Not for aggression, nor even for the defence of Turkey but for the defence of our faith. He is to stand before the world as the leader of the Muslims in this cause and whenever the liberty of conscience of the Muslims in any part of the world is placed in jeopardy, he would at least be able to say the aggressor, "you shall not do that with impunity".

Moulana Mohammad Ali pleaded his case eloquently but the delegation achieved nothing.

While the Indian Muslims were indignant against the British Government against the question of the Khilafat the Indian nationalists under Mr. Gandhi were up against them on domestic issues - Jalinwallabag incident and Rowlatt Act. Gandhi who had come from South Africa a short while ago sought to exploit the situation to develop a Joint Front against the British Government in India. The initiative which was taken

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by Jinnah in 1916 now passed into Gandhi, and through him to INC. Gandhi attended the First Khilafat Conference held at Delhi on the 23rd November 1919 and suggested the Khilafatists to adopt non-violent-non-co-operation as a method of forcing the British Govt. to redress the Khilafat wrong. Gandhi again attended the Calcutta session of the All India Khilafat Committee held on the 10th March 1920, during Mohammad Ali's absence in Europe. His programme of non-violent-non-co-operation was adopted as the only effective measure against the British Govt. Gandhi was interested in the Khilafat movement more probably as a Platform, than for the cause itself. The new technique that Gandhi had brought to use against the British Govt. was unknown and hitherto untried. Mohammad Ali's presence in India then would have possibly made it difficult, if not impossible for the Mussalmans to adopt it. Writing¹ about the adoption of Gandhi's programme at the Khilafat Conference Jawharlal Nehru said :-

"Mohammad Ali was in Europe then on a Khilafat deputation, on his return he also expressed regret at the method of boycott adopted, he would have preferred the Sin Fien way. But it was immaterial what other individuals thought in the matter, as ultimately Gandhiji's view was bound to prevail. He was the author of the movement and it was felt that he must be given freedom as to the details".²

By the time the Khilafat delegation returned from Europe Gandhiji had taken the leadership of the movement and the Mussalmans were further committed to his programme.

1. Ambedkar, B.R. - Thoughts on Pakistan - Page - 145

2. Nehru, J. - An Autobiography - Page - 99.

The next meeting of the Khilafat Committee was held at Allahabad on the 1st and 2nd of June, 1920. The meeting was attended by also a large number of Hindu Khilafat delegates under the influence of Mr. Gandhi. The meeting confirmed its Calcutta decision to implement the successive stages of the non-violent-non-co-operation programme which ^{was} as follows:-

1. "Firstly, to renounce all honorary posts, titles and memberships of Legislative Councils.

"Secondly to give up all remuneratory posts under Govt. service.

"Thirdly to give up all appointments in the Police and Military forces.

"Fourthly to refuse to pay taxes to Government".

2. The Allahabad Conference also authorised a Sub-Committee consisting of Mr. Gandhi, Moulana Abul Kalam Azad, Moulana Mohammad Ali, Moulana Shaukat Ali, Ahmed Haji Siddiq Khatri, Dr. Kitchlew and Moulana Hasrat Mohani, with powers to add to their number to give practical shape to the movement without further delay.

By the time Mohammad Ali returned with the delegation in June the non-violent-non-co-operation movement was about to be launched. On June 30, the Committee decided to start the movement after serving one month's notice to the Viceroy. The notice was served on the 1st August 1920 and the non-co-operation started on August 31, 1920.³

1. Besant, Annie - India Bond or Free ? - Page - 190.
2. Indian Annual Register 1920 Vol. I
3. Ibid.

The Khilafat Committee decision of June 30, to launch the non-violent-non-co-operation movement after proper notice to the Viceroy was very popular and was universally acclaimed. It had the support of the Indian Mussalmans and it also enlisted the support of the Indian National Congress and leading section of the Hindus. The League as an organisation had not yet said much on the issue so far, though the leading personalities of the Khilafat Committee and of the AIML were mostly the same. Mr. Jinnah was a notable exception.¹ He did not subscribe to the extra-territorial concern of the Indian Muslims, neither he liked the method of non-co-operation adopted by the Khilafatists, as he made it clear in the special session of the AINC held in ^{Nagpur} Calcutta on ~~the 16th and 17th~~ September 1920.

Nonetheless the issue of the Khilafat was taken up by the AIML. Moulana Shaukat Ali was instrumental in the League's endorsing the Indian Muslim demand on the issue.

Instead of going in straight for the non-violent-non-co-operation as adopted by the Khilafat Committee, The League took a milder course in the beginning.² The Council of the AIML at its meeting on July 18, held at Lucknow resolved to hold a special session at Calcutta on the 16th and 17th September & ^{and} in the meanwhile sent a cable to the Prime Minister and the Secretary of State for India condemning the vindictive and unjust terms of the Viceroy's proposed to be imposed on the Turkish Khalifa which they characterised as flagrant violation of the solemn promise given to the Indian Mussalmans in the beginning of the war.² The cable that was sent vehemently emphasised the reaction of the Indian Mussalmans to treaty terms proposed for Turkey. It said :-

1. Saigid, M.H - *Mohammad Ali Jinnah - A political study*. Page - 167

2. Mitra - *INDIAN ANNUAL REGISTER 1920. Vol II.*

¹The Council of the All India Muslim League indignently protests against peace terms offered to Turkey as in its deliberate opinion they are not only grossly unjust and intolerable in themselves and more vindictive than those imposed upon any other state lately warring with Allies but involved violation of solemn pledges of British Government, particularly those made at the beginning of war regarding holy places of Islam and later on regarding Thrace and Asia Minor and calculated to undermine Khilafat and destroy temporal power and prestige essential to it in flagrant disregard of repeated remonstrances based on requirements of religious faith and sentiments of millions of Muslim British subjects who have loyally carried out their duties to the empire during the war.

The Council solemnly declares its conviction that if the said terms are persisted in they will tend to perpetuate bitter feelings of animosity within British empire in as much as Muslims of India cannot and will not rest till they have secured the integrity of the Khilafat and sanctity of the Jaziratul Arab and their holy places in accordance with the demands of their faith regarding which they must prefer their own convictions to the contrary inferences drawn by some from Muslim history and to the opinion attributed to the late Sir Sayed Ahmed whose heterodoxy on religion is well known in the Muslim world and the Council considers it a solemn duty to warn Government that religious zeal for the security of the said pious object is likely to drive large bodies of Muslims to desperate actions resulting in the most serious consequences deplorable no less

1. Mitra - Indian Annual Register 1920 Vol. II.

to the Government than to themselves but still in the power of British Cabinet to avoid.¹

The League's cable like the representations and threats of the Khilafatists produced little effect on the Government. The resolutions of launching N.V.N.C. movement was carried into effect and the movement started on August 31 as already scheduled.

India started a new experiment that was conceived by Mr. Gandhi and inaugurated by the Khilafatists. Before however, the movement had actually started Gandhi decided to give it a colour of united Indian movement. Khilafat as such was not likely to be very popular with the non-Muslims and so ¹ the Indian National Congress Committee meeting held on May 30th and 31st at Benaras had added the 'Indian' cause of the Jalinwallabagh tragedy and the deficiencies of the Reforms act, to the grievances of the Muslims over the question ² the Khilafat. Gandhi explained his enthusiasm for the Khilafat cause in his Young India (on 20.10.21), when he said :-

² "I claim, that with us both the Khilafat is the central fact, with Moulana Mohammad Ali because it is his religion, with me because, in laying down my life for the Khilafat, I ensure safety of the cow, that is my religion, from the Musalman knife".³

The launching of the N.V.N.C. movement had a tremendous effect on the country and the Govt. Clerks and employees left

¹ Mrs. Besant - The future of Indian Politics, quoted by Ambedkar - "Thoughts on Pakistan" - Page - 145.

² Quoted in Thoughts on Pakistan by Ambedkar - Page - 146.

their work, lawyers and litigants boycotted Courts, students and teachers stayed away from Schools and Colleges. Quite a number of people surrendered their titles. Gandhi and the Ali Brothers were moving throughout the country urging people to make the movement a success and to paralyse the Govt.

¹ While the movement was already in progress the Congress and the Muslim League met simultaneously in special sessions at Calcutta on the 16th and 17th September 1920. They both endorsed their support for the Khilafatists.

² In approving the Non-violent-non-Co-operation movement inaugurated by Mr. Gandhi the Congress resolved that there was no course left open until the wrongs done by the Govt. were righted and the "Swarajya is established". They were of course basing, their remarks on the Khilafat cause and the Punjab tragedy.

The demand for Swrajya which was merely voiced in the Congress resolutions of September, 1920, became an article of the ¹AIML three months later. ²The annual session of the AIML held at Nagpur on December 30, adopted the change in the creed. ³The Muslims had become violently anti-British. Though Hasrat Mohani's resolution for adopting violent measures against the Government was not accepted by the session, the change in the creed and the utterances of the delegates were sufficiently indicative of the Muslim mind of the time. Dr. M.A. Ansari, the President of the session, in a long and impressive speech justified the action of

1. Indian Annual Register by Mitra Vol. II. 1920.

2. Ambedkar, B.R. - Thoughts on Pakistan - Page - 145.

3. Indian Annual Register by Mitra 1920 vol II

the Muslims in adopting the course of non-violent-non-co-operation in the light of existing circumstances. ²The Presidential address of Dr. Ansari was however, prescribed at Delhi. Moulana Mohammad Ali who was one of the guiding spirit of the movement already in Progress, was responsible for the adoption of the new creed of the League which was as follows :-

¹"The object of the All India Muslim League shall be :

The attainment of Swarjya by the people of India by all peaceful and legitimate means.

To Protect and advance the political, religious and other rights and interests of the Indian Mussalmans.

To promote the friendship and union between the Mussalmans and other communities of India.

To maintain and strengthen the brotherly relations between the Mohammedans of India and those of other countries".

This new creed for the attainment of Swarajya was a violent departure from the creed of the founders of the League which was to convince the British Government of the Muslim loyalty.

³"Throughout 1921 India was seething with exuberant fervour". But the anti-British feeling was stronger amongst the Mussalmans than amongst the rest of the Indian population.

The movement once launched began to gather momentum. Association with the Govt. in any matter was looked upon with dis-

1. Choudhury, B.M. - Muslim Politics in India - Page - 24

2. Mitra - Indian Annual Register Vol. II, 1920.

3. Smith, W.C. Modern Islam in India - Page - 232.

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favour. The Aligarh University which was being maintained mainly by the Government became an object of attack. Mr. Gandhi along with the Ali Brothers asked the University to sever connections with the Govt. and to give up the Govt. grant, but Dr. Ziauddin withstood the onslaught. The young students of the University who were more infected with anti-British feeling left the University in large number and joined the new Muslim institution - Jamia Millia Islamia, started by Moulana Mohammad Ali.

Over the issue of the Khilafat the Muslim masses were also roused. In fanning the religious fervour of the Muslim masses the Ulema played a leading role. They declared that ¹ "it was in every way religiously unlawful for a Mussalman at the present moment to continue in British army or to enter the army or to induce others to join the army". It was further stated that it was the duty of all Mussalmans and especially of the Ulema to see that ² "these religious commandments are brought home to every Mussalman in the army". This Fatwa of the Ulemas was later passed in the form of a resolution at the session of the All India Khilafat Conference held in Karachi on the 8th July 1921 under the Presidentship of Moulana Mohammad Ali.

The Govt. were quick to act. The Ali Brothers and their ³ five associates were soon put behind the bars, prosecuted and jailed for two years. The trial and imprisonment of the Ali Brothers caused a sensation all over the country. The Congress leaders approved the Ulema resolutions and 46 of them confirmed their approval of the same by their signature to the resolu-

1. Extract from the resolution passed at the session of the All India Khilafat Committee held in Karachi on 8.7.21 under the Presidentship of Moulana Mohammad Ali.

2. Ibid.

3. The persons involved were the Ali Brothers, Dr. Kitchlew, Sri Sankaracharya of Sarada Peeth, Moulana Nisar Ahmed, Pir Ghulam Mojadid and Moulavi Husain Ahmed. Ref. Silaranyya.P - History of the Congress - page - 217.

tion. The Fatwa was repeated from a thousand Platform but no further arrest was made by the Govt. ¹

The apparent coolness and unbecoming attitude of the Government exasperated the non-Co-operationalists. Hopes of an easy success began to dwindle. Gandhi was in fact contemplating to start a civil Disobedience movement to bring the agitation to a success. The ~~the~~ absence of an easy success to make the British Govt. undo the wrongs brought frustration in the minds of those who were impatient. The issues got confused and the Ulema under the inspiration of Moulana Abul Kalam Azad came out with a declaration that India was a "DARUL HARB"¹. Migration to Afghanistan was suggested and it was also given out that the Afghan Amir would soon invade India to rescue the Indian Mussalmans. Apparently the question of the preservation of the Turkish Khilafat had no bearing in the latest Fatwa. At least it was the product of confused thinking.

Misguided by the Fatwa about 18000 Mussalmans mainly from Sind and North West Frontier Province sold their Indian Possessions and took the road to Kabul. ~~The~~ The Amir of Afghanistan, however, refused their entrance into his country. The Muhajerin (emigrants) who reached Afghanistan were also expelled. ²"As a result, the tide of emigration ebbed slowly and fell back to its former home, but the road from Peshwar to Kabul was strewn with graves of old men, women and children, who had succumbed to the hardships of the journey".

1. Alberuni, A. H - *History of India and Her Neighbouring Countries* - p. 159.

2. Cumming, Sir John - *Political India* - Page - 96.

That the Khilafatists in general lost the sight of the main issue of their struggle became all the more clear in Malabar, when the Moplas rose in open rebellion on August 20, 1921. The poor, sturdy and independent minded Moplas, who were the descendants from the Arab stock is supremely religious. Instead of standing up for the Turkish Khalifa they declared a Khilafat Raj for themselves. The Moplas were an agriculturist community ruled over by Hindu middlemen and officials. The upsurge of the peasantry was thus a menace to both the Hindu middle class and the British Government. The lawless Moplah mob, in course of their struggle killed a number of Hindus and converted some, on charge of collaboration with the Government. The Government, however, put down the revolt with an iron hand. An instance of the Government severity was the notorious Moplah ¹train tragedy in which 100 Prisoners were put in a closed and airtight goods van and sent by railway. When the van was re-opened 66 of them were already dead of suffocation and the rest were at the point of death. It was indeed a twentieth century "Black Hole" - a real one.

The Moplah revolt was as much an instance of untoward development never conceived by the leaders as it was the sign of a big crack that was soon to develop in an unbridgeable gap between the two communities ^{with} ~~of~~ unequal economic and social development.

1. Mitra - Indian Annual Register, 1921, Vol. II.

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The Moplah rising created a sensation amongst the Hindu Mahashabhtes and other Hindu communalists but it went uncondemned by the Muslim leaders and Gandhi eager to keep the United Front had no strong words either. He praised the Moplahs as the "brave God-fearing Moplas who were fighting for what they consider as religion and in a manner which they consider as religious".¹ Writing in young India he had already given his explanation of the Mussalman impatience.

"In their impatient anger, the Mussalmans ask for more energetic and more prompt action by the Congress and Khilafat organisations. To the Mussalmans, Swaraj means, India's ability to deal effectively with the Khilafat question It is impossible not to sympathise with this attitude. I would gladly recommend immediate action if I could think of any effective course".²

But though Mr. Gandhi was satisfied with nonviolent-non-co-operation as the only means of redressing the Khilafat wrongs and achieving the Swaraj the whole country was urging for more positive programme. In 1921 all the three leading organisations, Congress, League and the Khilafat Committee, which held their sessions at Ahmedabad in December, had before them a resolution to adopt programme for independence - a step forward from mere attainment of Swaraj. The resolution fell through in all the cases, Gandhi unwilling to go fast opposed the motion by Moulana Hasrat Mohani³ in the Con-

1. Ambedkar, B.R. - Thoughts on Pakistan - page - 153

2. Quoted in Ambedkar's Thought on Pakistan - Page -149-150.

3. Ambedkar B.R. - Thoughts on Pakistan - Page - 276.

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gress session. Despite the enthusiasm of the younger section Gandhi, aided by the conservatives was successful in the final rejection of the resolution. ¹"So impassioned was his (Moulana Hasrat Mohani's) eloquence "said Subhas Chandra Bose; and so responsive was the audience that one felt as if the resolution would be carried by a large majority". But Gandhi would not allow the Congress to go "into depths unfathomable".

In the League session also the independence resolution was hotly discussed. Honourable Raja Ali and other old guards stood against the resolution and compelled Moulana Hasrat Mohani, the President of the session to disallow an open vote on the issue. Moulana Mohani, however, was strongly in favour of the resolution personally and ²got gaoled for his impassionate Presidential speech. The resolution faced the same fate in the Khilafat Committee session also. The net result : Gandhi triumphed. He would not go beyond non-violent-non-co-operation for the attainment of the "Swaraj", as he understood it.

The mass movement that Gandhi had started soon went beyond his control. There was excitement. People were not yet in a mood of working for his "constructive Programme". The excited mob soon lost the fine line of distinction between non-violent-non-co-operation and anti Government rising. Philosophy of Gandhi's movement was too subtle for his followers to comprehend. Indisciplined and excited mob could always go to excess and it did. There was an accident at Chaurichaura in

1. Bose, S.C. - The Indian struggle - Page - 84.

2. Ghoudhury, B.M. - Muslim Politics in India - Page - 25.

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the United Provinces though Gandhi had not foreseen it. On February 4, 1922, twenty one Policemen and a rural watchman were mobbed and a Police station was set on fire!

This incident convinced Gandhi of the impracticability of his 'Constructive Programme'. He cried a halt. The entire movement was called off. With it the Khilafat movement came to an end.

The end was too sudden and none was prepared for such an abrupt ending. Hopes had gone high which now ~~were~~ almost dashed to the ground. It infuriated people—Old and young, both of the Congress and the Khilafat Committee. But here too they proved ineffective against one man, Gandhi. Jawharlal Nehru aptly gives the reaction :-

"The sudden suspension of our movement after the Chauri-chaura incident was resented, I think, by almost all the prominent Congress leaders - other than Gandhi of course. My father (who was in gaol at that time) was much upset by it. The younger people were naturally even more agitated. Our mounting hopes tumbled to the ground and this mental reaction was to be expected. What troubled us even more were the reasons given for this suspension and the consequences that seemed to follow from them".

Continuing Jawharlal writes on the same account : "Chauri-chaura may have been and was a deplorable occurrence and wholly opposed to the spirit of the non-violent movement; but were a remote village and a mob of excited peasants in an out-of-the-way

1. Williams, L.F.R.— India in 1922-23 — Page — 269

2. Nehru, Jaharlal — An Autobiography — page — 32.

3. *Ibid*

~~21~~

place going to put an end, for some time at least, to our national struggle for freedom? If this was the inevitable consequence of a sporadic act of violence, then surely there was something lacking in the Philosophy and technique of a non-violent struggle for freedom. For it seemed to us to be impossible to guarantee against the occurrence of some such untoward incident¹.

The last chance for the Khilafatists to revive their movement was lost when Mustafa Kamal took whatever wind they had in their sail out by first replacing the Khalifa in 1922 without any temporal power and then by the abolition of the Khilafat itself in October 1924. The Indian Mussalmans protested against the abolition of the Khilafat but Mustafa Kamal did not pay any heed to it. H.H. the Agha Khan and Syed Ameer Ali published a letter protesting the abolition of the Khilafat but Kamal alleged that ¹⁴these persons were the henchmen of the British, "and they have no right to speak for Islam.

The Khilafat was a lost cause and the movement ended in failure. The Pan-Islamism had become almost an article of faith with the Indian Muslim Khilafatists since 1912. They had been completely oblivious of their own problems. They had given up jobs and Schools to save the Khalifa and his territory but the Khilafat ended not because of the British Government, but because of the revolutionary changes in the Khalifa's own country. In the bargain the Indian Muslims paid very dearly. The progress they had been making in the field of education and jobs received a rude shock from which they took a long time to revive. Psychologically they were a crest-fallen people.

1. Action, undertaken in 4 columns, p. 12-13
 2. Noman, M - Muslim India - Page - 215.

C H A P T E R - V

" The Parting of the Ways "

(1922-28)

The death of the Khilafat movement restored the All India Muslim League to life. So long as the Khilafatists held the imagination of the people, the Muslim League met only to endorse what the Khilafatists decided and the Congress dittoed. The League had gone so much into the background that on occasions its meetings did not have the proper quorum of attendance. The League had lost its independent existence. The political ideals of the League became almost identical "with those of the Congress so much so that many people began to look upon the Congress and the League as the two sides of the same coin".¹ The League had no independent sessions between 1917 and 1922. It met simultaneously with the Khilafat Committee and the Congress. Even the newly started Jamiat ul Ulama, an organisation of the Muslim devines² with Moulana Mahmoodul Hossain~~in~~ as its head, rose into greater prominence than the League did.

With the breakdown of the Khilafat movement again the camp of the Muslims was broken up. The leading Muslim personalities lost the cohesive bond that kept them together during the eventful days that preceeded. The failure of the movement got them frustrated and they broke up each according to his inclinations. ³Azad "chose the All India National Congress",² this time no longer a Pan-Islamist but a pure nationalist. Though Mohammad Ali ³"stuck to the effete Khilafat Committee

1. Karim, Rezaul - For India and Islam - Page - 107
2. Alberuni, A.H. - Makers of Pakistan - Page - 142
3. Ibid - Page - 142.

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Committee^r and also presided over the Coconada session (1923) of the Indian National Congress, he was already shifting his emphasis on the Muslim League. Mahmoodul Hasan and many other Ulemas like him stuck to the Jamiat - in preference to the League and ^{were} politically more inclined to the Congress.

These shifting of the emphasis were significant as the politics in India had started back to the position before the annulment of the Bengal Partition. Communalism again raised its head, this time in a violent manner.

Gandhi by joining and in fact by leading the Khilafat movement had sought to build an United Front. But the disintegration of the Khilafatists had violently shaken that Unity. And what was more each group - Muslim Pan-Islamists and Hindu Nationalists - frustrated as they were, sought to lay blame on each other for the failure.

The Muslims felt the heaviest brunt of the Khilafat movement and all for nothing. A section of them blamed the method of non-violent-non-co-operation. Others resented the sudden recall of the movement by Gandhi. The latter smelled rat in Gandhi's motive and so in Hindu motive. They had experienced with Hindu leadership and failed. The natural reaction was the bitterness against the Hindus - born out of frustration. Among the Hindu Nationalists again a section grew who became bitter against the Muslims. Sufficient cause was already there in the incidents during the Moplah rising, which would have been possibly forgotten had the Khilafat movement - a struggle against the British Government - had succeeded. The failure, however, brought the incidents

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in magnified proportions back to their memory. The stage was thus set for communal enmity to break out in open violence.

Each suspicions of the other the Hindu and Muslim interests came to a clash over the future administrative set up of North West Frontier Province. "In the Punjab the standpoint of one vehemently conflicted with that of the other! The old cause i.e. the rivalry about jobs and services was already there to develop into new and magnified dimensions in the climate of mutual suspicions.

Communal riot actually broke out in 1922 a few months after the non-violent-non-co-operation movement was called off. ~~The mass~~ Breaking out of communal riot was as much a failure of Gandhi's attempt to forge out a communal harmony as was a manifestation of the utter impracticabilities of the scheme of non-violent-non-Co-operation movement. What is significant the failures were due to reasons beyond control of individual leaders including Gandhi himself. Country was not prepared for either of them. The mass lacked the training in non-violent-non-co-operation and there were too many causes of communal enmity. The leaders, however, came out to pacify their followers and to preserve the communal peace. There were individual efforts as much as organisational attempts to restore peace and harmony,

The League took the lead. It met at Lucknow on March 31, 1923 with Mr. Bhurgri on the chair. Its deliberations after

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several years were concerned with Indian Problems. After condemning the Lyod George's Government for their alleged antipathy towards the Indian Mussalmans - the League deliberated upon the deterioration of the communal relations in India and as a way out of it suggested the conclusion of an Indian National Pact with the co-Operation of all other important political organisation in India such as the Indian National Congress, the Khilafat Committee, the Shiromoni Gurdwara Prabandhak Committee, the Jamiat ul-Ulama, the Hindu Mahashabha etc.¹ The League formed its own Committee to go into the matter and wished other organisations to form similar committees which jointly were to discuss and conclude the Pact on the basis of the following terms :-²

(a) "Safeguarding the rights of different Communities especially of the minorities by fixing up proportion of representation of the various communities in all the Councils, Municipal bodies, Local Boards, Panchayets, Universities and the services, the small minorities to get representation in excess of their population, these to be given from Hindu and Muslim members.

(b) "Perfect freedom in religious ~~affairs~~ observance of various sects inhabiting India. Complete respect for all religious and religious observances and susceptibilities of various sects by other sects. This freedom would include the right of preaching and spreading the various religions, provided no force, intimidation, coercion, or any other unfair means are adopted.

1. Mitra - Indian Annual Register Vol. I - Page 935-936.
1923.

2. Mitra - Indian Annual Register Vol. I -page 936
1923.

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(c) Settlement of questions leading to differences and conflict e.g., Cow preservation, Dusshera, Muharram, Rath-jatra procession, Sikh Diwans music before mosques and shrines and the recognition of Hindusthani (Urdu or Hindi) as the official language of India with Persian and Deva - Nagri scripts. Arbitration Boards to be appointed in each provinces and each district to prevent communal friction and to arbitrate in case of dispute".

¹ The sentiments of the League were reciprocated by the Congress when it met six months later in Delhi! It too formed a Committee to prepare ~~and~~ draft for National Pact. The drafts was prepared and submitted to the All India Congress Committee for adoption by the Coconada session of the Congress. ~~draft was significant~~ ² The Congress draft was significantly silent about the communal representation in regard to power and offices², while the League had made it their ~~first~~ first point. It seems that the Congress did not go into the cause of Communal problems. Mr. C.R.Das, the prominent Bengal representative to the Indian National Congress put up a draft of the Bengal Pact for adoption by the Congress. The Bengal Pact of Mr. Das sought to eliminate the cause of friction.³ It provided for 50% Government jobs to the Muslims and 60 to 40 percent representation of the majority and minority communities on all local bodies. But the Hindus of almost every political shade of opinion opposed the Bengal Pact and the draft was thrown out of the Congress session.

1. Ambedkar, E.R. - Thoughts on Pakistan - Page 306
2. Williams, R. - India in 1923-'24. Page - 260
3. Ibid - Page - 260.

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Meanwhile a section of the Hindus started the Suddhi movement for reconverting the Muslims to Hinduism. ~~Rajput~~ Rajputana was their main centre¹. Further the Hindu Mahashabha which was reorganised in 1923 ~~became~~ its support to the Suddhi movement as well as to the Sanghathanists, who sought to revive the Hindu militant spirit. Besides the activities of the above organisations there were a few leading individuals who actively supported those programmes, Swami ~~Sri~~ Suddhananda was one of them.

The activities of these Hindu organisations and individuals reacted on the Muslims who sought to counteract them if not also to retaliate.² Quite a large number of Muslims under the leadership of Dr. Saifuddin Kitchlew organised the Tanzeem and Tabligh movements, exactly with the similar purpose - namely to revive militant spirit among the Muslims and to preach Islam.

The cry for establishment of Communal peace which was raised by the AIML and echoed by the Indian National Congress was sure to drown itself into the wilderness in such explosive and tense state of communal jealousies. Violence instead of abating began to mount in number of incidents and magnitude of their horror and ruthlessness. The year 1923 was one of Hindus and Muslims ^{calling} ~~calling~~ each others throat.³ Amritsar, Multan, Moradabad, Meerat, Allahabad,

1. Ibid - Page - 258.

2. India in 1924-25 Page 302

3. Ibid - Page 301.

Ajmer, Jubbulpur, Panipat, Agra, Rai Barily were scenes of bloody riots and that at Shahrampur exceeded them all in brutalities. The picture was equally gloomy in the following year when the riots broke out in new areas, towns, and cities. Riots had spread to Bengal and Bihar, the U.P. and the Punjab maintaining its earlier record. ⁴The outbreak at Kohat was the most terrible. The immediate cause of the outbreak of riot at Kohat was the publication of a pamphlet by Sanatan Dharma Shabha which had the attack on Islam as its main theme. ¹The chain of reaction followed in various parts of the country, Calcutta and Allahabad figuring prominent among them.

But the League did not lose heart. It initiated another attempt for achieving the Hindu Muslim Unity. Jinnah declared that the Hindu-Muslim settlement was the pre-requisite for the success of any sort of constitutional movement in the country. The Council of the League at its meeting held in March, 1924 decided to hold the session of the League at Lahore in May with Mr. Jinnah in the chair. ²The session was to emphasise on the achievement of Hindu-Muslim unity on the pattern of Lucknow Pact, and also to obtain proportional representation for the Muslims in the country's local bodies, legislatures and in the services. ²Accordingly the session of the League was held in May. ³Mr. Jinnah in his Presidential address analysed the failure of the boycott movements, but he urged to take the good out of the past mistakes. ³He emphasised the need

1. Ibid - Page - 321

2. Alberuni, A.H. - Makers of Pakistan page - 201.

3. Mitra - Indian Quarterly Register 1924, Vol. I.

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for Swaraj but to him "Swraj is almost interchangeable term with Hindu-Muslim unity". Elaborating his theme he said "If we wish to be free people, let us unite, but if we wish to continue slaves of Bureaucracy, let us fight amongst ourselves and gratify petty vanity over petty matters. Englishmen being our arbiters."

The League under the inspiring leadership of Mr. Jinnah, repeatedly cried for Hindu-Muslim unity, while the picture in the country continued to be dark and grim. That some positive action for the Hindu-Muslim settlement was needed began to be felt by all shades of public opinion, but what that step should be was still undecided. At last Mr. Gandhi came forward with his new technique - fasting - to stop the riots. His fast commenced on September 18, and within eight days on September 26, 1924, leaders from almost all political shades of opinion and organisations attended a conference at Delhi, with a view to find out ways and means for Hindu-Muslim unity.² The conference was a representative one. And there^{were} expressions of fine sentiments, but nothing tangible came out of the deliberations. As the Congress session of Coconada failed to face facts this Conference also shelved the problems. No satisfactory decision about communal representations in public bodies and services was taken. Naturally the corollaries⁽³⁾ relating to music before mosque and Cow slaughter also baffled solution.

The Delhi Conference of September 1924 was soon followed by an⁴ All Parties Leaders' Conference at Bombay³ under the aus-

1. Ibid.

2. Indian in 1924-25 - Page - 321

3. India in 1924-25 - Page - 327.

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pieces of the Indian National Congress. This Congress sponsored unity Conference which met on November 21st. had apparently failed to appreciate the importance of the solution of the Communal questions and placed greater emphasis on the scheme for Swaraj. The Conference could not agree on communal representations, an agreement upon which was the persistent demand of the League as a preliminary for constitutional advancement of the country. Failing to achieve any positive result the Conference ended after forming a sub-committee with representatives from almost all political organisations.¹ The sub-Committee was to draw up a scheme of Swaraj including the solution of the communal question and submit the same by March 31, 1925 for consideration by the next All Parties Conference.¹

The two Conferences which met in quick succession at Delhi and Bombay, therefore, ended in failure. They could not find out any solution for the communal tension. The result of this failure was disastrous. It confirmed the suspicion of the minority about the motives of the majority community.

The apparent unity among the leaders of various political organisations - both Hindu and Muslims was already showing signs of cracks. The All India Khilafat Committee was the first to point out this crack. While meeting simultaneously with the Congress at Belgaon in 1924 Dr. Kitchlew one of the Khilafatist leaders openly² applauded the stand taken by the Muslims in respect of their communal rights and condemned the Hindu agitation in the Punjab.²

1. Ibid - Page - 327.

2. India in 1924-25 - Page - 329.

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The hands of the League were thus strengthened by the support of the Khilafat Committee. The League had proposed practical solution of Communal Problem as early as March, 1923 but no tangible steps were taken by others to strengthen the League demands within two years which saw terrible outbreaks of communal riots in the country.

¹The annual session of the AIML that met in Bombay on December 30, 1924 with Mr. Raja Ali in the Chair expressed support for the Khilafatists' views.¹ It felt the need for the unity of the Mussalmans and proposed a Conference of various Muslim organisations at an early date. In moving the resolution for a unity Conference of the Muslims Mr. Jinnah made it clear that ²the object of such unity was not to quarrel with the Hindu Community but with a view to unite and co-operate with them for the good of the motherland.²

The deliberations of the League had an undertone of desperation at the existing state of affairs. The Presidential address of Mr. Raja Ali clearly summarised the development in the country since the calling off of the 'Non-co-operation movement'.³ "The collapse of the non-co-operation movement" observed Mr. Raja Ali, has been followed by circumstances which its promoters did not and could not foresee. Not only have communal disturbances brought to the surface the inner working of the minds of considerable sections of

1. Ibid - Page - 329 .

2. Ambedkar, B.R. - Thoughts on Pakistan, Page - 321

3. Indian Quarterly Register 1924 Vol. II.

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the population, but the leaders of public opinion divided into a number of Parties have been unable to secure unanimaty for a common programme to be put before the country".

But the League was possibly crying to save a sinking ship-ship of common platform for country's political advancement.

Crack soon developed into an everwidening gap in 1925. ¹Riots raged in ~~save~~ fury in Calcutta, Delhi, Bombay and in the U.P. The occasion for most of them was the Muslim ceremony of Bakr I'd - sacrifice of cows. Unlike in 1923 leaders spoke not so much for peace, but as for putting responsibility on the opposite camp - camp based on religious grouping. There were provocations in speeches and deeds from both sides and hopes for peace had vanished in the air. Leaders did not feel ashamed of admitting their inability of solving the communal problem. Mr. Gandhi, in a very significant speech delivered at Mirzapur in Calcutta on May 1, 1925 said :²

"I have admitted my incompetence. I have admitted that I have been found wanting as a physician prescribing a cure for this malady. I do not find that either Hindus or Mussalmans are ready to accept my cure and therefore I simply now-a-days confine myself to a passing mention of this problem and content myself by saying that some-day or other we Hindus and Mussalmans will have to come together if we want the deliverance of our country; and if it is to be our lot that before we can come together we must shed one another's blood, then I say, the sooner we do so the better it is for us. If we propose to break one another's head let us do so in a manly way; let us not, then, shed

1. India in 1925-26 page - 4.

2. India in 1925-26 - Page - 11-12.

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crocodile tears, let us not ask for sympathy from any quarter if you do not propose to give any quarter. That is what I have to say about Hindu-Muslim unity".

This frustration in the minds of the prominent leaders helped the cause of growing Hindu-Muslim tension all over India. The Hindu-Muslim unity apparently seemed to be a lost cause. By the end of 1925 both the members of the Khilafat Committee and of the All India Muslim League started criticising the Hindus for their attitude towards the Muslims. Sir Abdur Rahim in his presidential address to the Annual session of the All India Muslim League held at Aligarh on the 30th and 31st December ¹"deplored the attacks on the Muslim community in the form of Suddhi, Sangathan and Hindu Mahashabha movements and activities led by politicians like Lala Lajpat Rai and Swami Shradhananda"². The Muslim League was driven to this extreme by the individual utterances of Hindu leaders of a very provocative nature and that in a very tense atmosphere of Hindu-Muslim enmity. The president of the League took note of these utterances and declared :-

²"Some of the Hindu leaders had spoken publicly of driving out Muslims from India as Spaniards expelled Moors from Spain. Mussalmans would be too big a mouthful for their Hindu friends to swallow. Thanks to the artificial conditions under which they lived they had to admit that Hindus were in a position of great advantage and even the English had learned to dread their venomous propaganda. Hindus were

1. Ambedkar, B.R. - Thoughts on Pakistan - Page - 345

2. Ibid - Page - 345.

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equally adept in the art of belittling in every way possible the best Mussalmans in public positions excepting only those who had subscribed to the Hindu political creed. They had in fact by their provocative and aggressive conduct made it clearer than ever to the Muslims that the latter could not entrust their fate to Hindus and must adopt every possible measure of self defence". The Muslim League had been driven from its positive attitude of establishing Hindu-Muslim unity to the negative one of defending the very existence of Muslims in India. Gandhi's helplessness certainly influenced this radical change in the attitude of the Muslim League.

While leaders and organisations looked on helplessly the communal fury went on in all its savagery in 1926.² The flare-up was occasioned by the Muslim festival of Bakr-I'd and scenes of terrible riots were Calcutta, Delhi and Allahabad.¹ In fact, celebrations of Bakr I'd became a permanent source of anxiety for the communal riots used to flare up on that occasion centering round the question of cow-sacrifice by the Muslims. As a Muslim member of the Legislative Assembly,² said the same year "we cannot enjoy our homelife happily nor do our festivals bring any joy to us." "On the occasion of every festival "he had added " more misery and sorrow is caused in every house".² The gravity of the inter-communal riots became the chief concern of Lord Irwin's¹ Government. And the Vice-roy in an appeal made from Simla on July 17 urged "in the name of India's national life and "in the name of religion" for the establishment of communal peace and harmony.³

1. India in 1926 - 27 - Page - 7

2. Ibid - Page - 10

3. India in 1926-27 - Page - 7.

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But no heed was paid to the Vice-roy's appeal.

A fanatical Pathan murdered Swami Sradhananda on December 23, 1926 and much communal out-bursts were noticed in reaction. The Swami was hated by the Mussalmans as he was a champion of Sudhi movement and had in fact reconverted a number of Rajput Mussalmans back to Hinduism.

The Viceroy¹ repeated his appeal for communal harmony in an address to the Legislative Assembly on August 20, 1927:-

"I am not exaggerating," he said, "when I say that during the 17 months¹ that I have been in India, the whole landscape has been overshadowed by the lowering clouds of communal tension, which have repeatedly discharged their thunderbolts, spreading far throughout the land their devastating havoc". "In less than eighteen months", continued the Viceroy, "so far as the numbers are available, the toll taken by this bloody strife has been between 250 and 300 killed and over 2,500 injured". In the conclusion of his speech Lord Irwin suggested for a Conference of the Hindu-Muslim leaders which would help the easing of tension between the two communities.

The Viceroy's appeal² was followed by a meeting mainly of the members of the Legislative Assembly held in Simla. Mr. Jinnah was elected Chairman. The meeting failed to agree on the scope of discussion. The Muslim leaders insisted on the solution of basic political problems, while the Hindus were unwilling to go beyond social and religious grievances. The mistake was repeated and even when discussion was limited

1. India in 1927-28 - Page - 17.

2. Coatsman, J. - India in 1927-28, Page - 19.

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to "Cow-music" questions i.e. the question of cow-slaughter and music before mosque, these off shoots of the basic problems found no solution. The Legislators agreed virtually on nothing.

¹The attempt for Hindu Muslim unity was repeated by Srinivas Aiyanger at Calcutta on October 27, 1927.¹ Neither League nor Mahashabha were represented in the discussion which ended with a suggestion for the solution of "Cow-music" question and with an appeal and hope that no side would give cause of offence to the other.

All attempts at communal harmony founded on the question of basic political issues. The country was going through blood-baths, and inter-communal fights; but at the same time was drawing nearer when the Indians, Hindus and Muslims were to decide the course of action necessary for getting an additional instalment of self-Government which was provided in the 1919 Constitution.²

The Muslim League felt the urgent necessity of an agreement among the political parties in India in order to press for united demand on the British Govt. ⁶Mr. Jinnah firmly believed that the Hindu-Muslim unity was the pre-requisite for Swaraj.³ But the Hindu-Muslim unity, the League felt, could be achieved only after the suspicions of the minority had been allayed by an agreement on certain basic poli-

1. Ibid - page - 20.

2. The Govt. of India Act 1919 provided that after the expiry of a period of every ten years a Royal commission is to be appointed which should enquire and report the working of the system of Govt. and suggest for further improvement or restriction. Ref. Section 84A. Govt. of India Act 1919.

3. Presidential address of Mr. Jinnah in the League session of 1924 held at Lahore. Ref. Supra - 8

tical demands of the Muslim minority. The Hindu-Muslim riots, the League had correctly analysed, were due to those suspicions of one community on the motives of the other and not actually for the cow and music which were mere pretexts for flare up. According to the League the intercommunal harmony could be achieved if the political parties agreed to the basic demands of the Muslims. These demands were enunciated in the annual session of the All India Muslim League held at Lucknow on 31st March, 1923. They included safeguard for different minority communities and determination of their share of representation in Legislatures and other public bodies and in services. These were further elaborated next year into six basic principles of Swaraj four of which dealt with minority safeguards. The remaining two suggested such constitutional development in India as would be acceptable to Muslim political opinion represented by the All India Muslim League.

The two demands were :-

1. The existing Provinces of India shall all be united under a Federal form of Government. Each Province shall have full and complete Provincial autonomy, and the functions of the Central Govt. will be confined to matters of General and common concern.
2. Any territorial readjustment that might at any time become necessary shall not in any way effect the Muslims majority population in the Punjab, Bengal and North West Frontier Province.

These demands of the Muslim League regarding the constitutional safeguards of the Mussalmans and other minorities in India were reiterated in the Aligarh session of the League held in 1925. In this session the League adopted a new resolution urging the Govt. to give effect to the majority Report of the Frontier enquiry Committee of

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1922. This report proposed certain changes in the administrative and legal machinery including the application of the reformed constitution in the Province, the reorganisation of the judiciary and the introduction of the system of election to the local bodies. In those days North West Frontier Province and Baluchistan, the two overwhelming Muslim majority areas were the only regions where no political reforms had ever been introduced as in other parts in British India. Hence it became a vital question with the All India Muslim League to secure reforms for these regions. In March 1926, a member of the All India Muslim League, Moulavi Sayed Mortuza Saheb Bahadur brought a resolution in the Central Legislature that "This Assembly recommends to the Governor General in Council that he be pleased to extend to the North West Frontier Province the Provisions of the Government of India Act which relate to Legislative Councils and the appointment of ministers, etc., with protection to the minorities". The resolution was strongly opposed by Pandit Madan Mohan Malaviya, Dewan Bahadur Rangachariar and ~~the~~ other Hindu members of the Assembly. In the same session of the Legislature Mr. Jinnah moved another important resolution demanding the appointment of a Royal Commission to secure the stability of the Government and willing Co-Operation of the people. But the motion was lost.

The Proceedings of the Central Legislature (e.g. the opposition of the Hindu leaders towards Frontier Reforms) further deepened the Muslim suspicions about the Hindus which found expression in deterioration of the communal pro-

1. Coatman, J - India in 1925-26 - Page - 105.

2. Ibid - Page - 106.

blem in India.

In the 1926 session the League reiterated its decisions of the previous ⁴years, 1923, 1924 & 1925 and took a positive step for the implementation of its objectives. ⁴The League appointed a Committee consisting of Mr. Jinnah, Sir Abdur Rahim, Sir Mohammad Shafi, Moulvi Mohammad Yakub, Mr. M. Hussain, Sir Ali Imam, and Sir Abdul Qaiyum. ¹This Committee was to draft a scheme in consultation with its counterparts, if any, formed by other political parties and put up the same to the League for its consideration and eventual submission to the Royal Commission, a demand for which was voiced by Mr. Jinnah in the Central Legislature.

Meanwhile the All India Muslim League, in compliance with its resolution of 1924 had been trying to organise a Conference of the representatives of various Muslim organisations in India. ²On March 20th, 1927. A Muslim unity Conference met in Delhi under the auspices of the Muslim League. ²The Conference was presided over by Mr. Jinnah.

Mr. Jinnah was so keen on an early solution of the Communal problem as a step towards an agreed formula for India's political advancement that the Conference announced its decision to accept joint electorate under certain conditions. This was a heavy price for Hindu-Muslim unity on the part of Mr. Jinnah - a virtual negation and reversal of the oldest Muslim demand.

Among the conditions for the acceptance of joint electorate, the Conference proposed :-

1. Mitra - Indian Quarterly Register Vol. I.
2. India in 1926-27 - Page 17.

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- 2 (1) Separation of Sind as a province from Bombay Presidency.
- (2) Introduction of reforms in Baluchistan and North West Frontier Province, in the lines of those already in operation in other British Provinces.
- (3) Representation in Bengal and the Punjab Legislatures on the basis of population.
- (4) Muslim representation in Central Legislature shall be no less than one third. The first proposals meant safeguarding of Muslim interest without any harm, to any other community. ~~Apparently no one~~ 1

Apparently no one could reasonably have any objections against these three conditions. No concession was involved or asked for.

But in the proposal that the Conference put forward for reserving one third of the seats in Central Legislature, through Joint Electorate, the Conference was asking for concessions to Muslims. The Muslims were certainly asking for more than their percentage in India would entitle them.

The controversial points relating to services and inter communal socio-religious problems were also discussed in the Delhi Conference, but were deferred for further consideration subject to the acceptance of the main proposal by different political parties in India, both Muslims and Hindus. In order to silence the Muslim objections against the proposal, Mr. Jinnah, who was the man behind them, declared that these proposals were to be accepted or rejected in toto.

Three days after the Delhi Muslim Conference the Hindu members of the Central Legislature met in Delhi to consider the Muslim proposals. ² They agreed with the concessions offered by the Delhi proposals - namely institution of Joint electorate. They also agreed to proportional representation

1. Report of the All Parties Conference, published by the AICC, Allahabad, page - 18.
2. India in 1927-28 page - 18.

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in the Legislature. They did not, however, agree with the conditions imposed by the Delhi proposals. In fact they were not even prepared to consider and discuss the Muslim demands for reservation of one-third seats in the Central Legislature. The question of re-arrangement of Provinces, they ~~opened~~, should be left open for the present. ¹ Instead of solving the political questions of the Hindu-Muslim problem put forward by the Delhi proposals, these Hindu Legislators ~~went~~ ^{went} to suggest solutions of religious and social problems and ~~opened~~ that religious and quasi-religious rites should be safeguarded by specific provisions in the constitution.

² The All India Hindu Mahashabha which was coming into lime light since the outbreak of the Hindu-Muslim riots, met in April and dismissed the Delhi proposals outright as premature even for discussion.

³ The Indian National Congress, however, was more sympathetic towards the Delhi proposals. In the session of the All India Congress Committee held in May under the Presidency of Dr. Ansari the Delhi Proposals were approved subject to slight modifications which did not materially affect the substance of the Muslim proposals.

But in an atmosphere of Communal frenzy the Congress was also unable to effect much. ⁴ The fanatical Hindu elements in the Congress questioned the Congress action and urged for a special meeting of the All India Congress Committee to demand explanations from the working Committee

1. India in 1927-28 - Page - 18.
2. Ibid - page - 18.
3. Ibid - page - 49.
4. Ibid - page - 49

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for piloting the approval of the Delhi proposals. The special meeting was not held, but in effect the Congress approval of the Delhi proposals, in the circumstances did not mean much. The organisation failed against its constituents.

The Delhi proposals offered to accept a system of joint electorate in order to be able to formulate a Joint Hindu Muslim demand for constitutional advancement in the country. The virtual rejection of the hand of friendship by the leading Hindus created an adverse reaction in the Muslim circles. By July the opposition to the proposals came out in public. Malik Firoz Khan, the then Minister for Local Self-Govt. in the Punjab in a joint statement signed by 26 other Muslim members of the Punjab Legislative Council, declared in favour of the maintenance of the separate electorate, until it could be abandoned by the common consent of both the communities, Hindus and Muslims.¹

The Delhi Muslim Conference was held for achieving unity among the Muslims also - but the failure of its proposals being accepted by the Hindus threatened to create division among them also. The unity Conference at Simla held under the inspiration of Lord Irwin or the Calcutta conference organised by Srinivas Aiyenger, were in the circumstances, already doomed to fail. Political India was unprepared with any agreed formula for any constitutional advancement when the Viceroy announced the formation of a Royal Commission in a statement made on November 8, 1927. The personnel of the Royal Commission were all British.² They included: Sir John Simon (Chairman), Viscount Burnham, Lord Strachan,

1. India in 1927 - 28, Page

2. Ibid - page - 389.

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E. Cadogan, Stephen Walsh, George Lane Fox and Clement Attlee.

The announcement of the Viceroy was sufficient to stir up political activities in India, for immediately the leaders of almost every school of thought joined hands in denouncing the constitution of the Commission and its procedure. On 16th November, the "Leaders Manifesto" came out in the Press! Mr. Jinnah was its author and he had by telegraphic message obtained approval of its supposed signatories - representing the liberal Hindu and Muslim opinion in India. Jinnah had to take recourse to this extraordinary means as he was fighting against time. He wanted the authoritative Indian opinion to reach the British parliament before they discussed the issue and came to a final decision.

1. Mitra - Indian quarterly Register 1927 Vol. IV. page 270.
2. The 'Leaders Manifesto' was published in the name of:-
 Sir Dinshaw Petit, Sir Ali Imam, Sir Chimanlal Sitalvad, Sir Abdur Rahim, Sir P.S. Sivaswami Iyer, Sir Tej Bahadur Sapru, Sir Firoze Sethna, Sir Purushotamdas Thakurdas, Munshi Iswar Sharan, Yakub Hassan, Dewan Bahadur Rangachariar, Dr. Annie Besant, K.G. Neogy, Bepin Chandra Pal, Lagi Naranji, R.K. Chetti, M.A. Jinnah, Sir Monomohon Das Ramji, M.H. Mody, Mrs. Sarojini Naidu, Raja Gaynafar Ali, Dr. Kitchlew, Mr. C.Y. Chintamani, Mohammad Yakub, S. Singha, and Nawab Ismail Khan. Ref. Indian Quarterly Register Vol. IV; 1927

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The Manifesto protested against exclusion of Indians from the Commission and against the Provision to consult only the Legislators to the exclusion of opinion outside. Elaborating, the Manifesto declared - ¹ "The underlying principle of the scheme, that Indians are ^{to} have authoritative voice either in the collection of proper materials and evidence or in the taking of decisions by way of recommendations of the Commission to Parliament, is of such a character that India cannot with any self respect acquiesce in it. Unless a Commission on which the British and Indian Statesmen are invited to sit on equal terms in set up we can not conscientiously take any part or share in the work of the Commission as at present constituted". ¹

The manifesto fell on deaf ears. The Houses of Parliament approved the decision already taken and the King-Emperor accorded his approval on November 26, 1927.

Unity in the Muslim ranks which was already cracked after the Delhi proposals, developed into a wide gap on account of divergent views about the Royal Commission. ² Even the All India Muslim League itself split up into two camps. ² Mr. Jinnah was already committed to boycott the Commission on the issue of exclusion of Indians therefrom. But Mia Mohammad Shafi, representing mainly the Punjab Provincial Muslim League opinion opposed Mr. Jinnah and offered to co-operate with the Simon - Commission.

1. Mitra - Indian Quarterly Register, 1927, Vol. IV.

2. Coatman, J - India in 1927-28. Page -61.

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This difference led to the dispute relating to the venue of the next session of the All India Muslim League, which according to a previous decision was to be held in Lahore under the Presidentship of Mia Mohammad Shafi. Mr. Jinnah was now opposed to this decision and in a special meeting of the Council of the All India Muslim League held at Delhi on December 11, 1927, he had the previous decision altered through a narrow majority.¹ The revised decision preferred Calcutta to Lahore. This again evoked protests challenging the legality of the procedure from the Punjab members with whom a few Bengal members and also joined hands. Mia Mohammad Shafi refused to preside anywhere except at Lahore. Consequently two rival League sessions were held in 1927. One at Lahore with Mia Mohammad Shafi as President and the other at Calcutta with Moulavi Mohammad Yakub in the Chair.

²Both the rival sessions agreed in reiterating the Muslim demands asking for separation of Sind and introduction of reforms in Baluchistan and North West Frontier Province.²

³Both again recognised the necessity for an agreed formula to be incorporated as the joint Indian demands.³

⁴Regarding the question of separate electorate the Lahore session was insistent on its continuance while the Calcutta session recognising the necessity for it agreed to give it up if other demands were conceded.⁴

1. India in 1929-27 Page - 62.

2. Ibid - Page - 62.

3. Ibid .

4. Ibid.

to and reservation of seats for Muslims was provided.

The Calcutta session decided non-co-operation with the 'Simon-seven' "at any stage or in any form", while the Lahore session decided to submit an agreed formula to the Commission or to the British Parliament. The Leaguers, attending the Lahore session were, it seems, not sure of themselves. Their meeting at Lahore had not the approval of the majority decision of the League Council and the Calcutta session were within their rights when they disaffiliated the Punjab Provincial Muslim League and condemned Mia Mohammad Shafi and his group.

The two rival sessions also differed in the procedure of arriving at the agreed formula. The Lahore session constituted a 30 men Committee to draft a constitution and to discuss it with non-Muslim communities whose Co-operation was invoked. The Calcutta session on the otherhand authorised the Council of the League to appoint a sub-committee to confer with the Congress working Committee and such other organisations as the Council thought proper for drafting a constitution for India. The decision to take part in the proposed All Parties Conference to be held at Delhi was also taken.

The move to co-operate with the Congress was made easier by the resolutions of the Madras session of the Congress held shortly before the sessions of the League.

The Madras session of the ^{Congress} ~~League~~ after resolving the boycott of the Royal Commission had under the Presidentship of Dr. Ansari.

1. India in 1927-28. Page - 62.

2. Ibid - page - 62.

3. Indian quarterly Register - 1927, Vol. IV.

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conceded most of the Muslim demands in substance.

They had urged for joint electorate with reservation of seats in Legislatures and for proportional representation according to population.

(2) Reciprocal weightage to minorities

(3) Grant of Reforms to N.W.F.P. and Baluchistan provided also the judicial system in those provinces were brought abreast of that in other Provinces.

Regarding the League demand for separation of Sind from Bombay the Congress agreed in principle when it resolved that Provinces should be redistributed according to language and start should be taken in the line by making not only Sind, but Andhra, and Karnataka also into separate provinces.

The Congress even went further to incorporate an earlier demand of the Muslim League relating to social and religious matters when it decided that no inter-communal matter should be discussed or moved in any Legislature if any 3/4 of the members of the community affected opposed it. The Congress had also passed a resolution directing its executive to convene an All India All Parties Conference with a view to draw up a draft constitution acceptable to all parties. The draft was to be placed before a special convention for ratification.

But for the League and Delhi Muslim proposal for one third seats to be reserved in the Central Legislature almost all the demands of the Muslims were conceded. Scope for negotia-

1. India in 1927-28 page : 22.

2. Choudhury - Muslim politics in India page - 34

tions on weightage was also those among the recommendations of the Congress.

The solution of the Political problems that kept the Muslims and the majority community apart so long was almost in sight and the League as indicated before reciprocated the Congress sentiments at the Calcutta session.

Despite the conciliatory attitude of the All India Congress Committee meeting at Bombay (in May 1927) and¹ annual session at Madras (Dec., 1927) the Congress was still unable to enforce its decisions against the opposition of the Hindu reactionery elements in the country. At the first² All Parties Conference convened by the Congress which met in Delhi on February 12, 1928¹ the² Hindu reactionery group headed by Dr. Moonje and other Hindu Mahashabha leaders opposed the introduction of reforms in N.W.F.P. and Baluchistan and the constitution of Sind into a separate province.² They

1. The parties invited to the All Parties Conference were :-

National Liberal Federation, Hindu Mahashabha, All India Muslim League, Central Khilafat Committee, Sikh League, South India Liberal Federation, All India Trade Union Congress, general Council of all Burmese Association, Home Rule League, Republican League, Independent Party in the Assembly, Indian States subjects Association, Indian States subjects Conference, Indian States peoples Conference, Anglo Indian Association, Indian Association of Calcutta, Persi Central Association, Zoroastrian Association. Barai Panchayat, All India Conference of Indian Christians, Southern India Chamber of Commerce, The Land holders Association of Qudh, Bengal, Bihar, Madras & Agra.

Subsequently at Bombay the following Associations were also invited :- Bombay non-Brahman party, The Nationalist non-Brahman party, the Communist party of Bombay, and the Bombay workers and peasants' Party. Report of the All Parties Conference - page - 12.

2. India in 1927-28. Page - 25.

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said they preferred communal representation.

The soothing balm that the Congress was trying to apply to the severe wound that India was suffering from after years of Communal riots was thus washed off by the unbending and very much vocal opposition of the Hindu Mahashabha, Sikh League and some other reactionary elements. The League felt frustrated at the Mahashabha move when its demands were about to be realised. The All Parties Conference which adjourned after ten days' session decided nothing. Before adjourn the Conference adjourned, it however appointed a Sub-Committee to report on the nature of the constitution, franchise, declaration of rights etc.

Before the adjourned meeting of the All Parties Conference resumed its deliberations on March 8, 1928, the League disgusted as it was, at the repeated failure of its solution being accepted by the majority community, reiterated its Calcutta decisions and charged its representatives to make it clear to the Conference that nothing short of the acceptance of the Calcutta resolutions would be binding on the League. The Mahashabha attitude had hardened the League and their representative refused to participate in the consideration of the report of the sub-Committee appointed on the 22nd February. (in the first session of the Conference)

The second session of the Conference also failed to reach agreement and appointed ¹two sub-Committees, one to go in to the financial implications of the Muslim demand of separation of Sind and the other to study the feasibility of the proportional representation recommended by the League and also by the Congress (Madrasa session).¹

²The All Parties Conference met again for the third time on May 19, this time at Bombay.² The session was presided over by Dr. ~~A~~ ^Ausari. Important leaders like, Mr. Gandhi, Mr. Jinnah, Tej Bahadur Sapru, Madan Mohan Malavya and some others were absent. ³The Sub-Committee had not agreed on electorate nor the report on the question of separation of Sind was yet ready.³ The Conference after a prolonged discussion appointed a small ⁴Sub-Committee with Pandit Matilal Nehru as Chairman to draft a constitution for India.⁴ In drafting the constitution the Sub-Committee was to take into consideration the various resolutions passed from time to time by different political organisations in the matter. Pandit Nehru was also urged to complete the drafting before July 1, after which the Conference was to meet again to consider the draft.

The Nehru Report was published on August 1, and was approved by the Conference at its meeting held at Lucknow in the same month. Mr. Shuaib Quraishi, representative of the

1. Report of the All parties Conference, published by the AICC, Allahabad - Page - 22.
2. Report of the All Parties Conference Page-23. *Handwritten signature*
3. Ibid - page - 23 .
4. The members of the Nehru Committee included:-Pt. Matilal Nehru (Chairman) Sir. Ali Imam, Mr. Shuraib Quraishi, Mr. M. S. Aney, Mr. Jayakar, Mr. G. R. Pradhan, Sardar Manghal Singha, T. B. Sapru & N. M. Joshi. Ref. All Parties Conference Report - Page - 23.

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Muslim League in the Committee refused to be a party to its adoption by the All Parties Conference.

The Nehru Report as adopted by the All Parties Conference at Lucknow drove the last nail in the Coffin of Hindu-Muslim settlement in India. The National Convention in Calcutta only saw its burial, after a last minute attempt by Mr. Jinnah to revive life into the decomposed body.

The Report proposed reservation of seats for Muslims in the lower House of the Central Legislature only from Provinces where they were in minority.¹ In effect there was to be no reservation of seats for Muslim representation in the Central Legislature from Bengal and the Punjab.

In the elections to the Provincial Legislatures of Bengal and the Punjab also there was to be no reservation for Muslims.² Summarised the above provisions meant that there could be no reservation of seats in any Province for the majority Community there - a fine principle without relation to implication of the practical conditions of Muslims in these two Muslim majority Provinces. Educationally and economically backward and dominated by a large and powerful Hindu minority the Muslims of these two Provinces could not hope to send their due share of representatives to the Central or Provincial Legislatures. More so after the Nehru Report Provided for universal adult suffrage and joint and mixed electorates with rights for the minorities to contest more seats than their proportion of population would justify. Apparently the suggestions were very much prejudicial to the interest of the Muslims - a device to

1. Report of the All Parties Conference - Page - 26.

2. Ibid.

keep the Muslims a minority in the Provinces where they were in actual numerical majority.

It cannot be argued that the drafters of the Report were unaware of the conditions of the Muslims in the sub-Continent. Their special care to name Bengal and the Punjab as the Provinces where the Muslims could not be given reservation of seats were sufficient to arouse the Muslim suspicious about the Hindu motive. Even the Madras resolutions of the Congress could not be included in the report of the Nehru Committee. Mr. Jinnah had seen through the game and had moved in vain a series of amendments in the Calcutta national Convention which took place from the 22nd December 1928 ~~upto~~ to 1st January, 1929. The opposition of the Hindu Mahashabha who threatened with drawal of support to the Nehru Report if any amendment thereof was accepted was a further confirmation of the Muslim fears, if any confirmation was at all needed,

There was nothing surprising, therefore, that Jinnah's demand as formulated in the Delhi proposals and reiterated by the League in 1928 session for reservation of $\frac{1}{3}$ seats in the Central Legislature would be similarly dismissed by the Calcutta Convention!

The drafters of the Nehru Report were inconsistent. They virtually refused to regard the Muslims as a minority in an all India context when they refused communal reservations for Muslims from Bengal and the Punjab, but in the allocation of powers, ^{residuary powers were proposed for the Centre.} Both could not go together, Jinnah therefore proposed residuary powers for the Provinces but this also was defeated.

Regarding the Muslim demand for the separation of Sind the Nehru Report had proposed its adoption ¹consequent upon

the attainment of dominion status, This conditional concession to the persistent Muslim demand which was already accepted by the Madras session of the Congress was a violent departure ~~to~~ ~~reverse~~, Mr. Jinnah by moving another amendment tried in vain to remove the condition attached. ¹ .

The Nehru Report had asked for dominion status and this was ² presented by Moulana Mohammad Ali who attended the Convention as a member of the Indian National Congress and not in his capacity as a Khilafatist. The Moulana urged for complete independence but could not carry any amendments. ²

The Calcutta Convention ratified the Nehru Report with only two insignificant amendments moved by Mr. Jinnah. The Convention showed utter coolness and indifference towards the basic and fundamental Muslim conditions for an agreed formula.

Jinnah had vainly appealed to the majority community :
³ "When a nation is struggling for freedom, when people are under foreign rule, and they are struggling for freedom", said Mr. Jinnah "you have to face the 'Problem of minorities and any constitution you frame will not receive the support of the minority, unless they can feel that they are secure". ³ ⁴ Following Mr. Jinnah, Sir Tej Bahadur Sapru also appealed to deaf ears. ⁴ Speaking about the importance of the occasion Sir Taj Bahadur said : - "Gentlemen, remember, it is not only our own countrymen but the whole world is watching you. If you leave this pandal with failure, you will have done a great damage to the country, from which it may not recover for a quarter of a century. The simple position is that for the sake of

1. Report of the All Parties Conference - Page - 123

2. Ibid - Page - 119

3. Ibid - Page - 123

4. Ibid - Page - 126

settlement you are invited by Mr. Jinnah, however, illogically and unreasonably to the proposition, which I consider is not in consistent with the Nehru Report".

Meanwhile the British Government silently watched the Indian reaction to the appointment of the Royal Commission. Indian critics were ~~re~~ thrice offered to suggest a constitution. The Nehru Report which scared away the minority - the Muslims, was a poor answer to the challenge to the Indian statesmanship. The Muslim leaders and legislators - not excluding the congressites declared in one voice that "no constitution could be acceptable to the Muslims unless it provided effective and adequate safeguard for their interests". India failed to suggest an agreed constitution for herself.

The Nehru Report was a negation of the Madras resolution of the Congress and yet the Congress yielded to the Hindu Communalist pressure to accept it. The Congress by declaring to resort to Civil Disobedient Movement in the event of the Nehru Report being not worked by the British Government within a year made it clear to all that it could do without Muslim Co-operation. In other words, Congress accepted defective position of a Hindu organisation. What was more - Jinnah who had been persistently advocating Hindu-Muslim settlement became completely disillusioned about its practicability. He felt a personal defeat - and if the story narrated by Hector Bolitho is correct -

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- ¹he shed tears and while leaving Calcutta, Jinnah is said to have told his Parsi friend : "this is the parting of the ways". Indeed it was so.

1. Bolitho.H. - Jinnah, Page - 95.

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CHAPTER VI

THE ERA OF FRUSTRATION

(1929 - 1932)

The failure of Hindu-Muslim unity pronounced, in effect, by the unaltered adoption of the Nehru Report at the All Parties Convention was a severe blow to Mr. Jinnah and the opinion he represented, in the League. Jinnah had such a confidence about a settlement that he did not hesitate to expel the dissenters and disaffiliate the Punjab League in 1927. It now seemed that the Punjab elements were right in their assessment of the Hindu mind and Mr. Jinnah and his fellow travellers were in the wrong.

Jinnah's failure to get his amendments accepted by the All Parties Conference broke even his own camp. The League which was in session in Calcutta since the 26th December, 1928, resumed its deliberations on the 29th after enabling its representatives to attend the All Parties Conference on the 28th. The session turned into a pandemonium. On the next day there was no quorum in the meeting. Controversy now raged relating to the desirability of joining the All Parties Muslim Conference which was organised by the expelled Leaguers mainly of the Punjab group. The Conference was scheduled to meet in Delhi under the Chairmanship of H.H. the Agha Khan, the former President of the League who had disassociated himself from the organisation on the League's becoming critical of the British Government in India. At one stage the decision was to boycott the Conference. Though Mr. Chagla was the mover of the resolution for boycott, Mr. Jinnah was the spirit behind it. Despite Jinnah's influence there was a serious difference of opinion and a strong group of leaguers did not agree to the boycott. In fact, the Leaguers

1. Mitra-Indian quarterly Register 1923 Vol. III

2. Ibid. The Bengal group under the leadership of Mr. Fazlul Huq and H.S. Suhrawardy led the opposition against Jinnah group.

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were in a state of confusion as to the next course of action to be taken. Mr. Jinnah who presided over the meeting, where no quorum was formed, adjourned the session until sometimes in May as the Council could arrange!

Adverse circumstances therefore took the initiative out of the hands of the League which now passed on the organisers of the All Parties Muslim Conference which met on December 31, 1928 and January 1, 1929 at Delhi. Mr. Fazal Rahimatullah, the General Secretary of the Conference made it clear that in view of the division in the League and failure of the Nehru Report to incorporate the Muslim demands it had become necessary to have a common platform to represent all shades of Muslim opinion in the country.² Solidarity of Muslims was stated to be main object of the Conference. It was also proposed to be founded on a permanent basis. The Agha Khan in his presidential address ~~defended~~ ^{upheld} the Muslim solidarity ~~so that~~ not only of the leaders but also of the Muslim masses. He virtually endorsed Mr. Jinnah when he said: "India could never be a prosperous and self-governing country if such a large and important community as the Muslims were allowed to feel any doubt about the safety of their economic^{and} moral interests".³

The All Parties Muslim Conference had representation from almost all shades of Muslim opinions.⁴ There were conservative and Pro-British elements. There were moderates and there were also extremists - independence Wallas. Though the Leaguers were not represented officially, yet a good number of League leaders did take part in the proceedings independently.

1. Ibid.

2. Ibid.

3. Coatsman. J. - India in 1928-29. Page. 36.

4. Coatsman. J. - India in 1928-29. Page - 36.

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Such a heterogeneous elements with conflicting interests could not come to any specific decisions as to the future course of action to be taken by the Muslims in that critical juncture when the Simon Commission was still in the country planning on the future constitution of India. They could agree only in certain general demands that would satisfy the Muslims. Significantly enough the All parties Muslim Conference remained silent about the burning problems of the time, namely, the future status of India, Simon Commission and the Nehru Report. ¹In fact, their silence in official resolutions relating to these topics were due to their disagreements on all of them.

The All Parties Muslim Conference however made one positive contribution. It helped in bridging the ~~gap~~ gulf between the Jinnah group of Leaguers and the Shafi group of Ex-Leaguers. The proceedings of the Conference had created a psychological condition in which the League and its leader Mr. Jinnah could now ~~come~~ come down without much loss of face. There was no adverse comment on Jinnah or his policy of appeasing the majority community by offering to accept joint electorate - the major point of dispute with the Shafi group whom he had expelled from the League. Threat of further division in the League which became so clear in the last session of the League was also averted. It offered Jinnah and his followers to retrace their steps as if with an apology - that the Hindus declining to accept the Muslim demands the conditional offer of joint electorate was withdrawn. The statesmanship of the All Parties Muslim Conference was rewarded by Jinnah's non-~~mix~~ insistence on party or personal prestige who soon started negotiations with different groups in the Muslim ranks.

²The All-India Muslim League convened a Council meeting at Delhi on March 3, 1929 in which the Shafilites also were invited to attend. ²Jinnah was formally authorised to negotiate with various

1. Ibid.

2. Mitra - Indian Quarterly Register 1929
Vol. I.

other Muslim groups to formulate an agreed formula for adoption by the adjourned session of the League which, it decided, to convene at Delhi on March 31.

Three days before the League session was to recommence the League Council held another meeting to finalise detail of the ensuing session. At the Council meeting Mr. Jinnah came up with his 14 points in drafting which he had also incorporated the unanimous resolutions adopted by the All Parties Muslim Conference. In fact neither the resolutions of the All Parties Muslim Conference nor the 14 points of Mr. Jinnah did put up any new point which the League had not discussed in their earlier deliberations. They were novel because they were sumtotal of demands, put together.

The adoption of Mr. Jinnah's 14 points by the League Council, however, became an object of controversy. At the Council meeting a heated controversy was raised as to the legality of inclusion of expelled Leaguers of the Shafi group in the meeting. The Council meeting thus had a bad start and an agreed decision became an absurdity. There were in fact three vocal elements in the League Council: "One desiring the adoption of the Nehru Report, the second standing for the rejection of the Nehru Report and the third standing for a compromise".

In the circumstances, the spirit of accommodation exhibited only 25 days ago became difficult to re-establish. Its breakdown was caused mainly by the provocations of Pro-Nehru Report-elements namely those led by Mr. Sherwani and Moulana Abul Kalam Azad. Shafi ites, who attended the Council despite the opposition of the above group urged adoption of the resolutions of

1. Ibid.

2. See Appendix III.

3. Mitra-India Quarterly Register 1929 Vol. I 4. Ibid.

the All parties Muslim Conference in toto. Ali Brothers group were in favour of the Jinnah draft which besides proposing rejection of the Nehru Report had yet sought to keep the door open by an alternative to the 14 points - based on his amendments moved at the All Parties Muslim Conference on December 28, 1928.

The alternative or the modification suggested :

4 "That in the present circumstances the representation of Mussalmans in the different Legislatures of the country and of the other elected bodies through separate electorate is inevitable, and further, the Government being pledged over and over again not to disturb this franchise so granted to the Muslim community since 1909 till such time as the Mussalmans chose to abandon it, the Mussalmans will not consent to joint electorates unless Sind is constituted into a separate Province and reforms in the fact are introduced in the North West-frontier Province and Beluchistan on the same footing as in other Provinces.

Further, it is provided that there shall be reservation of seats according to the Muslim population in the various Provinces; but where Mussalmans are in a majority ^{they} shall not contest more seats than their population warrants.

The question of excess representation of Mussalmans over ~~their~~ above their population in Provinces where they are in a minority is to be considered hereafter".

Jinnah it seems was prepared to forego insistence on every one of the 14 points if the substance of fair share for the Muslims was assured by the acceptance of the alternatives suggested.

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To this, however, the Shafi¹ites could not agree, nor the group supporting the Nehru Report. Opposition by the Shafi group could perhaps be avoided but for the very bad start that the Council meeting took. There was, indeed,² not much difference in substance between the resolutions of the All Parties Muslim Conference and the Jinnah draft. Each stuck to his point as a matter of prestige. The Muslims were again divided.

³In the morning of March 31, Ali Brothers and their supporters walked out of the subjects committee meeting in protest against certain remarks of Mr. Sherwani advantage of which was taken by Sherwani group to pass a resolution supporting the Nehru Report as verified by the Calcutta Convention.¹ Before Jinnah arrived to preside over the open session on March 31,² the Sherwani group had started the meeting with Dr. Mahmud Alam in the Chair. Dr. Alam had been proposed by Mr. Yusuf Imam and seconded by Mr. Sherwani. The Pro-Nehru ^{Ref. to} group elements acted unconstitutionally as Jinnah was the elected President for the session.

³Dr. Alam sought to present a fiat accompli to the Jinnah group by calling upon one A.R. Gazi to propose approval to the Nehru Report. But the majority of the delegates who had been taken unaware rose almost in revolt.³ A Pandemonium ensued and police had to intervene to restore peace. On Jinnah's arrival the audience cheered him and complete peace and order was restored. Jinnah as the President of the League declared the session adjourned.

⁴Moulana Abul Kalam Azad and Mr. Sherwani left the League on this occasion and formed the "Nationalist Muslim Party".⁴

The Nehru Report had not only broken the Muslims away from a joint course of action with the Hindus, it broke the Muslim solidarity also.

1. Mitra - Indian quarterly Register 1929 Vol. I
2. Saiyid. M.H. - Muhammad Ali Jinnah - A Political Study. Page-444.
3. Ibid.
4. Mitra - Indian quarterly Register 1929 Vol. I.

The Simon Commission which completed their report in April 1929, poured cold water on the League demand embodied in the Jinnah proposals. It said it could not agree in giving the Muslims of Bengal and the Punjab their due share on population basis : ¹"This claim seeks to preserve full security for representation now provided for Muslims in these six provinces and to enlarge in Bengal and the Punjab the proportion of seats secured to the Community by separate electorates to figures proportionate to their ratio of population. This would give Mohammedans a fixed and unalterable majority of the general constituency seats in both the Provinces. We cannot go so far. It would be unfair that Mohammedans should retain the very considerable weightage they enjoy in six provinces and that there should at the same time be imposed, in the face of Hindu and Sikh opposition, a definite Muslim majority in the Punjab and Bengal unalterable by any appeal to the electorate".¹

The political atmosphere in India during the first half of the year 1929 was one full of uncertainties. The adoption of the Nehru Report by the Congress broke the possibility of a joint demand being pressed upon the British Government. The Congress demand for dominion status based on Nehru Report within a year lacked the universal support necessary for the Govt. to accede to it. Not only was the Indian leadership divided in their opinion as to the future course of action, the Muslim leadership also exhibited a sharp division among themselves. The Simon Commission which lacked Indian Co-Operation from its inception had no chance of success.

It was in this condition of stagnation and frustration that Jinnah came forward with his proposals for a way out of the

1. Sen- S. The Birth of Pakistan, page - 94.

present impasse. In a letter to the British Prime Minister Ramsey MacDonald written on June 19, Jinnah reiterated his earlier suggestion for holding a Conference of leaders of political India and Great Britain to find out a solution acceptable to all. After denouncing the Simon Commission he said - "India has lost her faith in the word of Great Britain".¹ He "most earnestly" urged upon His Majesty's Government to immediately "make a declaration that Great Britain is unequivocally pledged to the policy of granting to India full responsible government with Dominion Status".²

Jinnah had suggested this Conference two years earlier in the Leader's manifesto on November 16, when he predicted the futility of the Simon Commission. Two years later Sir John Simon the leader of the Commission suggested to the Prime Minister in the similar line. ~~Wrote:~~ In his letter to the British Prime Minister dated October 16, Sir John Simon wrote - "that what might be required, after the reports of the Statutory Commission and the Indian Central Committee have been made, considered and published but before the stage is reached, of the Joint Parliamentary Committee, would be the setting up of a Conference in which His Majesty's Government should meet representatives both of British India and of the States for the purpose of seeking the greatest possible measure of agreement for the final proposals which it would later be the duty of His Majesty's Government to submit to Parliament".³

Simon's suggestion tantamounted to an admission of the failure of the Royal Commission. Jinnah's suggestion was corroborated. His Majesty's Government lost no time in deciding to hold a Round Table Conference. The Viceroy's announcement to this effect was published on October 31, 1929. The Viceroy's

1. Saiyid. M.H. - Mohammad Ali Jinnah - A Political Study. Page-453.
2. Ibid. Page - 456. 3. Ibid- page - 461-62.

announcement read :-

"The goal of British policy was stated in the declaration of August, 1917 to be that of providing for the 'gradual development of self governing institutions with a view to the progressive realisation of responsible Government in India as an integral part of the British empire'. As I recently pointed out, my own instrument of instruction from the King-Emperor expressly states that it is His Majesty's will and pleasure that the plans laid by Parliament in 1919 should be the means by which British India may attain its due place among his Dominions. Ministers of the crown, moreover, have more than once publicly declared that it is the desire of the British Government that India should in the fullness of time take her place in the Empire in equal partnership with the Dominions, but in view of the doubts which have been expressed both in Great Britain and India regarding the interpretation to be placed on the intentions of the British Government in enacting the Statute of 1919, I am authorised on behalf of his Majesty's Government to state clearly that in their judgment it is implicit in the declaration of 1917 that the natural issue of India's constitutional progress, as there contemplated, is the ^{attain} ~~state~~ment of Dominion status".¹

The announcement had a mixed reaction in India. The Congress had in 1928 made a bold decision to launch Civil Disobedience Movement in case the British Government were not granting Dominion status within a year. It could hardly eat up its own words without apparent loss of face. Naturally, therefore, the Congress at its Lahore session held under the Presidentship of Pandit Jawaharlal Nehru on December 31, 1929 announced "The attainment of complete independence for India" as its goal. It

1. Ibid.⁴⁶⁰⁻¹ 2. Coatsman-. J. India in 1929-30. Page 68.

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also decided that "nothing is to be gained in existing circumstances by the Congress being represented in the proposed Round Table Conference". The session further authorised the All India Congress Committee to initiate a campaign of Civil disobedience whenever it thought fit.

The All India Muslim League, naturally, welcomed the Viceroy's announcement.

In the circumstances the Civil Disobedience Movement that was started by Gandhi on April 6, 1930 lacked support of the major sections of Mussalmans. Although the nationalist Muslims and some individual Muslim leaders joined the movement the majority of the Muslim leaders looked upon the movement with disapproval and suspicion. Even leading Hindu liberals were not in it. Consequently the Government remained unmoved. Gandhi and other top ranking leaders were arrested. Martial law was proclaimed in various places.

While the Civil Disobedience Movement was in progress, the report of the Simon Commission was published in May, 1930. It suggested among others :-

- (i) An all India Federation including the Princes.
- (ii) Responsible Government in the Provinces.
- (iii) Election of Provincial Legislatures based upon wider franchise.
- (iv) No official block in the Provincial Legislatures.
- (v) Complete British authority to continue at the centre.

The Congress rejected the recommendations wholesale and continued the Civil disobedience movement.

Despite the Congress opposition the Government went ahead with their plan for holding a Round Table Conference on November 12, 1930. The Muslims, the non-Congress Hindus, Schedule Castes

1. Ibid.

Ibid. page - 72.

3. Ibid.

and the Sikhs joined the Conference. The Congress was isolated.

The Round Table Conference met in London and held its deliberations for about 2 months from November 12, 1930 to January 19, 1931. The British Government was convinced that the Communal Problem stood on the way of constitutional settlement in India and, therefore, they tried their utmost ~~to~~ to solve this problem. The English mind so far as the Muslim demands were concerned was already clear from the report of the Simon Commission. In London the Government spokesmen insisted on Muslim agreement to joint electorate. To this the Muslims had nearly agreed. ¹ Sir Mohammad Shafi proposed to accept joint electorate subject to the Conditions that the weightage to Muslims in minority provinces should continue and that in the Punjab and in Bengal the Muslims were to have representation on population basis. Shafi apparently wanted joint electorate with reservation of seats and endorsed Moulana Mohammad Ali who insisted ² "no candidate should be declared elected unless he had secured at least 40% of the votes of his own community". Alternatively Shafi held - that in case joint electorate on the above conditions were not acceptable separate ~~an~~ electorate under the following conditions ~~it~~ would be acceptable to the Muslims :³

- (a) "In the Punjab, Mussalmans should have through Communal electorate 49% of the entire number of seats in the whole House and should have liberty to contest the special Constituencies which it is proposed to create in that Province".
- (b) "In Bengal, Mussalmans should have through communal electorates 46% representation in the whole House and should have liberty to contest the special constituencies which it is proposed to create in that Province".
- (c) "In minority Provinces, Mussalmans should continue to enjoy the weightage which they have at present through separate electorates, similar weightage to be given to Hindus in Sind and to Hindus and Sikhs in the Punjab".

1. Sen. S - The Birth of Pakistan - page - 96.
2. Ibid.
3. Ibid - page - 96-97.

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(d) "If at any time hereafter two-thirds of the representatives of any community in any Provincial Legislative Council or in the Central Legislative Council desire to give up communal electorates, then thereafter the system of joint electorate should come into being."

In other words Shafi wanted joint electorate with statutory majority unless separate electorate with minority of seats was favoured. But the Muslim opinion was not unanimous. Though Shafi, Hedayetullah, Nawab of Bhopal and Fazlul Huq were willing to compromise - there was another section and Sir Fazle Husain was in it, who were adamant on the demand for separate electorate with weightage in minority Provinces and proportional representation in Bengal and the Punjab. Shafi's climbing down was worthy of note. He had broken away from Jinnah and the League when the latter suggested conditional joint electorate. In London he himself proposed it.

The Round Table Conference could not agree on the solution of minority problem. As in India the Muslim demands were ¹opposed by the Hindu Mahashabha representatives. The Labour Government also ²had no sympathy for Muslim demands. In the circumstances the Muslim delegates declared that no constitution for India could be framed prior to the settlement of Muslim demands.

Meanwhile the Annual session of the All - India Muslim League was held on December 29, 1930 at Allahabad. Dr. Mohammad Iqbal was the President. ³The Presidential address dwelt on the diversity of race, language, religion and culture in India which according to him have made the Principle of Western democracy unsuited for India without due recognition to communal groups. ⁴"To base a constitution", ^{he} said ~~he~~ "on the conception of a homogeneous

1. Saigid . M.H. - Mohammad Ali Jinnah - A Political Study. Page.
2. Sen.S.-The Birth of Pakistan-page-95. 476.
3. The full text of Dr. Iqbal's address is given in appendix IV.
- ~~4. Presidential address of Dr. Iqbal Saigid M.H. - Mohammad Ali Jinnah - A Political Study - Page - 478.~~

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India or to apply to India the principles dictated by British democratic sentiments is ~~is~~ unwillingly to prepare her for a Civil War".

Iqbal held unitary form of Government to be unthinkable for India. The residuary powers according to him must have to be vested in the federating states. He also felt that the existing structure of Provinces was largely responsible for the Communal controversy and suggested that Muslim India could have no objection to purely territorial electorates if the provinces were reconstituted so as to secure comparatively homogeneous communities possessing racial, cultural, linguistic and religious unity.

The most significant part of Dr. Iqbal's address was his scheme for a Muslim India within ~~K~~ India. ¹ "I would like to see," ~~he~~ declared ~~he~~, "the Punjab, North-West Frontier Province, Sind and Baluchistan, amalgamated into a single state. Self-Government within the British Empire or without the British Empire, the formation of a consolidated North-West Indian Muslim state appears to be the final destiny of the Muslims at least of North-West India." ²

The idea was nothing new. It was ~~xxxx~~ already in the air ² Moulana, Hasrat Mohani had suggested it in 1925 as a means of solution of communal Problem and had received support of Lala Lalpat Rai. ³ The matter was discussed in the Nehru sub-committee and was rejected. ³ Even liberal Hindu mind was apprehensive that it would give a handle to the Muslims to exert pressure on the Indian Government in times of emergencies. Significantly enough

1. Presidential address of Dr. Iqbal quoted in Makers of Pakistan by Alberuni. Page - 180-'81. Also appendix IV.

2. Lateef. S.A. - The Great leader- Page 121

3. Ibid.

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Bengal which had the largest concentration of Muslims in any Part of the world was ignored in all these schemes of a Muslim India within or outside India. It was possibly due to ^{the} fact that the framers of these schemes were all from the North-West India.

The League or the Muslim leaders did not go in immediately for the Iqbal plan. Their mind was seised with developments in London.

After the first Round Table Conference was over individual leaders of both the community again started preaching for unity. Jinnah who had noticed how the disunity among Hindus and Muslims in the first Round Table Conference ~~was~~ obstructed India's political salvation, again urged for unity between the two communities. ¹ Speaking at the U.P. Muslim Conference on August 8, 1931 he said: "I am for a settlement and peace among the Muslims first; I am for settlement and peace ~~in~~ between the Hindus and Mohammedans". ² In support of his pleadings Jinnah added. ² "I say without hesitation that if the Hindu-Muslims question is not settled, I have no doubt that the British will have to arbitrate, and that he who arbitrates will keep to himself the substance of power and authority." Jinnah had been pleading this argument right from the beginning but without any prospect ^{of success}.

Meanwhile the Congress, finding the lone battle taking them ~~to~~ nowhere were keen for a face saving device to call off the Civil disobedience movement. The Viceroy was only too eager to oblige. ^A The pact came about between the Viceroy (Lord Irwin), and Gandhi on March 4, 1931. The Congress called off the movement; agreed to join the Round Table Conference. The Government let off

1. Ambedkar, B.R. - Thoughts on Pakistan Page - 323
2. Ibid.

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the political prisoners excepting those guilty of violence and withdraw the repressive ordinances.

Much hopes were, therefore, raised before the Second Round Table conference actually met in London on September 7. Gandhi was the sole Congress mouthpiece at the Conference. The presence of Gandhi representing the Congress, however did not fulfil the expectations. The Indian leaders could not agree and the disagreement as usual was on point of communal safeguards for minorities. At the "Minorities sub-Committee" of the Round Table Conference an agreed demand in the form of a "minorities pact" was put up. Its signatories were the interests representing the Muslims, the Depressed classes, the Indian Christians, the Anglo-Indians as well as the European Commercial Community. Among the minorities not included in the Pact were the Sikhs. The section that was excluded was the Caste Hindu.

Gandhi as the sole representative of the Congress had the absolute authority to accept the united demand if he chose to do it. But the Mahatma in Gandhi had been eclipsed by the man in him and he failed to grasp the opportunity of solving the minority problem and have thereby the way to country's political advancement. Gandhi opposed the demand and he was backed by the caste Hindus and the sikhs. The demands were designated anti-national. What infuriated Gandhi most was the ^{demand} ~~grant~~ for separate political identity to the "Depressed classes. He insisted that they were Hindus and must be kept within the Hindu fold. His idea of one Indian nationhood did not allow him to accede to the demands of a separate political existence

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to the depressed classes. In fact, if ¹Ambedkar's revealing document is to be believed, Gandhi was prepared to concede all the demands of the Muslims - separation of Sind, introduction of reforms in the N.W.F.P., 51% representation in Bengal and the Punjab, 33% seats in the Central Legislature, and even separate electorate on top of all, if they would not Press for recognising other minorities excepting the Sikhs.¹ This secret move to isolate the Muslims from other minorities in order to break the minorities Pact eventually failed.

²The minorities however moved together and for this the Congress writers have conceived of a secret Conservative-Cum-Agha Khan extente as responsible. In any case it is clear that the fear of a political separation of depressed classes from the general body of Hindus had determined ^{Gandhi's} the entire attitude to the minorities demand. Gandhi failed India only to save the forced unity of Hindu India. He was prepared to give the depressed classes Social rights - call them Harijans, but certainly no separate existence politically. Thus the second Round Table Conference ended in utter failure ³"to secure an agreed solution of the Communal question through informal conversations among and with the representatives of the different groups".³ In view of the absence of unanimity among the Indian delegates to reach an agreement regarding the Communal problem the British Prime Minister suggested that ⁴"if all the delegates signed a pledge to abide by his verdict he would be willing to use his discretion and give his judgment."⁴ That was done.

The letter of Pandit Madan Mohan Malavya to the British Prime Minister assuring him of the support of the community they represent is revealing in this respect:⁵

⁵"With reference to your offer made yesterday to members

1. Ambedkar, B.R.-Thoughts on Pakistan, page-364-165.
2. India in 1931-32. Page-23.
3. Saiyid M.H.-Mohammad Ali Jinnah - A Political Study-page-507.
4. Saiyid. M.H.-Mohammad Ali Jinnah-A Political Study. Page-507-8.
5. The letter was written on the 14th day of November, 1931.
Quoted in PAKISTAN by Md. Habipullah. Pg Page - 39.

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of the Minorities Committee we have decided to approach you with a request and a promise. We request you that, in order to enable the work of the Federal Structure Committee to be continued and completed and report on the remaining subject to be considered, you will kindly undertake to arbitrate on the Communal issue as affecting the Hindus, Muslims and Sikhs. We shall abide by your decision and recommend the same course to those we represent".

The Indian delegates who could not agree among themselves agreed to abide by the arbitration of the British Prime Minister on the most difficult problem of Communal settlement.

The leadership of the Muslims at the Round Table Conferences ^{was} were with Sir Mohammad Shafi at the first Conference and with H.H. the Agha Khan at the second Conference. Jinnah who had attended both the Conferences had very little part to play in shaping the developments. At the first Round Table Conference he had urged ¹ "transfer of all powers to Indian hands" which evoked a comment from London Times that his "was the only discordant voice". ² It is said that he even refused to participate at the deliberations of the Minorities' Sub-Committee which met under the Chairmanship of Ramsey Medonald. He refused to "wash dirty linen before our white master". ²

Jinnah was not prepared to accept external intervention in Hindu-Muslim problem which he held was possible of solution only internally by a spirit of give and take between the two. After the second Round Table Conference if not also during the Conference Jinnah found himself isolated from all groups. In the words of Manchester Guardian, ⁶ "Mr. Jinnah's position at the Round Table Conference was unique." ³ The Hindus thought he was a communalist, the Muslims took him to be a pro-Hindu, the Princes

1. Quoted in Muslim Politics by Humayun Kabir.

2. A Barrister-at-Law- Jinnah faces an Assasin. Page-9.

3. Quoted in Jinnah faces an Assasin by A Barrister-at-Law.

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deemed him to be too democratic. The Britishers considered him an extreme nationalist - with the result that he was a leader without following".

Not unnatural, therefore, ^{Kal}Jinnah was not invited to the third Round Table Conference and ^{that} he decided to 'stay on in England and practice at the Privy Council ~~Bar~~. The proceedings of the first two Round Table Conferences had created a sense of disappointment in Jinnah's mind and he was utterly disgusted. As he said ~~later~~.
 "I received the shock of my life at the meetings of the Round Table Conference. In the face of danger the Hindu sentiment, the Hindu mind, the Hindu attitude led me to the conclusion that there was no hope of unity. I felt very pessimistic about my country. The Mussalmans were like dwellers in No Man's land; they were led either the flunkeys of the British Government or the camp followers of the Congress I felt so disappointed and so depressed that I decided to settle down in London".!

If Jinnah had decided to stay on in England after the second Round Table Conference - Moulana Mohammad Ali had already preferred to die in the free air of England while the first Conference was not yet over. The Moulana it may be noticed was ²already sick before he left the shores of India and died in England on January 4, 1931.

While the country's future was being debated at the various Round Table Conferences¹ in London - the Muslims in India were broken up into various camps. Jinnah's nationalist and yet independent platform had broken down due to ~~the~~ non-Co-Operation of the Congress under pressure of the short sighted and incorrigible Hindus. ²"The house which Jinnah built had collapsed at Calcutta, but he was equally unhappy at the sight of the Communal edifice, which the Punjab Muslim leaders were building up.²" He had tried

1. Jinnah speech delivered at the Aligarh University on 5th February 1938. Speeches and Writings of Jinnah by Ahmad. Pages.37-38.

2. Alberuni-Makers of Pakistan. Page-207.

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to win over and influence the Punjab leaders but had to accept defeat. Hence his exit from India. With his exit the League ceased to be any longer a virile organisation. The nationalist Muslims of all-India stature had either joined the Congress directly or swelled number of the Nationalist Muslim Party under the leadership of Dr. Ansari. On one side there were the ~~XXXX~~ Pro-British reactionary elements and on the other the Pro-Congress Progressive. There was no middle course left after the League had gone down. Nor was there any platform for them both to meet and effect a compromise.

The Punjab group had formed the All Parties Muslim Conference in which the Agha Khan also joined. Sir Mohammad Shafi and H.H. the Agha Khan dominated the scene which was made easy by the breakdown of the League. No body can possibly describe the then triumphant group who posed as leaders of the Muslim Community, better than Jinnah did in a private conversation at Oxford in 1932. He said : "The Muslim camp is full of those spineless people, who whatever they may say to me, will consult the Deputy Commissioner about what they should do".

Though the leadership was spineless the Muslim Community as a whole could not be spineless. There were second rate or even third rate leaders among them who refused to be a party to these reactionaries. Ahrars of the Punjab and the Khudaikhidmatgars of the N.W.F.P. were rebels against the dominant leadership of their respected areas. Both these organisations were religiously puritanic and politically anti-British, and therefore in the circumstances Pro-Congress. They had even participated in the Civil disobedience movement under the banner of the Congress. The League could not do anything. It had no leadership, no mass contact. So poor was the enthusiasm for the League that in 1931 its Annual Session was held in a private house in Delhi.² Chou-

1. Ibid. Page-209. (2) Choudhury, B.M.-Muslim Politics in India. Page-42.

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dhury Mohammad Zafarullah Khan presided over the session. ~~The session was presided over by Choudhury Mohammad Zafarullah Khan.~~ It made a vain attempt to revitalise the League by changing its creed from "the attainment of Swaraj" to "the attainment of full responsible Government with adequate and effective safeguards for the Mussalmans".¹

²This session of the League brought about certain organisational changes and opened its door to every adult Muslims in the country who agreed to the League creed and paid an annual subscription of Rupee one.² It also decided to try a negotiation for an amalgamation with the All-India Muslim Conference, on the basis of League principles.

³The League Council meeting held on March 5, 1932, to discuss amalgamation with the All-India Muslim Conference resulted in further break up of the League itself.³ The quarrel was centered round the personalities of Sir Mohammad Yakub, and Mr. Abdul Aziz. On a technical objection raised by one Mr. Jafri to Sir. Mohammad Yakub's continuing to act as the Secretary of the League, Mr. Abdul Aziz, the President, gave a ruling that the office of the Secretary was vacant and immediately dispersed the meeting without allowing any body else to speak. The action of the President was condemned at an informal meeting of the House. Sharp division came in the fold of the League.

The Muslims were possibly never more divided among themselves than when the British Government announced the "communal Decision" on August 4, 1932 with a supplement on December 24.

1. Mitra-Indian Annual Register Vol. II 1931

2. Ibid.

3. Ibid.

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The Communal decision of the British Government was a declaration of Indian disunity and the failure of Indian leaders to agree among themselves despite repeated ~~attempts~~ chances given to them to sit across the Table and discuss the problems. The Award gave a recognition to "depressed classes", reserved quota for them in the Legislature out of the general seats provisionally for 20 years. The Sikhs, Anglo-Indians, Indian Christians and Europeans got their separate electorate. Special constituencies were created for Commercial interests, Land-holders, Universities and labourers. The Muslims also obtained further lease of life to their separate electorate. In the Provincial allocation of seats - the Muslims in Bengal obtained 119 as against 80 general including depressed classes and that in a house of 250. In the Punjab the Muslims were awarded 86 seats out of a total of 175 seats though only 43 were meant as general seats. It is true that in the Muslim majority Provinces they were to get more seats than the Hindus, but balance lay in the hands of the Europeans, Commercial and such other special constituency groups.

The Award was taken as a personal injury by Gandhi. He had ~~not~~ vetoed Communal settlement in London only to see the depressed classes as politically undistinguishable from the Hindu Community of India. In protest he resolved to fast unto death. Fasting commenced on September 20, 1932 but the depressed classes saved Gandhi's life and agreed to a compromise with the caste Hindus. The result was the Poona Pact which the Government accepted.

The announcement of the Communal Award did not produce any immediate reaction on the Muslims. They were much divided among themselves. But the conclusion of the Poona Pact was

1. Ambedkar. B.R. - Thoughts on Pakistan. Appendix XI
Page - 366 - '70.

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followed by an ²initiative on the part of the Hindu leaders to reach an agreement with the Muslims.¹ The Muslims quickly reacted to this move and as a prelude to an intercommunal agreement sought closing rank among themselves. Moulana Saikat Ali was the leader of this move and he had active support from Moulana Abul Kalam Azad, Nawab Ismail Khan and Dr. Ziauddin in this respect. An all parties Muslim Conference was held at Lucknow on October 16. ²It was a Conference mainly of the Pro-Congress nationalist elements with members from the League in individual capacity.²

³The discussions at the Conference were centred round Jinnah's 14 points.³ Emphasis was laid upon the fact that Provincial responsibility should be the first to come. On the question of weightage the Conference decided to accept the Communal Award as the minimum Muslim demand. In general an unanimity was reached and ⁴Moulana Mohammad Ali's conditions for a joint electorate was declared to be acceptable.⁴

A Committee was formed with the leaders of this Conference to negotiate with other communities on these lines. This negotiating committee was given wide powers. But on the question of weightage the Committee had no option to compromise.

⁵The Council of the All-India Muslim League also considered the Award and showed willingness to negotiate with the majority Community on the nature of the electorate provided definite proposals on this issue were made to them.⁵

The General reaction of the Muslims towards the Award specially regarding the representations in the Provincial Legislatures

1. Coatsman, J.- India in 1931-32. Page - 65.
2. Ibid.
3. Mitra - Indian Annual Register 1932. Vol. II
4. Supra. page - 113
5. Ibid.

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appears to have been favourable. Even the Pro-Congress nationalists were not inclined to give up the weightage proposed in the Award.

The attempt of Moulana Shaukat Ali and others to close the Muslim ranks was a failure. ¹ Many Muslims specially of the North were outside the unity moves. Some of them were even opposed to it.

The organisers of the Lucknow Unity Conference, however went ahead. An inter Communal Unity Conference was held at Allahabad on November 3, 1932. The Conference adjourned after constituting a Committee of over 20 members representing the Hindus the, Muslims and the Sikhs to consider proposals for bringing about an agreement between the various communities.

By November ~~12~~ 15, the proceedings of the Conference were broadcast throughout the country. Before the unity Conference could come to a final agreement at their session on December 23, 1932 - its deliberations were denounced by various organisations. Dr. Moonje had defected from the Conference and on the 15th November ² the Working Committee of the Hindu Mahashabha condemned the Allahabad discussions. To them the trend of the Allahabad proceedings had gone too far in agreeing to concessions to minorities which they denounced as "Antinational".

The reactions of the League and the All-India Muslim Conference were quick to follow. ³ A Joint meeting of the Councils of the Muslim League and of the Muslim Conference in which the Kanpur branch of the Jamiat-e-Ulama also attended was held under the Presidentship of Sir Abdullah Haroon. The Meeting resolved that the proposed basis of agreement is "impracticable and

1. Coatsman. J- India in 1931-32. Page - 65

2. Ibid.

3. Mitra - Indian Annual Register 1932 Vol. II.

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unacceptable" to Muslim interests.

The Allahabad Conference went ahead despite defection and denunciation. ¹The Conference agreed among others, ^{Thinks} to let the Muslims have 32% seats from British India at the Central Legislature. Regarding Sind, it agreed to its constituting a Governor's Province with ~~major~~ safeguards for Hindu minorities and without subvention from the Central Government. ¹ But the agreement came about too late for the British Government have ² already decided to accord 33 $\frac{1}{3}$ % seats to the Muslims in the Central Legislature and to create Sind into a Province with subvention from the Central Government. ² The Government announcement was made by Sir Samuel Hoare the then Secretary of State for India to the third Round Table Conference then in session.

The Muslims obtained whatever they wanted. In fact, they were given more than they had hoped for. It is true that the Muslim had been claiming for $\frac{1}{3}$ rd seats since the days of the ³Delhi proposals. The demand had been publicly reiterated in the resolutions of the ⁴All-Parties Muslim Conference held in Delhi in January 1929 ⁵ and also in ⁶ the 14 points of Mr. Jinnah. ⁷ The Muslims would have agreed to 26% representation from British India and 7% from Indian India (Indian States) thus ensuring 33 percent in the Central Legislature if the secret Gandhi-Muslim negotiations in London had succeeded. ⁵ The Allahabad unity Conference had assured them 32 percent ⁶ from British India which again was ⁷ denounced by the Hindu Mahashabha, the Punjab and Bengal Hindus. ⁶ The British

1. Choudhury. B.M. - Muslim Politics - page - 42

2. Chintamani. C.Y. - Indian Politics since the Mutiny - page -134.

3. Supra. Page 87

4. Supra. Page

5. Appendix III

6. Ambedkar B.R. - Thoughts on Pakistan Appendix E pages 364-'65.

7. Coatsman. J. - India in 1931-32, Page - 65.

Government now offered them $33\frac{1}{3}$ percent representation from British India - the highest bid so far.

The Unity Conference already denounced by the Muslims and Hindu communal organisations had no chance to survive after this. The Muslims were given more than their due possibly with a view to keep them away from the agitating Hindus. (It may be re-called that the Civil disobedience movement was then in its full swing).

By a masterly stroke of pen the British Government dealt a death blow to the prospect of a political unity between the Hindus and Muslims. The Hindus could not certainly agree to pay a higher price and the Muslims did not risk to bargain further. The British declaration ^{It may recall,} met three amendments¹ moved by Jinnah to be incorporated in the Nehru Report which were rejected by the Calcutta Convention. The 4th amendment of Jinnah relating to residuary powers to the Provinces was yet unacceptable to the British Government. The Muslims also did not press for it at this stage.

Nonetheless the Communal Award was a declaration of the bankruptcy of the Indian statesmanship for which neither the minority nor the foreign Government can be blamed too much.

CHAPTER VII

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THE BID FOR POWER. (1933-1937)

The Communal Award had assured a reasonable share of power to the Muslims. The Muslim political parties had, therefore, no further demand to press for upon the Govt. either directly or with the concurrence of the other communities living in India. One phase of the Muslim political movement was over. Time had now come for them to address the Muslim community with positive programmes of what they want to do with the power granted to the community as a whole. This was a significant development in the Muslim politics of the country brought about by the declaration of the Government - which was later incorporated in the Government of India Act, 1935.

The phase of jockeying for power ~~was~~ therefore ensued. The Muslim problems were not the same everywhere nor with every class constituting the community. The politically conscious sections among the Muslims were already divided into a number of parties when the British announcement came. Though difficult to note the parties had the interests of different economic and social classes at their base. None of them, however, openly declared their economic class characteristics.

¶ We have noticed the Khudai-Khidmatgars of the N.W.F.P. They were composed of a class of people, economically and socially backward. Ahvans of the Punjab were equally of the backward classes. Their political slogan was Hukmat-i-Ilahi, the counterpart of Gandhi's slogan for Ram Rajya which had a direct appeal to the backward ~~mass~~ mass. The mass had no need or time to think over what actually either Hukmat-i-Ilahi or Ram Rajya meant. Their^s was not a questioning mind.

to supra page -

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These slogans on the otherhand had no appeal with the intellectual class- which again came from the educated middle class of the society. If the backwards of the Punjab formed the Ahrar Party the upper class had their own organisation too. We have seen how the Punjab leadership in the Muslim League broke away and formed the ¹All India Muslim Conference! Their breaking away from the Muslim League was socially significant. They were a class about whom Jinnah had rightly said that ²they would consult a Deputy Commissioner before they would do anything. ² The All India Muslim Conference and later its successor body the Unionist Party of the Punjab would never vote for the liquidation of the British Raj whose stay in India was rightly held as the means of their holding power. ³ Even as late as 1936 Sir Fazli Hussain, one of the pillars of the All India Muslim Conference and an architect of the Unionist Party could not conceive of ousting the British domination. ³ To him the communal conflict in the country ⁴"was not to oust British domination but to secure a position of importance and influence under British domination". ⁴ Therefore Sir Fazli Hussain and his Unionist Party became a national party - gave up communal slogan and joined hands with the Hindus and Sikhs of the corresponding class. They were afraid to be progressive - to call in the Muslims of the lower class to join them. Instead they called in upper class non-Muslims to maintain their hold on the lower classes - Muslims and non-Muslims alike.

1. The All Parties Muslim Conference which held its first session at Delhi under H.H. the Agha Khan became a permanent body (Supra page - 104) of the reactionary elements after January 1929. The organisation was thereafter named as All India Muslim Conference.

2. ^{Supra} ~~Alberuni~~ - page - 121 3. Punjab Politics in 1906 by Sir Fazli Hussain. Quotation from the Birth of Pakistan by Dr. Sachin Sen Page - 105. 4. Ibid-

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The Punjab phenomenon is significant. The Ahrars like the Khudai Khidmatgars were anti-British, nationalist and therefore Pro-Congress. The All India Muslim Conference or the Unionists were the reverse - pro-British. It was not peculiar in the Punjab alone. The Momins of Bihar, composed of the Muslim artisan class of weavers, were politically pro-Congress. Only in Bengal the Krishak Proja Party (the peasant's party) declared their class characteristics by the name of the organisation itself. Its leadership had no Krishak Proja - but only the rising Muslim middle class drawn from the non-cultivating petty peasant proprietor group. Politically, they too were nationalist and pro-Congress.

The Khaksars of the Punjab, a party organised by Allama Inayatullah Mashriqui, was a militant religio-political group - a direct influence of Hitlerite Germany on the Indian Muslims. They were suppressed by the unionists of the Punjab as they were considered to be pro-left and anti-British.

The regional development of political parties is again a point to note. The Krishak Projas, the Momin, the Ahrars and the Khudai Khidmatgars were provincial parties of the comparatively backward class. Yet they could not combine on an all India plane, because it is always more difficult for them to combine than the bigger interests.

The Muslim League at its earliest phase was a combination of the top-most Muslim interests in the British Indian empire. The aristocracy gave place to the upper-middle class in the second decade of the twentieth century. Despite the continuous increase in the size of the educated Muslim middle class the leadership of the League was retained by the older group until it be-

1. The Krishak Proja Party in Bengal was organised mainly by Mr. A.K. Fazlul Huq and Mr. Shamsuddin Ahmed. Both of them like their other colleagues came from the rising Muslim middle class families who were not peasants themselves. Both are lawyers.

came more progressive so as to be clearly anti-British and nationalist¹ in outlook. In fact the Muslim League was the most ardent champion of the national cause between 1924 and 1929 than even the congress was. ¹The Muslim League under Jinnah's leadership had expelled the reactioneries while the Congress submitted to the reactionery pressure.¹

The going down of the League in 1930 was a triumph of the reactioneries. Those ²who could not join the reactioneries made unconditional surrender to the Congress.²

The Civil-Disobedient movement launched in 1930 was a pressure exerted to the Government to adopt the Nehru Report. ³The All India Muslim League had no support for the movement.³ The Nationalist Muslims and the Jamiat joined it. After a short truce in 1931 the movement was launched again in 1932 for the failure of the implementation of the Gandhi Irwin Pact by the Govt. In the renewed Civil Disobedient movement too the Muslims participated in large numbers. The Swadeshi movement, as it was known, specially its economic implications had an irresistible appeal to the Muslim masses. Gandhi and the Congress were more known to a Muslim peasant or artisan than the League and the All India Muslim Conference who were fighting for their supposed political rights. Ansari and Azad became more known in ordinary Muslim house than Shafi, Fazli Hussain or even Jinnah. The contact with the larger section of the Muslims even of the Muslim Parties was through this Congress movement. The standpoint of the League vis-a-vis the Congress was little known or hardly

1. Shafi-group of Pro-Britishers were expelled by the Calcutta session of the AIML. (Supra page - 93). The Congress on the other hand could not carry its Madras resolution into practice under reactionery pressure.
2. Namely the members of the Jamiat and the Muslim Nationalist party.
3. Coatsman., J - India in 1929-30 - Page - 72.

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appreciated.

We have noticed the gradual disintegration of the League until 1932 by ¹which time ~~it~~ had changed its creed and thrown open its door to every adult Mussalman paying Rupee one as annual subscription! The story of ~~the~~ the League in 1932 was most tragic - it had virtually ceased to exist.² The announcement of the communal Award suddenly raised its importance and attempts began to revive it with a view to capture power through its platform. As we have seen ~~for~~ the Muslim organisations were mostly Provincial bodies with no affiliation outside the respective Provinces. Moreover they represented either Pro-British or Pro-Congress views. There was no All India Platform advocating a nationalist and yet an independent Muslim view, The growing Muslim middle class had no platform. The want could be filled up by the League and League alone.

In 1933, therefore, there were rival claimants for the League leadership. While there was no annual session of the League in 1932 there were two such sessions in 1933. ³Of the two one was held on October 21, 1933 at Howrah under the Presidentship of Mr. Abdul Aziz, who had played no mean part in undoing the League only a year ago.³ ⁴The other session was held on November 25, 1933 at New Delhi - Hafiz Hedayet Hussain ~~pre-~~siding. ⁴

Both were self-imposed leadership of the League. The Howrah meeting was boycotted by the Bengal provincial League. The reason put forward for the boycott was ^{that} though ~~it~~ ^{was} a Provincial branch ^{it} was entitled to be consulted, holding the actual

1. The Annual session of the League held in 1931 at Delhi under the Presidentship of Choudhury Jafarullah Khan changed the creed of the League and its constitution (Supra. Page - 122).
2. Choudhury., B.M. - Muslim Politics in India. Page - 46
3. Mitra - Indian Annual Register 1933 Vol. - II
4. Ibid.

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session in the Province it was ignored, and therefore under the League constitution the present session was not in order and that of the two rival Leagues, it was "difficult to say which was the original and which was the rebel body".¹

The weakness of the League as it was aptly demonstrated in the Howrah session alarmed the leaders and therefore a serious attempt was made to close the ranks.² Accordingly, the two groups came together on March 4, 1934 in a meeting Presided over by Hafiz Hedayet Hussain. The League leadership was aware of their limitations. The organisation itself had in the words of Begum Liakat Ali Khan "neither dignity nor power".³

In the move to unify the League, Nawabzada Liakat Ali Khan, an Oxford graduate had a leading role to play. It had become clear to all that the then set of leaders of the League could not inspire confidence of the people nor did they have the drive that the party needed from its leaders. At Liakat Ali's suggestion the party decided to invite Jinnah to preside over its destiny. Liakat Ali had in July, 1933, made the offer to Jinnah during a private visit to him in London.⁴ "They need someone who is unpurchasable" pleaded Liakat Ali, urging Jinnah to come back to India.⁵ "You must come back. The people need you. You alone can put life into the League and save it". Jinnah had agreed but waited until the League offered him the leadership.

Jinnah's election to the presidentship of the League had raised much hope. Speculation was ripe regarding the possible changes in its policy. It was hoped that the doors of the League would be re-opened to those Muslims who held more radical political views. There was a divergence of opinion on the white

1. Ibid. 2. Mitra - Indian Annual Register 1934 Vol. I

3. Bolitho, H - Jinnah - Page - 105. 4. Bolitho, Hector - Jinnah - Page - 105. 5. Ibid.

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paper proposals between Mr. Jinnah and other leading Muslim League spokesmen. ¹ Jinnah had been while in London voicing unequivocal condemnation of the entire constitutional scheme as embodied in the white paper, while the attitude of the Muslim League leaders to it was one of general support ~~in~~¹. Accordingly ² the Muslim nationalists under Mr. Asaf Ali joined the Council meeting of the All India Muslim League held on April 2, 1934 with Mr. Jinnah in the chair.² The meeting resolved to accept the communal Decision/ⁱⁿso far as it goes' and on that basis expressed readiness "to Co-Operate with other communities to secure such a constitution for India as will be acceptable to the country". This resolution caused much disappointment in the Congress circles. Shortly afterwards Jinnah left for England not to return until January 1935 to attend the meeting of the Central Legislature. ³ While absent in England Jinnah was elected to the Central Legislature by the Muslims of Bombay, in October 1934.³

⁴ The unification of the rival groups in the League in March 1934 was, however, immediately followed by an attempt by H.H. the Agha Khan to amalgamate the All India Muslim Conference with the re-united/^{Muslim} League.⁴ Jinnah was not yet in the scene and the move had failed. ⁵ With the approach of the election to the Central Legislature a need was felt to reach an workable agreement between the two groups in order to present an united platform for the Muslims.⁵ A meeting of the executives of the two bodies therefore met in Simla in August 1934. There they formulated a joint programme for the elections to be fought. ⁶ The Muslim electors were urged to vote for the nominees of either organisation who were committed to uphold the Communal Decision of the Government⁶ and thus present an opposition to the Congress which had decided x
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1. Coatman., J - India in 1933-34. Page - 19. 2. Ibid.
3. Bolitho, Hector - Jinnah - page - 109. 4. Coatman.J - India in 1933-34. Page - 19. 5. Ibid-page 34.
6. Ibid.

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¹ enter the central Legislature under the name of Swaraj Party with a programme among others to undo the communal Award and substitute it by the national demand on the lines of what Gandhi had put forward to the Round Table Conference.¹ ² Mr. Asaf Ali was mainly responsible to make Gandhi agree to the Congress entering the new Legislature.² The policy alignment in the elections, therefore, was Congress and Hindu Mahashabha on one side and the Muslim League and the Muslim Conference on the other. The Congress henceforward was being branded as a Hindu organisation by a section of the Muslims who forced the League to close ranks with the reactionary elements constituting the Muslim Conference.

This development in the politics of India in 1934 reacted adversely on inter communal relations. Riots broke out almost everywhere³ - Benares, Cawnpore, Lahore, Oudh, Peshawar, Bhagalpur, Kannanore, Ghazipur and also in various parts of Bengal and Sind. The explosive occasions were the Hindu festivals of Holy and the Muslim festivals of Muharran and Bakar I'd.

Jinnah came back to India to attend the session of the Central Legislature in January 1935.⁴ The Legislative Assembly in India was invited to discuss and pass an opinion on the proposals of the Joint Parliamentary committee's Report embodying the future constitutional provisions which were drafted on the basis of a white paper published after the conclusion of the Round Table Conference.⁴ The constitutional scheme recommended (a) Communal Award (b) Provincial autonomy and (c) a federal Government. In the Central Legislature Mr. Bhulabhai Desai urged rejection of the said scheme as instructed by the Congress working Committee's resolution of 5th - 7th December 1934.⁵ The Congress Working Committee had characterised the scheme as "designed as it is to faci-

1. Sitaramya., P - The History of the Congress - Page- 567

2. Ibid.

3. Coatman., J - India in 1933-34. page - 19.

4. Ahmmad., J - Select writings and speeches of Mr. Jinnah-
Page - 1.

5. Sitaramya., P - The History of the Congress - Page - 598.

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litate and perpetuate the domination and exploitation of this country by alien people under a costly mask, is fraught with greater mischief and danger than even the present Constitution". No reference was made to Communal Decision in the Congress condemnation of the scheme. Instead the Congress supported the continuance of the existing constitution² "until it is replaced by one framed by a Constituent Assembly in accordance with the Congress resolution on the subject"¹. An indirect hint at rejection of the Communal Decision was, however, made.

Mr. Jinnah moved his amendments in the Central Legislature on February 7, 1935. These were three in number, one relating to communal Award and the other two relating to constitutional provisions recommended in the Joint Parliamentary Committees' Report.

Mr. Jinnah's amendment was as follows :-²

"1. That this Assembly accepts the communal Award, so far as it goes, until a substitute is agreed upon by the various communities concerned".

"2. As regards the scheme of Provincial Governments, this House is of opinion that it is a most unsatisfactory and disappointing in as much as it includes various objectionable features, particularly the establishment of second Chambers, the Extra ordinary and special powers of Governors, provisions relating to Police rules, Secret Service and Intelligence Departments, which under the real control and responsibility of the Executive and Legislature in effective and therefore unless these objectionable features are removed, it will not satisfy any section of Indian opinion.

1. Ibid.

2. Quoted in Sitaramya.P - History of the Congress., Page - 596.

"3. With respect to the scheme of the Central Government, called 'All - India Federation' this House is clearly of opinion that it is fundamentally bad and totally unacceptable to the people of British India, and, therefore, recommends to the Government of India to advise His Majesty's Government not to proceed with any legislation based on this scheme and urges that immediate efforts should be made to consider how best to establish in British India alone a real and complete Responsible Government, and with that view, take steps to review the whole position in consultation with Indian opinion without delay".

1 In the voting on the first amendment the Congress put up a counter-amendment suggesting neutrality on the point. The Congress suggestion was outvoted. When Jinnah's amendment was put to vote the Congress remained neutral and the motion was carried by the Mussalmans with votes also from the Government members. /

2 The second and third amendments were also carried by 74 votes against 58 votes. The whole House participated the Government and nominated members opposing the motion. 2

The result of the debate in the Legislative Assembly was considered to be a personal triumph for Mr. Jinnah and the Muslim League. Jinnah had virtually spoken in the same voice as if the Congress except in matter of Communal Award. The Law member of the Government while commenting on the last two amendments of Jinnah, said:-³

3 "Now, Sir, I was going to say that instead of the honest, direct and the frontal attack which comes from my friend Mr. Desai, we have this disingenuous and indirect attack from my

1. Sitaramya., P - The History of the Congress. Page - 596.

2. Ibid.

3. Quoted in Sitaramya., P - The History of the Congress. Page - 597.

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Hon. friend, Mr. Mohammad Ali Jinnah, although directed on the identical purpose. My Hon. friend knows perfectly well that although, in form, it is an attack only on half, yet in substance, in effect, there is no difference in the amendment of my Hon. friend Mr. Jinnah, and the amendment of the Congress leaders".

While the Central Legislative Assembly was in session negotiations were started for an agreed settlement between the Congress President Mr. Rajendra Prasad and the League President Mr. Jinnah - to replace the Communal Award. ¹ It continued from January 23, to March 1, but without any result. The leaders agreed in a joint statement to declare that they could not agree. ¹

² "We have made earnest efforts", declared the Joint statement" to find a solution concerned. We regret that inspite of our best efforts we have not been able to find such a formula. We realize that the Communal harmony and concord are essential for the progress of the Country and we can only hope that forces will arise which will make a future attempt more fruitful". ²

Meanwhile the Government of India Act based mainly on the white Paper and Joint Parliamentary Committee's Report was passed by the British Parliament and received the Royal assent on July 2, 1935.

The inter-communal relations in India deteriorated with the passing of the Government of India Act. ³ Pandit Malavya and C.Y. Chintamani had organised an Anti-Communal Award front to protest against the weightage and separate electorate given to the Muslims. ³ In 1936 Calcutta witnessed two mammoth demonstrations one against and another in favour of the Communal Award. ⁴ The Bengal Hindus with blessings from the Provincial Congress submitted

1. Sitaramya., P - The History of the Congress - Page - 601.

2. Noman., M - Muslim India. Page - 324.

3. Ibid. Page - 324.

4. Singha Roy., B.P.-Parliamentary Government in India.

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a memorial to the Secretary of State for India, Lord Zetland, for the annulment of the award. ¹There was a protest meeting held on July 15, at the Calcutta Town Hall, with Poet, Rabin-dra Nath Tagore in the Chair. ²The Hindu protest meeting was followed by a Public meeting organised by the Mussalmans held in the same hall on August 2. ³The meeting was presided over by Sir Abdul Halim Gaznavi. The Calcutta meetings were significant in so far as they demonstrated the inter-communal relations in the whole Province. There were also outbreaks of communal riots in Bengal and the Punjab. In Lahore, trouble had started when the bitterness were created on the question of the Sikh occupation of a mosque in Shahidganj area. The Punjab Muslims and the Punjab Sikhs from whom the bulk of the British army used to be recruited in India - started fighting among themselves and the result was horrible. ⁴Jinnah went to Lahore as a mediator. He pacified the Muslims and urged them to proceed constitutionally. ⁵Without sacrificing the claim for the mosque he brought it home to his militant listeners that ⁶there is no question of defiance or intimidation of the sister community. ⁷"The Sikhs are a great community" he added "and nothing will please me more than an honourable settlement with them and we shall spare no pains for that." ⁸His success was unique and the Government of the Punjab appreciated the service rendered by Jinnah in restoring communal peace in the Province. ⁹

The Government of India Act as passed by the British Parliament had taken no notice of the two amendments moved by Jinnah and supported by the Congress. The Congress naturally received the new Act with disfavour and they said they would not

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| 1. Ibid. | 3. Bolitho, Hector - Jinnah - Page - 110. |
| 2. Ibid. | 4. Lateef. S.A. - The Great Leader
Page - 126. |
| 5. Bolitho., Hector - Jinnah. Page - 111. | |

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work it.

The Muslim Camps as noticed already, were many and their reactions were not immediately available. The Muslim League was yet to be reorganised. On the whole the Act found no favour with the Muslims either, but as Jinnah said later he ¹"saw that the new constitution was coming. From 1924 to 1936 it came to this - nothing doing. In sheer desperation I called the session of the All-India Muslim League in April 1936".

The Congress in the words of Jawaharlal Nehru had branded the Act as a ²"new charter of slavery to strengthen the bonds of imperialist domination and to intensify the exploitation of our masses". The League was no less vocal in condemning the Act. The League in its official resolution of the Bombay session (commencing on April 12, 1936) had characterised the federal part of the new constitution as ³"fundamentally bad; it is most reactionary, retrograde, injurious and fatal to the vital interests of British India vis-a-vis the Indian States and it is calculated to thwart and delay indefinitely the realisation of India's most cherished goal of complete responsible Government and is totally unacceptable". The Provincial part of the constitution was not hailed as an ideal one and under Jinnah's inspiration, the League decided to utilise it for ⁴"what it is worth, in spite of the most objectionable feature contained therein, which render the real control and responsibility of the Ministry and the Legislature over the entire field of Government and the Administration ungatory". Regarding Communal Award the League only accepted it "till a substitute is agreed upon between the Community concerned." There was no word of thanks for the British Government.

1. Jinnah address delivered to the Aligarh students February 5, 1938. Ahmed. J-Writings and Speeches of Mr. Jinnah. Page - 38.
2. Noman. M - Muslim India Page - 328
3. Saiyid., M.H.- Mohammad Ali Jinnah - A Political Study. Page - 541
4. Ibid.

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The Bombay session of the League was presided over by Sir Wazir Hasan - who had all praise for the new constitution. The dominant note of the League resolution went counter to what the President of the session had voiced :

¹ "In my opinion the Constitution of 1935 Provides much larger scope and gives more powers to our Ministers to carry out beneficent reforms in almost all the nation building departments".¹ To him this was sufficient to dole out some concessions to the classes of people below and ² "giving them at least the rudiments of civilised existence and making them free citizens of a free land." This he pleaded was ² "the duty if it is not only an obligation created by self interest of all us, educated classes, capitalists, and land holders to lay the foundations of a new structure. Of course, in order that this effort must fructify, sacrifices will have to be made on the part of all".³ Sir Wazir made no secret that in the event of their failing to act quick-doom was imminent. "Unless such change is soon made the whole of the social structure must come down with a crash which will involve the extinction of not only the educated sections of our people but also of all privileged classes, whether they hold privilege by reason of caste, land or money". The entire logic behind the Presidential speech was that the constitution is to be worked for powers given to carry out 'beneficent reforms' - so that the privileged class may not suffer extinction.

1. Presidential address of Sir Wazir Hasan, quoted in Muslim India by Mohammad Noman, Page - 326.
2. Presidential address of Sir Wazir Hasan, quoted in the Muslim League election Manifesto (1936)
3. Ibid.

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There was no mention of excessive powers given to the bureaucracy to veto the decisions of popular ministry or against using the reactionary princes as agents of imperialism to retard the democratic advancement of the country.

In spite of Sir Wazir, Jinnah gave expression to the voice of the progressive Muslim intelligentsia of India. He vehemently criticised the reactionary clauses in the constitution~~s~~ and himself moved the main resolution adopted by the League session.

The discordant note in the voices of Muslim India was much too audible. The question arose which voice was to drown the other, under the canopy of the League had assembled the privileged class - who wanted to maintain what they had by timely concessions to the starving masses below. There was another voice - and the adoption of the resolutions on the Government of India Act suggest - a stronger voice which was more radical - anti-British and nationalist. The latter spoke for India's future and not for future of the privileged class nor of the Muslims alone. This voice (Jinnah's) was to dominate but it had many hurdle to cross.

As Jinnah recalled later ¹ "There was opposition from every direction, from the Congress, from many of our own people." Each opposition had its own reasons. The congress Press denounced Jinnah as a Communalist because Jinnah and the League had accepted the Communal Award. To his Congress and Hindu critics he said that the Muslim League was ready more than ever to join hands with the Congress in the struggle for freedom. ² "The Muslims of India", Jinnah assured his critics, "are willing and even more anxious than any other community to fight for the freedom of the mother India hand in hand with other communities". ² He had even

1. Jinnah's speech to the Aligarh students delivered on 5th February 1938. Ahmad. J - writings and Speeches of Mr. Jinnah. Page - 38.

2. Quoted in The Great Leader by S.A. Lateef. Page - 128.

appealed ¹"Are we going to move on and apply our minds to larger questions affecting India ? Close the controversy over the communal Award for the time being and God willing we would produce better settlement". ²"No constitution is permanent. Constitutions are made by men but men are not made by constitutions." Yet the Hindu Press gave no respite to Jinnah. Chintamani, Malavya and many other prominent congressites were all out for the denouncement of the communal Award despite the official neutrality of the Congress. The shadow of the Congress was a menace to Jinnah which he could not fight. He had appealed to the Congress, ³"Never mind what was done, stop this bitter controversy over the Communal Award. Good, bad or indifferent let it stand in the absence of an agreed solution. Let us face the bigger issue". ³ Congress alone could have stopped the controversy if it wanted to. If it had failed the Hindu communalist would have been exposed. Instead the Congress remained neutral allowing each to draw his own conclusions. Jinnah concluded Congress was backing Hindu Communalism - with certainly ample reasons for the said conclusion. ⁴In Bengal at least the Congress did not remain neutral. ⁴The Provincial Congress openly sympathised with the Hindu agitation in Bengal against the communal award.

The League had decided to fight the new election. ⁵"We do not accept the reforms" said Jinnah " which have been forced on us but at the same time we cannot remain outside the Councils. We will try inside as well as outside the Legislature to achieve our object". ⁵Jinnah was a realist and faced the issue boldly. The Congress also agreed to work the constitution after having declared not to work it. To save the face they declared that they ⁶would enter the Legislature under the new constitution only to "wreck the constitution". ⁶

1. Ibid.
2. Ibid.
3. *Ahmed, Speeches*, 38
4. Singha Roy., B.P. - Parliamentary Government in India. Page - 378.
5. Jinnah's speech at the Badshahi mosque, Lahore. Quoted in Muslim India by Mohammad Noman. Page - 330.
- ~~6. The resolution was moved by Raja Gurnafar Ali Khan and was unanimously accepted. Gaiyid, M.H. Mohammad Ali Jinnah. Page - 548.~~

The Bombay session of the League had decided to form a Muslim League Parliamentary Board in order to fight the election. Jinnah had been authorised to form it. He came out to enlist support of the Muslims. "The aim of the Muslim League is not to split but to unite the Muslims on a common platform" - said Jinnah in an election speech at Lahore. It was almost like trying the impossible. He wanted the wolf and the lamb to sail in the same boat. In other words, the League intended to hold the Privileged, the intelligentsia and the mass together.

With a view to ascertain the Muslim opinion and to popularise the Muslim League Jinnah toured almost all the Provinces in British India. He met stiff opposition from the privileged class which had nothing to gain from the League with its new trends. It seems they were more conscious of the economic class distinction than was Jinnah. In this Jinnah persisted right to the end which possibly gave him some immediate advantage, but left many new problems created for the League in future.

Sir Fazli Hussain of the Punjab, a prominent member of the now defunct All India Muslim Conference, reorganised the Unionist party of the Punjab in 1936. The Unionists diagnosed the Communal problem as due to economic reasons. They forgot all about the "Muslim Conference" and their role during the Round Table Conference, and became ardent champions of a non-communal party. In truth they formed an united inter communal party of the Feudal elements in the Punjab. The Muslim League with its door flung open to the mass was no place for them. Sir Fazli Hussain and his party saw no defects in the new constitution and

1. Quoted in Muslim India by Mohammad Noman. Page 330.
2. Sen., Sachin - The Birth of Pakistan. Page - 105.
3. Ibid.

like high-minded nationalists refused to be dragged in a Communal Party like the Muslim League. Jinnah argued :-

"The reason why they wanted communal, Parties, was that as the constitution was based on communal electorates, they would have to enter the Legislature on communal ticket. It was their desire to become Communalised. They had made it clear, they would enter the Council through separate electorates but while in the Legislature they would co-operate and form alliances with those whose ideals are identical with theirs." But the argument fell on deaf ears.

Instead of the Upper class joining the League - those that were already in it started deserting in quick succession. Nawab Yusuf and the Nawab of Chhatari resigned, " on the plea that the Co-operation between the Hindu Zamindars and Muslims was essential and their ideal was Dominion status". Sir Abdullah Haroon of Sind and a few others also resigned from the League. Similar plea - namely formation of mixed parties was put forward by one time League President (1932) Mr. Sayed Abdul Aziz of Bihar. He also resigned as the Muslim League was a communal body.

Significantly the Jamiat, (mainly of the U.P.) and the Ahrars of the Punjab were willing to join the Muslim League Parliamentary Board. The Ahrars had one objection - none of the Mirzais (Qadianis) was to be allowed in the Muslim League. Of course, this was an objection more religious than economic or political. In the Punjab Jinnah had thus only the Ahrars and the poet-philosopher Dr. Mohammad Iqbal to support him.

1. Noman., M - Muslim India. Page - 330.

2. Ibid-page - 331.

3. Ibid - Page - 332.

4. Ibid -

5. Ibid. Page - 329.

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In Bengal the League affairs were mismanaged. Careful handling would have brought about a coalition of the Krishak Praja with the League in forging a joint front to fight the elections.

¹Nikhil Banga Krishak Praja Samity had at least the following objects in common with the League :-

- (a) to press for full responsible government with safeguards for Muslims,
- (b) to protect the political and religious rights of Indian Muslims,
- (c) to promote friendship between Muslims and other communities,
- (d) to repeal all repressive laws,
- (e) to reduce the heavy cost of administrative machinery,
- (f) to make Primary education free and compulsory,
- (g) to promote and protect the Urdu language and script.

As noticed earlier the Krishak Praja was apparently a non-denominational party in name, democratic in character and progressive in political outlook. In spite of its peculiar Muslim slogans it was Pro-Congress.

The League leadership in Bengal had devolved on Zaminder-cum-mercantile group who posed as self made leaders of the Community. Their claim to the leadership was their privileged position as landlords and moneyed people. Clash of personalities kept Fazlul Huq out of the League leadership and Fazlul Huq represented the rising Muslim educated class with roots in the soil. Jinnah could have prevented the development had he been aware. In truth he was totally ignorant of the Bengal Muslim Society. He might have known Calcutta but no city not even Calcutta, did represent Muslim Bengal.

With little preparation, no mass contact the League faced

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the elections in January, 1937. ¹"With no primary organisation", ~~said~~ and with very inadequate resources the League fought the elections ----- But still in some of the Muslim majority provinces there was no Muslim League Party", admitted Jinnah! ²In the absence of a proper organisation the League formed a Parliamentary Board and issued an election manifesto leaving it to the Muslim intelligentsia to carry the message to the masses.

The election manifesto was an important document. It summed up the League's political attitude and also the ideal it hoped to realise if ~~given~~ power is given. The League reiterated its stand for full responsible government, denounced "³double domination of reactionary forces and imperialistic power" that was generated by the Government of India Act 1919. The League was no less strong in denouncing the Government of India Act 1935 which was ⁴"forced upon the people of India", "against their will and inspite of their *repeated disapproval and dissent expressed by the various parties and bodies in the country". Despite the League's decision to work the Provincial part of the Government of India Act it had no praise for it. Jinnah had made no secret of his attitude towards the new constitution in his address at the Bombay session of the League. He had described it as ⁵"the gross breach of faith on the part of the British Government" to which he must submit as it was going to be the law of the land. ⁶"If I have to submit to it" he said "I shall submit to it under protest, I shall see what use I can make of it". ⁵He did not hesitate to characterise the forcing of the new Act on the Indians as similar to the forcing of the Treaty of

1. Jinnah's address to the Aligarh students. Ahmed. J-writings and speeches of Mr. Jinnah page - 38
2. Noman. M - Muslim India. Page-329. 3. Muslim League Election Manifesto, ~~see the~~ Appendix. ~~V. Ibid.~~ ⁴Saiyid., M.H. - Mohammad Ali Jinnah - A political study - Page-546.
6. Ibid - Page - 546-147.

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Varsailles on the Germans and declared that "as the Germans dealt with the Varsailles Treaty, I shall begin by tearing off as many pages as the Government of India Act has, and we shall not rest content until that constitution is replaced by a constitution which is acceptable to us" ¹

"The main principles", the Manifesto declared, "on which we expect our representatives in various Legislatures to work will be (1) that the present provincial constitution and proposed Central constitution should be replaced immediately by democratic full self Government; (2) and that in the meantime, representatives of the Muslim League in the various Legislatures will utilize the Legislatures in order to extract the maximum benefit out of the constitution for the uplift of the people in the various spheres of national life. The Muslim League party must be formed as a corollary so long as separate electorates exist, but there would be free co-operation with any group or groups whose aims and ideals are approximately the same as those of the League party".

The League stand could not be mistaken. Not only the official declarations of the party were openly nationalistic in tone and contents, Jinnah its leader was vehemently critical of the first speech of the Viceroy Lord Linlithgo who assumed office in April, 1936. The Viceroy had referred to the deterioration of law and order in the country.² Jinnah replied that the Viceroy "must look to the causes, which disturb law and order, and not take it for granted that suddenly large classes of people in India have become criminals and therefore the ordinary, judicial procedure should be departed from and that the only method of doing with

1. Ibid - Page - 547.

2. Saiyid., M.H. - Mohammad Ali Jinnah - A Political Study. Page - 550.

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it is by repressive measures, executive orders and detention of people without trial." He laid the responsibility at the door of the ¹"policy that has been adopted by the British Government in India for the last ten years." Certainly these were no words from a communalist leader of a communalist party which had every reason to be happy after the communal Award was made into law.

If the League is to be judged by its public declarations the manifesto was that declaration. It was certainly not of a Pro-British and reactionary party. The League manifesto was practical in its approach to the political problems of the day. The League had no confusion of mind and so its declarations were pointed, positive and unambiguous.

On the contrary ²"the Congress election manifesto was indicative of its indecisive attitude towards the new reforms; it used hard words against the Act of 1935, promised remedy of wrongs to the electors and expressed determination to wreck the constitution as a way of knitting together the radical elements in the Congress. To cover the inconsistent arguments with a political philosophy, it was emphasised that 'real strength comes from organising and serving the masses'." ³

In the general elections that took place in 1937 the league could not contest all the Muslim seats. ⁴"In each and every Province where League Parliamentary Board was established and the League parties were constituted we carried away about 60 and 70 percent of the seats that were contested by the League candidates", admitted Jinnah later. ⁵On the whole the Muslim League could not secure more than 4½% seats throughout the country. ⁶

1. Ibid. Page - 551.

2. Singha Roy., B.P.-Parliamentary Government in India. Page - 206.

3. Ahmed. J-Writings and speeches of Mr. Jinnah. Page-25.

4. Smith., W.C.- Modern Islam in India. Page - 289.

The election results could be foreseen. In the Punjab the Unionist combination of the Upper strata of the Muslim and non-Muslim Society was very effective. In N.W.F.P., Muslims under the leadership of Khan Brothers were Pro-Congress. In Sind the League has antagonised the bigger interests and the mass was too backward. The Congress had a better success there. The elections in Bengal was significant. Mainly three parties contested the elections. ²The Congress contested only the non-Muslim seats! They left the Muslim seats to be contested by the Krishak Praja Party and in this the League was a rival to the Krishak Praja. Whatever the stand of the Congress was, in Muslim majority Bengal it became identified with the Hindu interests only.

The Krishak Praja in its manifesto, as noticed earlier, had a more common ground with the League than ^{in 1937} the Congress. The Krishak Praja had ²"the abolition of Zamindari, transfer of proprietary rights to the tillers of the soil and removal of agricultural indebtedness" as their declared objects which was a threat to the Hindu middle class interests that formed the bulk of the Congress supporters in Bengal. Yet the Congress lent its support to the Krishak Praja, This has been interpreted later as a sinister move of the Congress - and the critics dubbed it as a more calculated to thwart the progress of the Muslim League as an All-India Party. This argument carried weight in the context of the ³Congress attitude towards the League.

In Bengal, the League was deemed a reactionary body. Profession and practice differed. The League leadership in Bengal had come to rest in the hands of such a group whose death was

1. Singha Roy., B.P.- Parliamentary Government in India - Page - 379.
2. Ibid.
3. Even as late as ~~Mar~~ March, 1937, the Congress President Mr. Nehru ignored the Muslim League as a party in a speech at Calcutta. Infra. Page -

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wanted by the League itself - ^{namely} the reactionery elements boosted up during the working of the Govt. of India Act 1919, as an obstacle in the way of Indias political advancement. The League used to be sarcastically called "Khawja-Gaza" party because of its leadership in the Presidency! In fact a trio ruled over the League's affairs in Bengal. Khawja Nazimuddin, a Cambridge graduate, a beurocrat by temperament - ~~was~~ member of the Governor's Council, a triple knight, and pet of Sir John Anderson was the League Chief, His family had come from Kashmir to trade in Bengal and ultimately became one of the leading Muslim Zamindars of the Province. The second was M.A.H. Ispahani, an Oxford graduate coming from a merchant family which had established itself in Calcutta, since the early days of the English rule. The third yet a junior partner was H.S. Suhrawardy, another Oxford graduate, extremely intelligent and ambitious and coming from old immigrant Muslim family which rose to high emminence in Scholarship and had at the moment three knights in the family. Economically, the family belonged to the new Muslim official class in Bengal. It was Suhrawardy who was mainly responsible to keep out Fazlul Huq. He had planned to support Nazimuddin in order eventually to substitute himself in the League's leadership.

Fazlul Huq in disappointment threw out a challenge to defeat Sir Nazimuddin, the League Chief, in any constituency in Bengal. Nazimuddin chose Patuakhali within his own Zamindari ; Fazlul Huq stood for elections from two seats, Patuakhali being one of them. Patuakhali was the test of the League popularity in Bengal. Sir Nazimuddin had all advantages, financial and official, at his

1. Meaning a combination of Khawjas and Gaznavies and their allies.
2. The League affairs in Bengal during the 1937 elections has been narrated to the author by a prominent League Worker of the time.

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disposal while Fazlul Huq was then financially on the verge of bankruptcy. In the election Sir Nazim was signally defeated. The Krishak Praja captured the largest number of Muslim seats in Bengal, in direct proportion to the discredit of the League.

The League's appeal to the electorate had failed. The phase of manoeuver for power began.

CHAPTER VIII

THE CHALLENGE AND REACTION : 1937-39.

The discomfiture of the League in the general elections was too much pronounced. That it was so was quite natural in the circumstances of the unpreparedness in which the League had to fight. The Congress which under Nehru's leadership was ignoring the communal problem in the country, despite the facts of history pointing to a contrary conclusion, led it to commit a further blunder. Besides the Congress attitude of ignoring the minority problem, the comparative disparity in the relative success of the Congress and the League might have played a contributory part in the Congress attitude towards the League. The Congress had won absolute majority in six Hindu majority Provinces of Bombay, Madras, Bihar, U.P., C.P., and Orissa. In no province having a considerable non-Hindu population could the Congress win such victories. In Bengal the League had won about 34% of Muslim seats and Congress none. The other party that had won the majority of Muslim seats was ideologically more allied to the League principles, if not also to its practice. In the Punjab - with a considerable Muslim population the Congress was in the minority. Also in Sind and Assam, which had a non-Hindu majority, the Congress had no victory as compared to those in Hindu majority provinces. N.W.F.P. had no mixed population and therefore no communal problem. The verdict of N.W.F.P. in the circumstances had one meaning - complete independence or in other words expulsion of the British.

1. Singha Roy., B.P. - Parliamentary Government in India
Page - 207.

~~2. supra. Page -~~

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So far as the Muslim seats were concerned the Congress as such could ^{not} secure any seat except a few in Bihar and perhaps one or two in the Punjab. Nehru admitted "only in regard to the Muslim seats did we lack success".¹ Yet the Congress made no analysis of the situation and only regretted that it had neglected the Muslims so far, and resolved not to do so in future. It is curious that it did not occur to the Congress that the Muslims could not be in a state of vacuum. They were divided no doubt but their division were into several Muslim parties. In any case they were not, as the election verdict suggested, in the Congress. Yet the Congress President Pandit Jawharlal Nehru declared in Calcutta that there were only two parties in India that mattered - namely the Congress and the British Government - and that there was no other party.² This was certainly over simplifying the matter in the face of the verdict of the general elections. One could also interpret the claim as ignoring the Muslims as having any importance in Indian politics. The latter was Jinnah's interpretation and he gave out a rejoinder and declared ³ "there was a third party namely the Mussalmans. We are not going to be dictated to by anybody. We are willing to Co-operate with any group of a Progressive and independent character provided its programme and policy correspond to our own. We are not going to be camp followers of any party. We are ready to work as equal partners for the welfare of India".

By March 1937 the Congress had decided to undertake a programme of Muslim mass contact and came in direct clash with the

1. Noman., M- Muslim India - Page - 336.
2. Saiyid., M.H.- Mohammad Ali Jinnah - A political study. Page - 557.
3. Ibid - Page - 558.

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Muslim League. ¹Jinnah pleaded with the Congress leadership :- "there is really no substantial difference now at any rate between the League and the Congress as plan of wrecking of the constitution has disappeared from the Congress programme". He asked the Congress not to rival the League in contesting Muslim seats in the bye-elections. In other words the Congress which by its own admission had ignored the Muslim problems should no longer meddle into it and leave the field open for the League. ²He assured the Congress: "I have often said that I am trying to see that Muslims should whole-heartedly and sincerely adhere to the policy and programme of the All India Muslim League which is both national and patriotic, and we shall always be glad to co-operate with the Congress in their constructive Programme". He urged Congress on the other hand to concentrate jointly with the League ³"on those causes which stand in the way of a united front". ³

⁴In fact throughout 1936 and the first three quarters of 1937 Jinnah had been vigorously supporting the nationalist cause ⁴and rendered valuable assistance to the Congress in the Central Legislature. ⁵In return he was asking the Congress to let him have the unresisted freedom to organise the Muslims under one platform, the All - India Muslim League, to work as an equal partner with the Congress.

The hand of friendship was spurned for the simple reason that the Congress though in fact a Hindu dominated body could not officially accept the position of a non-Muslim organisation, without compromising its claim to represent the Indian nation.

1. Ibid. Page - 559
2. Ibid.
3. Ibid.
4. Singha Roy., - B.P.- Parliamentary Govt. in India
Page - 366-'67.
5. This admission is recorded in a statement issued by Mr. Asaf Ali, whip of the Congress Assembly party, on the 23rd January, 1937.

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In rejecting Jinnah, the Congress was rejecting the spirit behind the Lucknow-Pact and thereby also the fact of history. The Congress on the other hand was asserting a new claim - claim also to represent the Muslims. There were, no doubt, Muslims^{as} in the Congress, but they were also simultaneously members either of the League or the Khilafat Party. Later they belonged either to the Jamiat or to the Muslim Nationalist Party. Thus the Congressite Muslims until 1937 belonged to one Muslim organisation or other which again was allied to the Congress. Moreover during the general elections in some of the Provinces, e.g. Bengal, the Congress had left the Muslim seats to be contested by so-called 'secular' parties with peculiar Muslim slogan.

The Congress decided to contest the bye-election from the Muslim seat of ~~Buxar~~ Bahraich which had fallen vacant on the death of the League nominee who had been returned during the general elections.¹ This was taken as a declaration of war against the League. Jinnah appealed to Gandhi in May 1937 to use his influence to arrive at a Hindu-Muslim settlement.² Gandhi expressed his inability. "I wish I could do something but I am utterly helpless. My faith in unity is bright as ever; only I see no day light out of the impenetrable darkness and in such distress I cry out to God for light".³

To the realist Jinnah "God helped those who helped themselves". He had fallen in a desperate situation. The Mussalmans of India were divided into so many parties of local importance. There were also the reactionary Muslim elements forming the

1. Saiyid., M.H. - Mohammad Ali Jinnah - A political study.
2. Ahmad. J - Writings and Speeches of Jinnah. Page-22.
3. Ibid.

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bulk of the Unionist Party of the Punjab. Only with the Congress he had an ideological meeting point but things were developing in such a manner that a breach with the Congress became apparent.

The thumping Victory of the Congress in a large number of Provinces inflated the Congress pride. They felt they could dictate to the Government terms of their acceptance of the office. ¹ Therefore demand was made on the Government, that unless the Government assured that the Governors would not use their power of veto against the decision of the ministry under any circumstances they were not going to accept the office. ¹ This was a serious threat as in some provinces (e.g., Hindu majority ones) there could be no alternative ministry with the Congress in the opposition. ² But the Government refused to budge as the special powers of the Governors was a part of the constitution itself. ² The Congress, therefore, kept itself out when the new constitution was inaugurated on April 1. April 1, was declared as a day for observing hartal throughout the country. ³ The Government determined to go ahead with the constitution installed minority ministries in the Congress dominated Provinces. ³ In the Muslim majority Provinces of the Punjab the Unionists under Sir Sikandar Hayat Khan formed a stable ministry. ⁴ In Bengal Mr. Fazlul Huq, the Praja Party leader who had appealed in vain to the leader of the Congress Assembly Party Mr. Sarat Chandra Bose for a coalition with the Congress immediately after the elections formed a Praja-League Coalition Cabinet. ⁴ Sir Nazimuddin had been returned

1. Singha Roy., B.P. - Parliamentary Govt. in India
2. Ibid. Page - 208. Page-207.
3. On the 1st of April 1937, the Chief Ministers of the different Provinces were as follows :- Mr. Fazlul Huq (Bengal), Sir Sekandar Hayat Khan (Punjab), Sir B. Cooper (Bombay), Nawab of Chattari (U.R), Sir K.V. Reddy (Madras) Mr. Mohammad Yunus (Bihar) Maharaja of Paralakimedi (Orissa), Sir Sadullah (Assam) Sir A. Qaiyum Khan (NW.F.P), Sir G.H. Hedayetullah (Sind), Mr. E. Raghavendra Rao (C.R.).
4. Choudhury - Muslim Politics. Page - 51-52.

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unopposed through a bye-election and joined Fazlul Huq ministry as Home Minister. Mr. Suhrawardy also joined the ministry. Besides the League non-Congress Hindus who provided the Finance Minister Nalini Ranjan Sarkar and the Scheduled Castes also joined the Coalition.¹ Development in Bengal is significant because it was in Bengal that the League really came to share in power.

On an assurance from Viceroy that the Congress request would be kept as far as possible within the meaning of the Statutory Provisions of the constitution the Congress decided to form the ministry.² The League offered its co-operation in the formation of ministry in Muslim minority provinces.³ The constitution required and there was a gentlemen's agreement at the Round Table Conference that the Ministries should have minority representatives.⁴ The U.P. League Parliamentary Board offered to co-operate with the Congress in the Province on the Congress Programme adopted at Wardha on February 8, 1937.⁵ The offer of Coalition was rejected and the U.P. League M.L.A.'s were told to obliterate their identity as League representatives.⁶ They could join as congressites, by becoming full fledged Congress members. There were six terms for coalition offered by Moulana Abul Kalam Azad, on behalf of the Congress Parliamentary Board.⁷ These were :-

- (1) The Muslim League group in the U.P. Legislature shall cease to function as a separate group.
- (2) The Muslim League members must join the Congress party as full members and share their privileges and obligations.

1. Singha Roy., B.P.-Parliamentary Govt. in India -Page-
2. Ibid. Page - 213. 254.
3. Ambedkar., B.R.-Thoughts on Pakistan. Page-38-39.
4. Singha Roy., B.P.-Parliamentary Govt. in India. Page-
217.
5. Sen., Sachin-The Birth of Pakistan-page-108.
6. Ibid. Page - 108.

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- (3) The Muslim League Parliamentary Board in the U.P. will be dissolved.
- (4) No candidate will be set up by the Muslim League Board in any bye-election, and the candidates nominated by the Congress must be supported by them.
- (5) The Muslim League Parliamentary members must abide by the rules of the Congress party.
- (6) In the event of the Congress party deciding on resignation from the ministry or from the Legislature, Muslim League members shall be bound by that decision.

The Congress was in no mood for co-operation, Coalition or friendship in Hindu majority Provinces.

The plea of the Congress was joint responsibility of the Cabinet which was not possible unless the Cabinet was formed from the same party. But this principle was not adhered to where the Congress was allowed to form Coalition in Provinces where they were in a minority. It was a bad logic that joint responsibility was necessary where the Congress was in a majority and not where they were in a minority. The truth was that the Congress wanted sole power where it dominated and share in power where it did not.

For the Muslim League, however, the terms offered by the Congress were worse than open rejection. The Congress was determined to be the only party in India, enjoying powers and uttering threats to others. ² Those who were against the Congress were therefore dubbed as traitors by the Congress Press. ¹

Jinnah protested against the insinuation. ² As late as September, 1937. Jinnah declared ¹ "there is no difference between the ideals of the Muslim League and of the Congress, the idea being complete freedom for India. There could not be any self

1. Singha Roy., B.P.-Parliamentary Govt. in India.
Page - 218.

2. Ibid. Page - 367.

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respecting Indian who favoured foreign domination or did not desire complete freedom and self Government for his country."

It is premature to judge if this was good for any one, the Congress or the League. But it became crystal clear that there could be no co-operation with the Congress. The Congress did not want it.

The Muslim League in the circumstances had only one way open - that of ~~pro~~opposition. If the Mussalmans of India could not be organised under one banner in co-operation with the Congress it had to be done in opposing the Congress. The League was forced to deviate from its old stand. The Muslim mass contact of the Congress was to be resisted by the League's own mass contact.

Long before the Congress had accepted the office a voice from an individual of a very high stature was being dinned in Jinnah's ears : ²" I believe you are also aware that the new constitution has at least brought a unique opportunity to Indian Muslims for self organisation in view of future political developments both in India and Muslim Asia." But Jinnah did not attach much importance to the underlying significance of the letter so long as he hoped to have a working compromise with the Congress. Jinnah was an Indian nationalist and had nothing as yet to do with Muslim nationalism of whatever brand, whether Indian or Asiatic. He had never looked upon the cons-

1. Iqbal's letter to Jinnah. Quoted in "Mohammad Ali Jinnah - A Political study by M.H. Saiyid. Page-560.

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titution as an opportunity for the Muslims. ¹ He always denounced it as ~~xxxxxx~~ reactionery and a forced one. He had agreed to work it, only to tear the pages of the Government of India Act. ¹

Jinnah could not readily reconcile himself to the idea voiced to him by Allama Iqbal or with the aims of the "Pakistan National Movement" led by Choudhury Rahmat Ali. He was hoping against hope. In the Central Legislature he did not actually oppose the Congress resolution on the formation of a constituent Assembly. ² He only moved an amendment ². The Congress had the amendment contemptuously voted out.

Jinnah did not oppose the Congress on national issue. ³ "The All India Muslim League certainly and definitely stands to safeguard the rights and interests of the Mussalmans and other minorities effectively what else are we doing which the Congress objects to" ? ³

Jinnah had been constantly resisting the voice that were coming into his ears for championing the cause of one or more Muslim states in India. ⁴ He did not hesitate to dub Choudhury Rahmat Ali, the organiser of the "Pakistan National Movement" as "irresponsible" and his scheme "a crazy" one. But this time persistent whisperings came not from an irresponsible College student but from the great poet - philosopher of Muslim

1. Jinnah's speech at the Bombay session of the Muslim League held in 1936. Mohammad Ali Jinnah - A political study - by M.H. Saiyid. Page - 547.
2. Jinnah favoured a Convention or Conference elected on the basis of separate electorate in the absence of an agreement to the contrary. He further held that the right and interests of Muslims and other minorities should be effectively safeguarded with the consent of the communities concerned. This amendment was moved by Jinnah on 17.9.1937. 3. Ahmad. J-Writings and Speeches of Jinnah. Page-30-31
4. Ganba., K.L.-Consequences of Pakistan Page - 47.

India. What was ~~more~~ the moment was psychological. Every move of the League to come to an agreement with the Congress had failed. It had offered even to work the Congress programme in U.P., and was told to liquidate itself. On the other hand the Leaguers were being constantly branded as Communalists, Tories and reactionaries, in the Congress press. As Jinnah pointed out the ² ¹ "terms and words and abuses are intended to create an inferiority complex amongst the Mussalmans and to demoralise them; and are intended to sow discord in their midst and give us a bad name in the world abroad".¹

In another letter Iqbal persuaded Jinnah ² "Muslim India hopes that at this serious juncture your genius will discover some way out of our present difficulties".² In the same letter Jinnah was told about Iqbal's scheme of "a free Muslim State or States", and was further requested to ³ "give them serious consideration either in your address or in the discussions of the coming session of the League".³ At least an indication of "the line of action that the Muslims of North West India would be finally driven to take" was urged by Iqbal.

Jinnah replied to the Congress propoganda and to the poet by an open reiteration of the League's political stand : "The Muslim League stands for full national democratic self government for India", at the League session held in October, 1937 at Lucknow. The Lucknow session is significant in so far as to re-state the League's objective in clear and unambiguous language.⁴ The resolution stood :

1. Ahmad. J - Writings & Speeches of Jinnah. Page-30
2. Saiyid. M.H. Mohammad Ali Jinnah - A Political Study
Page - 567.
3. Ibid. Page - 569.
4. Noman., M. - Muslim India-Page - 354.

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"That the object of the All-India Muslim League shall be the establishment in India of full independence in the form of a federation of free democratic states in which the rights and interests of the Mussalmans and other minorities are adequately and effectively safeguarded".

The re-statement of the League's stand was also necessary because : ² "A great deal of capital is made as to phrases more for the consumption of the ignorant and illiterate masses. Various phrases are used as Purna Swaraj, self-government, complete independence, responsible government, substance of independence and dominion status". ¹

Jinnah was critical of the Congress in his Presidential address but his criticism was restricted to certain policies of that organisation.

One of the points of Jinnah's attack on the Congress was its ² passing "off as a Mussalman Minister", one who "did not command the confidence or the respect of an overwhelming majority of the Mussalman representatives in the Legislatures". ² This he characterised as a sinister move to divide the Muslims.

Another charge that Jinnah made against the Congress was its refusal to acknowledge facts : ³

⁵ "The Congress High Command speaks in different voices. One opinion is that there is no such thing as Hindu-Muslim question, and there is no such thing as Minorities' question

1. Ahmad., J - Writings and Speeches of Mr. Jinnah.
2. Ibid. Page - 27. Page- 25.
3. Ibid. Page - 29.

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in the country. The other high opinion is that if a few crumbs are thrown to the Mussalmans in their present disorganised and helpless state, you can manage them".

For all these his target of attack was the then Congress leadership who according to Jinnah, had been responsible during the last ten years¹ "for alienating the Mussalmans of India more and more by pursuing a policy which is exclusively Hindu, and since they have formed the Governments in six Provinces where they are in a majority they have by their words, deeds and Programme shown more and more that the Mussalmans cannot expect any justice or fair play at their hands".¹

Even if the first two charges against the Congress could be met by some sort of arguments favouring the Congress stand the specific charges relating to Hindū and Bandemataram had no such justification.

Urdu as national language for India was the Muslim demand - not only of the League's but also of the Congress allies in Bengal during the general elections - the Krishak Prajas. The Congress attempt to foist only Hindi as India's national language had sufficient cause for alarm in Muslim mind. The Muslim fears about Hindi had its historical reasons. With the abolition of Persian, the language of Muslim culture, the Indian Mussalmans had taken to Hindusthani in Persian script. Hindusthani in Persian or Urdu had become the medium of expression of Indian Mussalmans during the last one century and

1. Ibid. Page - 26.

a half, The very being of the Indian Mussalmans, specially of upper India was based on Urdu. Substitution of Urdu by Hindi or even a talk of that was sufficient to make the Indian Muslims apprehensive of the medium of their cultural basis and therefore of their culture. .

Bandenataram as a national song was resented by the Muslims not so much because the song conceived the motherland as a mother. It was certainly objectionable because it conceived the motherland as the Hindu goddess Durga. More so, because its historical association also was too much objectionable to the Muslims. To ask, therefore, a Muslim to sing the song of invocation to Hindu goddess was too much, specially when the song was associated with destruction of Muslims. It is true, however, that the Muslims did not hesitate to shout Bandemataran in during non-Co-Operation days, but then the Hindus also shouted Allah-O-Akbar the Muslim war cry. Jinnah, therefore, complained : ¹ "On the very threshold of what little power and responsibility is given, the Majority community have clearly shown their hand that Hindusthan is for the Hindus". ² The result of the present policy of the Congress, Jinnah warned would "result in class bitterness, Communal war, and strengthening of the imperiastic hold as a consequence". ²

Contradiction in Congress policy and practice was brought under fire ³ :- ³ It "is no use having complete independence on your lips and the Government of India Act 1935 in your hands !

..... was the Gandhi - Irwin Pact in consonance with

1. Ibid. Page - 27.
2. Ibid.
3. Ibid - Page - 25-26.

complete independence ? Does wrecking means working? These paper declarations, slogans and shibboleths are not going to carry us anywhere". Jinnah made a concrete suggestion - "what India requires is a complete united front", The hint was too clear. But the Congress was in a mood to form an United Front. It felt it could face the enemy alone.

Jinnah's failure to reach an agreement with the Congress made him bitter against it. He became convinced ¹ "no settlement with majority community is possible, as no Hindu leader speaking with any authority shows any concern or genuine desire for it". He became determined to change the policy because - "offers of peace by the weaker party always mean confession of weakness, and an invitation to aggression". He made no secret² of the fact that ¹ "Honourable settlement can only be achieved between equals, and unless the two parties learn to respect and fear each other, there is no solid ground for any settlement. ² But "all safeguard and settlements would be a scrap of paper, unless they are backed up by power".³ Power the League must acquire - for a settlement with the majority community.

⁴ "Politics means power and not relying on cries of justice or fairplay or good will".⁴ Has not the Congress deviated from its principles and declarations to enjoy power ? The League only followed in the footsteps of the Congress to form alliance in Provinces^x where it was in a minority. In fact it was in a minority everywhere. In Bengal, the League had already participated in forming the Fazlul Huq Ministry. By October Fazlul Huq was converted to League - ideology. Conversion of Sir Sakandar Hayat

1. Ahmad. J - Writings & Speeches of Jinnah Page - 29.
2. Ibid.
3. Ibid.
4. Ibid.

Khan was also completed at the Lucknow session. Both Fazlul Huq and Sekandar Hayat announced the willingness of the Muslim members of their respective parties in the Legislature to join the League. Jinnah was compelled to seek new allies from whom his party had unsuccessfully fought only ten months ago.

The Lucknow session marked a departure from the original stand of the League - it was a re-orientation of the policy. The address of Moulana Hasrat Mohani possibly indicated the new thesis that the League was later to propagate. The League was now to thrive in opposition to the Congress. Hasrat Mohani bitterly criticised the Congress policy and urged for the Muslim solidarity. He also said "Mr. Jawharlal Nehru and others are talking of breaking, tearing, and burning the federal plan but he was convinced that Messrs Gandhi, Nehru and Malavya would very soon accept it with thanks for they believed that although it might not bring real independence and freedom for India, it would inaugurate Hindu raj at the Centre as in the Provinces and that the entry of the Hindu Princes in the Government of India would strengthen the power and position of Hindus as a whole".

The Congress made the League mass conscious. In order to counter the Congress attempt for a Muslim mass contact the League was to draw up a programme that would appeal to the mass. Mere negative attitude was not going to help them. That a mass appeal was necessary was voiced by Sir Wazir Hasan in the Bombay session of the League. Iqbal had been urging Jinnah to solve the problem of bread of the Muslim masses. "under the new constitution the higher posts go to the sons of upper classes; the

1. Noman - Muslim India 354.

2. Iqbal's letter to Jinnah quoted in Mohammad Ali Jinnah - A Political Study by M.H. Saiyid. Page-565-67

3. ~~Noman~~ ~~Muslim India~~ ~~354~~.

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smaller ones go to the friends or relatives of the ministers. In other matters too, our political institutions have never thought of improving the lot of Muslims generally. The problem of bread is becoming more and more acute". The solution of the Muslim poverty was considered to be the first problem of the Society. ²"If the Muslim League can give no such promises I am sure the Muslim masses will remain indifferent to it as before" warned the poet. ¹

The League resolved on a Programme of Social and economic uplift of the country and its masses. ⁴ In moving the resolution the young idealist Raja of Mahmabad offered to give up his Zamindari if required. ² The resolution was :-

"This session of the All-India Muslim League directs the Working Committee of the All-India Muslim League to take immediate steps to frame and put into effect an economic, social and educational programme with a view :-

To fix working hours for factory workers and other labourers.

To fix minimum wages.

To improve housing and hygiene conditions of the labourers.

To reduce rural and Urban ~~debts~~ ^{debts} and abolish ~~a~~ usury.

To grant a moratorium with regard to all debts whether decreed or otherwise till proper legislation has been enacted.

To secure legislation for exemption of houses from attachment or sale in execution of decrees.

1. Ibid.

1. Ibid. ~~Now~~ ~~Muslim~~ ~~League~~.

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To obtain security of tenure and fixation of fair rents and revenue.

To abolish forced labour.

To undertake rural uplift work.

To encourage Cottage industries and small indigenous industries both in rural and urban areas.

To encourage use of Swadeshi articles specially hand-woven cloth.

To establish an industrial board for development of industries and prevention of exploitation by middle men.

To devise means for the relief of unemployment.

To advance compulsory Primary education.

To recognise secondary, University education specially scientific and technical.

To establish rifle clubs and a military college.

To establish and remove un-Islamic customs and usages for the Muslim Society.

To organise a volunteer corps for special service, and

To devise measures for attainment of full independence and invite the Co-operation of all political bodies working to that end. ¹

The Muslim League was now all out to enlist mass support for its ideology. Palestine issue came handy as an instrument to further popularising the League. The Indian Mussalmans had always an extra-territorial affiliation and no issue probably excited them more than the Balkan wars and later the Khilafat cause. Palestine issue was a bye product of world war I which had become explosive after Balfour Declarations of 1922.

¹, Noman. M.- Muslim India. Page - 356-57

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Indian Muslim political parties were little concerned about the fate of their Arab Muslim brethren so long. Now that the League needed a mass excitement to develop itself Palestine was given an importance that it lacked so long.

The Congress Governments in Hindu majority Provinces provided sufficient materials to popularise the League in its anti-Congress propaganda. Indian political thinking has been always in the line of religious group thinking. The term "Jati" which meant the nation also meant to the Hindu mass the Hindu community and not infrequently the caste also. The conception of an Indian nationhood embracing all the natives of India irrespective of Caste, creed and colour could never go beyond pious wishes of a few high-minded Western educated individuals with very secular mind. This is why Gandhi had to make the Hindu masses understand independent India as Ram Rajya as no other description would enable the mass to understand the import of the term 'independence'. Unfortunately not all in the Congress could develop the secular attitude of mind. The assumption of power by the Congress and its refusal to coalesce with the League was, therefore looked upon as the establishment of Hindu raj - a mentality that was not absent even among a majority of ministers not to speak of Legislators. The programme of Muslim mass contact was therefore destined to fail as it was inaugurated simultaneously with the assumption of power by the Congress. Vindya Mandir is for example a Hindi word for an educational institution, but the term 'Mandir' is associated with Hindu religious institutions also. Though on ultimate analysis Vindya Mandir might mean a secular institution it conveyed two different meanings to the Hindu and Muslim masses. We have already discussed the attitude of the Muslims towards Bandemataram and Hindi. Hindus found no offence in signing Bandemataram and

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and so ¹ they retained it as a feature of proceedings in the Legislative Assembly organs of the country, despite the protests and walkout by the Muslim Legislators. Either the Hindus did not understand the Muslim point or they did not want to understand it. The effect was the same. Muslim fears were roused. If essence of Nationalism is the sum total of certain community of sentiments grown out of some beliefs, the doings of the Congress ministries were not conducive for developing a secular nationalism in India.

Whether genuine or unreal the Muslims were given enough reasons to feel that the Congress Raj (though limited in its power then), actually meant Hindu Raj. If the Congress leadership was at fault it was only guilty of refusing a political condition to develop wherein the Muslims could have no occasion to blame the Congress though they might have still some reasons to blame individuals in the Congress. ² The Muslim complaints against the Congress as voiced through the League had support from non-Muslim leaders like Mr. Tairsu, President of Hindu Gymkhana club, Sardul Singh Caveeshar and Sir Chimanlal Sitalvad. ² The central point of their criticism of the Congress was the Congress refusal to incorporate representative Muslim leaders in the Congress Ministry.

The Congress, however, felt that all was not well. ³ The working Committee of the Congress in November, 1937, pledged in general term to protect the minorities interest ³ and declared its objective to establish an "independent and united India

1. Noman. M- Muslim India - page- 359
2. Alberuni., A.H. - Makers of Pakistan etc. - page- 217
3. Noman.M. - Muslim India - Page - 360.

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Where no class or group or majority or minority may exploit another ~~at~~ to its own advantage. It was a pious profession uncorroborated in and more often contradictory to the practice. As before, the congress repeated its mistakes and did not come to the brass tags.

The Lucknow session of the League was followed by vigorous activities. Almost every day new League branches began to crop up in different parts of the country. Reservation of service for the Muslims in the Punjab and in Bengal made it more popular with the younger section of the Muslim community as it evoked protests from the Hindus and Sikhs who previously held a monopoly of jobs and services.

Before the year was out Jinnah had opened a new front and that was the Muslim students' front in politics.¹ The All India students' Federation which was dominated by the Hindu students had become a camp follower of the Congress. Jinnah, therefore took active interest in organising the Muslim students under the All India Muslim students Federation, which was destined to play a prominent part in mobilising ~~the Mus-~~ ^{the Mus-} ~~li M.~~ ^{li} prominent part in mobilising the Muslim masses under the banner of the All India Muslim League.

The Congress failed to realise the potentiality of the League's activities. ² Jāharlal Nehru ignored them and dubbed the Lucknow session as the "last ditch of political reaction."²

Gandhi, from his camp at Sevagram was watching things more minutely. To him therefore the Lucknow session of the League

¹. Politics, Hector - Jinnah. Page - 120
². Noman. M - Muslim India - Page- 358.

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was a declaration of war. So it was. ¹Gandhi complained in one of his letters to Jinnah that he missed the nationalist Jinnah whom he knew! Gandhi initiated a negotiation for a compromise. Jinnah responded to the move of Gandhi. ²Gandhi in his letter dated the 24th February, 1933 had offered to meet Jinnah if the latter did not want to meet Jawharlal Nehru or Subhas Chandra Bose (who had succeeded Nehru as the Congress President) before meeting Gandhi. ²He further suggested that it would be better for Jinnah to meet Moulana Abul Kalam Azad, in the first instance as the Moulana had succeeded Dr. Ansari as Gandhi's guide on Hindu-Muslim question. ³

Gandhi in fact confessed his personal incompetence in the matter. It was too much damaging for the claim made about him to represent India. A secular national leader did not need a Muslim adviser, and if he needed any adviser on Hindu-Muslim problem, he needed one Muslim and one Hindu adviser. By what he suggested to Jinnah it meant that only on Muslim point of view he required the guidance of Moulana Azad but he could do without an adviser on Hindu point of view, for which he considered himself to be competent.

Jinnah, however, had objections to meet Moulana Azad to settle the Hindu-Muslim problem. He questioned the earnestness of Gandhi and asked ⁴"whether you are of opinion that you see light now and the moment has come". ⁴Jinnah wanted the credentials of Gandhi and the League to be declared, before any negotiation is conducted. ⁵"We have reached a stage" wrote Jinnah, "when no doubt should be left that you recognise the All-India

1. Boliths, Hector - Jinnah. Page 158.

2. All-India Muslim League - Jinnah - Gandhi talks.

3. Saiyid. M.H. - Mohammad Ali Jinnah - A political study-

~~4. This Page - 587.~~

Muslim League as the one authoritative organisation of the Muslims of India and on the otherhand, you represent the Congress and other Hindus throughout the country. It is only on that basis that we can proceed further and ~~at~~ devise a machinery of approach." He expressed his willingness, however, to meet Nehru or Bose as Gandhi would desire.

Gandhi was reluctant to commit himself. "You ask me whether I have seen the light. Much to my regret, I have to say 'No'," replied Gandhi. Regarding the representative character of Gandhi he claimed to represent none. ¹"You expect me to be able to speak on behalf of the Congress and other Hindus throughout the country, I am afraid I cannot fulfil the test but I would exert to the utmost all the moral influence I could have with them in order to secure an honourable settlement".²

²Yet the two met in Bombay in April 1938. After preliminary talks Gandhi realised that as he had no sanction of the Congress behind him it was necessary that the Congress president should meet the League President. Jinnah Gandhi talks came to no conclusion.³

³The Congress President Jawaharlal Nehru had already initiated correspondence with Jinnah as early as 18th January, 1938. Nehru had asked to know the points in dispute. Jinnah suggested that the points could not be discussed through correspondence. He had, however, started by raising the question of safeguarding the rights and interests of the Mussalmans with regard to their religion, culture, language, personal laws and political rights in the national life, the government,

1. Ibid. 587

2. Ibid. Page - ~~586~~ 588

3. ~~All-India Muslim League - Jinnah-Gandhi talks.~~ Ibid. 606.

and the administration of the country. Nehru on March 8, again repeated his ignorance of the Muslim demands and asked to be referred to "recent statements made in the Press or Platforms which will help me in understanding" the intricacies of the problem, Jinnah's patience was taxed. He replied on March 17, - "I am surprised when you say in your letter under reply, "But what are these matters which are germane" perhaps you have heard of the fourteen points". He concluded ~~-xxx~~ "I consider it as the duty of every true nationalist to which ever party or community he may belong to make it his business and examine the situation and bring about a pact between the Mussalmans and Hindus and create a real united front; and it should be as much your anxiety and duty as it is mine, irrespective of the question of the party or the community to which we belong. But if you desire that I should collect all these suggestions and submit to you as a petitioner for you and your colleagues to consider, I am afraid I cannot do it nor can I do it for the purpose of carrying on further correspondence with regard to those various points with you. As to meeting you and discussing matters with you. I need hardly say that I shall be pleased to do so". He had, however, furnished two news paper cuttings to Mr. Nehru which contained a discussion on Muslim problems.

A Contributor "Through Muslim eyes" had in the new Delhi edition of the Statesman, dated, February 12, 1938 summarised. the Muslim demands that needed being accepted by the Congress to formulate an acceptable pact between the League and the Congress. These were :-

- (1) the acquiescence of the Congress in separate electorates (at least for a certain period)

1. ~~Idid.~~ Nehru Jinnah Correspondence. by A.I.C.E.

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- (ii) Coalition ministries
 - (iii) recognition of the League as the one authoritative organisation of Indian Muslims.
 - (iv) modification of its attitude on the question of Hindi
 - (v) scrapping of Bandemataram altogether
- and
- (vi) possibly a re-designing of the tri-colour flag or at least agreeing to give the flag of the League an equal importance.

Nehru had not either taken any notice of these demands nor of the basic points for discussion raised by Jinnah - or he ignored them.

At the Haripura Congress Nehru, and therefore the Congress of which he was the President had made it abundantly clear that the Congress lacked clear thinking on the communal problem in the country. The Congress President denounced the communal Award from his socialistic angle of vision. To him it was merely a problem created by the middle or upper class for the sake of a few seats in the Legislature or appointment in Government service or for ministerial positions. ¹ This he elaborated later in a letter to Jinnah (dated April 8, 1938). Referring to Jinnah's letter and its enclosure the Pandit said "there is nothing in them which refers to or touches the economic demands of the masses or affects the all important questions of poverty and unemployment". Nehru was certainly evading the points raised either by Jinnah or the Muslim columnists in the newspapers. The Congress thesis was, as Nehru declared at Haripura " I have examined the so-called communal question through the telescope and if there is nothing what can you see". The Congress

1. Ibid.

rejected the fact that there was any Communal problem - and in doing so it was denying the history of Indian problems of at least the last fifteen years if not more. Nehru possibly forgot that the National Congress was also an organisation of the upper and middle class since its very inception and it became gradually more widened with the growth of middle class in India.

The Congress could have outright denied knowledge of any Hindu-Muslim dispute but they could not deny a fact. Nehru himself had asked Jinnah to clarify the points of dispute. Gandhi who was the unofficial guide of the Congress had admitted its existence but only saw no light showing him way out of the darkness. To crown all contradictions the Haripura Congress itself had on a proposal from Nehru adopted a resolution assuring the minorities of their religious and cultural rights.¹ The truth was that the Congress was still reluctant to face facts.

Among the paper cuttings forwarded to Nehru by Jinnah was an article in "New Times", Lahore, published in its issue dated March 1, 1938. The writer had commented on the contradictions in the transaction of Nehru at the Haripura session. "If the resolution has to be judged in the light of that speech, then it comes to this that the resolution has been passed not in any spirit of seriousness but merely as a meaningless assurance to satisfy the foolish minorities who are clamouring "for the satisfaction of the Communal problem". The writer further went on "It appears to us that it is the height of dishonesty to move a resolution with these premises. If there is no minority question, why proceed to pass a resolution?" The columnist had also detailed the Muslim demands and said "it is a matter of intense pain that the President of an All India Organisation,

1. New Times, Lahore, dated 1.3.1938.

which claims to represent the entire population of India should be so completely ignorant of the demands of the Muslim minority".

The Muslim demands that had Jinnah's approval had been reduced by Nehru to himself to 14 points :-¹

- (1) The "Fourteen points" formulated by Jinnah in 1929.
- (2) The Congress should withdraw all opposition to the Communal award and should not describe it as a negation of nationalism.
- (3) The share of the Muslims in the State services should be definitely fixed in the constitution by statutory enactment.
- (4) Muslim Personal law and Culture should be guaranteed by Statute.
- (5) The Congress should take in hand the agitation in connection with the Shahidganj mosque and should use its moral pressure to enable the Muslims to gain possession of the mosque.
- (6) The Muslims right to call Azan and perform their religious ceremonies should not be fettered in any way.
- (7) Muslims should have freedom to perform cow-slaughter.
- (8) Muslim majorities in the provinces, where such majorities exist at present, must not be affected by any territorial redistribution or adjustments.
- (9) The Bandemataram song should be given up.
- (10) Muslim want Urdu to be the National language of India and they desire to have statutory guarantees that the use of Urdu shall not be curtailed or damaged.

1. Nehru's letter to Jinnah, dated Calcutta, April 6, 1938.
Published by the A.I.C.C. in the ~~Jinnah-Gandhi talks~~
Nehru - Jinnah Correspondence.

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- (11) Muslim representation in the local bodies should be governed by the principles underlying the communal award, that is separate electorate and population strength.
- (12) The tri-colour flag should be changed or alternatively, the flag of the Muslim League should be given equal importance.
- (13) Recognition of the Muslim League as the one authoritative and representative organisation of Indian Muslims.
- (14) Coalition ministries.

Pandit Nehru' remarked in his reply to Jinnah that some of these points "are wholly covered by previous decisions of the Congress, some others are hardly capable of discussion".¹

It must be admitted, however, that the letter of Jinnah dated March 17, 1938 enclosing the news paper cuttings did not detail the Muslim demands. He had refused to give a complete list. Nehru, therefore, avoided a direct discussion. ¹"That the list given above is not a complete list and that it can be augmented by the addition of further demands. Not knowing these possible and unlimited additions I can say nothing about them" - wrote Nehru.

²The 14 points tabulated by Nehru were taken up by him one by one and the Congress stand with regard to them were explained.² The Congress point of view apparently contradicted the League point of view. With regard to communal Award, the Congress objection as Nehru said was on the point of weightage given to

1. Ibid
2. Nehru's letter to Jinnah, dated, Calcutta, April 6, 1938
Published by the A.I.M.L. in the Jinnah Gandhi talks.
Published by the A.I.C.C. - Nehru - Jinnah talks correspondence
2. Ibid.

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Europeans in certain parts of India - to which the League attitude was one of concurrence. Regarding other points against the communal Award the League had a different point of view. The Congress described "its whole basis and structure" as antinational in so far as it stood in the way of the "development of a national unity". Regarding the Congress stand to seek its "alteration only on the basis of mutual consent of the parties concerned" the League had had a similar view.

Nehru had prefaced his letter to Jinnah by a declaration that "the Muslim League is an important communal organisation and we deal with it as such". He had added as if by way of a challenge to the League's importance that more attention is paid to an organisation the more it is felt important and "this importance does not come from outside recognition but from inherent strength". As if to add insult to the injury Nehru further wrote "the other organisations even though they might be younger and smaller, could not be ignored".

Jinnah did not take the challenge lying. He had been pressing so long to be recognised as the sole Muslim mouthpiece. He now widened his claim and demanded the League to be regarded as an equal to the Congress. "Your tone and language display the same arrogance as if the Congress is the sovereign power.... unless the Congress recognises the Muslim League on a footing of complete equality and is prepared as such to negotiate for a Hindu-Muslim settlement, we shall have to wait and depend upon our inherent strength which will determine the measure of importance or distinction it possesses." Jinnah pleaded his inability

1. Jinnah's letter to Nehru, dated the 12th April, 1938.
Published by the A.I.C.C. in the *Amal-gandhi* *Collection*

to make Nehru understand the position any further. The Jinnah-Nehru correspondence came to a close.

Subhas chandra Bose had succeeded Jawharlal Nehru as President of the Congress. Gandhi, after meeting Jinnah in April advised Bose to follow up the correspondence with the League President.

In his negotiations with Bose, Jinnah was already on the offensive.¹ He suggested the Hindu-Muslim settlement to be pre-
~~z~~ faced by a preamble which should read that the "All-India Muslim League as the authoritative and representative organization of the Indian Muslims, and the Congress as the authoritative and representative body of the solid body of Hindu opinion". ~~As~~ ~~Alternative~~ ~~ly~~ Jinnah held, the preamble should contain the statement :-

"The congress and the All-India Muslim League as the authoritative and representative organisations of the Mussalmans of India have hereby agreed to the following terms of a Hindu-Muslim settlement by way of a pact".¹

This was certainly not only to get the All-India Muslim League recognised as the sole mouthpiece of the Mussalmans in India but to brand the Congress as a pure communal organisation of the Hindus - a virtual substitute of the Mahasabha.

Bose was more moderate than Nehru; but the situation had changed and the position proposed for the Congress could not be accepted by the most moderate of the Congressites.

Bose pleaded :-

1. Jinnah's letter to Subhas Chandra Bose, dated Bombay, 5th June, 1938. Published by the A.I.M.L. in the Jinnah-Gandhi talks.

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4 "The Congress cannot possibly consider itself or function as if it represented one community only, even though that might be the majority community in India. At the same time the Congress is perfectly willing to confer and Co-Operate with other organisation which represent minority interests The Congress, however, would be bound to consult other existing Muslim organisations which have co-operated with the Congress in the past, Further, in the event of other groups of minority interests being involved, it will be necessary to consult representatives of such interests".¹

The Bose-Jinnah correspondence was bound to fail. The League President was insistent that before any negotiation was started, the Congress must accept the Muslim League as the sole representative of the Indian Muslim opinion. The Congress did not accept the term. The Congress working Committee under the dictation of Gandhi drafted a reply to Jinnah in an appealing tone :-² "There are Muslim organisations which have been functioning independently of the Muslim League. Some of them are staunch supporters of the Congress. Moreover there are individual Muslims who are Congressmen..... you will see that in the face of these known facts it is not only impossible but improper for the Congress to make the admission which the first resolution, of the League Council apparently desire the Congress to make".²

The Congress suggested a way out, to open up the negotiation for a Hindu-Muslim settlement without a categorical acceptance of the League stand though it was prepared to accede to League's claim in fact. The ~~xxx~~ letter from the Congress Working Committee added :-

1. The resolution of the Congress Working Committee handed over to Mr. Jinnah on the 14th May 1938. Published by the All India ~~xxx~~ Muslim League in the Jinnah-Gandhi talks.
2. A.I.M.L - Jinnah-Gandhi talks.

"It is suggested that the status of organisations does not accrue to them by any defining of it. It comes through the service to which a particular organisation has dedicated itself. The Working Committee therefore hopes that the League Council will not ask the Congress to do the impossible. Is it not enough that the Congress is not only willing but eager to establish the friendliest relations with the League and to come to an honourable understanding over the much vexed Hindu-Muslim question?" /

Jinnah refused to listen to the Congress proposal. Nehru had set him on a war path. He had not forgotten that ¹"the very existence of the League had been questioned by Pandit Jawharlal Nehru, the President of the Congress, in one of his statements where in he asserted that there were only two parties in the country, namely, the British Government and the Congress".² This statement of Nehru, it was held by the League Executive Council, had questioned the status of the League as recognised by the Congress since 1916 upto the time of Jinnah-Prasad conversation in 1935. Therefore, the League President insisted on the acceptance of the basis as a preliminary to further talks. Otherwise the League did not "require any admission or recognition from the Congress".

Meanwhile Jinnah had planned to see that the Congress could claim to represent none but the Hindus. If "Hindu" Congress was to speak for the minorities why not the "Muslim" League. The Executive Council of the League had, therefore, resolved on the 5th June, 1938 ²"that it is the declared policy of the All-India Muslim League that all other minorities ³should have their rights

1. Ibid.

2. Jinnah reply to Bose, published in the Jinnah-Gandhi talks.

3. A.I.M.L. - Jinnah-Gandhi talks.

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and interests safeguarded so as to create a sense of security amongst them and win their confidence and the All-India Muslim League will consult the representatives of such minorities and any other interests as may be involved, when necessary".

The Congress Working Committee, therefore protested against the League stand. It said it could not understand the particular resolution of the League Executive Council. "So far as the Working Committee is aware, the Muslim League is purely a Communal organisation, in the sense that it seeks to serve Muslim interests and its membership too is open only to Muslims. The Working Committee also has all along understood that so far as the League is concerned, it desires, and rightly, a settlement with the Congress on the Hindu-Muslim question and not on questions affecting all minorities".¹

The Congress-League Correspondence ended on October 10, 1938. Jinnah had kept the door open for further discussion only on the basis put forward by the resolution of the League Executive Council. The Congress, obviously, could not agree to this basis.

The Congress leadership were blowing hot and cold simultaneously on the League. While the negotiations between the Congress Working Committee and the League Executive Council were in progress, there was a discussion on criminal law Amendment Bill in the Central Legislature on August 23, 1938.² The Congress was opposing the Bill and their party leader wound up his statement¹ with a declaration that any one supporting the bill would

1... Ibid

2. Ahmad.J - Writings and Speeches of Jinnah. Page - 44.

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be selling the country's freedom. As if that was not enough he made the Muslim League party in the Central Legislature a special target of attack :¹ "You, the Muslim League, are occupying a position of balance. Probably this is not going to last. There is soon coming a time when that Bench will disappear".¹ The attack was provocative and Jinnah interpreted this as a threat to the Muslims. ²"What does he (the Congress leader) foreshadow for us - that we should be crushed down, ground down by a brute Hindu majority".² Jinnah got another point to establish his thesis, that the Congress, given power, would crush the minority and that the British system of Parliamentary democracy was unsuited to India. He lost no opportunity to get recorded in the proceedings of the Central Legislature a question - ³"Sir, is this democracy".³

The League was building up its "inherent strength" to stand eventually on the same footing with the Congress. It was continuously widening its demand. A new note was struck in Jinnah's address at the special League session held early in 1938 in Calcutta. ⁴"Muslims have made it clear more than once that besides the question of religion, culture, language and personal laws, there is another question equally of life and death for them and that their future destiny and fate are dependent upon their securing definitely their political rights, their due share in the political life; the government and the administration of the country".⁴

But the League President was silent as to who could secure it for the Muslims. It was an omission too unusual for the League President to make. His silence was more significant than what he

1. Ibid.

2. Ibid.

3. Ibid.

4. Saiyid., M.H.- Mohammad Ali Jinnah-A Political Study.

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said. He had added that the Muslims ¹ "will fight for it till the last ditch and all the dreams and notions of the Hindu Raj must be abandoned". By implication he meant that the Muslims were going to fight the Congress Raj which he alleged was virtually a Hindu Raj. To the Muslim ~~h~~ listeners of Jinnah, the Congress was the enemy number one, and possibly the only enemy then. That there was another enemy - namely the British Government was possibly forgotten in the heat that was generated at the moment.

In the Patna session of the League held in December 1938, Mr. Jinnah made a fervent appeal to the Muslims - ² "I appeal to every one : come into the Muslim League, it is your own organisation". When it was pointed out to him by some younger people that certain individuals should have no place in a people's organisation, he drowned their protests - ³ "But the Muslim League is the organisation of all Muslims". As to why the Muslims should come to the League even if it contains leaders who are not true representatives of the people, the League President had only to point his fingers to the Congress in reply. He made no secret that the League ⁴ "would be the ally of even the devil if need be in the interests of Muslims". ⁴ The whole range of the Presidential address could be summarised as attacks on the Congress and a mild reference to Palestine issue.

⁵ "The Congress is nothing but a Hindu body The presence of a few Muslims - the few misled and misguided ones and the few who are there with ulterior motives - does not, cannot make it a national body, ⁵ was the first point of his thesis.

1. Ibid.
2. Ahmad., J-Speeches and writings of Jinnah. Page - 77.
3. Ibid.
4. Ibid
5. Ahmed, J - Speeches and writings of Jinnah. Page - 68.

Therefore he argued that the Congress speaks of Swaraj "they mean only Hindu Raj". Has not the Congress sufficiently demonstrated the truth he posed. ¹"What did the Congress do when it got the power? With all its pretensions of nationalism, it straight way started with the Bandemataram. It is admitted that Bandemataram is not the national song, yet it is sung as such and thrust upon others. It is sung not only in their own gatherings, but Muslim children in Government and Municipal Schools too are compelled to sing it. Muslim children must accept Bandemataram as their national song, no matter whether religious beliefs permit them to do so or not. It is idolatrous and a hymn of hate against Muslims." When Jinnah asked his audience - ²"Is there any doubt now in the mind of anyone that the whole scheme of Hindi-Hindustani is intended to stifle and suppress Urdu?" There was ^{no} to his listeners ^{no}doubt about the villainy of the Congress. ²

As if that was not enough to agitate the Muslim passions against the Congress. He characterised the Congress support to the trouble created by Arya Samajists and Hindu Mahashabha in Hyderabad state as a move directed against a Muslim ruler which was evident due to the Congress' silence over the fate of the Muslim subjects of the Dogra state of Kashmir.

Jinnah did not believe that the Congress really would not work the Federal part of the 1935 constitution. Statements of a few Congress individuals had reasons to cast doubt ¹ on the Congress declarations. ²The Muslims he said "are not what they were three years ago" - and as such the Congress could no longer ³ "deceive the Muslims." ³"The whole game of the Congress

1. Ibid- Page - 70. 2. Ibid. 3. Ibid-page-75.

4. ~~Ibid.~~

is and has been to get a substantial majority in this wretched highly objectionable and rotten constitution which they want to enjoy".

The League had not yet taken up the proposal of its Sind Branch to regard the Indian Mussalmans as a nation. The Sind Provincial League in its session in October had urged the League to review its policy regarding the future constitution of the country in the light of what it regarded as a fact - that India is a homeland of two nations, Hindus and Muslims and that it is not a country but a continent. The two-nation theory had yet found favour with Jinnah.

Instead, Jinnah¹ denounced the present leadership of the Congress" which "is destroying the ideal with which the Congress was started".¹ He denounced Gandhi as the genius behind the metamorphosis of the Congress. Gandhi's ideal, he said "is to revive Hindu religion and establish Hindu-Raj in this country".² Gandhi was the "one man responsible for turning the Congress into an instrument for the revival of Hinduism".³

Jinnah was only half true in this respect. The Congress was started at a time when Indian nationalism was only Hindu nationalism and that the Congress became a national body in the second and third decades of the current century was a later development. Gandhi was a man of religion and a Hindu at that. That the Congress under his leadership would take a Hinduised tint was anything but unnatural. Even without being a four anna member of the Congress, Gandhi was its soul.⁴ No leader not even atheistic⁴ Socialist Nehru, as Iqbal described him could escape the conflict of head and heart. Nehru's heart responded to Gandhi

1. Ibid - page - 70. 2. Ibid-page-71. 3. Ibid-page-70

4. Iqbal's letter to Jinnah quoted in Mohammad Ali Jinnah- A Political Study by M.H. Saiyid.

²To the ordinary Hindu mass Gandhi was a Maharaj - a Mahatma, and was an object of worship as almost an incarnation of God come down to establish Ram Rajya.

The Congress, under Gandhi had given sufficient reasons to its critics to question its bonafide as a national organisation. Various catalogues of alleged persecutions of Muslims under the Congress rule, were prepared, the most important of them was the "Pirpur Report" submitted at the Patna session to be followed by the "Sharif Report published in two volumes in February, 1939.

The Sharif Report contained extract of a statement from Babu Rajendra Prasad issued to the Press on January 27, 1939. "Bakrid is approaching. In former times there used to be one day in the year in Bihar which was a source of anxiety for the administration and the public workers at large and that day was Bakrid day. But now nobody feels safe on any day as the whole atmosphere is vitiated.....The Hindus must recognise that it is not for them to enforce their own religious opinions and practice on others".

Gandhi also made no secret of his reactions to the happenings in the country. He wrote in Harijan on January 22, 1939.

"Out of the present condition of the Congress I see nothing but anarchy and red ruin in front of the country. Indiscipline of Congressmen is on the increase everywhere. Many of them make irresponsible, even violent speeches. Many fail to carry out instructions".³

~~1. Radhakrishnan on Gandhi, article by Sarma.~~

1. The All India Muslim League in March, 1938, had appointed a Committee to enquire into the grievances of the Mussalmans under the Congress-governed provinces. Raja Sahab of Pirpur was the Chairman of the Committee. Hence it was known as the Pirpur Committee and the Report submitted by it as the Pirpur Report.

2. The Sharif Report was prepared by Mr. S.M. Sharif and published by the Bihar Provincial Muslim League, Patna.

3. Quoted in Sharif Report.

It was a fact that in the provinces where the Congress ran the administration the Muslims suffered. The atrocities on the Muslims under the Congress rule was a dominant factor in changing the attitude of the Muslim masses towards the Congress : Jinnah, had therefore, little difficulty in convincing his listeners in Patna (in the Congress governed province of Bihar) ² "Whenever Muslims have raised the slightest voice of protest against the imposition of Hindu Culture on them, they have been branded as communalists and disturbers of peace, and the repressive machinery of the Congress Governments have been set in motion against them. Take the cases that have occurred in Bihar. Who have suffered suppression of culture under the Congress Government ? It is the Mussalmans". ¹

The Muslim passions were roused against the Congress to such an extent that in the circle of the lesser leaders there was a clamour for declaring ² direct action against the Congress. Jinnah had need for Muslim hatred towards the Congress but he had as yet no stomach for direct action business. The Patna session of the League had, therefore, adopted a formal resolution for direct action with a directive clause that it could be started as and when the Working Committee would so decide.

The Patna session of the League could claim to represent Muslim India. By the end of the year 1938 the League Parliamentary Party had been functioning in 8 out of 11 legislatures of British India Provinces. Its membership had risen from a few thousands to a few hundreds thousand. ³ In ten provinces, Pro-

1. Ahmad. J.- Speeches and writings of Jinnah - page-71.
2. In the Patna session of the League a resolution asking for direct action against the Congress was tabled before the subject Committee. It was debated and discussed, but could not get through because according to Jinnah the time was not yet opportune.
3. Presidential address of Jinnah in the ^{Calcutta} Patna session of the League. ~~Speeches and writings of Jinnah.~~ ⁽¹⁹³⁸⁾

vincial, district and primary units had been set up. Every day new branches were being opened up in different parts of the country.

Hindu-Muslim relation had already been very much strained for a long time - since practically 1922. Riots and communal clashes were normal features of India's national life. The League had by its continuous propaganda identified the Congress with the Hindus and thereby transferred the Muslim bitterness against the Hindus to the Congress. The line of argument was like this : if Hindu is an enemy of the Muslims and if the Congress is a Hindu organisation, the Congress is an enemy of the Muslims.

Events in politics move not as they should. Certain beliefs, whether they have any reason or not make the events move in their particular pattern. The Muslim youth had become an ardent believer in the Muslim League. Apart from the tinge of Pan-Islamism that the movement of the League had in its very existence namely - Pan-Indian Islamism, the League had started to shout about the danger to Islamic culture and civilisation. Apparently it was an idealism that had drawn the rising Muslim intelligentsia towards the League. There was an essential economic appeal as well. The Muslim youth in Bengal and the Punjab had hopes raised to share half of the Govt. jobs and services, which until recently was a virtual monopoly of the Hindus and Sikhs. The Muslim youth in the minority provinces specially in the U.P. found the door of services getting closed on their face under the Congress regime. It is true that the Hindus had a right to higher percentage than they had been enjoying before the working of 1935 Act in the U.P. according to the same logic that ensured 50% of jobs to the Muslims, say in Bengal. It was equally true that justice to the Hindus in U.P. was in direct clash with the interest of the U.P. Muslim youth.

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It was not unusual to find in those days that in the same Muslim house in Bengal the father was not anti-Congress if not also pro-Congress while his son in the College or University was vehemently anti-Congress and an ardent supporter of the League. Father knew the Congress of the Khilafat days and the son knew the Congress in power. Youth has been the instrument of power in politics in India. The Congress had used them and so did the League.

Jinnah had obviously noticed the rise of Hitlerite Germany very carefully. ¹ He had seen how the wrongs done to the Germans in the Versailles Treaty was systematically exploited by Hitler not only to unify the German nation but to forge an aggressive movement for its undoing. The corner stone of the League to unify the Indian Mussalmans was the wrongs done to the Muslims by the Congress ministries. If Hitler and Jinnah differed in methods that was because Hitler was organising a free nation and Jinnah a subject people. The Report of the Pirpur Committee had created a great stir in the country. The Congress denied the charges and ² suggested an impartial tribunal presided over by the Chief Justice of India to go into them. ³ The League disagreed because it held that the Congress as accused had no right to constitute the tribunal. ³ Moreover it had no legal authority to "summon witnesses, to take evidence on oath and call for the production of documents that might be required". Only the ruling power could hold an enquiry and so a Royal Commission, should in their opinion, enquire into the allegations. The allegations contained

1. Jinnah once spoke of undoing the constitution of 1935 as the Germans undid the Versailles Treaty. (Jinnah's address to the Bombay session of the League 1936). In another speech he mentioned the Sudetan Germans.
2. The Congress President, Babu Rajendra Prasad wrote to Mr. Jinnah on the 5th of October 1939, offering to constitute an enquiry Committee to investigate into the Muslim grievances, with Sir Maurice Gwyer, Chief Justice of the Federal Court or some other persons of a similar status as the Chairman.
3. Jinnah's statement to the press on Najaf Day.

in the Pirpur Report was therefore neither proved nor disproved. Even if a later enquiry would disprove the allegations - the Congress could never regain ~~the~~ loss and the damage sustained by the publication of the report. The mischief was already done to the Congress; to the same extent the League was a gainer. The League had no longer to prove its thesis. It was generally accepted by the Muslims that the Congress was a Hindu body.

By the beginning of 1939, therefore, Jinnah opened his second front - the attack against the British Government in India, whom he called the ally of the Congress. Speaking to the Aligarh students in February, 1938, Jinnah had complained-"the British Government shows no sign of coming to the help of Muslims but is throwing them to the wolves." Jinnah possibly had an expectation that the British Government would come to the help of the Mussalmans in view of the special responsibilities given to the governors under the 1935 Act and in the name of justice to minorities; By December of the same year the expectation was found not to materialise. In his Presidential address at the annual session of the League (held in December) Jinnah urged his followers not to expect any help from the Britishers. His voice was one of bitterness against the British Government.

"I am sure even if there were a few amongst Muslims who had thought in the past that the Muslims might gain their end by alliance with British imperialism, they have now been thoroughly disillusioned".¹ Jinnah was only preparing for an attack.

1. Ahmad. J - Speeches and writings of Jinnah-page-76.

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The attack was opened on March 22, 1939, in connection with a debate in the Central Legislature, on the Finance Bill. Jinnah used the occasion to bring his grievances home more to the British Government, than to the sworn enemy - the Congress. He had a favourable position of power to do it. He made no secret to state :- ¹"we hold the balance in the House" and warned the Government "If we are supporting the Government, then I think the Finance member can safely pilot this Bill to his satisfaction and he can carry this Bill without a comma of it being altered; and he naturally would plead before this House and plead before my party that we should support it". He had no such warning to make to the Congress - the opposition in the Central Legislature.

There was no mistake in his note of threat to the British Government and sense of helplessness against the Congress. The Congress, he knew could defeat the Govt. in case the Muslim League party remained neutral but such victory of the Congress, he maintained would be an empty one.

The moot point of Jinnah's stand was that the Government did not do its duty as a paramount power. ²"The British Government has failed even to secure us our elementary rights ~~as~~ of citizenship, and those special powers which were assumed under the guise of the Governors and the Governor General being the protectors and the trustees of minorities have proved to be a fraud, worse than a fraud".²

The League leader had nothing to say about the Finance Bill and the proposals contained therein. All that he was interested in was to record his protest against the non-interference of the Governors in the activities of the Congress

1. Ibid - page - 79.

2. Ibid - page - 82.

ministries. The position stood thus: the Governors would have justification if they interfered in favour of Muslims. Jinnah would have no objection to the bureaucracy vetoing the actions of the elected representatives of the people.

It was indeed a great lapse in Jinnah. There might have been sufficient reasons for the change in him. It is true that he wanted to unite the Muslims and that could easily be achieved by denouncing the Congress. It is equally true that Jinnah had ceased to be what he was even until 1936 - possibly more by circumstances than by choice.

It is argued, however, that the Congress also felt no less jubilant when the British Government frustrated the League move to form Govt. in Sind or in the Punjab! But one wrong never justifies another wrong. Despite close Co-Operation between the Govt. and the Congress in the Congress majority provinces, the Congress had not deviated from its anti-British policy either in the Central Legislature or in the politics outside the Legislature. One might possibly suspect that the League fell an easy prey to a bigger game and the British non-interference in the Provincial administration was a part of that game - namely to cause an unbridgeable gulf between the Congress and the League. When charged with acts of injustice to the Muslims the Congress replied that the fact that the British Governors had only words of commendation for the administration of the Congress was a sufficient proof to the contrary.²

1. Saiyid. M.H. - Mohammad Ali Jinnah - A Political Study.
Page - 642

2. Mukherjee. S. - Muslim Politics. Page - 58.

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~~grievances of the Muslims.~~

The fact remains - that for the lapse of the League the Congress was equally responsible. ^{In the 16th Congress} It had ceased to represent the Muslim India.

Another new and significant development is noticed in the League politics since December 1938. The Muslims were no longer considered to be a community. The League began to call them a nation in India. It must be admitted, however that the concept was not League's ; it only accepted the concept that was developing in the minds of a very vocal sections of the Muslims of India, mainly of the North West. By 1939 quite a number of schemes for dividing India were already in the air! The League had not immediately taken official notice of the schemes of partitioning India. It had at least the satisfaction that the concept of Indian nationhood preached by the Congress was becoming a myth to a large section of the Muslims.

Jinnah had used the term "Muslim Nation" only once in 1938 and that was while addressing the Annual session of the League in December. In the following year he used the term more often. Even as late as September 28, 1939 Jinnah was speaking for a Hindu-Muslim pact, but that was to be not of the type of the Lucknow Pact of 1916 as between two communities of the same Indian nation, but of the type of "German-Soviet Pact between the two nations which were the bitterest enemies".² That there was an essential difference, did not occur to Jinnah. Both Germany and the Soviets were sovereign nations while the Indian 'nations' were under foreign control. Jinnah obviously wanted

1. Infra. page - 217

2. Ahmad. J. - Speeches and writings of Jinnah.
Page - 83-84.

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to emphasise that Indian Muslims were a nation. Otherwise the analogy was irrelevant.

For this development in Jinnah's mind the events in the country had helped a good deal. On September 3rd, the Viceroy declared India at war with Germany following declaration of war by the His Majesty's Government. The Government of India needed public support for the successful prosecution of the war efforts. The Viceroy had invited Gandhi and Jinnah for consultation in this connection. If Gandhi was representing Hindu India, Jinnah obtained recognition to represent Muslim India. Jinnah had made his importance felt during the discussion of the Finance Bill in March and in subsequent months; in September his importance recognised. The Viceroy's declaration on 11th September 1939 that His Majesty's Govt. had suspended the Federal part of 1935 Act was taken as a great victory of the League.

While the Congress Working Committee resented India's involvement in the war without her consent the Muslim League had no such objection. The state of emergency in India was on the other hand sought to be an occasion to press upon the Govt. the demands of the Muslim League. The Executive Committee of the League in its resolution on September 18, 1939 asked for the complete abandonment of the Federal part of the Govt. of India Act 1935 and not its suspension alone. Reiterating the League's allegation against the Congress ministries it asked "His Majesty's Government and the Viceroy and Governor General to direct Governors to exercise their special powers, where any provincial ministry fails to secure justice and fairplay to the Mussalmans or where they resort to oppression or interference with their political, economic, social and cultural rights, in accordance

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with the sacred promises, assurances and declarations repeatedly made by Great Britain in consequence of which these special powers were expressly embodied in the Statute".¹ The League Executive Committee further reiterated ²"that while Muslim India stands against exploitation of the people of India and has repeatedly declared in favour of "Free India" it is equally opposed to the domination of Hindu majority over Mussalmans and other minorities and vassalisation of Muslim India, and is irrevocably opposed to any 'federal objective' which must necessarily result in a majority community rule under the guise of democracy and Parliamentary system of government".² Elaborating, the League officially declared that the country is composed of various nationalities and does not constitute a national state. ³Requesting the His Majesty's Government, "to satisfy the Arab national demands", the League urged the Govt. to take into its 'confidence the Muslim League which is the only organisation that can speak on behalf of Muslim India".³

While the Muslim League was asking to be taken into confidence of the British Government the Congress demanded that Britain should state her war aims and declare India an independent country. The Congress insisted formation of a constituent Assembly based on adult franchise and the League demanded "the British Government to review and revise the entire problem of India's future constitution denovo". Jinnah explained ⁴"The words 'nationalism' and nationalist' have undergone many changes in the definition and significance. Some people have a dictionary of their own but within the honest meaning of the term, I still remain a nationalist."⁴ Jinnah could have added "a Muslim nation-

1. Saiyid - Mohammed Ali Jinnah 650-51

2. Ibid. 649 - 150. 3. Ibid. 652. 4. Ibid. 654.

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alist". It was nonetheless a confession that his conception of Indian nationhood has changed.

Together with a change in the concept of nationhood in Jinnah there was another noticeable change in him since 1939. He had become an exponent of Islam.¹ He told the Aligarh students that the Muslim League "stands for complete freedom of India, not for one community but for all the peoples composing this great subcontinent". The message assumes a significance when he adds that the Muslim League also stands "for free and independent Islam".¹ Unfortunately he did not elaborate his meaning of "free and independent Islam". The Quid-i-Azam (The great leader), the title that was applied for Jinnah by the Muslims and also by Gandhi - for the first time in his political career broadcast a message for the Id on November 13, 1939, in which he dwelt on the significance of the prayer. The change amused the Hindus who still believed that the Muslim leaders do not support Jinnah. Dr. B.R. Ambedkar, the scheduled caste leader did not fail to notice the significance of the change in Jinnah's attitude.² Writing in 1940. Ambedkar observed : ²Mr. Jinnah was never known to be a very devout, pious or a professing Muslim. Besides kissing the holy Quran as and when he was ~~sw~~ sworn as an M.L.A. he does not appeared to have bothered much about its contents or special tenets. It is doubtful if he frequented any mosque either out of curiosity or religious fervour To day he goes to the mosque to hear Khutba and takes delight in joining the I'd congregational prayers, Dongri and Nulbazar once knew Mr. Jinnah only by name today they know him by his presence In this Mr. Jinnah has

1. Jinnah's message to the students of Muslim University, Aligarh. Ahmad.J - Speeches and writings of Jinnah

2. Ambedkar. B.R.-Thoughts on Pakistan. Page - 351.

merely followed king Henry IV of France Henry IV was a Huguenot by faith but he did not hesitate to attend the mass in a Catholic Church in Paris. He believed that to change his Huguenot faith and go to mass was an easy price to pay for the powerful support of Paris. As Paris became worth a mass to Henry IV, so have Dongri and Nulbazar become worth a mass to Mr. Jinnah and for the same reason. It is strategy; it is mobilisation. But even if it is viewed as the sinking of Mr. Jinnah from reason to superstition he is sinking with his ideology which by his very sinking is spreading into all the different strata of Muslim Society and is becoming part and parcel of its mental make-up".

¹Only a year ago Jinnah was condemning the Moulavis and Moulanas! If he condemned the pro-Congress Jamiat-i-Ulam-i-Hind, he had already created conditions for the rise of Jamiat-i-Ulama-i-Islam.

As noticed already that in reply to the appeal of the British Government to help in the war efforts, the Congress had asked for terms on which the Government was prepared to purchase it, and demanded immediate independence and a constituent Assembly on adult franchise. In this respect the Congress had gone beyond Gandhi's terms. ²Gandhi was prepared to wait until the war was over for an immediate deliverance would not be worth it if England and France fell or if they come out victorious "ruined and humbled".

³The British Press condemned the Congress demand. ³"They evidently hope to extract political profit from the situation. The Congress demand, the London Times said could not be accepted by the British Government. The British Government cannot bind itself

1. His speech to the Aligarh students in February, 1938.

2. Noman. M - Muslim India-page- 388.

3. Article published in the Times of London referring to the statement by the Congress Committee regarding British war aims, quoted in Muslim India by M.Noman. Page - 391.

to concede to the Indian Congress party what would amount to a monopoly of the representation of Indian political opinion." Such undertaking the news paper added, "would constitute an injustice to other very important Indian interests, - the Muslim Community among them".

The British Press comments apparently sought to exploit the declarations of the League to deny representative character of the Congress and thereby to ignore the Congress demands for an immediate declaration of India's independence and constitution of a Constituent Assembly on adult franchise for deciding India's ~~xxxx~~ future constitution. The League had inspite of itself, become a handy weapon to beat the Congress demand for immediate independence for India. ²In reply to the Congress demand for a declaration of war aims with regard to India - the Secretary of State announced in October in the House of Lords that India's political goal was attainment of Dominion status of the Westminster variety. ¹The Secretary of State ^{Lord} ~~Mr.~~ Zetland further assured the Muslims in reply to their demand for asking the Governors to exercise their special responsibility, that the Govt. "was not divorcing the responsibility which devolved on the shoulders of the British Government". The British Government also repeated its request for a workable unity among the Indian parties to prosecute the war efforts.

²The Viceroy's announcement on October 18, repeated the British war aims for India as the attainment of Dominion status. His statement was intended to please both the Congress and the League and urge on both to co-operate with the war efforts of the Government. Assurance for Dominion status after the war would have satisfied the Congress as Gandhi was not insistent on its

1. Noman - Muslim India - Page - 389.

2. Ibid - Page - 392.

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immediate implementation. The Viceroy's statement asking the Indian Parties not to insist on particular phrases was intended possibly to satisfy the League for the Viceroy remarked that the situation had to be faced in terms of the political realities of the country.

In the circumstances, the Viceroy suggested formation of a consultative group fully representative of all major political parties to advise the Government on war efforts. The consultative group would be presided over by the Viceroy at the centre and the governors in the provinces. The intention of the Government was not to risk splitting the Unity of India on the rock of phrases. The early reverses of the allies in the war had made some co-operation of India absolutely essential for the Government.

The Viceroy's offer could not be unwelcome to the League. The League could hope to share in power in the Congress provinces—though it meant also the Congress sharing in power in Bengal and the Punjab. On the other hand the proposal sought to take away the bargaining power of the Congress — which they had by virtue of their absolute majority in as many as six provinces.

The Congress High command reacted on October 22 by asking the Congress ministries to resign office.

The Viceroy invited the Congress and League Presidents and Gandhi to a consultation on November 1. On November, 2, the Viceroy wrote to Gandhi, Jinnah and Rajendra Prasad detailing the scheme he had discussed the previous day. The Viceroy's letter put the Congress and the League on the same footing — the object for which Jinnah had been fighting since 1937.

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The Letter maintained - "The proposition which I invited you and the other gentlemen present to consider, as leaders of the Congress, and the Muslim League, was that, given the great importance of ensuing harmonious working at the Centre, you should enter upon discussions between yourselves with a view to discovering whether you could reach a basis of agreement between yourselves in the Provincial field, consequent on which you could let me have proposals which would result in representatives of your two organisations immediately participating in the Central Government as members of ~~my~~ Executive Council". The Viceroy held that absolute unity of view on every detail was not necessary and that the arrangement proposed was to be an ad-hoc one "for the period of the war". Other groups also could be represented on the Viceroy's Executive Council ^{after} with consultation ~~with~~ the Congress and League and all members of the Executive Council would be of equal status. The arrangement was envisaged without prejudice to future constitutional arrangements after the termination of hostilities.

Babu Rajendra Prasad, the Congress President replied that unless the Govt. clarified the war aims, the subsidiary proposals could not be considered. The Congress, he maintained could not appreciate "the communal question being dragged in, in this connection." ²

Since the whole scheme was envisaged on a possible Congress-League co-operation, it fell through. Jinnah accordingly informed the Viceroy ³

"I beg to inform you that I understood that the Congress Leaders and myself were to consider the proposals of your Excellency. In consequence I met the leaders of the Congress and I was

1. Gaiyid. M.H. - Mohammad Ali Jinnah - A Political study Page-674-
 2. Ibid. Page - 677. 175.
 3. Ibid. Page - 678.

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informed by them finally that they had come to the conclusion that they could not discuss any questions with regard to matters referred to in your letter of the 2nd instant, relating to the Provincial field or at the Centre, until the British Government had complied with their demand as embodied in the resolution of the All India Congress Committee hence these two questions were not further discussed."

The Congress appreciated the Hindu-Muslim unity was necessary for "our forward move towards our goal of self Government" but was reluctant to meet the League for the purpose. ¹Instead they held - "it is essential that Congress - minded and truly nationalist Mussalmans of Hindustan have got to become vocal" / Jinnah described this attitude of the Congress as refusal to grasp the hand of friendship.

The Congress, it seems had not learnt anything from the developments in the country since Pandit Nehru had declared in 1937 that there were only two parties in India. Gandhi repeated the same words when speaking to a foreign correspondent in 1939. He said that there was only one party in India which could deliver the goods and that was the Congress. On being told that there was the Muslim League he refused to accept the fact of any other party. On being pointed out that one party government would be fascist and not democratic, Gandhi replied :-²"Damn it by whatever name you may, there can be only one party in India, and that is the Congress." ~

No ~~any~~ approachment was possible in the circumstances - when the Congress refused to face facts however unpalatable the facts

1. A letter from the Bihar Provincial Congress Committee issued from the Sadaqat Ashram, addressed to the President of the District Congress Committee, Gaya, which was published in the Star of India on the 4th December 1939. Quoted in Jinnah's statement. Speeches and writings of Jinnah by Ahmad. Page-104
2. Gandhi in an interview with the representative of the "News Chronicle". Speeches and writings of Jinnah by Ahmad. Page-105.

were. ¹Jinnah claimed to represent the majority of the Indian Muslims and nobody could claim to represent 100% ^{per cent -} of any people. As the Congress refused to endorse Jinnah's claim he also refused to be a party to the Joint demands formulated by the Congress. The Congress - League agreement, Jinnah maintained, was a necessity before any joint demand is made to the Government.

The Congress ministries resigned under directions of their High command. The League President availed this opportunity to issue an appeal on December 2, asking the Mussalmans all over India to observe December 22, as "Najat Day" (Day of deliverance). Explaining the reasons Jinnah summarised the developments in the Congress-governed Provinces in so far as the League regarded them as directed against the Muslims.

The draft resolution of the Muslim League for the day was also circulated for adoption by different meetings that were to be organised throughout the country.² The meetings in their resolutions were to endorse the League claim to deny the representative character of the Congress regarding the Muslims and other minorities; they were to ratify the charges of deliberate suppression of the elementary rights of the Mussalmans, economic, political and cultural. They were further to express satisfaction at the termination of the Congress Governments and urge upon the governors of the Provinces ruled under section 93 of the Government of India Act "to redress" the wrongs done to the Muslims.

The "Najat Day" was observed by the Leaguers with great success. Many non-Congress non-Muslims also joined the observance.³ As Jinnah explained the presence of the Scheduled Caste, Parsis,

1. Jinnah's Press statement in reply to Sir Hugh O Neil. Speeches and writings of Jinnah by Ahmad. Page - 110.
2. Jinnah's appeal for the observance of "Najat Day" issued from Bombay, on 2nd December 1939. Speeches & writings of Jinnah by Ahmad. Page - 95-97.
3. Jinnah's letter to Gandhi, January 1, 1940. Speeches and writings of Jinnah by Ahmad. Page - 120.

and Justice Party at these meetings "was partly a case of adversity bringing strange bed-fellows together and partly because common interest may lead Muslims and minorities to combine.

in:

"In his letter in reply to Gandhi's letter of the 16th December, Jinnah further mentioned - "I have no illusions in the matter, and let me say again that India is not a nation nor a country. . It is a Sub-continent composed of nationalities, Hindus and Muslims being the two major nations".¹ To Gandhi's contention that religion could not be a main factor in determining a nation, Jinnah replied by quoting Gandhi who ^{had} said earlier- "the thing that leads us to do what we do", was "purely religious" whether the object was religious or social or political.²

The breach with the Congress was final. A common Indian nationhood was no longer a possibility. The All India Muslim League, had after this, no alternative ^{but -} to ask for a homeland for of the Muslim nation of India.

1. Ibid.

2. Ibid - page - 121.

CHAPTER IX

The cry for a homeland. 1940.

The observance of the "Najat Day" throughout the country amply demonstrated that the Congress stood condemned by the overwhelming majority of the vocal section of the Indian Muslims and other minority communities. The Congress Raj, they held, was in fact, Hindu Raj - a caste Hindu Raj.

The Congress demand in the circumstances for immediate independence and constitution of a constituent Assembly to frame the future constitution of India was bound to react adversely on the Muslim League. The League viewed the demand as a means to extend the Congress or caste Hindu Raj from 8 Provinces to the whole of India, states and Provinces.¹

The Congress in defiance of the wishes of Gandhi had demanded immediate transfer of power to India.² In order to force the British Government the Congress ministries were asked to resign. The time and occasion was well chosen as the British Government was in need of Indian Co-operation in war efforts. The Congress had resorted to pressure tactics, but much of its effect was minimised by the League observance of the Najat day. Frustrated the Congress branded the League as an obstacle on the way of India's independence. Whatever the League point of view was, the Congress charges made^a good and effective propoganda against the League. Gandhi revised himself and by December 1939, he was propogating for the Congress demand of the immediate formation of a constituent Assembly. In Press interviews to foreign journalists he maintained that³ the Congress was the sole mouthpiece of India and it was only the Congress that could deliver the goods.

1. Ahmad. J. - Speeches and writings of Jinnah. Page - 117
2. Supra - page - 200
3. Ahmad. J. - Speeches and writings of Jinnah. Page. - 105

Gandhi's pleadings for a Constituent Assembly had roused Jinnah's fears as Gandhi advised Britain as "a ~~the~~ friend of Britain". Jinnah came out to counter the propaganda of Gandhi and the Congress. The Congress did not detail the scheme for a constituent Assembly nor did Gandhi. There was no word^{said} as to how the minorities would have the effective guarantees of their rights and privileges. Whatever was said in Gandhi's scheme for minority safeguard was on ultimate analysis found by Jinnah as ineffective. ~~xxxxxxxanalysisxxxxxxx~~

In the course of his pleadings against the Congress - Gandhi demand for a Constituent Assembly Jinnah again made it clear that the Muslims were not a minority in the sense the Parliamentary minority in Great Britain was.

Unqualified Western democracy was, therefore, unsuited to Indian conditions where the Hindus formed the permanent majority.

In his article published in the 'Time and Tide', London on January 19, 1940, Jinnah argued against the Congress Case. The Constituent Assembly as proposed by the Congress would mean permanent Hindu Raj over the whole country as "experience has proved that, whatever the economic and political programme of any political party, the Hindu as a general rule, will vote for his caste fellow and the Muslim for his Co-religionist".² The Hindu Raj had already demonstrated its character in the Congress governed Provinces. Denouncing the timing of the ~~the~~ Congress demand as a political blackmail in Britain's distress, Jinnah summarised the League points of view on the matter of constitutional advancement of the country. The League he maintained, stood "for a free India" but it was irrevocably opposed to any federal objective ensuring

1. *Ibid.* Page - 108
2. *Ibid.* - page - 118

3. *Ibid.* Page - 113

- 3 -

"a majority community rule". The question of future constitution was to be reconsidered "in the light of the experience gained by the working of the present Provincial Constitution and developments taken place since 1935," but no constitution that lacks approval of the All-India Muslim League would be acceptable to the League or the Indian Muslims. Jinnah was still speaking of "a free India" in which the Government was to be shared by both the Nations.

The concept of a separate Muslim nationhood was not new. Good or bad Indian society had always been divided. The division had various origins, but they obtained their rigidity from religious sanction. In the opinion of Karl Marx Indian Society were divided¹ "not only between the Mohammedan and Hindu, but between tribe and tribe, between caste and caste, a society whose framework was based on a sort of equilibrium resulting from a general repulsion and constitutional exclusiveness between all its members".

It is true that there was an attempt to evolve an Indian nationhood in the 19th century following the development of a concept of a united India Co-terminous with British Indian possessions. But at the same time political education imparted to the country was detrimental to the evolution of an Indian nationhood irrespective not so much of caste as of creed. India's political past was designated as periods of Hindu or Muslim rule. History thus taught possibly helped to fade out the tribal or racial distinctions and rivalries of the past rulers of India; but emphasised their religious denominations.

The English who had taken the task of educating the Indians had succeeded in creating an educated class, primarily Hindu who had begun looking upon the English as the liberators of India obviously from the hated Mussalman foreigners. Islam, despite its

1. Quoted in "Pakistan" by Mohammad Habibullah - page - 1.

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claiming over a quarter of India's population always remained foreign in so far it could not be co-ordinated in the Hindu religion-social pattern. Muslims even of pure Indian origin were socially outcastes - Yavanas or foreigners.

Thus educated, Bankim Chandra, the author of *Bandemataram* could not but look upon the Muslims as hated foreigners who were to be driven out or destroyed. Indian nation, to him was the Hindu nation irrespective of caste or race. His *Bandemataram* was a hymn of hate and war cry against the Muslims. Yet Bankim Chandra was the poet of Indian nationalism and his *Bandemataram* national slogan and song. Though independent India to day prides over the fact of Hindu participation in the mutiny of 1857, the whole ¹responsibility then was laid at the door of the Mussalmans as a religious group.

No wonder then that at the dawn of Muslim renaissance Sir Sayed Ahmad urged his followers: "The proposals of the Congress are ~~exactly~~ exceedingly inexpedient for a country which is inhabited by two different nations ... Now suppose that all the English were to leave India then who would be rulers of India? Is it possible that under these circumstances two nations - the Mohammedans and Hindu - could sit on the same throne and remain equal in power? Most certainly not. It is necessary that one of them should conquer the other and thrust it down. To hope that both could remain equal is to desire the impossible and the inconceivable".² Whether the argument to retain English rule in India then was valid or otherwise the fact remained that the Muslims were led to believe that they were a separate nation.

Hindu renaissance rejected the so-called Muslim period of Indian history as its past and went back to pre-Muslim India to draw its inspiration. Muslim renaissance, therefore, sought inspi-

1. Supra. Page - 2

2. Quoted in the Making of Pakistan by Richard Symond. Page-31.

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ration from the caliphate. There was no common source to draw inspiration for both.

In spite of the fact that the Hindu or the Indian Mussalman drew inspiration from different sources the two gradually came closer towards the second decade of the current century. The reason was quite simple - both found the British imperialism a stumbling block on their ways. They Co-operated in undoing the British Raj which became their principal objective. Individual ideals whether Ram Rajya or Hukmat-e-Ilahi were not immediate points at issue. The Hindu Muslim Co-Operation during the Khilafat days or the earlier Lucknow Pact never compromised individual individual identities though there was co-operation against the British Government in India. With the end of British Raj in view - objectives beyond loomed large on the horizon and the conflict ensued. Under the British Raj Hindus and Muslims were two communities forming an united national front to put an end to the foreign domination. In India free from British Raj there could be in the context of Indian tradition built up during centuries of the past a rule of the majority community - in other words the Hindu Raj. India could not develop a secular attitude in its social interrelations and therefore there could not be any secularism in politics - its principal phenomenon. As stated already the religious division of the Indian population was admitted when a common front was made against the British Govt. To deny that division in the sharing of power was bound to create suspicion. It was undoubted that the Congress followers were mostly Hindus.

1. The Congress Working Committee admitted this fact in its resolution of 25th July 1938. The resolution is quoted in Mohammad Ali Jinnah. A Political Study by M.H. Saiyid. Page -610.

Its claim in the circumstances to represent India to the ~~exclusion~~ exclusion of the League that claimed to represent the Mussalmans of India was naturally interpreted as a Hindu game to obliterate the very existence of the Mussalmans in India. The louder the Congress shouted in the name of Indian nationalism, the more the Muslims became convinced of the Congress intention to impose Hindu nationalism. To counter the virtual Hindu nationalism of the Congress the League had to revive the cry of Muslim nationalism.

The talk of transfer of power in Indian hands and the constitution of a constituent Assembly for framing new constitution for the country brought the clash to its highest pitch. Jinnah wanted the constitution to be so framed where in provision for a joint government by the two nations should be made.

On February 25, 1940 while addressing the League Council Jinnah made it clear - "We will not let either the British or Mr. Gandhi to rule the Mussalmans!" Subsequent developments in the League politics were quick to follow. If the League did not envisage the British rule or the rule of the majority community of which Gandhi was the leader - as acceptable to the Mussalmans - the unexpressed intention was to have a Muslim rule as well. To think of the Muslim minority ruling over Hindu majority in India was simply an absurdity. Muslim demand to enjoy absolute power in Muslim majority areas of the Indian sub-continent was a natural outcome in the circumstances. When the Muslims had been again made to think in terms of a separate nation - the cry for a national homeland was inevitable. The cry came in less than a month's time. The Annual session of the League that met in Lahore on March 22, adopted a resolution on the following day asking for Muslim homeland in the Indian sub-continent.

1. Ahmad, J. - Speeches and writings of Jinnah - page 132.

The cry for a Muslim homeland was not new. ¹ The idea was conceived by the champion of Pan-Islamism, Jamaluddin Afghani (1836-97) who dreamt of an united Muslim state-comprising also ² the Muslim North-West India. Early in this century ³ the "silsila-i-Jamia" movement of Syed Jalil Ahmed Senusi which had received ^{ten} the patronage of ~~Mr~~ Kamal Ata-Turk conceived of ~~these~~ Muslim republics of which three, the Republics of Hydria (Hyderabad.D.N.) Mohammadia (Bengal), and Islamistan (North-West India) belonged to India. ⁴ The idea appears to have been voiced for the first time in India by Khan Saheb Sardar Mohammad Gulkhan, President of the Anjuman-e-Islamia Dera Ismail Khan, in his evidence to the North West Frontier Committee in 1923. ⁵ "The Hindu-Muslim unity will never become a fact it will never become a fait accompli" observed Sardar Gulkhan in reply to a question put to him by one of the members of the Committee. He said ⁶ "we would very much rather see the separation of the Hindus and Mohammadans, 23 crores of Hindus to the south and 8 crores of Muslims to the North". ⁴ According to him the Muslim homeland should stretch from Peshawar to Agra.

Sardar Gulkhan was not the only person thinking in the line, In 1924, Moulana Mohammad Ali, while speaking in the Bombay session of the Muslim League suggested that ⁶ the frontier Muslims should have the right to self determination ^{and} to chose between an affiliation with India or with Kabul. ⁵ He envisaged an independent Muslim Zone from Constantinopole to Shahrampur.

⁶ Moulana Hasrat Mohani drew up a geographical scheme for Hindu-Muslim settlement. ⁶ He was more practical and envisaged separate

1. Habibullah. Md. -Pakistan. page - 97
2. Ibid.
3. Ambedkar., B.R.- Thoughts on Pakistan. Page - 333
4. Ibid.
5. Ibid. Page - 336
6. Lateef. S.A. - The Great leader Page - 121.

homelands for Muslims and Hindus in the subcontinent, joined under a national Federal Government. In this Moulana Mohani made a departure from Sardar Gulkhan and Moulana Mohammad Ali who urged for non-Indian affiliation for the proposed Muslim State.

¹Moulana Mohani's scheme evoked welcome response from Lala Lajpat Rai in 1925. ²Unless the Muslims were going to give up their separate entity by giving up separate electorate, India should according to him be divided into Hindu states and Muslim States. The Muslims would obtain four States; Sind, the Punjab, N.W.F.P. and East Bengal. ²The Lala had no comment on the Mohani Scheme for a national Federation. Lalaji was not afraid of seven crores Indian Muslims, but the possibility of ~~them~~ ^{their} joining "the armed hosts of Afghanistan, Central Asia, Arabia, Mesopotamia and Turkey" was a serious proposition to be afraid of.

Next to preach for a national homeland for the Muslims was Dr. Mohammad Iqbal. In his presidential address at the Allahabad session of the All-India Muslim League in December 1930, Iqbal said: ³"To base a constitution on the conception of a homogeneous India or to apply to India the principles dictated by British democratic sentiments is unwittingly to prepare her for a Civil War". He tried to justify the creation of a "Muslim India within India". He wanted to see the Punjab, the N.W.F.P. Sind and Baluchistan amalgamated into a single Muslim State within or outside the British empire, Iqbal's concern was North West India. It is significant that his scheme did not include the Muslim homeland of East Bengal though Lala Lajpat Rai spoke of its possibility five years earlier.

1. Ibid.

2. Ibid - page - 122.

3. Saiyid. M.H. - Mohammad Ali Jinnah - A political study. Page-179. For the full text of the Presidential address of Dr. Iqbal see Appendix IV.

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Iqbal evoked no response from the Muslims in India. ¹ Possibly he had discussed the possibility with the British statesman also when he attended the Round Table Conference as a Muslim representative from India but there was no response from them either. Britain was not yet thinking in terms of quitting India and a divided India would have been unthinkable to her. His visit to England however helped Iqbal to influence a group of young Muslim students who gave a rousing reception to the poet. Though direct evidence is lacking to connect Iqbal with the originators of the "Pakistan scheme", the identity of their line of thinking make it ~~amply~~ amply clear that Choudhury Rahmat Ali and his friends were directly influenced by Iqbal's ² ideas.

1. Dr. B. R. Ambedkar in his Thoughts of Pakistan, page 337, mentions that the scheme for Partitioning India "was privately discussed with the British authorities who were not in favour of it. "But he does not say who discussed it. However, again, in page 336, Ambedkar writes "If opposition to one common Central Govt. be taken as a principal feature of the scheme of Pakistan then the only member of the R.T.C. who may be said to have supported it without mentioning it by name was Sir Mohammad Iqbal who expressed the view that there should be no Central Govt. for India and that Provinces should be autonomous and independent dominions in direct relation to the Secretary of State in London".
2. (A) Coatman is supposed by Mehta and Patwardhan and also by W.C. Smith to have visualised the idea. This seems unwarranted. Coatman who happened to be the compiler of the Govt. Report in India, it is true visualised the possibility of North West India breaking away to form a "Powerful Mohammedan State with its eyes definitely turned away towards the rest of the Muslim world". By then the idea was already voiced by many leading Muslims and at least one leading Hindu of the time.

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 (B) That Iqbal was very serious about the scheme/amply clear from his repeated letters to Jinnah in 1937. (The letters have been published by Agraf Publication, Lahore) As Thompson suggests the idea was not his own (Enlist India for freedom pp.58). It was already voiced by others mostly non-Leaguers.

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In January 1933 when the Joint Parliamentary Committee were carrying on its work of examining witnesses a pamphlet was published under the joint authorship of Choudhury Rahmat Ali, Sheikh Mohammad Sadiq and Mohammad Aslam Khan, protesting against the federal scheme for the Indian administration that was being framed. The authors of the pamphlet claimed to speak for "thirty million Muslim brethren who live in Pakistan - by which we mean the five Northern units of India viz., the Punjab, N.W.F.P. (Afghan Province) Kashmir, Sind and Baluchistan".²

The self imposed leadership for the Muslims of so-called "Pakistan" was repudiated by the accredited Muslim representatives of India in England. They dubbed the scheme of a separate Muslim homeland called Pakistan as "a students' scheme" and considered it as chimerical and impracticable.³

The reactions in Hindu and English Circles in England was equally unfavourable. The Duples of Athol M.R. found in the scheme a danger to India from the Muslims living the entire area upto the Mediterranean. She was more afraid of 'Afghan invasion with Soviet support', Professor Gulshan Rai writing in the Tribune on October 12, 1935 found in the scheme a danger not only to the Hindus and Sikhs but also to the British Government. The Times of London as late as 1935 did not find anything in the difference of the Hindus and Muslims except "the superstition" which it hoped "will die out and India will be moulded into a single nation".⁴

1. Gauba., K.L. - Consequences of Pakistan. Page 36.
2. Quoted in Indian Politics (1936-48) by compand .Page-199.
3. Gauba. K.L. - Consequences of Pakistan - page - 45.
4. Gauba., K.L. - Consequences of Pakistan. Pages 42-43.
5. Ibid. Pages - 41-42.
6. Quoted by Jinnah in his presidential address delivered at the Lahore session (1940) of the League. Speeches and writings of Jinnah by Ahmed - Page - 151.

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Despite the cold receptions to their scheme the young enthusiasts headed by Choudhury Rahmat Ali carried on their vigorous propoganda from the ¹platform of what they called "the Pakistan National Movement" in England. Proposed separation of Burma under the Government of India Act of 1935 gave them an additional argument for a separate Pakistan. ¹ Jinnah called them "irresponsible" and characterised their scheme as "crazy" and retaliated by denouncing Jinnah and the Muslim League. ²

As already discussed Jinnah was being constantly urged by ³Iqbal to think out the possibility of a separate Muslim homeland, but Jinnah was adamant. ³

Not only the poet Iqbal and the "irresponsible" students of the University of Cambridge were serious advocates for separate Muslim homeland. In India too gradually new voices of the same line were being raised.

By 1938-1939 there were four principal schemes for Muslim homeland in India besides the Pakistan scheme of Choudhury Rahmat Ali.

Of the four schemes three were mainly political in character, the Latif scheme was cultural in emphasis.

They were in brief :

A. ⁴The "Confederacy of India" ⁴scheme by 'a Punjabi' of which Nawab of Mamdot was the author proposed five federations for India of which two were to be Muslims. (a) The Indus Valley Federation was to comprise 82% Muslim population. The area to be included were the Punjab (excluding Ambala division, Kangra district, Unao and Garshankar Tahahils of the Hoshiarpur district) Sind, N.W.F.P., Baluchistan, Kashmir-Jammu, Bahawalpur,

1. Gauba., K.L. - Consequences of Pakistan. Page-49.

2. Ibid. Page-47. 3. Supra - Page -

4. Khan, Mujibor Rahman - Pakistan. Pages 85-86.

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Abb, Dir, Swat, Chitrat, Khairpur, Kalat, Lasbela, Karpurta-
la and Malerkotla. (b) The other Muslim area was to be the
Bengal Federation including East Bengal, Goalpara and Sylhet
districts of Assam and Tippera State ensuring 66% of the po-
pulation to be Muslims.

B. ~~The~~ The "Aligarh Scheme" of Syed Jafarul Hasan and Afzal
Husain Qadri proposed partition of India into six independent
States. Two of them Pakistan in the North West and Bengal in
the East (excepting Howrah and Midnapore¹, including Purnia
district of Bihar and Sylhet district of Assam) were to contain
a larger area than of the Mandot Scheme with 60% and 57% of
Muslim population respectively. Another feature of this ~~is~~
scheme was the constitution of Hindu States in such a manner
as would ensure a Muslim population of 7% in one 9% in the
second 27% in the third and 28% in the fourth. ¹

C. ~~The~~ The Sekandar Hayat Khan scheme envisaged seven units. ²
It was better known as the "Regional Federation scheme". The
emphasis on this scheme was on regional nationalism than on
either Hindu or Muslim nationalism. Sir Sekandar, it might be
recalled maintain³ a precarious double sole in his politics.
He was a Muslim Leaguer and at the same time ³ his political
future in the Punjab was dependent on Hindu support. ³ The re-
gional federal units proposed were :

- (i) Assam and Bengal (excluding two or three districts
of Bengal), Indian States in Bengal & Sikkim
- (ii) U.P., and its States
- (iii) Bihar and Orissa (including the separated districts
from Bengal)
- (iv) Madras, Trivancore and Kurga including the States in
Madras

1. Ibid - page - 86. 2. ~~It~~ Ibid - page - 86

3. Gauba., K.L. - Consequences of Pakistan - page - 80.

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- (v) Bombay, Hayderabad including West Indian States, States in Bombay, Mysore and C.P. States.
 - (vi) Indian States in Rajputana (excluding Bikanir and Jasalmir) Goalior, Central Indian States, States of Bihar and Orissa & Berar and C.P.
 - (vii) The Punjab, Sind, N.W.F.P., Kashmir, Punjab States, Baluchistan, Bikanir and Jasalmir.
- D. ¹ Dr. Latif envisaged 15 cultural zones in India - four of them Muslims. The Muslim Zones were according to him :
- (i) The North West block - Sind, Baluchistan, the Punjab, N.W.F.P., Khairpur and Bahawalpur
 - (ii) The North East block - East Bengal and Assam.
 - (iii) Delhi-Lucknow block - From the Eastern boarder of Patiala upto Lucknow comprising Rampur, Agra, Delhi, Kanpur & Lucknow.
 - (iv) The Decsan block - Hayderabad and Berar. It will have a corridor from Kudappa, Chitore, North Arcot and Chingolput upto the sea.

These cultural blocks could develop into political units of a Confederacy. Exchange of population with a view to develop culturally homogeneous units was a feature of the scheme.

Jinnah did not attach much importance to any one of these schemes and he publicly denied any responsibility of the Muslim League regarding the Sekandar Hayat Khan scheme also, though Sir Sekandar was a strong pillar of the organisation. In a statement to the Manchester Guardian late in 1939 he said -

² "We have appointed a Sub-Committee to examine the whole question thoroughly and when this sub-committee has made its report it will be examined by the Working Committee of the League in order to take such steps as it may think proper. Until that stage has been reached, the Muslim League feels in no way bound by any Scheme or proposals, that are propounded by various people". 2

Though the League working Committee discussed the proposals at a meeting in September 1939, Jinnah was unable, it seems to reconcile himself to the idea until it became the

1. Khan, Mujibor Rahman - Pakistan. Page - 87-88.
2. Ahmad. J - Speeches & writings of Jinnah. Page 88-89.

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only alternative suggested by facts of circumstances, Only on January 19, 1940 Jinnah was speaking of "a free India".

The leader became a convert to the idea of a separate homeland by March 23, 1940. Jinnah in his presidential address delivered at the Lahore session of the League gave a lot of self explaining before he recommended the acceptance of the resolution for separate homeland by dividing India into "autonomous notional States".

"Ladies and gentlemen", said he "we never thought that the Congress High Command would have acted in the manner in which they actually did in the Congress-governed provinces. I never dreamt that they would ever come down so low as that. I never could believe that there would be a gentlemen's agreement between the Congress and the Britishers to such an extent that although we ~~cried~~ cried hoarse, week in and out, the Governors were supine and the Governor-General was helpless".¹

As if it was a mistake not to ~~foresee~~ foresee the developments as they actually took shape. Had not Lala Lajpat Rai in a letter to C.R. Das maintained that Hindu-Muslim unity was "neither possible nor practicable".² Had not the Lala said "although we can unite against the British we cannot do so to rule Hindustan on British lines. We cannot do so to rule Hindustan on democratic lines." And Lalaji was a great Hindu leader. If the nationalists living in India are so divergent despite a thousand years of close contact "it was inconceivable that "the fiat or writ of a government" could "ever command a willing and loyal obedience throughout the sub-continent by various nationalities except by means of armed force behind it",³ Jinnah narrated the Hindu-Muslim difference as

1. Ibid. Page - 141. 2. Ahmad. J. - Speeches & Writings of Jinnah. Page - 150.

3. Ibid. Page - 152.

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"not religious in the strict sense of the word" but "different and distinct social orders". The whole reason of the failure of the British system in India was that "you cannot get away from being a Hindu if you are a Hindu". Gandhi had said, Jinnah reminded his followers. "To me Hindus, Muslims, Parsis, Harijans, are all alike - I can not be frivolous while I talk of Quid-e-Azam Jinnah. He is my brother." Jinnah replied "The only difference is this, that brother Gandhi has three votes and I have only one vote".²

Concluding his Presidential address Jinnah affirmed "Muslims are a nation according to any definition of a nation, and they must have their homelands, their territory and their state. We wish to live in peace and harmony with our neighbours as a free and independent people".³ Separate homelands for Hindus and Muslims was the only solution of the Indian Problem unless a civil war was to follow British withdrawal from India. "There is no reason why these states should be antagonistic to each other. On the otherhand the rivalry and the natural desire and efforts on the part of one to dominate the social order and establish political supremacy over the other in the Government of the country will disappear This will lead further to a friendly settlement all the more easily with regard to minorities by reciprocal arrangements ^{and} adjustments between Muslim India and Hindu India which will far more adequately and effectively safeguard the rights and interests of Muslims and various other minorities".⁴

The open session of the League on March 23, 1940 adopted unanimously a resolution moved by Mr. A.K. Fazlul Huq, then premier of Bengal:

"That it is the considered view of this session of the All - India Muslim League that no constitutional plan would be

1. IBID - Page - 153 2. Ibid. page - 144-145. 3. Ibid. Page-155.

4. Ibid - Page - 152-153.

5. ~~Saiyid, M.H. - Mohammad Ali Jinnah - A Political Study.~~

~~Pages - 690-92.~~

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workable in this country, or acceptable to Muslims unless it is designed on the following basic principle, namely, that geographically contiguous units are demarcated into regions which should be so constituted, with such territorial readjustments ~~may~~ may be necessary, that the areas in which the Muslims are numerically in a majority as in the North-Western and Eastern zones of India should be grouped to constitute 'Independent States' in which the constituent units shall be autonomous and sovereign".

"That adequate, effective and mandatory safeguards should be specifically provided in the constitution for minorities in these units and in these regions for the protection of their religious, cultural, economic, political, administrative and other rights and interests in consultation with them; and in other parts of India where the Musalmans are in a minority adequate, effective and mandatory safeguards shall be specially provided in the constitution for them and other ~~the~~ minorities for the protection of their religious, cultural, economic, political, administrative and other rights and interests in consultation with them.

"This session further authorises the Working Committee to frame a scheme of constitution in accordance with these basic principles, providing for the assumption finally by the respective regions of all powers such as defence, external affairs, communications, customs and such other matters as may be necessary." ¹

The resolution of the League is significant because it is the beginning of a serious striving for what materialised seven years later as Pakistan. The League it may be recalled was revived by Jinnah in 1934 to fill the want of an All-India platform for the Muslims. It ended up in 1940 by a declaration that there was no India. The concept of India ~~is~~

1. Saïyid. *Mohammad Ali Jinnah* 690-92.

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" is a pure intellectual and mental luxury in which "Jinnah alleged "some of the Hindu leaders have been indulging so recklessly". Jinnah conveniently, forgot that it was not only the Hindus, but he himself was one of those who enjoyed the mental luxury of conceiving of an India . . .

Whatever may be the change in Jinnah it became abundantly clear that partition of India was the only solution of the constitutional problem that was facing India. The League was not the originator of the idea - it was only a very late convert. The League's conversion to the idea made it more popular. What was so long in the realm of mental exercise of a few individuals henceforth became the national demand of the Indian Muslims.

Hindus called the Lahore resolution a demand for² Pakistan, and the name appealed to Muslim India.²

1. Saiyid. M.H. - Mohammad Ali Jinnah - A Political Study
Page - 701.
2. Ibid.

A P P E N D I X - I

Annual Session of the All-India Muslim League.

<u>Year.</u>	<u>Venue.</u>	<u>President.</u>
1907 ..	Karachi	.. Sir Adamjee Peerbhoy
1908 ..	Amritsar	.. Sir Ali Imam
1909 ..	Delhi	.. Prince of Arcot
1910 ..	Nagpur	.. Mr. Sayed Nabiullah
1912 ..	Calcutta	.. Nawab Salimullah
1913 ..	Lucknow	.. Mia Mohammad Shafi
1915 ..	Bombay	.. Mr. Mazharul Huq
1916 ..	Lucknow	.. Mr. M.A. Jinnah
1917 ..	Calcutta	.. Maharaja of Mahmudabad (The President-elect Moulana Mohammad Ali could not attend as he was interned under the Defence of India Act)
1918 ..	Delhi	.. Mr. A.K. Fazlul Huq
1919 ..	Bombay	.. Maharaja of Mahmudabad
1920 ..	Nagpur	.. Dr. Ansari
1920 (Special Session)	Calcutta	.. Mr. M.A. Jinnah
1921 ..	Ahmedabad	.. Moulana Hasrat Mohani
1922 ..	Calcutta	.. Mr. Bhurgri
1923 (The session was adjourned)	Lucknow	.. Mr. M.A. Jinnah
1924 ..	Bombay	.. Sayed Raja Ali
1924 (Adjourned Session of 1923)	Lahore	.. Mr. M.A. Jinnah
1925 ..	Aligarh	.. Sir Abdur Rahim)
1926 ..	Calcutta	.. Sir Abdul Qadir
1927 (Calcutta)	Calcutta (Jinnah Group)	.. Moulvi Mohammad Yakub
	Lahore (Shafi group)	.. Sir Mohammad Shafi
1928	Calcutta	.. Maharaja of Mahmudabad
1929	Delhi	.. M.A. Jinnah

(Contd. on page no. 2)

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<u>YEAR</u>		<u>VENUE</u>	<u>PRESIDENT</u>
1930	..	Allahabad	.. Dr. Mohammad Iqbal
1931	..	New Delhi	.. Choudhury Mohammad Zafarullah Khan
1933	..	(New Delhi	.. Hafiz Hedayet Husain
		(Howrah	.. Abdul Aziz
1936	..	Bombay	.. Sir Wazir Hasan
1937	..	Lucknow	.. Mr. M.A. Jinnah
1938	..	Patna	.. Mr. M.A. Jinnah
1938		(special session) Calcutta	.. Mr. M.A. Jinnah
1940	..	Lahore	.. Mr. M.A. Jinnah.

APPENDIX - IILUCKNOW PACT - 1916

(The League-Congress scheme of Reforms adopted at the Council sessions of the All India Muslim League and the Indian National Congress held on the 31st December, 1916).

1. PROVINCIAL LEGISLATIVE COUNCILS :-

1. Provincial Legislative Councils shall consist of four fifths elected and one-fifth nominated members.

2. Their strength shall be not less than one hundred and twenty-five members in the major provinces, and from fifty to seventy-five in the Minor Provinces.

3. The members of Councils should be elected directly by the people and on as broad a franchise as possible.

4. Adequate provision should be made for the representation of important minorities by elections and that the Muslim should be represented through special electorates on the Provincial Legislative Council.

Punjab - One-half of elected Indian members.

United Provinces	- 30 per cent	"	"	"	"
Bengal	- 40	"	"	"	"
Bihar	- 25	"	"	"	"
Central Provinces	- 15	"	"	"	"
Madras	- 15	"	"	"	"
Bombay	- One third	"	"	"	"

provided that Mohammedans should not participate in any of the elections to the Legislative Councils.

Provided further that no Bill, nor any clause thereof, nor a resolution introduced by a non-Official member affecting one or the other community, which question is to be determined by the members of that community in the Legislative Council concerned, shall be proceeded with, if three-fourth of

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the members of that community in the particular Council, Imperial or Provincial, oppose the Bill or any Clause thereof or the resolution.

5. The head of the Provincial Government should not be the President of the Legislative Council, but the Council should have the right of electing its President.

6. The right of asking supplementary questions should not be restricted to the member putting the original question, but should be allowed to be exercised by any other member.

7. (a) Except customs, post, telegraph, mint, salt, opium, railways, army and navy, and tributes from Indian States, all other sources of revenue should be provincial.

(b) There should be no divided heads of revenue. The Government of India should be provided with fixed contributions from the Provincial Governments, such fixed contribution being liable to revision when extraordinary and unforeseen contingencies render such revision necessary.

(c) The Provincial Council should have full authority to deal with all matters affecting the internal administration of the Province, including the power to raise loans, to impose and alter taxation and to vote on the Budget. All items of expenditure and all proposals concerning ways and means for raising the necessary revenue should be embodied in Bills and submitted to the Provincial Council for adoption.

(d) Resolution on all matters within the purview of the Provincial Government should be allowed for discussion in accordance with rules made in that behalf by the Council itself.

(e) A resolution passed by the Legislative Council

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shall be binding upon the Executive Government, unless voted by the Governor-in-Council, provided however that if the resolution is again passed by the Council after an interval of not less than one year, it must be given effect to.

6. A motion for adjournment may be brought forward for the discussion of a definite matter of urgent public importance if supported by not less than one-eighth of the members present.

7. Any special meeting of the Council may be summoned on a requisition by not less than one-eighth of the members.

8. A Bill, other than a money Bill, may be introduced in Council in accordance with the rules made in that behalf by the Council itself, and the consent of the Government should not be required therefor.

9. All Bills passed by Provincial Legislatures shall have to receive the assent of the Governor before they become law, but may be voted by the Governor-General.

10. The term of office of the members shall be five years.

11. PROVINCIAL GOVERNMENTS.

1. The head of every Provincial Government shall be a Governor who shall not ordinarily belong to the Indian Civil Service, or any of the permanent Services.

2. There shall be in every Province an Executive Council which, with the Governor, shall constitute the Executive Government of the Province.

3. Members of the Indian Civil Service shall not ordinarily be appointed to the Executive Councils.

4. Not less than one-half of the members of the Executive Council shall consist of Indians to be elected by the elected

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members of the Provincial Legislative Council.

5. The term of Office of the members shall be five years.

III. IMPERIAL LEGISLATIVE COUNCIL.

1. The strength of the Imperial Legislative Council shall be one hundred and fifty.

2. Four-fifths of the members shall be elected.

3. The franchise for the Imperial Legislative Council should be widened as far as possible on the lines of the Mohammedan electorates, and the elected members of the Provincial Legislative Councils should also form an electorate for the return of members to the Imperial Legislative Council.

4. The President of the Council shall be elected by the Council itself.

5. The right of asking supplementary questions should not be restricted to the member putting the original question but should be allowed to be exercised by any other member.

6. Any special meeting of the Council may be summoned on a requisition by not less than one-eighth of the members.

7. A Bill, other than a Money Bill, may be introduced in Council in accordance with rules made in that behalf by the Council itself, and the consent of the Executive Government should not be required therefor.

8. All Bills passed by the Council shall have to receive the assent of the Governor-General before they become law.

9. All financial proposals relating to sources of income and items of expenditure shall be embodied in Bills. Every such Bill and the Budget as a whole shall be submitted for the vote of the Imperial Legislative Council.

10. The term of office of members shall be five years.

11. The matters mentioned hereinbelow shall be exclusively under the control of the Imperial Legislative Council.

(a) Matters in regard to which uniform legislation for the whole of India is desirable.

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(b) Provincial legislation in so far as it may affect inter-provincial fiscal relations.

(c) Questions affecting purely Imperial revenue, excepting tributes from Indian States.

(d) Questions affecting purely Imperial expenditure, except that no resolution of the Imperial Legislative Council shall be binding on the Governor-General-in-Council in respect of military charges for the defence of the country.

(e) The right of revising Indian tariffs and customs-duties, of imposing, altering or removing any tax or cess, modifying the existing system of currency and banking, and granting aid or bounties to any or all deserving and nascent industries of the country.

(f) Resolutions on all matters relating to the administration of the country as a whole.

12. A resolution passed by the Legislative Council shall be binding on the Executive Government, unless voted by the Governor-General in Council; provided, however, that, if the resolution is again passed by the Council after an interval of not less than one year, it must be given effect to.

13. A motion for adjournment may be brought forward for the discussion of a definite matter of urgent public importance, if supported by not less than one-eighth of the members present.

14. The Crown may exercise its power of veto in regard to a Bill passed by a Provincial Legislative Council, or by the Imperial Legislative Council, within twelve months from the date on which it is passed, and the Bill shall cease to have effect as from the date on which the fact of such veto is made known to the Legislative Council concerned.

15. The Imperial Legislative Council shall have no power to interfere with the Government of India's direction of the military officers and the foreign and political relations of India, including the declaration of war, the making of pea

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peace and the entering into treaties.

IV. THE GOVT. OF INDIA.

The Governor-General of India will be the head of the Government of India.

2. He will have an Executive Council, half of whom shall be Indians.

3. The Indian members should be elected by the elected members of the Imperial Legislative Council.

4. Members of the Indian Civil Service shall not ordinarily be appointed to the Executive Council of the Governor-General.

5. The power of making all appointments in the Imperial Civil service shall vest in the Government of India as constituted under this scheme, and subject to any laws that may be made by the Imperial Legislative Council.

6. The Government of India shall not ordinarily interfere in the local affairs of a Province, and powers not specially given to a Provincial Government shall be deemed to be vested in the former. The authority of the Government of India will ordinarily be limited to general supervision and superintendence over the Provincial Governments.

7. In Legislative and administrative matters, the Government of India, as constituted under this scheme, shall, as far as possible, be independent of the Secretary of State.

8. A system of independent audit of the accounts of the Government of India should be instituted.

V. THE SECRETARY OF STATE IN COUNCIL.

1. The Council of the Secretary of State for India should be abolished.

2. The salary of the Secretary of State should be placed on the British Estimates.

3. The Secretary of State should, as far as possible, occupy the same position in relation to the Government of India as the Secretary of State for the Colonies in relation to the Governments of the self-governing Dominions.

4. The Secretary of State for India should be assisted by two permanent under-Secretaries, one of whom should always be an Indian.

VI. MILITARY AND OTHER MATTERS OF POLICY :-

1. The military and naval services of His Majesty, both in their commissioned and non-commissioned ranks, should be thrown open to Indians, and adequate provision should be made for their selection, training and instruction in India.

2. Indians should be allowed to enlist as volunteers.

3. Indians should be placed on a footing of equality in respect of status and rights of citizenship with other subjects of His Majesty the king throughout the Empire.

4. The Executive Officials in India shall have no judicial ~~and~~ powers entrusted to them, and the judiciary in every province shall be placed under the highest Court of that Province.

APPENDIX III

JINNAH'S FOURTEEN POINTS.

Whereas the basic ideas on which the All Parties Conference was called in being and a Convention summoned at Calcutta during Christmas Week 1928, was that a scheme of reforms should be formulated and accepted and rectified by the foremost political organisations in the country as a National Pact; and whereas the Report was adopted by the Indian National Congress only constitutionally for one year ending 31st December 1929, and in the event of the British Parliament not accepting it within the time limit, the Congress stands committed to the policy and programme of the complete independence by resort to civil disobedience and

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non-payment of taxes and ~~a~~ whereas the attitude by the Hindu Maha Sabha from the commencement through their representatives at the Convention was nothing short of an ultimatum, that, if a single word in the Nehru Report in respect of the Communal Settlement was changed they would ~~have~~ immediately withdrew their support to it; and whereas the National Liberal Federation delegates at the Convention took up an attitude of benevolent neutrality, and subsequently in their open session at Allahabad, adopted a non-committal policy with regard to the Hindu-Muslim differences; and whereas the Non-Brahmin and depressed classes are entirely opposed ~~to~~ to it; and whereas the reasonable and moderate proposals put forward by the delegates of the All India Muslim League at the Convention in modification were not accepted, the Muslim League is unable to accept the Nehru Report.

The League after anxious and careful consideration most earnestly and emphatically lays down that no scheme for the future constitution of the government of India will be accepted to Mussalmans of India until and unless the following basic principles are given effect to and provisions are embodied therein to safeguard their rights and interests :-

1. The form of the future constitution should be federal with the residuary powers vested in the provinces.
2. A uniform measure of autonomy shall be granted to all Provinces.
3. All Legislatures in the country and other elected bodies shall be constituted on the definite principle of adequate and effective representation of minorities in every Province without reducing the majority in any Province to a minority of even equality.
4. In the Central Legislative, Mussalman representation shall not be less than one third.

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5. Representation of communal groups shall continue to be by means of separate electorates as at present : provided it shall be open to any community, at any time, to abandon its separate electorate in favour of joint electorate.
 6. Any territorial redistribution that might at any time be necessary shall not in any way, affect the Muslim majority in the Punjab, Bengal and N.W.F. Province.
 7. Full religious liberty i.e. liberty of belief, worship and observance, propaganda, association and education, shall be guaranteed to all communities.
 8. No bill or resolution or any part thereof shall be passed in any legislative or any other elected body if three-fourths of members of any community in that particular body oppose such a bill, resolution or part thereof on the ground that it would be injurious to the interests of that community or in the alternative, such other method is desired as may be found feasible and practicable to deal with such cases.
 9. Sind should be separated from the Bombay Presidency.
 10. Reforms should be introduced in the N.W.F. Province and Baluchistan on the same footing as in other provinces.
 11. Provision should be made in the constitutional giving Muslims an adequate share along with the other Indians, in all services of the State and in local self-governing bodies having due regard to the requirements of efficiency.
 12. The constitution should embody adequate safeguards for the protection of Muslim culture and for the protection and promotion of Muslim education, language, religion, personal laws and Muslims Charitable Institutions and for their due share in the grants-in-aid and given by the State and by the local self-governing bodies.
 13. No cabinet, either Central or Provincial, should be formed without their being a proportion of at least one-third Muslim Ministers.
 14. No change shall be made in the constitution by the Central Legislature except with the concurrence of the States constituting the Indian Federation. The draft resolutions also mentions an alternative to the above provision in the following terms :

That, in the present circumstances, representation of Mussalmans in the different Legislatures of the country and other elected bodies through the separate electorates is inevitable and further, the Government being pledged over and over again not to disturb this franchise so granted to the Muslim ^{Community} ~~country~~ since 1909 till such time as the Mussalmans chose to abandon it,

the Mussalmans will not consent to join electorates unless Sind is actually constituted into a separate province and reforms in the fact are introduced in the N.W.F. Province and Baluchistan on the same footing as in other provinces.

Further, it is provided that there shall be reservation of seats according to the Muslim population in the various Provinces; but where Mussalmans are in a majority shall not contest more seats than their population warrants.

The question of excess representation of Mussalmans over and above their population in Provinces where they are in a minority is to be considered hereafter.

APPENDIX IV

Presidential address of Dr. Sir Mohammed Iqbal delivered at the Allahabad session of the All India Muslim League held in December, 1930.

Gentlemen,

I am deeply grateful to you for the honour you have conferred upon me in inviting me to preside over the deliberation of the All-India Muslim League at one of the most critical ~~moments~~ moments in the history of Muslim political thought, and activity in India. I have no doubt that in this great Assembly there are men whose political experience is far more extensive than mine and for whose knowledge of affairs I have in highest respect. It will, therefore, be presumptuous on my part to claim to guide an assembly of such men in the political decisions which they are called upon to make today. I lead no party; I follow no leader. I have given the best part of my life to a careful study of Islam, its law and polity, its culture, its history and its literature. This constant contact with the spirit of Islam, as it unfolds itself in time, has, I think, given me

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a kind of insight into its significance as a world-fact. It is in the light of this insight, whatever its value, that, while assuming that the Muslims of India are determined to remain true to the spirit, of Islam, I propose, not to guide you in your decisions, but to attempt the humbler task of bringing clearly to your consciousness the main principle which, in my opinion, should determine the general character of these decisions.

ISLAM AND RATIONALISM

It cannot be denied that Islam, regarded as an ethical ideal plus a certain kind of polity - by which expression I mean to social structure regulated by a legal system and animated by a specified ethical ideal - has been the chief factor in the life-history of the Muslims of ~~India~~ India. It has furnished those basic emotions and loyalties which gradually unify scattered individuals and groups, and finally transform them into a well-defined people, possessing a moral consciousness of their own ; Indeed it is no exaggeration to say that India is perhaps the only country in the world where Islam, as a people-building force, has worked at its best. In India, as elsewhere, the structure of Islam as a Society is almost entirely due to the working of Islam as a culture inspired by a specific ethical ideal. What I mean to say is that Muslim Society, with its remarkable homogeneity and inner unity, has grown to be what it is under the pressure of the laws and institutions associated with the culture of Islam. The ideas set free by European political thinking, however, are now rapidly changing the outlook of the present generation of Muslims both in India and outside India. Our younger men, inspired by these ideas, are anxious to see them as living forces in their own countries, without any critical appreciation of

the facts which have determined their evolution in Europe. In Europe Christianity was understood to be a purely monastic order which gradually developed into a vast church-organisation. The protest of Luther was directed against this church-organisation, not against any system of polity of a secular nature, for the obvious reason that there was no such polity associated with Christianity. And Luther was perfectly justified in rising in revolt against this organisation; though, I think, he did not realise that in the peculiar conditions which obtained in Europe this revolt would eventually mean the complete displacement of the universal ethics of Jesus by the growth of a plurality of national and hence a narrower systems of ethics. Thus the upshot of the intellectual movement initiated by such men as Rousseau and Luther was the break-up of the one into mutually ill-adjusted many, the transformation of a human into a national outlook, requiring a more realistic foundation, such as the notion of a country, and finding expression through varying systems of polity evolved on national lines, i.e. on lines which recognise territory as the only principle of political solidarity. If you begin with the conception of religion as complete other-worldliness, then what has happened to Christianity in Europe is perfectly natural. The universal ethics of Jesus is displaced by national systems of ethics and polity. The conclusion to which Europe is consequently driven is that religion is a private affair of the individual and has nothing to do with what is called man's temporal life. Islam does not bifurcate the unity of man into an irreconcilable inability of spirit and matter. In Islam God and the universe, spirit and matter, Church and State, are organic to each other. Man is not the citizen of a profane world to be renounced in the interest of a world of spirit situated elsewhere. So, Islam matter is spirit realising itself in space and time. Europe uncritically accepted the duality of spirit and matter

probably from Manichaeian thought, Her best thinkers are realizing this initial mistake today, but her statesmen are indirectly forcing the world to accept it as an unquestionable dogma. It is, then, this mistaken separation of spiritual and temporal which has largely influenced European religious and political thought and has resulted practically in the total exclusion of Christianity from the life of European states. The result is a set of mutually ill-adjusted states dominated by interests not human but national. And these mutually ill-adjusted states, after trampling over the moral and religious conditions of Christianity are today feeling the need of a federated Europe, i.e. the need of a unity which the Christian Church-organisation originally gave them, but which, instead of reconstructing it in the light of Christ's vision of human brotherhood, they considered it fit to destroy under the inspiration of Luther. A Luther in the world of Islam, however, is an impossible phenomenon; for here there is no church organisation, similar to that of Christianity in the Middle Ages, insisting a destroyer. In the world of Islam we have a universal polity whose fundamentals are believed to have been revealed, but whose structure, owing to our legists' want of contact with the modern world, stands today in need of renewed power by fresh adjustments. I do not know what would be the final fate of the national idea in the world of Islam. Whether Islam will assimilate and transform it, as it has assimilated and transformed before many ideas expressive of a different spirit, or allow a radical transformation of its own structure by the force of this idea is hard to predict. Prof. Wensinek of Leiden (Holland) wrote to me the other day: "It seems to me that Islam is entering upon a crisis through which Christianity has been passing for more than a century. The great difficulty is how to save the foundations of religion when many antiquated notions have to be given up. It seems

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to me scarcely possible to state what the outcome will be for Islam." At the present moment the national idea is racialising the outlook of Muslims, and thus materially counteracting the humanising work of Islam. And the growth of racial consciousness may mean the growth of standards different and even opposed to the standards of Islam.

I hope you will pardon me for this apparently academic discussion to address this session of the All India Muslim League you have selected a man who is not despaired of Islam as a living force for freeing the outlook of man from its geographical territories, who believes that religion is a power of utmost importance in the life of individuals as well as states, and finally who believes, that Islam is itself destiny and will not suffer a destiny ! Such a man cannot but look at matters from his own point of view. Do not think that the problem I am indicating is a purely theoretical one. It is a very living and practical ~~problem~~ problem calculated to affect the very fabric of Islam as a system of life and conduct. On a proper solution of it alone depends your future as a distinct cultural unit in India. Never in our history has Islam had to stand a greater trial than the one which confronts it today. It is open to a people to modify, re-interpret or reject the foundation principles of this social structure; but it is absolutely necessary for them to see clearly what they are doing before they undertake to try a fresh experiment. Nor should the way in which I am approaching this important problem had anybody to think that I intend to ~~quarrel~~ quarrel with those who happen to think differently. You are a Muslim assembly and, I suppose, anxious to remain true to the spirit and ideals of Islam. My sole desire, is to tell you frankly what I honestly believe to be the truth about the present situation. In this way alone it is possible for me to illuminate,

according to my light, the avenues of your political action.

THE UNITY OF AN INDIAN NATION.

What, that, is the problem and its implication? Is religion a private affair? Would you like to see Islam, as a moral and political ideal, meeting the same fate in the world of Islam as Christianity has already met in Europe? Is it possible to retain Islam as an ethical ideal and to right it as a polity in favour of national politics, in which religious attitude is not permitted to play any part? This question becomes of special importance in India where the Muslims happen to be in a minority. The proposition that religion is a private individual experience is not surprising on the lips of a European. In Europe the conception of Christianity as a monastic order, renouncing the world of matter and fixing its gaze entirely on the world of spirit, led, by a logical process of thought, to the view embodied in this proposition. The nature of the Prophet's religious experience, as disclosed in the Quran, however, is wholly different. It is not mere experience in the sense of a purely biological event, happening inside the experient and necessitating no reaction on his social environment. It is individual experience creative of a Social order. Its immediate outcome is the fundamentals of a polity with implicit legal concepts whose civic significance cannot be belittled merely because their origin is revelational. The religious ideal of Islam, therefore, is organically related to the social order which it has created. The rejection of the one will eventually involve the rejection of the other. Therefore the construction of a polity on national lines, if it means a displacement of the Islamic principle of solidarity, is simply unthinkable to a Muslim. This is a matter which at the present moment directly concerns the Muslims of India. "Man", says Renan, "is enslaved neither by his race nor by his religion, nor by the course of rivers, nor by the direction of

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mountain ranges. A great aggregation of men, sore of mind and warm of heart, creates a moral consciousness which is called a nation". Such a formation is quite possible, though it involves the long and arduous process of practically remaking men and furnishing them with a fresh emotional equipment. It might have been a fact in India if the teaching of Kabir and the "Divine Faith" of Akbar had seized the imagination of the masses of this country. Experience, however, shows that the various caste-units and religious units in India have shown no inclination to sink their respective individualism in a large whole. Each group is intensely jealous of its collective existence. The formation of the kind of moral consciousness which constitutes the essence of a nation in Renan's sense demands a price which the peoples of India are not prepared to pay. The unity of an Indian nation, therefore, must be sought, not in the negation, but in the mutual harmony and co-operation of the many. True statesmanship cannot ignore facts, however unpleasant they may be. The only practical course is not to assume the existence of a state of things which does not exist, but to recognise facts as they are, and to exploit them to our greatest advantage. And it is on the discovery of Indian unity in this direction that the fate of India as well as of Asia really depends. India is Asia in miniature. Part of her people have cultural affinities with nations in the East and part with nations in the middle and West of Asia. If an effective principle of co-operation is discovered in India, it will bring peace and mutual goodwill to this ancient land which has suffered so long, more because of her situation in historic space than because of any inherent incapacity of her people. And it will at the same time solve the entire political problem of Asia.

It is, however, painful to observe that our attempts to discover such a principle of internal harmony have so far failed.

Why have they failed ? Perhaps we suspect each others intentions and inwardly aim at dominating each other. Perhaps, in the higher interests of mutual co-operation, we cannot afford to part with the monopolies which circumstances have placed in our hands, and conceal our egoism under the cloak of a nationalism, outwardly stimulating a large-hearted patriotism, but inwardly as narrow-minded as a caste or a tribe. Perhaps, we are unwilling to recognise that each group has right to free development according to its own cultural traditions. But whatever may be the causes of our failure, I still ~~feel~~ feel hopeful. Events seem to be tending in the direction of some sort of internal harmony. And as far as I have been able to read the Muslim mind, I have no hesitation in declaring that, if the principle that the Indian Muslim is entitled to full and free development on the lines of his own culture and tradition in his own Indian homelands is recognised as the basis of a permanent communal settlement, he will be ready to stake his all for the freedom of India. The principle that each group is entitled to free development on its own lines is not inspired by any feeling of narrow communalism. There are communalism and communalisms. A community which is inspired by feelings of ill-will towards other communities is low and ignoble. I entertain the highest respect for the customs, laws, religious and social institutions of other communities. Nay, it is my duty, according to the teaching of the Quran, even to defend their places of worship if need be. "Yet I love the communal group which is the source of my life and behaviour; and which has formed me what I am by giving me its religion, its literature, its thought, its culture, and thereby recreating its whole part, as a living operative factor, in my present consciousness." Even the authors of the Nehru Report recognise the value of this higher aspect of communalism. While discussing the separation of Sind they say : "To say from the larger view point of nationalism that no communal provinces should be created is, in a way, equiva-

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lent to saying from the still wider international viewpoint that there should be no separate nations. Both these statements have a measure of truth in them. But the staunchest internationalist recognises that without the fullest national autonomy it is extraordinarily difficult to create the international state. So also, without the fullest cultural autonomy, and communalism in its better aspect is culture, it will be difficult to create a harmonious nation".

MUSLIM INDIA WITHIN INDIA.

Communalism, in its higher aspect, then, is indispensable to the formation of a harmonious whole in a country like India. The units of Indian society are not territorial as in European countries, India is a continent of human groups belonging to different races, speaking different languages, and possessing different religions. Their behaviour is not at all determined by a common race-consciousness. Even the Hindus do not form a homogeneous group. The principle of European democracy cannot be applied to India without recognising the fact of communal groups. The Muslim demand for the creation of a Muslim India within India is, therefore, perfectly justified. The resolution of the All-Parties Muslim Conference at Delhi is, to my mind, wholly inspired by this noble ideal of a harmonious whole which, instead of stifling the respective individualities of ~~the~~ its component wholes, affords them chances of fully working out the possibilities that may be latent in them. And I have no doubt that this House will emphatically endorse the Muslim demands embodied in this resolution. Personally, I would go further than the demands embodied in it. I would like to see the Punjab, North-West Frontier Province, Sind and Baluchistan amalgamated into a single state. Self-Government within the British Empire, or without the British Empire, the formation of a consolidated North-West Indian Muslim State appears to me to be the final destiny of the Muslims at least of North-West India."

"The proposal was put forward before the Nehru Committee. They rejected it on the ground that, if carried into effect, it would give a very unwieldy state. This is true in so far as the area is concerned; in point of population, the state contemplated by the proposal would be much ~~xxx~~ less-than some of the present Indian provinces. The exclusion of Ambala Division and perhaps of some districts where non-Muslims predominate, will make it less extensive and more Muslim in population - so that the exclusion suggested will enable this consolidated state to give a more effective protection to Non-Muslim minorities within its area. The need not alarm the Hindus or the British. India is the greatest Muslim country in the world. The life of Islam as a cultural force in this country very largely depends on its centralisation in a specified territory. This centralisation of the most living portion of the Muslims of India, whose military and police service has, notwithstanding unfair treatment from the British, made the British rule possible in this country, will eventually solve the problem of India as well as of Asia. It will intensify their sense of responsibility and deepen their patriotic feeling. Thus, possessing full opportunity of development within the body politic of India, the North-West Indian Muslims will prove the best defenders of India against a foreign invasion, be that invasion one of ideas or of bayonets. The Punjab with fifty-six per cent Muslim population supplies fifty-four per cent of the total combatant troops in the Indian Army, and if the nineteen thousand Gurkhas recruited from the independent state of Nepal are excluded, the Punjab contingent amounts to sixty-two per cent of the whole Indian Army. This percentage does not take into account nearly six thousand combatants supplied to the Indian Army by the North West Frontier Province and Baluchistan. From this you can easily calculate the possibilities of North-West India Muslims in regard to the defence of India against foreign aggression. The Right Hon'ble Mr. Srinivasa Sastri thinks that the Muslim demand for the creation of autonomous Muslim status along the

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North-west border is actuated by a desire "to acquire means of exerting pressure in emergencies on the Government of India". I may frankly tell him that the Muslim demand is not actuated by the kind of motive he imputes to us; it is actuated by a genuine desire for free development which is practically impossible under the type of unitary government contemplated by the nationalist Hindu politicians with a view to secure permanent communal dominance in the whole of India.

Nor should the Hindus fear that the creation of autonomous Muslim states will mean the introduction of a kind of religious rule in such states. I have already indicated to you the meaning of the word religion as applied to Islam. The truth is that Islam is not a church. It is state conceived as a contractual organism long before Rousseau ever thought of such a thing, and animated by an ethical ideal which regards man not as an earth-rooted creature, defined by this or that portion of the earth, but as a spiritual being understood in terms of a social mechanism and possessing rights and duties as a living factor in that mechanism. The character of a Muslim state can be judged from what the 'Times of India' pointed out sometime ago in a leader on the Indian Banking Inquiry Committee. "In ancient India", the paper points out, "the state framed laws regulating the rates of interest; but in Muslim times, I although Islam clearly forbids the realisation of interest on money loaned, Indian Muslim states imposed no restrictions on such rates." I therefore demand the formation of a consolidated Muslim state in the best interests of India and Islam. For India it means security and peace resulting from an internal balance of power; for Islam an opportunity to rid itself of the ~~stagnant~~ Stamp that Arabian Imperialism was forced to give it, to mobilise its law, its education, its culture and to bring them into closer contact with its own original spirit and with the spirit of modern times.

THE ALTERNATIVE :

I have thus tried briefly to indicate the way in which the Muslims of India ought in my opinion to look at the two most important constitutional problems of India. A redistribution of British India, calculated to secure a permanent solution of the communal problem, is the main demand of the Muslims of India. If, however, the Muslim demand of a territorial solution of the communal problem is ignored, then I support, as emphatically as possible, the Muslim demands repeatedly urged, by the All-India Muslim League and the All-India Muslim Conference. The Muslims of India cannot agree to any constitutional changes which affect their majority rights, to be secured by separate electorates in the Punjab and Bengal, or fail to guarantee them 33 per cent representation in any Central Legislature. There were two pitfalls into which Muslim political leaders fell. The first was the repudiated Lucknow Pact which originated in a false view of Indian nationalism, and deprived the Muslims of India of chances of acquiring any political power in India. The second is the narrow visioned sacrifice of Islamic solidarity in the interests of what may be called Punjab Ruralism resulting in a proposal which virtually reduces the Punjab Muslims to a position of minority. It is the duty of the League to condemn both the Pact and the proposal.

The Simon Report does great injustice to the Muslims in not recommending a statutory majority for the Punjab and Bengal. It would either make the Muslims stick to the Lucknow Pact or agree to a scheme of joint-electorate. The despatch of the Government of India on the Simon Report admits that since the publication of that document the Muslim community has not expressed its willingness to accept any of the alternatives proposed by the Report. The despatch recognises that it may be a legitimate grievance to deprive the Muslims in the Punjab and Bengal of representation in the Councils in proportion to their population merely because of weightage allowed to Muslim minorities elsewhere. But the

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despatch of the Government of India fails to correct the injustice of the Simon Report. In so far as the Punjab is concerned - and this is the most crucial point - it endorses the so-called 'carefully balanced scheme' worked out by the official members of the Punjab Govt. which gives the Punjab Muslims a majority ~~in~~ of two over Hindus and Sikhs combined, and a proportion of 49 per cent of the House as a whole. It is obvious that the Punjab Muslims cannot be satisfied with less than a clear ~~MA~~ majority in the total House. However, Lord Irwin and his Government do recognise that the justification for communal electorates for majority communities would not cease unless and until by the extension of franchise their voting strength more correctly reflects their population; and further unless a two-third majority of the Muslim members in a provincial Council unanimously agree to surrender the right of separate representation. I cannot, however, understand why the Government of India, having recognised the legitimacy of the Muslim grievances, have not had the courage to recommend a statutory majority for the Muslims in the Punjab and Bengal.

Nor can the Muslims of India agree to any such changes which fail to create at least Sind as a separate Province, and treat the North-West Frontier Province as a province of inferior political status. I see no reason why Sind should not be united with Baluchistan and turned into a separate Province. It has nothing in common with the Bombay Presidency. In point of life and civilization the Royal Commissioners find it more akin to Mesopotamia and Arabia than India. The Muslim geographer Mas'udi noticed this kinship long ago when he said - "Sind is a country nearer to the dominions of Islam". The first *monarch* ruler is reported to have said of Egypt - "Egypt has her back towards Africa and face towards Arabia". With necessary alterations the same remark describes the exact situation of Sind. She has her back

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towards India and face towards Central Asia. Considering further the nature of her agricultural problems which can invoke no sympathy from the Bombay Government, and her infinite commercial possibilities, dependent on the inevitable growth of Karachi into a second metropolis of India, it is unwise to keep her attached to a Presidency which, though friendly today, is likely to become a rival at no distant period. Financial difficulties, we are told, stand in the way of separation. I do not know of any authoritative announcement on the matter. But assuming there are any such difficulties, I see no reason why the Government of India should not give temporary financial help to a promising province in her struggle for independent progress.

As to the North-west Frontier Province, it is painful to note that the Royal Commissioners have practically denied that the people of this Province have any right to reforms. They fall far short of the Bray Committee, and the Council recommended by them is merely a screen to hide the autocracy of the Chief Commissioner. The inherent right of the Afghan to light a cigarette is curtailed merely because he happens to be living in a powder house. The Royal Commissioner's epigrammatic argument is pleasant enough, but far from convincing. Political reform is light, not fire; and to light every human being is entitled whether he happens to live in a powder house or a coal mine. Brave, shrewd and determined to suffer for his legitimate aspirations, the Afghan is sure to resent any attempt to deprive him of opportunities of full self-development. To keep such a people contented is in the best interests of both England and India. What has recently happened in that unfortunate province is the result of step-motherly treatment shown to the people since the introduction of the principle of self-government in the rest of India. I only hope that British Statemanship will not obscure its view of the situation by hoodwinking itself into the belief that the present unrest in the Province is due to any extraneous

causes.

The recommendation for the introduction of a measure of reform in the N.U.F.P. made in the Government of India's despatch is also unsatisfactory. No doubt, the despatch goes further than the Simon Report in recommending a sort of representative Council and a semi-representative Cabinet, but it fails to treat this important Muslim Province on equal footing with other Indian Provinces. Indeed, the Afghan is, by instinct, more fitted for democratic institutions than any other people in India

CONCLUSION :

Gentlemen,

I have finished. In conclusion I cannot but impress upon you that the present crisis in the history of India demands complete organisation and unity of will and purpose in the Muslim community, and in the interest of India as a whole. The political bondage of India has been and is a source of infinite misery to the whole of Asia. It has suppressed the spirit of the East and wholly deprived her of that joy of self-expression which once made her the creator of a great and glorious culture. We have a duty towards India where we are destined to live and die. We have a duty towards Asia, specially Muslim Asia. And since seventy millions in a single country constitute a far more valuable asset to Islam than all the countries of Muslim Asia put together, we must look at the Indian problem not only from the Muslim point of view but also from the standpoint of the Indian Muslim as such. Our duty towards Asia and India cannot be loyally performed without an organised will fixed on a definite purpose. In your own interest, as a political entity among other political entities, of India, such an equipment is an

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absolute necessity. Our disorganised condition has already confused political issues vital to the life of the community. I am not hopeless of an inter-communal understanding, but I can not conceal from you the feeling that in the near future our community may be called upon to adopt an independent line of action to cope with the present crisis. And an independent line of political action, in such a crisis, is possible only to a determined people, possessing a will focalised by a single purpose. Is it possible for you to achieve the organic wholeness of a unified will, yes, it is. Rise above sectional interests and private ambitions and learn to determine the value of your individual and collective action, however directed on material ends, in the light of the ideal which you are supposed to represent. Pass from matter to spirit. Matter is diversity; spirit is light, life and unity. One lesson I have learnt from the history of Muslims. At critical moments in their history it is Islam that has saved Muslims and not vice versa. If today you focus your vision on Islam and seek inspiration from the ever-vitalising idea embodied in it, you will be only ~~resembling~~ ^{resembling} your scattered forces, regaining your lost integrity, and thereby saving yourself from total destruction. One of profoundest verses in the Holy Quran teaches us that the birth and rebirth of the whole of humanity is like the birth of a single individual. Why cannot you who, as a people, can well claim to be the first practical exponents of this superb conception of humanity, live and move and have your being as a single individual ? I do not wish to mystify anybody when I say that things in India are not what they appear to be, The meaning of this, however, will dawn upon you only when you have achieved a real collective ego to look at them. In the words of the Quran, "Hold fast to yourself; no one who erreth can hurt you, provided you are well guided, (5 : 104).

APPENDIX VTHE LEAGUE PARLIAMENTARY BOARD MANIFESTO.

After discussion lasting over four days, the AIML Parliamentary Board under the Presidentship of Mr. M.A. Jinnah, adopted the following manifesto and issued it from Lahore on the 11th June 1936 :-

The advent and announcement of the ~~ix~~ Minto-Morley reforms brought home to leaders of Mussalmans the necessity of starting a Muslim political organisation and thus was founded the All India Muslim League at Dacca in December 1906. The League adopted its creed and ideal definitely in December, 1912, and altered its constitution, having for its aims and objects (1) full responsible government for India with adequate and effective safeguards for Mussalmans (2) to protect and advance the political and religious and other rights and interests of Indian Mussalmans (3) to promote friendship and union between Mussalman and other communities in India, and (4) to maintain and strengthen brotherly relations between Mussalmans in India and those in other countries.

The League has been faithfully and loyally acting in accordance with these fundamental principles ever since. During the period of existence of Minto-Morley constitution, it continued its development from time to time and represented and voiced the true feelings and opinions of Mussalmans. As time went on the Co-Operation and help of Prominent leaders of India, and particularly of that great man, the late Maharaja of Muhmudabad, whose selfless devotion and patriotic fervour and singlemindedness of purpose gave the League such strength, power and support that it reached the zenith of its ascendancy and accomplished what is one of the greatest beacon lights in the constitutional history of India, the Lucknow pact, which is known as the "League Congress Pact" in 1916. This Pact will

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go down in Indian history as a landmark in the political evolution of the country as signal proof of the identity of purpose, earnestness and Co-Operation between the two great sections of the people of India in the task of the attainment of responsible government.

But the pact was not the last word on the question of adjustment of Political differences between Hindus and Mussalmans. Nor was it even intended or could be so considered in the new circumstances that arose and developed since then. The national demand for complete responsible government after the Montagu-Chelmsford Reforms became more and more insistent from 1921 onward. Mussalmans stood shoulder to shoulder with sister communities and did not lag behind in their patriotic Co-Operation with Hindus. But as a minority they maintain the principle that this position in any future political constitutional structure should be protected and safeguarded. Here it might be stated that at first sight it may appear to an amateur politician that such demand savours of Communalism but in reality must be evident that it is not only natural but is essential by insuring whole hearted and willing co-operation of the minorities who must be made to feel that they can rely upon the majority with a complete sense of confidence and security.

INDIA'S GOAL.

In the various steps that followed the deliberations and collaborations that took place, the League has always stood for full responsible Government for India and unflinchingly stands for the same ideal. It deploras that as a result of the Round Table Conference, the British Parliament has forced upon the people of India constitution embodied in the Government of India Act of 1935. Its attitude towards the constitution is defined by its resolution passed at the session of the AIML to the following effect: "while it accepts the communal

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Award till a substitute is agreed upon between the communities concerned & emphatically protests against the constitution embodied in the Government of India Act of 1935 being forced upon the people of India against their will and inspite of their repeated disapproval and distant expressed by the various parties and bodies in the country. The League considers that having regard to the conditions prevailing at present in the country the Provincial scheme of the constitution be utilised for what it is worth, inspite of the most objectionable features contained therein, which under real control and responsibility of the Ministry and Legislature over the entire field of Government and administration migatory. The League is clearly of opinion that the All India Federal Scheme of Central Government embodied in the Government of India Act of 1935 (1935) is fundamentally bad. It is most reactionary, retrograde, injurious, and fatal to the vital interests of British India vis-a-vis Indian States and it is calculated to thwart and delay~~xxx~~ indefinitely the realisation of India's most cherished goal of complete responsible Government and is totally unacceptable. The League considers that the British Parliament should still take the earliest opportunity to review the whole situation afresh regarding the central scheme before it is inaugurated or else the League feels convinced that the present scheme will not bring peace and contentment to the people but on the contrary it will lead to disaster if forced upon and persisted in as it is entirely unworkable in the interests of India and per people".

ELECTION BOARD.

But as the Provincial scheme embodied in the Govt. of India Act is going to be enforced in the course of next year, the League decided that having regard to the conditions pre-

vailing at present in the country, the Provincial scheme of constitution be utilised for what it is worth. In view of this decision, the League further decided that a Central Election Board be formed with power to constitute and affiliate Provincial election Boards in the various Provinces and passed the following resolution :

"Whereas the Parliamentary system of Government which is being introduced in this country with the inauguration of the new constitution pre-supposes the formation of Parties with a well-defined policy and Programme which facilitate the education of the electorate and Co-Operation between the groups with approximate aims and ideals and ensures the working of the constitution to the best advantage and whereas in order to strengthen the solidarity of the Muslim community and to secure for Muslims their proper and effective share in Provincial governments it is essential that Muslims should organise themselves as one party with an advanced and progressive programme, it is hereby resolved that the All India Muslim League do take steps to contest the approaching provincial elections and for this purpose appoint Mr. Jinnah to form a Central Election Board under his Presidentship, consisting of not less than 35 members, with powers to constitute and affiliate Provincial Election Boards in the various Provinces, having regard to the condition in each Province and devise ways and means for carrying out the aforesaid objects".

In pursuance of that resolution, the Central Board has now been formed and the policy and programme of the Central Board has to be defined. The inauguration of the Montagu-Chelmsford scheme of constitution and the working thereof has developed and brought forth various forces and it appears that such power as was available under the scheme has been captured ~~in~~ in the various Provinces by the reactionery con-

servative elements in combination with a coterie of men whose sole aim and object is to secure offices and places for themselves wherever and whenever available. This has suited the Government and these two classes have received every encouragement and support with the result that they have not only been a hindrance and an obstacle in the way of the independent and progressive intelligentsia, but people generally have been exploited. Thus was created a double domination of reactionary forces and imperialistic power. Our aim is that this domination must cease.

POLITICAL SITUATION.

The present political situation has been aptly described by the President of the last session of the AIML in the following words :

"Now problems have arisen today. It is not only the question of educating the middle class of Muslims in India on Western lines and providing them with jobs, it is only the question of infusing in them the ideals of Victorian liberalism. On the contrary, present conditions compel one to go much deeper into the Problems of the entire social regeneration of the seventy millions of Muslims, of extracting them from the terrible poverty, degradation and backwardness into which they have fallen and giving them at least the rudiments of civilised existence and making them free citizens of a freeland. We must realise, as people of other countries have realised, that a change is necessary and that unless such change is soon made the whole of this social structure must come down with a crash which will involve the extinction of not only the educated section of our people but also of all privileged classes, whether they hold privilege by reason of caste, land or money. The foundations of the superstructure in which we are living today were laid centuries ago and it is but natural that those foundations have ceased to be

stable now. It is the duty, if it is not only an obligation created by the motives of self interest, of all of us educated classes, capitalists and land-holders to lay the foundations of the new structure, of course, in order that this effort must fructify, sacrifices will have to be made on the part of all. Let me tell you that the building of such a Social edifice will be more glorious, more human and more just than the building of an empire". But at the same time we must take it clear that the League is opposed to any movement that aims at expropriation of private property.

The main principles on which we expect our representatives in various legislatures to work will be (1) that the present Provincial constitution and proposed Central constitution should be replaced immediately by democratic full self government; (2) and that in the meantime, representatives of the Muslim League in the various Legislatures will utilize the Legislatures in order to extract the maximum benefit out of the constitution for the uplift of the people in the various spheres of national life. The Muslim League party must be formed as a corollary so long as separate electorates exist, but there would be free co-operation with any group or groups whose aims and ideals are approximately the same as those of the League party. The League appeals to Mussalmans that they should not permit themselves to be exploited on economic or any other grounds which will break up the solidarity of the community.

PROGRAMME FOR ELECTION.

The manifesto lays down the following programme for the ensuing elections : To protect religious right of Mussalmans in which connection for all matters of purely religious character, due weight shall be given to opinions of the Jamiat

ulama i Hind and Mujehids to make every effort to secure the repeal of all repressive laws; to reject all measures which are detrimental to the interest of India, which encroach upon the fundamental liberties of the people and lead to economic exploitation of the country, to reduce the heavy cost of administrative machinery, central and Provincial and allocate substantial funds for nation-building departments; to nationalise the Indian Army and reduce military expenditure; to encourage development of industries, including Cottage industries; to regulate currency, exchange and prices in the interest of the economic development of the country; to stand for social, educational and economic uplift of the rural population; to sponsor measures for the relief of agricultural indebtedness, to make elementary education free and compulsory, to protect and promote the Urdu language and script; to devise measures for the amelioration of the general conditions of the Mussalmans; and to take steps to reduce the heavy burden of taxation and create healthy public opinion and general political consciousness throughout the country.

THE END.

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