Corruption in Bangladesh: A Study on the Attitudes of the Civil Servants and the Politicians

Master of Philosophy in Public Administration

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DEDICATED..............

To my estimable Parents M. N. Ali Molla& Begum Hajera Ali

and

Late Mr. Miraj Khan Thakur who inspired mealways to search for knowledge.

DECLARATION

Certified that the thesis entitled "Corruption in Bangladesh: A Study on the Attitudes of the Civil Servants and the Politicians", submitted by Mohammad MasudurRahman, Registration No. 283 of Session: 2003-2004 for the degree of Master of Philosophy (M. Phil.) in the Department of Public Administration, University of Dhaka, is his original work carried out under my supervision. The thesis has reached the standard fulfilling the requirements of the regulations relating to the degree.

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ABSTRACT

Corruption is a broad term covering a wide range of misuse of entrusted funds and power for private gain: bribery, theft, fraud, nepotism, abuse of power etc.Corruption is a pervasive and universal phenomenon. It is often argued that it reduces private and public sector efficiency when it enables people to assume positions of power through patronage rather than ability; it distorts the financial and economic environment; and at limit, corruption introduces instability and anarchy into the political process.

In the context of Bangladesh corruption is the most formidable reality and a challenge. The vast majority of the people are victims of corruption. Corruption by a limited number of powerful individuals and failure of leadership and institutions to control and prevent corruption should not be considered as evidences to suggest that the country or the nation or the people are most corrupt. The fundamental problem that relates to corruption in Bangladesh is the dominance of the vested interest, irrespective of charge in the political hues in the power matrix.

The objective of this study is to understand and assessthe background, causes, extent, nature, types, forms of corruption, consequences, effective ways to combat corruption based on the perceptions of civil servants and thepoliticians in Bangladesh.

This study is primarily used as a qualitative perspective, attempting to discern the meaning of events to the participants. Both primary and secondary sources of data are used to get comprehensive picture of the reality. We have contacted with different participants of different levels including present ministers, ex-ministers to gather information and civil servants of both central govt. and local govt. Besides, official records, documents and other secondary sources are utilized.

This study demonstrates that the civil servants have by and large become accustomed to live a life style far beyond their legal income. One may ask the question as to why such large-scale administrative corruption exists. The reasons for such corruption can be summed up. First, civil servants involved in corrupt practices in most cases do not lose their jobs. Very rarely they are dismissed from service on charges pertaining to corruption. Still more rarely they are sent to prison for misusing

public funds. They have never been compelled to return to the state their ill-gotten wealth. Second, people have a tendency not only to tolerate corruption but to show admiration to those civil servants who make a fortune through dubious means. The underlying assumption is that it does not matter how one has acquired wealth as long as he has done so. Third, it is easier for a citizen to get quick service because he has already paid the civil servant rather than wait for his turn. Fourth, there is now social acceptance of corruption by public officials. Fifth, barring occasional public procurements, the representatives of the people, i.e. politicians in power, are unwilling to take effective measures to curb corrupt practices in public dealings. Therefore, much attention is to be paid to stop corruption in Bangladesh.

That this study suggests ways to combat corruption in Bangladesh based on the perception of two significant groups namely the civil servants and the politicians.

ACRONYMS

WB	World Bank
UN	United Nations
SIDA	Swedish International Development Agency
ICAC	Independent Commission Against Corruption
PSAC	Performance of South Asian Countries
PFM	Public Financial Management
PAC	Patterns of Administrative Corruption
SCF	Several Contributing Factor
USSR	Union of Soviet Socialist Republics
BIGR	Bolivia Institutional Governance Review
NIP	National Integrity Plan
IRP	Institutional Reform Project
AMRAR	Anticorruption Measure in Revenue Administration Reform
UKTFR	United Kingdom's Treasury Fraud Report
USAID	U.S. Agency for International Development
PMO	Project Management Office
PIU	Project Implementation Unit
TIB	Transparency International Bangladesh (TIB)
TI	Transparency International
PFM	Public Financial Management
BAC	Bureau of Anti-corruption
ACC	Anti-corruption Corruption
CPI	Corruption Perception Index
NGO	None Government Organization
RMG	Ready Made Garment

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CHAPTER1

INTRODUCTION

1.1Background of the study

Corruption in public offices is a widely discussed but scarcely deliberated issue in Bangladesh though we have been unfortunately reached at the top of corrupted countries and had remained the same for consecutive five years. Therefore, corruption is the number one problem in our country. In general, people think that only the bureaucrats are involved in this unwanted malpractice. We disagree on this point and we want to figure out the fact that corruption is taken place not only by the bureaucrats but also by the important personalities in and outside of the government who are directly or indirectly involved in politics.There is a concept throughout the world that grabbing public resources is corruption (Salim Rashid: 2004).

TI, a German-based anti-corruption watchdog, has found Bangladesh for the fourth consecutive time as one of the world's most corrupt nation. The Corruption Perception Index year ranks in the 2002 edition 102 countries in terms of the degree to which corruption is perceived to exist among public officials and politicians. Finland (with the score of 9.7)was found as the least corrupt country, Denmark and New Zealand go just behind (9.5), and the most corrupt was Nigeria (1.2) followed by Ukraine and Azerbaijan (1.5). Looking at geographic areas one can see that Bangladesh, Latin America and Asia are perceived to be significantly more corrupt than the average for other continents.

Corruption has become a way of life in Bangladesh. It is a topic of discussion in academic circles and among media people, professionals, politicians, government officials, businessmen, students, foreign investors, donor agencies and non-government organizations. Corruption in different sectors is shown in the figure given below.

| Box – 1.1 | **Corruption as all sectorsphenomenon in the society** |

Source: Long Saga of Corruption by News Network-May,2005

The figure shows corruption is prevailing in every sector of our society. And poor people are hit hardest by demands for bribes in developed as well developing countries. As corruption is well spread all over the society so achieving a corruption free country is impossible. But to reduce it up to a tolerable limit is possible by adopting comprehensive anti-corruption mechanism through concern organizations.

Transparency is the demand of the people at every level of the country. Good governance and anticorruption are now high priorities in the development agenda. The empirical evidence suggests that even after our independence in 1971, we could not make any substantial dent on combating corruption. Rather we have seen that we have failed to address the issue in particular. All the governments since independence had committed to establish good governance and eliminate corruption, but there have so far been little efforts to address the issue of improving governance, strengthening accountability and ensuring transparency.

The remedies to improve transparency and reduce corruption should not have been impossible. But those who are to do the jobs are in no mood to appreciate the fact that bold governance reforms are good politics that earns the electorate's support in an unalloyed manner. To effectively deal with corruption through ensuring

accountability at all levels is now a major issue in Bangladesh. Even of late, the government of Bangladesh has formed an independent Anti-Corruption Commission (ACC) on November 21, 2004 with limited authority in the face of pressure by the donor agencies, but the anti-graft body still remains very ineffective (Rahman:2005).

We hope that this study will recommend ways to find a stable solution to prevent corruption in Bangladesh.

1.2 Objectives of the Study

Theobjective of this study is to:

a. understandthe perceptions of the civil servants and the politicians about corruption in the context of Bangladesh.

b. assess the background, causes, extent, nature, types, forms of corruption based on the perceptions of civil servants and the politiciansin Bangladesh.

1.3 Overview of the Methodology

Weused both primary and secondary sources of information in carrying out this work. The main data collection tools were interviews, questionnaire, and examination of records.With a view to find out the perceptions of civil servants and the politicians on the notion, forms, extent and impact of corruption, we administered separate two (2) sets questionnaires. We managed to interview 50 Civil Servants of different levels and 50 Politicians of central and local level of different political parties to get their attitudes on the motion.

1.4 Rationale of the Study

For Bangladesh corruption is a key national challenge and it is the main obstacle to development and poverty reduction. It increases social injustice and human insecurity. What is striking about Bangladesh is that it is hardly ever that corruption is punished. On the contrary, corruption, especially political and administrative corruption, has become a way to echelons of power. One of the considerations to choose the Civil Servants and the Politicians is that theyarethe most significant groups to address the number one problem, corruption, in Bangladesh and that is why we are keenly interested to relate them with the study of corruption.

Majority of the respondents believe that the politicians are the most significant actors to root out corruption from society and without corruption free political leadership no nation can be free from this long-suffering disease. The following figure illustratesthat politicians around the world become rich using political power through corrupt transactions as politics is considered as the way of making quick money.

BOX1.2   **10 most self-enriching Political Leaders in recent years**

The anticorruption watchdog Transparency International has listed the 10 most self-enriching political leaders in recent years. Ranked by the amount each allegedly stole, in U.S. dollars, they are:

1. Former Indonesian president Suharto ($15-35 billion)
2. Former Philippine president Ferdinand Marcos ($5-10 billion)
3. Former Zairian president Mobutu SeseSeko ($5 billion)
4. Former Nigerian president SaniAbacha ($2-5 billion)
5. Former Yugoslav president Slobodan Milosevic ($1 billion)
6. Former Haiti president Jean-Claude Duvalier ($300-800 million)
7. Former Peruvian president Alberto Fujimori ($600 million)
8. Former Ukrainian prime minister PavloLazarenko ($114-200 million)
9. Former Nicaraguan president Arnoldo Aleman ($100 million)
10. Former Philippine president Joseph Estrada ($78-80 million)

Source: The Many Faces of Corruption, Edited by-J. Edgardo Campos, SanjayPradhan, Pg-390 as per the TI Report (2004).

The phenomenon of corruption is one of the most serious problems facing the Bangladesh society today and we hope that this study will lead us to ways towards

finding a permanent solution in combating corruption. Therefore, need of addressing corruption brooks no delay for ensuring good governance in Bangladesh.

The issues of corruption are the priority problem, judging from the level of social danger or damage. It should be noted that, at this time, corruption is seen as a serious social problem even when compared with the poor economic situation, unemployment, poor health care, education and polluted environment.

Given that politics is the other name of investment for making quick money. On the other hand, absence of effective deterrence against corruption it has also become so widespread in the civil service. When answers of those respondents concerning the issue of most serious social problem at this time, the problem of corruption stands out parallel with such social problems as poverty, political instability and crime. So, the civil servants and the politicians, as the most powerful and dominating social elite of Bangladesh, should think about the problem. If the perception of these two significant groups is not addressed, the problem will remain the same even it must turn in to the worst.

1.5Management of the Data

Data are recoded and copied manually. Tabulation is preparedto manage the qualitative data. Every interview is analyzed separately and findings are re-checked with the views of other respondents. As per chapter outline collected data are arranged in different folders and used in writing the chapters accordingly.

1.6 Limitations of the Study:

The major limitation of the study is that it focuses only on two groups who are known as major sources of corruption in Bangladesh. Due to very sensitive issue, sometimes we faced lack of cooperation from some respondents. As the civil servants and the politicians are very busy it was very much time consuming to get information from them. Above all, time and resources constraints always discomfort researchers. Limited time and resources were also the constraints of this study.

1.6Organization of the Thesis

This thesis is presented in seven chapters. **Chapter 1: Introduction**. It explains the background, overview of the methodology and management of data. It specifies research objectives. Further, it also sheds light on the rationale of the study, limitations of the study and organization of the thesis.

Chapter 2:Research Methodology and Sample Design. In this chapter the research methodology i.e. methods, sources of data, data collection technique, sampling, validation of data, data analysis techniques are demonstrated.

Chapter 3: Review of Existing Literature. This chaptercontains perspectives of corruption according to existing literature. To do this study we have reviewed national and international literatures on corruption which are displayed in this chapter.

Chapter 4: Corruption: Theoretical & Conceptual Consideration. This chaptercontains perspectives of corruption according to existing literature i.e. the definition of corruption,causes, typology, where corruption thrives, which sectors or departments are more corrupted, most frequent patterns of corruption etc.In this chapter we have also discussed on Modernization and Corruption, Alternative Approaches of Corruption, Corruption and Development, Public Opinion about Corruption.

Chapter 5: Attitudes of the Civil Servants and the Politicianson Corruption in Bangladesh –This chapter presents the opinion of the Civil Servants and Politicians about corruption, what are the consequences of corruption in Bangladesh is discussed here. The effective ways of combating corruption, according to them, are discussed.Their roles are also discussed to address corruption in Bangladesh.

Chapter 6: Analysis of the Findings-This chapter analyses critically aboutthe finding of the study.

Chapter 7:Conclusion. In this chapter we tried to recommend the ways to combat corruptionand aimed to sketch the Implication for Future Research.

1.7Summmery

In this chapter a brief overview has been given about the research problem, objectives and broad research preposition. Here corruption in the context of Bangladesh is also illustrated in brief manner. Besides, it incorporates methodology used to conduct the investigation, significance of the study and an outline of the organization of the thesis.

Chapter 2
Research Methodology & Sample Design

2.1 Introduction

This chapter examines the research methodology which generally means the selected methods of achieving the research objectives. To be more precise, it primarily focuses on the method(s) of data collection along with the justification of using the method(s). It also includes basic parameters to be chosen related to the selected method(s). In addition to that, the instruments for gathering data also fall within the definition of methodology of a research (Aminuzzaman: 1991). This section of the proposal intends to depict the methodology of this study.

We used both primary and secondary sources of information in carrying out this work. The main data collection tools were interviews, questionnaire, and examination of records. With a view to find out the perceptions of civil servants and the politicians on the notion, forms, extent and impact of corruption, we administered separate 2 (two) sets of questionnaires. We managed to interview 50 Civil Servants of different level and 50 Politicians of different political parties to get their attitudes on the motion.

2.2 Methods

Assessing and identifying the concept of corruption according to the civil servants and the politicians in the context of Bangladesh is a matter of qualitative judgment. However, to prioritize actions to enhance such preparedness deserves some sort of quantitative evaluation. Therefore, a combination of qualitative and quantitative approach is used to attain the objectives of a study (Creswell: 2003). For the purpose of this study, three methods are used namely-

    i.   Content Analysis

    ii.   Interview

    iii.   Questionnaire Survey

Content Analysis: This includes collecting related information and data from all relevant books, documents, published and unpublished research works available, online articles, notes etc.

Interview: This includes interviewing of Civil Servants of different level and Politicians of different political parties to get their opinion on corruption in Bangladesh based on two questionnaires designed for them. Some questions like ***'In your opinion please tell us the extent of corruption in Bangladesh'***, 'What ***may be the effective ways to combat corruption in Bangladesh?'*** are included in the questions list. Some key personnel of relevant government offices like Secretary, Ministry of Finance, Secretary-in-Charge, Ministry of Communication (MoC), Joint Secretary, Ministry of Housing & Public Works, DC of different districts etc. On the other hand, some key politicians of different political parties like Minister, Ministry of Commerce, Ex-Minister, Ministry of Agriculture, Chairman, Parliamentary Standing Committee on Ministry of Education, Chairman, Parliamentary Standing Committee on Ministry of Post and Telecommunication, Member, Presidium, Bangladesh Awami League, Member, Presidium, Bangladesh Jatio Party, In charge of Office Secretary, Bangladesh Nationalist Party (BNP), President Bangladesh Workers Party, President Bangladesh JASOD, President of district Awami League, BNP, Jatio Party, Jamayet E Islam Bangladesh etc.

The prime objective of interview method is to collect information about the attitude of the civil servants and the politicians about corruption in Bangladesh.

Questionnaire Survey: This survey is intended to gather primary data about corruption in Bangladesh with a semi-structured questionnaire.

2.3 Sources of Data

The data for this study have been collected both from primary and secondary sources. Secondary data are drawn from the existing literatures like books, newspaper reports, previous research works, seminar papers, reports etc. Primary data have been collected through questionnaire survey. The respondents included the civil servants of different level and the politicians of different political parties.

2.4 Data Collection Techniques

To collect data, in-depth interviews are conducted through open ended semi structured questionnaire. Two different questionnaires are prepared to cover all two groups of respondents (mentioned above).

2.5 Sampling

Due to resource constraints all the civil servants of different departments and the politicians of alllevels in Bangladesh have not be chosen as respondents.*Stratified Random Sampling* is useful to questionnaire interview (Wieviorka: 1992). Therefore, we used it to choose the respondents for the purpose of the questionnaire survey. And we have selected some civil servants from different departments and some politicians from different political parties as respondent.

Apart from the civil servants at work and the politicians in power, some ex-civil servants and ex-ministers are also covered in the interview.

2.6 Sample Size

a. *Interview:*

A total of 100 (hundred) respondents are chosen from the two strata mentioned above for the questionnaire interview. The composition of the respondents is as follows:

Table 3.1: Respondent Distribution for Questionnaire Interview

Study Area	Stratum
Different civil service Offices/ Departments of the in Bangladesh	Secretary, Ministry of Finance, Secretary-in-Charge, Ministry of Communication (MoC), Additional Secretary, Joint Secretary, Ministry of Housing & Public Works, JS, DS, Sr. AS, AS of different Ministries, DC, ADC, UNO of different districts, etc.
Different Govt. / Political Offices of the Politicians in Bangladesh	Minister, Ministry of Commerce, Ex-Minister, Ministry of Agriculture, Chairman, Parliamentary Standing Committee on Ministry of Education, Chairman, Parliamentary Standing Committee on

	Ministry of Post and Telecommunication, Member, Presidium, Bangladesh Awami League, Member, Presidium, Bangladesh Jatio Party, In charge of Office Secretary, Bangladesh Nationalist Party (BNP), President Bangladesh Workers Party, President Bangladesh JASOD, President of district Awami League, BNP, Jatio Party, Jamayet E Islam Bangladesh etc.

b. Justification of Strata Sizes: The civil servants are involved in carrying out the decision making process in practice, so they compose a significant portion of the total respondents. The politicians are the decision maker of every policy and they are the significant group to address the number one problem, corruption, in Bangladesh and that is why they also cover noteworthy segment of the total respondents.

2.7 Data Validation

The collected data have been validated through cross checking with each other and with the secondary sources.

2.8 Data Analysis Tools/ Techniques

The collected data are processed and analyzed using statistical techniques and instruments. For the purpose of analyzing the data Statistical Package for the Social Sciences (SPSS), Microsoft Access and Microsoft Excel have been used.

Chapter 3

Review of Existing Literature

Introduction: In absence of a serious academic review such an important national and international issue remained confiscated. To do this study we have reviewed national and international literatures on corruption.We also remained conscious about literature selection and review. Among the reviewed literature, some major findings can be illustrated which are more relevant with corruption combating process in Bangladesh. The study may validate the existing literature on policy implementation and/or generate new insights in this field that may help to supplement the knowledge of different stakeholders in general and policy researchers in particular.

Literature review: In reviewing the literature, the researchers found varieties of definition of corruption in terms of society, community and group of people discussed by the academics and researchers.U Myint (2000) in his paper "Corruption: Causes, Consequences, and Cures" has defined corruption as the use of public office for private gain, or in other words, use of official position, rank or status by an office bearer for his own personal benefit. Following from this definition, examples of corrupt behavior would include: (a) bribery, (b) extortion, (c) fraud, (d) embezzlement, (e) nepotism, (f) cronyism, (g) appropriation of public assets and property for private use, and (h) influence peddling. In this list of corrupt behaviour, activities such as fraud and embezzlement can be undertaken by an official alone and without involvement of a second party. While others such as bribery, extortion and influence peddling involve two parties – the giver and taker in a corrupt deal.

Some studies have focused on public sector corruption in Bangladesh (Ahmed, B. et al.: 1992) in the late nineties. Mostly corruption in administration has been highly focused in these papers and the ways to combat corruption effectively (Alam, M.S.1996) are also illustrated. The unique ways are also exemplified through ensuring accountability and promotion of ethics and standard of behaviour of the public bureaucracy in Bangladesh (Aminuzzaman, S.M.,1996).

Corruption is a universal phenomenon. It is not something new either. Corruption in one form or another existed since time immemorial (MM Khan, 1998).

A review of penal codes utilized in various ancient civilizations clearly demonstrate that bribery was a serious problem among the Jews, the Chinese, the Japanese, the Greeks, the Romans as well as the Aztees of the New World (Thakur, 1979:7). In ancient India large-scale corruption dominated public life (Thakur, 1979:12). As has been observed "corruption prevailed on a larger scale in India during the ancient period and the ones that followed" (Padhay, 1986:26). From this one can assume the nature and scale in the increase of corruption from medieval to the present time in the countries of the Indian sub-continent. One of the greatest evils of medieval administration in India was the extortion of perquisites and presents (Sarkar, 1935:83). Corruption was evident during the British rule in India. There was almost regular and systematic corruption involving almost all officials at different levels in the political and administrative hierarchy. There was an underlying belief among officials of "making hay while the sun of British Raj shone" (Dwivedi and Bhargava, 1967:7).

Some administrative reforms initiatives have made in Bangladesh to make the administrative performance more effective (Khan, M.M.:1989b). Lewis, D.J. (1996) has done his work focusing on the Discourse, Judgments and Modalities of Corruption in Bangladesh. Another study has done by Rahman, M.A. et al. (1993) on naming Towards Better Government in Bangladesh. Some initiatives are also taken by the UNDP (Report on Public Administration Sector Study in Bangladesh, 1993), World Bank (Bangladesh: Government That Works: Reforming the Public Sector: 1996a). World Bank (Bangladesh: An Agenda for Action: 1996b). All of these studies suggested the means and ways to make the public sector more transparent and corruption free.Gould, D.J. and J.A. Amaro-Reyes (1985) illustrate the effects of corruption on administrative performance in developing countries.

In the paper titled - "Corruption and Patronage: The Social and Political Linkage" the author (Rahman, M.H.,1994) showed that corruption has universal linkage between the society and the politicians. If the politicians do not patron, the term corruption may not exist in the society.A unique work on policy issues in Bangladesh was made by Taslim, M.A. (1994) titled - "Public Corruption, External Interference and Policy Making in a Dependent Regime" where the author illustrated

why and how the policy making process get influenced by external group and in this paper the author had suggested the applicable measures to solve it.

Corruption has been analyzed in several Eastern European countries in 2002-2005(Anderson, H. James and Cheryl W. Gray, 2007**).** During this period customs related bribery decreased in many countries due to systematic efforts to combat corruption that included the revision of legislation, implementing risk analysis, random audit, and stronger enforcement and sanctions mechanisms. Drawing from a project on trade and transport facilitation in Southeast Europe led by the US, the World Bank, the EU and eight participating governments, the authors also note a positive impact of international cooperation for streamlining procedures in these countries which they assert led to improve efficiency and lower corruption.

A detailed analysis of modern internal control and audit systems in governmental agencies has taken place. The study asserts that in the studied countries the reformers manage to build such systems on the national level, but neglected the local governmental level (Baltaci, Mustafa and Serdar, Yilmaz,2006). To aid implementation of the system on the local level, they offer a conceptual framework for internal control and audit. In addition to guidelines on establishing the system, the publication also provides country examples which public administration practitioners may find useful when developing their own frameworks. Despite its orientation towards the local level, the publication can serve as a platform for the development of internal audit and internal control systems in any public administration.

There is some study on Public-sector corruption. Much of these academic literatures describe the problem and its impact on the organization, but fails to offer possible solutions, especially ones that are social scientifically sound in that they can be benchmarked and measured over time(Cantens, Thomas, GaëlRaballand and Samson Bilangna:2010). In this paper, the authors present the formulation, implementation, and evaluation of the use of performance contracts between the Customs Director General and frontline officers conducted at the Cameroon Customs.

De Sousa, Luis (2006)has a publication on the development of European anti-corruption agencies. The report covers the process of agency establishment, its

different institutional formats, mandate and scope of action. It analyses conditions of success and failure of such agencies. The report also discusses results achieved during the workshops on issues related to anti-corruption agency strategies and day-to-day management. Drawing from national experiences, this report provides an overview of the agencies and gives recommendations for their further development.

Fjeldstad, Odd-Helge (2003)analyses the impact of Revenue Authority (RA) establishment on corruption. In his case study, he states that tax revenues collected by the new Revenue Authority grew significantly within the first three years after the organizational restructuring. Subsequently, however, tax revenues declined and corruption rose. One of Fjeldstad's conclusions is that salary is one of several factors affecting the behavior of revenue officers. He notes that in an environment where there is a demand for corrupt services and a low accountability, a wage increase might be regarded as an extra bonus on top of bribes. Thus while higher salaries might be a short-term solution it should be only one component of a reform programme in order to reduce incentives for corruption. He discusses HR policies, noting that they may lead to corruption in case of large layoffs when former tax officers are recruited by the private sector as sources of insider knowledge. He underlines the necessity of more comprehensive administrative reforms backed up by political will in order to achieve sustainable improvements.

The article on "The Long War Against Corruption," by Heineman, Ben W. and Fritz Heimann (2006) discusses corruption in developing countries. After describing corruption's effects on national economies, the authors discuss the demand and supply sides of corruption. They suggest different strategies to mitigate corruption including consideration of the cultural dimension of the problem. Understanding the cultural aspect, they argue, helps strengthen enforcement, prevention and state building. After giving an overview of the existing international legal treaties to fight corruption, the authors contend that ensuring compliance with these treaties is important and call for a more rigorous monitoring to determine whether governments live up to their commitments. At the same time, the transnational corporations, which are often a source of corruption and a target for extortion, should be fundamental in an anti-corruption strategy. In conclusion the authors underline that corruption inhibits development and economic growth and undermines assistance programmes.

Deriving from the Klitgaard (1998) theoretical framework, the authors(Edgardo Campos and SanjavPradhan -"The Many Faces of Corruption: Tracking Vulnerabilities at the Sector Level"*)* develop a corruption risk map related to combating illicit trade, weakness of the legal and regulatory system, inefficient HR system and lack of an appropriate accountability system. They support and further develop the argument of Tuan Minh Le (2007) on the correlation between corruption and size of the shadow market. Having identified the risks of corruption, the authors give an overview of strategies to reduce it. In their case study they come to the same conclusion as Fjeldstadt (1998) that raising salary levels does not necessarily enhance ethical behaviour, though salary levels should at least correspond to a living wage. The authors advocate limiting opportunities for rent seeking behaviour by simplifying and streamlining the legal operational framework, computerising business processes, introducing a code of ethics with strong managerial support on both central and local levels, revising HR policy, modernising procedures, using risk-based controls, establishing an internal audit unit, performance-related bonuses, and an open and transparent relationship with the private sector.

An OECD report titled "Specialised Anti-Corruption Institutions, Review of Models" is dedicated to different models of specialised anti-corruption agencies. Based on a number of criteria, the authors have identified three general models: multi-purpose agencies with law enforcement powers; law enforcement agencies, departments and units; and preventive, policy development and coordination institutions. The authors (Klemencic, Goran and JanezStusek , 2007),provide a comparative overview of these institutions and measure their performance using qualitative and quantitative indicators, as well as OECD and Group of States against Corruption (GRECO) country reports. They give a detailed description of the case studies chosen for every type of the institution and offer possible solutions for common problems.

In his book (*Controlling Corruption*, Berkeley, University of California) Klitgaard, Robert (1998),uses the principal-agent-client framework to explain the phenomenon of corruption, where the principal (a policymaker) authorises his agent (a civil servant) to provide services to clients (service recipients). Within this framework Klitgaard defines three conditions under which corruption is more likely

to occur: a monopoly of power by agents (e.g. customs officers) over clients (e.g. traders/taxpayers); discretionary decision power over provision of services from the side of the agents and low level of accountability of agents in front of principals. Within this framework Klitgaard identifies the costs and benefits as well as incentives and sanctions for corruption. Using case studies he answers more practical questions related to the policy decisions in order to combat corruption: he describes the policy instruments to deal with the expected gain of the corrupt act, the enforcement mechanisms and probability of being caught. The book's emphasis is on the "why, what and how" in anti-corruption policy.

In an article "Combating Corruption in Revenue Administration: an Overview," and *"The Many Faces of Corruption: Tracking Vulnerabilities at the Sector Level"* the authors (Le, Tuan Minh and J. Edgardo Campos and SanjavPradhan, 2007) argue that there is a correlation between countries with high levels of corruption and large shadow economies. This can result in the depletion of the tax base and thus diminishing state revenue. The author suggests that corruption drives enterprises out of the formal sector in order to be more competitive compared to those that already use. Thus the development of the formal economy is undermined. Moreover, taken that in some countries customs is responsible for aspects of security, corruption may facilitate the transit of weapons, drugs and other prohibited items.

Based on the practical experience of designing national anti-corruption strategies Michael, Bryane and MariyaPolner (Fighting Corruption on the Transitional Border: Lessons from Failed and New Successful Anti-Corruption Programmes, 2008) examine the problems of the legislation in place and action planning as well as refers to the issue of the best organizational model to combat corruption. In conclusion the authors argue that implementation of a risk management system and introduction of investigation and prosecution mechanisms can be effective in reducing corruption.

As a contribution to research on measuring corruption as being critical to the design of successful anti-corruption policies, *Measuring Corruption* by Sampford, Charles, Arthur Shacklock, Carmel Connors, and Fredrick Galtung (2006) examines

methods to measure corruption, including the Transparency International's Corruption Perception Index and Bribery Perception Index. The limits and functions of the corruption indices and other measurement tools are discussed. The book discusses the indices reliability, and whether regular surveys can measure changes in corrupt behavior. The authors also give an overview and evaluate the methodologies used in different countries.

Conclusion: For analyzing corruption in Bangladesh, the researchers studied plenty of areas as per their aptitude. In this study we aim to generate the perception of two most imperative sections of people (the civil servants and the politicians) about causes, consequences and cures of corruption. In the following chapters the perception of those important respondents will be appraised in combating corruption which may help to supplement the knowledge of corruption in general and policy researchers in particular.

Chapter 4

Corruption: Theoretical & Conceptual Consideration s

4.1 Introduction

This chapter examines the theoretical considerations of corruption. Corruption is considered as one of the most harmful social phenomena. Some respondents consider that corruption is something which has always been existed in every society and it will always exist (Salim,2004); the rest believe that corruption is a necessary evil, or something not proper, but can be useful; and some of the respondents see in corruption a means for a faster and a more successful solution to certain problems in public works (Hussain, 1990).

Corruption in Bangladesh is not identifiable as a single, separate, independent entity which can be isolated and destroyed. Corruption is a complex set of processes involving human behaviour and many other variables, some of which are difficult to recognize or measure. Even though corruption manifests itself as a force on its own and often generates its own momentum, it is linked to many other factors, and it is by understanding these factors that we can hope to understand corruption (Almas and Haque, 2010) One can cheat and earn money by using private resources. For instance, most people in our country do not try to understand whether adulteration of products is a corruption. This is obviously a corruption because the sellers are not giving his or her consumers the right quality products; no matter it is a food item or construction material.

Corruptionis a term familiar to human civilization from a long ago. Reference of corruption was found in both subcontinent and western history. Corruption has been around in one form or another form of the earliest days of social organization.The first prime minister of UK Robert Walpole was accused of corruption (taking bribe) in sanctioning royal subsidy to South Sea Company and finally he was sacked in 1742. A charge of corruption was brought against Lord Clive before the British Parliament is known to all. House of Lord convicted Sir Francis

Bacon, a renowned essayist in 1921 for corruption. Allegation of taking bribe of $2 million against Billy Carter, brother of ex-president, Jimmy carter is also known to all.

However, corruption is not a new phenomenon for only our country but it is an old global problems. It may be defining as many ways. Corruption occurs when organization or individuals improperly make profit or take advantage through their position in an activity.

4.2 Corruption: Putting into Perspectives

In our society, there prevails a misconception that corruption only related with Govt. machinery but in fact, corruption infected all the sphere of our society. Corruption is not merely limited to exchange of bribery, misuse or misapplication of power by Govt. servants or politicians. Cheating in manpower business, leakage of question papers by teacher, Garments workers are often deprived of regular salaries and benefits by RMG sector, misappropriation of funds by NGO's –these are not corruption? In addition raising the market prices of commodities by creating an artificial crisis through hoarding, sending national assets abroad, smuggling, nepotisms in private firms ---- are not these corruption as well?

There are two social aspect of corruption: **First** those who enjoy privilege get involved in corruption.[1] **Second,** increased disparity in the society leads to corruption. (Campos and Pradhan, 2007, The Many Faces of Corruption).

Corruption describes behaviour which is usually unacceptable to society; consequently there are criminal and legal sides to this definition as well. But when it comes to the actual application of official responsibility or actions, especially on a day-to-day basis, legal definitions are not always enough - indeed, under the guise of regulations, they may even create a rigid bureaucracy which becomes inefficient and eventually requires 'speed-money' or other forms of graft to make it work (Guhan and Paul, 1997). Indeed as one analyst has noted, there is only one thing worse than a 'rigid, over-centralized dishonest bureaucracy' and that is, a 'rigid, over-centralized

honest bureaucracy'. In a perverse sort of way, therefore, corruption can therefore actually enable the public sector (and the economy) to function.

Corruption has been defined in a diverse way by many authors and organizations at times though there is no unified definition accepted by all. Here we shall trace some of the definition of corruption in brief.

In the text titled "Liberalization and the New Corruption, Vol 27, No.2'' (Barbara Harriss-White and Gordon White, 1996) Corruption has been identified as one of the consequences of excessive state intervention and the bureaucratic rents created thereby; on the political side, it has been seen as a consequence of the unaccountable monopoly power of various kinds of authoritarian or totalitarian regimes.

There are many definitions of corruption. The classic definition, which was particularly in vogue in the 1990s, is "*the misuse of public power for private gain."* Jeremy Pope, the former head of Transparency International, has defined corruption as "*the misuse of entrusted power for private benefit*" (Pope 2000:2). For more information on these definitions, see Amundsen (2000), and Michael and Polner (2008).

Kautilya, the prime minister tothe great Chandra Gupta Mauryaand author of the Arthasastramade a classic comment of corruption, "Use and abuse of public fund by Govt. Servant." Kautilya described corruption of revenue servant of that time as "just as it is impossible not to take taste of honey or poison when it is at the tip of tongue, so it is impossible for a Govt. Servant not to eat up a bit of revenue."

Corruptionisthe misuse of public office, rules or resources for private benefit or gain; the benefit may be material or otherwise (World Bank, 1992, Governance and Development, Washington D.C.).

"A corruption in public life is the use of public power for private profit, preferment or prestige or for the benefit of a group or class, in a way that constitutes a breach of law or standards of high moral conduct."(United Nation's Dictionary of Social Science)

SIDA, Sweden defines a situation where-"Corruption occurs when organizations or individuals profit improperly through their position in an activity and thereby cause damage or loss of national property."

ICAC, Australia preaches...'The community trusts public officials to perform their duties with honesty and in the best interest of the public. Corruption involves breaching public trust."

The opinion of both the Civil Servants and the Politicians in this regard is meaningful. Some of them said that corruption involves the dishonest or preferential use of power being position which has the result of one person or organization being advantaged over another.Many of them opined thatcorruption is the misuse of vested power or authority of any organization / agencies / individual. We think that in the context of Bangladesh corruption is a complex product of social, cultural, political and economic factors for private or organizational gain or profit. Therefore, any illegal contract entered with the public representative or public servant or the pubic to effect the transaction at a specified future time would of course constitute corruption.

4.3 The causes of corruption: International Experiences

A variety of characteristics of countries' economic, political, social and legal systems might affect the frequency and /or magnitude of acts of corruption.

These assumptions, embodied in the popular meaning of corruption, are significant because definitions aside, when it comes to dealing with corruption - at the political, economic and certainly, at the sociological level - it is often difficult to decide exactly what constitutes corruption.

A question which is frequently posed in the study is- 'Whether corruption is an age-old practice or a relatively new innovation'. In the specific definition which we use most commonly both in our lexicon and in this Study, corruption can only apply to a situation in which there is a clear and specific demarcation between the 'public' and the 'private'. In 'pre-modern' times, when political organization was based on kingship, there was no clear demarcation between the ruler's public and private duties, rights or responsibilities. Yet, there is evidence that corruption did exist in 'pre-

modern' times (Theobald, 1990 p. 41- 45). So corruption was present at an earlier era in different kinds.

One of the obvious costs that corrupt behaviour entails is the risk of punishment, which depends in part on legal systems. The main factor of difference between legal systems is that some follow civil and others common law. Common law traditions are found in most present and former members of the British Commonwealth, except South Africa and Quebec, where the basic legal tradition is civil law, however intellectual property laws and their application follow the common law pattern in these countries. Some countries that were never British colonies have adopted common law systems: Thailand, Liberia, and Namibia. In the rest of the world civil law traditions apply.

Outside the Western European countries civil law traditions have been adopted as a result of a colonial legacy in Latin America and francophone Africa, but also in Turkey, Japan, Egypt and Eastern Europe or as a result of a combination of both, as in Taiwan and Korea, where the Japanese imposed their own legal system during their period of colonization. Scholars consider that the greater protections of property against the state embodied in common law systems improve less corrupted governments, while business corruption may be more insidious.

The differences between civil and common law traditions make themselves felt more clearly in matters of procedure than of substance. In many civil law countries the role of the judiciary is manifest through the widespread use of written materials and the absence of traditional common law tools, such as discovery or questioning of witnesses before the court in litigation procedures. A willingness of judges to follow procedures even when the results threaten hierarchy increases the chance that official corruption will be exposed and punished.

Confirming this ambiguity the empirical study by Treisman (2000) shows that common law systems such as Britain and former British colonies have significantly lower perceived corruption. However, the most corrupt countries in the world, Bangladesh and Nigeria, were British colonies, too.

Religious traditions have been thought to determine cultural postures towards authority and social morals. Thence confrontations with officeholders are rarer in societies where Catholicism, Islam, and Orthodoxy, known as hierarchical religions, are pre-eminent than in cultures formed by more egalitarian religions such as Protestantism. Avoiding confrontations, the relations among people are liable to toadying and to bribery. Empirically revealed correlations show that the larger the proportion of Protestants in a country's population, the lower is the perceived corruption. Religions influence also the degree of individual loyalties to family thus affecting the level of corruption in the form of nepotism. Societies privileging the virtue of economic achievement engender corruption more than those who are less fascinated by economic progress. The will for power embodied by the various holders of dooms them to meet and to clash. It is at this moment that capital policy is born. It does not certainly consist only of transactions. The organizations and the men of the capital buy, produce and sell, but also make a pact, unite themselves, betray, look for influence through weapons and not only through financial titles. This slope of the activity associated with capital is at the same time most intuitively known and most constantly denied. All is not pure economics in the elements of the economy. Corruption accompanies the objective process of the accumulation of capital, described by Marx.

Above some level of development (non-capitalist, post-materialist motivation in Protestant Scandinavian countries, for example) corruption becomes smaller. Indeed, in contrast to economic growth, sustainable human development with the spread of education, literacy, health, and depersonalized access to the provision of these services, make corrupt acts not only morally wrong but simply vain.

The roots of corruption in developing regions might be found in the survival of the traditions of their societies, where presents, tribute and other social obligations were a customary and normal part of social networks. Where fundamental loyalties are due the family, the village, co-religionists or one's own ethnic group or caste (see Myrdal :1968) for South Asia, then for office holders favors and preferential treatment for kinsmen are more important than fidelity to the state. Added to this, in many developing countries government employees are so poorly paid that they are

unable to maintain even a modest standard of living. In consequence, they have almost no other recourse than to seek to augment their income by bribing. Because of the confluence of poverty, relics of old traditions, and bad governance, Myrdal's principles of cumulative causation and circular interdependence intensify the effects of the corruption.

The dynamics of globalization over the last two decades have resulted in almost ideal conditions for the rapid penetration and spread of transnational organized crime in economically less developed countries. The weak, often corrupt, and frequently illegitimate states typical throughout the Latin America and the Caribbean have proven unable to address adequately the needs of the "marginalized" segments of the ir populations. They have been even less able to halt the rise or impede the spread of more sophisticated and technologically adept transnational corruption and organized crime.

In countries of former USSR also the persistence and enlargement of a shadow economy and of corruption may be explained by some long terms background. Traditionally, citizens defy the state. Behaviour on the edge of the lawful is not morally condemned by societal opinion or by authorized social groups. But, the interruption in society development pathway and of long- lived aspects of cultural traditions during the 1990's nullifies the accumulated rules of justice, decreasing restrictions on egoistic forces and corruption. Thus a special push for corruption and other forms of iniquitous activity resulted from the deposition of the communist party and the soviet state, which in turn caused the slacking of legal protection of state ownership and of contracts between the state and enterprises. In this country, new legislation was slow in being implemented and the carrying out of laws, of decrees and of instructions was lost. Russian criminal organizations have been able to exploit this legislative vacuum as well as the increased ease of international travel, the liberalization of emigration policies, the expansion of international trade, the spread of high technology communications systems and of international financial networks to extend their criminal enterprises well beyond the borders of their own country.

Another important factor for the rise in corruption in the countries of former USSR was probably the tendency of the state to erode the small private property.

Small businesses are not sufficiently protected and certainly not supported in fact. Disorders of an economic nature that followed the liberalization of prices encouraged corruption at personal and at firm levels. New forms of business corruption are "seizure of the State", on the one hand, and "confiscation of business", on the other hand.

The first term suggests that entrepreneurs forcibly set up many decisions at different levels of State and in different branches of power intending to get the exclusive position. In early 2000's the third of Russian entrepreneurs responded that they attempted at least once to influence government choice. The supporters of "State seizure" are, first of all, firms controlling natural resources, big monopolists, and firms linked to the state by licenses and orders. The term "confiscation of business" signifies that officeholders exercise a permanent control over private business.

4.4 Basic Types of Corruption

Three basic types of corruption characteristic for contemporary societies are: ***additional payment*** to a public servant for realizing of a right which by law is available to an individual, then ***bribery for the purpose of acquisition of a right*** which according to law or sub-law act one does not have, and finally, ***bribery for readjusting of a law of sub-law regulation (different bylaws and regulations) in line with interests of the corruptor***.

Findings of the interview demonstrate the following: anindividual in practice cannot easily differentiate between realizing of a right or of breaking of a law. The second problem is that they are not interested in this issue. They are only interested if they have to provide additional payment for the service or not. Finally, psychologically it is somewhat easier to classify your deed as the realization of your rights, then as breaking the law.

The first type of corruption, *realizing of a right*, is a consequence of the following fact: bureaucratic apparatus of public services prolongs the realizing of rights or by its additional interpretation deters an individual from attaining that right. For this reason the user of this right is forced to speed up the procedure, which was

put in place by the bureaucratic apparatus as an obstacle, by providing additional payment. The same holds true for the quality of service. Additional payment for realizing rights is explained by the public servant with an argument that it is possible only under a condition that he ignores certain elements of procedure. The same holds true for the realizing of a right without waiting. If a bribe is expected or coerced does not change things. The key characteristic of this bribe is that the public servant is not breaking the law or misusing his position. By doing this, his risk is lower. This is one of the reasons why this type of corruption is most widely present. The outspread of this kind of corruption is caused by the frequent contacts of private entrepreneurs with public servants in an attempt to realize their rights.

Corruption for the realizing of rights, according to statements of private entrepreneurs, most frequently occurs during the acquiring of electricity and telephone services, working permit, acquiring contacts with the government and local government, acquiring a contract with a state company, acquiring a building location, approval of new sales prices, import-export licenses, and company registration. The second type of corruption, breaking of rules, is a consequence of the following chain of events: a public servant, so that he could collect for a service, tolerates a potential client who is breaking the rules (various misdemeanor fines, letting the merchandise pass customs, etc.) or breaks the rules himself (issuing of different permits, fixing tenders, etc.).

Since in this case there is no clear line between corruption and crime, for both sides, the corruptor and the corrupted, the risk is higher. The amount of risk, in addition to the value of the deal, influences the price for the service. Since this type of corruption is linked with more risk it is somewhat less present then the corruption aimed at the realization of rights. Breaking of rules, as a type of corruption, is the most common, according to statements of private entrepreneurs, for acquiring of customs documentation, foreign currency transactions, tax administration, financial police, than sanitary and urban planning inspections, and mandatory registration of foreign trade deals.

The third type of corruption, influencing the change of laws, in the West is mostly legalized and called lobbying. Locally it is less developed, at least in regard to

small private entrepreneurs. This is most likely because their social influence is rather small, and they are not in a position to participate in passing of laws, or rules. It is probable that some of their answers in this regard are overstatements of their real social influence. On the other hand, large private entrepreneurs most likely to focus the largest part of their corruption activities towards state employees, or politicians of the ruling party in an attempt to change laws, or sub law regulations.

Corruption is everywhere in the society of Bangladesh. There are some other major types of corruption prevailed in our society. They are- ***Ghoosh*** or Bribe, ***Tadbir*** or Pursuing, ***Bakshis*** etc. ***Ghoosh*** or bribe is one kind of visible corruption which takes place in economic exchanges such as the process of rent-seeking which (regulatory requirements by) public servants impose on players in the market.

But ***tadbir*** may be visible and invisible in a host of activities which range from outright bribery to more subtle forms of patronage or persuasion. Another type of corruption takes place through underhand deals involving vast sums of money at the national and international levels, to petty, everyday ***baksheesh*** which the doorman at a bureaucrat's office extracts in order to perform his normal duties. ***Gift-giving***, another form of corruption is part of ***negotiating and relationship building***. The other forms are ***contact steering***, ***kickback***, ***misuse of public assets***, ***abuse of travel expenses*** and ***abuse of portable assets*** etc.

4.5 Where Corruption thrives?

Corruption can be found in all countries but particularly widespread in societies where the legal system, mass media and the public administration are weak and undeveloped. **Corruption thrives where… Box-2.1**

1. Temptation coexists with permissiveness.
2. Institutional checks on power are missing.
3. Decision making remains obscure.
4. Civil society is thin on the ground.
5. Great inequalities in the distribution of wealth condemn people to live in poverty.
6. Concepts like public procurement procedures are ignored.

4.6 Which sectors or departments are more corrupted?

The results of the empirical study clearly demonstrate that majority of the politicians and the civil servants there are many sectors or departments which are at present questioned in maintaining quality and efficiency of public services due to manifested with corruption (Hussain: 1990). At the top of the list are parliament, courts, tax department, customs, police/ safety and security, and health care (Guhan, S. and Paul, Samuel: 1997).

In contrast, the post office, the telecommunications company, the national bank, power plants received somewhat better average marks (Shleifer, A. &Vishny, R.:1993). Since for all the services under considerations significant financial means are necessary, the quality of their services is in direct correlation with the overall financial situation of society. And since that overall material situation of society is extremely poor, it is logical that services, provided by these public entities, are at a low level.

4.7   Most Frequent Forms / Patterns of Corruption

According to the views of the majority of civil servants and the politicians, corruption in our society is most often used in circumnavigating legal obligations and norms; then, in an attempt to change the existing legal norms for someone's gain and interest; and only then in an attempt of the people to realize certain rights, which are guaranteed by existing legal norms. Such answers could be explained in light of subsequently listed results that the basic causes of corruption, according to the respondents, are inherent to the system.

Corruption is, therefore, perceived as the adequate response by individuals to the faults of that system a way and an attempt to bypass or change norms that do not enable the appropriate protection and realization of rights. Although corruption is generally condemned, majority of the respondents has a tendency to justify its use, under certain circumstances: when it contributes to the realization of rights guaranteed

by law, and which in a way prescribed by the law cannot be realized.

Figure-2.1

Corruption Patterns

Types of Public Sector Corruption, United Kingdom 2005
(Percentage of total reported cases)

Source: Her Majesty's Treasury (2005, pp. 7-8).

The United Kingdom's Treasury fraud report 2005 found that fraud related to personnel management (both govt. servants and politicians), theft of assets and information, and procurement fraud were the most common types of fraud, in that order of magnitude (see figure above). By monetary value the top three in order of magnitude were theft of assets and information, procurement, and travel allowances fraud.

We posed a question: how does a civil servant / politician feel when he offers bribe in cash or a gift to a clerk to get the things done? Answers follow: The most common emotional response of civil servants / politicians who were forced to pay a bribe, according to answers of those polled, is anger. The feeling of shame, which would represent an indicator of an interior moral norm or an internal sanction, is characteristic only for one quarter of answers. Indifference or even satisfaction connected to this act, is expressed by one third of those polled, and a significant number of those who refused to answer this question are a significant sign that in the society there is a significant level of getting used to this phenomenon, that it is

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becoming something normal, everyday, which does not cause moral revolt, condemnation or aversion. The readiness of civil servants and politicians to participate themselves in the practice of corruption, regardless of moral positions, greatly depends on whether it is perceived as a mean that can efficiently resolve or ease the solving of problems of an individual civil servant or politician.

We see that corruption is a serious problem to both developing and developed world.There is a strong link between poverty, failed institutions and graft. We observe that corruption is not a monopoly of the developing countries. Other notable poor performers and backsliders of the developed world in the 2008 CPI, TIB indicate that strength of oversight mechanisms is also at risk among the wealthiest.

The example of UK is particularly remarkable. Having scored 8.6 and 8.4 in 2006 and 2007 respectively, UK has dropped this year to 7.7, marking a serious deterioration, hardly ever seen in the 14-year history of CPI. This has been attributed to the UK Government's intervention into the Serious Fraud Office's investigations into the BAE Systems' alleged bribing of the Saudi officials. Developed countries that have shown tendency to compromise integrity of judicial, financial and oversight institutions have also scored low in CPI. Many wealthy countries have also failed to effectively regulate their private sector, in terms of addressing overseas bribery. Moreover once again, none of the enlisted countries has scored 10 out of 10 in the scale.

It seems difficult to get away from the impression, therefore, that the industrialized countries of the North possess a 'cleaner' polity. The question is, how far is this perception a true reflection of reality? A brief survey of the industrialized world demonstrates that far from being absent, corruption is both present and frequently disguised in the polity.

The latter aspect is significant because it highlights the complex nature of corruption. It also highlights the fact that perceptions are misleading: we cannot assume that there is no corruption in the developed world. Indeed, as one writer concludes, 'patrimonialism, in the sense of the distribution of public resources according to personality criteria, and/or the appropriation of public resources for

private ends, appears to be *normal* among dominant groups in industrial societies.'(Theobald, 1990, p. 64)

For instance, there is the 'spoils' system in the United States - a 'classic example of a polity thoroughly permeated by patronage' (Theobald, 1990, p. 54). The roots of the system go back to the political 'machines' which originated in the 1830s, subverting democratic principles in order to mobilize blocks of relatively unsophisticated electors. They declined gradually, over the years, but remnants still remain on the US political landscape. Interestingly, an act of legislation to establish the principle of merit in civil service appointments was enacted as far back as 1883, but patronage continues unabashedly in American politics. One estimate claims that that no less than half of the 8 million local government employees in the country are appointed in some form of patronage (Theobald, 1990, p. 56) while other works (Smith, 1988)provide details of a complex, imbedded network of patronage extending from the upper reaches of the social ladder, to an exclusive segment of clients and beneficiaries, which include subtle, minute and seemingly innocent ways of influencing politics and the allocation of resources.

In the other industrial societies, the picture is not dramatically different. Here, too, it is generally acknowledged that patronage plays a major role in the recruitment and cohesion of dominant political and economic elites. In the United Kingdom, for instance, where though there is no overt 'spoils' system like the United States, there is a complex network of political patronage on a scale which is far from negligible. (*Ibid.*) It extends from the extensive kinship and friendship connections which closely connect members of the ruling classes or the 'establishment', to the regular dispensation of patronage by the ruling party through a well developed reward system. (*Ibid.*)

Apart from the existence of patronage or what some writers define as 'industrial clientage' (Theobald, 1990, p. 73), there have also been many public breaches of confidence in the industrialised countries. Although the more celebrated cases, like Watergate, Iran-Contra and so on, easily come to mind, further examination reveals there is a sizeable body of evidence about more serious infringements of the public trust as well. The interesting aspect of all these publicly exposed cases of corruption, however, is that they appear to be exceptions to the rule.

This Study is not concerned about the nature of corruption in the developed world, so it is not relevant to dwell further on this aspect of the subject. What is relevant to our critical analysis, however, is that contrary to popular notions, corruption is an imbedded, consistent feature in developed societies. Consequently it becomes important to understand why there is a distinct impression that developed societies have a 'clean' polity and developing societies do not.

There are two major reasons for this perception-First, a close examination of the developed societies reveals that by far and large, there is little or no evidence of corruption in the visible, widespread, day-to-day, petty and routine aspects of public administration. In these societies, corruption exists in the upper, less visible, more exclusive domain of the rich, wealthy, senior members of government, bureaucracy and civil society (Theobald, 1990).

In developing societies, on the other hand, corruption is not restricted to an exclusive elite network alone but extends to different levels of socio-economic and political activity. Corruption in these societies prevails at virtually every point of contact between the state and the market, or the public with the private. In Bangladesh, for instance, as has already been stated, there is ample evidence to show that corruption is not the exception to the rule. It is found at virtually every level of activity in which the state plays a role - from the national, political level to the far-flung rural level. Corruption permeates not only the relatively higher, politically sensitive, and sensitive aspects of state activity, but also its routine functions and structures.

So the perception of a difference between the developed and the developing world in terms of corruption, is not entirely without basis in the sense that corruption 'extends' over a greater range or area in the developing world, though it does not, necessarily involve a greater volume of activity. Nevertheless, the wider area of reach of corruption can explain to some extent the existence of a general impression that there is 'more' abuse of the public office in the developing world.

But the second reason for the perception that developing countries are 'more' corrupt is interesting. This reason is not easily or compactly described because it is more or less an attitude or approach which influences and informs the manner in

which corruption is perceived - as an activity, as a social, economic and political exchange, and as an outcome. Several trends of thought can be discerned in this approach, some of which are discussed below. Among these trends, the most dominant - and the most challenging - is a set of theories which have been defined as 'modernisation' theories.

By understanding the implications of 'modernization' which, together with several historical and ideological trends, has shaped our ideas about corruption, we can unravel some of the myths and misunderstandings about corruption and in so doing, devise solutions which will work in Bangladesh.

4.8 Modernization and Corruption

It is tempting to interpret the existence of corruption on a widespread scale in the developing world as the result of cultural traits or traditional ways of existence. Indeed, one reason corruption appears as a 'problem' in developing countries is because it is associated with certain so-called innate, cultural and traditional traits.

The rationale for this line of thinking began with a school of thought in social science described as the 'modernization' school. According to this school of thought, civilization essentially means the movement of people from a 'backward' to an 'advanced' state of existence, the aim of the movement being, ultimately, to achieve a level of 'modernity', which signals the end of the journey. The theory holds that the developed world has already moved from a 'backward' to an 'advanced' level of organization, but that the developing world is in a process of transition - from the 'primitive' to the 'advanced' stage.

In this hypothesis, 'modernization' is offered as the ultimate goal of all civilized societies. Through this world-view, the developed world appears to display all the characteristics of a 'modern', 'advanced', socio-economic and political system. In dramatic contrast to this, 'modernization' seems to be absent in the developing world. Here, poverty and economic deprivation are linked inexorably to 'backwardness' in social, economic and political organization.

While modernization doctrine has been the subject of much debate, its relevance to this Study lies in the influence it has had in defining and interpreting the processes and structures of social systems, and how corruption features within those systems.

Modernization dogma holds that certain characteristics in developing societies are innate, or essentially primordial. The argument is furnished that a 'traditional' way of life predisposes developing societies to a less developed level of existence, holding them 'back' from becoming more sophisticated and advanced. A key element of socio-political organization in these developing societies is apparently, patrimonialism. The term itself has been used widely, with differing interpretations, but generally speaking, it is used to describe a kind of extended patriarchy in which the authority of the patriarch is required to expand in order to meet the needs of a growing polity or state. Since patrimonialism relies on a personalized dispensation of political and social resources, it cannot be reconciled with the impartial, rational-legal bureaucratic principles of the 'modern' state.

According to the modernization hypothesis, developing societies are essentially patrimonial in character, displaying a personalized, patron-client based political and socio-economic organization. They are prone to factionalism, clientelism and differing types of kinship-based ties and arrangements - all of which are throwbacks of their more 'primitive' and 'pre-modern' roots. Modernization acknowledges that all 'pre-modern' societies displayed these general characteristics, but while some societies in the developed world eventually managed to advance out of their 'backwardness' into a sophisticated level of development, others did not. Consequently, these societies have to advance stage by stage on a path of development which has already been traversed by the developed world.

As might be obvious to many, the problem with modernization theory, is not only that it is a somewhat crude, evolutionary interpretation of human activity, but also that it fails to resolve several fundamental inaccuracies and contradictions in its hypothesis.

Modernization ignores the reality that the development of the modern polity, such as exists in the industrialized world, was the result of a specific set of

circumstances, not the evolution of a special, culturally sophisticated set of values. Indeed, as has been stated earlier in this Study, historical evidence clearly demonstrates that the growth of the modern nation-state and the concept of the rational-legal bureaucracy came into its own on the expansionist heels of colonialism, industrial capitalism and the social changes which accrued as a result of all this. The 'modern' notion of the nation-state did not 'evolve', but came into existence both in the consciousness of the developing world, as well as in the physical domains of colonial rule, because it managed to marginalize all other concepts of state and, at the same time, to successfully enter the interstices of public consciousness all over Asia, South America and Africa (Nandy, 1992). The legacy of this colonization of the narrative of the state has been felt everywhere in the developing world and to this day, informs the terms of reference on discussions of the state, the nation and issues of corruption, transparency, democracy and development. The terms of reference of the modernization theories are thus based on an assumption of reality which stems from a particular historical specificity.

Modernization is unacceptable also because it cannot resolve several basic contradictions. For instance, it cannot explain why, if the developed world has already arrived at the 'end-state of modernity', remnants of the 'old' way of life still remain. If corruption is an example of the 'backwardness' of a social system, how can we explain its existence in the industrialized world? Here, as has already been mentioned, evidence of corruption is found not only in the few, highly publicized cases of corruption in high places, but also in a consistent, permeating level of patronage in political circles. As far as social structures are concerned, therefore, developing societies also display characteristics which, by the terms of reference established by modernization, are clearly 'backward'.

Dyadic structures, (regarded as the hallmark of 'backwardness'), are evident in many societies in the developed world, from the patronage system and the political machines of the United States, to the familial organizations in Italy, to the network of business, friends, family which in Britain provides a special kind of patronage to the members of the 'establishment'. Modernization has no explanation for the survival of these 'pre-modern' traits in the 'advanced' societies, except to suggest that the process

of modernization is 'discontinuous', hence some old structures from 'pre-modern' times have survived the 'transition' to 'modernity'.

The core problem with modernization, however, is that although it recognizes the existence of poverty, social deprivation and individual forms of organization in developing countries, it fails to understand the relationship between these factors and socio-economic and political change. The hypothesis of modernization ignores the reality of social, political and economic processes in the developing world, because they are not structured according to Weberian notions of rationality. Consequently, it is easy to declare that poverty and a chronic scarcity of resources are somehow the result of a particular cultural condition which includes, among other 'backward' traits, a propensity to be corrupt. Modernization fails to comprehend - or even to consider - the possibility that poverty and deprivation are the most likely causes of instability, rent-seeking and a so-called mind set such as developing societies tend to display - not the other way around.

Modernization cannot resolve the problematic inherent in the rational-legal ideal of bureaucratic transparency, nor can it account for the reality of patrimonial forms of organization in the developed countries. Furthermore, it cannot satisfactorily explain why, when the developed societies and states do come under socio-economic pressure, they tend to become as 'soft' as their counterparts in the developing world - the presence of large, immigrant, so-called 'ethnic', or socio-economically challenged communities, living on the margins of 'civic' life in the developed world, is a case in point and worth noting (Theobald, 1990 p. 168). We might also remember that public administration in the developing world is regarded to be 'clean' because it has seldom been tested - at base, it is a fragile system, prone to abuse and misuse, just like any other system (Wood, 1994, p.21). In other words, we can safely conclude that the developed world is not really 'modern', nor even real, after all.

Given these obvious limitations, it is not surprising that 'modernization' as a doctrine has been explicitly abandoned by social science. The problem is, its basic tenets continue to influence contemporary thinking. True, the bias is not necessarily obvious, and there are refreshing departures from the influence, but by far and large, development doctrine is inspired by a fundamental concept which encourages the differentiation of societies along ethnocentric, ideological lines. Modernization

continues to inform the discourse on development, and therefore on corruption and transparency, shaping the framework within which these issues are discussed, defined and subsequently (attempted to be) resolved. It is hardly surprising, therefore, that reforms which radiate from this basis are difficult to implement and ultimately futile in their attempts to stem the tide of poverty in the developing world.

4.9 Alternative Approaches

The foregoing discussion has highlighted some of the weaknesses in existing formulations of corruption, a lack of understanding about the implications of this term, and the conflict between perception and reality. It is useful now to proceed beyond the problematic of corruption and move to an understanding of the reality of corruption, thus enabling the innovation of pragmatic measures which will tackle corruption with greater success than has been achieved so far.

4.10 Corruption and Development

To understand corruption, it is important to re-examine the contemporary context of corruption as an issue for development administration. It is crucial to do so with an exploratory aim in mind. This implies, that first, we must acknowledge the historical context in which the discourse of development has been founded. The term 'underdeveloped' had been in use for several years, but it was in a famous inaugural address on January 20, 1949, that US President Truman launched a term and an era, at the same time (Estevo, 1992). The term was 'underdevelopment' and the era came to be known as the 'era of development'. It was the beginning, in formal terminology, of the terms of reference for a body of practical and theoretical knowledge which came to be known as development administration. President Truman's words speak for themselves:

We must embark on a bold new programme for making the benefits of our scientific advances and industrial progress available for the improvement and growth of underdeveloped areas. The old imperialism - exploitation for foreign profit - has no

place in our plans. What we envisage is a programme of development based on the concepts of democratic fair dealing. (Esteva, 1992 p. 6)

It is crucial to note that since that day in 1949, the 'underdeveloped' world and its perceived problems have been at the centre of the development agenda, but they have been there for very specific reasons.(Esteva, 1992).

Indeed, the present platform of 'good governance' which incorporates fundamental requirements such as transparency is premised to a great extent on the development formula launched after the Second World War. Truman's words are important because they remind us that the goals of development which prioritize the battle against corruption were premised to a great extent on the exigencies of an internationally determined political and socio-economic scheme of organization, formally launched soon after World War II, in which the world was viewed through several key and undeniably presumptive concepts. Prominent among the assumptions was a western style liberal-democracy, regarded to be the best - and the only - path of 'development' for all societies in the world. That world-view has not changed. As President Truman's words had highlighted, the aims of the United States, followed in time by the rest of the industrialized world, in pursuing the agenda of development has been fairly uncompromising. The dominant development formula has allowed little room for exploration. The problems which accompany the uncritical acceptance of this formula cannot be addressed within the confines of a predetermined framework. Original, authentic, relevant solutions cannot emerge under these constraints.

Indeed, proof of this statement can be found in the reality that, nearly fifty years after development officially began, the developing countries of the South are seriously 'behind' the developed countries of the North - in terms of economic, social and political stability and prosperity. In 1960, the countries of the industrialized world were 20 time richer than the countries of the developing world; in 1980, 46 times (Sachs, 1992, p. 3). There are social tensions as well, as income disparities show little sign of declining yet real incomes continue to fall. Cut-backs in the public sector further destabilize large sections of the population and people are caught in what one writer describes as the 'deadlock of development' - when the 'old' ways have been abandoned and the 'new' agenda poses problems of application. (*Ibid.*)

Given these circumstances, the only avenue to travel upon is one which is fundamentally exploratory. Before we blindly accept the exigencies of the development agenda which appears to recommend that we keep re-applying the same formula of liberal-democracy, a rational-legal bureaucracy, and the 'modern' nation-state, until the developing world gets it right, it is useful to critically analyze the fundamental basis of development agenda, especially its implicit advocacy of modernization doctrines.

One problem with the development formula launched by President Truman, was that its roots spread into modernization theory. But it was not until the end of the first development decade that modernization theory first came under serious scrutiny and was found wanting. It was at this time that, contrary to western expectations, the countries of the 'underdeveloped' world displayed clear and on occasion, violent signs of having 'failed' to modernize on schedule. Political upheavals, economic crises and social problems attacked many parts of the developing world, including Africa, resulting in a serious re-assessment of development goals. (Theobald, 1990)

The result was the birth of 'modernization revisionism' led by the eminent social scientist, Samuel Huntington, who argued against economic growth as the panacea of all underdevelopment evils (Theobald, 1990, p. 77 and *passim*). Huntington warned that far from promoting social stability and democracy, rapid economic growth had the potential to exert more pressure on an already overburdened state apparatus than it could handle, create severe inequities in income, and actually undermine the goals of development (*Ibid.*). Soon, others joined the discussion and the result was a growing sense of suspicion about the role of development, as well as about its evolutionary interpretation of human activity. The notion that the western world had effortlessly achieved the 'end-state of modernity' came under scrutiny, as did the structures of political and socio-economic organization in the third world.

There is no denying that armed with these ideas and influenced by repeated 'failures' in the 'underdeveloped' world, the doctrine of development began to emphasise social and not just economic development as key components of its agenda. Terms like "participation' and 'participatory' appeared in the terminology, gradually becoming more popular as development administration tried to find new avenues of addressing what it saw to be the same old problems (Rahnema, in Sachs,

1992). At the same time, 'top-down' strategies were re-examined, with special reference to the failure of growth to equitably reach the poor. The part played by development - in perpetuating poverty - was recognised for the first time. The President of the World Bank himself admitted in 1973, that growth had been accompanied by 'greater maldistribution of income in many developing countries'(*ibid*), thus acknowledging that development could alter the dynamics of a society in more ways than development, itself, was capable of understanding.

But, even though new avenues were explored, the fundamental assumptions on which the dogma had been based - essentially, a western world-view of progress and change -continued to inform the discourse of development. The ideal of a western model of the nation-state comprising of among other things, a rational-legal Weberian model of public administration and liberal-democracy, remained intact. True, there was, renewed emphasis on establishing mechanisms - such as transparency, for instance - which would provide an enabling environment for development to bear fruit. But in the final analysis, the 'failure' of development resulted mainly in a re-ordering and re-organization of old ideas, not a fresh way of approaching the entire subject of development.

Corruption, too, has remained a key factor in the development agenda, perhaps even more key than before, because in a climate of increasing economic strain, the proportion of assistance to the third world has come under some constraints and this has added a greater sense of urgency to the need to achieve tangible results. The efficient application of development programmers have been regarded as necessary in any case, but with repeated failures to contend with, development administration is becoming more and more frustrated. The result is, there are increasing pressures on third world countries like Bangladesh to accept the terms of reference set by the developed world.

For social scientists trying to unravel the processes of corruption in a society like Bangladesh, these terms of reference are significant - not so much because of what they have achieved, but unfortunately, because of what they have failed to achieve. In Bangladesh, for instance there has been a notable failure to implement change, or even to create an enabling climate for change. There has been no move as yet to 'reform' the bureaucracy, for instance, a move which it is believed would play a

crucial role in the eradication of corruption. This, in spite of the fact that pressure has been exerted on the government from the aid community - pressures which, in view of the reality that the country has received millions of dollars in external aid and continues to receive approximately $2 billion annually even now, cannot be taken lightly.

Currently, corruption is found in: satisfying rules and obtaining licenses; access to publicly provided goods and services; decisions on the subject of public investment contracts; control over the application of tax fees; hiring within the public sector.

Chapter 5

Attitudes of the Civil Servants and the Politicians
on Corruption in Bangladesh

5.1 Introduction

This chapter examines the attitudes of the civil servants and the politicians about the causes, consequences and the ways to combat corruption in Bangladesh. To understand the present scenario we need to know about the root first.It has been argued that Bangladesh society is a highly complex network involving reciprocal favours and obligations, and that as a result payoff is the lifeblood of Bangladesh (Maloney, 1986:173). Payoff benefits include money, jobs, luxury gifts, building supplies, overseas travel and the payment of foreign tuition bills, foreign medical bills, overseas hotel and restaurant bills and personal liabilities (Kochanek, 1993:258). The symptoms of patron-client relationship are further reflected by the practice of some businessmen to maintain rest houses and high-class exclusive hostesses to entertain important foreign guests and big bosses (Siddiqui, 1990). Many of these big bosses are no doubt top-ranking politicians and senior civil servants (Khan, 1998).

This Chapter analyzes the perception of the politicians and the civil servants while they are known as the major sources of the phenomenon i.e. causes, costs and cures of corruption in Bangladesh.

5.2 Scenario of Corruption in Bangladesh

Many centuries ago Kautilya's writing identified forty types of embezzlement committed by public servants (Padhay, 1986). In ancient India corruption was prevalent in administration, judiciary and trade (Khan, 1997). As indicated earlier corruption in one form or another became an integral part of politico-administrative systems during the Khilji and Tuglaq dynasties. The situation did not change during the rule of Mughals and the British. Many politicians were charged with corruption and debarred from politics after the promulgation of the first martial law in Pakistan in 1958. Many civil servants, some belonging to the elite Civil Service of Pakistan (CSP), were dismissed from their services on corruption changes.

Corruption during Bangladesh era goes unchallenged and the flaws are basically institutional. The fundamental problem that relates to corruption in Bangladesh is the dominance of the vested interest, irrespective of charge in the political hues in the power matrix. The remedies to improve transparency and reduce corruption should not have been impossible. But those who are to do the jobs are in no mood to appreciate the fact that bold governance reforms are good politics that earns the electorate's support in an unalloyed manner. To effectively deal with corruption ensuring accountability at all level is now a major demand in Bangladesh. Corruption is a complex multi-faceted social phenomenon with innumerable manifestations. It takes place in Bangladesh as an outcome of deficiencies in the existing public administration apparatuses and systems as well as cultural, economic, political and social factors. (Khan: 1998).

While interviewing the civil servants and the politicians we have asked them, **"Is Bangladesh a "corrupt country"?** They have given different opinion in assessing the extent and the level of corruption in the country which is shown below.

Table 1.1: The extent of corruption and level of involvement by the politicians and the civil servants in Bangladesh.

Question	Opinion of Politicians & Civil Servants	Number of Respondent	Percentage (%)
Do you think that *Civil Servants* and Politicians are involved in corruption?	Yes	100	100
Please assess the level of their Involvement in Corruption.	Low Medium Level High Level	70 25 5	100

Source: Derived from field study data

It is the matter of regret which is shown in the above table that all among the 100 respondents admitted Bangladesh as a corrupt country. Seventy percent of the respondents believe that most of them (70%) are involved in lower level of corruption, twenty five percent respondents acknowledged their involvement in medium level and only five percent involved in high level of corruption. Majority of them opined that in the context of Bangladesh corruption is made by a limited number

of powerful individuals of political parties and/or govt. officials (high level of corruption) and it takes place because of the failure of effective leadership.

We have asked the civil servants and the politicians to comment on whether corruption in Bangladesh is on the rise or gone down.Their opinion is given in the table below.

Table 1.2: Expected level of corruption in Bangladesh

Level of Corruption is going to…	Expectation of the politicians and the civil servants	Percentage (%)
Increase	Yes	15
Stay about the same	Yes	30
Decrease	Yes	55
No comment	None found	0

Source: Derived from field study data

We see the majority of them expect that corruption in Bangladesh, in near future, is going to decrease in a substantial amount.

We aimed to wino out the overall situation of both the public and private sector corruption scenario of Bangladesh. We have also asked that"Beside government, is corruption a serious problem in private sector of Bangladesh? Their opinion is sketched in following table.

Table 1.3: Is Corruption prominent in the public or the private sector?

Corruption is more prominent in….	Opinion of the politicians and the civil servants	Percentage (%)
Public Sector	More prominent	40
Private Sector	Mostly seen	5
About the same in both	Prominent	52
Don't know	There is corruption but the extent of it is in both sectors	3

Source: Derived from field study data

According to the opinion of the respondents, both the sectors (public and private) are prominent in corruption. As a social process, therefore, corruption is everywhere in Bangladesh (Rahman:2005). It is present, for instance, in the process of political patronage, and/or the socio-political institutional arrangement called a patron-client relationship, through which public resources are appropriated by a select group of people, usually described as elites; it is visible in economic exchanges such

as the process of rent-seeking which (regulatory requirements by) public servants impose on players in the market: also known as ***ghoosh***or bribe. It is visible and invisible in a host of activities which range from outright bribery to more subtle forms of patronage or persuasion such as ***tadbir***, from underhand deals involving vast sums of money at the national and international levels, to petty, everyday ***baksheesh*** which the doorman at a bureaucrat's office extracts in order to perform his normal duties.

Most of the respondents believe that different national and international anti-corruption watchdogs are studying on this issue and if Bangladesh takes the lessons to address corruption in Bangladesh, the nation can be benefited. They opined that corruption was at all levels of government institutions involved in the process and now incidence and volume corruption has increased and it has also been centralized for that matter. Transparency International (TI), a German-based anti-corruption watchdog, has found Bangladesh fort the consecutive times as one of the world's most corrupt nation. In fact, the TIB report did not only provide a quantitative figure for a pervasive sin but it also provides all concerned with a warning signal about one of a host of vices ailing society and the administration that has been blocking their progress(Rahman,2005). The politicians and the civil servants have said that they cannot deny that among Asian countries Bangladesh has a significant extent of corruption. The picture of the limit of corruption in Bangladesh in comparison with other South Asian countries can be shown in the following figure-

TABLE 3.1 **Performance of South Asian Countries 2007-2008**

SL	Country	Score		Rank(from below)	
		2007	2008	2007	2008
1	**Bangladesh**	**2.0**	**2.1**	**7**	**10**
2	Afghanistan	1.8	1.5	5	4
3	Pakistan	2.4	2.5	11	14
4	Nepal	2.5	2.7	12	16
5	Maldives	3.3	2.8	20	17
6	India	3.5	3.4	22	22
7	Sri Lanka	3.2	3.2	19	21
8	Bhutan	5.0	5.2	35	36

Source: Corruption Perceptions Index (CPI) 2008, TIB

Comparison among other than South Asian countries the picture of the extent of corruption in Bangladesh reflects around the same.

| TABLE 3.2 | **Bangladesh's Score & Rank Compared to other Low-Scoring Countries in the World during 2007-2008** | | | | |

SL	Country	Score		Rank (from below)	
		2007	2008	2007	2008
1	**Bangladesh**	**2.0**	**2.1**	**7**	**10**
2	Kenya	2.1	2.1	8	10
3	Russia	2.3	2.1	10	10
4	Syria	2.3	2.1	11	10
5	Belarus	2.1	2.0	12	9
6	Central African Republic	2.0	2.0	7	9
7	Ivory Coast	2.1	2.0	8	9
8	Ecuador	2.1	2.0	8	9
9	Laos	1.9	2	6	9
10	Papua New Guinea	2	2	7	9
11	Tajikistan	2.1	2	8	9

Source: Corruption Perceptions Index (CPI) 2008, TIB

According to the above CPI 2008 of Transparency International Bangladesh (TIB), Bangladesh has been ranked in the tenth position from below while in 2007 it was 7th and in 2006 it was ranked third and during 2001-2005 at the bottom. With score less than 3 Bangladesh continues to be a country where corruption is perceived to be high and widespread.

The respondents (politicians and civil servants) have opined inversely about the extent of corruption in Bangladesh. They have committed their involvement in the process whether it is high, medium or low and the participants have no doubt that there is corruption in every sphere of our society. During the questionnaire intervention it has been clearly reflected in the reply of both the sources that the politicians and the civil servants can play pivotal role in combating corruption in the country.

5.3 The Concept of Corruption by the Civil Servants & the Politicians

A general impression conveyed by the politicians and the civil servants that corruption is viewed quite clearly as 'a way of life'. According to them some common types of corruptions of Bangladesh are- **Ghoosh** or Bribe, **Tadbir** or Pursuing, **Bakshis** etc. **Ghoosh** or bribe. **Gift-giving,** another form of corruptionis part of **negotiating** and **relationship building**. The other forms are **contact steering**, **kickback**, **misuse of public assets**, **abuse of travel expenses** and **abuse of portable**

assets etc.We made an attempt to find out from the civil servants and the politicians – "what is the situation today in terms of incidence of corruption compared to pre-liberalization era". It is necessary to point out that both the respondents groups assessed corruption in those fields they deal with. However, majority of them stated that volume and extent of corruption has gone remarkably up after liberalization. Economic liberalization expanded the opportunities for everyone on a quite unprecedented scale. Politicians, state bureaucrats, the military hierarchy found a fertile ground for large-scale self-enrichment through this process.

Many local civil servants and politicians are not satisfied with the existing institutional arrangements for smooth operation of daily works. According to them "there are loopholes in the governmental institutional arrangements which allow foreign firms to evade revenue". Government follow a policy of double standard in its treatment and support to foreign and local business firms. Under the current industrial policy, the major incentive for the foreign firms operating in Bangladesh is that they can have 100% ownership of their business interventions. Most of the respondents however, were in agreement to suggest that major disincentive for the foreign and local business firms emanates from frequent demand for bribe by the government officials in connection with politicians. This culture of bribe is deeply entrenched in the civil administration. It is difficult to get anything done without "proper grease" or "speed money".

The volume and incidence of corruption has increased by many folds after economic liberation took place. Many foreign business firms consider the payment of bribe on a regular basis as an extended operating cost. Some civil servants have mentioned that -"who wants to get stuck for an unlimited period for administrative approval, and in the process somebody rather may lose, so the payment of bribe to government officials make things smooth for us in the administration and some politicians also have stake in this." A top level politician who is a minister now mentioned that "People have to make major payments to the politicians even before they start their business and society consider this as an investment cost, and those politicians then informally work as their agent and this way it is easier for people to run their business smoothly". "They have made things worse, as they pay bribe on a regular basis, it is difficult for us now to do business without bribe, social and

personal networks have become less important, it does not matter anymore "who you know", at present what matters is "how much you want to pay". Now the bureaucrats work as the broker between entrepreneurs and politicians and they all have stake in this," the respondents added.

A prominent politician pointed out that a person who earns his living from business is interested in quick turnover and a reasonable margin of profit. But business in Bangladesh is infested by power-brokers and middlemen largely because of the political patronage system. The trade and business associations are led by former government employees or politically active persons. This patron-clients relation between government and business leads to many artificial crisis for real businessman e.g. shortage of rice during the final years of the last government (2005) as proper price at farmers level could not be ensured or shooting up of the price of salt or onion or the crisis in fertilizer. How to withdraw the patronage, how to restrict businessman's donation to political parties and their mastans (musclemen), and how to establish the leadership of true businessman in place of new rich intruders are important factors contributing to private business corruption in Bangladesh.

About half of respondents believe that the partial primary responsibility for corruption in Bangladesh lay in the hands of government officials but most lay in the hands of politicians. A recent survey carried out by the Bangladesh UnnayanParishad reinforces that a solid 62 percent of respondents believed that the primary responsibility for corruption in Bangladesh lay in the hands of government officials (Almas and Haque: 2010). Most of the participants viewed that corruption lies at the root of the overall degeneration of politics and of a section of our politicians that we see today. Thus, corruption in Bangladesh is seen both as the root and as the effect of a situation, with the nexus of politicians and bureaucrats.

5.4 The Causes of Corruption in Bangladesh

The prime cause of corruption in Bangladesh is the abuse of power (News Network: 2003). When we discuss corruption in Bangladesh, we are referring to destruction of integrity, the exchange, activity, process or behaviour which occurs when the public domain comes into contact with the private domain*(*Theobald, 1990).

We have mentioned in the previous chapter of this study that corruption is more or less developed in almost all societies and Bangladesh is no exception to it ((News Network: 2003). A legal system and a cultural-historic heritage, state interventionsaresome of the key causes of corruption. As specific causes of corruption, especially the small scale, since not all countries are exposed to them, we can name poverty. With its increase the extent of corruption grows. It is known that the increase of state intervention influences the development of corruption, or that where economic relations are regulated by a large number of rules, which are to be interpreted or implemented the possibility for the sale of those services by public servants is much greater.

Table 1.4: Causes of corruption in Bangladesh (by the politicians and the civil servants.)

Sl. No.	The main causes of corruption in Bangladeshi Society in General
01	Lack of patriotism, the overall crises of ethics, degradation of morality of the society, social tension and economic insecurity -which is on the rise for growing division in the society.
02	Lack of the rule of law. Lack of institutional capacity. The formation of corruption is mostly influenced by the nature of the political and economic system, the weakness of the system which means absence of rule of law, inefficiency of the judiciary system, bad legislation, etc.
03	Poor payment, lack of opportunities in the service (reward, regular promotion etc.), illegal pressure and more volume of works.
03	Personal interest, greed rather than national interest/ last for money.
04	The growing poverty of the society/ need.
05	Lack of political and professional commitment, abuse of the power vested on them, lack of transparency and accountability.
06	Lack of education of the density of population.
07	Free market economy or economic liberalization leads to corruption. State patronized privatization. As a result, their involvement is seen as more than facilitating.
08	Needs a knowledge-based, skilled, high performing civil service and committed politicians to implement it.
09	No/ very limited access for citizens to government information.
10	Less emphasis on moral values in school teaching and religious community do not take real steps in promoting moral values in everyday life.
11	Ineffective anti-corruption measures to fight against corruption in real sense.
12	Opposition parties, parliamentary committee and civil society do not act as a "watchdog" of government activities.

Source: Derived from the field study data.

The majority of the civil servants and politicians believe that lack of patriotism, the overall crises of morality of the society, social tension- which is on the rise for growing division in society, overall growing poverty of the society, and the lack of the rule of law, are the basic (and almost equally important) causes of corruption in our circumstances. If we divide corruption causes into systemic, objective, and subjective factors, we can conclude that, in the perception of civil servants and the politicians, the formation of corruption is mostly influenced by the nature of the political and economic system, the weakness of the system which means absence of rule of law, inefficiency of the judiciary system, bad legislation, etc.

Often mentioned as the utmost causes of corruption by them are concerned with the bribes: (i) Government contracts: bribes influence on who gets the contract, the terms of the contract, as well as terms of subcontracts when the project is implemented. (ii) Government benefits: bribes influence the allocation of monetary benefits such as credit subsidies and favoured prices and exchange rates where price controls and multiple exchange rates exist. Bribes are also important in obtaining licenses and permits to engage in lucrative economic activities such as importing certain goods in high demand and in short supply. Moreover, bribes are employed to acquire in-kind benefits such as access to privileged schools, subsidized medical care, subsidized housing and real estate, and attractive ownership stakes in enterprises that are being privatized. (iii) Government revenue: bribes are used to reduce the amount of taxes, fees, dues, custom duties, and electricity and other public utility charges collected from business firms and private individuals. (iv)Time savings and regulatory avoidance: bribes are speeded up the granting of permission, licenses and permits to carry out activities that are perfectly legal. This is the so-called "grease money" to turn the wheels of bureaucracy more smoothly, speedily and hopefully in the right direction. (v) Influencing outcomes of legal and regulatory processes: bribes are be used to provide incentives to regulatory authorities to refrain from taking action, and to look the other way, when private parties engage in activities that are in violation of existing laws, rules and regulations such as those relating to controlling pollution, preventing health hazards, or promoting public safety as in the case of building codes and traffic regulations. Similarly, bribes are normally given to favour one party over another in court cases or in other legal and regulatory proceedings.

5.5 Which Actions Make Up Corruption?

There is a well-established understanding that corruption is basically something that is socially unwanted and condemned there is no consensus regarding which actions make up this phenomenon. Confusion regarding moral condemnation of certain types of corruption exists, most often, when dealing with the following practices: giving pre-election donations to political parties, personally contacting a municipal representative in an attempt to acquire a development permit and above all giving a gift or additional payment to a bureaucrat or politician. Obviously, the activity which assumes reciprocity in granting certain services, giving concessions, make privileges possible among close acquaintances i.e. what is customary considered as using contacts and relationships- which make up a part of traditional morals are exempt from the phenomena of corruption. Implicitly, the concept of corruption is linked with giving of cash or the realization of a financial gain (for example: giving money to a state employee for decreasing taxes, offering money to a politician so somebody can complete a business deal with ease).

5.6 Groups Seen as Bearers to Combat Corruption

Both the Politicians and the civil servants think that the majority of public servants, both on the central and local level of the executive branch of government, participate in corruption. They also admit that it takes place because of political weaken leadership. They further comment that if the politicians are not corrupted, no public servant dares to be corrupted. Similarly as with the assessing of widespread of corruption in certain fields and institutions, it is believed that more than three-fourths of all state employees participate in corruption.

The Ex-Finance Minister told parliament that corruption had gripped every ministry of the government and it was regrettable that the National Board of Revenue (NBR) was the worst graft-infested department. "There is no angel in any ministry… corruption, more or less, is everywhere," he said during the question-answer session. Describing corruption as a disease, the minister said, "I can name the ministries one by one, from education ministry to communications, where corruption pervades." He, however, defended his ministry by saying that the NBR is suffering from scarcity of

efficient tax officials as appointments to the department have been halted for the last few years. "If I initiate actions against the corrupt (tax) officials the entire revenue division will become empty," he said. "I can't do this as I have to run the office." (The Daily Star, 6 June'05).

The Finance minister told the House that Bangladesh received foreign loans and grants of $28,364 million since independence. He strongly supported consultancy by development partners in foreign-aided projects and said, "We get quality work through their consultancy." But the minister differed from the view of another lawmaker and said, "Of the $28,364 million in foreign loans and grants so far received, only 2 percent has been spent on consultancy." (The Daily Star, 6 June'05). Two other ministers (one is present and another is ex-minister) also opined that politicians are the most powerful dominators in the corruption process. They added that all ministers along with the prime minister who head the governance should be honest and wise persons otherwise they might turn as barriers to stop corruption. They also said that politicians are not truly accountable to citizens, society and state which lead them to be barrier to combat corruption.

5.7 Inefficiency of Public Services as a Precondition of Corruption

Weak management supervision, weak transparency and accountability, limited capacity to detect and monitor corruption, and limited enforcement capabilities give rise to significant opportunities for corruption in public procurement. **Table 1.5 provides**a more extensive, though not exhaustive, list of administrative corruption by economic classification as well as some factors that contribute to corruption.

TABLE 1. PFM System Weaknesses and Patterns of Administrative Corruption

Economic class	Systemic contributing factors	Examples of corruption
Employer Compensation	• Absence of clear rules or hiring • Absence of management controls, internal controls • Absence or weakness in internal audit, external audit • Absence of treasury payroll matching • Absence of records, weak record keeping • Absence of management mandates for and review of regular financial reports	• Ghost employees • Nepotism • Absenteeism • Queue jumping in payments and consultants fee

Goods and services	• Absence of non-payroll expenditure controls • Absence of inventory control, asset registry • Weak procurement system • Absence of management oversight and review of payment and procurement practices	• Contract steering • Collusion • Fraudulent invoices • Payment for goods and services not received • Theft of government supplies
Capital Expenditures	• Absence of non-payroll expenditure controls • Absence of inventory control, asset registry • Weak procurement system • Absence of management oversight and review of payment and procurement practices	• Favoritism in payments or contract awards • Use of substandard material or practices in construction • Collusive pricing • Underpricing bids and using change orders to raise cost • Theft of stocks
Transfers	• Cash on in-kind transfers • Weak or no record keeping • Absence of clear procedures for processing applicants • Failure to follow procedures • Absence of clear laws, regulations, rules for eligibility, criteria	• Transfers to unauthorized, fictitious, or deceased individuals • Transferring less than approved levels and pocketing difference • Kickbacks • Favoritism in approving eligibility

Source: The Many Faces of Corruption, Edited by-J. Edgardo, Sanjay Pradhan, Pg-274.

The respondents viewed that one of the key conditions for governance activity is the quality and adaptation of legal regulations to market conditions. In addition to the named regulations, additionally of extreme importance is the quality of services provided by public services; from the quality of the road network, telephone and other public utilities and health care services, to services of the executive branch. They form a social climate, or the environment that we most often assess as mostly favorable or mostly unfavorable to the development of entrepreneurship. Quality, for many of them, besides efficiency and promptness, also implies impartiality. Public services are seen in this context as providers of logistic support for every national operation. Without this support it is almost impossible to carry out modern official activity.

The assessments of the respondent are in line with facts known form political philosophy stating that the success or failure of each individual, in this case civil servants and politicians, significantly depends from the success or lack of success of not only the narrow (community) but also of the social community which they belong to or the state. When this point is interpreted a bit more loosely, we can see that its

success, and therefore the quality of services offered by public services, depends to a great extent not only on the municipal and state authorities as such, but also on the general social and inherited socio-historical conditions. We believe that many of inherited social-historic conditions can be, by deliberate activities of political authorities, changed or corrected, or their influence be somewhat neutralized. The construction of an adequate system of regulation is recommended to be carried out by social institutions.

Bangladesh-a country which is witnessing rapid transition is faced with numerous problems, including the diverse problem in the functioning of public services. They were, above all, conceptualized as a service of the ruling nomenclature. The key for placement and advancement of employee cadre has been obedience and nepotism, and not expertise and quality of work.

This process of granting jobs was carried out most often according to special criteria. Along with the long expected political changes in Bangladesh a fear concerning job security grew among employees this fear was especially induced by recession, due to which thousands of other workers were dismissed or send on forced leave. Simultaneously, within society a small group grew rich very quickly. This wealth was attained most often through economic transactions between the newly formed private and the state. The key actors of these business arrangements were members of the political nomenclature. The unpunished accumulation of wealth in an illegal manner by people close to authorities applied pressure on the system of moral attitudes of every individual. This caused the erosion of business ethics and corrosion of the system of social values.

On the other hand, with a rapid growth of poverty there was a rapid fall of salaries of public servants and, as a consequence, the decrease of work discipline. The decrease of salaries, low job security, implosion of overall social responsibility, and the real fear that many of them will lose their job with the change of political authorities, constituted the motivation for the rapid increase of desire to exploit the time remaining in their positions to the full extent. In reality, all of this motivated them to cash in on their services as much as possible; and since this could not be done legally, their leaning towards corruption increased. Self-justification was easy: if others can do it, why not me, especially since I am paid so poorly.

5.8 Personal tendency to participate in corruption

The exchange process of both the giving, and the taking of a bribe exists in corruption. The examination of personal readiness of the civil servants and the politicians to participate in corruption includes both sides. Would people pay a bribe if asked? Findings show that the majority of people (even those who have a principle position that corruption is unjustified) are prone under pressure of circumstances and in a situation where they have no other method to solve their problem unless to take part in corruption by paying a bribe. Only one-fifth would never pay a bribe; more from one half would not pay a bribe only if there is another way to solve their problem; one-fifth would pay if they had their own believes in this regard, under certain conditions and for lack of an alternative.

5.9 Consequences of Corruption in Bangladesh

The experience of civil servants and politicians regarding the practice of corruption includes a certain pressure from state employees to have bribes offered, or pressure exerted on state employees to accept a bribe. Findings demonstrate that, in general, the corruption pressure between people and public servants / politicians is moderate and more often implied than direct. Judging from answers of the respondents only in a small number of cases public servants overtly sought from them cash, gifts, or favors, but in a greater number of cases they demonstrated that they expect something like that. Corruption being performed by civil servants / politicians, therefore, is not so much a result of overt imposition, but of willing acceptance, motivated by an understanding that this is the most efficient way for accomplishing of their interests and needs.

Based on the survey results we can see that corruption is widely present and that it has become almost a public affair. This means that money or favors are sought or expected with no shame and fear. One can notice right away that bribery is present the most with administrations dealing with acquisition of building sites, or, for construction of temporary buildings. Then import-export licenses and obtaining of government contracts, and then for acquisition of telephone and electric power

services, tax administration, company registration, and approval of new sales prices. Interestingly, more corrupt are those services where the possibility of income for the private entrepreneur is greater. Corruption has spread so much that it became systemic it is built-in into the social-economic and the political system of Bangladesh.

Corruption inversely affects the service delivery as only who can afford to pay (bribes) gets services. Corruption increases cost of investment affects that adversely decreases businessperson's confidents. It also increase gap/ mistrust between Govt. and people. In the opinion of TIB on an average loss incurred by the Govt. for corruption is about 2.5-3% GDP. On the other hand, private sector's unofficial payments for getting things done – are an average 2.10% of total sales.

The effects of corruption on the economy can be seen from different perspectives. One of them is the decay of personality (producer of cultural and material values) and of democracy, both weakening human development. Other effects are purely on economic development: growth, consumption, investment.

As corruption is a fracture of economic ethics it would be accurate to analyze this phenomenon using approaches which treat market imperfection, since the trust of liberty and equity between partners is represented in economic theory and in neo-classical theory in particular, by market equilibrium. It is more difficult to analyze the consequences of corrupt transactions than of legal ones because corruption must be hidden from the public and because the partners of a corrupt agreement are linked to each other even after the bribery act.

More often in economic literature corruption is reduced to the misuse of public power for private benefit, involving or not money changing hands. In the last case the problem of corruption relates to profit sharing and to the effects that it has on the economic activity of different agents and on their incentives. Theories classify situations of corruption depending on beliefs about government ethic as benevolent, contested, or self-seeking, and often use the Principal-Agent model to formulate the bribery acting. The results become aware of model analysis with symmetric or asymmetric information that the government (Principal) and other contractual parties (Agents) have. Usually for certain situations resulting from bribery the balance

between costs and benefits are evaluated for each party, as well as the sum of losses and benefits of all participants, which is called traditionally the general welfare implication.

As a rule the authors in their models take into account that reducing corruption, detecting and punishing it or/and inducing agents to behave honestly, is costly to implement. In the case of "benevolent government" the act of corruption act may be blamed on a disobedient agent who is disloyal to rules and these acts have to do with misinformation.

Known consequences of this kind of corruption are usually: controls are avoided, inferior contractors selected, inefficient technologies applied, inappropriate public projects promoted, ineffective policies implemented, and investment projects of poor quality selected. Yet, Paul Romer (1994) suggested that corruption, as a tax on ex-post profits, may stimulate the entry of new goods or technology which requires an initial fixed-cost investment.

The model of "Contested government" describes usually the behaviour of an agent who has power but is not necessarily benevolent. Therefore, corruption can be a way to undermine the selection of the principal, or public income may be used for staying in power instead of further satisfaction of people's needs. "Contested government" reflects that the competition does not ensure that benevolent persons obtain the principal's position, or that competition enabled society to get malevolent principal but performing efficiently. Promoting corruption is often suggested so as to avoid corruption, since it may possibly provide a mechanism for discovering new alternatives. Although, the society that supports the achievement motivation as ethic value, grows more corrupted in the long run.

The economic agents may create a situation when rules in place do not prohibit the self-seeking behaviour of politicians. Corruption can even be the cause of laws designed with the intention of spreading the "self-seeking government's" ends. Such situations may occur when the government using its monopoly position distorts prices, creates tariffs favourable for firms with which it shares profits, restricts permits and licenses, creating in this way scarcity. Strong and stationary corrupt

government, called often "kleptocracy", can exercise the power consistent with certain interests of the population. Bribery can be analyzed in some cases as an alternative tax system, which may provide public good. On the contrary, big corrupt powers can transfer into foreign banks part of the national income or utilize it inappropriately.

Cross-section empirical studies provide evidence that different corrupt regimes have different influence on investment rates. When corruption is predictable, the impact on investment is relatively small because corruption risk can be insured. Certainly, the level of corruption matters also. Consequently, the countries with high levels of corruption and low predictability have as a rule huge problem in attracting foreign direct investment. Governance issues in the modern globalizing economy include issues of foreign direct investment and transfer of new technology. R&D activity is vulnerable where there is corruption because self-seeking government is not motivated by long-run returns and for this reason does not fund fundamental research.

At length, the credibility of agreements concerning intellectual property rights in the process of technology transference from one country to another determines the process of accumulation and the sustainability of world development. Using the knowledge gaps between the societies, the corrupt acts of governments consist either advertising forbidden technologies or consenting to transfer technologies of lower quality than those negotiated. The amount of bribery may reach the value of innovation or the cost of discovery.

5.10 Effective Ways to Combat Corruption

During the interview session we have asked the civil servants and the politicians about different measures to help fight corruption. Many of them have said that there is no easy or short-cut way to combat corruption. This is a very deep-rooted cross-cutting issue. It needs a rigorous research to know its features, causes and consequences. Then some of them have suggested a holistic approach that is social

and institutional reform movement to address it. According to their opinion, we have listed the measures which are shown in the table…….

Description of the Measures to Combat Corruption	Very Effective	Effective
Increase commitment by political and business leaders and civil servants to fight corruption and fraud. Form new policy to build a knowledge-based, skilled, high performing civil service and by implementing it.	√	
Increase salaries of government employees.	√	
An independent Anti-Corruption Commission (ACC) to address corruption .	√	
Greater access for citizens and news media to government information (including budgets).	√	
Schools placing more emphasis on moral values.	√	
Religious community placing greater emphasis on promoting moral values in everyday life.	√	
Greater transparency and accountability of over all government procedures.	√	
A single independent anti-corruption hotline dedicated to fight against corruption.	√	
Disclosure by top civil servants and politicians of all financial interests.	√	
Opposition parties and civil society acting as a "watchdog" of government activities.	√	
Increase the ability of parliament to oversee the activities of government.	√	
Create a national, non-statutory independent body to advise and co-ordinate the implementation of anti-corruption policies.	√	
More research on the causes, nature and extent of corruption.	√	
Codes of conduct to promote professional ethics in government.		√
A media campaign to raise public awareness of the extent and costs of corruption.		√
More resources to investigate and prosecute corruption cases.		√
Special anti-corruption courts.		√
Greater internal financial controls and internal audits of government spending.		√
Verifying qualifications of all potential appointees to the civil service.		√
Blacklisting businesses proved to be involved in corruption.		√

5.11 Role of the Civil Servants and the Politicians in Combating Corruption

Corruption, especially political and administrative corruption, has become a way to echelons of power. The Civil Servants and the Politicians are the most significant groups to address the number one problem, corruption, in Bangladesh. Most of the senior and experienced politicians and civil servants have said that if the political will can set against corruption, it is obvious that the problem will be automatically solved.

Some of the respondents have said that as the bearers and implementers of public offices they are involved in doing all sorts of state activities. If the heads remain corruption free, then they are followed by all their adherents in government offices as well as in politics. Some respondents believe that there are civil servants who consider themselves as service providers to the people. They follow the rules of business and do their duties for the people of the country. If all the civil servants fallow them, there will be no corruption in the public offices.

Some of them have viewed that a democratic political party rather than a government can address corruption effectively. Because once a particular party (based on ethics, norms and values) is committed to fight corruption, they can make some bright examples. If this committed political party takes power, they can play very important role to fight against corruption in the context of Bangladesh.

There is no doubt that the civil servants and the politicians, as the most powerful and dominating social elite of Bangladesh, are known as the sources of corruption and only they can play the vital role in combating corruption more considerately and efficiently.

Chapter 6

Analysis of the Findings

1. Bangladesh is a developing country, and by definition, poor. The state and the society both have to cope with severe socio-economic and political pressures, such as a chronic scarcity of resources, unpredictable political changes and needs associated, frequently, with post-colonial upheavals, as well as the intervention of outside influences which bring with them alien ideas and often alter the dynamics of the country. These circumstances, accompanied by wide disparities in income distribution and the needs of vast numbers of people who survive under conditions of extreme poverty, add special significance to the prevalence of corruption.

2. This study examines that there is always a thirst for an independent ACC to combat corruption in Bangladesh. We have failed to combat corruption due to weak institutional capacity. Bangladesh has been experiencing the absence of an independent anti-corruption authority to address corruption since our victory as a state.Even of late, the alliance government has formed an independent Anti-corruption Commission in the face of pressure by the donor agencies. **Anti-corruption Commission Bangladesh (ACC)** was created through an act promulgated on 23 February 2004 that into force on 9 May 2004. In November 21, 2004, the government of Bangladesh formed **Independent Anti-corruption Commission** dissolving the Bureau of Anti-corruption (BAC), the previous corruption watchdog. The Anti-corruption Commission (ACC) came into being with the promise to be fully independent entity. Since its formation, the Commission has failed to function effectively for the nation. People of Bangladesh also considered it as a government tool to take control over the matters of ruling party's interest. But it's true that ACC made a sensation and hope for the nation after February 2007. It has taken many positive steps. Corruptions of politicians, government servants/relevant authorities were reduced. Moreover, most of the allegations it made against influential persons, people of Bangladesh think it to be true or partly true. But as times go on it has been clear that it is not free from influence. Some of its action was usual, some were in good faith and some actions were to control politics and

politician. This double standard policy has made the Commission in question of its neutrality as well as its efficiency.The Anti-corruption Commission (ACC) formed in Bangladesh in 2004 has adequate investigation power but its autonomy is limited.It was thought that as the BAC worked under the Prime Minister's Office (PMO), corruption cases against favoured politicians and ministers have hardly been ever pursued. The newly formed Commission, which would work independently, was expected to free anti-corruption activities from the influence of the PMO and others.But in fact the Commission has failed to function effectively. Some recommendations are illustrated here to make the Commission effective.

- First of all the Anti-corruption Commissionshould not continue to be a tool of partisan politics. It should be free from the influence of the government in power while the commission deals with high profile and very sensitive cases.

- A consultative or advisory body may be formed comprising the members drawn from among the eminent and senior citizens, academics, researchers, civil society members has been recommended. The prime purpose of the body will be to provide broader social inputs on the issues and processes and offer technical submission for consideration of the commission on an occasional basis to make the commission effective.

- Strong emphasis should be given on the development of Management Information System (MIS) and computerization of data and information regarding case management and record keeping.

- Emphasis should be given on internal capacity for undertaking policy research, action research on various issues related to corruption and vigilance procedures.

- Creation of a new unit for public awareness and media communication for addressing corruption from the demand side of the problem is recommended.

- Special Investigation Unit (SIU) is recommended which will deal with high profile and very sensitive cases, under the direct supervision of the chairman of the commission.

- A group of skilled lawyers should be appointed to conduct the cases from the commission. A panel of lawyers would be formed to take legal support for conducting the cases of high profile, like PM, Cabinet Member, Judges and others.

There was confusion whether the Anti-corruption Commission would be able to perform its duty independently. It is really sad that the commission cannot do its job smoothly and independently. But the commission should be completely independent. The perception of the people as well as my own view is that the commission is not independent and has failed to achieve trust of the people, it could not fulfill expectation of the corruption-hit people of the country. Therefore, for the quest of a corruption free society, there is no other way but making ACC effective by tackling it from the influence of corrupted political system. Anti-corruption authority was seen with each new government dropping on-going cases against its own party members and launching new cases against members of the last government. Therefore, an independent anti-corruption organization is the demand of time always.

3.So much attention is paid to corruption in the developing world. In a climate of chronic scarcity in which a majority of the population lives under severe economic and social pressures, corruption is seen as an unforgivable waste, a squandering of the national wealth- especially by political leaders and public servants who are expected to devote their lives for the betterment of their country. While it may be argued that expectations like these seem to be unrealistic, because there are a host of personal and professional pressures on political leaders and public servants themselves (to be corrupt), and these are by no means negligible, it must be acknowledged that in the modern nation-state, the political leader and the public servant are expected to rise above their own problems and play a noble, even altruistic role.

4. Consequently, the impact of corruption in a developing country like Bangladesh will continue to be emphasized.

5.It is important, therefore, to locate the context in which corruption is a problem. In Bangladesh, corruption cannotbe 'absorbed' - as it appears to be, in developed societies- because of three basic reasons. First, as explained above, because it is located within the existing socio-economic and political conditions of poverty and social cleavages. Second, corruption is also located within the overall discourse on the subject and this discourse discourages the understanding of any other intellectual

framework as a rationale for social process and formation (in Bangladesh). Third, it has a serious, negative impact.

6.The aim of 'absorption' of corruption - i.e. to contain corruption to acceptable, tolerable levels - is no aim at all, because it advocates an abdication rather than a resolution of the problem. But neither can the aim of elimination of corruption be adopted without reservation because of the several problematic inherent in the term.

7. Corruption not only buries the country's image, but it also remains to be a stumbling block in the way to development of Bangladesh.

8.Using position while in power to grant undue favour and benefit to one's relatives, friends and key supporters is a hall-mark of politics in Bangladesh. Most of the rulers have been accused of either direct or indirect involvement in large-scale corruption.

9. This study has found that the civil servants have by and large become accustomed to live a life style far beyond their legal income. The citizens have accepted the stark reality that nothing moves without adequately satisfying the concerned civil servant.An opinion survey conducted in 1992 of household heads in Dhaka City found that 68.25% of respondents paid bribes to concerned officials to get services. Another finding of the survey reaffirmed the commonly held belief that the higher the level of bureaucracy the lower the frequency but higher the amount of bribe; and the lower the level of bureaucracy the higher the frequency but less the amount of bribe. One may ask the question as to why such large-scale administrative corruption exists. The reasons for such corruption can be summed up. First, civil servants involved in corrupt practices in most cases do not lose their jobs. Very rarely they are dismissed from service on charges pertaining to corruption. Still more rarely they are sent to prison for misusing public funds. They have never been compelled to return to the state their ill-gotten wealth. Second, people have a tendency not only to tolerate corruption but to show admiration to those civil servants who make a fortune through dubious means. The underlying assumption is that it does not matter how one has acquired wealth as long as he has done so. Third, it is easier for a citizen to get quick service because he has already paid the civil servant rather than wait for his turn. Fourth, there is now social acceptance of corruption by public officials. Fifth, barring

occasional public procurements, the representatives of the people, i.e. politicians in power, are unwilling to take effective measures to curb corrupt practices in public dealings.

10. The analysis of corruption is more successful while the less it depends on intuitions and judgments, and the more it builds on explicit statements about the conception of individual and of society. The analysis of individuals' moral motivations concerns also the consequences that these motivations can lead to the economy and the society.

CHAPTER 7

Conclusion

7.1 Concluding Notes

Perhaps there is no society beyond corruption from the beginning of the human society. It has grown parallel with the increase of social and political power, growth of bureaucracy and the meddling of the state in market transactions. The prime cause of corruption in Bangladesh is the abuse of power. The most outspread kind of corruption, according to the experience of civil servants and politicians, is in the acquisition of a building location, then during acquisition of import-export licenses, acquiring of government contracts, and acquisition of telephone and electric power services etc. Fighting corruption is not just law enforcement. Rather it is a reappraisal of the way we think and the way we act. No anti-corruption drive can succeed or survive without active support or participation of the people.

7.2 Recommendations

During the interview session we asked the civil servants and the politicians that people talk about different measures to help fight corruption. For each of the following proposals, please tell me whether you think it would be very effective, effective, not very effective, or not at all effective in fighting corruption. According to their opinion we have listed the measures which are effective.

  a) It is seen that there is lack of political and professional commitment among the politicians and the civil servants. Increased commitment by political leaders and civil servants is very effective to fight corruption and fraud.

  b) Government employees are ill-paid. Increment of the salaries of government employees may be very effective.

  c) Greater access for citizens and news media to government information (including budgets) would be very effective.

  d) A national anti-corruption hotline may be very effective.

e) During school education more emphasis should be given on moral values.

f) Religious community placing greater emphasis on promoting moral values in everyday life.

g) Greater transparency and accountability of over all government procedures.

h) A single independent agency (ACC) dedicated to fighting corruption

i) Disclosure by top civil servants and politicians of all financial interests

j) Opposition parties and civil society acting as a "watchdog" of government activities

k) Increase the ability of parliament to oversee the activities of government

l) Create a national, non-statutory independent body to advise and co-ordinate the implementation of anti-corruption policies

m) More research on the causes, nature and extent of corruption

n) Codes of conduct to promote professional ethics in government.

o) A media campaign to raise public awareness of the extent and costs of corruption.

p) More resources to investigate and prosecute corruption cases.

q) Special anti-corruption courts.

r) Greater internal financial controls and internal audits of government spending.

s) Verifying qualifications of all potential appointees to the civil service.

t) Business leaders or firms are often involved in corruption. Blacklisting businesses proved to be involved in corruption.

In addition, to prevent corruption from our society we can introduce the following mechanisms:

- People in Bangladesh spend money or contribute to party funds not out of a sense of commitment to healthy democratic politics. Money is spent by candidates or provided by contributors chiefly because they expect something in return. Both civil servants and politicians said that Greater transparency of political party finances is very effective to address corruption.

- Generating social movement on curbing corruption: here Govt. along with all party politicians, TIB, NGO's --- all these organizations have to play a combined role to create awareness among people to fight against corruption.

- Introducing the spirit of sacrifice instead of consumerism in the mind of people. These can be done by stimulating moral and social values through education can culture.

- Ensuring social and economic security of people. State should provide guarantee of food, cloth, housing, health care and education facilities. By eradicating poverty from society, it possible to eliminate corruption up to an acceptable level.

- Rationalizations pay structure for Govt. Servant. Salary should be service delivery oriented. Better delivery of services, more financial commission for provider(Govt. servant)

- Enforcing ACC laws strictly without any favoritism, political influences. Proper punishment to corrupt person and reward to honest employees must be ensured.

- Introducing citizen charter and enforcement of conduct rules in every public and private organization. Private entrepreneur must have to show commodities buying and selling prices for the consumers.

- Office discipline, accountability and transparency should ensure.

- Establishing insulated bureaucracy to combat against corruption. Political influence free, unbiased and neutral functioning of bureaucracy is needed.

- To wake up people, resist corruption by boycotting corrupt person in the society. Ensuring severe punishment of corrupt person through court that will provide an environment in society where people will fear to adopt any unfair means.

- Comprehensive law and a commission needed for ensuring transparency and accountability of NGO's sector. To prevent fund embezzlement in NGO's , how much money given by donor agencies must be informed to subscribers.

- To prevent massive corruption of Multinational Companies ---- project proposals, Tender documents, Treaty or production sharing treaty(in case of gas companies like Chevron, Oxidental, NIKO, Shell oil) should be formulate

more transparent way with the consultation of experts & stakeholders with proper focusing in media.

- To prevent huge sums of corruption in defense related contracts---- more transparency should upheld. Defense purchase must be taken under public audits. PPR-2008 should be followed in all types of defense purchase

- Develop arrangement for using ICT, digital, online and all categories of automation system in custom, tax, port to prevent corruption in these sectors.

- Combating corruption calls for a range of actions that go far beyond the passing laws or the pronouncement of policies. It requires establishment of good governance at all level of the society. Introducing good governance needs an effective strategy to address corruption. The following five key elements of an anticorruption strategy may guide us to the ways of fighting corruption.

| Figure 9.1 | nents of an Anticorruption Strategy

1. **Move from denial to acceptance of the problem and build a board agreement among policy makers and key stakeholders**
   - Undertake analytical and diagnostic work to identify the causes of the problem, its severity and effects, and the political cost of maintaining the status quo
   - Consult on the diagnosis to create an authorizing environment for implementation of the strategy
   - Disseminate diagnostic information without blaming the actors
   - Launch a communication campaign with strong and visible involvement of senior politicians

2. **Build a coalition**
   - Ensure buy-in by utility management and employees by addressing employee issues
   - Secure employee commitment to reforms
   - Improve customer service by establishing effective customer support centers
   - Reduce the political cost of reform through better-targeted, transparent, judicious, and equitable enforcement
   - Ensure that service improvements preside tariff adjustments
   - Engage in meaningful consultation with and participation of civil society

3. **Improve utility business processes**
   - Simplify and codify procedures
   - Introduce modern technology in selected areas
   - Foster efficiency and effectiveness of customer service and compliance with services standards
   - Make procurement transparent

4. **Strengthen institutional mechanism for accountability**
   - Separate commercial from regulatory functions
   - Strengthen audit and internal integrity units
   - Prosecute offenders in courts and confiscate their illegal gains

5. **Encourage public participation**
- Sponsor open discussions on all important matters
- Institutionalize user surveys
- Put in place a mechanism to redress public grievances
- Implement an effective "right to information" program
- Persuade client governments to adopt reforms suited to their countries

Source: The Many Faces of Corruption, Edited by-J.EdgardoCampos& Sanjay Pradhan, P-138

In fine we want to place a bright example of a successful government initiative with thesupport of WB's IRP project to fight corruption at the beginning of 1998 in Bolivia. The Bolivian Government designed a comprehensive governance reform program, called the NIP.The following figure illustrates the NIP initiative—

FIGURE 9.2   **The NIP**

Source: Leyton and Matsuda (2004).

After completing the review, the government announced its strategy for fighting corruption. The president himself presented the NIP. The NIP was formulated as a long-term strategy to address structural issues in the public administration arena. By this initiative, the people of Bolivia got served highly through the fight against corruption. At present whether the economy is poor or rich has to fight in the same cage of free market with super economic power like USA, Japan, and S. Korea. Unfortunately, in an open and capitalist economy corruption is inevitable. In capitalistic economy, black money drives away white money.

Since, intuition is a type of knowledge about fact, not about values, corruption needs to be scrutinized from the point of view of social ethics, and the science that enquires what should be done in Bangladeshi society. Ethical progress consists in replacing irrational views by rational ones, prejudice by judgment and emotion by reason. To analyze corruption is a circumstance to reflect on: the value of liberties, the dimension of needs, the reason for inequalities, and the logic of accountability and responsibility. Therefore, making a society free from corruption is really very difficult and possible all measures should be taken against corruption to reduce up to tolerable limit.

7.3 Policy Implications of the Study

This study has explored different aspects of corruption. The findings have identified the areas where further improvements are required for combating corruption and making a corruption free society. This study may lead to the development of a pragmatic guideline for the Civil Servants and the Politicians who are known as major sources of corruption in Bangladesh. Therefore, it is hoped that an in-depth research based on the study can be commissioned.

7.4 Scope for Future Research

We have reviewed national and international literatures on Corruption to do this study.We havestayedaware about the selection and review of literature. Some major findings are illustrated which are more relevant with corruption in Bangladesh among the studied literatures. The study may be useful to the academics, scholars and other researchers. The study may validate the existing literature on policy implementation and/or generate new insights in this field that may help to supplement the knowledge of different stakeholders in general and policy researchers in particular. The present study, therefore, is an attempt to analyze the extent of corruption in Bangladesh. In this endeavor an attempt is made to determine the factors that inhibit and facilitate reform measures to combat corruption.

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APPENDICES

Appendix 1: **Table given below shows the details about the participants of the study (The Politicians and the Civil Servants).**

A. Politicians

SN.	DESIGNATION / JOB TITLE	ORGANIZATION / DEPARTMENT
01	Ministers (3 Persons)	Ministry of Commerce, Ministry of Education, Ministry of Home Affairs
02	Ex-Minister	Ex-Minister, Ministry of Agriculture
03	Member of Parliament	Chairman, Parliamentary Standing Committee on Ministry of Education
04	Member of Parliament	Chairman, Parliamentary Standing Committee on Ministry of Post and Telecommunication
05	Member of Parliament (2 Persons)	Member, Presidium, BangladeshAwami League
06	Member of Parliament	BangladeshJatio Party
07	Joint Secretary General	In charge of Office Secretary, Bangladesh Nationalist Party (BNP)
08	President	District Awami League, Gopalganj
09	President	District Amir, Jama-E-Islam, Gopalganj
10	General Secretary	District BNP, Gopalganj
11	Mayor	Mayor Office, GopalganjMunicipality
12	Counselor	Pannel Counselor, GopalganjMunicipality
13	Counselor	Counselor, Ward 7,8 & 9 of GopalganjMunicipality
14	Counselor	Counselor, Ward 5 of GopalganjMunicipality
15	Counselor	Counselor, Ward 8 of GopalganjMunicipality
16	Counselor	Counselor, Ward 9 of GopalganjMunicipality

17	P A to Mayor	GopalganjMunicipality
18	UpazilaChairman	SadarUpazilaParishad, Gopalganj
19	UpazilaVice-Chairman	SadarUpazilaParishad, Gopalganj
20	Union Parishad Chairman	Ulpur Union Parishad, GP
21	Union Parishad Chairman	Latifpur Union Parishad, GP
22	Union Parishad Chairman	Gobra Union Parishad, GP
23	Member (Female)	1,2 &3 No. Gobra Union Parishad, GP
24	Member (Female)	4, 5 & 6 No. Gobra Union Parishad, GP
25	Member (Female)	7, 8 & 9 No. Gobra Union Parishad, GP
26	Member (Male-8 Persons)	20 No. Gobra Union Parishad, GP
27	Thana Level Leaders (16 persons)	Different Thana Level Political Parties

B. Civil Servants

SN.	DESIGNATION / JOB TITLE	ORGANIZATION / DEPARTMENT
01	Secretary	Ministry of Finance
02	Secretary-in-Charge	Ministry of Communication
03	Joint Secretary	Ministry of Housing & Public Works
04	Deputy Secretary (RAJUK)	Ministry of Housing & Public Works
05	Deputy Secretary (Others)	Ministry of Housing & Public Works
06	Secretary to the Finance Secretary	Ministry of Finance
07	Sr. Asst. Secretary	Ministry of Housing & Public Works
08	Sr. Asst. Secretary	Finance Division, Ministry of Finance
09	Sr. Asst. Secretary	Ministry of Housing & Public Works
10	Asst. Secretary	Ministry of Housing & Public Works
11	Deputy Commissioner	Detective Branch, Dhaka (South)
12	Deputy Commissioner	Kotoyali, Dhaka
13	Deputy Commissioner	Gopalganj
14	ADC (General)	DC Office, Dhaka
15	ADC (General)	DC Office, Gopalganj
16	Police Superintendent (SP)	Gopalganj
17	UNO	NoakhaliSadar, Noakhali
18	UNO	UNO Office, GopalganjSadar
19	Asst. Superintendent of Police (2 Persons)	Dhaka Metropolitan Police Head Quarter
20	Officer –in-Charge	Tejgaon Thana, DMP
21	Head Asst.	DC Office, Gopalganj
22	Office Asst.	AC Land , DC Office, Gopalganj
23	Office Asst (3 Persons)	Registration Office, DC Office, Gopalganj
24	Office Asst.	District Magistrate / DC Office, Gopalganj
25	KGO	DC Office, Gopalganj

26	Asst. Engineer, BSIC	DC Office, Gopalganj
27	UDA (3 Persons)	DC Office, Gopalganj
28	Surveyor	DC Office, Gopalganj
29	Treasurer	DC Office, Gopalganj
30	Secretary	Mayor Office, Gopalganj
31	Accountant	Mayor Office, Gopalganj
32	UDA	UNO Office, GopalganjSadar
33	Process Surveyor (2 Persons)	UNO Office, GopalganjSadar
34	Office boy	UNO Office, GopalganjSadar
35	O/A (5 Persons)	UNO Office, GopalganjSadar
36	Upazila Education Officer	GopalganjSadar
37	Upazila Secondary Education Officer	UNO Office, GopalganjSadar
38	Service Officer	Upazila Secondary Education Office
39	Field Assistant (2)	Upazila Fishery Office, Gp
40	Secretary	Gobra Union Parishad, GopalganjSadarUpazial
41	Dofadar	Gobra Union Parishad, GopalganjSadarUpazial
42	Chokidar	Gobra Union Parishad, GopalganjSadarUpazial
43	Inspector	RAJUK

Appendix 2: Questionnaire (Civil Servants)

The purpose of this interview:

The purpose of this interview is to draw the perceptions of the Civil Servants on corruption. Besides, this study aims to know about the factors responsible for corruption, the nature of it and possible or effective remedies to root out corruption in Bangladesh.

I wish to remind you that information gathered from this interview is strictly confidential and no answer given by an individual can be identified. Further, it is mentioned that information provided by you will exclusively be used for the research purpose.

Sex .....…………………….………   Age......…………........................
Education …………………….…   Designation…………...................
Year of service……………………..

Please read the following questions carefully. Tick one out of the given choice which you deem most appropriate and please write your opinion in the given space as needed.

Questions to be asked:

Q1. Do you think that *Civil Servants* are involved in corruption?

Yes
No

 If no, please tell us why do you think so.

………………………………………………………………………………………
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If yes, please give your opinion on the following questions in brief.

………………………………………………………………………………………
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Q2. Would you please give your opinion on the following questions:

(a) What do you think is the MAIN causes of corruption in Bangladeshi in general?

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(b) Please rank the causes of Corruption in Bangladesh (by civil servants).

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Q3. Please assess the level of involvement –

High
Medium
Low

Q4. Provide your opinion on whether the government has sufficient resources to fight corruption?

1   Enough resources

2   Needs a little more resources

3   Needs a lot more

4   Haven't you heard enough about this to have an opinion?

Q5. How committed do you think the government is to fight corruption? Would you say that it is...?

1	Very committed
2	Committed
3	Not very committed
4	Not at all committed
5	Did not answer

Q6. In your opinion, how effectively the government is combating corruption?

1   Very effectively

2   Fairly effectively

3   Not very effectively

4   Not at all effectively

5   Did not answer

Please give reasons in favour of your answer:

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Q7. Rank the following list of ministries, departments and agencies in order of their involvement in corruption.

1   Culture and Technology
2   Customs and Excise
3   Defense
4   Education
5   Environment/Conservation/National Parks
6   Finance
7   Foreign Affairs/Embassies/Consulates
8   Health
9   Home Affairs/Passports
10   Housing
11   Justice/Attorney Generals
12   Public Service and Administration
13   Public Works
14   Police/ Safety and Security
15   Trade & Commerce
16   Welfare and Population Development
17   Other (SPECIFY, ease)…………………………………………………
18   Don't know

Q8. In your opinion, which one is the most important case of bureaucratic corruption in recent time (last 10 years) in Bangladesh?

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Q9. We would like to read you a list of statements concerning corruption in government. For each, please tell us whether you strongly agree, agree, neither nor disagree, disagree, or strongly disagree.

	Strongly agree	*Agree*	**Disagree**	**Strongly disagree**
Government officials are so poorly paid that they have no choice but to ask people for extra payments				
Paying bribes to government officials or doing favours for them helps overcome the red tape of bureaucracy and makes it easier to get things done				
Democratic systems of government increased the amount of corruption in a country				
Liberal economic policies adopted by the government contribute to increasing level of corruption.				

Q10. In your opinion, how effective is the Anti Corruption Commission (ACC)?

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Q11. People talk about different measures to help fight corruption. For each of the following proposals, please tell us whether you think it would be very effective, effective, not very effective, or not at all effective in fighting corruption.

Please mark *v e* for very **effective,***e* for **effective**, *n v e* for **not very effective** and n *a e* for **not at all effective**.

Role of the following in fighting corruption	Very Effective	Effective	Not very effective	Not all effective
media				
professional ethics in government				
political leaders' commitment				
moral values				
religious values				
increased fund/more resources to investigate and prosecute corruption cases				
independent ACC				
special anti-corruption courts				
national anti-corruption hotline				
increasing salaries of government employees				

Up holding transparency and accountability				
parliamentary committee to oversee the activities of government				

Q12. Civil servants found guilty of corruption and fraud could face a number of situations. Which one of the following do you think is the most appropriate?

1   Lose their jobs and go to prison
2   Lose their jobs and have to pay a fine
3   Lose their jobs only
4   It depends on the nature of corruption
5   There should be no penalty for this
6   Don't know

13. How does a civil servant feel when he offers bribe in cash or a gift to a clerk to get the things done?

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Q14. In near future, do you expect levels of corruption is going to—

1   Increase

2   Stay about the same

3   Decrease

4   Don't know

Please explain also why do you think so?

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Q15. What are the most *effective ways* to combat corruption in Bangladesh?

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Q16. Do you think *Civil Servants* can play important role to address corruption in Bangladesh?

Yes
No

If yes, how civil servants can play role to tackle corruption in Bangladesh?

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Thank you for the time and input provided during this interview.

Appendix 3: Questionnaire (For Politicians)

The purpose of this interview:

The purpose of this interview is to draw the perceptions of the Politicians on corruption. Besides, this study aims to know about the factors responsible for corruption, the nature of it and possible or effective remedies to root out corruption in Bangladesh.

I wish to remind you that information gathered from this interview is strictly confidential and no answer given by an individual can be identified. Further, it is mentioned that information provided by you will exclusively be used for the research purpose.

Sex .....…………………………...   Age.....……………………………..

Education …………………….…   Designation…………........................

Year of service……………………..

Please read the following questions carefully. Tick one out of the given choices which you deem most appropriate and please write your opinion in the given space as needed.

Questions to be asked:

Q1. Do you think that *Politicians* are involved in corruption?

Yes
No

   If no, please tell us why do you think so.

……………………………………………………………………………………………

……………………………………………………………………………………………

If yes, please give your opinion on the following questions in brief.

……………………………………………………………………………………………………

…………………………………………………………..

Q2. Would you please give your opinion on the following questions:

(a) What do you think are the MAIN causes of corruption in Bangladeshi in general?

……………………………………………………………………………………………………

……………………………………………………………………………………………………

……………………………………………………………………………………………………

(b) Please rank the causes of Corruption in Bangladesh (by politicians).

……………………………………………………………………………………………………

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……………………...……………………………………………………………………………

Q3. Please assess the level of involvement –

| High |
| Medium |
| Low |

Q4. Provide your opinion on whether the government has sufficient resources to fight corruption?

1   Enough resources

2   Needs a little more resources

3   Needs a lot more

4   Haven't you heard enough about this to have an opinion?

Q5. How committed do you think the government is to fight corruption? Would you say that it is...?

1	Very committed
2	Committed
3	Not very committed
4	Not at all committed
5	Did not answer

Q6. In your opinion, how effectively the government is combating corruption?

1   Very effectively

2   Fairly effectively

3   Not very effectively

4   Not at all effectively

5   Did not answer

Please give reasons in favour of your answer:

…………………………………………………………………………………………

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Q7. Rank the following list of ministries, departments and agencies in order of their involvement in corruption.

1   Culture and Technology
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3   Defense
4   Education
5   Environment/Conservation/National Parks
6   Finance
7   Foreign Affairs/Embassies/Consulates
8   Health
9   Home Affairs/Passports
10   Housing
11   Justice/Attorney Generals
12   Public Service and Administration
13   Public Works
14   Police/ Safety and Security
15   Trade & Commerce
16   Welfare and Population Development
17   Other (SPECIFY, ease)………………………………………………
18   Don't know

Q8. In your opinion, which one is the most important case of political corruption in recent time (last 10 years) in Bangladesh?

……………………………………………………………………………………………

……………………………………………………………………………………………

……………………………………………………………………………………………

Q9. We would like to read you a list of statements concerning corruption in government. For each, please tell us whether you strongly agree, agree, neither nor disagree, disagree, or strongly disagree.

	Strongly agree	*Agree*	**Disagree**	**Strongly disagree**
Government officials are so poorly paid that they have no choice but to ask people for extra payments				
Paying bribes to politicians as tadbir for making personal gain increases corruption dreadfully				
Democratic systems of government increased the amount of corruption in a country				
Liberal economic policies adopted by the government contribute to increasing level of corruption				

Q10. In your opinion, how effective is the Anti Corruption Commission (ACC)?

……………………………………………………………………………………………

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……………………………………………………………………………………………

Q11. People talk about different measures to help fight corruption. For each of the following proposals, please tell us whether you think it would be very effective, effective, not very effective, or not at all effective in fighting corruption.

Please mark *v e* for very **effective,** *e* for **effective**, *n v e* for **not very effective** and n *a*

e for **not at all effective**.

Role of the following in fighting corruption	Very Effective	Effective	Not very effective	Not all effective
media				
professional ethics in government				
commitment of political leaders				
moral values				
religious values				
increased fund/more resources to investigate and prosecute corruption cases				
independent ACC				
special anti-corruption courts				
national anti-corruption hotline				
increasing salaries of government employees				

up holding transparency and accountability				
parliamentary committee to oversee the government activities				

Q12. Politicians found guilty of corruption and fraud could face a number of situations. Which one of the following do you think is the most appropriate?

1 Lose their jobs and go to prison
2 Lose their jobs and have to pay a fine
3 Lose their jobs only
4 It depends on the nature of corruption
5 There should be no penalty for this
6 Don't know

13. How does a politician feel when he offers bribe in cash or a gift to a clerk to get the things done?

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Q14. In near future, do you expect levels of corruption is going to—

1 Increase
2 Stay about the same
3 Decrease
4 Don't know

Please explain also why do you think so?

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Q15. What are the most *effective ways* to combat corruption in Bangladesh?

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Q16. Do you think *Politicians* can play important role to address corruption in Bangladesh?

Yes
No

If yes, how politicians can play role to tackle corruption in Bangladesh?

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Thank you for the time and input provided during this interview.